

An ‘Organised Disorganisation’: Informal Organisation and the Persistence of Local Party Structures in Argentine Peronism*

STEVEN LEVITSKY

Abstract. This article attempts to fill the void in research on the Justicialista Party (PJ) organisation. Challenging accounts of the contemporary PJ as a weak, personalistic organisation, it argues that the party maintains a powerful base-level infrastructure with deep roots in working- and lower-class society. This organisation has been understated by scholars because, unlike prototypical working class party structures, it is informal and highly decentralised. The PJ organisation consists of a range of informal networks – based on unions, clubs, NGOs and activists’ homes that are largely unconnected to the party bureaucracy. These organisations provided the government of Carlos Menem with a range of benefits in the 1990s, particularly in the realm of local problem-solving and patronage distribution. Yet they also constrained the Menem leadership, limiting its capacity to impose candidates and strategies on lower-level party branches.

The Argentine Justicialista – or Peronist – Party (PJ) has long posed a puzzle for analysts. Although Peronism’s electoral strength is beyond dispute, the weakness and inactivity of the party bureaucracy and formal leadership bodies have led scholars to describe its organisation as virtually non-existent. Scholars dismiss the original Peronist party as a ‘cadaver’¹ or ‘little more than an appendage of state bodies’.² Similarly, the contemporary PJ has been described as a ‘mere nameplate’³ or an

Steven Levitsky is Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University.

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¹ Félix Luna, *Perón y su tiempo* (Buenos Aires, 1984), p. 60. Luna writes that ‘no one will be able to write the history of the Peronist party between 1946 and 1955 because it never existed’.

² Marcelo Cavarozzi, *Peronismo y radicalismo: transiciones y perspectivas* (Buenos Aires, 1988), p. 4. For a critique of this view, see Moira Mackinnon, ‘Sobre los orígenes del partido peronista: Notas introductorias’, in W. Ansaldi, A. Pucciarelli, and J. Villarreal, *Representaciones inconclusas: Las clases, los actores, y los discursos de la memoria, 1912–1946* (Buenos Aires, 1995).

³ Gabriella Cerruti, *El Jefe: Vida y obra de Carlos Saúl Menem* (Buenos Aires, 1993), p. 338.

‘electoral committee’ run by a small circle of ‘operators’ in Buenos Aires.⁴

Another look at the PJ organisation, however, reveals a strikingly different picture. The contemporary PJ maintains a massive base-level infrastructure, and its membership of nearly four million makes it one of the largest democratic parties in the world. Moreover, Peronism’s deep social and organisational roots in working and lower class society have enabled it to survive decades of proscription, the death of its charismatic founder, and, more recently, the repudiation of its traditional socio-economic programme. How can the PJ simultaneously be so weak and so strong?

A major reason for this confusion is that when scholars look for the PJ, they tend to look in the wrong place. Attention to the weakness of the PJ’s formal structure tends to obscure the vast *informal* organisation that surrounds it.⁵ The Peronist organisation consists of a dense collection of personal networks – operating out of unions, clubs, non-governmental organisations, and often activists’ homes – that are largely unconnected to (and autonomous from) the party bureaucracy. Although these networks are not found in the party’s statutes or records, they provide the PJ with extensive linkages to working and lower class society. Notwithstanding the existence of an impressive body of literature on Peronism, little research has been done on the PJ organisation,⁶ and virtually no work has been done on the party’s informal structure. As a result, we know little about how the PJ functions, particularly at the local level.

This article takes a step toward filling that gap. Drawing on data collected during an extensive study of local Peronist organisations in Greater Buenos Aires, the article examines how the PJ is organised and functions internally. The article is divided into two sections. The first outlines the origins and contemporary structure of the Peronist party organisation. Challenging characterisations of the party as a weak, personalistic organisation, it argues that the PJ is best understood as an *informal mass party*. Peronism maintains a powerful base-level infra-

⁴ Marcos Novaro, ‘Menemismo y peronismo: Viejo y nuevo populismo’, in Ricardo Sidicaro and Jorge Mayer (eds.), *Política y sociedad en los años de Menem* (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 60; and Vicente Palermo and Marcos Novaro, *Política y poder en el gobierno de Menem* (Buenos Aires, 1996), pp. 370–6.

⁵ This focus on informal organisation was inspired by Guillermo O’Donnell’s recent discussion of informal institutions in democratic regimes. See O’Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1996), pp. 34–51.

⁶ Exceptions include Vicente Palermo, *Democracia interna en los partidos* (Buenos Aires, 1986) and Ana María Mustapic, ‘El Partido Justicialista: Perspectiva histórica sobre el desarrollo del partido. La estructura del partido’, unpublished manuscript, Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires, 1996.

structure, a large activist base and extensive linkages to working and lower class society, but unlike prototypical mass parties, its organisation is informal and highly decentralised. The second section examines the relationship between the PJ and Carlos Menem in the 1990s. Contrary to many conventional accounts, it argues that Menem's relationship to the PJ rank-and-file was always mediated by powerful local organisations. These organisations provided the Menem government with a range of political benefits, including vast human resources and extensive channels for policy implementation, patronage distribution, and local problem-solving. Yet they also constrained the Menem leadership, limiting its capacity to impose candidates and strategies on lower-level branches. Indeed, local branches routinely rejected – or ignored – instructions from the national leadership, following strategies that had little to do with either Menem or his neo-liberal programme.

The article's focus on the PJ's internal structure serves two broader analytic goals. First, it highlights the importance of studying *informal* patterns of party organisation. In many Latin American parties, the organisations that exist 'on the ground' differ substantially from those outlined in the statutes, and formal rules and procedures are fluid, manipulated, and even ignored. Nevertheless, relatively little effort has been made to investigate, conceptualise, or theorise these organisational forms. Research on the informal structures of Latin American parties can play an important role in broadening and refining the existing literature on parties and party organisations. Because this literature is based almost entirely on studies of advanced industrialised countries,⁷ where parties tend to be relatively well-institutionalised, it incorporates little variation on these dimensions. This failure to incorporate a wider range of cases has important theoretical costs.⁸ Parties with informal structures and fluid internal rules function differently – and with different consequences – from well-institutionalised or bureaucratic parties.⁹ In order to be able to assess these differences systematically we need a more thorough understanding of how Latin American parties work. This article takes a

⁷ For example, Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State* (New York, 1954/1963); Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organisation and Power* (Cambridge, 1988); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (New York, 1994); Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organisations in Western Democracies* (London, 1994).

⁸ Scott Mainwaring makes a similar point in his recent work on the Brazilian party system (Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford, 1999), pp. 21–5).

⁹ See Steven Levitsky, 'Crisis, Party Adaptation, and Regime Stability in Argentina', *Party Politics*, vol. 4, no. 4 (1998), pp. 445–70; Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization*.

step in that direction, going beyond party statutes and formal organisations to examine the informal rules of the game that structure the internal life of the PJ.

The article also seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on the politics of economic reform in Argentina. Early analyses of the Menem period characterised the reforms as a kind of neoliberal revolution from above, imposed by a powerful president acting at the margins of the PJ, major interest groups, and the legislature and other democratic institutions.¹⁰ Indeed, the Menem presidency was characterised – along with those of Fernando Collor and Alberto Fujimori – as a near-archetypal case of ‘neo-populism’.¹¹ Recent research suggests that such accounts may have been somewhat overstated. For example, scholars have shown that Menem’s capacity to impose reforms unilaterally was in fact relatively limited, and that the passage of most major reforms required substantial concessions to governors, business and labour leaders, PJ legislators, and other key social and political actors.¹² Other scholars have challenged the notion that the PJ was marginalised under Menem, arguing that the party was critical to Menem’s success in both the legislative and electoral arenas.¹³ The data presented here provides further

¹⁰ Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 55–69; Christopher Larkins, ‘The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina’, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 30, no. 4 (1998), pp. 423–42; Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, 1999), pp. 34–5.

¹¹ Kenneth Roberts, ‘Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America’, *World Politics*, vol. 48, no. 1 (1995), pp. 110–12; Kurt Weyland, ‘Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America’, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 31, no. 1 (1996), pp. 3–31; Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe’, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 31, no. 4 (1999), pp. 379–401.

¹² Pablo Gerchunoff and Juan Carlos Torre, ‘La política de liberalización económica en la administración de Menem’, *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 36, no. 143 (1996): 733–68; Palermo and Novaro, *Política y poder en el gobierno de Menem*; Edward L. Gibson, ‘The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina’, *World Politics*, vol. 49, no. 3 (April 1997), pp. 339–370; Edward L. Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, ‘Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms: Evidence from Argentina’, Paper presented at the XX International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 17–20 April, 1997; Sebastian Etchemendy and Vicente Palermo, ‘Conflicto y concertación: Gobierno, Congreso y organizaciones de interés en la reforma laboral del primer gobierno de Menem’, *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 37, no. 148 (1998), pp. 559–90; Mariana Llanos, ‘El presidente, el congreso y la política de privatizaciones en la Argentina’, *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 38, No. 151 (1998).

¹³ Gibson, ‘The Populist Road’; Steven Levitsky, ‘From Laborism to Liberalism: Institutionalisation and Labor-Based Party Adaptation in Argentina, 1983–97’, Ph.D Dissertation (Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1999); Javier Corrales, ‘Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules: A Theory on the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America’, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 32, No. 2 (January 2000), pp. 127–50.

evidence in this direction. It shows not only that the PJ organisation remained active in the 1990s, but that the persistence of strong local organisations placed real limits on the Menem leadership's capacity to transform the party from above.

The article draws on data from two surveys carried out by the author in 1997: (1) a survey of 112 local party branches (base units, or UBs), based on visits to the UBs and in-depth interviews with the activists who ran them; and (2) a survey of 611 party activists, based on a 39-point questionnaire distributed to activists in each of the surveyed UBs. The surveys were carried out in the Federal Capital, which is predominantly middle class, and the Greater Buenos Aires municipalities of La Matanza and Quilmes,¹⁴ which have larger working and lower class populations. UBs were selected so as to be as representative as possible of the socioeconomic, geographic, and internal factional make-up of each municipality. Although the Federal Capital, La Matanza, and Quilmes are not representative of the country as a whole, the organisational patterns observed in these districts were confirmed through interviews with party leaders and activists from several other cities in Greater Buenos Aires¹⁵ and other industrialised provinces,¹⁶ as well as through visits to a smaller number of base units in the provincial capital of San Miguel de Tucuman. Hence, there is reason to think that the findings of this study are generalisable, at least within urban Peronism.¹⁷

An informal organisation: rethinking the Peronist party structure

The anthropologists Gerlach and Hine once observed that scholars tend to assume that organisations are hierarchical and have a 'well-defined chain of command'.¹⁸ Thus, 'in the minds of many, the only alternative to a bureaucracy or a leader-centred organisation is no organisation at

¹⁴ La Matanza and Quilmes were selected because they are relatively representative of Greater Buenos Aires Peronism. The two districts lie near the median on several demographic and socioeconomic dimensions, and they each possess characteristics of the zone's first and second 'belts'. The first belt is a more established, industrialised zone with larger middle and working class populations, while the second belt is poorer, less developed, and populated by a larger number of internal migrants. Many of these migrants live in shantytowns or slums. Though strong in both belts, the PJ is particularly dominant in the second belt.

¹⁵ These include Avellaneda, Beratazegui, Hurlingham, Ituzaingo, José C. Paz, Lanus, and Tres de Febrero. ¹⁶ These include Córdoba, Mendoza and Santa Fe.

¹⁷ Interviews with leaders and activists from rural areas suggest that these patterns extend to those areas as well, although lack of data limits our ability to generalise with as much confidence about peripheral Peronism.

¹⁸ Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation* (New York, 1970), p. 33.

all'.¹⁹ Such has arguably been the case in studies of Peronism. Lacking the kind of disciplined, hierarchical, and bureaucratic organisation characteristic of many other working class parties, the Peronist party organisation has received almost no scholarly attention. The few existing analyses of the PJ organisation focus primarily on its formal, national-level leadership structure.²⁰ This structure is indeed largely inoperative. A visit to the national party offices reveals a strikingly underdeveloped bureaucracy. The party's top executive body, the National Council, lacks substantial resources or a professional staff, possesses little data on provincial party branches, and has virtually no record of its own activities prior to 1990.²¹ Apart from a handful of custodial and low-level administrative staff, the national party headquarters are generally empty. Provincial and local party headquarters are even less active.

