Tools of single party hegemony in Tanzania: evidence from surveys and survey experiments

ABSTRACT

How do long-ruling parties maintain power in developing countries that have transitioned to democracy? This paper presents evidence about how power is maintained through instrumentalization of party institutions in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. First, I show that the ruling party maintains a large infrastructure of neighborhood representatives, and that in the presence of these agents, citizens self-censor about their political views. Second, I provide improved estimates of the frequency with which politicians give goods to voters at election time, demonstrating that such gifts are far more common in Tanzania than previous surveys have suggested. Finally, I use a survey experiment to test respondents’ reaction to information about corruption by politicians. Few voters change their preferences upon receipt of this information. Taken together, this provides a detailed picture of ruling party activities at the micro-level in Tanzania. CCM’s ten cell network provides the institutional substructure for political dominance. Citizens conceal opposition sympathies from ten cell leaders, either because they fear punishment or wish to receive benefits. These local party agents can monitor citizens’ political views, facilitating clientelist exchange. Finally, citizens’ relative insensitivity to clientelist practice helps explain why, even in formally democratic settings, politicians are not punished for these strategies.

KEYWORDS: dominant party democracies; clientelism; survey experiments; vote buying; Tanzania

“It is also necessary to have a strong political organization active in every village, which acts like a two-way all weather road along which the purposes, plans, and problems of government can travel to the people at the same time as the ideas, desires, and misunderstandings of the people can travel direct to the government. This is the job of the new TANU.”

-Julius Nyerere
“It was practically impossible to advance in Tanzanian society without the endorsement and approval of one’s house cell leader…it proved to be an extremely effective way to induce behavioral compliance with the system of one party dominance.”

-Michael Lofchie

INTRODUCTION

Compared to a generation ago, many more African countries are democracies. But genuine liberal democracies, with entrenched civil liberties, meaningful competition for executive power, and robust protections for minority rights, are still relatively rare. Much more common are “hybrid regimes” where the formal rules are democratic, yet political life is still completely dominated by one party or a small political elite. In some cases, the mechanisms of domination are readily apparent: These may include large-scale electoral fraud and violence, or thinly-disguised theft and clientelist distribution of natural resource rents. In other settings, however, the mechanisms of enduring single party rule are less blatant, and may be only partially visible to outside observers. The analytical challenge in these cases is to distinguish ruling parties that win consistently large electoral majorities due to genuine popularity from those that use relatively subtle yet illiberal strategies to maintain power.

Tanzania is a case in which the nature of the ruling party’s dominance, and the strategies that it has used to retain power, are in dispute. Some argue that the achievements of its ruling party, CCM, are the reason for its hold on power since independence, while others question whether CCM’s record alone could account for such complete political dominance. Lofchie (2014), for example, refers to one of the “political puzzles of modern Tanzania…how has the CCM been able to maintain high levels of popular support despite high levels of official corruption, and despite the fact that a rich and powerful oligarchy dominates the political system?” Similarly, O’Gorman notes that “the continuing strength of the CCM is puzzling. One would expect to see
scant support for a party which appears to neglect the vast majority of its citizens.” In this paper, I provide evidence about the ways in which Tanzania’s ruling party uses its mass organization in various ways—to discourage vocal grassroots dissent, to identify opposition supporters, and to distribute patronage—which are consistent with a less democratic form of single party dominance.

Identifying these mechanisms is important because Tanzania is often seen as well-governed relative to other countries in the region, with a strong national identity and a relatively functional democracy. Indeed, since the transition to multiparty politics in 1995, elections have been ostensibly free and fair (outside of Zanzibar), ethnic peace has been maintained, political violence has been relatively rare, and the country has typically been considered less corrupt than its neighbors Uganda and Kenya. Yet Tanzania’s politics is completely dominated by the ruling party, CCM, which has ruled the country since independence. Tanzania is therefore an important setting in which to study the strategies that dominant parties use to shape political outcomes in formally democratic settings.

In this paper, I report the results from two survey experiments and one quasi-experiment in Dar es Salaam, each of which measures a different aspect of the ruling party’s activities in practice. The first “quasi experiment” emerged through mistakes in the administration of a household survey, which meant that local ruling party representatives were present and observed respondents answer the survey (including political questions) in a subset of interviews. The second is a randomised list experiment to estimate the prevalence of vote buying. Using this technique, I show that vote buying appears to be far more common than previous estimates in the Tanzanian context have indicated. Finally, motivated by the apparently high prevalence of vote buying, I examine how respondents evaluate vote buying candidates when they are explicitly linked to corrupt activities, versus when there is no direct link between vote buying and
corruption. To do this, I test whether respondents are more likely to support a fictional candidate making an anti-corruption speech versus one making clientelist appeals and promising to distribute gifts during his campaign, both with and without information relating to one of the candidates’ involvement in corruption. I find that respondents are not very sensitive to information linking vote-buying politicians to corruption. I interpret this surprising result in light of another finding, which shows that respondents have very high baseline corruption expectations vis-à-vis political leaders in our sample.

