Location Matters: The Politics of Refugee Camp Placement

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Abstract

Border refugee camps sometimes provoke cross-border attacks, often destroy potentially productive land, and may introduce disease or other public health problems into the refugee recipient country population. Yet countries frequently choose to set up border camps in response to refugee flows. On domestic grounds alone, it appears that border refugee camps are often suboptimal. Why, then, are border refugee camps so common? This article explores cases of refugee policy selection in East Africa. It develops a theoretical model for refugee policy selection and an explanation for why border camps are so common. Countries choosing refugee policy are considering not only their domestic concerns, but also their foreign policy aims. Border refugee camps help a rebel group primarily by making recruitment and maintenance of forces easier. As such, a border refugee camp is a provision of technology to a rebel group. It constitutes a quiet, subtle intervention into a neighboring country’s civil war. In cases in East Africa, refugee recipient countries have had success with helping the rebel group to extract concessions at the bargaining table. They provide technology to a rebel group, improving the rebel group’s bargaining position, and may help to bring about a peace agreement and resolution to the refugee crisis. In addition, the theory has clear implications for policy. Refugee settlements that are further from the border, are less densely populated, and have fewer quality potential recruits are less useful to rebel groups and therefore less likely to provoke attack.


1 Introduction

In the 1990s, Burundi’s internal instability devolved into a violent civil war. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Tanzania. Tanzania received refugees and with international assistance set up a series of camps along the border with Burundi. Within in a few years of the outbreak of civil war, hundreds of thousands of refugees were clustered there, some a close as 15 km from Burundi. The camps were a source of hostility between Burundi and Tanzania. Burundi claimed that Tanzania was harboring rebels in the camps. Twice the camps’ location resulted in militarized disputes between Tanzania and Burundi. Throughout Burundi’s civil war, Tanzania insisted that rebels were not in the camps, and perhaps ironically, hosted talks among the rebel leaders and the Burundian government in search of a negotiated settlement to end the civil war. Tanzania had the opportunity to revisit the location of camps several times over the course of the civil war in Burundi, but maintained Burundian camps very close to the border. This decision was at odds with the preferences of the international humanitarian community and was also a departure from Tanzania’s previous handling of refugees.

These camps clustered very close to Burundi stand in contrast to several similar crises and the corresponding refugee policies. In 1972 and 1973, Tanzania had received Burundian refugees and found itself similarly at odds with Burundi. Tanzania moved the Burundian refugees into settlements far into the interior (100 km from the border). This move de-escalated the international dispute, and within a handful of years, these settlements were self-sufficient. In 1993, Tanzania received Burundian refugees and similarly planned to move them away from the frontier. This proved unnecessary because most of these refugees quickly returned home.

Toward the beginning of the refugee influx from Burundi, Tanzania also had a large refugee population from Mozambique. Most of these refugees lived dispersed in the countryside. In 1996 and 1997, refugees arrived in Tanzania from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and camps were built for them, each more than 100km from the DRC. While close to the Burundian camps, these Congolese camps were actually further away from Burundi than most of the Burundian camps. None of these alternative policies were responded to with armed attacks.
If Tanzania’s previous experience with refugees suggested that densely populated camps close to the Burundian border provoked attacks, why would they have insisted on maintaining such camps, again? It is especially odd, as Tanzania hosted peace negotiations for Burundi, and the first President of Tanzania served as the mediator, backed as a neutral party by the international community. Tanzania could have reasonably moved Burundians to other areas as they had in the 1970s, allowed them to disperse throughout Western Tanzania as they were with the Mozambican crisis, or even used the sites they selected for the Congolese for Burundians instead. All of these options would have limited the extent to which Burundi could claim rebels were using the camps. From the humanitarian community’s perspective, any one of these options would have been preferable.

This article investigates the policy that Tanzania chose during the Burundian civil war in the 1990s: long term, densely populated, strictly enforced camps at the border (border camps). This refugee policy is remarkable because it has importance for international politics. Tanzania maintained this policy because it was a strategic choice to facilitate the rebel cause and ultimately push for regime change in Burundi. Border refugee camps can provide improved efficiency to a rebel group in a civil war. This efficiency translates into more effective fighting and a better bargaining position in a negotiated settlement. Also, since domestic politics can drive refugee policy selection, a border refugee camp’s purpose can be ambiguous from the vantage of the international community. An asylum country can choose a refugee policy—border camps—that still appears humanitarian, invites international aid, and helps persuade an antagonistic neighbor to bargain with a rebel group.

The argument advanced in this article is an unexplored but natural extension of work on transnational civil war and refugee policy selection in the developed and developing world. An expanding literature in transnational civil war examines the interactions between non-state actors, like rebel groups, when they cross borders.1 Another literature examines how states interact when one state cannot control the actors who cross borders.2 This article asks how a receiving country might strategically respond to rebel groups in a neighboring country and examines the implications

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1. Weiner 1996; Gleditsch 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008; Salehyan 2009
2. Schultz 2010; Carter 2012; Bapat 2014
for refugee policy, war, and peace.

Refugee policy and forced migration in the developed world has been examined through the lens of strategic foreign policy. I build on this work and argue that foreign policy aims influence the refugee policies of developing countries. Lower capacity operates as a constraint on the strategic choices, but does not eliminate strategic behavior entirely. Many studies of refugee policy focus on whether or not refugees are placed in camps, the degree of openness of a country’s asylum policy, and the welfare consequences of these choices. While international aid and regional relations play a role, this literature has mostly focused on the internal objectives of government, be they helping a regime survive, satisfying a constituency, or ensuring security and economic stability within the country.

These studies of camps and asylum policy reveal a host of factors related to refugee policy selection. Drawing on the correlates of refugee policy selection, I develop a positive theory to explain border camps. I theorize that refugee policy, motivated in part by foreign policy objectives, is the strategic choice on the part of an asylum country to intervene (or not) in a neighboring country. In this article I employ an Analytic Narrative approach\(^3\) to investigate refugee camp location. I analyze two East African countries’ refugee policies during the 1990s. I model refugee policy selection by drawing on insights into the foreign policy implications of border refugee camps and their alternatives in these cases. Incorporating the strategic value of refugee policy into the model helps to explain why border camps are frequently the refugee policy chosen. In line with the Analytic Narrative approach, I draw out generalized implications of the model and explore alternative explanations. Importantly, the model subsumes previous accounts of refugee policy selection by incorporating both domestic and foreign policy considerations into the policy selection. Ultimately the analysis suggests factors that can limit the importance of border camps in ongoing civil war. When camps along a border are driven by domestic concerns, or if an asylum country determines as a war changes that the camp is no longer a strategic asset, the model suggests ways of decreasing the value of the border camp. Border camps will be strategically less useful
when they are further from the relevant border or from easy transit, when they spread refugees out across a larger area, creating less dense settlements, and when they house fewer prime recruits.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I describe the kind of problem that border refugee camps are solving for asylum countries. Second, I situate this article in the context of scholarly work on refugee policy and the international relations of civil war. Third, I develop the two cases. Fourth, I present a model of refugee policy selection. Fifth, I analyze implications of the model. I conclude with alternative explanations and policy implications.

2 Pushing for Regime Change

Border refugee camps solve a foreign policy problem for asylum countries when the asylum country favors a regime change in a neighboring country. Border camps help rebel groups to recruit and maintain forces more easily. Rebel groups in and around East Africa fight with ground forces, small arms, and a range of guerrilla and terrorist-style tactics. Thus, their ability to recruit and maintain forces is of critical importance. Recruiting more efficiently directly impacts how efficiently the group fights.

Refugee camps host a large pool of potential recruits, all in a single, concentrated location. For rebel groups that use child soldiers, a refugee camp is all the more useful. The group need not search through villages and towns for children to abduct or coerce into fighting. Rather, the rebel group can go to a single location and have a pool of tens of thousands—more, if recruiting children—from which they can select new soldiers.4

Furthermore, maintaining fighters is easier with access to a refugee camp. Refugee camps generally have health services on site and receive regular distributions of food aid. Fighters can use health services or steal medical supplies. They can steal, tax, or even register as refugees to take advantage of regular distribution of food aid.5

Analytically, two features make a border refugee camp more useful to the rebel group: the

closeness to the border and the concentration of prime recruits. If a refugee camp is very far from where rebels are fighting, smuggling new recruits can be very costly or impractical. When the camp is near the border, rebel fighters access the camp and return to the front lines far more easily. Furthermore, if a refugee camp were full of very young children and people who were too elderly to fight, then it would be of little use. However, the more adolescent or young adult men in the camp, the better recruiting ground the camp is.

Border camps can be an asylum country’s quiet intervention into a neighboring country’s civil war. Since a border refugee camp improves how efficiently a rebel group fights by helping the group to recruit easily, the camp can help the rebel group improve their position in the war. They may therefore be able to control more territory or exact more concessions at the bargaining table. Getting regime change through negotiation may be optimal for the asylum country. Unlike more overt interventions, the asylum country can rely on some ambiguity in the purpose of the refugee camp from the perspective of the international community. By claiming that the placement of the camp is driven by domestic politics, the asylum country can still invite humanitarian funding for the refugee camp, claim neutrality in the matter of the civil war, and push for a negotiated settlement.

In sum, in a civil war, the border refugee camp makes recruiting and maintaining rebel forces easier. The rebel group fights better, and is more likely to win the war or is able to demand more concessions. Even though a refugee camp has a humanitarian purpose, when rebels have easy access to the camp, it becomes strategically useful. Recognizing this, an asylum country may choose to offer improved efficiency to the rebel group, as third parties provide resources to rebel groups.

From the perspective of the asylum country, the border refugee camp can be strategically useful in broader international politics. There is a critical difference between offering access to a refugee camp and providing resources directly to the rebel group or providing a rear base of operation: ambiguity. Providing resources or a base of operation unambiguously draws the asylum country into the civil war on the side of the rebel group. In the case of the refugee camp, it may be clear
to the government in the country of origin that a border refugee camp is making their fight harder; however, the camp’s use, purpose, and reason can be ambiguous to the international community. Since a refugee camp is humanitarian, the asylum country can invite funding from international donors. Because domestic costs can be a determining factor in camp location, the asylum country can claim that their policy is to appease domestic constituents. The situation is ideal if the asylum country prefers to pursue marginal changes in regime at the negotiating table rather than be drawn into a costly international conflict.

