The Effectiveness of US Human Rights Policy, 1973–1980

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While US human rights policy has been the object of intense debate and discussion, few serious attempts have been made to assess and explain the effectiveness of US human rights policy towards Latin America. An assessment of the influence of US policy is essential, not only as a guide to future policy-making, but as a means of strengthening our understanding of the causes of and remedies for repression in the hemisphere. This chapter presents a preliminary analysis of the influence of US human rights policy on human rights practices and democratization in Argentina, Guatemala, and Uruguay in the 1970s and early 1980s, primarily focusing on the Carter period. In each of these cases, the United States attempted to influence the domestic human rights situation through linking the improvement of human rights practices to the provision of military or economic aid. But the nature of the pressures applied and the responses to human rights pressures were quite different in the three countries.

The Carter Administration human rights policy has been criticized as ineffective and inconsistent. Yet many analyses of human rights policies fail to explore the precise linkages between the implementation of policy and the changing human rights practices in specific countries. This requires careful case-by-case research not possible in large quantitative studies or studies that focus only on the US policy-making process without examining the response to US policy in target countries. Secondly, most discussions of the effectiveness of US human rights policy look only at the short-term impact of the policy on repressive practices. Although the short-term impact of a human rights policy is important, it is equally essential to evaluate the longer-term impact of human rights
policies, especially the impact on democratization. In the midst of the current concern with supporting democracy, the effectiveness of the Carter human rights policy deserves a re-evaluation.

Using the case-study approach and looking at both policy implementa
tion and the response in selected countries, I conclude that US human rights policy was neither as disastrous as its critics alleged nor as successful as initially promised. I argue that the Carter policy was partially effective in both the short term and the long term in Argentina and Uruguay, but to different degrees, and in different ways. In the short term, the policy helped to limit direct human rights abuses, but also, by helping to isolate military regimes from a traditional ally by removing symbolic and material support, the US human rights policy indirectly contributed to the transition to democracy. In Guatemala, where a true transition to democracy has yet to occur, US policy failed to make a contribution to respect for human rights in either the short term or the long term. The purpose of this study is to examine the conditions under which a human rights policy can be effective.

1. Defining Effectiveness

The first task is to define what we mean by a successful or effective human rights policy. In the first instance, a successful human rights policy is one that has an immediate impact on the victims of human rights abuses: that saves live, stops torture, and helps get political prisoners released from prison. This is a central goal of any effective policy, and must be taken into account in any discussion of success. This is what is referred to here as the short-term impact of human rights policy.

But we cannot limit our definition of success only to the direct impact on victims of repression. As important as it is to help victims, human rights policy has broader objectives in addition to direct assistance.³ In particular, I am interested in looking at the impact of human rights policy on:

(1) the strengthening of regional and international human rights organizations;
(2) destabilizing and delegitimizing authoritarian governments, and contributing to redemocratization;
(3) influencing the linkages between the political opposition in Latin America and US policy-makers; and
(4) reinforcing transnational linkages between human rights
groups in Latin America and policy-makers and NGOs in the United States. This is what I refer to as the long-term impact of human rights policy. In a broad sense, changes in each of these dimensions could make a contribution to the democratization process in Latin America.

As a starting-point for this discussion, it is first necessary to relax the unitary actor assumption inherent in much research on foreign policy. As the disputes within the US government between the newly formed Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) and the American Regions Area (ARA) in the State Department during the Carter Administration made clear, the US government did not speak with a single voice on human rights policy towards Latin America, and the outcome of policy often depended on which side won out in a particular internal debate. In the United States, the primary relevant actors in making human rights policy include Congress, the different parts of the executive branch, and the US human rights lobby, as well as domestic business groups who were potentially affected by human rights legislation.

In authoritarian regimes the number of actors making policy is much smaller, since the influence of political parties and some interest-groups is diminished. Nevertheless, common to the literature on military regimes in Latin America is the distinction between the soft-liners (blandos) and the hard-liners (duros) among the military. Military leaders must negotiate with other branches of the armed forces, as well as with hard-liners or soft-liners within their own force. The concerns of some interest-groups, such as business organizations, may also play a role within the domestic game in military regimes. The outcome of human rights policy depended on the ways in which the external pressures interacted with the internal negotiations within the authoritarian regime.

In a chapter that focuses on US policy, it is important to remember that US human rights policies are only one part of a broader process of international human rights pressures involving international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other governments. To study the influence of human rights policy in Latin America we must understand the ways US policy fit within the wider international context of human rights pressures. More than any other issue area, the human rights area presages the possibility of positive international humanitarian linkages, binding together the effort of non-governmental organizations interacting with government policies and international organizations to promote positive change.
Any examination of US human rights policy cannot ignore the earlier role of the United States in contributing to the rise of the very regimes responsible for human rights abuses. Such historical responsibility is the result of both direct and indirect actions, including military interventions, diplomatic manoeuvres, the US contribution to military training in National Security Doctrine, direct police training through the office of Public Safety, and the ongoing covert activities of the CIA operatives in these countries. The recognition of historical US responsibility in contributing to the emergence of authoritarian regimes, however, does not invalidate the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of US human rights policy during the Carter Administration. In fact, past responsibility points more urgently to the need to develop and evaluate alternative policy goals and means that can build a more constructive relationship between the USA and the region. I believe that human rights policy offers this potential.

2. Background

In the seven-year period from 1973 to 1980, the United States substantially altered its external policy by explicitly incorporating human rights criteria into the foreign policy calculus. To say that a country has a human rights policy does not imply that human rights considerations are taken into account in all bilateral relations, but rather that there are explicit mechanisms for integrating human rights concerns into foreign policy, and that these have modified foreign policy decisions in some cases. Although human rights policy is usually associated with the Carter Administration, it actually began in the Congress well before Carter was elected.

When Carter took office, virtually all of the essential human rights legislation was already in place. In addition to the standard array of diplomatic tools, the new human rights legislation led to the adoption of new policies, including the annual Country Reports on Human Rights; the diplomatic initiatives of the newly created Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights or of human rights officers in embassies; cut-offs of bilateral military assistance and sales and of bilateral economic aid; no-votes or abstentions on multilateral loans in the international financial institutions; and the denial of export financing through the Export–Import Bank.

During the Carter Administration the human rights concerns that the Congress initiated were strongly endorsed by the executive, and incorporated as a crucial component of the administration’s foreign
policy, although the administration opposed human rights legislation that appeared to place limits on Executive discretion in foreign policy-making. The cases of US human rights policy towards Argentina, Guatemala, and Uruguay illustrate the range of new and old policy tools available to policy-makers and the degree of Executive discretion as to how forcefully policy was implemented.