LITERATURE

This paper speaks both to the literatures on single party regimes and on clientelism in developing countries. Huntington (1968) identified parties as the critical institutions that integrate new groups into the political process in developing countries experiencing rapid political change, while Zolberg (1966) noted the ways that post-independence political parties in sub-Saharan Africa often morphed into “party states” geared towards mobilizing supporters and monitoring the opposition. A more recent literature emphasizes the role that institutions such as parties (together with legislatures and elections) can play in explaining authoritarian persistence. Brownlee (2007) shows that institutionalized parties are often the glue that holds contemporary hybrid regimes together, by mitigating elite conflict, enabling elite collective action, and by lengthening time horizons for politicians. Levitsky and Way (2010) identify party scope and cohesion as a key predictor of competitive authoritarian regime survival, in part by ensuring elite cohesion when coercive measures are needed. Geddes (2006) stresses the role of parties as institutions that can deter threats to the regime from other elite institutions such as the military, and finds that single party regimes are more durable than other forms of authoritarianism. Boix and Svolik (2013) see parties as a mechanism of information exchange, which enables credible
commitment between leaders and their coterie, while Gelbach and Keefer (2012) stress that parties enable collective action by elites, preventing their expropriation and domination by the leader.⁹

As this brief review demonstrates, much of the “new institutionalist” research on authoritarianism focuses on the functions that parties fulfill at the elite level. By contrast, there has been less research on the role that dominant parties play in relation to the population at large. Notable exceptions include Magaloni (2006), Greene (2007), and Magaloni and Kricheli (2010). Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) stress not just the party’s role in enabling elite accommodation (a bargaining function), but also its use as a tool to mobilize support and deter opposition (a mobilizational function). Magaloni (2006) develops a formal model about the operation of the mobilization function in PRI-era Mexico, which was enabled by the party’s comprehensive local network of brokers and representatives, and provides empirical evidence about the ways that this punishment and reward system was put into practice.¹⁰ Greene (2007), also writing about Mexico, develops a similar resource-based theory of single party dominance, in which access to state resources and distribution of these resources as patronage entices citizens to support the dominant party, while exclusion from patronage networks as well as direct repression deter potential opponents.¹¹ In Tanzania, several recent papers have analyzed CCM as a hegemonic party along similar lines, also emphasizing the use of the party machinery to distribute patronage and discourage opposition.¹²

Nonetheless, a gap remains in this literature. Even in recent work that focuses on the use of dominant party structures to reward supporters or punish the opposition, there is limited direct observation of interaction between party representatives and voters. These “carrot and stick” strategies of patronage and punishment are typically informal and often illegal, and are thus
difficult to observe and measure systematically. Even when they can be measured via surveys, it is extremely difficult to estimate their impact on citizens. An advantage of this paper is a unique opportunity to observe the operationalization of both the deterrence of opposition and the reward of supporters using individual-level data, using plausibly exogenous variation in the presence of party cadres and randomized survey techniques. This paper thus contributes to the emerging literature on dominant party regimes by adding novel empirical evidence about how CCM operationalizes its hegemony in Tanzania.

This paper also speaks to the literature on clientelism and vote buying as practiced in Tanzania, focusing specifically on the ways in which clientelist political strategies are enabled by an institution (the ten cell network) which can monitor ground-level political activity. The limited observability of voting choice and of political preferences is a key challenge for clientelist strategies. Effective implementation of exchange with voters (payments in exchange for votes, for example) requires that parties have some way of verifying, however imperfectly, that the recipient complies with their end of the bargain. This could be through violation of the secret ballot, or through the maintenance of a network of representatives who closely observe local political discourse. However, there has been to date limited empirical evidence that party agents actually play this role, in Tanzania and elsewhere. The evidence presented here, which shows that party agents seek to learn – and respondents seek to conceal – true political preferences suggests that these agents do indeed play a monitoring role. Together with list experiment evidence demonstrating the high frequency of voter buying, I speculate that this monitoring plays a role in targeting of clientelist resources by CCM. Therefore this paper contributes to our understanding of the operationalization of clientelism in Tanzania.

POLITICS IN TANZANIA
Since independence in 1964, Tanzania has been ruled by a single party, known as the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), then as Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) after 1977. The country was a de facto single party state since independence, led by *Baba wa Taifa* (“Father of the Nation”) Julius Nyerere. He retired in 1985, and in 1995, Tanzania had its first multi-party election. Yet in the 20 years of multiparty politics, CCM’s hold on power has never been threatened, as the party has maintained between 60-80% of the vote and 70-90% of the seats in Parliament.

What explains such single party dominance? The “official” story is that Tanzanians appreciate CCM for its role in maintaining peace and stability, and because it was the party of Julius Nyerere, who was beloved for his personal integrity and his far-sighted policies to promote a Tanzanian sense of nationhood in place of ethnic and subnational identity. The alternative interpretation of Tanzanian politics, however, stresses that while CCM is legitimately quite popular, it is also very skilled at manipulating the institutional environment to ensure its continued reign. The first-past-the-post electoral system gives CCM a roughly 20% “seat bonus”, while the allocation criteria for appointed seats in Parliament further pads out their parliamentary majority. CCM similarly benefits from Tanzania’s “super-presidentialist” division of powers. The public campaign finance system awards funding in proportion to vote share, further entrenching CCM’s domination. Finally, there is also strong evidence that CCM uses rent-seeking to amass resources, which it then distributes strategically to entrench its rule.