3 International Relations, Refugees and War

The argument advanced in this article builds on work on transnational civil war and refugee policy among developed countries. The strategic context is similar to work that examines how dynamics among states in the presence of non-state armed actors gives rise to interstate disputes. However, my goal is to explain refugee policy, rather than interstate disputes, and I gain some traction on incentives in bargaining during war. The theory builds on insights from a broader set of transnational interactions around civil war, including intervention. Particularly, the theory contributes to the literature on how refugees and transnational rebel groups spread civil war and spur interventions and interstate disputes. I add to the understanding of transnational civil war by examining the agency of asylum countries and their objectives in an intervention in civil war through the strategic placement of refugee camps.

The literature on transnational civil war and refugees has yet to carefully consider the agency of the asylum country. By contrast, earlier works explore broad trends and the systemic conditions under which countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia have faced so much refugee-generating civil war. Scholars observe that refugee-receiving countries necessarily play a role in this. These

10. Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1992
scholars and others examine migration as a strategic tool of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{11} This work develops how asylum countries use migration policy strategically, although in the context of great power politics and proxy wars. I argue that despite the limited material capacity of developing countries, their refugee policy can also be motivated by foreign policy aims.

Many studies of refugee policy focus on whether or not refugees are placed in camps,\textsuperscript{12} the degree of openness of a country’s asylum policy,\textsuperscript{13} and the welfare consequences of these choices.\textsuperscript{14} From this collection of work and discussion, a number of correlates of refugee policy openness can be drawn. These include seeking aid, regional relationships, and size and scope of the crisis, but otherwise are fundamentally about politics internal to the country, including regime survival, internal security and stability, xenophobia, and addressing domestic constituencies. In reviews of refugee policy that focus on Africa, scholars note asylum countries’ interest in supporting broader pan-African goals like decolonization.\textsuperscript{15} Fundamentally though, the literature searches for reasons in the domestic context of a crisis for the refugee policy selected and notes trends over time. It cites domestic pressure when residents grow tired of hosting refugees or are overwhelmed in numbers and issues like local security and environmental degradation as the reasons for changes in policy. This literature clearly views refugee policy as domestic, not foreign, policy.\textsuperscript{16}

4 The Cases: Refugee Policy in Tanzania and Kenya

To ground a theory of refugee policy selection, I study Kenya and Tanzania and in particular, two refugee arrivals in each country at roughly the same time. In Kenya, I examine refugee arrivals from Sudan and Somalia beginning in the early 1990s. In Tanzania, I look at refugee arrivals from Mozambique and Burundi beginning in the late 1980s. Figure 1 displays a map of Africa with these countries noted.

\begin{itemize}
\item Zolberg 1988; Greenhill 2010.
\item Borght and Philips 1995; Dualeh 1995; Jacobsen and Jeff 1998
\item Jacobsen 1996; Milner 2009
\item Kok 1989; Whitaker 2002
\item Rutinwa 2002b.
\item Crisp 2000; Rutinwa 2002a, 2002b; Kamanga 2002.
\end{itemize}
Figure 1: Map of African Countries Referenced in Case Studies
These cases are analytically useful for two reasons. First, they allow me to set aside two often-cited considerations for refugee policy selection: changes over time and the size of the population. All of these cases begin within a decade of one another. Further, all of these arrivals are fairly large, ranging from more than 50,000 to around 500,000. Because they occur at roughly the same time and are generally considered large crises, I can focus on how domestic and foreign policy considerations drive variation in the refugee policy.\textsuperscript{17}

The second reason these cases are analytically useful is because the foreign policy context of each is separable from the others. Regional geopolitical goals are driving Kenya and Tanzania in each of the four sets of arrivals, but the referent region is distinct. Tanzania-Burundi relations are in the context of East and Central Africa, while Tanzania-Mozambique relations are in the context of Southern Africa. Similarly, Kenya-Somalia relations are squarely in the context of the Horn of Africa. Kenya-Sudan relations are more complex, but because of the rebel group’s origins and orientation, the geopolitics Kenya is concerned with have to do with East Africa.\textsuperscript{18}

Within the four refugee policy responses, there are two critical features of the policy—containment along the relevant border and the extent to which the containment is enforced. These two features define what is useful about the border camp. Containment a short distance from the border affords easier access for recruitment. Strongly enforced containment ensures that prime age refugees are in the camp. Tanzania and Kenya each chose a strongly enforced border camp policy for Burundian refugees and Sudanese refugees, respectively. For the Somali refugees, Kenya chose a loosely enforced border camp policy. With Mozambican refugees, Tanzania allowed dispersed settlement and actively avoided setting up a camp for most of the crisis. Table 1 summarizes the policies in each of the four cases on these two dimensions, closeness to the border and the extent of enforcement of containment.

The remainder of this section explores refugee arrival in Tanzania and Kenya during the late

\textsuperscript{17} These cases still exhibit a great deal of variation in total arrivals. However, they all are well above 10,000—the generally accepted threshold for large flows.

\textsuperscript{18} In the 1990s, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda were slowly rebuilding the the East African Community (EAC). Burundi, Rwanda, and South Sudan have since joined the EAC. It took South Sudan some time to meet the requirements, but the country began the membership process shortly upon independence. See Hornsby 2012, p. 661 and 783.
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<th>Border Camp</th>
<th>Dispersal/Interior Camp</th>
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<td>Burundians in Tanzania</td>
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<td>Mozambicans in Tanzania</td>
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1980s and early 1990s. Each of pair of crises in Tanzania and then Kenya is described and compared with attention to the domestic and foreign policy context of each crisis.

### 4.1 Tanzania’s Distinct Refugee Policies

Tanzania chose two distinct refugee policies in response to the arrival of Mozambicans and Burundians. Mozambicans were allowed to disperse, while Burundians were placed in camps very close to the border. The drastic difference in refugee policy, I argue, is motivated by foreign policy implications rather than domestic interests. Figure 2 displays a map of Tanzania and neighboring countries, placement of the border camps from the Burundian crisis in the 1990s, and the area where most of the Mozambicans were dispersed.

#### 4.1.1 Mozambican Civil War and Refugees in Tanzania

Between 1986 and 1993, an estimated 72,000 refugees left Mozambique for Tanzania because of the civil war in their home country.¹⁹ The number of refugees might have been much larger. In 1993 and 1994, when organization for repatriation began, as many as 300,000 Mozambicans lived in Tanzania.²⁰ Tanzania chose to allow Mozambican refugees to disperse into the interior. Tanzania’s foreign and domestic policy interests were well aligned in this case. It was particularly easy...
Figure 2: Map of Tanzania with Burundian and Mozambican Refugee Policy
for Mozambicans fleeing the civil war to integrate into Tanzanian villages. Furthermore, Tanzania squarely supported the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government of Mozambique in the civil war.

Mozambican refugees easily integrated into Tanzania. They were generally part of two ethnic groups, the Yao and Makonde, both of which are well represented on both sides of the border. Tens of thousands of Mozambicans lived in southern Tanzania before the outbreak of the civil war. Tanzania in fact resisted setting up any sort of settlement until 1989. When they did set up a settlement, it was in Likuyu, well over 100 miles (160 km) from the border with Mozambique, and not connected by a major road.21

Tanzania and the FRELIMO government in Mozambique remained strong allies because of their posture against white minority rule in Southern Africa and the roughly contemporaneous opening toward capitalism in the late 1980s. FRELIMO was founded in Tanzania in 1962 by Mozambicans in exile. The group launched its fight for independence using Tanzania as a base. In 1975, FRELIMO won independence from Portugal and, like its northern neighbor, embraced African socialism. Shortly after independence, an anti-communist rebel group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) formed. RENAMO remained fairly contained until the death of the first Mozambican president. Following the transition of power, RENAMO gained strength, and Mozambique devolved into civil war.22 By all indications, RENAMO did not engage in any activity in Tanzania.23

4.1.2 Burundian Violence and Refugees in the 1990s

Between late 1994 and 1999, nearly 350,000 Burundians, mostly ethnic Hutu, fled to Tanzania from violence and the civil war. Tanzania chose a border camp policy with high enforcement. They set up a series of camps for Burundian refugees, all 15 to 30 kilometers east of the Burundian

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21. Crisp and Mayne 1996. The closest route to Mozambique was about a 10-hour drive. This can be compared to the settlements during the war of independence, some of which were along a road to Mozambique and less than half that distance.
22. BBC 2015.
23. RENAMO was supported by the governments in Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa.
border. Very few of this refugee cohort lived anywhere else. Allowing refugees into the interior to settle and farm would have posed domestic costs somewhat comparable to the Mozambicans, but Tanzania chose to put camps immediately on the border. Tanzania’s refugee policy was driven by regional politics with Burundi. The two countries had increasingly diverged in their views on the future of Africa and on regional coordination.

The late 1980s and early 1990s were politically tumultuous for Burundi. Pierre Buyoya, a member of the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party, seized power in a coup in 1987. This ultimately laid the foundation for democratic elections in 1993, and Buyoya ceded power to the first Hutu president in mid-1993. Between 1993 and 1996, there were a series of four different presidents because of coups, an assassination, and interim leaders elected by the National Assembly. Buyoya took power again in a coup in 1996. By 1996 Burundian forces were fighting civil wars on multiple fronts.24, 25

Burundian refugees could have been accommodated away from the border in large interior settlements. During a previous crisis, Tanzania accommodated hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees in three interior camps, and the camps became self-sufficient. Burundian refugees were also dispersed in Kigoma, the major town close to the Burundian border.26

One of the interior camps from the 1970s and Kigoma town are in an area that is predominantly ethnic Ha. The Ha speak a language similar to Kirundi, the main language in Burundi. They also have a pre-colonial relationship with a group of Tutsi rulers that is similar to the pre-colonial relationship between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. Finally, the Ha and Burundian refugees were agriculturalists.27 Kigoma and much of the surrounding area in Tanzania was not densely populated in the 1990s, and there was ample fertile land to farm.