Argentina

The military coup that brought General Jorge Videla to power in 1976 was preceded by an upsurge in activities by right-wing death squads and by left-wing guerrilla movements. Once in power, the military government initiated a programme of brutal repression of the opposition, including mass kidnappings, imprisonment without charge, torture, and murder.6

Early in the Carter Administration, Argentina was chosen as one of three human rights target countries, along with Ethiopia and Uruguay. According to one State Department official, no human rights situation created greater concern in Washington than that of Argentina in the 1970s.7 In 1977 the Carter Administration reduced the planned level of military aid for Argentina due to human rights abuses.8 In July 1977 Congress passed a bill eliminating all military assistance to Argentina, which went into effect on 30 September 1978.9 A number of high-level delegations met with the junta members during this period to discuss human rights, including a delegation to Argentina led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Vance carried with him on this visit a list of approximately 7,000 disappeared people in Argentina, which was presented to Argentine authorities.10

In the multilateral financial institutions, the United States voted against or abstained on 23 of 25 Argentine loan applications, although no loan was denied because of a US 'no' vote. During meetings of President Videla of Argentina with both President Carter and Vice-President Mondale, the US requested that Videla invite the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) for a visit to Argentina as a means of improving US–Argentine relations.11 In exchange the USA offered to release Export–Import Bank funds to Argentina that had been blocked because of Argentine human rights abuses.12 In December of 1978 the Argentine government invited the IACHR to conduct an on-site investigation. Although human rights pressures were relaxed in 1980 as the United States tried to gain Argentine co-operation with the grain embargo to the Soviet Union, the ban on arms sales continued until 1983.
Guatemala

During the period 1954–76, Guatemala was a major recipient of US military and economic assistance, including substantial training and equipment for military and police officers. In Guatemala police brutality and military repression against civilians has been commonplace since the late 1960s, when the military was joined by private death squads organized under the patronage and approval of the government and army. Within this general framework of repression, however, the human rights situation deteriorated in the period from 1978 to 1982. In 1980 evidence surfaced of a specialized agency, under the control of President Lucas García and located in an annexe to the National Palace, that co-ordinated the actions of various private death squads and regular army and policy units.

Although Congress eliminated all military aid to Guatemala for the period from 1978 to 1983, military supplies already in the pipeline continued to flow, and the administration continued shipments of some military supplies by reclassifying them as non-military items. The primary means Guatemala used during this period to obtain military equipment and technology from the United States was commercial sales made by US companies to the Guatemalan government and private businesses but licensed by the US government. Continued military sales during this period indicate the Executive’s lack of commitment to implement fully the human rights policy in Guatemala. Neither the administration nor Congress took any steps toward cutting economic aid or imposing trade sanctions as they did to Argentina and Uruguay. The United States opposed two multilateral development bank loans to Guatemala on human rights grounds, but approved five others during this period. US human rights policy towards Guatemala became even more compromised after the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979, when policy towards Central America became dominated by the perceived threat of revolution throughout the region.

Uruguay

Because the military took power in a more gradual three-stage coup in 1973, maintaining the civilian president in power, and because the coup in Uruguay was overshadowed by the more dramatic coup in Chile three months later, it took longer for international public opinion to understand the profoundly repressive nature of the new Uruguayan regime. Repression in Uruguay was not characterized by massacres and death squads, as in Guatemala, or by legions of disappeared people, as in Argentina. Instead the military
implemented a programme of far-reaching arrests, routine torture of prisoners, and complete surveillance of the population. In 1976 Amnesty International estimated that 60,000 people had been arrested and detained in Uruguay; one out of fifty Uruguayan had been through some period of imprisonment since the coup. Seventy-eight prisoners died in prison, many as a result of torture. With its 1976 report detailing extensive human rights abuses, Amnesty International brought the human rights situation in Uruguay to the attention of Congressman Edward Koch, who led the movement to ban military aid. The Koch amendment was one of the earliest country-specific cut-offs of military aid motivated by human rights concerns. Early US human rights policy to Uruguay sent mixed messages because of differences between Congress and the Executive branch, but under the Carter Administration US human rights policy towards Uruguay from 1977 to 1980 was one of the most coherent and consistent of all the bilateral human rights policies. In 1977 Secretary of State Vance announced that the United States would reduce economic aid to Uruguay, making it a test case of the new administration's commitment to take human rights into consideration in the granting of economic aid. The USA also opposed 12 of 13 loan requests from Uruguay in international financial institutions during the period 1977–80.

Although the United States kept a lower profile with Uruguay on the human rights issue than in the case of Argentina, under the guidance of Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, it maintained strong and consistent pressure on the Uruguayan military. Early in 1980, however, the Carter Administration approved the sale of three search-and-rescue aircraft, apparently as a means of encouraging the move towards the plebiscite that year. The Uruguayan people's dramatic defeat of the military constitutional draft is generally considered the turning-point for the transition to democracy and the eventual improvement of human rights practices.

This simple recounting of bilateral relations between the United States and the three countries, however, does not give adequate attention to the very substantial behind-the-scene role played by non-governmental human rights organizations during this period. Non-governmental human rights groups provided the information to US policy-makers about human rights abuses that served as a basis for human rights policy. Human rights organizations presented information on human rights abuses and recommended contacts to give testimony at hearings that provided the basis for Congressional decision-making on Guatemala, Uruguay, and Argentina.
3. Judging the Effectiveness of Human Rights Policy

Direct Impact on Victims of Repression

US human rights policy had very different impact on the victims of human rights abuses in the three countries. In Argentina it appears that US human rights policy contributed to limiting the practice of disappearances. In Guatemala, however, there was no immediate discernible impact on the victims of repression; to the contrary, human rights abuses actually escalated during the period 1976–80, compared with the previous four-year period. In Uruguay US pressure appears to have contributed to the release of a considerable number of political prisoners.

In the cases of Argentina and Uruguay I do not argue that external pressures, in and of themselves, led to changing human rights practices. Rather, external pressures influenced internal negotiations within the military governments, lending crucial weight to the positions of soft-liners within these regimes. The external influence is necessary but not sufficient to explain the changes, since to function it must coincide with the agendas of internal actors. The following section will summarize the evidence that leads to these conclusions.

Estimates of the total number of the disappeared in Argentina vary from 6,000 to 30,000. The National Commission on Disappeared People (CONADEP) received 8,960 documented cases of disappeared individuals whose whereabouts is still unknown. The great bulk of these disappearances occurred during the two-year period 1976–8: by 1979 the number of disappearances was much lower, and after 1980 the practice was no longer used. At the same time, over 10,000 people were illegally detained and imprisoned; many others were threatened, robbed, and removed from their jobs.

Although it is difficult to chart the exact causes for the changing patterns of disappearances and imprisonment in Argentina, there is evidence that the decline in the use of the practice of disappearances followed a period of intense international scrutiny, and the convergence of strong US pressures on the Videla–Viola regime. In the period that followed the decision to invite the IACHR, the human rights situation in Argentina improved significantly; especially noteworthy was the decline in the practice of involuntary disappearance for which the Argentine regime had gained international notoriety. The decline in the practice of disappearance is particularly noticeable in the period following September 1978. At this point, the Congressional arms embargo went into effect, the Ex-Import Bank loan to Argentina was still being withheld, and at high-level meetings, US officials had stressed the importance of
improving human rights practices and the invitation to the IACHR as a pre-condition for improved bilateral relations. This analysis of the impact of US policy is reinforced by the testimony of a number of victims and some interviews with Argentine policy-makers during the military regime.