In light of this bureaucratic weakness, scholars have often concluded that the PJ organisation is weak or even non-existent, and that party leaders maintain a personalistic and largely unmediated relationship with the Peronist rank-and-file.²² Thus, applying the well-known conceptual frameworks of European scholars such as Kirchheimer and Panebianco,²³ scholars have characterised the contemporary PJ as an 'electoral-professional'²⁴ or 'catch-all'²⁵ party.

However, attention to the weakness of the PJ bureaucracy tends to obscure the powerful *informal* organisation that surrounds it. The Peronist organisation consists of a vast collection of informal networks that operate out of a range of different entities, including unions, cooperatives, clubs, soup kitchens, and often people's homes. These informal entities

¹⁹ Gerlach and Hine, *People, Power, Change*, p. 34.

²⁰ Alberto Ciria, 'Peronism and Political Structures, 1945-55', in Ciria (ed), *New Perspectives on Modern Argentina* (Bloomington, 1972); Ciria, *Política y cultura popular: la Argentina peronista, 1946-55* (Buenos Aires, 1983); Carlota Jackisch, *Los partidos políticos en América Latina: Desarrollo, estructura y fundamentos programáticos. El caso argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1990); Mustapic, 'El Partido Justicialista'.

²¹ When the newly-created Juan D. Perón Institute contacted party headquarters in 1997 to invite National Council members to its public inauguration, party administrators were unable to even come up with the phone numbers or addresses of the body's membership.

²² Marcos Novaro, *Pilotos de tormentas: crisis de representación y personalización de la política en Argentina (1989-1993)* (Buenos Aires, 1994), pp. 76-89; Palermo and Novaro, *Política y poder*, pp. 370-376; Weyland, 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America'.

²³ Otto Kirchheimer, 'The Transformation of West European Party Systems', in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J., 1966), pp. 177-200; Panebianco, *Political Parties*, pp. 264-7.

²⁴ Novaro, 'Peronismo y Menemismo', pp. 59-60.

²⁵ Eugenio Kvaternik, 'El peronismo de los 90: un análisis comparado', *Agora*, no. 3 (1995), p. 9; Mustapic, 'El Partido Justicialista', p. 74.

are self-organised and operated. They do not appear in party statutes, are rarely registered with local party authorities, and maintain near-total autonomy from the party bureaucracy. Yet they constitute the vast bulk of the PJ organisation. If, following Sartori, we define a political party as ‘any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office’,²⁶ then all Peronist sub-units – formal or informal – that participate in electoral politics should be considered part of the party organisation. Studies of the PJ that focus on the party’s formal structure miss this informal infrastructure, and as a result, they miss the vast bulk of the party organisation.

Rather than employ Panebianco’s distinction between ‘mass-bureaucratic’ and ‘electoral-professional’ parties,²⁷ then, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the PJ as an *informal mass party*. It is a mass party in that it maintains a powerful base-level infrastructure, extensive linkages to working and lower class society, and a large membership and activist base. It is informal in that Peronist sub-units organise themselves, lack a standard organisational structure, and are generally not integrated into (or subject to the discipline of) the party’s central bureaucracy.

The roots of informality: Peronism as a movement organisation

The roots of the PJ’s informal structure lie in its distinctive history. Although Peronism originated as a charismatic party²⁸ during the first Perón government (1946–1955), with a centralised, though non-bureaucratic, hierarchy based on the personalistic leadership of Juan Perón,²⁹ the organisation changed considerably after Perón’s overthrow in 1955. Banned and intermittently repressed throughout most of the 1955–1983 period, Peronism moved underground, surviving within trade unions, clandestine cadre organisations, and thousands of neighbourhood activist networks.³⁰ However, unlike many other banned working class

²⁶ Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge, 1976), p. 64.

²⁷ Panebianco, *Political Parties*, pp. 264–7.

²⁸ On charismatic parties, see Panebianco (1988).

²⁹ For analyses of the early Peronist Party, see Walter Little ‘Party and State in Peronist Argentina’, *Hispanic American Historical Review* vol 53, no. 4 (1973), pp. 644–62; Ciria, *Política y cultura popular*; Susana Elena Pont, *Partido Laborista: Estado y sindicatos* (Buenos Aires, 1984); Juan Carlos Torre, *La vieja guardia sindical y Perón: Sobre los orígenes del peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1990); Mackinnon, ‘Sobre los orígenes del partido peronista’.

³⁰ Activists formed ‘walking base units’, moving from house to house and holding meetings under the guise of barbecues or birthday parties. These groups engaged in a variety of clandestine activities, including study groups, ‘lightening meetings’ (in which activists would gather at a street corner, sing the Peronist March, and then flee), midnight graffiti brigades, masses for Evita, and literature distribution at soccer games.

parties (such as the French communists, German social democrats, and Venezuelan Democratic Action), which survived periods of repression by creating disciplined, hierarchical organisations, Peronism's vertical links broke down after 1955, and the organisation fell into a decentralised, semi-anarchic state. Initial acts of Peronist opposition were 'spontaneous, atomised initiatives', carried out in the 'absence of a coherent, national leadership'.³¹ Peronists operated through self-constituted 'commandos' based on pre-existing union-based or neighbourhood friendship and family-based networks.³² Linkages among these local commandos were 'tenuous at best',³³ and the bodies created to coordinate their activities, such as Centre of Resistance Operations and the Peronist Grouping of Insurrectionary Resistance, were ineffective.³⁴

Post-1955 Peronism thus took on a segmented, decentralised structure that, following Gerlach and Hine, may be characterised as a 'movement organisation'.³⁵ Peronist sub-groups organised themselves autonomously from each other and from the central authorities. At the local level, activists formed neighbourhood 'working groups' or *agrupaciones* that maintained little systematic contact either with each other or with higher-level authorities. At the national level, Peronism was little more than a 'loose federation of different groups loyal to Perón',³⁶ including unions, left and right wing paramilitary organisations,³⁷ and numerous provincial 'neo-Peronist' parties.³⁸ No single organisational order encompassed these sub-groups, and no central authority structure emerged with the capacity to coordinate their activities, discipline them, or even define who

³¹ Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946–1976* (New York, 1988), pp. 51–2.

³² James, *Resistance and Integration*, p. 78.

³³ James, *Resistance and Integration*, p. 78.

³⁴ James, *Resistance and Integration*, pp. 143–4.

³⁵ Gerlach and Hine, *People, Power, Change*. According to Gerlach and Hine, movement organisations may be distinguished from bureaucratic organisations in that they are *segmented* and *decentralised* (pp. 33–45). They are *segmented* in that sub-units are largely autonomous from each other and do not interact regularly (pp. 41–42). They are *decentralised* in that sub-units are not integrated into a central hierarchy. Hence, no central authority can 'make decisions binding on all of the participants in the movement' (p. 36).

³⁶ James, *Resistance and Integration*, p. 184.

³⁷ These included *Comando de Organización* and the Iron Guard on the right and the *Montoneros*, *Descamisados* and Peronist Armed Forces on the left.

³⁸ Neo-Peronist parties were Peronist organisations that competed in provincial elections under invented party labels, such as the Popular Union, the Populist Party, and Social Justice. Neo-peronist parties did not come together into a single national organisation, but rather were fragmented into autonomous (and competing) organisations. See María Fernanda Arias and Raúl García Heras, 'Carisma disperso y rebelión: Los partidos neoperonistas', in Samuel Amaral and Mariano Ben Plotkin (eds), *Perón: del exilio al poder* (Buenos Aires, 1993).

was or was not a Peronist. Although Perón remained the movement's undisputed leader, his authority was limited to major decisions, and the bodies he created to represent him, such as the Superior and Coordinating Council and the Tactical Command, were routinely ignored by the unions, paramilitary groups, and provincial bosses.³⁹ While Peronists who disobeyed Perón's orders were sometimes 'expelled' from the movement, such expulsions were often ignored and were almost never permanent.⁴⁰

After a brief return to power between 1973 and 1976, Peronism again fell into an anarchic state during the 1976–83 dictatorship. The bulk of urban party activity migrated to the unions, but activists also worked within a range of clandestine organisations. Although base units were closed down, many continued to operate through informal 'working groups'. Others 'took refuge in non-governmental organisations',⁴¹ such as *sociedades de fomento*,⁴² neighbourhood clubs, soup kitchens, and church organisations.⁴³ Still others worked out of front organisations such as 'study centres'.⁴⁴ Although little data exists on clandestine Peronist organisation during the *Proceso*, the number of activists who engaged in at least sporadic political activity appears to have been significant. Of the base units surveyed by the author in 1997, 58 per cent were led by an activist who worked in a Peronist organisation during the dictatorship.

As a result of this clandestine work, when the military regime collapsed in 1982, Peronism quickly re-emerged as a mass organisation. Base units mushroomed throughout the country – seemingly out of nowhere. By mid-1983, the PJ had signed up more than three million members, which was more than all other parties combined.⁴⁵

³⁹ Arias and García Heras, 'Carisma Disperso y Rebellion;' Miguel Bonasso, *El presidente que no fue: Los archivos ocultos del peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1998).

⁴⁰ An example is Catamarca boss Vicente Saadi, who was expelled from the movement twice. In 1958, Saadi was expelled after he disobeyed Perón's order to back Arturo Frondizi in the 1958 presidential election. Yet he retained control of Catamarca Peronism, and in 1961, he was re-instated in the party. Similarly, when Perón 'expelled' the Montoneros in 1974, Montonero leader Dardo Cabo declared, 'No one has the right to throw us out. No one can fire us!' (Quoted in Liliana De Riz, *Retorno y derrumbe: El último gobierno peronista* (Buenos Aires, 1981), pp. 153–154).

⁴¹ Author's interview with Aníbal Stela, a local PJ leader in La Matanza, 16 July, 1997.

⁴² Non-governmental neighbourhood development centres.

⁴³ In Tucumán, Peronists operated out of 'neighbourhood centres' in lower class areas, while in Federal Capital shantytowns, they created 'neighbourhood juntas' and soup kitchens.

⁴⁴ For example, a major Río Negro faction worked through 'Institutes of Río Negro Studies'.

⁴⁵ *Clarín*, 23 April, 1983, p. 6 and 21 July, 1983, p. 4. Given the party's lack of access to state resources, this initial burst of party activism was based primarily on collective or non-material incentives. Although unions (which *did* have access to state resources) played a major role in financing party activity in the early 1980s, a large number of

Unlike previous periods of civilian rule, during which major Peronist organisations ignored party activity, the PJ underwent an unprecedented process of ‘partyisation’ after 1983. As elections came to be viewed as the only legitimate road to power, virtually all Peronist sub-units integrated themselves into party activity through participation in internal elections. Peronist unions invested heavily in party politics,⁴⁶ as did former paramilitary organisations such as the Iron Guard, *Comando de Organización* (C de O), the Peronist Youth (JP), and the *Montoneros*.⁴⁷ By the mid-1980s, with the exception of the trade union realm, non-party Peronist activity had largely disappeared.

The post-1983 ‘partyisation’ process was not accompanied by a process of bureaucratisation, however. Rather than establishing a bureaucratic structure, the post-1983 PJ retained key aspects of its movement organisation. Peronism re-emerged from the dictatorship in a bottom-up, semi-anarchic manner. Activists established their own base units without the approval (or even knowledge) of the party hierarchy. Not only did the party bureaucracy itself not create or finance base units, but it had no say over who could create them, how many were created, or where they were located. Moreover, while unions, ex-paramilitary organisations, and scores informal territorial networks all entered party activity in the 1980s, they did not abandon their organisational forms or integrate themselves into the party bureaucracy. Rather, they remained self-organised, creating, financing, and operating their own base units. As a result, the PJ’s

activists were linked to the party by a shared identity and ideology. These activists were generally recruited through family and friendship networks and social organisations such as unions, cooperatives, clubs, and church groups.