Tanzania-Burundi relations are a better explanation for the border refugee camps. Interstate

24. Two of the most important groups in the civil war were associated with rebel activity in or near Tanzania. The larger rebel group, Forces for the Defense of Democracy CNDD-FDD had rear bases of operation in the Congo. The National Forces of Liberation (FNL) had it origins in Tanzania. There is evidence that factions from both groups recruited and trained near Tanzanian refugee camps.
relations deteriorated quickly in the 1990s. At one point in 1997, the Tanzanian military and Burundian military traded attacks in Lake Tanganyika, which borders both countries.\textsuperscript{28}

Widespread violence in Burundi and the refugee crisis were among the reasons for tensions. However, just as important, the minority Tutsi government in Burundi, which had deposed a fledgling Hutu government, was not in line with Tanzania’s vision for Africa. With Apartheid coming to an end in South Africa, black African independence had largely been achieved. Tanzania adopted a more progressive push for African governance in the form of majority rule.\textsuperscript{29} Further, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda had revived some cooperation and begun to re-establish the East African Community.\textsuperscript{30}

Meanwhile, the Hutu rebel movement had ties to Tanzania. A group of Burundian refugees who had fled Burundi in the 1970s established a political party, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) in Tanzania. By 1985, PALIPEHUTU had an armed wing, but the party split into multiple political and armed factions in the 1990s. The refugee camps along the border that were established in the 1990s served as a point of organization as well as recruitment for rebel groups. Some reports suggest that training took place in the refugee camps, but more often outside—yet near to—the camps.\textsuperscript{31}

The Burundi-Tanzania relationship was not all antagonistic. The refugee camps were an asset to the Burundi rebel groups, but still gave Tanzania a way to appear neutral. Tanzania sequestered some individual rebels who were caught inside Tanzania.\textsuperscript{32} They maintained trade ties, which were critical for landlocked Burundi’s access to shipping. Finally, Tanzania hosted a series of talks throughout the late nineties, which ultimately resulted in an agreement to end the war in 2000.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{28} Durieux 2000; Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004.
\textsuperscript{29} Rutinwa 2002b.
\textsuperscript{30} Hornsby 2012, p. 783.
\textsuperscript{31} HRW 1999; ICG 1999; Durieux 2000.
\textsuperscript{32} Crisp 2001.
\textsuperscript{33} Peace Accords Matrix 2000.
4.2 Chaos in the Horn and Refugees in Kenya

By the end of the 1980s, political events in multiple countries threw the Horn of Africa into chaos. Refugees began pouring into Kenya. Most numerous were refugees from Somalia and Sudan. Like Tanzania’s selection of different refugee policies for Mozambicans and Burundians based on international relations, a less stark, but thematically similar distinction is apparent in Kenya’s refugee policies for Sudanese and Somalis. Border camps were set up for the Sudanese with remarkably strict enforcement. With Sudanese refugees, Kenya’s foreign policy and domestic policy incentives were aligned.
Somali refugees were initially scattered in a variety of camps along Kenya’s Eastern border and coast. A sizable group was settled in Nairobi, as well. By contrast with the policy toward Sudanese refugees, Kenya attempted low enforcement of the border camp policy for Somalis, hoping to balance conflicting domestic and somewhat less clear foreign policy interests.  

Figure 3 displays a map of Kenya with its neighbors and placement of the camps for refugees.

### 4.2.1 Sudanese Refugees and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

From 1983 to 2005, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) fought a war against the government in Khartoum for South Sudan autonomy. Initially, the SPLA operated a rear base of operation from Ethiopia. In 1991, the Ethiopian regime was toppled, and Sudanese who had sought asylum in Ethiopia poured into Kenya.

Between 1991 and 1999, more than 64,000 refugees originally from Southern Sudan fled to Kenya. Kenya set up the Kakuma refugee camps for Sudanese refugees, not far from the border town of Lokichogio. The Sudanese were unique among refugees in Kenya because nearly all of them stayed in the camps near the border. Very few of the refugees from Sudan were given permission to live elsewhere, and Sudanese refugees appear only in small numbers in reports of dispersed or urban refugees.

The border camp policy for the Sudanese was useful to Kenya for both domestic and foreign policy reasons. The ethnic Turkana in Northwest Kenya have a common lifestyle and livelihood with the primarily ethnic Dinka and Nuer refugees from Southern Sudan. They are pastoralists. The semi-arid climate in Turkana county meant that the groups would probably compete for resources. For this reason alone, Kenya might have selected the encampment policy.

Kenya’s foreign policy interest also aligned with border camps. Before the fall of the Ethiopian government, Kenya’s ties with the government of Sudan were strained. Tensions were in part

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34. These camps are further from the border than the ‘minimum safe distance.’ However, they are along major roads to the border with easy access to the frontier. See Reich, Finkel, and Bissett 2008 on the inadequacy of a simple distance for establishing safety.

35. See ICG 2010.


due to Kenya’s sympathy for the SPLA.\textsuperscript{38} The leaders of the SPLA had enjoyed time in exile in Nairobi.\textsuperscript{39} Also, an independent South Sudan would be dependent on Kenya or Ethiopia and Djibouti for international sea trade. Much of the oil in Sudan is in South Sudan. The forward-looking leaders of the SPLA seriously considered a pipeline through Kenya and eventually made public overtures about their interest in joining the EAC. Another country in the EAC and an oil pipeline would strengthen the Kenyan economy.\textsuperscript{40}

The SPLA made plenty of use of Kakuma, recruiting and regrouping there.\textsuperscript{41} Without Kakuma, the open border, and the support of Kenya, the SPLA probably would have been less successful in their fight against Khartoum.\textsuperscript{42} As Tanzania did with Burundi, Kenya managed to appear fairly neutral. Publicly, they leaned on domestic politics as a reason that the border camp was necessary and hosted peace talks. In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi. The CPA, among other things, laid out a path for an independent South Sudan.\textsuperscript{43}

4.2.2 Drought, Civil War, and Refugees from Somalia

In 1991, at roughly the same time as the arrival of Sudanese in Kenya, the Siad Barre regime in Somalia was ousted. Without leadership, the country broke into factions fighting for control. The political violence in Somalia, combined with worsening food conditions, pushed hundreds of thousands of Somalis into Kenya. Kenya chose a border camp policy for Somalis, but it was implemented quite differently from the Sudanese camp. Domestic and foreign policy considerations for the Somali refugee policy were at odds with each other. Ultimately, the Kenyan government aimed to balance the domestic need for border refugee camps with low enforcement as it felt out foreign policy implications.

Low enforcement of the border camp policy for Somalis is clearer in comparison to the Sudanese case. The first and largest refugee camps for Somalis were on the border with Somalia.

\textsuperscript{38} Kenya was far more subtle and cautious than Ethiopia in supporting the SPLA.
\textsuperscript{39} Hornsby 2012, p. 418.
\textsuperscript{40} Hornsby 2012, p. 783.
\textsuperscript{41} Perlez 1992.
\textsuperscript{42} ICG 2010.
\textsuperscript{43} Peace Accords Matrix 2005.
There was also a proliferation of small camps along the coast and a large settlement in Eastleigh, a Nairobi neighborhood. By 1994, Kenya had consolidated the Somali refugee camps into a set of camps known as Dadaab, near the border with Somalia. Some of the Somali refugees along the coast were given the option to settle in Kakuma. Until 2010, little effort was made to move the Nairobi-based Somali refugees to the Dadaab.

The decision to place refugee camps near the border with Somalia was driven by local politics near the coast and by national political considerations, rather than by local politics in the North-east of Kenya. There is an ethnic Somali population in Kenya with close ties to ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia and Somalia, which might have made integration of Somalis along the border easy. However, there was some suspicion of ethnic Somali Kenyans and Somalis alike because of Siad Barre’s attempt to create a pan-Somalia. Furthermore, the Somali refugees who had settled near the coast initially posed economic and political problems for Kenya. The coast is the heart of the tourist and shipping economy, and thus the land is valuable. Furthermore, there is a small, but sometimes problematic, rebel movement in the coastal region that seeks independence from Kenya. National politics in Kenya led the government to pursue recovering valuable coastal land and settling Somali refugees in camps close to their ethnic Somali Kenyan counterparts.

While Siad Barre was in power in Somalia, Kenya and Somalia had a rather tense relationship because of the pan-Somalia movement. Following the fall of Siad Barre, it is difficult to identify the Somali factions relevant for interstate relations with Kenya. Over time, though, Kenya built alliances with some groups, which led to a friendly relationship with the later established transitional and federal governments. As Kenya allied itself with the government of Somalia, Al-Shabaab formed and grew into a formidable rebel group. Among the biggest problems in the Dadaab Refugee camps since the 2000s are the recruitment and kidnapping of Somali refugees for Al-Shabaab forces and the hiding of Al-Shabaab fighters in and around Dadaab. The Somali

44. Parker 2002.
45. As of 2007, as many as 60,000 Somali refugees lived in the Eastleigh, but Kenya responded to Al-Shabaab terror attacks in Nairobi and elsewhere by sending many Somalis to Dadaab. See Pavanello, Elhawary, and Pantuliano 2010; Migiro 2011.
46. Ostensibly, taking land from Kenya.
border camps have evolved into a foreign policy problem for Kenya.47

4.3 Comparison Across Crises

Before shaping salient features of these cases into a generalizable model, I situate the cases comparatively. Figure 4 captures the relative cost of dispersal across the four crises. Table 2 compares cases in terms of proximity on foreign policy issues.

Cost of Dispersal

| Lower Cost | Moambicans in Tanzania | Burundians in Tanzania |
| Higher Cost | Somalis in Kenya | Sudanese in Kenya |

Figure 4: Refugee Cases on Ordinal Scale of Domestic Interests

Dispersal would have had relatively low cost for both crises in Tanzania. However, it was particularly low cost in the Mozambican crisis. The border areas of Tanzania just across from Mozambique and Burundi were not densely populated and were generally suitable for farming, which is a major part of the economy on both sides of the respective borders. The Makonde and Yao from Mozambique have close ties to their co-ethnics in Tanzania, and some individuals could integrate seamlessly. For Burundians, integration would have been eased because of cultural similarities with the Ha in Kigoma, but these ties are not as close as the co-ethnic ties on the Tanzania-Mozambique border.