However, Tanzania shares these features -- formal rules that favor the ruling party; the use of state resources for electoral advantage -- with many other African countries which have nonetheless seen highly competitive elections and executive turnover. What is most distinctive about the Tanzanian regime is not these formal rules but the partisan institutional environment -
- a legacy of Tanzania’s state-building process, which left the country with a massive party infrastructure down to the village and even neighborhood level -- and the way that this institutional structure interacts with a rent-seeking, clientelist political economy.\textsuperscript{21}

This massive network of party representatives perpetuates a historically fuzzy boundary between state and party. At the same time, it provides a way for the party to gather information from society, including about potential threats or emerging political challenges. Finally, the network is a potential channel for resource distribution, which can be activated during election campaigns.

**THE TEN CELL LEADER “QUASI-EXPERIMENT”**

Party and state, which had been completely fused in Tanzania during the single-party era, were not officially separated until the 1990s. Previously all civil servants and soldiers had to be CCM members, while regional and district commissioners were both party and state officials. At the local level, the ten cell was a party institution, but this distinction meant little when party and state were fused. Ten cells were first introduced between 1963 and 1965, first in Dar es Salaam and then progressively throughout the country.\textsuperscript{22} They were a feature of CCM’s large, hierarchical structure which incorporated mass participation and which allowed it to penetrate deeply into Tanzanian society. This apparatus ranged from the Central Committee of the National Executive Commission (with just 35 members), to the ten cell, which encompassed every ten households at the village level. As Barkan (1994) noted:\textsuperscript{23}

TANU established an extensive apparatus that paralleled all state institutions down to the village level. Basic political representation in Tanzania was via party organs, the lowest of which is the neighborhood cell of ten households and the highest the National Executive Committee (NEC). Election to each organ above the cell was indirect – by the membership of the organ immediately below – thus guaranteeing that the outcomes of the elections
at each level are consistent with the views of the leadership and NEC…organs from the ward on up maintain thousands of offices in the countryside from which to organize their activities.

Ten cells historically played an important role in electoral mobilization, collection of party membership dues, informing citizens about government policy, and maintenance of public order.24 During electoral campaigns, “the massive Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) network of 10 House Party Cells made it ‘very easy for the party to reach everyone in the country.’”25 Morse (2013) quotes opposition politician Mwesiga Baregu’s observation that “CCM has a grasp on their [voters’] minds – from the 10-house cell.”26

After the introduction of multiparty politics, party and state were separated, at least in theory. Yet observers have noted that “during Tanzania's transition to a multiparty system, the CCM deliberately created a set of political institutions that blurred the distinction between the Party and the State in order to keep its position and power secure.”27 While this strategy has been noted by observers of Tanzanian politics, there has not been any empirical evidence to date that it affects the voter behavior.

In 2009, a Tanzanian NGO called Twaweza implemented a household survey focused on public service delivery and governance in Dar es Salaam. Twaweza (later in partnership with the World Bank) then followed up this baseline survey with more than 25 rounds of follow up surveys using mobile phones, via a call center operated by the survey firm.28 All results reported below are from these surveys.

The survey “quasi-experiment” came about as part of field operations for the baseline survey. The survey team did not have access to National Bureau of Statistics enumeration area maps, which are the primary sampling units for most surveys done in Tanzania. Therefore, the team
constructed a sample frame by randomly selecting the lowest administrative level (the street or *mtaa*) and listing all households in each selected *mtaa*. However, in the course of field testing, it became apparent that mtaas were too large for cost effective listing. Mtaa-level officials, however, pointed out that there was a further, comprehensive but non-official administrative unit– the party institution known as the ten cell. Conducting the listing exercise at the ten cell level required working with the ten cell leader, known in Kiswahili as the *balozi* (or *mjumbe*). Since only the balozi knew which households in a particular neighborhood were part of his ten cell, he accompanied enumerators as they listed each household in the ten cell and made appointments to interview the selected respondents.

The quasi-experimental variation in survey implementation came about because in a number of cases, the ten cell leader (*balozi*) remained present during the actual interview. The survey team instituted a protocol to prevent this from happening, which involved bringing the ten cell leader/balozi away from the interview site to have a soda or other refreshment while interviews were actually conducted. However, for reasons which remain unclear, in a number of cases, this protocol was not followed. 17% of the sample (91 out of 550 respondents) received the questionnaire with the local ten cell leader (the *balozi* or *mjumbe*) present for part or all or part of the interview, while 83% received the questionnaire in a normal environment.

According to the “official” narrative, ten leaders are purely a channel of communication, enabling the party to communicate its policies to citizens, and also allowing citizens to give feedback to the party about their views. Others have suggested that the ten cell leader (*balozi*) plays a more insidious role, monitoring citizen behavior and perhaps ensuring loyalty to CCM. Through quasi-experimental “treatment” of balozi presence during survey implementation, this paper tests which of these two stories is closer to the truth. If the balozi is merely a helpful
information channel, his presence should not have much effect on survey answers. On the other hand, if his presence is less benign, respondents may unintentionally give evidence of this, by censoring themselves and giving “party line” answers to questions when the balozi is in the room.