The counterfactual argument that one has to confront here is that the changes in levels of repression were due to an internal dynamic in Argentina that happened to coincide with external pressure, but was not related. What this fails to take into account are the divisions within the Argentine military about the definitions of ‘the enemy’ and the necessary extent of the dirty war. One faction was led by Admiral Massera, a right-wing populist, another by Generals Carlos Suárez Masón and Luciano Menéndez, who supported indefinite military dictatorship and unrelenting war against the left, and a third, led by Generals Videla and Viola, who hoped for eventual political liberalization under a military president.

It is of crucial importance which one of these factions prevailed, and in particular, the way in which international pressures influenced the internal negotiating process within the Argentine military. By 1978, when the Videla–Viola faction had emerged supreme within the junta, US–Argentine relations, and to a lesser extent Argentine relations with European countries, had deteriorated over the human rights issue. Meanwhile, the conflict with Chile over the Beagle Canal had intensified in mid-1978, while relations with Brazil remained troubled.

Videla and Viola understood that in order to improve their international image, as part of the process of military-led political liberalization they were advocating, some kind of explanation of past repression would have to be provided. It appears that they saw the visit of the IACHR and its report as a potential means of whitewashing or drawing a curtain over the past by providing a minimal explanation of abuses, while placing emphasis on the limited process of liberalization they were initiating. Thus the international pressures played into the internal conflicts within the Argentine military, adding strength to the argument that something had to be done to change repressive patterns and improve external relations. The strengthening of Videla’s position in the autumn of 1978, and the problems Argentina faced in the foreign policy realm, combined with US pressure, helps to explain Videla’s willingness to deliver on his promise to invite the IACHR to visit Argentina.

In the Guatemalan case, the situation was quite different. Although the United States had linked military assistance and sales to the improvement of domestic human rights practices, US human rights policy towards Guatemala was less comprehensive and forceful than
its policy towards Argentina. The period following the cut-off of US assistance witnessed not a decline in human rights abuses, but an escalation in outright killings and disappearances. While estimates of human rights abuses differ for the period, there is agreement that 1978 marked the beginning of an escalation of repression which continued for the next five years, during the administrations of General Lucas García and General Ríos Montt.32

US policy was less effective in Guatemala because it was ambiguous and less forceful, and also because there was no internal faction inside the military willing to respond. Contrary to the situation in Argentina, where many commentators spoke of 'moderates' (albeit murderous ones) within the military, by the 1970s in Guatemala, the reformist groups within the Guatemalan military had been virtually eliminated.33 The Guatemalan military had received substantial US assistance and training over twenty years. In many ways, past US influence (especially during the coup of 1954, and the counter-insurgency campaign of 1966–8) contributed to the structure of the Guatemalan military that later blocked US human rights pressures.34

In Guatemala the revolutionary forces were gaining strength during the period 1975–80. It is estimated that by 1979 the guerrillas had at least 1,800 armed men, and substantial civilian support.35 The upsurge in the rural insurgency in Guatemala in the late 1970s served to unify the military ideologically and to focus them on the shared task of counter-insurgency. In this context, the military viewed US human rights policy as interventionist, divisive to the military as an institution, and an interference in the strategy of counter-insurgency.

In Uruguay, US and international human rights pressures contributed to the release of political prisoners. In the two years that corresponded to the most intense human rights pressures, 1977–9, the number of political prisoners dropped from around 4,300–5,000 to between 1,000 and 2,500.36 US human rights pressure focused on the problem of political prisoners, with the embassy playing an active role in urging the release of prisoners.37 Although it is impossible to discover the exact cause of the release of each prisoner, US pressure appears to have contributed to this reduction in the number of prisoners.

Other Measures of Effectiveness

The discussion above mainly focuses on the short-term impact or lack of impact of US human rights policy on the victims of repres-
sion. It is more difficult to judge the long-term effectiveness of a human rights policy, because there is no clear yardstick to use to measure success. Nevertheless, it is essential to attempt to evaluate these other criteria because the long-term impact of a human rights policy may be more important than the short-term impact. The following discussion represents a first attempt to consider the longer-term effect of human rights policy in the three case countries.

**Strengthening regional and international human rights organizations.** If US human rights policy contributed to strengthening regional and international human rights organizations, then it is more likely to have had a long-term effect on human rights practices. Indirectly, these human rights organizations worked together with US human rights policy to magnify the effect of bilateral pressures, and they continued to function even after Carter left office, providing ongoing monitoring and reporting on human rights situations in Latin America.

In the case of Argentina, there is evidence that the Carter Administration human rights policy towards Argentina contributed to strengthening regional and international human rights organizations, especially the IACHR. The Carter Administration worked to strengthen the human rights activities of the OAS: it increased the US financial support of the IACHR fourfold during its administration, signed the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and encouraged Latin American nations to do the same.38

The request for the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was not a unique feature in the Argentine case, but a request that the Carter Administration officials made to the officials of many repressive regimes in Latin America. A side-effect of this policy was the fortifying of the regional organization. In the Argentine case the routine request to invite the IACHR became a key linchpin in the negotiations. The Carter Administration may have hit upon one of the few face-saving alternatives that allowed the Videla administration to respond to human rights pressures. A report by a regional organization was more legitimate in the eyes of the Argentine government and public, and less compromising to the government than direct interference from the US government. It was not until the IACHR report was written after the visit that Videla and Viola realized that they had seriously misjudged the Commission. In the words of one observer, the Commission’s report ‘boomeranged’ on Videla.

The Argentine case also had very important repercussions on the main UN human rights body, the Human Rights Commission.
In a well-documented book on this topic, Iain Guest shows ‘how, after seizing power in 1976, Argentina’s military rulers set out to cripple the UN’s human rights machinery in an effort to muzzle international protest, and how—with the support and encouragement from the Carter Administration—the UN fought back. This fight rejuvenated the UN’s ponderous human rights machinery.’

The very able diplomacy of the Argentine foreign service, with the support of the Soviet Union, with which the Argentine military regime had developed a close trading relationship, initially blocked consideration of the Argentine human rights situation at the UN. The creation of the UN Working Group on Disappearances in 1980, with strong US support, allowed the UN a less politicized forum to draw attention to the practice of disappearances in Argentina and elsewhere in the world. Jerome Shestack, Carter’s delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission’s 1980 session, and former president of the International League for Human Rights, played a central role in the creation of the Working Group on Disappearances. The UN policies during the Reagan Administration, however, undermined many of the advances in the human rights machinery at the UN made during the 1970s.

