may be dramatizing grievances, enlisting support, or possibly seeking to embarrass someone who has offended them (see Lewis, 1966; Baumgartner, 1981: Chapter 2).

Many examples of healers can be found in the ranks of supernaturally-skilled persons around the world. In Somalia, for instance (see Lewis, 1966), among the Tonga of Zambia (see Colson, 1969), in medieval Europe (see Cohn, 1975), and in numerous other settings, people behaving in culturally inappropriate ways may be considered to be possessed by spirits and to need curative rituals staged by specialists. Typically the object is to propitiate, expel, or master the offending supernatural spirit. Such a process is illustrated by the handling of a case in a Swahili tribe of East Africa:

At that time Chuma had had an episode of mental disturbance. He became irrational and violent and, as his brother described it, would throw men about with the strength of an ox . . . . Chuma's brothers went to Tawalini and found out through divination that his trouble was caused by a shetani [spirit] that had been sent to annoy him by the outraged husband of a woman to whom he had been paying attention . . . . The deranged man was exorcised by [a religious specialist]. Seven loaves of bread and seven coconuts were arranged on a table which was held over Chuma's head by his brothers, their hands joining to form a circle around him. A cock was slaughtered . . . and the blood applied to the
patient. Then parts of the Koran with special mystical meanings were read aloud. The rite accomplished its purpose; Chuma recovered completely and went back to his occupation of fishing (Gray, 1969: 182). Similarly, throughout Latin America, religious specialists treat unacceptable behavior in their clients by staging rituals to retrieve their souls, which are believed to be lost (see, e.g., Gillin, 1948; 1956).

Also examples of healers in our sense are medical specialists who attribute behavioral abnormality to organic causes and treat it accordingly. Thus, in ancient Egypt and Greece, as well as later civilizations influenced by them, much unacceptable conduct in women was attributed to a wandering uterus or other reproductive disorder (see Veith, 1965). In this vein, a sixteenth-century French surgeon, Ambroise Paré, made the following observations:

For som accidents com by suppression of the [menses], others com by corruption of the seed, but if the matter bee cold, it bringeth a drousiness . . . whereby the woman sinketh down as if shee were astonished, and lieth without motion . . . . If it be more gross, it conferreth a convulsion; if it participate of the nature of a gross melancholik humor, it bringeth such heaviness, fear, and sorrowfulness, that the party that is vexed therewith shall think that hee shall die presently, and cannot bee brought out of his minde by anie means or reason; if of a cholerick humor, it causeth the madness called furor uterinus, and
such a pratling, that they speak all things that are to bee concealed; and a giddiness of the head, by reason that the animal spirit is suddenly shaken by the admixture of a putrefied vapour and hot spirit; but nothing is more admirable, then that diseas taketh the patient sometimes with laughing, and sometimes with weeping, for som at the first will weep and then laugh in the same diseas and state thereof (quoted in Veith, 1965: 114).

Physical remedies were accordingly prescribed for the organic disturbances responsible for these symptoms; fumigations of the uterus, ingestion of herbs and other substances, and applications of ointments were all used in various countries (Veith, 1965). In the modern era, people are more likely to attribute aberrant conduct to disorders of the brain than of the uterus, and to pursue treatment through the use of drugs that affect neurochemistry.

Contemporary healers often appear as psychiatrists or psychologists. Unusual behavior, from their perspective, is generally seen as the outcome of underlying emotional disturbances which can be cured or manipulated through a variety of psychotherapeutic techniques. In the pursuit of a cure, psychotherapists may encourage their patients to discuss their problems at length, may analyze their dreams, and may probe into details of their personal lives. They may orchestrate group encounters or may recommend changes in a person's routine (including commitment to a mental hospital). Some may plan behavior-modification strategies to help people overcome opiate or alcohol
"addition," cigarette smoking, "over" eating, or violent propensities. Common to all of these strategies is the underlying aim of changing or reordering an individual's personality until it accords with the normality seen in others.

In its own way, the role of healer combines elements of support and of settlement. Healers serve as friends to their patients, doing everything on their behalf. At the same time, they speak with some authority about what, if anything, is "wrong" with a given person and what is necessary to achieve a "cure" or a proper "adjustment." Healers, like negotiators, therefore occupy a composite role. Unlike negotiators, however, or any other third parties in our scheme, they are not identified with human conflict at all. For this reason, in our typology the healer is graphically placed in a location entirely beyond the boundaries within which third parties usually are found.

A NOTE ON LEGAL OFFICIALS

Before concluding, it might be noted that in the foregoing pages we have not given special attention to third parties who intervene in the name of the state, or legal officials. Instead, we have sought to show that each mode of intervention occurs in a wide range of social settings, informal as well as formal, and that it would be inaccurate to identify any single species of third party exclusively with law. It should be added, moreover, that the opposite applies as well: Though none of the roles in our typology is performed by legal officials all of the time, all are performed by legal officials some of the time.