As Table 1 shows, the respondents whose interviews the balozi was present for were similar across a range of observable demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, with exception of whether a household is urban or rural, and whether a household is in the poorest income quintile. In a regression framework, however, living in rural areas is the only significant predictor of balozi presence – the more frequent presence of the balozi for the poorest households is no longer significant. We therefore control for rural residence and wealth quintiles in all regressions.

[Table 1 here]

In interviews where the balozi was present for most of the interview (including the politics and governance module), 97% of respondents stated that they planned to vote for CCM parliamentary candidates, and 97% of respondents (n=72) said that they would vote for the CCM presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, while just 3% said that they would vote for opposition candidates. By contrast, with the balozi absent (n=379), 86% of respondents report that they intend to vote for incumbent Jakaya Kikwete (for President) and the CCM candidate (for parliament), with the remaining 14% reporting that they would support one of the opposition parties. This percentage who state their intention to vote for the opposition collapses from 14% of the sample to just 3% (2 respondents) when the balozi is present.33

[Table 2 here]
Moving beyond bivariate comparisons, we can estimate the effect of balozi presence on the likelihood that a respondent reports that he or she intends to vote for the ruling party, controlling for a range of covariates, including rural residence. Table 3 shows OLS models with vote intention for the CCM candidate (Jakaya Kikwete) as the outcome variable, and a rural dummy variable as a control in the first specification, with a wide range of socioeconomic controls in the second model, and with the same socioeconomic covariates as well as ward-level fixed effects in the third specification. Column 4 shows the increase in CCM vote in interviews where the balozi was present for some of the interview but not the politics module. (This result gives us confidence that the effect does not simply reflect the desire of the respondent to be agreeable for social reasons, such as to be polite to the balozi while he is present.) Across the four specifications, balozi presence is highly significant and increases the likelihood of a reported vote for CCM consistently, by 9-16 percentage points.

[Table 3 here]

This evidence suggests that at least part of CCM’s support is because voters they fear the consequences of being known to be an opposition supporter. This could affect voting, if respondents believe that the balozi can find out who they voted for. While in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, only 10% of Tanzanians doubted the secrecy of the ballot, there have been irregularities in recent elections, such as potentially identifying numbers included on ballots in 1995 and 2005. Even if citizens were confident that CCM could not find out which party they voted for, something that is clearly observable by the balozi is public support of opposition candidates, and similar forms of oppositional collective action. In any dominant party regime, opposition voters and activists face a collection action dilemma: No one wants to be the only activist, because in that case punishment is likely and electoral success is impossible. By
contrast, if opposition is evidently widespread, the potential costs of opposition are reduced and the odds of success are increased. If citizens in Tanzania are not willing to be publicly seen by the balozi (and by extension, by CCM) as opposition supporters, they will be unlikely to take the fundamental, publicly observable steps needed to create an effective opposition party, such as to publicly advocate for alternate policies and candidates, organize and attend opposition rallies, and campaign for opposition candidates.

**PATRONAGE POLITICS AND VOTE BUYING**

The monitoring role of the balozi likely interacts in important ways with the operation of clientelist networks in Tanzania. A large literature describes how political actors in Tanzania use state resources to establish patron-client networks, in which material benefits are exchanged for political support. Yet the existing empirical literature on clientelism in Tanzania largely focuses on the targeting of patronage resources at district level. By contrast this section, motivated by the previously-observed role of the balozi in monitoring vote choice, focuses on mass clientelist practices such as vote buying.

In most countries, vote buying is illegal (as it is in Tanzania) or at least socially discouraged, so respondents may not admit to it in surveys. A new literature uses the technique of the “list experiment”, which preserves respondent anonymity, to study this topic. List experiments, initially developed to measure racial bias in the US, involve dividing a survey sample into treatment and control groups, and asking respondents to report on the number of actions that they have done, from among a list of actions which includes the sensitive behavior for the treatment
group, but does not contain this behavior for the control group. They do not report on which behaviors they have done, they simply report the number of behaviors from the list, preserving anonymity. Since in expectation the frequency with which respondents will have done the activities is equal in treatment and control groups (because of randomization), subtracting the sum of the frequencies between treatment and control enables the researcher to estimate the “true” prevalence of the sensitive behavior. Corstange (2012), for example, uses a list experiment in Lebanon to study vote buying, finding that vote buying is two times more prevalent using the list experiment than under direct questioning. Most relevant for our context, Weghorst (2011) demonstrates that list experiments yield very different responses compared to standard survey questions when asking about sensitive political topics in Tanzania.

In Tanzania, discourse around vote buying focuses on the distribution of small gifts (known as “takrima” in Kiswahili) at campaign meetings or rallies. Such exchanges have a controversial history in Tanzania. They were legalised before the 2000 elections, with the justification that they represented a traditional form of African hospitality to attendees at campaign rallies. They were then outlawed again in 2006. Qualitative studies of Tanzanian elections have pointed to the ways in which the ruling party uses its financial muscle to hold large rallies and distribute material benefits. However, relatively little work has been done to study the actual frequency of this practice. If “takrima” is widespread, it would point to a large potential advantage for CCM, since it has vastly more resources than opposition parties.