The Carter Administration also attempted to interpose regional and international organizations in the case of Guatemala, but with much less success. During this period, the Guatemalan government refused to permit an on-site visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, or to co-operate with any international or regional human rights organization. The Guatemalan government effectively stonewalled the IACHR by extending a formal invitation for a visit, but then never agreeing to set a date for the visit. The IACHR still issued a report on human rights in Guatemala, but without an on-site visit the report was less forceful, and there was no possibility for the visit of the Commission to have an impact on domestic public opinion as in the case of Argentina. The effectiveness of UN action on Guatemala was also limited. During the height of repression, 1978–82, the Guatemalan government avoided UN investigation. When a special UN human rights investigator was appointed in 1983, he became what one author referred to as ‘a full-blooded apologist for the Guatemalan government and the most “politicized” human rights investigator ever appointed in the UN’.

The Uruguayan government also refused to permit the IACHR an on-site visit to prepare its 1978 report on the human rights situation in Uruguay. Nevertheless, the IACHR issued reports in 1978, 1979, and 1980 outlining abuses of human rights in Uruguay,
reports that were later adopted by the OAS General Assembly. As a result of this human rights record, and lobbying by Venezuela and the USA, the OAS permanent council rejected the Uruguayan government’s offer to host the meeting of the General Assembly in 1978.\textsuperscript{42}

Aside from the OAS, the international body most active on Uruguay was the UN Human Rights Committee, generally considered the most forceful part of the UN human rights machinery. Prior to the dictatorship, Uruguay had signed the optional protocol of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which permitted individual citizens to bring claims against Uruguay in the UN Human Rights Committee. Under this provision, the Committee considered a number of individual cases of violations of human rights in Uruguay, and found the government responsible for diverse human rights abuses, including torture and arbitrary detention. The committee published its findings in press releases, and called upon the Uruguayan government to release the prisoners and provide compensation.\textsuperscript{43} Because of the legal legacy of Uruguayan ratification of the optional protocol, the UN human rights activity was more effective in Uruguay than in Argentina and Guatemala. US human rights policy, however, was less responsible for UN action on Uruguay, since the UN Human Rights Committee is made up of members who serve in their individual capacity.

**Destabilizing and delegitimizing authoritarian governments, and contributing to redemocratization.** The human rights policy designed by Congress and endorsed by the Carter Administration was focused on a relatively limited number of gross violations of basic rights, including torture, summary execution, and prolonged detention without trial. In this sense, it was not designed to promote democracy.\textsuperscript{44} Nevertheless, it is useful to ask if one of the indirect effects of US human rights policy under Carter was to contribute to redemocratization in Latin America. If this is the case, the long-term effects of the bilateral policy are enhanced, since democratic government’s human rights practices are far superior to the records of non-democratic regimes.

One of the clearest examples of Carter human rights policy making a direct contribution to redemocratization is in the Dominican Republic in 1978. After twelve years of authoritarian rule under Joaquín Balaguer, the 1978 elections represented the possibility of a transition to a more democratic regime. When it became evident that the opposition party was winning, however, a group of military officers stopped the vote count. International and domestic
protest was massive and immediate. According to Jonathan Hartlyn, however, 'the most important actions came from the United States. This included visits by embassy staff and military attachés, strong statements by Secretary of State Vance and President Carter . . . and a phone call to the Dominican military from General McAuliffe, the commander in chief of the Southern Command in Panama.' As a result of this external and internal protest, the opposition candidate, S. Antonio Guzmán, was allowed to take office.

None of the cases considered in detail here offer such a clear case of a direct contribution to redemocratization. The causes of redemocratization in Argentina are usually traced to the impact of the defeat in the Falklands-Malvinas war on the military and the pressures of domestic societal groups for change. While the United States did not play an important role in the immediate transition to democracy in Argentina and Uruguay, however, it had an influence in both countries at a crucial turning-point in the decision to initiate a process of liberalization.

In Uruguay, US pressure appeared to have contributed to pushing the military towards adopting a timetable for a transition to democracy. Some authors agree that the adoption of the so-called cronograma (timetable) for transition was in part the result of pressure from the Carter Administration. Just as in the case of Argentina, external pressures influenced the internal negotiations among the military, strengthening the position of the soft-liners. According to Charles Gillespie, 'partly as a result of pressure from the Carter Administration, the power struggle in the army resulted in a complex victory for the proponents of what was called the "cronograma".' Other authors minimize the role of external pressures in the process of redemocratization, stressing instead the pressure of internal political groups, especially political parties, and the democratic tradition within the Uruguayan armed forces. After the plebiscite in 1980, the dynamic of redemocratization was clearly internal, but during the more repressive period in Uruguay from 1976 to 1979, internal political groups were barely permitted to function. It is at this point that a stronger case can be made for the importance of external factors. It appears true that a stronger democratic tradition existed in the Uruguayan military than in the other military forces in the Southern Cone. For example, the number of military officers in Uruguay forced to retire early because of their apparent support for political opening is much higher than in either Argentina or Guatemala. For example, in 1977 alone, over 75 officers were forced into retirement. Yet, the purges themselves indicate that the pro-democracy officers were a minority and
the hard-liners continued to have the upper hand. In this situation, international pressures helped to throw new weight behind the arguments of the soft-liners.

Yet, perhaps the most important impact of US human rights policy on the process of redemocratization was the removal of symbolic support for the military regime, which in turn contributed to delegitimization of the regime. It is extremely difficult to document the impact of these symbolic gestures, but they should not be underestimated.

For example, in February 1977 Robert White, the US ambassador to the OAS, addressed the opening session of the seventh meeting of the Inter American Council on Education, Science and Culture in Montevideo, saying ‘culture cannot enrich the lives of our citizens unless the state protects certain rights . . . the right of assembly, freedom of expression, protection against arbitrary arrest and punishment’. White’s speech was published in full by two daily newspapers in Uruguay, but the military denounced it as a ‘veiled but direct attack on the country’. The military banned further diffusion of the speech, and prohibited journalists from either commenting on the text or interviewing White.

Another key symbolic moment in Uruguay came in September 1976, when Uruguayans were surprised to find in their normally highly censored daily newspapers a partial transcript of hearings in the US Congress on human rights abuses in Uruguay. The rumour circulated that the US embassy in Montevideo had pressured the Uruguayan government to allow publication of the transcript. This is almost certainly not true, since Ambassador Siracusa had made clear his opposition to the attempts by the Congress to cut off aid. President Aparicio Mendez of Uruguay was so outraged by the debate that he later made remarks to the press accusing Senator Edward Kennedy of being linked to sedition and a supporter of Fidel Castro. This in turn led to the unexpected result that the government closed a newspaper, La Mañana, for one day for having quoted remarks made by the President of Uruguay.