By contrast, dispersal in the crises in Kenya would have been far more costly than in either crisis in Tanzania. The land immediately adjacent to Sudan and Somalia in Kenya is semi-arid and suitable for grazing of livestock, but not as fertile as borderland in Tanzania. Furthermore, Kenya has a long history of contentious land politics from the colonial era. Even with the Sudanese in camps, there were sometimes resource disputes between refugees and the Turkana in Northwest Kenya. With dispersal, competition over land could have been problematic. Dispersal of the Somali refugees near the border with Somalia might not have been so problematic, but those Somalis

47. Migiro 2011.
who settled in Kenya’s coastal area did pose economic and political problems for Kenya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Closer to Rebels</th>
<th>Closer to Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundians in Tanzania</td>
<td>Mozambicans in Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese in Kenya</td>
<td>Somalis in Kenya^48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 summarizes how relatively similar Tanzania and Kenya expected their regional foreign policy interest to be with the parties in the civil war. On the one extreme, leaders of the SPLA made overtures to the Kenyan government, and the Kenyan government expected gains from coordination with an independent South Sudan. Similarly, Tanzania’s regional economic and political interests were more closely aligned with the Hutu majority rebel groups than with the government in power in Burundi at the time. On the other extreme, Tanzania and the government of Mozambique had forged and maintained close ideological ties and were both members of a growing regional economic organization. Kenya’s relationship with Somalia is less clear because of the ambiguity at the beginning of the crisis. However, Kenya ultimately is far more aligned with the government of Somalia than Al-Shabaab.

5 The Model: Refugee Policy as Foreign Policy

In this section I build on the literature that develops refugee policy as domestic policy. The asylum country certainly weighs how many people are arriving, where there is room for them, and how local communities will respond. However, I argue they will also weigh their foreign policy interests, what regime in the country of origin they can coordinate with, and whether helping a rebel group could change the war. In the context of foreign policy, the asylum country essentially has two options: keep all of the refugees contained and at the border (Border Camps (B)) or allow them into the interior in settlements or dispersed (Dispersal (D)). If the asylum country allows the refugees to disperse or situates them very far from the border, there will be no implications for
the civil war. However, if the asylum country sets up camps close to the border, they give the rebel group an added advantage which could change the course of the war. The country of asylum will weigh its domestic interests and foreign policy concerns and choose a policy. To develop the theory, I focus first on domestic considerations, and then I turn to the foreign policy interests.

5.1 Domestic Policy Interest

The model of domestic interests in refugee policy is a formalization of what is widely discussed in the literature. When the refugee population can easily be integrated into the country of asylum and become self-sufficient, there is little impetus for setting up refugee camps or even seeking international aid. While this is partly a matter of the volume of refugees arriving, it also has to do with the characteristics of the refugees, the local hosts, and the region where refugees will live. When refugees cannot be easily integrated into the country of asylum, either because of their number or their characteristics, then camps are selected as policy.

5.1.1 Dispersal

Allowing refugees to disperse can take a few forms. First, the state could do nothing. People would then be free to move across the border and spontaneously settle wherever it is convenient for them. In some places, this might also involve formal recognition of the migrants as refugees. However, in other places, people may just move across the border without any formal recognition. In the relief literature, this is often referred to as spontaneous settlement. Tanzania responded to the Mozambican refugees this way.

The costs associated with dispersal of refugees is a function of population. As more people arrive, this option becomes more costly. Furthermore, when there is a large enough population of refugees, the cost associated with dispersed refugees rises dramatically. The costs in this model are intended to encompass at least three kinds of costs. First is the strain that additional population may put on public goods provision in the communities where the refugees settle, such as overuse of roads, education, or health care. The second cost is the domestic discontent associated with the
refugees’ use of public goods and resources. Last are the costs associated with the risk that an individual refugee may be pursued in the community where they settle by the government of their country of origin.

More formally, the cost of choosing dispersal, $c_D$, is a function of the population that arrives at the border, $F$. Costs are increasing in population $c'_D(F) > 0$, and the marginal cost of each additional person is increasing in population. That is, the costs are convex in $F$ ($c''_D(F) > 0$). Qualitatively, the reason for the convexity is the domestic discontent associated with the arrival of refugees. A few refugees in any community probably would not be a problem. When many communities find their public buildings—schools, churches, hospitals—filled with refugees rather than with their own village members, their discontent at the situation is compounded. Eventually, it can become a problem with national attention.

The more easily the refugees and local population live together, the more shallow this convexity is. The Yao and Makonde in the south of Tanzania and the north of Mozambique already had lived together and shared land easily, so while convex, the marginal increase in cost is small. By contrast, the Turkana from Kenya and the Dinka and Nuer from South Sudan would probably compete for pasture land. Because these are distinct groups of people and resources are more limited, the domestic costs of dispersal would be steeply increasing with additional Sudanese refugees.

The benefit of dispersal as a policy choice is largely maintaining international relationships. An asylum country can meet its international obligation to provide asylum (formally, $H_D$), similar to the international reputational benefit often attached to compliance with a treaty in the international cooperation literature. Also, in post-Colonial East Africa specifically, people talk about providing hospitality to their fellow black Africans, suggesting that they derive some utility from hosting refugees that extends beyond mere compliance.

49. These functional form assumptions ensure a unique ordering of the two choices as population increases.
5.1.2 Border Camps

The other option is to contain refugees at the border. This requires recognizing refugees formally so that they can be identified as refugees and then restricting their movements to some degree. I will refer to this as setting up a camp, but in practice, movement may just be restricted to one province or region, not necessarily to a single camp. This is the policy selection that is most often depicted in the news with pictures of tent cities. In the 1990s, Kenya chose this policy for the Sudanese, and Tanzania chose it for the Burundians.

I assume that there are large upfront fixed costs to setting up a camp and smaller incremental costs to expanding the camp. The costs of the camp are increasing with population, but benefit from economies of scale. Formally, there are fixed costs of setting up the border camp, $s_B$, and the cost of expanding camps is $c_B$. The major fixed cost is the allocation of land for the camp. This is low if there is a great deal of unused land. However, if the land itself is in high demand, one can imagine the set-up cost to be quite high. The cost of expanding the camp is increasing in $F$, but concave in $F$. The concavity captures the economies of scale. The idea behind economies of scale is that once the camp is established, it costs the asylum country very little to fill it.

As for benefits, like allowing refugees to disperse, border camps allow the asylum country to meet its treaty obligation to provide protection and get the international reputational benefit, $H_B$. With a border camp, $H_B$ may also include some international assistance that will accrue to the country of asylum, like upgrading roads or an airport or hiring asylum country nationals or giving contracts to asylum country-based NGOs. Thus, I assume that the benefits from the international community are at least as great for setting up the border camp as they are for dispersal ($H_B \geq H_D$).

Finally, I assume that there is always a small enough population of refugees that if that number were to arrive, the country of asylum would not pay the fixed cost of setting up a border camp and placing the refugees in the camp because the cost of allowing them to disperse is less\textsuperscript{50}. Realistically, if only 20 or 25 people were to arrive claiming refugee status, the cost of setting up a camp

\textsuperscript{50} To avoid confusion, note that this assumption does not incorporate any of the interstate politics that might influence the asylum country’s decision.
or whole settlement for them does not make sense. For a few refugees, it is simply always more cost effective to allow them to choose where to settle and work during their period of asylum.

The formalization of a theory of domestic consideration in refugee policy making yields a simple calculus to be built on. On the one hand, the asylum country considers dispersing the refugees. The country weighs the reputational benefits of hosting refugees, less the cost of dispersal, given the population arriving: \( H_D - c_D(F) \). On the other hand, the asylum country considers setting up a border camp. The country weighs reputational benefits of hosting refugees, plus some international aid, less the set-up cost of a camp and the incremental cost of expanding the camp, given the population arriving: \( H_B - s_B - c_B(F) \).

5.2 Foreign Policy Interests

Modeling the foreign policy considerations of the asylum country is the primary contribution of this article. In previous literature, placing a camp near the border has been thought of as merely a domestic cost-saving exercise, keeping the refugees at the periphery. The short militarized dispute between Tanzania and Burundi, however, raises a question. Is keeping refugees at the border really cost saving? Cost-saving perhaps does not go far enough; camps along the Burundian border were advantageous to Tanzania. Similarly, the border camp near South Sudan was useful to Kenya specifically because of the foreign policy implications.

Thus, the model incorporates two critical insights about the asylum country. First, the asylum country has preferences for one regime over another in a neighboring country. In the case of the Sudanese in Kenya, there were good cooperative economic prospects for Kenya, given a victory by the SPLA and an independent South Sudan. Kenya would gain a new landlocked trading partner and the opportunity to benefit mutually from an oil pipeline through South Sudan to port in Kenya. Sudan was not landlocked, and the government in Khartoum was oriented toward trading with its neighbors in the north. Thus, prospects for coordination and cooperation between the SPLA and Kenya were much better than the status quo relationship that Kenya had with Sudan.

Second, a border refugee camp can help a rebel group by making recruitment and maintenance
of forces easier. The SPLA took advantage of these opportunities in the Kakuma refugee camp. They recruited, and sometimes kidnapped, boys from the camp to serve in the army. Members of the SPLA were often in the camp to take advantage of food and medical care. The usefulness of a border refugee camp is helping the rebel group to fight more efficiently by allowing them to maintain their forces efficiently.

The model captures both of these insights. The prospect for coordination with the rebels and the country of asylum I model on a policy continuum and refer to as the value of a regime change, \( w \). The technology provided by the border camp is a component of the likelihood that the rebel group wins the war, \( p_R \). These paired together form the foreign policy calculus, the expected value of a regime change in the asylum country’s neighbor.