⁴⁶ In a survey of 39 national unions carried out by the author, 35 reported participating in PJ politics in the 1980s, and 31 reported placing members on PJ parliamentary lists or party leaderships. This evidence runs counter to James McGuire’s claim that two of the four largest Peronist union factions (the Ubaldinistas and the ‘15’) did not participate in party activity in the 1980s (McGuire, ‘Union Political Tactics and Democratic Consolidation in Alfonsín’s Argentina, 1983–1989’, *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1992), pp. 62–65). While it is true that these factions did not work closely with the party at the national level, individual unions within these factions did in fact participate actively.

⁴⁷ Iron Guard networks established powerful territorial factions in urban districts such as the Federal Capital, Buenos Aires, and Santa Fe, winning six seats in congress and the governorship of Formosa. The Montoneros aligned with Catamarca boss Vicente Saadi to create a national party faction called Intransigence and Mobilisation, which was based on Montonero networks and financed largely by the Montoneros. C de O participated actively in internal elections in La Matanza and elected leader Alberto Brito Lima to congress. Even the most ‘movementist’ of Peronist Youth factions, such as Juan Carlos Dante Gullo’s Unified Peronist Youth, participated regularly in internal elections after 1983.

national organisation remained a loose and heterogeneous collection of weak national factions, rump paramilitary organisations, labour organisations, and emerging provincial fiefdoms.

Although the 1987–89 Renovation period brought a degree of institutional order to the PJ,⁴⁸ the reforms associated with this period were less far-reaching than is often believed. During this period, party reformers – called *renovadores* – took important steps to democratise the PJ internally (such as introducing direct elections for leadership and candidate selection) and paid unprecedented attention to its formal structure. Formal party organs such as the National Council met more frequently, the party began to keep records of its activities, and a greater effort was made to adhere to party statutes. Aside from the introduction of internal elections, however, the Renovation process did little to change the way the PJ actually functioned in practice. The *renovadores* failed to impose a standard organisational structure on the party and were unable to create an effective central bureaucracy capable of imposing discipline on lower level organisations. Consequently, Peronist sub-units remained informal and relatively autonomous.

The contemporary Peronist organisation: An informal mass party

According to the party statutes that emerged from the 1987 reform process, the contemporary PJ is formally structured as a European-style mass party, with a bureaucratic chain of command that runs from the National Council to provincial and municipal branches down to neighbourhood base units.⁴⁹ In practice, however, the party more closely resembles what one Peronist mayor described as an ‘organised dis-organisation’.⁵⁰ The PJ retains a powerful mass organisation with deep

⁴⁸ Mustapic, ‘El Partido Justicialista’, pp. 67–8; Marcos Novaro and Vicente Palermo, *Los caminos de la centroizquierda: Dilemas y desafíos del FREPASO y la Alianza* (Buenos Aires, 1998), pp. 47–52.

⁴⁹ The formal party hierarchy consists of four levels: (1) the national leadership, which includes the National Council and the party congress; (2) provincial-level branches, which are governed by provincial party councils; (3) municipal-level branches, which are governed by municipal councils; and (4) neighbourhood-level base units. The highest body of authority is the party congress, which has the power to determine the party programme, modify the party charter, and intervene provincial party leaderships. Day-to-day leadership of the party is carried out by a 110-member National Council and its 32-member Executive Board leaderships (Partido Justicialista, *Carta Orgánica Nacional* (Buenos Aires, 1991), articles 20–21).

⁵⁰ Author’s interview with Juan José Alvarez, mayor of Hurlingham, 18 July, 1997. Local party leader José Montenegro described the PJ as a ‘giant informal network’ (author’s interview, 26 Aug., 1997). According to Montenegro, ‘some Peronists work in the base units, others in their homes, and others in *sociedades de fomento*. But they are all part of

roots in working and lower class society, but these linkages continue to be non-bureaucratic, informal, and highly decentralised.

A mass organisation

Although no modern day parties ‘encapsulate’ their members to the same degree that some turn-of-the-century European mass parties did,⁵¹ the PJ maintains what is by contemporary standards a powerful mass organisation. This can be seen in several ways. First, it retains a large mass membership. Party membership stood at 3.85 million in 1993, which represented a striking 18 per cent of the electorate.⁵² Indeed, the PJ’s membership-to-vote ratio of 54.2 exceeded those of postwar social democratic parties in Austria, Germany and Sweden.⁵³ Although the utility of such comparisons is limited by the fact that PJ membership entails a lower level of commitment than it does in most European mass parties,⁵⁴ this extensive affiliation is nonetheless striking.

Second, the PJ maintains a dense territorial infrastructure. Although the party’s failure to keep records of its base units makes it difficult to accurately measure the density of its organisation, evidence from La Matanza, Quilmes, and the provincial capital of San Miguel de Tucuman suggests that the PJ’s base-level infrastructure remains both extensive and densely organised. In 1997, these three municipalities contained approximately one UB per 2000 residents and more than two UBs per square kilometer.⁵⁵

Third, the PJ remains deeply embedded in working and lower class society through linkages to a variety of (formal and informal)

the network. This network is always there, sometimes latent, but always ready to be activated’.

⁵¹ Giovanni Sartori, ‘European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism’, in Robert Dahl and D.E. Neubauer (eds), *Readings in Modern Political Analysis* (New York, 1968), pp. 122–123; E. Spencer Wellhofer, ‘Strategies for Party Organisation and Voter Mobilisation: Britain, Norway, and Argentina’, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (1979), pp. 169–204.

⁵² Mark Jones, ‘Evaluating Argentina’s Presidential Democracy: 1983–1995’, in Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Soberg Shugart (eds), *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (New York, 1997), p. 274.

⁵³ Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 234.

⁵⁴ For example, Peronists do not pay regular dues.

⁵⁵ In La Matanza, where there are approximately 700 UBs, there is an estimated one UB per 1754 residents and 1.8 UBs per square kilometer. In Quilmes, where there are approximately 300 UBs, there is an estimated one UB per 1822 residents and 3.28 UBs per square kilometer. (Based on demographic data in *Informe de Coyuntura* (La Plata, Nov.-Dec. 1996), p. 98). In San Miguel, the PJ has approximately 250 UBs, which is equivalent to roughly one UB per 2400 residents.

organisations. At the most basic level, local PJ organisations maintain extensive links to interpersonal networks in working and lower class neighbourhoods. In lower class zones, the ‘natural leaders’ or ‘problem solvers’ of the neighbourhood – are generally Peronists.⁵⁶ Although many of these ‘natural leaders’ are not full time party activists, almost all of them maintain ties – through friends, neighbours, or relatives – to informal party networks. These ties are periodically activated both ‘from below’ and ‘from above’: neighbourhood ‘problem-solvers’ use them to gain access to government resources, while local *punteros* use them to recruit people for elections or other mobilisations.⁵⁷

Local party organisations also maintain linkages to a range of social organisations. Historically, the most important of these have been unions. Although union influence in the PJ has declined considerably since the mid-1980s, the vast majority of unions remained active in local Peronist politics through the late 1990s. Of 36 local unions surveyed by the author in 1997, 33 (92 per cent) participated in party activity in 1997.⁵⁸ PJ organisations are also linked to a variety of urban social movements, such as squatters’ movements and shantytown organisations. In the Federal Capital, for example, the vast majority of shantytown organisations are run by PJ activists, and city-wide organisations of shantytown dwellers, such as the Shantytown Movement and the Social Front, maintained close ties to the PJ. In La Matanza, five of 31 UBs surveyed for this study were linked to squatter settlements, and the coordinator of the Roundtable of Squatter Settlements, which claimed to represent 60 shantytown organisations, is a member of the local PJ leadership.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ For an insightful account of Peronist ‘problem-solving networks’, see Javier Auyero, ‘The Politics of Survival: Problem-Solving Networks and Political Culture Among the Urban Poor in Contemporary Buenos Aires’, Ph.D dissertation, New School for Social Research, New York, 1997.

⁵⁷ There is a dark underside to this social embeddedness. Because urban slum zones are frequently centres of illicit activity such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and gambling, Peronist networks are inevitably linked to these forms of organisation as well. Although verifiable data on illicit Peronist networks is difficult to obtain, it is widely believed that Peronist factions in La Matanza are linked to drug running, gambling, prostitution, and extortion networks. For example, networks of temporary workers in La Matanza’s Central Market complex, which are regularly mobilised by Peronist factions to paint graffiti and attend PJ mobilisations, are also rumored to be involved in drug trafficking and thug work, including the beating of a journalist who was writing a book on Buenos Aires governor Eduardo Duhalde.

⁵⁸ All of the surveyed unions were located in the Federal Capital, La Matanza, and Quilmes.

⁵⁹ Author’s interview with Raúl Tuncho, 30 Aug., 1997. Similarly, in the San Francisco de Solano zone of Quilmes, where 20,000 squatters carried out land invasions during the *Proceso*, the movement’s political organisation, Social Justice, joined the PJ in the early 1980s (Luis Fara, ‘Luchas Reivindicativas urbanas en un contexto autoritario’, in Elisabeth Jelin (ed), *Los nuevos movimientos sociales* (Buenos Aires, 1989), pp. 185–185).

Base-level PJ organisations are also linked to a variety of non-governmental organisations, including *sociedades de fomento*, school cooperatives, and soup kitchens.⁶⁰ For example, shantytown organisers in the Federal Capital estimate that ‘seventy or eighty per cent’ of the city’s 150 soup kitchens are run by Peronists.⁶¹ Similar estimates have been made for the Greater Buenos Aires districts of Hurlingham, Lanus, and Quilmes.⁶² A smaller number of UBs maintain ties to church organisations. Finally, many Peronist organisations maintain ties to neighbourhood and local clubs.⁶³ Of particular importance are local soccer clubs (especially those in the second or ‘B’ division). Local PJ leaders often use soccer fan clubs to mobilise for rallies, paint graffiti, and, at times, intimidate opponents. Scores of party-club linkages exist in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. For example, union leader Luis Barrionuevo’s control over the Chacarita soccer club helped him establish a powerful political base in Greater Buenos Aires. In La Matanza, the local party uses the Laferrere soccer fan club for mobilisations and graffiti painting.⁶⁴ Party-club linkages are also common in the interior provinces. In Tucuman, for example, the two largest soccer clubs were controlled by Peronists in the late 1990s.⁶⁵

Overall, more than half (56.7 per cent) of the UBs surveyed by the author showed evidence of a linkage to one or more social institutions, and more than a third (36.5 per cent) were linked to two or more such

⁶⁰ In Quilmes, for example, most of the approximately 150 *sociedades de fomento* are run by Peronists. The Quilmes Federation of *Sociedades de Fomento*, which claims to represent 90 *sociedades*, linked itself to the PJ by creating the Justicialista Centre of Organised Communities and placing its president, Cornelio Melgares, in the local party leadership (author’s interviews with Cornelio Melgares, 2 April, 1997, and José Luis Saluzzi, Quilmes Director of Non-Governmental Entities, 4 Sept., 1997).

⁶¹ Author’s interviews, 31 May, 1997.

⁶² The Hurlingham figure is based on the author’s interview with Hurlingham mayor Juan José Alvarez, 18 July, 1997. The Lanus figure is based on research by Javier Auyero (personal communication). The Quilmes figure is based on the author’s interview with José Luis Saluzzi, Quilmes Director of Non-Governmental Entities, 4 Sept., 1997.

⁶³ In La Matanza, three of the largest clubs – Almirante Brown, Huracan, and Laferrere – have close ties to the PJ. In the Caballito neighbourhood in the capital, activists from the Peronist Unity Front have led the West Railroad Club and Italian Club since the 1970s.

⁶⁴ In the Federal Capital, city council member Raúl Padró uses the Defenders of Belgrano fan club as an organisational base, while the UOM’s ties to the Nueva Chicago fan club strengthens its political presence in Mataderos and other southern neighbourhoods. In Lomas de Zamora, the PJ factions maintain close ties to the Banfield soccer club, and in Lanus, the local soccer club is closely linked to PJ mayor Manuel Quindimil.