In Guatemala, eventually the extreme corruption of the Lucas García government and the sense of increasing international isolation led to the ousting of that government in March 1982. US military aid cut-backs were among the multiple factors that contributed to the coup against the Lucas García regime. As government reserves declined, junior officers became increasingly concerned about the lack of adequate supplies, and some even called for a reduced level of human rights violations to improve the military’s image. This regime change, with General Ríos Montt taking power
in a coup, did not lead to an improvement in human rights practices. Later, in 1985, Guatemala did experience a transition to the civilian regime of Cerezo, but not to full democracy, since the military retained extraordinary power and human rights abuses continued at very high levels. In one sense, US human rights policy has contributed to crude forms of redemocratization in Guatemala by encouraging Guatemalan elites to move towards civilian-led governments. But instead of serving to promote respect for human rights, these tenuous civilian regimes served to diminish international awareness of human rights abuses in Guatemala and legitimize continued military aid in spite of ongoing human rights abuses.

Influencing the linkages between the political opposition in Latin America and US policy-makers. Some authors have suggested that one of the main effects of US human rights policy was to win friends among democratic opposition parties. This pattern was far from uniform, however, and varied significantly from country to country. In Argentina Carter’s human rights policy did not lead to the development of strong linkages between the opposition political parties and US policy-makers. The greater success of the military government in mobilizing Argentine nationalism against international human rights pressures led Argentine political parties to be extremely cautious in avoiding association with the human rights policy and the Carter Administration. Even human rights organizations were initially very reluctant about developing contacts with US policy-makers, because of the general assumption that it was anti-national to denounce the actions of your government to representatives of the United States.

In terms of its influence on political parties in Argentina, at most US human rights pressure can be said to have contributed indirectly to changing the terms of political discourse used by political parties and other societal groups, including the Catholic Church, to talk about repression. In Argentina the great majority of the military believed that they were fighting (and winning) an irregular war against international subversion, and that they should be thanked, not condemned, by domestic and international groups. The military has never retreated from this discursive position. But domestic and international human rights pressures may have had an impact on civilian and public understanding about the nature of the conflict in Argentina. Initially, the military were able to use international human rights pressures to their advantage. In the late 1970s a large number of Argentine citizens accepted the government
line that international human rights activity was part of an international anti-Argentine campaign to discredit their country. International human rights pressures initially sparked a nationalist backlash that galvanized support for the military government.

The major political parties in Argentina during this period adopted an ambivalent position on the issue of human rights. Some sectors of the political parties adopted the government’s discourse and definition of the situation as one of ‘war against subversion’ rather than as a problem of human rights abuses. Political party leaders, with a few notable exceptions, were unwilling to participate in the activities of human rights organizations or to endorse their definition of the Argentine situation as one of massive human rights violations initiated by the highest levels of the armed forces. The first time that an Argentine political party denounced human rights violations before an international body was in September 1979. After meeting with the delegates of the IACHR during their visit to Argentina, the leader of the Peronist party issued a public statement denouncing the ‘death and/or disappearance of thousands of citizens’.53

One of the important indirect results of the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was that it began to transform the way in which societal groups such as political parties thought and talked about the issue of repression. The IACHR report provided the most in-depth, well-researched information on the human rights situation in Argentina, documenting that the Argentine government had engaged in a systematic government campaign of gross abuses of human rights.54 The visit of the IACHR to Argentina and its report provided a turning-point in the Argentine human rights situation. It helped to create more general awareness in Argentina about the nature of the abuses that had occurred. This awareness was deepened and solidified during the 1985 trials of the military juntas for human rights abuses.

In Uruguay, on the other hand, Carter’s human rights policy did lead to the development of closer relationships between the political opposition and US policy-makers. In Uruguay, one of the explicit practices of the embassy during the Carter Administration was to invite opposition politicians to embassy receptions and dinners for visiting US policy-makers. During his visit to Montevideo in 1977, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terrance Toddman met with a handful of politicians from the traditional parties. During a similar visit by Sam Eaton in 1980, including a sit-down dinner with politicians from the Blanco, Colorado, and the Christian Democratic parties, Eaton was snubbed by military
commanders who failed to turn up at the dinner to protest about his decision to meet with opposition politicians. Although it alienated the military, this practice helped to maintain positive relations between the US government and opposition politicians.

In February 1977 a spokesman for the joint commission of opposition party leaders of Blanco and Colorado parties called upon the Carter Administration to show its concern for human rights in Uruguay by withdrawing Ambassador Siracusa, who had expressed his clear opposition to the Koch amendment. Carter Administration officials indirectly responded to this concern in June 1977, when Vance wrote to Congressman Koch to assure him that Siracusa was retiring, and the new ambassador ‘possesses the deep respect for human rights’.

In addition to the contacts formed by members of the administration, some members of the US Congress also developed relations with members of the Uruguayan opposition parties. Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate of the Blanco party, who testified in Congressional hearings in favour of the Koch amendment cutting off military aid to Uruguay, maintained good relations with a number of Congressional offices while he was in exile.

In Guatemala, the possibilities for these kinds of contacts between US policy-makers and opposition politicians were limited because of a concerted repressive policy of murdering centrist politicians. The 1979 murders of Alberto Fuentes Mohr and Manuel Colóm Argueta, ‘two of the most prominent genuinely reformist politicians’, were examples of attacks on centrist parties. The Christian Democrats alone suffered 120 assassinations from mid-1980 to mid-1981. In such an atmosphere of violence, strong links with opposition political party figures were not developed.

Reinforcing transnational linkages between human rights groups and the US government, and between human rights groups in the USA and in Latin America. The most important way in which human rights policy was institutionalized in US foreign policy was through the formation of the Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the State Department, and the requirement that the State Department issue country human rights reports every year. This requirement in turn altered the job requirements of foreign service officers around the globe, who for the first time were instructed to gather information on human rights abuses. In some embassies, this led newly appointed human rights officers to form direct and enduring contacts with local human rights organizations. These domestic human rights organizations learned that they
could indirectly pressure their governments to change practices by providing information on human rights abuses for inclusion in the annual country reports. At the same time, the sub-committees of Congress responsible for human rights also developed links with human rights organizations in Latin America.

Human rights policies were promoted by existing non-governmental organizations, and in turn led to the formation of new human rights groups. Important interest-groups grew up around the issue of human rights. Some, like Amnesty International, existed prior to the adoption of US human rights policy and contributed to the emergence of the policy. But many organizations were set up together with or as a reaction to the adoption of the human rights policy. Once established, they created an important lobby in favour of continuing the human rights policy. In turn, these human rights organizations developed strong links to domestic human rights organizations in countries experiencing human rights violations.

The influence of these human rights organizations is unlike most types of influence studied in international relations. They were not numerically strong nor economically powerful; they were not able to contribute money to re-election campaigns, and rarely able to mobilize constituents to vote. The influence they wielded was the direct result of the reliability of their information and the resonance of their arguments with the moral concerns of policy-makers. But in order to ensure the reliability of their information, they developed strong transnational networks with other groups, sharing and disseminating the latest information on human rights abuses.