Formally, the country of asylum must weigh domestic and foreign policy considerations and choose between dispersal and border camps.

\[
U_x = H_x - s_x + c_x(F) + p_{R,x}w, \ x = D, B.
\] (1)

The remainder of this section develops the value of a regime change, \( w \), and the probability that the rebels win, \( p_{R,x} \), in more detail.

### 5.2.1 The Value of a Regime Change

The asylum country has preferences about who rules a neighboring country—the one from which the refugees fled. Thus, the asylum country cares about whether the rebel group or the government wins the civil war in the refugees’ country of origin. Specifically, the value of a regime change, \( w \), can be thought of as a preference for convergence on regional policy. If two countries agree on how to coordinate trade, migration, and other regional matters—like an oil pipeline—there will be mutual gains in the long run.

To model this, I use a linear policy space where each party—the asylum country (A), the rebel group (R), and the government of the country of origin (O)—has an optimal coordination policy,
\( \ell \in [-1, 1] \). The asylum country is better off, the closer their optimal policy is to the regime in power in the neighboring country. I model this as deviations from an ideal point with a quadratic loss function. Since the government of the country of origin is already in power, the deviation that matters is how different the rebel group’s optimal policy is from that of the government (the status quo).

Formally, \( w = (\ell_O - \ell_A)^2 - (\ell_R - \ell_A)^2 \). This construction of the value of regime change has an intuitive property. If the asylum country prefers the rebel group’s cooperation position to that of the government’s, \( w \) will be positive. A regime change would result in a benefit to the asylum country. If, however, the asylum country prefers the government’s cooperation position, \( w \) will be negative. Thus, a regime change would be costly to the asylum country.

### 5.2.2 The Probability of a Rebel Win

The asylum country considers how the extra technology of a border refugee camp will change the probability that the rebel group wins. How this works is the result of an underlying model of strategic civil war and how a border refugee camp fits into that. Because I want to focus on the decision making of the asylum country here, I sketch the underlying model and relegate more detail to the supplement. I explore three components here: a useful model of civil war for my purposes, how the asylum country’s choice fits into the civil war, and two resulting comparative statics.

None of the resources provided by the refugee camp directly help the rebel group fight its war; refugee camps do not provide arms, military training, or soldiers directly. However, refugee camps do provide a source of assistance that enhances the rebel group’s ability to fight the war. When rebels have access to refugee camps, they gain access to humanitarian aid and to the refugees themselves. They can take food and other supplies. In some cases when rebels have considerable power in a refugee camp, they even ”tax” refugees by seizing a portion of rations or salaries.\(^{51}\)

Rebels also gain access to a concentrated recruitment pool. This is particularly so when civil wars

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\(^{51}\) Lischer 2003.
continue for a long time and cohorts of young men come of age in a refugee camp or when rebels recruit child soldiers. Finally, and more generally, the refugee camp provides a citizenry in exile to whom the rebel group can politicize its cause.\textsuperscript{52}

Formalizing the refugee camp as a technology of war maps directly onto how scholars and practitioners understand the rebels’ use of refugee camps qualitatively. Therefore, I draw on the economic rent seeking literature and select a model of civil war that incorporates differential technology of war.\textsuperscript{53}

In brief, in the economic model of civil war, the government of the country of origin (O) and the rebel group (R) have an endowment of resources they can choose to invest in either production ($X$) or fighting ($G$). The probability that each party wins the war is based on a contest success function ($p$) of their investments in fighting. Each party’s objective function is the expected value of winning the war. Thus, they take into account their probability of winning the war ($p$) and the total remaining resources, that is, those devoted to production rather than fighting. The parties simultaneously allocate resources to fighting and production. The war occurs, and the winner takes all the spoils.

Since a rebel group may or may not have a border refugee camp to use, I model two potential civil wars. One is the baseline in which there is no additional technology from the border camp. The other is the war in which the rebel group has improved fighting technology because of the border camp. To capture differential fighting technology, I use a weighted lottery over the allocation to fighting. Formally,

$$p_i(G_i, G_{-i}) = \frac{\alpha_i G_i}{\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i} G_{-i}}.$$ (2)

The weights ($\alpha_i$) in the lottery correspond to how efficiently the parties fight. This efficiency I will refer to as their conflict technology, or simply technology. The rebel group’s technology

\textsuperscript{52} Stedman and Tanner 2003; Achvarina and Reich 2010.

\textsuperscript{53} Using the contest success function framework to examine civil conflict is well established in the literature. The model used here is a particular case of what is reviewed in Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007 and developed in Tullock 1980, Hirshleifer 1989, and Neary 1997. What is novel is the application. Typically interventions in conflict are thought to operate through material resources (Nunn and Qian). However, rather than providing material resources, the refugee camp provides an opportunity for rebels to be efficient. Thus the intervention operates through the scaler, $\alpha$, not the resources available to the rebels, $X$. 

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can be decomposed into the part that is from the border refugee camp and everything else. Thus, 
\( \alpha_R = \tau \hat{\alpha}_R \). In the civil war with no border camp, the technology scaler is \( \tau = 1 \). In the civil war where the rebel group gets the border refugee camp, the rebel group receives additional technology, \( \tau > 1 \), which scales up the rebel group’s original conflict technology.

5.3 Equilibrium

The model contains the civil war and the asylum country’s decision in a sequential game. There are two stages in the model. In the first stage, the government of the country of origin and the rebel group choose their allocation to fighting. In the second stage, the country of asylum chooses a border camp or dispersal.

Using the model of an economic civil war yields two important implications for the asylum country’s refugee policy decision. First, in the absence of a border refugee camp, the equilibrium probability of a rebel win depends strictly on the technology of the government in the country of origin and the technology of the rebels. Further, the probability is strictly increasing in the value of the technology. Thus, the more that the border refugee camp improves the efficiency with which the rebel group fights, the greater the probability that the rebel group wins in equilibrium.

Specifically,

\[
p^*_R, D = \frac{\sqrt{\alpha_R}}{\sqrt{\alpha_R} + \sqrt{\alpha_O}}
\]

when the asylum country has chosen dispersal and

\[
p^*_R, B = \frac{\sqrt{\tau\alpha_R}}{\sqrt{\tau\alpha_R} + \sqrt{\alpha_O}}
\]

when the asylum country has chosen a border refugee camp.\(^{55}\)

The asylum country has a simple maximization problem with two options. Essentially, whichever utility is the largest, \( U_D \) or \( U_B \), the asylum country’s best response is to choose the corresponding

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54. I use Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as the relevant solution concept and restrict attention to interior solutions (i.e. when the budget constraint binds).

55. Recall that \( \tau = 1 \) because there is no border camp.
policy, Dispersal or Border Camps. However, because the border camp will impact the civil war in favor of the rebels, the probability of the rebels winning changes the value of $U_B$. Anticipating the refugee policy choice of the asylum country (A), the government of the country of origin (O), and the rebel group (R), adjust the resources devoted to fighting according to whether or not the rebel group receives the additional technology ($\tau$) of a refugee camp for fighting.

I define the equilibrium refugee policy choice in terms of a critical threshold. Let $\bar{w}$ be the point of policy diversion at which the asylum country is indifferent between dispersal and border camps. Formally,

$$\bar{w} = \frac{(H_B - H_D) - (s_B + c_B(F) - c_D(F))}{p^*_R - p^*_D}.$$  

(5)

In equilibrium, if the value of a rebel win is larger than the threshold, $w > \bar{w}$, the asylum country will choose border camps. If the value of a rebel win is at least as small as the threshold, $w \leq \bar{w}$, the asylum country will choose dispersal.

One way to understand the threshold is to examine the relative importance of foreign policy considerations as compared to domestic interests. Suppose that the difference between dispersal and border camps is small and fixed. When foreign policy is such that the rebel group and the government of the country of origin have very different preferences for regional coordination, then $w$ will be large. If the asylum country much prefers the rebel group’s position, $w$ will also be positive. When the difference between the options in terms of domestic interest are small, the large positive value of a rebel win will mean that the asylum country will choose border camps. By contrast, when the asylum country prefers the government’s position, $w$ will be large in magnitude, but negative. A large in magnitude, negative value of a rebel win will mean that the asylum country will choose dispersal. Finally, if the difference between the position of the rebel group and the government of the country of origin on regional matters is negligible, then domestic interests will dominate.

Intuitively, the threshold takes the domestic calculus of the asylum country and compares it to foreign policy interests, how valuable it is to the asylum country that the rebels win the civil war. This trade-off between domestic and foreign policy interests is critical to the case analysis.
What the threshold and model adds is a framework to understand how the border refugee camp is impacting the civil war, thus changing the calculus of the asylum country. Understanding this is the subject of the next section.

6 Implications and the Cases

Thus far, the analysis from the model matches a simple intuition about the asylum country’s decision. The asylum country trades off between its foreign policy and its domestic policy considerations in a cost benefit analysis. How increasing the efficiency of the rebel group impacts the asylum country’s decision is less intuitive. This is where the model is useful. The model connects two concepts, the additional efficiency provided by the border camp (captured in $\tau$) and the change in the probability that the rebel group wins ($p_{R,D} - p_{R,B}$), which is itself a function of the additional efficiency.

The change in the probability of a rebel win ($p_{R,D} - p_{R,B}$) has a clear comparative static. As the efficiency available to the rebel group through the border camp increases, the distance grows between the probabilities that the rebels win with and without the border camp. This comparative static holds even when taking into account how the rebel group and the government will strategically respond to a more efficient rebel group. Thus, there are some substantive implications that come out of linking the technology of the border camp to the probability that the rebel group wins the war, as the model does.

1. All else equal, when foreign policy interests are driving the refugee camp along the border, the camps should be closer to the border.

2. All else equal, when domestic policy interests are driving the placement of a refugee camp along the border, the camps should be further from the border.

3. All else equal, when foreign policy interests are driving the refugee camp along the border, enforcement of containment will be strict and allow few refugees to live away from the camp.
4. All else equal, when domestic policy interests are driving the placement of a refugee camp along the border, enforcement of containment will be lax and allow more refugees to live away from the camp.