⁶⁵ One of these clubs, Club Atletico, was run by PJ senator (and later governor) Julio Miranda. Similarly, in San Juan, control of the San Martin Club helped launch the political careers of PJ legislator Juan José Chica Rodriguez and PJ governor Jorge Escobar.

Table 1. *Social linkages of base units surveyed in the federal capital and greater Buenos Aires**

	Number	Percentage
Base units with ties to at least one social organisation	59	56.7
Base units with ties to at least two social organisations	38	36.5
School cooperative	23	22.1
<i>Sociedad de fomento</i>	21	20.2
Neighbourhood club	21	20.2
Self-help organisation	21	20.2
Union	15	14.4
Church organisation	9	8.7
Squatter organisation	7	6.7
Total	104	100.0

* No information was available for eight of the surveyed base units.

entities. This data is summarised in Table 1. Of the UBs surveyed, 22.1 per cent had ties to a school or child care cooperative, 20.2 per cent had ties to a local club, 20.2 per cent had ties to a *sociedad de fomento*, 20.2 per cent had ties to a soup kitchen or other self-help organisation, 14.4 per cent had ties to a union, 8.7 per cent had ties to a church organisation, and 6.7 per cent had ties to a squatter organisation.

An informal structure

As they were throughout the 1955–83 period, the PJ's mass linkages remain *informal and decentralised*, rather than bureaucratic. The formal party structure is largely ignored, and power, resources, information, and even political careers pass through informal, self-organised sub-units with only weak and intermittent links both to each other and to the party bureaucracy.

Neighbourhood-level organisation: base units. According to party statutes, base units constitute 'the primary organ of the party'.⁶⁶ They are the neighbourhood branches out of which activists operate. Formally, UBs must have at least 50 members and must be governed by a Base Unit Council that is elected every two years by the membership.⁶⁷ In practice, however, they tend to be run by either a small group of activists or a single *puntero* (neighbourhood broker) and her or his inner circle of friends and family. Only 4.8 per cent of the UBs surveyed for this study held regular elections with leadership turnover. 22.1 per cent held nominal elections in which the same leader always won, and 73.1 per cent held no regular elections at all.

⁶⁶ Partido Justicialista, *Carta Orgánica*, article 12.

⁶⁷ Partido Justicialista, *Carta Orgánica*, articles 14, 16.

Formally, UBs are part of the party bureaucracy. According to party statutes, UBs register with, and fall under the direct authority of, local party councils. The local party council determines the jurisdiction of each UB, and in some districts it has the authority to intervene UBs that do not properly carry out their functions.⁶⁸ In reality, however, UBs are autonomous from the party bureaucracy. They are not created by the party and their offices are not party property. Rather, they are created, privately, by the activists themselves. Anyone can open a UB at any time and in any place. Frequently, *punteros* establish UBs in their own homes and thus literally become their ‘owners’. As one local leader put it,

We don’t have to ask, ‘may we open up a Peronist community centre?’ No. In Peronism you have the freedom to create what you want. No one tells you what to do.⁶⁹

Of the surveyed UBs, 67.6 per cent were created ‘from below’ by activists or *punteros*, 11.7 per cent were created as outgrowths of existing UBs, 12.6 per cent were created ‘from above’ by local factions (or *agrupaciones*), and 8.0 per cent were created by unions. Not a single UB was created by the party bureaucracy.

Not only do local party bureaucracies lack control over how many UBs exist or where they are located, but they often do not even have a record of the UBs under their jurisdiction. In Quilmes, party officials estimate that they have a record of about a third of the existing UBs.⁷⁰ In La Matanza, party administrators claim to possess no records of existing UBs. Although party leaders have occasionally attempted to bring UBs under the control of the party bureaucracy, these efforts have repeatedly failed.⁷¹ For example, a 1997 proposal in the Federal Capital to limit party offices to one officially recognised branch per ward was rejected as impossible to enforce. As one local leader put it,

Who would finance and run these offices? And how are they going to close down the other base units if the base units are owned by the *punteros*? Are they going to throw the *punteros* out of their homes?⁷²

UBs take a variety of organisational forms. While some take the form stipulated by the party statutes, others take the form of informal ‘working

⁶⁸ Partido Justicialista, *Carta Orgánica*, article 13); Partido Justicialista de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, *Carta Orgánica Provincial* (La Plata, 1988), article 28.

⁶⁹ Author’s interview with José Montenegro, 26 Aug., 1997.

⁷⁰ Author’s interviews with PJ-Quilmes administrator Elba Quiroga (26 Nov., 1996) and party president José Rivela (22 May, 1997).

⁷¹ In Quilmes in the mid-1980s, for example, party president Roberto Morguen sought to permit only officially recognised UBs to operate in each neighbourhood, but because the party had no means of enforcing the policy, the policy was widely ignored (author’s interviews with Roberto Morguen (13 May, 1997) and José Luis Saluzzi (4 Sept., 1997)).

⁷² Author’s interview with PJ-Federal Capital treasurer Raúl Roa, 10 Nov., 1997.

groups', which operate out of activists' homes, without a sign outside or any kind of formal recognition from the party. Legitimated by Perón's proscription era motto that 'every house is a base unit', working groups are formed by activists without the numbers or resources to maintain an office, or by *punteros* who prefer informality because it gives them more 'room for manoeuvre'. Other UBs operate out of civic associations such as neighbourhood cooperatives, community centres, or soup kitchens.⁷³ Most of these entities function just like UBs, signing up party members, competing in internal elections, and campaigning in general elections.⁷⁴ According to a local leader who runs the 'Companions' UB in the capital,

We put on different hats. One day we are a base unit; the next day a child care centre, and the next day the civic association. But we always have the same Peronist ideology.⁷⁵

In some areas, a majority of UBs operate out of civic associations. In San Miguel (province of Tucuman) for example, most UBs function as 'neighbourhood centres', and in the province of Santa Cruz, a large number of UBs are organised into 'community centres'. Finally, some UBs are actually neighbourhood annexes of local party factions. Neighbourhood annexes differ from other UBs in that they are created (and often staffed) from the outside, rather than by neighbourhood activists. Like working groups and civic associations, however, they are not sanctioned by, or subject to the authority of, local party authorities.

PJ organisations thus consist of a heterogeneous mix of UBs, working groups, civic organisations, and non-profits. For example, in the Lugano neighbourhood in the Federal Capital, the MOVIP faction includes a child care centre, a comedor, a 'mother's centre', a community centre, and several working groups and UBs, while the Loyalty faction in Quilmes includes a church group, a mother's association, a children's rights group, and several community centres. Table 2 shows the distribution of organisational forms taken by the UBs surveyed for this study. Less than half (42.9 per cent) took the form stipulated by the party charter; 22.3 per cent were informal working groups; 23.2 per cent operated out of civic associations; and 11.6 per cent were neighbourhood annexes sponsored

⁷³ Such arrangements are generally an effort to gain access to state subsidies or to administer state-financed social programmes. They also represent an effort to appeal to a broader, non-Peronist constituency.

⁷⁴ As one activist put it, 'We work for nine months out of the year as a civic association, and then at election time we turn ourselves into a base unit' (author's interview, 22 March, 1997).

⁷⁵ Author's interview with Liliana Monteverde, 30 June, 1997. Similarly, an activist whose UB was transformed into a comedor said, 'we had to take down the Peronist sign to get funding, but everyone knows it is still a base unit' (author's interview, 24 March, 1997).

Table 2. *The organisational form of surveyed base units*

Organisational Form	Number	Percentage
Formal Base Unit	48	42.9
Informal 'Working Group'	25	22.3
Civic Association/Non-Profit	26	23.2
Annex of <i>Agrupación</i>	13	11.6
Union	2	1.8
Total	112	100.0

by local factions, or *agrupaciones*. A small number (1.8 per cent) operated out of unions.

Municipal-level organisation: agrupaciones. UBs are linked to the party through informal organisations called *agrupaciones*. *Agrupaciones* are clusters of UBs that compete for power in the party at the local level. They may be led by government officials, city council members, provincial or national legislators, unions, or outside political entrepreneurs seeking to build a base. They range in size from four or five UBs to more than 100, although most contain between 10 and 30. Two or three dozen *agrupaciones* may exist in each municipality, but usually only a handful are politically influential. In their competition for votes, *agrupaciones* build alliances with *punteros* throughout the municipality. In exchange for their support, *punteros* seek direct financing for their UBs, material resources to distribute to their constituents, and, whenever possible, government jobs. Because those in the best position to offer such resources are public office holders, most *agrupaciones* are held together by state patronage. Public officials use money from kickbacks, resources from the government agencies they run, and low level government jobs to finance their *agrupaciones*. Food and medicine from social welfare ministries are routinely diverted to UBs, and *punteros* are widely employed in government offices.⁷⁶ Of the UBs surveyed for this study, 93 per cent belonged to an *agrupación*, and most of the others were in transition from one *agrupación* to another.

Agrupaciones are thoroughly informal organisations. They are not mentioned in the party charter, and local party offices generally keep no record of them. Because they organise and finance themselves, *agrupaciones* enjoy substantial autonomy from the party bureaucracy. They do not have to conform to either the dictates of party statutes or the decisions of local party authorities. This organisational autonomy is legitimated by Peronism's 'movementist' tradition. Because the Peronist 'movement' is understood to be broader than the party, and because the movement lacks

⁷⁶ *Punteros* commonly receive fictitious government contracts that enable them to earn full time salaries while they work in the UBs.

any kind of (formal or informal) structure or hierarchy, Peronists often conceive of their *agrupaciones* as lying outside the party, but inside the movement.⁷⁷ Thus, the PJ's boundaries are fluid: *agrupaciones* float in and out of the party with relative ease.⁷⁸

It is the *agrupaciones*, not the party bureaucracy, that link the party to its mass base. The vast bulk of party resources – particularly patronage and other unregulated forms of finance – pass through the *agrupaciones*,⁷⁹ and it is the *agrupaciones*, not the party bureaucracy, that finance and maintain the UBs.⁸⁰ Of the UBs surveyed by the author, 85.6 per cent received most or all of their resources from an *agrupación*, while 14.4 per cent were either self-financed or were financed through private sector donations. Not a single UB was financed by the party bureaucracy.

Agrupaciones also carry out the bulk of the party's mobilisational work. *Punteros* mobilise their supporters for activities sponsored by the *agrupación*, carry out instructions that are channeled through the *agrupación*, and distribute material goods and literature supplied by the *agrupación*. *Punteros* get the bulk of their information from assemblies run by their *agrupación*, and to the extent that UBs are able to channel demands upward through the party, they do so via the *agrupación*. By contrast, UBs rarely

⁷⁷ Thus, despite the fact that it participates in internal elections and campaigns for the PJ in general elections, the ex-paramilitary group *Comando de Organización* in La Matanza considers itself 'part of the movement, but not part of the party' and therefore in no way subject to the discipline of the local party (author's interview with Alberto Brito Lima, 8 April, 1997). Similarly, a Quilmes city councilman Reymundo Gonzales claimed he worked in an *agrupación* so as to 'avoid impositions by the party' (author's interview, 13 June 1997).

⁷⁸ In the Federal Capital, for example, Peronist Victory (VP) left the party in 1996 to back the mayoral candidacy of Gustavo Beliz of the New Leadership party. Over the next two years, VP maintained 'one foot in and one foot out of the party', calling itself a 'Peronist *agrupación* outside the structure of the PJ' (author's interviews with VP leaders Jorge Arguello (19 May, 1997) and Victor Pandolfi (5 June, 1997)). In 1997, VP aligned with Domingo Cavallo's Action for the Republic party. In 1998, VP returned to the PJ to join to back Eduardo Duhalde's presidential campaign.

⁷⁹ Although public finance is channeled through the party bureaucracies, this amounts to a relatively small percentage of party finance. Most private donations – and, crucially, all *patronage resources* – are channeled through the *agrupaciones*.