Some of the linkages among human rights organizations in the United States and Latin America were formed in the mid- to late 1970s, as part of the process of providing information and testimony for US policy-makers about US human rights policy. This was most effective in Argentina, where a strong community of human rights organizations already existed. One important reason for international awareness of Argentine human rights abuses was the presence, by 1977–8, of a wide range of domestic human rights organizations with significant external contacts. Thus, organizations like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the Center for Legal and Social Studies, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, the Commission of the Family Members of the Disappeared and Detained, the League for Human Rights, the Service for Peace and Justice, and the Ecumenical Commission for Human Rights worked to document
and publicize the abuses of human rights in Argentina. It is not clear whether these groups eventually had a direct impact on the decision-making of the Argentine military. They were often the target of abuse: their members were disappeared, their offices sacked, and their documents confiscated. These transnational linkages also served to help protect domestic human rights organizations. These groups sought external contacts to publicize the human rights situations, and to help protect themselves against further repression by their government. They were a crucial link in providing documentation and information to spur the interests and concern of US policy-makers.\textsuperscript{57}

If we examine some key events that served to keep the case of Argentine human rights in the minds of US policy-makers, the impact of these transnational linkages on policy becomes apparent. In 1979 the Argentine authorities released Jacobo Timmerman, whose powerful memoir detailing his disappearance and torture by the Argentine military made an important impact in US policy circles.\textsuperscript{58} Timmerman’s release was largely due to US government pressure, which had made it a key case in bilateral relations. Patricia Derian enquired specifically about Timmerman during her visits to Argentina. But it was societal groups who first brought Timmerman’s case to the attention of US policy-makers. Human rights organizations, members of the US Jewish community, and US journalists helped make Timmerman’s case a \textit{cause célèbre} in US policy circles.

In 1980 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Argentine human rights activist Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. Peace and human rights groups in the USA helped sponsor Pérez Esquivel’s speaking tour to the United States at exactly the same time that the OAS was considering the IACHR report on Argentina, and the Congress was considering lifting the arms embargo to Argentina. He used his public position, including a group meeting with members of the House Foreign Relations Committee, to speak out against the continuing human rights abuses in Argentina and to urge Congress to maintain the arms embargo.

A third example of the power of transnational linkages is the role of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in creating international awareness of the human rights situation in Argentina. These women, many of whom did not speak any foreign languages and had never travelled abroad before, launched an impressive international lobbying campaign with the help of the network of human rights organizations in the USA and Europe. They met with parliamentarians and with the press. During the meetings of the UN
Human Rights Commission or the OAS, the vigil of the women in the white headscarves helped undermine the Argentine diplomatic strategy of burying human rights issues.

In Guatemala the absence of human rights organizations, and the explicit government policy of eliminating leading members of the political parties, made the formation of transnational linkages difficult. Domestic human rights groups were formed for the first time in the 1980s in Guatemala, but they continue to face profound repression and have not been supported by the US government. Indeed, by reinstating military aid to Guatemala in 1983 in the presence of continuing gross violations of human rights, the US Congress signalled that it was prepared to disregard and de-emphasize human rights violations.

Since 1986 the government has formed three governmental human rights offices—the Human Rights Attorney’s Office, a Congressional Human Rights Commission, and a Presidential Advisory Commission on Human Rights. These groups may in the future begin to operate as true human rights organizations, but they have not yet been able to address government human rights abuses. In particular, they have not even played an active role in protecting non-governmental human rights monitors.

The presence of non-governmental human rights organizations suggests that the seeds of improved human rights practices exist in Guatemala today, but they have not yet started to bear fruit. Such institutional features as a new constitution enshrining respect for human rights, and organizations with a mandate to protect human rights, are not insignificant, but for them to be translated into improved human rights practices will take major changes within Guatemala, supported by concerted international efforts. To date, US human rights policy has failed to support and promote respect for human rights in Guatemala.

The US government also co-operated with some NGOs as regards human rights in Uruguay. In particular, it encouraged a visit by a delegation from the US American Bar Association in May 1978 that led to some apparent changes in government policy on human rights. Perhaps most significant was that the ABA mission received collaboration from the military regime, largely, it appears, because the leader of the soft-line faction, General Alvarez, believed that progress on the human rights front could help him in this internal power struggles with other members of the military and with his future presidential ambitions. Once again, the pattern of influence is similar to that in Argentina: policy is effective because it overlaps with the goals of a faction of the armed forces who believe that
they can use external human rights pressures to strengthen their internal position.

The role of internal human rights organizations was minimal in Uruguay as compared to Argentina. Until 1981, when a Uruguayan branch of SERPAJ was set up, no human rights organization existed in Uruguay. As a result, whatever human rights documentation work there was in Uruguay was done by people connected to political parties rather than by non-partisan human rights organizations. Internationally, however, quite a number of groups devoted their energies to the cause of human rights in Uruguay. Of these, Amnesty International played the most crucial role throughout the period of the dictatorship by denouncing and documenting human rights violations.

4. Conclusions: Why and When is US Human Rights Policy Effective?

Can a human rights policy contribute to democratization? In Argentina and Uruguay, in the later stages of transition to democracy, domestic groups were key actors in pressing for change. But many theorists of transition to democracy assert that transitions always begin as a direct or indirect result of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally between hard-liners and soft-liners. I argue that it is at exactly this point of decision within the authoritarian regime, when civil society is still severely repressed and not yet actively able to mobilize, that international human rights efforts may help to affect the calculations of actors internal to the regime, giving weight to arguments that the soft-liners are making in favour of liberalization. In this sense, this argument fits in between what Whitehead refers to (in Chapter 1 above) as the 'control' and the 'consent' perspectives for analysing democratizations. Direct US pressure during a very authoritarian phase contributed to initial liberalization, which in turn opened space for more active participation by domestic groups during the transition phase.

The argument presented here is that US human rights policy towards Argentina was effective because:

1. it was applied in a comprehensive and forceful manner—a clear message was sent through multiple channels that the USA was serious about human rights policy and that bilateral relations would suffer until changes were made;

2. it worked through both bilateral and multilateral channels,
thus reinforcing bilateral pressures with actions from regional and international organizations;

3. A faction existed within the Argentine military government, the so-called soft-liners associated with Videla and Viola, that by 1978 decided to try to use US and international pressure to pursue their own internal policy;

4. It was supported by the work of strong domestic human rights organizations within Argentina with links abroad, which facilitated the gathering and dissemination of information on the Argentine human rights situation. In Argentina, however, US policy did not lead to the furthering of links between US policy-makers and opposition political parties.