In the baseline survey in 2010, respondents were asked: “Are you ever given small gifts by candidates running for political office or people who are campaigning for them (for example
food, soap, a t-shirt, alcohol?)” Just 6% responded affirmatively. Respondents were then asked in round five of the mobile phone survey: “In the last election, did you ever receive a small gift (soap, food, t-shirt, etc) from any candidate running for office?” This time twice as many respondents (13%) reported receiving such a gift. It seems likely that this increased level of reported vote buying reflects the greater comfort level of respondents after multiple survey rounds.\textsuperscript{45} Finally we used a randomised list experiment in a later mobile phone survey round (the text is presented in the appendix). The anonymity of the list experiment appears to have enabled even freer responses, revealing that between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in Dar es Salaam received a gift from a political candidate at some point during in the 2010 election season.

[Figure 1 here]
The broad range of point estimates in figure 1 illustrates a tradeoff. The truthfulness of respondents’ answers very likely increased over survey rounds, and then increased further when moving from the direct question to the list experiment. However, the representativeness of the sample was reduced as respondents attrited from the survey (only 2/3 of the baseline sample were reached for the mobile phone follow up questions about vote buying). Therefore, while we cannot generate a precisely measured point estimate of the incidence of vote buying, we can provide a set of plausible upper and lower bounds – all of which are significantly higher than what we uncover through direct questioning in the baseline. The 6% of respondents who openly admit to receiving gifts from politicians in our face-to-face baseline is almost certainly an underestimate. The estimates generated in round 5 of the mobile phone survey, where the unweighted point estimate is 12.9%, and the weighted estimate is 13.1%, are therefore a likely lower bound of the true frequency. The point estimates generated by the list experiment suggest a
much higher frequency of vote buying, either 27% respondents (unweighted for attrition), or 36% of respondents (weighted for attrition). Without the list experiment, it would appear that vote buying is roughly half as prevalent as it is in reality.

Bounding the incidence of vote buying in Dar es Salaam between 13% and 36% shows that this form of clientelistic exchange is far from a marginal phenomenon (as suggested by “naïve” direct survey questions) and is actually a very common component of modern campaigning in Tanzania. We can also observe that takrima is far more common than formal, programmatic forms of aid. The 2008-9 and 2010-2011 National Panel Surveys ask Tanzanians whether they anyone in their household had received food aid, food, cash or agricultural inputs in exchange for work, or school scholarships, over the past year from the government or a non-governmental source. While approximately 1 in 3 respondents had received campaigns gifts, only 4% of Tanzanian households received food aid in 2008-09 (6% in 2010-11); and fewer than 1 percent of Tanzanians received any of the other five forms of assistance.

It is important to note that we do not have information about which party distributed takrima. Opposition politicians have in the past been known to participate in vote buying, supported by personal wealth or contributions from supporters. Although some fraction of the vote buying reported in our sample is likely from opposition politicians, it is also true that CCM has vastly more resources than all opposition parties. To the extent that elections devolve into a contest of vote purchasing, they will inevitably have an upper hand. And while there may be diminishing returns to additional resources at some margin, it is also the case that to the extent that efficient vote buying requires a network of party agents to be implemented, CCM again benefits
disproportionately, since opposition party networks are far more limited. These factors in combination again help to explain the entrenched dominance of CCM, which is by far the richest party in Tanzanian politics and so has most ability to benefit when the use of private, non-programmatic sources of cash, such as “takrima”, become institutionalized.

**VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT**

The next step is to understand how such practices become widely accepted and practiced, despite being illegal. Recall that the public debate about takrima in Tanzania centered around whether giving voters handouts was a legitimate form of social exchange, or a form of corruption. This suggests that some fraction of voters may be uncertain as to whether election campaign handouts are genuine generosity from legitimately wealthy politicians, or whether such gifts are a tool used by politicians who finance their largesse through corruption. Corruption is by definition hidden, so uncertainty on this point is plausible. Due to uncertainty, voters may therefore fail to punish such politicians, leading to perpetuation of the corruption/vote buying equilibrium. To test this, we experimentally vary the degree to which campaign handouts (and clientelist campaigns more broadly) are explicitly linked to corruption, to see if this shifts voters’ reactions to candidates promising such goods.

It is important to note that there have been a number of recent examples of grand corruption linked to senior CCM politicians. For example in 2008, audit reports revealed that $133 million had been embezzled from the Bank of Tanzania. Also uncovered in 2008 was the Richmond power generation scandal, in which a private firm was given a lucrative contract (signed under irregular circumstances at the behest of then-Prime Minister) to supply emergency electricity,
and was paid despite never supplying any power. Another scandal, linked to the purchase of military air traffic control equipment, led to the resignation of then-attorney general Andrew Chenge. In 2014, yet another embezzlement scandal (of $122 million) at the Central Bank led to the resignation of the Attorney General and two ministers, the suspension of other senior officials, and the resignation of three MPs. Scandals of this magnitude have led observers like Booth et al. (2014) to be “shocked by the decentralised and apparently chaotic rent-seeking that has emerged as the main feature of the political settlement presided over by CCM during the last 20 years.”