⁸⁰ According to former Federal Capital party treasurer Raúl Roa, 'The party bureaucracy just maintains the headquarters, which is nothing more than an office and the employees that clean the place. The rest of the organisation is financed and coordinated by the leaders of the *agrupaciones*. The party's real infrastructure is in the hands of the *agrupaciones*' (author's interview, 12 May, 1997). Indeed, whereas the headquarters of the PJ Metropolitan Council in the Federal Capital is generally staffed only by cleaning personnel, *agrupaciones* such as the Peronist Unity Front and Liberators of America maintain computer-equipped headquarters with full time staff. Similarly, in La Matanza, the PJ's *de facto* headquarters in the 1990s was the office of the dominant Militancy and Renovation (MyRP) *agrupación*. Known as *La Casona*, the MyRP headquarters was better financed, better staffed, and more frequently visited than the party headquarters.

participate in events sponsored by the local party leadership. Even political careers are channeled through *agrupaciones*. Because leadership recruitment and candidate selection is done almost entirely by the *agrupaciones*, emerging politicians invest in *agrupaciones* rather than build careers in the party bureaucracy.

Agrupaciones also have a greater capacity to impose discipline on local leaders than does the party bureaucracy. For example, despite the fact that the Federal Capital party statutes stipulate that elected officials must contribute 10 per cent of their salaries to the local party,⁸¹ only three of six congressional deputies did so in 1997.⁸² By contrast, *every one* of the elected officials belonging to Liberators of America and FUP regularly contributed 10 per cent of their salaries to their *agrupaciones*.⁸³ A similar situation exists in Quilmes, where local party president José Rivela claims that ‘less than half’ of elected officials meet their obligation to contribute five per cent of their salaries to the party.⁸⁴ According to Rivela, local Peronists

ignore the party leadership They respond to the *agrupaciones* because that is where the money comes from The *agrupaciones* can provide them with something – money to pay the rent, or food or blankets to give away. The party can’t offer anything, so no one pays any attention to it.⁸⁵

Provincial and national party organisation. At the provincial level, *agrupaciones* aggregate into competing factions or *líneas internas*, which are almost always led by public officials, such as governors, national or provincial cabinet members, or legislators.⁸⁶ The primary currency of exchange between *líneas internas* and *agrupaciones* is patronage: *agrupaciones* exchange votes for positions in provincial governments or on national or provincial legislative lists. *Líneas internas* vary in their organisational structures. Some are loosely organised factions that emerge for internal elections and then disappear. Others, such as the Peronist Renovation Movement in Santa Cruz, the Orange List in Mendoza, and Peronist Convergence in La Pampa, endured for more than a decade. Although a

⁸¹ Partido Justicialista Metropolitana, *Carta Orgánica Metropolitana*, (Buenos Aires, 1986), article 80.

⁸² Author’s interview with Federal Capital party treasurer Raúl Roa, 12 May, 1997.

⁸³ Author’s interviews with Raúl Roa of FUP and Victor Columbano of Liberators of America, 12 May, 1997. ⁸⁴ Author’s interview, 22 May, 1997.

⁸⁵ Author’s interview, 22 May, 1997.

⁸⁶ In Buenos Aires, the party was dominated by two factions in the 1990s: the Federal League, which was run by Chamber of Deputies president Alberto Pierri and provincial public works minister Hugo Toledo, and the Buenos Aires Peronist League, led by provincial chamber of deputies president Osvaldo Mercuri. Both factions were loyal to governor Eduardo Duhalde. In Tucuman, the two dominant *líneas internas* in the 1990s – ‘True Peronism’ and ‘Peronism of Hope’ – were led by the party’s two national senators, Olijela Rivas and Julio Miranda.

few *líneas internas* are well-institutionalised and maintain relatively coherent programmatic profiles,⁸⁷ most are highly personalistic, often taking on the name of their leader.⁸⁸

Power, resources, and careers pass through the *líneas internas*, rather than formal party hierarchies, and as a result, provincial party bureaucracies tend to be weak. For example, the Buenos Aires party branch, which has a membership of more than one million, was only open for three half days every week in 1997 and had no full-time staff. The provincial council rarely met, and when it did, it often had to call acting party president Alberto Pierri to have the office unlocked.⁸⁹ By contrast, the party's two dominant factions, the Federal League and the Buenos Aires Peronist League kept detailed records of local-level party activity, organised and financed the party's campaigns, mobilised Peronists for rallies, and disciplined local organisations. In Tucuman, when the factions stopped funding the party in 1997, the provincial party headquarters was left for several weeks without phone service, running water, or funds to finance its congressional campaign.⁹⁰ Hence, without control over the *líneas internas*, control of the bureaucracy means very little. Indeed, when the party's formal leadership is not aligned with the dominant factions, it becomes virtually powerless.⁹¹

Through the 1990s, the PJ lacked an effective structure – even an informal one – at the national level. As is the case at the local and provincial levels, the national party bureaucracy is largely inoperative. To date, however, no national-level equivalents to *agrupaciones* and *líneas internas* have emerged.⁹² Provincial bosses are not linked together horizontally or vertically integrated into a central hierarchy, but rather tend to remain entrenched in their own fiefdoms.

⁸⁷ Examples include Peronist Renovation Movement in Santa Cruz, Eva Perón in Formosa, and, more ambiguously, the Orange List in Mendoza.

⁸⁸ Examples include *Jaurismo* (after governor Carlos Juárez) in Santiago del Estero, *Romerismo* (after governor Juan Carlos Romero) in Salta, and *Saadismo* (after Vicente and Ramon Saadi) in Catamarca.

⁸⁹ Author's interview with Oscar Guida, a member of the PJ-Buenos Aires provincial council, 22 Nov., 1996.

⁹⁰ Author's interview with PJ-Tucuman president Amado Juri, 8 Dec., 1997.

⁹¹ This was clearly seen in the case of the 1990 referendum in Buenos Aires on a set of reforms to the provincial constitution that would have permitted governor Antonio Cafiero to run for re-election. When the measure was handily defeated, with many Peronists voting against it, the outcome was taken as a major surprise given that Cafiero controlled the party 'apparatus'. Yet two of the party's three major *líneas internas*, the Federal League and 'Menem Leadership', did not work in favour of the measure and, in many places, quietly worked against it. By August 1990, when the referendum was held, the Federal League had grown substantially in the province, leaving Cafiero with a minority of the 'real' party.

⁹² Only one national faction – the *renovadores* – emerged in the post-1983 period, and it disintegrated soon after its defeat in the 1988 internal elections.

Due to this informal and segmented structure, the PJ is substantially more decentralised than is often believed. Lacking an effective central bureaucracy, the PJ functions like an organisational ‘big tent’, containing within it diverse and often contradictory elements. Far from the centralised or ‘verticalist’ tradition with which Peronism is often associated,⁹³ the relationship between higher and lower level PJ authorities is actually closer to one of mutual autonomy.⁹⁴ On the one hand, in the absence of effective horizontal links, Peronist sub-units have difficulty acting collectively to check the power of central leaders, which gives PJ leaders substantial autonomy from lower level authorities.⁹⁵ On the other hand, party leaders lack effective mechanisms with which to impose discipline on party sub-units. Consequently, unlike centralised mass parties such as the Chilean communist party or the Venezuelan AD, in which sub-units must strictly adhere to the national party line or face expulsion, the PJ exhibits a substantial degree of internal tolerance and diversity. As one PJ legislator put it,

In other parties, everything one does has to be approved by the party hierarchy Your discourse has to conform to certain party standards. In Peronism, none of that is true. You can do or say whatever you want.⁹⁶

The PJ under Menem: The surprising resilience of local and provincial party organisations

By virtually any measure, PJ underwent a set of radical changes in the 1990s. Under the leadership of Carlos Menem, a Peronist government dismantled the statist economic model that had been in place since the 1940s and established one of the region’s most open economies. Early analyses depicted this reform process as a kind of ‘revolution from above’, imposed by a powerful president acting at the margins of the PJ, major interest groups, and the legislature.⁹⁷ Argentina was thus widely viewed as a case of ‘neo-populism’, in which the president circumvents parties in favour of direct, unmediated appeals.⁹⁸ In line with these analyses, the PJ was viewed as having been eviscerated or transformed from above in the 1990s. According to Marcos Novaro, the PJ ‘was

⁹³ See Ciria, *Política y cultura popular*.

⁹⁴ Eldersveld used the terms ‘stratarchy’ and ‘reciprocal deference’ to describe a similar phenomenon in U.S. parties. See Samuel D. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (New York, 1964), pp. 9–10.

⁹⁵ Levitsky, ‘From Laborism to Liberalism’, pp. 246–60.

⁹⁶ Author’s interview with congressional deputy Fernando Maurette, 4 July, 1997.

⁹⁷ O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’.

⁹⁸ Roberts, ‘Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism;’ Weyland, ‘Neo-populism and Neoliberalism in Latin America;’ Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe’.

completely reorganised, from the highest positions to each one of its local chapters'.⁹⁹ Menem, he argues, 'reduced the role of the party organisation to a minimum', such that the PJ came to function largely as an 'electoral committee'.¹⁰⁰ From this perspective, the national party leadership 'functioned as a ... mechanism of control of provincial leaderships',¹⁰¹ allowing Menem to impose strategies on provincial branches and replace local party leaders and candidates with media-friendly 'outsiders'.¹⁰²

This section offers a somewhat different picture of the PJ-Menem relationship. It argues that unlike 'neo-populist' leaders such as Collor and Fujimori, President Menem's relationship to the Peronist rank-and-file was always mediated by strong, semi-autonomous local organisations. These base-level organisations provided the governing party with a range of political benefits in the 1990s. Yet they also proved double-edged, for they limited Menem's capacity to impose leaders, candidates, and strategies on lower level branches. As a result, local and provincial Peronist organisations remained surprisingly 'un-Menemised' at the end of the 1990s.

Base-level party activity in the 1990s

Recent studies have emphasised the central role of the Peronist party in building and maintaining support for the Menem government's reform programme.¹⁰³ Gibson and Calvo, for example, have noted the importance of 'well-established networks of political support' in delivering Peronist votes in the provinces.¹⁰⁴ Although these authors focus on the peripheral provinces, it is clear that local organisations were critical to maintaining mass support in poor urban areas – such as Greater Buenos Aires and Greater Rosario – as well. Not only did the PJ's vast infrastructure of UBs, unions, soup kitchens, clubs, and informal social networks yield vast human and organisational resources for campaigns, but it also provided channels for patronage distribution, policy implementation, social and cultural contact, and (albeit with less frequency) political participation and

⁹⁹ Marcos Novaro, 'Shifting Alliances: Party Politics in Argentina', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, vol. 31, no. 6 (1998), p. 12.

¹⁰⁰ Novaro, 'Menemism and Peronism', pp. 59–60. Similarly, McGuire cites an Argentine newspaper column that claims that 'the committees of the defeated UCR show more life today than the base units of the victorious Partido Justicialista' (James McGuire, *Peronism without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina* (Stanford, 1997), p. 244).

¹⁰¹ Palermo and Novaro, *Política y Poder*, p. 404.

¹⁰² Novaro, 'Menemismo y Peronismo', pp. 60–2; María de los Angeles Yannuzzi, *La modernización conservadora: El peronismo de los 90* (Buenos Aires, 1995), pp. 179–86; McGuire, *Peronism without Perón*, pp. 243–8.

¹⁰³ Gibson, 'The Populist Road to Market Reform'; Gibson and Calvo, 'Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms'; Corrales, 'Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules'.

¹⁰⁴ Gibson and Calvo, 'Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms'.

demand-making. For example, during the 1989–90 hyperinflationary crisis, tens of thousands of party activists worked to dampen working and lower class protest in response to the hyperinflationary crisis and the government's austerity measures. This was done through persuasion, the physical expulsion of leftist activists from their neighbourhoods,¹⁰⁵ and a variety of neighbourhood-based emergency social welfare measures. In La Matanza, for example, Peronist activists reportedly operated more than 200 city-sponsored soup kitchens in 1989.¹⁰⁶ Peronists also operated scores of soup kitchens in the shantytowns of the Federal Capital.¹⁰⁷ In the city's first ward, activists from the 'United or Dominated' UB claim to have distributed food to 300 families, going door to door in their neighbourhood to find out who was in need. In the 22nd ward, *punteros* organised collective soup kitchens in which families with food provided for those who lacked it.