In the next two parts of this section, I explore what is driving these implications and how these general points explain features of the cases that are not explicitly modeled. I begin by what makes a border refugee camp better conflict technology and then examine each implication.

### 6.1 Border Camps and Conflict Technology

A few years after the Burundian refugee crisis in Tanzania was resolved, a UNHCR official who worked in Kigoma from 1997 to 1999, Jean-Francois Durieux, reflected on Tanzania’s decision to place Burundian refugees along the border. He wrote:

> All camps hosting Burundian refugees in the Kigoma region are within walking distance from the international border. . . . The location of the camps in this kind of proximity was no accident. It is the result of a deliberate policy by the government of Tanzania to keep the refugees in the border area. . . . The strategic value of refugee camps in the border area is obvious from the standpoint of armed Burundi opposition groups. While the precise role of the camps in a possible Tanzanian strategy is harder to figure out, there can be no doubt that they play some role in such a strategy.  

Durieux is not clear on what Tanzania’s foreign policy strategy is. He has concluded, though, that the camps along the border are part of it. The model and implications in this article help explain Tanzania’s strategic logic. Typically, placing a camp along the border is not thought of as aiding rebels or intervening in a civil war. This is because setting up a border refugee camp is not like providing military aid, arms, or soldiers in a war. The border refugee camp is more subtle. It does not provide resources. Rather, it helps the rebel group be more efficient.

The border refugee camp helps with recruiting soldiers. The cases highlight how this works. In the Sudanese camp in Kenya, the SPLA used the border camp, Kakuma, for recruiting and regrouping. Kakuma was known for the volume of unaccompanied children and adolescents who

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lived in the camps. Documented incidents have between 1,000 and 3,500 boys “disappearing” from Kenya. Furthermore, refugees at Kakuma, especially the non-Sudanese, complained about the SPLA’s control over the camps.\footnote{Lindley 2007.}

Burundian rebels may have used refugee camps similarly. The major rebel group CNDD-FDD did most of its training in the DRC. Large groups of men traveled from the Tanzanian border camps to the DRC. While some of these men were pursuing economic opportunities, CNDD-FDD military training provides an explanation for the volume of movement. Furthermore, there are reports of military training taking place in Western Tanzania, outside the refugee camps. However, the trainees were often registered refugees.\footnote{Durieux 2000; ICG 1999.}

When are border refugee camp especially useful to the rebel group? First is when the rebels are fighting a war that is dependent on high volumes of people. Second, since refugee camps often are populated by women and children, rebel groups that make use of women and child soldiers should benefit differentially from border refugee camps. Third, larger, more densely populated camps make recruitment even more efficient. Fourth, more prime potentially recruits - adolescent and young adult men, make a higher quality recruitment pool. Finally, the easier the travel between the front lines and the refugee camp, the more useful it is for smuggling recruits and appropriating food and supplies Shorter distances, flatter terrain, and the absence of bodies of water should increase the efficiency of the rebel group.

\section*{6.2 Camp Distance to the Border}

The asylum country cannot be strategic about how the rebel group fights; however, they can control how close the camp is to the border. Camps closer to the border should be more efficient for the rebels. The first implication of the model provides an explanation for how geopolitics informed Tanzania’s placement of the camps for Burundians. In the Burundian case, optimal foreign and domestic policy are at odds. In the absence of foreign policy concerns, Tanzania
probably would have chosen dispersal, but in the absence of domestic policy concerns, Tanzania would have chosen a border camp. In this situation, as a border camp offers more technology to the rebel group, a border camp policy is more likely. This is because when an asylum country prefers dispersal on domestic grounds, the threshold \( \bar{w} \) is decreasing in technology.

Border camps offer more technology when they are near the border and when they have a higher concentration of prime potential recruits. The Burundian camps were very close to the border, some within 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) of Burundi. People in good health could walk to Burundi from the camps. Why might the closeness have mattered for the geopolitics? The model suggests that close border camps were optimal for Tanzania for foreign policy reasons, and that border camps further from the border would have been less preferred than even dispersal. Putting the camps close to the border would improve the efficiency of the rebel groups even more, thus making a rebel win more probable.

6.3 Containment Enforcement

A similar logic in the second implication can explain why Kenya chose lower enforcement of the Somali refugee camps. The asylum country can exact some control over the quality of the potential recruits. By allowing some refugees to pursue economic or schooling opportunities outside refugee camps, an asylum country uses normal economic processes to degrade the quality of the recruits. Prime-age working men are more likely to seek opportunities outside the camp, and children who are coming of age often look for opportunities to go to school elsewhere. Thus, when enforcement is relaxed, prime-age men and youth leave disproportionately. These are precisely the most sought-after recruits.

As with Burundians in Tanzania, Kenya’s optimal domestic and foreign policy were at odds with each other in the Somali refugee crisis. In the absence of foreign policy concerns, Kenya would have chosen a border camp; in the absence of domestic policy concerns, Kenya probably would have chosen to disperse the Somalis. When interests are at odds like this in the model, as the border camp offers less technology to the rebels, a border camp policy is more likely. This is
because when an asylum country prefers border camps on domestic grounds, the threshold is increasing in technology. Thus, Kenya allows Somalis to engage in economic opportunity in Nairobi and even allows some Somalis to settle in Kakuma when consolidating camps. This degrades the recruitment pool for Al-Shabaab.

This is where understanding refugee policy has the clearest implication for the international community. When a rebel group who uses child soldiers has easy access to a refugee camp with many children, the camp is improving their efficiency. The rebel group need not go from village to village to recruit or kidnap. They can go to one place and get many child soldiers. Thus, creating opportunities for children who are old enough to be recruited to go to school outside the camp may protect those children. It may also make the camp a less attractive place to recruit. Therefore, the camp may be relatively safer for the people who remain in the camp because the camp will become less useful to the rebel group.

6.4 Beyond the Model: Pushing for Peace Talks

Kenya and Tanzania have hosted and negotiated the peace settlements for the resolution of the conflicts in Sudan and Burundi, respectively. I have argued that Tanzania and Kenya both claimed that border camps were necessary in these cases because of domestic problems. However, their foreign policy interests align with helping the rebel groups, too. Throughout the peace process Burundi repeatedly called Tanzania’s neutrality into question. Careful observers questioned Kenya’s neutrality as well. These criticisms of Tanzania and Kenya fell on deaf ears. The role the refugee camps played in the war was obvious, but Tanzania and Kenya’s insisted that their decisions were based on domestic politics, and so the matter of a foreign policy objective remained ambiguous to the international community. Kenya and Tanzania leveraged the ambiguity and were backed as neutral parties. Thus, they could host peace talks and help resolve the conflict and the refugee crisis, too.

This is noteworthy because of the kind of conflicts that occurred in Southern Sudan and Burundi. These conflicts are similar to peripheral insurgency, a kind of civil war that lasts a long time
and is particularly difficult to end with a peace agreement. The goal of the rebel group in a peripheral insurgency is either to win by dominating militarily or to fight and exact so many costs that the government will give sufficient concessions at the bargaining table.\textsuperscript{59} Part of the problem with these wars is that negotiation is very difficult because there is a prominent commitment problem. The government can offer concessions to the rebel group, but there is a risk that when the rebel group disarms, whatever concessions were offered will be taken away. In order to ensure against the commitment problem, the rebel group needs to make sure that it either can retain arms or does not need to disarm until after it holds formal power.\textsuperscript{60}

The model sheds light on how Kenya and Tanzania could set up border refugee camps, quietly intervene in the war, and be successful in pushing peace talks. Until now, I have interpreted the probability of a rebel win as representing the likelihood that future fighting would result in military dominance. Another typical interpretation of the probability of a rebel win is a measure of the bargaining power of the rebel group at the negotiating table. Improving the efficiency of the rebel group improves the probability that the rebel group wins, and it also improves their bargaining position.

Burundian rebel groups and the SPLA were able to leverage their bargaining position well. This may have been the aim of Tanzania and Kenya, respectively. Relatively few civil wars end in negotiated settlements, as compared to interstate wars.\textsuperscript{61} Both the Burundian civil war and the SPLA fight for autonomy ended with negotiated settlements. Burundian rebels extracted a path toward majority rule that would start before demobilization. The SPLA extracted a path to independence from Khartoum. While the agreement did include disarmament, the SPLA was able to stave off this requirement until after independence when South Sudan could raise its own army. Furthermore, while fighting diminished and most of the refugees from Kenya were able to return home safely, a border conflict continues still more than ten years after the peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan.

\textsuperscript{59} Fearon 2004.
\textsuperscript{60} Walter 1997.
\textsuperscript{61} Walter 1997.
Recruitment for the sake of negotiations may have been part of the tactics of the rebel groups in the Burundian and Sudanese negotiations. The number of rebel fighters had direct implications for how joint military-SPLA security units would be set up in Southern Sudan and how long it would take the SPLA to demobilize and disarm. Similarly, in the Burundian negotiations the number of members of groups had implications for power-sharing among the groups.

Tanzania’s or Kenya’s provision of technology is more subtle than allowing a rear base of operations or hosting the rebel movement to launch and execute attacks. Tanzania and Kenya use the ambiguity because they need to appear neutral to be able to pursue the negotiations. Meanwhile, for negotiations to resolve the conflicts and the refugee crises, it needs to be the case that the rebel groups can extract sufficient concessions to be able to overcome the risk of losing everything after they disarm. The additional technology of the border refugee camp can improve the probability that the rebel group wins enough to extract sufficient concessions from the government.

With this additional framework, there is a final implication of the theory—that conditional on a border camp policy, more strict enforcement of the containment policy, and more rebel access to the refugee camp can be coincident with more frequent or productive peace talks—that makes more sense. Stricter enforcement and more rebel access to the refugee camp are indications that the rebel group is taking advantage of the efficiency offered by the border refugee camp. This improves their bargaining position, and on the margin it may be possible for the rebel group to extract sufficient concessions to overcome the commitment problem. This logic has some purchase in explaining the negotiated settlements in Burundi and South Sudan.