Yet while grand corruption is clearly present, and linked to senior politicians, the extent to which voters link such corruption to on-the-ground partisan practices is unclear. The experiment was therefore designed to make such links explicit. In one mobile phone survey round, enumerators read all respondents two stylized “speeches” from hypothetical candidates: One speech promised patronage benefits to voters, including handouts at his campaign rallies, while the other promised reform and efforts to fight corruption. In a second, randomly selected group, respondents were presented with the same two speeches, but they were also told, in addition to some generic information about the candidates’ careers, that the “patronage” candidate had previously been accused of corruption. (Full speech texts are available in the appendix). Respondents in both the treatment and control groups were then asked which candidate (the “reform” candidate or the “patronage” candidate) they would be more likely to vote for if this had been a real election. The structure was designed to link the concept of vote buying and clientelist politics more closely with actual corruption, and by doing so, to see if this caused greater disapproval of the vote-buying/patronage candidate.

RESULTS
While respondents prefer the “reform” candidate over the “patronage” candidate in both treatment and control groups, we do not interpret this difference as meaningful, since the order of speeches was not randomized. All respondents heard the “reform” candidate’s speech last, potentially biasing them in favor of this message. Instead we focus on the results of the experimental treatment, which shows that respondents are only slightly more likely to prefer the reform candidate to the patronage candidate when they find out about the patronage candidate’s corrupt background: The anti-corruption candidate’s vote margin increases by just 4 percentage points, from 72% to 76%.

[figure 2 here]

The effect of linking corruption explicitly to patronage on voters’ preference for the non-corrupt politician is small in magnitude, and is not statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect grows even smaller in a regression framework when controls for randomization strata (gender and district of residence) are included.

[table 4 here]

This null result is strong evidence against the hypothesis that the reason that vote buying is effective is because of ambiguity about its relationship to corruption. It might seem surprising that information directly linking a candidate to corruption barely shifts his or her vote share. One possible explanation might be that this information did not shift voters’ priors about corruption, because they already believe that most politicians are corrupt. Corruption perceptions are quite difficult to measure accurately. From some standard sources, it might appear that Tanzanians do not perceive political figures to be predominantly corrupt. For example, in the 2008 Afrobarometer, many Dar es Salaam respondents perceived high corruption levels among tax
officials and police (1/3 believed all or most were corrupt), but were more sanguine about MPs, ward councillors, government officials, and the President (between 10%-16% believed all or most were corrupt).

[figure 3 here]

Our survey, however, suggests that if questions about corruption are asked in a more concrete fashion, reported expectations of corruption increase dramatically. In two separate survey rounds, the following questions were used:

- “Many people say that corruption is a big problem in Tanzania. Imagine that the government decided that, because of increase in prices, every household in Dar es Salaam should be given 10,000 Tsh in cash to help them buy food. How much of that Tsh 10,000 would actually arrive at your household?”

- “The capitation grant is a payment of 10,000 Tsh that every primary school in Tanzania is supposed to receive each year from the central government, that is, 10,000 Tsh for every student in primary school. If you had to guess how much of that 10,000 Tsh arrives at your child’s school and is spent correctly on your child’s education each year, how much would you estimate?”

This more specific form of questioning revealed very high corruption expectation. In both rounds, the modal response was 0 (67% of respondents in Round 5 and 46% in Round 20) and the mean response was 2,000 Tanzanian shillings. This suggests that voters expect that 80% of the value of the transfer would evaporate before it reached them. Evidently, when specific and concrete forms of distribution are specified, expectations of corruption are quite high. In this context, it makes more sense that adding additional information about a politician’s links to corruption – already assumed to exist by our respondents – would not shift their opinion about the politician appreciably.
DISCUSSION

This paper started by asking why the ruling party, CCM, has remained so dominant in Tanzania throughout the multiparty era, and has attempted to shed light on this question by analyzing CCM’s monitoring and clientelist networks through several survey experiments and quasi experiments. They highlight three factors. First, they show that the historical legacy of institutions from the single party days matter: CCM’s ten cell leader network is present and active in Dar es Salaam, and most Dar residents are unwilling to admit opposition support in its presence. This strongly suggests either that respondents fear being known as an opposition supporter, or they anticipate potential rewards for being known as a CCM supporter. Second, the list experiment shows that gifts from politicians are pervasive during election campaigns, with a true frequency that is 2-4 times greater than might be inferred from simple survey questions, and with vastly greater frequency than respondents receive other targeted benefits (such as food aid, agricultural inputs, or scholarships). This likely helps entrench CCM’s electoral edge, given that it maintains a dramatic financial advantage over opposition parties. While we do not have direct evidence linking vote buying to the balozi’s monitoring activity, I speculate that the verification problem around clientelist exchange was “solved” in Tanzania by the inheritance of a massive party-state apparatus, originally constructed for an ideological project of socialist transformation. Once it existed, however, it was available to be repurposed by CCM once their party’s modus operandi shifted. Finally, given that vote buying appears to be so pervasive – and yet its relationship to corruption is potentially ambiguous - we attempt to measure the sensitivity of this practice by testing whether respondents are less likely to support a patronage/vote buying
candidate when the candidate is linked to corruption. We find that calling attention to a background of corruption on the part of a political candidate does not significantly shift respondent voting intentions, potentially because voters already expect very high levels of corruption.