Local Peronist organisations engaged in a variety of other political, social, and cultural activities in the 1990s. For example, party activists played a major role in the delivery of social assistance in lower income neighbourhoods. Of the base units surveyed for this study, 96 per cent engaged in some form of social assistance. Although scholarly and journalistic accounts of this material goods distribution tend to portray it as naked clientelism,¹⁰⁸ virtually no research has been done on what UBs actually do. Indeed, as recent work by Javier Auyero demonstrates,¹⁰⁹ the picture is somewhat more complex. Much Peronist base-level social assistance is in fact clientelistic. As Table 3 shows, more than two-thirds (69.6 per cent) of the UBs surveyed for this study engaged in the direct distribution of food or medicine, and nearly a quarter (22.3 per cent) of the UBs regularly provided jobs for their constituents.

Yet UBs also provide a range of other social welfare services –

¹⁰⁵ Author's interview with La Matanza city council member Abraham Delgado, 21 Nov., 1997, and activists Cacho Ines, and Graciela Diaz, 21 June, 1997.

¹⁰⁶ Author's interview with Aníbal Stela, who served as vice-president of the PJ in La Matanza during the hyperinflationary period, 21 June, 1997.

¹⁰⁷ Based on the author's interviews with PJ activists Reinaldo Mendoza (26 Oct., 1996), Eugenio Lammardo (28 June, 1997), Mate Ocampo (22 March, 1997), Carlos Racedo (15 March, 1997), and Ana Suppa (22 July, 1997).

¹⁰⁸ See Judy Lawton, 'Clientelist Politics and Peronism in the Squatter Settlements of Greater Buenos Aires: Squatters' Views on Politics and Society', paper delivered at the XVIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1994; Hernan López Echague, *El otro: Una biografía de Eduardo Duhalde* (Buenos Aires, 1996); Daniel Otero, *El entorno: La trama íntima del aparato dubaldista y sus punteros* (Buenos Aires, 1997); *Página/12*, 6 Oct., 1996, p. 14.

¹⁰⁹ Auyero, 'The Politics of Survival' and 'Evita como performance: Mediación y resolución de problemas entre los pobres urbanos de Gran Buenos Aires', in Javier Auyero (ed), *¿Favores por votos? Estudios sobre clientelismo político contemporáneo* (Buenos Aires, 1997).

Table 3. *Social welfare activities of surveyed base units, by social class of neighbourhood** (percentages in brackets)

Activity	Lower class (n = 20)	Working class (n = 64)	Middle class (n = 28)	Total (n = 112)
General social assistance	20 (100.0)	62 (98.8)	25 (89.3)	107 (95.5)
Direct distribution of food or medicine	19 (95.0)	49 (76.6)	12 (42.9)	78 (69.6)
Provision of government jobs	5 (25.0)	18 (28.1)	2 (7.1)	25 (22.3)
Programmes for children	11 (55.0)	36 (56.3)	16 (57.1)	63 (56.3)
Programmes for the elderly	6 (30.0)	27 (31.3)	18 (64.3)	51 (45.5)
Legal assistance	2 (10.0)	17 (26.6)	10 (35.7)	29 (25.9)
Neighbourhood social and cultural events	6 (30.0)	34 (53.1)	19 (67.9)	59 (52.7)
Regular delivery of particularistic favours	13 (65.0)	45 (70.3)	9 (32.1)	67 (59.8)
Neighbourhood improvement	15 (75.0)	26 (33.3)	7 (25.0)	48 (42.9)

* Categorisations of social class are author's judgements, based on firsthand observation and interviews with neighbourhood activists.

including medical and legal services, child care, job training, and programmes for the elderly – that are less directly tied to a political exchange. For example, the ‘Reconquest’ UB in the Federal Capital offers school tutoring for children, computer classes and a job location programme for adults, and a retirees centre for the elderly, the ‘October 3’ UB in Quilmes runs a health clinic and provides school uniforms for a local school, and the ‘Juan Manuel de Rosas’ UB in La Matanza founded a child care centre, organised a neighbourhood youth soccer team, and runs a retirees centre. Of the UBs surveyed for this study, 56.3 per cent provided regular activities for children, 45.5 per cent offered programmes for the elderly, and 25.9 per cent provided free legal assistance for low-income residents.

UBs also engage in a variety of social and cultural activities. For example, the ‘Nelson Calvi Peronist House’ in the capital runs a youth soccer programme, holds monthly parties to celebrate neighbours’ birthdays, and throws a well-attended annual Children’s Day party; the ‘Ramon Carillo’ UB in Quilmes organises barbecues for workers from a nearby factory; and the ‘Menem Leadership’ UB in La Matanza offers martial arts, movie nights, and dance programmes for teenagers. Overall,

52.7 per cent of the UBs surveyed regularly organised social and cultural activities in their neighbourhoods.

A smaller number of UBs organise specifically Peronist cultural activities, such as masses for Evita and the celebration of Peronist holidays such as Evita's birthday, October 17, and the 'Day of the Activist'.¹¹⁰ About a third of the surveyed UBs (35.7 per cent) surveyed regularly sponsored such Peronist cultural activities.¹¹¹ A few UBs (6.3 per cent) continued to teach Peronist 'doctrine', either through classes, reading groups, or the distribution of Perón's writings.

Peronist base organisations play a critical role in linking working and lower class citizens to the state. Many UBs participate directly in the implementation of government social programmes. Although such politicisation is often viewed as a corrupt and inefficient distortion of state policy,¹¹² in many lower class areas, the state bureaucracy is so weak that party networks are a more effective means of reaching the population. An example is the Pierrri Law, a programme through which tens of thousands of families received legal titles for their properties. Because many local residents were unaware of the requirements of the programme, and because local governments lacked the resources to carry out an extensive grassroots campaign, Peronist activists frequently provided the legwork, going door-to-door and helping residents do the paperwork.¹¹³ Another example is the Life Plan, which distributes a daily ration of eggs, milk and other basic goods to nearly 400,000 people through a network of 10,000 volunteer *manzanas*, or block workers. Although the programme is officially non-partisan (*manzanas* are chosen through community organisations), the vast majority of *manzanas* are Peronist, and most are linked to the party through informal Peronist networks.¹¹⁴ As Table 4 shows,

¹¹⁰ The Day of the Activist, Nov. 17, marks the day in which Perón returned from exile in 1972.

¹¹¹ For example, the 'Companions' UB in the Federal Capital carried out an 'Evita campaign' in 1997 in order to 'reactivate the memory', while the 'Juan Manuel de Rosas' UB in La Matanza organised an Evita Day, in which dozens of women were invited to discuss 'what Evita means to me'.

¹¹² See, for example, the various publications of the Instituto Bonaerense de Análisis y Proyectos (IBAP), as well as López Echague, *El otro*, pp. 161–74.

¹¹³ Another example is the UGE plan, a Buenos Aires programme in which unemployed residents are paid to pave the streets of their neighbourhoods. To qualify for the programme, neighbourhoods must form cooperatives, collect a quota of signatures, and submit an application. These tasks are often performed by UBs, and as a result, *punteros* frequently run the UGE programme in their neighbourhoods.

¹¹⁴ For example, in his research in a Lanús shantytown, Auyero found that 20 of the zone's 23 *Manzanas* were recruited from Peronist networks (Auyero, 'The Politics of Survival', p. 123). In La Matanza, local Life Plan director Mario Ferreri acknowledged that a 'majority' of the non-governmental organisations from which *Manzanas* are selected are 'run by Peronists' (author's interview, 19 September, 1997).

Table 4. *Base unit participation in government social programmes in greater Buenos Aires**

Government Programme	Number (n = 47)	Percentage
Participate in at least one programme	28	59.6
Life Plan	8	17.0
Public works jobs programmes	12	25.5
Pierri Law	12	25.5
UGE (street pavement)	12	25.5
Soup kitchen	4	8.5

* Because these programmes are sponsored by the provincial government of Buenos Aires, base units from the Federal Capital, which lies outside the province of Buenos Aires, were excluded from the sample. Three additional base units were excluded due to insufficient information.

59.6 per cent of the Greater Buenos Aires UBs surveyed for this study participated in at least one government programme.

PJ activists also play an important role ‘from below’ in providing residents of lower class neighbourhoods with access to the state. Where the PJ controls the local government, activists use their ties to public officials to act as a ‘nexus between the neighbourhood and the city government’.¹¹⁵ Thus, local PJ organisations serve as ‘problem solving networks’,¹¹⁶ obtaining wheelchairs, disability pensions, scholarships, funeral expenses, and odd jobs for working and lower class residents who lack alternative sources of social assistance.

Not all problem-solving networks are particularistic. Activists also employ them to obtain *collective* goods and services for their neighbourhoods. In La Matanza, for example, the ‘Perón and Evita’ UB played a major role in bringing street lights, paved roads, and bus service to a neighbouring squatter settlement. In the capital, the ‘October 8’ UB brought a child care centre, a gymnasium, and a computer-equipped job training centre to the *Ciudad Oculta* shantytown, the Nelson Calvi Peronist House helped to install a sewage system in the Soldati neighbourhood, and the ‘United or Dominated’ UB began teenage pregnancy and battered women’s programmes in the city’s first ward. Overall, 42.9 per cent of the UBs surveyed for this study – and 75 per cent in lower class neighbourhoods – engaged in such neighbourhood improvement work (see Table 3).

Peronist activists also engage in political fights in defense of their neighbourhoods. In La Matanza, for example, the ‘Perón and Evita’ UB

¹¹⁵ Author’s interview with La Matanza activist Tina Blanco, 31 May, 1997.

¹¹⁶ Taken from Auyero, ‘The Politics of Survival’.

represented the neighbourhood when the regional electric company sought to collect back debts that residents could not pay. In the Federal Capital, the ‘United or Dominated’ UB has defended a nearby squatter settlement against city government efforts to remove it. In Quilmes, UBs from the Loyalty faction organised protests that forced the regional water company to restore service to the neighbourhood after it had been cut off for non-payment of debts, successfully pressured the city government to increase police patrols in the neighbourhood, and led a petition drive to pressure the provincial government to take action to prevent flooding from a nearby river.

Finally, a minority of UBs function as channels of grassroots participation by creating arenas for debate or holding regular meetings with local politicians. In Quilmes, for example, the ‘Cooperativism and Social Justice’ UB organised a day-long workshop in which women from poor neighbourhoods discussed their socio-economic problems with local leaders. In the Federal Capital, the ‘Hour of the People’ UB holds monthly public lectures and debates on issues such as the future of the government’s economic programme, social policy, and labour market reform. Also in the capital, the Justicialista Victory UB holds well-attended weekly political meetings with city councilwomen Kelly Olmos. Overall, 39.4 per cent of the surveyed UBs showed evidence of some kind of non-electoral political activity, and 15.8 per cent showed evidence of high and sustained levels of political activity.

Although the political impact of this base-level party activity is difficult to measure, it undoubtedly helped to reinforce and sustain the Peronist subculture and identity in the 1990s. Though weakened by generational change and the penetration of mass media technologies,¹¹⁷ a common body of language, symbols, traditions, practices, and beliefs continues to unite Peronists of different ages, regions, social backgrounds, and ideologies. For many working and lower class voters, the Peronist identity extends beyond party politics into the social and cultural realms.¹¹⁸ For these voters, Peronism continues to be less of a party choice than an encompassing identity.¹¹⁹ The persistence of this identity raises the threshold at which such voters decide to abandon the PJ. Indeed, as Pierre Ostiguy has shown, the PJ’s traditional electorate remained relatively stable in the 1990s, despite the fact that many traditional

¹¹⁷ Oscar Landi, ‘Outsiders, Nuevos Caudillos y Medias Políticas’, in Carina Perelli, Sonia Picado, and Daniel Zoviatto (eds), *Partidos y clase política en América Latina en los 90* (San José, 1995); Silvio Waisbord, *El gran desfile: Campañas electorales y medios de comunicación en Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1995).

¹¹⁸ Pierre Ostiguy, ‘Peronism and Anti-Peronism: Class-Cultural Cleavages and Political Identity in Argentina’, Ph.D dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1998.

¹¹⁹ Ostiguy, ‘Peronism and Anti-Peronism’, pp. 394–482.