7 Conclusion

I have analyzed the reasons that asylum countries often select border refugee camps to deal with crises. I argue that on domestic grounds alone, it is not clear that border refugee camps should be optimal. Despite efforts to set an international norm of keeping refugee camps away from the border, border refugee camps persist. Two critical insights underpin an explanation for
border refugee camps. First, asylum countries are considering not only their domestic concerns, but also their foreign policy aims. Second, a border refugee camp helps a rebel group to do more with less by making recruitment and maintenance of forces easier. As such, a border refugee camp constitutes a quiet, subtle intervention in a neighboring country’s civil war.

As a bi-product of the formal analysis I can explain more puzzling features of Tanzania’s and Kenya’s actions. Kenya was more lax in their enforcement of the encampment policy for Somalis in order to undermine the efficiency provided to Somali rebels, while being very strict with the Sudanese in order to bolster the efficiency provided to the SPLA. Furthermore, Tanzania’s insistence on placing refugee camps so close to the border was driven by the opportunity to enhance the position of the Burundian rebel groups. Setting up the border camps may have been aimed at shifting the bargaining position of the rebels and leveraging the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

### 7.1 Alternative Explanations

There are three prominent alternative explanations for why asylum countries choose refugee border camps. The first is that domestic pressure drives countries to keep refugees as close to the periphery as possible. The second is that asylum countries have grown weary of hosting refugees; as time wears on, they introduce more and more restrictive policies. The third is that border refugee camps are for particularly large populations of refugees that cannot be efficiently protected in other ways.

In the development of the theory, I address the first explanation head on. I argue that domestic interests do matter in determining refugee policy. I conclude that domestic interests probably determined Kenya’s decision to put the Somali refugees in border camps. I build on the insight that domestic interests matter. The first explanation is a special case of the larger theory I propose that includes foreign interests, too.

Some empirical facts from the cases undermine the second and third alternative explanations. One might look at the Mozambicans in Tanzania during their civil war and conclude that the dispersal policy preceded the Burundian crisis. However, the civil war was not the first Mozambican
refugee crisis in Tanzania. Earlier during the revolution, when Tanzania supported FRELIMO’s fight against Portugal, Tanzania chose to put the Mozambican refugees in camps, some of which had easy access to the border. Similarly, large population sizes alone cannot explain the variation in the cases. Even low estimates of the Mozambican arrivals in Tanzania, 75,000, are larger than the Sudanese crisis in which refugees totaled around 64,000. Neither of these alternative explanations sheds light on why Kenya would simultaneously use more lax enforcement of the border containment for Somali refugees and much stricter enforcement for the Sudanese. The alternative explanations do not illuminate why Tanzania insisted the Burundian camps be so close to the border.

### 7.2 Conditions

The theory presented in this paper is developed in East Africa but has implications that do generalize. There are some clear limitations to generalizing, though. First, the model relies on the notion that the location of the refugee settlements is the choice of the asylum country. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has made recommendations to Tanzania and Kenya about camp locations, they have retained placement as part of their prerogative. This need not be the case elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, while Tanzania and Kenya are sufficiently large countries that allocation of land is a feasible choice, in smaller, more densely populated countries, choosing land may be impossible.

Second, the situation assumes a certain kind of fighting on the part of the rebel group, fighting that is dependent on large groups of people and small arms. This is the kind of civil war that is typically fought in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as other places in the world. However, the logic of the refugee camp improving efficiency may carry less well to rebel groups that employ different fighting technology—urban terrorism or large weapon systems.

The model examines one geographic situation in which the country of asylum that is receiving the flows of refugees shares an international border with the country with a civil war, and that international border abuts rebel territory. The theory offers little explanation for border refugee
camps along other kinds of international borders.

Finally, concerns have been raised that Somalia is a unique case because of the absence of a government for so long. Thus, generalization from Somalia may be questionable. Somalia’s political decline in the early 1990s may be a unique historical event. The relationship between Kenya and Somalia may not have been so unique, though. What is salient for the theory is Kenya’s relationship to the warring parties in Somalia. Without clear preferences over warring parties in as they built Dadaab, Kenya perceived minimal foreign policy implications to the policy selection. This situation should generalize to any case in which the asylum country has little to gain by supporting the rebels or the government. In this case, like Somali-Kenya case, foreign policy interests may well be dwarfed by domestic political concerns.

7.3 Policy and Scholarship

The research project explored in this article has three key policy implications of interest to the international aid community. First and most starkly, when the international community funds the refugee policy of an asylum country that is adjacent to the civil war, they are delegating decisions that have strategic implications for the war. Funding border refugee camps may implicitly be funding the asylum country’s foreign policy objectives which may not be aligned with a humanitarian agency’s mandate.

On the other hand, border refugee camps in some cases, like the Somali case in Kenya, may be driven by domestic politics. In these cases, the international community can more easily put their funds to work limiting the extent to which the border refugee camp makes rebels efficient. This may include sponsoring children’s schooling away from the camp and implementing programming to support refugees who seek economic opportunities elsewhere in the country of asylum.

Finally, while the project may have little implication for refugees who have crossed multiple international borders, it does have implications for Internally Displaced Person camps. IDP camps that are located in or that abut rebel-controlled territory can function similarly to border refugee camps. Therefore, degrading the quality of recruits in the IDP camp by encouraging schooling or
working abroad may be critical.

Beyond the policy implications, this project makes key contributions to scholarship. This article connects themes addressed in international relations some time ago to current literature in transnational civil war. Scholars have investigated the strategic use of migration in foreign policy with a focus on great power politics. This article demonstrates that developing countries leverage refugee policy to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Also, scholars have explored strategic ambiguity in war. I argue that border refugee camps are a similarly strategic intervention. The asylum country leverages the ambiguity as to which of their interests—domestic or foreign—are driving the camp placement. I also expand the set of possible interventions to include those that involve providing efficiency to a party in the war rather than providing resources alone. The article speaks to a gap in the transnational civil war literature, the agency of asylum countries. I demonstrate that asylum countries can be strategic actors in selecting their refugee policy and allowing, or limiting, transnational rebel use of their territory. Finally, as asylum seekers move well beyond their region of origin, civil war has broader transnational, even global, implications. This article provides a context for exploring why asylum seekers may need to leave not only their country of origin, but the region as well.
References


A Supplement

In this supplement, I provide a more detailed development of the model and comparative statics discussed in the paper. I begin with an overview of the model of civil war used in the article, then develop the three-player game sketched in the article and provide additional detail on the useful comparative statics.

A.1 Model of Civil War

In the development of the article, I make use of a variation of a model of civil war which is drawn from the rent seeking literature. Since this model of conflict is used extensively in the literature, many scholars provide proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibria and axiomatization of criteria for the models. I note the relevant work for proofs and extensions.

In the model of civil war, there are two warring parties. Each party has an endowment of resources, $E_i$, to allocate between investments in fighting, $G_i$, and investments in production, $X_i$. The parties simultaneously choose investments. They fight and the winner takes all the spoils, that is, the resources that were devoted to production.

I consider two warring parties that have different conflict technology. To incorporate this asymmetry, I use a weighted lottery over the contest. The probability of winning the war, $p_i$, is a function of the investment in fighting, $G_i$, and the conflict technology, $\alpha_i$. Thus, the probability that a party wins the war is:

$$p_i = \frac{\alpha_i G_i}{\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i} G_{-i}}.$$  

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62. I selected this model for a substantive reason—being able to incorporate a refugee border camp as technology—and a technical reason of the model itself. The model is relatively simple. Unlike bargaining models of war, there is complete information, and there are no commitment problems. This makes the three-player game more tractable. This model also precludes the possibility of no war. This is a problem to the extent that we might believe that anticipation of refugee-related intervention in a civil war could prevent the civil war to begin with. On the other hand, if a rebel group—even strategically anticipating losing the war—chooses not to engage in violence or investment in war, they would not be considered a rebel group at all, but political opposition. For this reason, the assumption that there has to be some violence for the situation to qualify as a civil war seems sufficiently reasonable.

63. Useful summaries of this class of models can be found in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011).
Each party optimizes the expected value of winning,

\[ V_i = \alpha_i G_i \frac{E_i - G_i + E_{-i} - G_{-i}}{\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i} G_{-i}} \], \quad (7) \]

and solves the first order condition,

\[ \frac{\alpha_{-i} G_{-i}}{[(\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i} G_{-i})^2 [E_i - G_i + E_{-i} - G_{-i}]]} - \frac{\alpha_i G_i}{\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i} G_{-i}} = 0. \] \quad (8)

Using \( i = O,R \) and substituting yields,

\[ \frac{G_O}{\alpha_R G_R} = \frac{G_R}{\alpha_O G_O}, \] \quad (9)

which simplifies:

\[ G^{**}_O = G^{**}_R \sqrt{\frac{\alpha_R}{\alpha_O}}. \] \quad (10)

The condition in Equation 10 can be written in terms of resources and scaled by the weighted lottery.

\[ G^{**}_O = \frac{E_O + E_R}{2 \left( 1 + \sqrt{\frac{\alpha_O}{\alpha_R}} \right)} \] \quad (11)

The existence and uniqueness of the equilibria follow directly from the proofs in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) and the axiomatization of the contest success function in Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998).

### A.2 Outline of Three-Player Game

#### A.2.1 Definition of the Game

I define the game in terms of the players, sequence of play, and strategies with their associated utility functions. Figure 5 summarizes the game.

1. Players: There are three players in this model, the refugee receiving country (\( A \)), the rebel
Players $O$ and $R$

$G_i \in [0, R_i]$

Player $A$

$D$ $B$

$U_D = H_D - C_D(F) + p_{R,D}w(\ell_A, \ell_O, \ell_R)$

$V_i = p_{i,D}(G_i, G_{-i})[(R_i - G_i) + (R_{-i} - G_{-i})]$ where $i = O, R$ and $x = B, D$  

(12)

where $p_{i,x}(G_i, G_{-i})$ is a weighted lottery as follows:

$p_{i,x} = \frac{\alpha_i G_i}{\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i}G_{-i}}$  

(13)

Figure 5: Extensive Form Game Tree for Refugee Policy as Foreign Policy

2. Sequence of Play: First, Players $O$ and $R$ select their investment, $G_i$, simultaneously. Second, Player A selects its policy ($D$ or $B$).