The effects of US policy in Uruguay were also meaningful. As compared with Argentina, the policy was applied comprehensively but less forcefully towards Uruguay. Few public statements were made, policy was handled by lower-level officials, and maximum sanctions, such as an Eximbank cut-off, were never applied. Similarly to the situation in Argentina, the policy worked through both multilateral and bilateral channels, and a faction also existed within the Uruguayan military which was willing to use external pressure to pursue its internal policy. One important difference between Argentina and Uruguay, however, was that until 1981 no domestic human rights groups existed in Uruguay to work together with international groups. Instead, US human rights policy seemed to be more effective in developing links between US policy-makers and opposition politicians than was the case in Argentina.

What made the Guatemalan situation different from the situation in Argentina and Uruguay? Five conditions seem to be important:

1. US human rights policy towards Guatemala was much less forceful and comprehensive. The priority of counter-insurgency goals led to a de-emphasis on human rights issues.

2. No powerful group existed within the Guatemalan military that could perceive a tactical advantage in responding to US human rights pressures.

3. The late 1970s witnessed a dramatic upsurge in the size and success of the rural armed insurgent movement.


5. Opposition political parties were targeted as victims of governmental repression, thus eliminating any interlocutors for human rights policy, and narrowing political alternatives.
I shall briefly examine some of these factors separately.

A Forceful and Comprehensive Policy

The case of Argentina suggests that the combination of very severe pressure (military and economic aid cut-offs, 'no' votes in international financial institutions, and the denial of Eximbank loans) plus the willingness to bargain on one important sanction (the Eximbank funds) contributed to change. This suggests that if the United States had made human rights a higher priority in its bilateral relations with Guatemala and brought more pressure to bear, the chances of success might have been greater, but instead the pressures were much less forceful in the Guatemalan case. Congress never threatened to reduce economic aid or impose any kind of trade sanctions, except denial of military assistance.

This kind of forceful and comprehensive human rights policy is most likely to be applied in countries where the USA has few competing policy goals. The Argentinian academic Carlos Escudé puts it more harshly, arguing that US moral imperialism will only be applied in marginal countries. The Argentine case, however, was not without cost to the US government, since it involved alienating a potentially valuable ally. But even extremely forceful human rights pressures cannot guarantee success unless other necessary pre-conditions exist within the repressive country to allow negotiations to succeed.

A Faction in the Target Government is Willing to Negotiate on Human Rights Issues

Forceful policy would have been insufficient to bring about changes in Argentina and Uruguay if no faction had existed which was prepared to negotiate on the human rights issue. Soft-liners in both Argentina and Uruguay attempted to use the international pressure in order to pursue an internal political strategy vis-à-vis other sectors of the military. And in both cases, the strategy of controlled opening backfired on the military. In the case of Argentina, the IACHR report was much more damning than the military had anticipated. In Uruguay the defeat of the plebiscite undermined the military's plans and reinvigorated domestic political dissent. But by the time the strategy had backfired it had gained a momentum of its own that made it difficult for the military to backtrack.

The soft-liner argument is often misused by opponents of a human
rights policy. The argument is frequently made that strong human rights pressures fortify the positions of the hard-liners and undermine soft-liners. But the evidence from the Argentine and Uruguayan cases does not support this argument. Rather, it was the existence of very strong pressures, the most consistent and forceful pressures in all the human rights cases, pressures that were denounced and criticized by the soft-liners, that nevertheless eventually led to an improvement in the human rights situation. Since the soft-liners use international pressures to fortify their positions vis-à-vis hard-liners, more forceful pressures create more leverage in internal negotiations.

In Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s there were no factions within the Guatemalan regime looking for an excuse to bring the death squads under control, and, as a result, US human rights policy failed there. An analysis of current policy, however, neglects the historical reasons why there is no progressive coalition within the Guatemalan military. To a large degree the absence of a progressive faction within the military interested in responding to US human rights policy was the result of past US interventions, such as the CIA-supported coup in 1954 against the government of Jacobo Arbenz, exactly the kind of reform-minded government that the Carter Administration was seeking. Since then the United States has trained over 3,000 Guatemalan officers in US military academies. To include history in the game, we see that the United States contributed to creating the kind of military that has committed the current abuses. The human rights policy found no resonance from within the government. ‘If only we had an Arbenz now,’ a State department official under Carter lamented. ‘We are going to have to invent one, but all the candidates are dead.’

Support for International, Regional, and Domestic Human Rights Organizations

The single most successful element of the US policy towards Argentina was the reiterated emphasis on the importance of an invitation for an on-site visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. By integrating its bilateral pressures within a multilateral strategy, the US both strengthened multilateral human rights institutions and was more effective. Secondly, combining bilateral and regional activities with the actions of non-governmental human rights organizations led to especially effective human rights pressures. In Uruguay US bilateral policy was reinforced by multilateral actions by the OAS and the UN, but the absence of domestic
human rights groups weakened the potential for positive international linkages.

These cases suggests the importance of transnational linkages in influencing human rights practices. The activities of domestic and international human rights organizations provided the essential information that led to the emergence of the issue and permitted monitoring of change. Because few powerful domestic interest-groups competed for influence, relatively small non-governmental organizations armed with information were able to have a substantial effect on policy.

Notes

1. Although this chapter has a different focus, it draws upon an earlier co-authored work: L. Martin and K. Sikkink, ‘US Policy and Human Rights in Guatemala and Argentina’, in P. Evans, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam (eds.), International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: An Interactive Approach (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). I wish to recognize the contribution of Lisa Martin to the overall project, and thank her for permission to use some of the material from that chapter here.


3. S. Hoffman discusses four possible goals of a human rights policy: (1) to help victims; (2) to raise consciousness; (3) to advance the national interest; (4) to change regimes: Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 113–14.

4. As regards some of the ideas presented in this paragraph as to how to define the success of US human rights policy, I am indebted to comments by Marcelo Cavarozzi, Catalina Smulovitz, and Carlos Acuña in response to a presentation of an early study at CEDES in Buenos Aires.


6. Amnesty International, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977). Most of the disappeared were eventually murdered, and their bodies were buried in unmarked mass graves, incinerated, or thrown into the sea.


13. From 1950 to 1980, 3,360 Guatemalan military officers were trained by the USA as a part of the International Education and Training Program (IMET). United States Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1984. A large number of police officers were also trained in the Office for Public Safety Program, under the aegis of the Agency for International Development.

14. Amnesty International, Guatemala: A Government Program of Murder (London: Amnesty International, 1981), 7. It is even more difficult to chart the pattern of human rights abuses in Guatemala than it is in Argentina. This is partly the result of an apparently deliberate government policy to eliminate evidence. One Guatemalan colonel told a US journalist, ‘In Argentina there are witnesses, there are books, there are films, there is proof. Here in Guatemala there is none of that. Here there are no survivors’. A. Nairn and J. M. Simon, ‘Bureaucracy of Death’, New Republic, 30 June 1986, 14.