Table 5. *Activists' views on the menem economic programme**

View of the government's economic policies	Percentage		
Agree with the neoliberal programme	10.2		
Disagree with the neoliberal programme but back the government out of loyalty	10.5		
Disagree with the neoliberal programme but believe that no other option existed	10.7		
Disagree with major aspects of the neoliberal programme and believe other options were available	49.1		
Fully oppose the neoliberal programme as a betrayal of Peronist ideals	19.5		
Total	100.0		
Activist Views of Government Policies Toward Business, Unions, and Workers			
	Business	Unions	Workers
Too Favourable	70.4	7.4	0.7
Correct	26.3	45.4	31.3
Too Unfavourable	2.9	47.1	67.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
The next Peronist government should ...			Percentage
Maintain the Menem economic model			5.5
Maintain the Menem model, but with more social justice			52.4
Return to the roots of Peronism			42.1

* Based on author's survey of 622 PJ activists in the Federal Capital, La Matanza, and Quilmes in 1997.

Peronists did not agree with the Menem government's economic policies.¹²⁰

Local autonomy and the stability of the PJ activist base

The stability of the PJ activist base in the 1990s presents somewhat of a puzzle. Party activists, or at least an important subset of activists, are generally thought to be more ideologically-driven than party leaders.¹²¹ If that is the case, then we should expect that PJ activists, who have historically been almost uniformly anti-liberal, would have abandoned the party in droves in response to the Menem government's neoliberal turn. Data from the 1997 activist survey suggests that PJ activists *were* in fact quite critical of the Menem programme. As Table 5 shows, more than

¹²⁰ Ostiguy, 'Peronism and Anti-Peronism'.

¹²¹ John D. May, 'Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity', *Political Studies* vol. 21, no. 2 (1973), pp. 135-51; Panebianco, *Political Parties*, pp. 26-30; Kaare Strom, 'A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1990), pp. 565-98; Alan Ware, 'Activist-Leader Relations and the Structure of Political Parties', *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 22 (January 1992), pp. 71-92.

two-thirds of surveyed activists opposed either part or all of the Menem programme. Moreover, large majorities believed the government's policies to be 'too favourable' to business (70.4 per cent) and 'too unfavourable' to workers (67.8 per cent). On the question of what economic policies a future Peronist government should carry out, only 5.5 per cent opted for continuity, while 42.1 per cent sought to 'return to the roots of Peronism'.

Nevertheless, the PJ's activist base does *not* appear to have been substantially eroded in the 1990s. Despite two important elite-level defections (the Group of Eight in 1990 and senator José Octavio Bordón in 1994) and the emergence of the centre-left Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) as a serious political alternative in the mid-1990s, few PJ activists followed these groups out of the party.¹²² Although it is difficult to measure the number of activists who simply quit politics in the 1990s, there is little evidence that the activist base was substantially depleted. Indeed, more than three-quarters of surveyed activists in Greater Buenos Aires said the number of activists either *increased* (68 per cent) or remained the same (8 per cent) in the 1990s. Moreover, the relatively high level of PJ activism in the 1990s appears not to have been a product of an influx of new members. Seventy-three per cent of the surveyed activists had worked in the PJ since before 1989, and new activists were at least as likely as older members to oppose Menem's policies.¹²³

Why did anti-Menem activists remain in the party? One reason is patronage. The role of selective material incentives in fostering activist participation increased significantly over the course of the 1990s. More than two-thirds (68.6 per cent) of the UBs surveyed for this study were run by an activist with a government job, and more than a third (34.3 per cent) had two or more activists with government jobs. Moreover, three quarters (75.6 per cent) of the surveyed UBs were financed by *agrupaciones* with positions in local or provincial governments. As Table 6 shows, the importance of selective material incentives appears to be increasing over time. Of the surveyed base units that were established before 1985, 82.2 per cent were held together primarily by personal ties, social networks, or shared ideology.¹²⁴ In only 17.8 of the cases were selective material

¹²² In the words of one former Group of Eight activist, 'no one came with us – not even our wives' (author's interview with Mario Wainfeld, 29 June, 1994). According to former Group of Eight leader Chacho Alvarez, approximately 200 activists joined the group (author's interview, 29 July, 1997).

¹²³ Levitsky, 'From Laborism to Liberalism', pp. 280–85.

¹²⁴ Scorings are the author's judgments, based on interviews with the activists in the UB. Indicators used were the existence of family relationships, pre-existing friendships, neighbourhood ties, or shared ideology, possession of government jobs or other

Table 6. *The increasing role of material benefits in fostering PJ activist participation* (percentage of surveyed base units)*

	UB established before 1985 (<i>n</i> = 45)	UB established between 1985–1995 (<i>n</i> = 39)	UB established after 1995 (<i>n</i> = 17)
Primary Incentive for Activist Participation			
Personal ties, social networks, or ideology	82.2	51.2	35.3
Material benefits	17.8	48.8	64.7

* Author's judgements, based on interviews with activists in each base unit. 11 UBs could not be scored due to lack of sufficient information.

incentives clearly the dominant linkage between activists and the UB. Of the UBs created between 1985 and 1995, however, the percentage of selective material incentive cases rose to 48.8 per cent, and of the UBs that were established after 1995, the percentage rose to 64.7 per cent. This evidence suggests that PJ activism is increasingly based on selective, rather than collective, incentives, and that the urban PJ is becoming less of a 'community of values'¹²⁵ and more of a machine-like party.

Yet the stability of the PJ activist base cannot be attributed solely to patronage. Nearly a third of the surveyed UBs (31.4 per cent) had no access to patronage at all, and in a majority of UBs, patronage benefits did extend beyond one or two activists. Hence, even in the late 1990s, a significant number of activists continued to participate despite having little or no access to state resources.

Critical to keeping many of these activists in the party was the PJ's informal structure. Unlike more centralised mass parties such as the Venezuelan AD or the Chilean Communist Party, the PJ's decentralised structure allowed activists to avoid making a stark choice between adhering to the national party line and leaving (or being expelled from) the party.¹²⁶ Specifically, PJ's system of *agrupaciones* offered alternative channels of participation to Peronists who disliked the national party's neoliberal profile. A range of nationalist, traditional populist, social

benefits or stated desire to obtain such benefits, and activist turnover in the base unit. If the activist base in a UB was relatively stable, held few or no government jobs, and showed evidence of social or ideological ties, then the UB was judged to not be based primarily on selective material benefits.

¹²⁵ Panebianco, *Political Parties*, p. 9.

¹²⁶ Ian McAllister makes a similar argument with respect to the Australian Labor Party (McAllister, 'Party Adaptation and Factionalism within the Australian Party System', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 35, no. 1 (1991), pp. 206–27).

democratic, and even socialist *agrupaciones* co-existed with the Menemist national leadership in the 1990s. For example, although the neo-fascist *Comando de Organización* (C de O) abandoned paramilitary activities after 1983, it continued to engage in nationalist activities, such as protests against the British occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.¹²⁷ In 1997, as part of its battle against ‘cultural imperialism’, C de O organised protests against the screening of the (foreign made) film ‘Evita’.¹²⁸

An example of a left wing *agrupación* is ‘March 11’ in Quilmes.¹²⁹ Founded in 1985 by a group of leftist activists and ex-guerrillas, ‘March 11’ grew into the largest *agrupación* in Quilmes in the 1990s, with approximately 300 activists. ‘March 11’ leaders describe themselves as ‘socialist’ and ‘revolutionary’ and share a commitment to ‘deepening democracy’ through grassroots organisation. They participate in a variety of left-wing political activities, including benefits to raise money for Cuba and an annual party to celebrate the fall of Saigon. Another leftist *agrupación* is the Federal Capital-based Peronism for Everyone, which maintains a small but committed core of (mainly ex-Montonero) activists that regularly supported strikes and other protests against the Menem government.

Finally, scores of *agrupaciones* – and a much larger number of UBs – provide arenas for participation for what might be called traditional or orthodox Peronists. These activists tend to be strongly attached not only to the traditional Peronist programme, but also to Peronist symbols and practices. An example of a traditional Peronist *agrupación* is Peronist Loyalty in La Matanza, which is run by former mayor Federico Russo. The second largest *agrupación* in La Matanza, Peronist Loyalty contains dozens of old guard Orthodox activists, many of whom have worked for Russo since the 1970s. Most of these activists strongly oppose the neo-liberal model, and Russo maintains a populist and anti-liberal profile.¹³⁰ Peronist Loyalty engages in a variety of traditional Peronist activities, ‘doctrinal training’, the celebration of Peronist holidays, and the maintenance of women’s and youth branches.

¹²⁷ The walls of the C de O headquarters in La Matanza are covered with posters that read ‘Defend the Malvinas Islands!’ and ‘Long Live the Argentine Army’.

¹²⁸ Author’s interview with C de O leader Alberto Brito Lima, 8 April, 1997. In the Federal Capital, many nationalists belong to Doctrinal Peronism, which is widely believed to have ties to the *Carapintada* military rebels.

¹²⁹ This section is based on the author’s interviews with ‘March 11’ members Lalo (22 May, 1997), Mario Scalisi (28 May, 1997), Eduardo Schiavo (9 April, 1997), and Oscar Vega (2 April, 1997).

¹³⁰ In one 1997 assembly, for example, Russo called for the ‘return to a true Justicialista government, made up of Peronists and truly dedicated to national sovereignty and social justice’ (Peronist Loyalty meeting in San Justo, La Matanza, 29 August, 1997).

Table 7. *Activist responses to the question: “What level of party activity is most important to you”?* (in percentages)*

	Federal Capital (n = 255)	Greater Buenos Aires (n = 235)	Total (n = 490)
<i>Agrupación</i>	25.5	40.0	32.4
Local/Provincial Party	10.6	22.6	16.3
National Party	63.9	37.4	51.2

* Based on author’s survey of PJ activists in the Federal Capital, La Matanza, and Quilmes in 1997.

Table 8. *Activists’ views on level of party that is most important, by Ideology (in percentages)*

	Neoliberals (n = 48)	Opponents (n = 86)	All Activists (n = 490)
<i>Agrupación</i>	18.8	45.3	32.4
Local/provincial party	6.3	16.3	16.3
National party	75.0	38.4	51.2

The PJ’s segmented and decentralised *agrupación* system thus provided outlets for scores of Peronist activists, allowing them to continue to carry out forms of Peronism that had little to do with – indeed, often contradicted – the programmatic agenda of the Menem government. Data from the activist survey suggests that this base-level autonomy may have induced many activists to stay inside the party. Table 7 shows activists’ responses to the question, ‘What level of party activity is most important to you?’ In Greater Buenos Aires, nearly two-thirds of the activists said their *agrupación* (40.0 per cent) or local party (22.6 per cent) was more important to them than the national party. The survey results also suggest that anti-Menem activists were more likely to prioritise their *agrupación* than were other activists. As Table 8 shows, nearly half (45.3 per cent) of the activists who characterised themselves as ‘opponents’ of the government’s economic policy viewed their *agrupación* as the most important level of activity, compared to 18.8 per cent of Menem supporters. Taken together, this data suggests is that a substantial number of activists who were critical of the Menem programme took shelter in their *agrupaciones* in the 1990s, prioritizing local party organisations and, to some extent, detaching themselves from national party activity.

In sum, the PJ’s decentralised structure arguably helped the party maintain its activist base in the 1990s. For a relatively small but committed minority, channels existed for the continued expression of leftist, nationalist, or orthodox Peronist beliefs. For a larger group of activists,

who were less ideological but nonetheless uncomfortable with the neoliberal turn, the persistence of semi-autonomous local organisations allowed them to continue to practice their own style of Peronism at the grassroots level rather than face a stark choice between Menemism and leaving the party.

Local autonomy and the limits of Menemism

Although the persistence of strong, semi-autonomous local organisations provided the PJ leadership with a range of political benefits in the 1990s, it also placed important constraints on that leadership. Because local organisations mediated Menem's relationship with the Peronist rank-and-file, and because the party bureaucracy lacked the capacity to systematically discipline these sub-units, Menem's ability to impose strategy or candidates on these sub-units was limited. As a result, Menem was forced to settle for a policy of 'live and let live' with those branches.