While this paper focuses on the role of CCM’s party apparatus in maintaining single party rule, it is also important to recognize that institutionalized ruling parties also have positive effects. In Tanzania, CCM has institutionalized executive leadership selection, and competitive elections for lower level posts enabled the circulation of elites even in the single party era. The point is not that a party such as CCM is, by necessity, an obstacle to good governance, but that in the Tanzanian context at least, its benefits must be weighed against the cost of reduced political space at the local level.

There has been much talk about the growing competitiveness of Tanzanian politics ahead of the 2015 elections. Yet the evidence from this paper suggests that even as elections grow more competitive, CCM still has extensive scope to ratchet up levels of patronage to its supporters, and to ensure a local public sphere in which mobilization in favor of opposition parties is rare and potentially costly. While structural forces such as urbanization, economic growth, and education are likely to increase political competition over time, any linear extrapolation from these trends to consolidated democracy in Tanzania must also account for the latent power of CCM’s legacy institutions, especially the ten cell/balozi network.

**CONCLUSION**

Analysts of African politics frequently point out that democracy in Africa has not translated into dramatic improvements in governance. But the specific mechanisms by which this happens are often not well understood. This paper presents evidence that the ten cell system, pervasive vote
buying, and low voter expectations from politicians are important mechanisms of ruling party dominance in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. While we cannot necessarily generalize our results to other areas of Tanzania, the fact that such strategies are pervasive in the relatively better-off capital city suggests that these patterns are likely common throughout Tanzania. These results highlight the path dependency of political outcomes, and the extent to which political institutions created in the past – such as mass mobilizational political parties – can establish durable equilibriums and lock in political advantage across generations. The legacy of the single party state is alive and well in Tanzania.
1. Bienen, “Tanzania.”
2. Lofchie, “The Roots of Civic Peace.”
5. Huntington, “Political Order in Changing Societies.”
15. It regularly wins large electoral majorities, and the 2012 Afrobarometer poll shows that 66% of Tanzanians report that they trust CCM “a lot” or “somewhat.”
16. Hoffman and Robinson, “Tanzania’s Missing Opposition.” For example in 2005 CCM gained almost 90% of directly-elected seats in Parliament with 70% of the popular vote.
17. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, “Tanzania’s Economic and Political Performance.”
22. Bienen, “Tanzania.”
24. At various points in Tanzanian history they played explicit roles in social mobilization and control. See Tripp, “Changing the Rules.”
26. Morse, “Party Matters.”
28. Over 80% of households owned mobile phones at baseline, and a subsample of the remaining households were given phones by the project team. See Croke et al 2014, “High Frequency Panel Data,” for more details.
29. The officials made it clear that the ten cell network covered the entire population, and was not limited to CCM supporters.
30. Hereafter “balozi.” The word means “ambassador” in Kiswahili; it refers to the balozi’s intended function as a messenger from the ruling party to citizens. Mjumbe means “messenger.”
32. Former Prime Minister Kawawa hinted at this when he told ten cell leaders that they “are the eyes of the nation... [they] must expose dangerous characters like thieves and other infiltrators who many poison our nation and put its safety at stake,” in Bienen, “Tanzania.”
33. The baseline survey took place 2-3 months before the 2010 general election.
34. I present OLS models here; probit models show almost identical marginal effects of balozi presence.
36. 72% of respondents in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey say that in Tanzania, you have to be careful what you say about politics.
37. Kuran, “Now Out of Never.”
39. See Rosenzweig, “Electoral Competition”
41. Corstange, “Vote Trafficking in Lebanon.”
42. Weghorst, “Political Attitudes and Response Bias.”
43. Lofchie, “Political Economy of Tanzania,” p. 45
44. Hoffman and Robinson, “Tanzania’s Missing Opposition.”
45. The effect is not driven by attrition: the results are almost identical if when restricted to respondents present in both rounds.
46. Since attrition was highly correlated with wealth quintile, the mobile phone survey was reweighted to restore the same wealth quintile distribution as in the baseline. Alternatively, a propensity score model incorporating a range of factors beyond wealth was estimated to generate weights. For details see Croke et al, “High Frequency Panel Data.”
47. Author’s calculations from National Panel Survey data; available upon request.
49. Elinanza, “Dar to Probe Radar Scandal.”
50. Kabendera, “Tanzania Cabinet Reshuffled.”
52. This is similar to the experiment done by Banerjee et al, “Are Poor Voters Indifferent?”
**Table 1: Comparison of the two groups (balozi and non-balozi)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>balozi</th>
<th>No balozi</th>
<th>(1)-(0)</th>
<th>P-Val</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.6887</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0346</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years school</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
<td>0.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>40.99</td>
<td>38.57</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.1457</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.097</td>
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<tr>
<td>married</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.6785</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0334</td>
<td>0.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own phone</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.9658</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.0391</td>
<td>0.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal sector</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.1684</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.0484</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.5695</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.0453</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improved sanitation</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.8908</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.0388</td>
<td>0.308</td>
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<tr>
<td>ever read</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.5838</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.0398</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poorest</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.0762</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.7312</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0656</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.2463</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.0592</td>
<td>0.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.0527</td>
<td>0.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>richest¹</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.5724</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.1133</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2: Self-reported voting intention in 2010 election, with and without balozi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>balozi present</th>
<th>balozi absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM President vote share</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM Parliament vote share</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same president (generic)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same MP/party (generic)</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Regression of balozi presence and covariates on Kikwete (CCM) vote share