3. Players $O$ and $R$ in the first stage play an economic civil war game by choosing their investment in fighting, $G_i$. They optimize the expected value of the war subject to their resource constraint, where the conflict technology of Player $R$ differs according to whether there is a border refugee camp or not (i.e. whether they are at node $B$ or $D$). In particular their objective is:

$$V_i = p_{i,x}(G_i, G_{-i})[(R_i - G_i) + (R_{-i} - G_{-i})]$$ where $i = O, R$ and $x = B, D$  

(12)

where $p_{i,x}(G_i, G_{-i})$ is a weighted lottery as follows:

$$p_{i,x} = \frac{\alpha_i G_i}{\alpha_i G_i + \alpha_{-i}G_{-i}}$$  

(13)
and $\alpha_R(x)$ is a discrete mapping from $\{D, B\} \rightarrow \{\hat{\alpha}_R, \tau\hat{\alpha}_R\}$, with $\tau > 1$

Specifically,

$$\alpha_R(x) = \begin{cases} 
\hat{\alpha}_R & \text{if } D \\
\tau\hat{\alpha}_R & \text{if } B 
\end{cases}$$ (14)

Note that $\alpha_R(D) = \hat{\alpha}_R$ is like the case in which $\tau = 1$.

Therefore, each party $i = O, R$ has a strategy pair $(G_{i,D}, G_{i,B})$ which is conditional on the policy selection of the Player A.

4. Player A, the asylum country, chooses between two discrete policy choices Dispersal, $D$, or Border Camps, $B$. Where they take into account international reputation and aid, $H_x$; set-up cost, $s_x$; incremental costs of expanding (a function of population $F$), $c_x(F)$; the probability of a rebel win, $p_{R,x}$, in the civil war; and the value of a regime change, $w$, in the country of origin.

In particular, A’s utility can be characterized as:

$$U_x = H_x - s_x - c_x(F) + p_{R,x}w, \ x = D, B$$ (15)

I impose the following assumptions to ensure that the domestic calculus, $H_x - s_x - c_x(F)$, is well ordered as population increases.64

- International reputation and aid on net is greater with a border camp $H_D \leq H_C$. The set up cost of a border camp are greater than dispersal $s_D \leq s_C$ and without loss of generality, $s_D = 0$

- The incremental cost of dispersal is increasing and convex in population $c'_D(F) > 0, c''_D(F) > 0$

64. These assumptions were chosen because they will establish single crossing, while being realistic in the context studied.
The incremental cost of border camps is increasing and concave in population $c_B'(F) > 0$, $c''_B(F) < 0$

There exists some small enough population, $\tilde{F} > 0$, such that on domestic grounds, dispersal is preferred to border camps. i.e $H_D - c_D(\tilde{F}) > H_B - s_B - c_B(\tilde{F})$

Finally, for the value of a regime, $w$, I use a unidimensional policy space to capture preferences for regional coordination. Each player has an ideal point, $\ell$. I assume quadratic loss over distance. The value of a regime change incorporates a deviation from the status quo. Thus, $w = (\ell_O - \ell_A)^2 - (\ell_R - \ell_A)^2$. Note that when the asylum country (A) has an ideal point closer to the rebel group (R), $w > 0$. When the asylum country (A) has an ideal point closer to the government of the country of origin (O), $w < 0$.

Since Player A moves second, A’s strategy is a single choice D or B.

A.2.2 Equilibrium of the Game

Earlier in this supplement, I describe the equilibrium of the civil war. At each node, each Player O’s and R’s best response is defined by $G^*_O = G^*_R \sqrt{\alpha_O(x)/\alpha_R}$. Explicitly: $G^*_{O,x} = \frac{E_O + E_R}{2(1 + \sqrt{\alpha_O(x)/\alpha_R})}$ and $G^*_{R,x} = \frac{E_O + E_R}{2(1 + \sqrt{\alpha_O(x)/\alpha_R})}$.

To characterize A’s, best response, I define a threshold.

**Definition 1.** Let $\bar{\bar{w}} = \frac{H_B - H_D - (s_B + c_B(F) - c_D(F))}{p^*_R - p^*_B}$. When $w > \bar{\bar{w}}$, A’s best response is to chose B. When $w \leq \bar{\bar{w}}$, A’s best rest response is to chose D.

I note two preliminaries:

**Lemma 1.** In the civil war subgame in equilibrium, the probability of a rebel win is increasing in $\tau$.

**Proof.** From substitution, $P_R = \frac{\sqrt{\alpha_R}}{\sqrt{\alpha_R + \alpha_O}}$. Further, $\frac{\partial P_R}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\sqrt{\alpha_O}}{2\sqrt{\alpha_R}} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha_R + \alpha_O}} \right)^2$. Since $\alpha_O > 0$, $\alpha_R > 0$, $\tau > 0$ by assumption. $\frac{\partial P_R}{\partial \tau} > 0$
Lemma 2. \( p_{R,D}^* - p_{R,B}^* < 0 \).

Proof. Since in \( p_{R,D}^* \), \( \tau = 1 \) and in \( p_{R,B}^* \), \( \tau > 1 \) and \( P_R^*(\tau) > 0 \), \( p_{R,D}^* < p_{R,B}^* \)

I now describe the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of the model.

**Proposition 1.** If \( w > \bar{w} \) then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which \( O \) will invests \( G^*_{O,D} \) if \( A \) chooses \( D \) \( G^*_{O,B} \) if \( A \) chooses \( B \), \( R \) will invest \( G_{R,D}^* \) if \( A \) chooses \( D \) and \( G_{R,B}^* \) if \( A \) chooses \( B \). \( A \) will choose \( B \).

Proof. For Player \( A \) since \( w > \bar{w} \), \( H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) + p_{R,B}^* w > H_D - c_D(F) + p_{R,D}^* \) and \( U_B > U_D \). If Player \( A \) were to deviate, he would be worse off. See Appendix for proof of Player \( R \) and \( O \)'s best response.

**Proposition 2.** If \( w < \bar{w} \) then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which \( O \) will invests \( G^*_{O,D} \) if \( A \) chooses \( D \) \( G^*_{O,B} \) if \( A \) chooses \( B \), \( R \) will invest \( G_{R,D}^* \) if \( A \) chooses \( D \) and \( G_{R,B}^* \) if \( A \) chooses \( B \). \( A \) will choose \( D \).

Proof. For Player \( A \) since \( w < \bar{w} \), \( w < \frac{H_B - H_D - (s_B + c_B(F) - c_D(F))}{p_{R,D}^* - p_{R,B}^*} \). Because of Lemma 2, \( H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) + p_{R,B}^* w < H_D - c_D(F) + p_{R,D}^* \) and \( U_B < U_D \). If Player \( A \) were to deviate, he would be worse off. See Appendix for proof of Player \( R \) and \( O \)'s best response.

**A.3 Comparative Statics**

**Proposition 3.** If \( H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) < H_D - c_D(F) \), then \( \bar{w} \) is decreasing in \( \tau \).

Proof. \( \frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial \tau} = (H_B - H_D - (s_B + c_B(F) - c_D(F)) \left( 0 - \frac{\sqrt{\alpha_R}}{2\sqrt{\tau \alpha_R}} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha_R}} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha_R + \sqrt{\alpha_R}}} \right) \right)^2 \). Since 
\[ H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) < H_D - c_D(F) \], \( \frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial \tau} < 0 \)

Proposition 3 underlies the reasoning behind Implications 1 and 3. When \( H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) < H_D - c_D(F) \), on domestic grounds alone, the asylum country should choose dispersal. If border
camps are nevertheless chosen, it must be because of the foreign policy interest. Border camps are more likely to be chosen, the smaller the threshold $\tilde{w}$. Since the threshold, $\tilde{w}$, is decreasing in $\tau$, alternatives that may make $\tilde{w}$ larger make $\tilde{w}$ smaller.

The study posits a number of reasons that the border refugee camp may offer more efficiency to the rebel group (i.e. increase $\tau$). Two of these are highlighted in the cases as plausible choice variables, the distance to the border and the extent of containment enforcement. Thus by decreasing the distance to the border or increasing enforcement, the asylum country increases the likelihood that their foreign policy preferences will prevail (this is the denominator of $\tilde{w}$). Thus, when foreign policy interests are driving the asylum country’s policy ($H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) < H_D - c_D(F)$), the asylum country can do best by increasing $\tau$, that is decreasing the camp’s distance to the border (Implication 1) and increasing containment of that camp (Implication 3).

**Proposition 4.** If $H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) > H_D - c_D(F)$, then $\tilde{w}$ is increasing in $\tau$.

**Proof.**

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{w}}{\partial \tau} = (H_B - H_D - (s_B + c_B(F) - c_D(F)) \left(0 - \frac{\sqrt{a_O}}{2\sqrt{\tau a_R}}\right) \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{a_R + a_G}} - \frac{\sqrt{\tau a_R}}{\sqrt{a_R + \sqrt{a_G}} + \sqrt{a_G}}\right)^2.$$

Since $H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) > H_D - c_D(F)$, $\frac{\partial \tilde{w}}{\partial \tau} > 0$.

Proposition 4 underlies the reasoning behind Implications 2 and 4 through a similar logic as discussed above. When $H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) > H_D - c_D(F)$, the cost of the border camp, on domestic grounds alone, is greater than that of dispersal. This means that if border camps were chosen, it is because domestic interests were consistent with or dominated foreign policy interests. This is most likely to occur when the threshold, $\tilde{w}$ is large. Since in this case, $\tilde{w}$ is increasing in $\tau$, alternatives that decrease $\tau$ make foreign policy interests less salient. Thus, when domestic policy interests are driving the asylum country’s policy ($H_B - (s_B - c_B(F)) < H_D - c_D(F)$) and $\tilde{w} < 0$), the asylum country can do best by decreasing $\tau$, that is increasing the camp’s distance to the border (Implication 2) and decreasing containment of that camp (4).