The autonomy of local PJ leaders is in large part rooted in their control over local party machines. Local organisations control the bulk of patronage distribution, mobilise activists, and deliver a large percentage of the party vote. Control over these organisations is essential to winning internal elections. Because voting in primaries is voluntary and virtually all voters must be physically brought to the polling place, winning such elections requires an extensive activist-based organisation. Such organisations generally come under the control of local office-holders, such as mayors and governors, who use patronage resources to co-opt *agrupaciones* into municipal or provincial-level machines. Where such machines consolidate and local bosses gain a monopoly over the local activist base, outsiders – even those backed by the president – stand little chance of success in intra-party competition. Although the national party has the formal authority to intervene provincial branches, doing so in the face of a unified, office-based party is costly, for it risks dividing the party and losing the votes controlled by the local boss.

The persistence of strong local machines limited President Menem's capacity to influence the strategies of lower-level party branches. Although some government officials envisioned a 'Menemised' PJ in which neoliberals, business leaders, and pro-Menem 'outsiders' would be wedded to the Peronist base through Menem's direct mass appeal,¹³¹ such

¹³¹ *Clarín*, 3 Nov., 1991, p. 7. Some Menem allies reportedly sought to intervene all non-Menemist provincial branches and impose Menemist leaderships (*Clarín*, 15 August, 1990, p. 4), and others even talked of creating a 'Menemist party' that would break with the PJ and base itself on Menem's direct mass appeal (*Clarín*, 8 July, 1990, p. 14; 11 Sept., 1990, p. 18).

a transformation did not in fact occur. Efforts to impose strategies on local branches frequently failed, and the national party leadership often found its strategies thwarted – or ignored – by local leaderships. For example, when Menem instructed provincial branches to align with the right wing Centre Democratic Union and other conservative parties in the 1991 elections, only a handful complied. Local leaderships in Salta, San Juan, and other districts openly rejected the order,¹³² and many others simply ignored it. Similarly, in 1993, when Menem sought to impose a campaign strategy that centred on the government's economic programme and Menem's re-election,¹³³ various party branches ignored the national campaign and maintained their own profiles. Indeed, Buenos Aires boss Eduardo Duhalde ordered the 'de-menemisation' of the provincial party's campaign.¹³⁴

The Menem leadership was also limited in its capacity to impose candidates on provincial branches. For example, when Menem announced that he planned to support a variety of non-Peronist candidates – including conservative provincial party leaders, ex-military officials, and well-known 'outsiders' – who backed his economic programme in the 1991 gubernatorial and legislative elections,¹³⁵ provincial branches fiercely resisted the strategy and ultimately forced him to accept party candidacies in all but a few districts. In Buenos Aires, for example, Duhalde ignored Menem's request to place business leaders Carlos De la Vega and Guillermo Alchouran on the party's parliamentary list and included only two Menemists in the top 20 positions on the list.¹³⁶ In Mendoza, Menem's attempt to place 'people of confidence'¹³⁷ on the legislative list was thwarted when non-Menemist party leaders created their own list and defeated a coalition of Menemist factions in internal elections. Similarly, when government officials designed a strategy in 1992 to ensure that provincial branches nominated Menemist candidates for the senate,¹³⁸ they managed – despite months of lobbying¹³⁹ – to obtain their preferred candidates in only three districts (the Federal Capital, Entre Ríos, and Tucumán). In Catamarca, Jujuy, La Pampa, Salta, Santa Cruz, and Santa Fe, the national leadership's candidates were openly rejected by provincial

¹³² *Clarín*, 29 June, 1990, p. 13; 7 July, 1991, p. 13.

¹³³ *Página/12*, 31 March, 1993, p. 5.

¹³⁴ *Clarín*, 15 Aug., 1993, p. 11.

¹³⁵ *Clarín*, 5 Nov., 1990, p. 5. Menem's initial list of extra-party gubernatorial candidates included Domingo Cavallo (Córdoba), pop singer Palito Ortega (Tucumán), conservative Alberto Natale (Santa Fe), and former military leaders Roberto Ulloa (Salta) and José Ruiz Palacios (Chaco) (*Clarín*, 21 June, 1990, pp. 6, 8; 29 June, 1990, p. 13; 28 Oct., 1990, p. 14; 5 May, 1991, p. 22).

¹³⁶ *Clarín*, 5 June, 1991, p. 13; 26 June, 1991, pp. 9; 30 June, 1991, pp. 8–9; 30 July, 1991, p. 8–9.

¹³⁷ *Clarín*, 19 Oct., 1990, p. 11.

¹³⁸ *Clarín*, 5 March, 1992, p. 14; 8 March, 1992, p. 2.

¹³⁹ *Clarín*, 13 May, 1992, p. 6; 3 June, 1992, p. 18; 11 Sept., 1992, p. 9.

party branches.¹⁴⁰ In Santa Fe, for example, despite intense pressure from Menem and other top government officials to re-elect senator Liliana Gurdulich,¹⁴¹ the local party nominated Jorge Massat, an ally of governor Carlos Reutemann. In La Pampa, where Menem sought the nomination of former governor Nestor Ahuad to fill one of two vacant senate seats, local boss Ruben Marín imposed allies Esteban Martínez and Carlos Verna instead.¹⁴² In Buenos Aires, Formosa, Mendoza, Misiones, and San Luis, the national leadership had so little influence that it ultimately decided not to propose a candidate.

The Menem leadership also failed to impose its preferred candidate in several key gubernatorial elections. In Mendoza, for example, efforts by top Menemist official Eduardo Bauz to bring the provincial branch ‘fully in line with the national project of Justicialism’¹⁴³ and nominate non-Peronist businessman Carlos Pulenta for the 1995 gubernatorial candidacy failed when the local party nominated Arturo Lafalla, a Menem critic. In Tucuman, the provincial branch nominated old guard leader Olijela Rivas for the 1995 gubernatorial candidacy despite the public opposition of Menem and intense pressure from government officials.¹⁴⁴

Hence, although Menem was at times able to intervene (or formally replace the leaderships of) provincial party organisations and impose ‘outsider’ Menemist candidates (as in the well-known cases of auto racer Carlos Reutemann and pop singer Palito Ortega in 1991), these impositions were the exception rather than the rule. In districts in which provincial bosses consolidated stable machines, such as Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Formosa, La Pampa, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, Santa Cruz, and San Luis, such interventions did not occur. In each of these provinces, party leaders and candidates were consistently selected candidates from within the local organisation, and in almost all of these cases, provincial branches retained traditional ‘Peronist’ – rather than ‘Menemist’ or neo-liberal – profiles.

Menem was only able to intervene in provincial branches that were suffering deep internal crises. Such crises occurred when corruption scandals discredited sitting governors (as in Santa Fe and Tucuman in 1991), deep internal conflicts led to the *de facto* rupture of the party (as in Corrientes, San Juan, Santiago del Estero, and Córdoba), or the party – generally out of power – became highly fragmented (as in the Federal Capital). In such cases, important factions sought out the support of the

¹⁴⁰ *Clarín*, 18 June, 1992, p. 7; 6 September, 1992, p. 15.

¹⁴¹ *El Litoral*, 30 April, 1992, p. 12; 6 May, 1992, p. 12; 2 Sept., 1992, p. 12.

¹⁴² *Clarín*, 27 April, 1992, pp. 6–7. ¹⁴³ *Clarín*, 11 March, 1994, p. 10.

¹⁴⁴ *Clarín*, 15 Feb., 1995, p. 8; 19 March, 1995, p. 4; 22 March, 1995, p. 13. Non-Menemists also won the governorships of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Salta, Santa Cruz, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Santa Fe in 1995.

national leadership, thereby providing the leadership with the organisational base it needed to effectively intervene. Few interventions produced long-term changes in provincial parties, however. In most cases, externally imposed leaderships failed to consolidate control of the party, and in many intervened districts, including Catamarca, Córdoba, Santiago del Estero, and Tucuman, old guard leaders soon regained power. In other cases, such as Santa Fe and to a lesser extent San Juan, previously outsider governors built their own support bases within the party and thus gained substantial autonomy from the national leadership.

The Menem leadership thus proved relatively limited in its capacity to transform provincial party branches. At the end of Menem's ten year presidential tenure, the vast majority of provincial branches were governed by non-Menemists and maintained profiles that were far less neo-liberal than that of the national leadership.¹⁴⁵ In many cases, the provincial party was controlled by sectors that had been in power (in some cases, with interruptions) since the early or mid-1980s.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, only four of the PJ's 24 district-level branches – La Rioja, Neuquen, San Juan and the Federal Capital – were controlled by Menemists in 1999.¹⁴⁷ These four districts represented just 14.8 per cent of the overall electorate.¹⁴⁸

Contrary to many conventional accounts of the Menem-led PJ, then, traditional Peronism remained largely intact at the local and provincial levels despite the right-wing turn of the national leadership. With few exceptions, the local and provincial organisations that run the PJ's campaigns, develop its leaders, and select its national legislators became neither Menemist nor neo-liberal. This failure to transform provincial branches helps to explain the rapid erosion of Menem's influence within the PJ – despite the fact that he remained party president – after he left office in 1999. This outcome highlights the enormous difference between the PJ and other 'neo-populist' cases. Whereas Collor's National Reconstruction Party did not survive the downfall of its leader and

¹⁴⁵ Non-Menemist districts included Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Formosa, La Pampa, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, San Luis, Santa Cruz, Santiago del Estero, and Tucuman. These districts represent 68.4 per cent of the electorate.

¹⁴⁶ These include Catamarca, Córdoba, Formosa, La Pampa, Mendoza, Misiones, Salta, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, and Tucuman.

¹⁴⁷ Of these, only the party leaderships of the Federal Capital and San Juan were neo-liberal.

¹⁴⁸ Another indicator of the non-Menemisation of provincial Peronism is the composition of the PJ bloc in congress, for deputies are nominated and elected at the provincial level. In 1997, only 22 of 119 PJ deputies belonged to the Menemist sub-bloc, a membership that is smaller than that of the 24-member Menemist sub-bloc in 1988 (*Clarín*, 9 June, 1988, p. 10). Of the 22 Menemist deputies, eight were from the Menemist districts of La Rioja and San Juan, and seven more were legislators from the Federal Capital, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Santiago del Estero who were nominated while the party was 'intervened' by the national leadership.

Fujimori's various parties will almost certainly face a similar fate, few doubt that the PJ will survive the passing of Menemism.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to fill the gap in scholarly work on how the PJ is organised and functions, particularly at the local level. Challenging accounts of the Menem-led PJ as a 'neo-populist' party dominated by an unmediated, personalistic leadership, it argues that Peronist leaders and masses have long been linked by a powerful organisational infrastructure with deep roots in urban working and lower class society. The PJ's mass linkages have been understated and even ignored by scholars because, unlike many European working class parties, they are almost entirely informal. Peronist sub-units organise themselves and maintain only weak ties to the party bureaucracy. Often based out of activists' homes and rarely registered with party authorities, these sub-units nevertheless constitute a massive base-level infrastructure. This infrastructure yielded the party important political benefits, but it also limited the degree to which President Menem was able to control (or transform) local and provincial party branches.

More generally, the Peronist case points to the importance of studying informal patterns of party organisation. Analyses of political parties must go beyond formal structures and examine how parties work in practice. While some parties – for example, many northern European parties – possess relatively formalised or bureaucratic structures, many others, particularly in Latin America, are largely informal. In such cases, studies that focus exclusively on party statutes or formal leadership bodies run the risk of missing the 'meat' of the party. This has clearly occurred in studies of Peronism, as scholars have often taken the absence of an effective bureaucracy to mean that the party is based primarily on unmediated, personalistic forms of leadership. Not only do such characterisations lack empirical foundation, but they fail to account for the PJ's capacity to survive – and even thrive – after the passing of its populist (or 'neo-populist') leaders. Party founder Juan Perón used to say that 'only organisation conquers time'. Although Perón's party-building never matched his rhetoric, the informal and often chaotic organisation he left behind has proven more resilient – and more effective – than virtually anyone expected. It must therefore be studied more seriously.