15. Congress prohibited FMS credits to Guatemala in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for 1978, but the deliveries never ceased and other types of economic and military aid continued. In fiscal years 1978, 1979, and 1980—the three years for which the Carter Administration can be held wholly responsible—the USA delivered $8.5m. in military assistance, mostly FMS credit sales, and it issued export licences for commercial arms sales worth $1.8m., a rate that does not differ much from that of the Nixon–Ford Administrations: testimony by L. Schoultz, ‘Human Rights in Guatemala’, Hearings, 30 July 1981, 98.

16. United States General Accounting Office, ‘Military Sales: The United States Continuing Munitions Supply Relationship with Guatemala’, 4. Approval of export licences to Guatemala varied over this period: the State Department disapproved of 2.1 per cent of licences in 1979, 68


23. The substantial documentation provided by the military themselves and uncovered by the judiciary in the trials of the military juntas demonstrates that the decisions to engage in repression were made at the highest levels of the Argentine government. Thus, the eventual decision to diminish that repression was also made by top-level government officials. See, for example, ‘La Sentencia’, *Diario del Juicio*, 11 December 1985.


25. This interpretation differs from that of Carlos Escudé, who claims that US human rights policy was unsuccessful in Argentina. Although Escudé is correct that US human rights policy was sometimes applied in a contradictory fashion in Argentina, he does not discuss the fact that it was applied more consistently in the case of Argentina than in any other country except Uruguay. Second, he does not discuss the granting of blocked Eximbank credits in exchange for the Argentine invitation of the IACHR, which is key to the argument here. Third, Escudé underestimates the importance of diplomatic pressures on the Argentine military government. While it is true that initially the Argentine government reacted nationally against the campaigns, by 1978 they were profoundly concerned about the international isolation of the military regime: C. Escudé, ‘Argentina: The Costs of Contradiction’, in *Exporting Democracy*.


27. D. Rock, 370–1. This understanding of divisions within the military is reinforced by other observers, including victims of repression who saw the functioning of concentration camps from the inside, such as J. Timmerman, *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 147, 163.
28. The only significant civilian allies of the Argentine government whose opinions could have contributed to the process of military decision-making were the civilian technocrats, especially the economic policymakers, and key business groups. The economic programme of the military regime constituted one of the two main goals of the government: the re-establishment of order and the reinvigoration of the economy through a programme of liberalization, expansion of exports, and foreign assistance and investment. The civilian technocrats and their closest allies in the military, the Videla–Viola faction, were concerned with the international image of Argentina, and the damage done to that image by the widespread reports of human rights violations. Nevertheless, neither the economic policy team, nor domestic entrepreneurs advocated changing human rights practices, in part because the topic of the repression was perceived as taboo by civilian allies of the military: interview with a high-level official in the Ministry of Economics, Buenos Aires, 31 July 1990. Also, because businessmen and members of the economic team had been targets of left-wing kidnapping and assassination attempts, they tended to support the repressive measures of the military: interview with Jose A. Martinez de Hoz, Minister of Economics during the Videla administration, 6 August 1990, Buenos Aires.
29. Carta Politica, no. 59 (October 1978).
30. Interview with Tom J. Farer, member of the Special Commission of IACHR that conducted the on-site observation in Argentina in September 1979, 13 May 1990; and with Ambassador Arnoldo Listre, Buenos Aires, 20 July 1990.
36. Latin America, 11 February 1977, xi (6); and Schoultz, Human Rights, 350.
37. Interview with Lawrence Pezzullo, 29 August 1991, Baltimore, Md.


44. For a discussion of efforts to promote democracy by the US government through AID and the National Endowment for Democracy, see Chapter 5 below.


47. C. Gillespie, ‘From Suspended Animation to Animated Suspension: Political Parties and the Reconstruction of Democracy in Uruguay’, unpublished paper, Yale University, 12 January 1984, 32.

48. See, for example, G. Rama, *La Democracia en Uruguay* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1987), 200. Rama argues in passing that diplomatic pressures from the USA and Europe were not significant in the process of redemocratization, but does not present any material to back up this argument.


51. In Chapter 7, below, Alan Angell quotes Susan Kaufman Purcell, who argues that the main effect of US human rights policy in Chile was that it ‘won friends for the United States among the democratic opposition parties of the center and center left’. Angell clarifies, however, that there were no direct party links between US parties and Chilean parties of the kind that existed between European and Chilean parties, and there was still considerable suspicion towards the US government on the part of many Chilean politicians.

52. Interview with Dr Jose Federico Westerkamp, 20 August 1989, Buenos Aires.


55. *Latin American Political Report*, 4 February 1977, xi (5); 17 June 1977, xi (23).

57. Members of these organizations frequently travelled to the USA and to Europe, where they met with human rights organizations, talked to the press, testified before Congress, and met with Members of Congress and their staff, and with State Department Officials. One key human rights advocate, Emilio Mignone, talks of the threats that he and his family suffered, and affirms, 'I think the openness of our activity and the international recognition it began to receive helped save our lives': *Derechos Humanos y Transicion Democratica en la Sociedad Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Pensamiento Nacional, 1991), 94.

58. Timmerman, *Prisoner Without a Name*.

59. Guatemala now has three non-governmental human rights organizations, two formed since President Cerezo came to office. Two have lost members to government violence. All receive threats and harassment. See, Americas Watch, *Persecuting Human Rights Monitors: The CERJ in Guatemala* (May 1989), 43.

60. Interview with Jorge Arturo Roche Tobar of the Human Rights Attorney's Office, and Ana Carolina Reyes Riveiro, Assistant to the Congressional Commission on Human Rights, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1990.


64. On Argentina, interviews with Ambassador Arnoldo Listre, 20 July 1990, Buenos Aires, and with Dr Ricardo Yofre, 1 August 1990, Buenos Aires.


66. For example, it is unlikely that the IACHR would have been able to do such well-documented work in so short a time if it had not been for the collaboration of domestic human rights groups. In anticipation of the IACHR visit, DELS select 300 of the strongest cases from over 4,000 cases, which became the cases analysed and presented in detail in the Commission's report: E. Mignone, 'Derechos Humanos y Transición Democrática en la Sociedad Argentina', paper presented at a Seminar on Transition to Democracy in Argentina, Yale University, New Haven, 4–8 March 1990, 117.

67. The importance of human rights organizations is reflected in the opening statement of Representative Bonkers in the hearings considering the reinstatement of military aid to Argentina in 1981: 'If Reagan Administration officials ... had read the reports on Argentina by Nobel prize winning organization Amnesty International, if they had read the report of the United Nations Human Rights Commission working group on disappearances; if they had read the 266 page report on
Argentina by the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a Commission that has distinguished itself in the hemisphere by its objectivity and fairness in advancing human rights; and if they read the reports on Argentina by the International Commission of Jurists; they would not be making silly statements such as “We want good relations with Argentina”’. ‘Review of United States Policy on Military Assistance to Argentina’, Hearing before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organization and on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 1 April 1981 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), 3.