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>balozi</td>
<td>0.108**</td>
<td>0.094**</td>
<td>0.104**</td>
<td>0.158*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years school</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>0.082**</td>
<td>0.089***</td>
<td>0.096**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ward fixed effects?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes: Column 4 is restricted to observations in which the balozi was present only for the political section of the interview.
Table 4: effect of corruption priming on candidate preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>treatment</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.131*</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treat x female</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Figure 1: Comparative corruption rankings in East Africa, 1995-2012.

Source: World Governance Indicators (World Bank)
Figure 2: reported frequency of vote buying in elections across survey methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Reported Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>baseline</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>round 5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>round 5 (weighted)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>list experiment</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>list experiment (weighted)</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: respondent preferences across treatment and control in the vignette experiment
Figure 4: Dar es Salaam respondent views on corruption, Afrobarometer 2008

□% who believe many or all are involved in corruption
Figure 5: Amount of hypothetical 10,000 Shilling ($7.50) cash transfer that respondents believed would reach them
APPENDIX

Vignette experiment text:

In the Listening to Dar survey this week, we will be doing something different. Instead of asking you a series of questions, this time we will read you a short speech, of the kind that a politician might make. It is not a real speech, and the people reading it are not real candidates. But we would like to imagine that it is a speech that you are listening to during an election campaign. We will read both speeches once, and if you like, we can repeat them. Then we will ask you which candidate you feel that you would be MORE likely to vote for. This has nothing to do with current political parties in Tanzania. We are not asking you about which party or political leader you vote for. We want you to just think about these particular messages about politics in Tanzania, without thinking about any particular party or candidate.

Speech A:

Good afternoon. I am running to be a Member of Parliament from this constituency and I would like to speak to you today about my candidacy. Here is why I think that I should be elected. So many politicians get to power and forget about the wananchi who supported them. I will not do that. When I come back to this area to hold meetings and greet wananchi, everyone will have something to eat. Here in Tanzania there is so much corruption. The big people are all eating. Why can’t regular wananchi get something too? Tanzania is a rich country, but none of the money makes its way down to the bottom. If you come to my campaign rallies, there will be some takrima for everyone. And I will make sure that some people from this area will get jobs with the government. That is how I will campaign, and that is how I will govern – I will make sure that I give people in this area something to eat, no matter what it takes. Then we will see how life gets better for wananchi.

Speech B:

Good afternoon. I am running for a Member of Parliament from this constituency and I would like to speak to you today about my candidacy. Here is why I think that I should be elected. I will fight corruption. Life in Tanzania is so hard, and that is because of corruption. That is why our schools are bad, our hospitals have no drugs, and our roads are not paved. So many politicians come to ask for your vote. They invite you to a meeting. They give you some takrima, some chai, or small money. And then they steal the big money from the budget that is meant to really improve life here – money for schools, roads, and hospitals. I will be an honest man in politics. I am going to into politics in order to fight corruption, no matter what it takes. Then we will see how life gets better for wananchi.

In treatment group, the following candidate descriptions were added:

Speech A: This speech is given by a candidate for Bunge. He has also lived in Dar es Salaam his whole life, and he is also a businessman. In addition, he was very involved with a political party in recent years. He was accused of embezzlement of funds during his work for the political party, however, and returned to his business career. Now he is seeking to run for parliament.
Speech B: This speech is given by a candidate for Bunge. He has lived in Dar es Salaam his whole life. He is a businessman, and has recently gotten more involved in politics. Now he is running for parliament.

Appendix B: List experiment design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control group:</th>
<th>Treatment group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1: attend community meeting in last year</td>
<td>Activity 1: attend community meeting in last year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 2: attend school committee meeting in last year</td>
<td>Activity 2: attend school committee meeting in last year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 3: attend a political rally or meeting during the last election campaign in 2010</td>
<td>Activity 3: attend a political rally or meeting during the last election campaign in 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Activity 4: received a small gift during the last election from a candidate (t-shirt, food, alcohol) during the last election. | }
Banerjee, Abhijit, Donald Green, Jeffrey McManus and Rohini Pande. “Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders are Criminal or Corrupt? A Vignette Experiment in Rural India.” Political Communications 31, no. 3 (2014): 391-407.