In a modern society such as the United States, for example, legal officials as a group perform virtually every one of the 12 roles in
our classification from time to time: Police officers often simply
give information or advice, prosecutors act as judges when they
dismiss cases, judges mediate and arbitrate, and so on. Indeed, it
would seem that police officers by themselves perform every role in
the typology, shifting from one to another as they move from encounter
to encounter (see, e.g., Cumming, Cumming, and Edell, 1965; Bittner,
Their role even changes as a single case moves through stages of the
criminal process, so that an officer might begin to handle a case
in the field as, say, a healer or a friendly peacemaker, resolve
it by arrest—in most instances a kind of adjudication—only to find
himself or herself merely a witness—an ally of the prosecution—
when the case is heard in court. Complainants undergo a similar
transformation, since a legal official, the prosecutor, steps forth
as their surrogate to pursue their grievance in court (compare
Christie, 1977), while still another official of the state, a judge,
decides who is right. Similar dynamics are found in conflict manage-
ment of all kinds: Conflict itself constantly fluctuates, and any
classification of its structure should be viewed as provisional,
valid only until a new episode begins (see Mather and Yngvesson,

CONCLUSION

From one standpoint, our typology offers a preliminary vocab-
ulary by which the many species and varieties of third parties may
be classified. In this regard, it serves a purpose similar to that which
a handbook or field guide might serve for a butterfly collector or
a birdwatcher. Beyond this, however, the typology—like other
classifications of empirical phenomena—describes a universe of its own, a range of variation. It invites inquiry into why such variation occurs at all, and into what explains the particular instances that are observable.

Our typology thus provides a focus for a sociological theory of the third party: Why do third parties intervene in conflicts in so many different ways? Why does one conflict result in, say, mediation or arbitration while another is adjudicated or repressed? Why does one person intervene as an advocate or ally while another is willing only to give information or advice? The typology challenges us to understand differences in conflict management across communities and societies and, for that matter, across social settings of all kinds. It challenges us to predict and explain the role of third parties from one case to the next. Perhaps in closing we should mention briefly several of the patterns we have so far discovered in the course of our investigations of the third party, considering in particular the social conditions associated with settlement behavior—friendly pacification, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, and repressive pacification. We leave aside for now the social characteristics of the parties in conflict—a topic that has already been explored in some detail as a factor in legal behavior such as adjudication (see especially Black, 1976)—and turn instead to the characteristics of the third parties themselves.

Our review of the empirical literature on conflict management suggests, for example, that the role of settlement agents is closely associated with their social status in relation to that of the parties in conflict, i.e., their relative status (for further details on the
concept of status as used here, see generally Black, 1976: Chapters 2-6). All else the same, rarely is a settlement agent's status lower than that of the parties in conflict, more often it is about equal, but usually it is higher. What is more, it appears that the higher the settlement agent's relative status, the more authoritative intervention occurs. Recalling the rank order of the five settlement roles by their degree of intervention (see page 4), this implies that—all else constant—the status distance between a third party and the principals will be least in friendly pacification, somewhat greater in mediation, greater still in arbitration, then in adjudication, and greatest in settings where repressive pacification occurs. Since our purpose here is merely to illustrate the nature of the theory of the third party, we shall not attempt to review the empirical evidence relating to this formulation, but turn instead to a second example.

Another variable that appears to be related to settlement behavior is the degree of relational distance, or intimacy, between the third party and the principals (see Black, 1976: 40-41, for an explication of relational distance as a social variable). Settlement agents might be extremely intimate with both principals—as when an entire conflict begins and ends within a single household—or they might be somewhat removed from both, or they might be complete strangers. Generally the intimacy between the agent and each of the principals is about equal, so that the three parties together form an isosceles triangle of relational distance (see Simmel, 1908: 149-153), but the actual distances involved vary considerably. Furthermore, it appears that the greater the relational distance
between the settlement agent and the principals, the more authoritative intervention occurs. Friendly pacification thus seems to be most likely where settlement agents are highly intimate with the parties in conflict, mediation would be expected where there is a bit less intimacy, and arbitration in situations where there is still less. Adjudication seems to occur where there is even more distance between the parties—they typically share only the same community or region—while repressive pacification appears to be found where settlement agents are the most distant from those whose conflicts they handle and find so offensive. It seems, incidentally, that what applies to intimacy also applies to cultural homogeneity, so that the greater the cultural distance between the settlement agent and the principals, the more authoritative intervention occurs. In any event, again we leave the empirical evidence aside, hoping that these formulations illustrate the kind of theory our typology anticipates.

Finally, it might be noted that a sociological theory of the third party may prove to have practical as well as scientific interest. Since the theory is intended, among other things, to specify how conflict management varies with the social characteristics of those involved as third parties, its formulations might be used to advantage by particular segments of society or, on a case-by-case basis, by one side or the other of a conflict. Modern courts, for example, are readily subject to manipulation of this kind. Thus, a theory of the third party will ultimately be able to specify precisely how the social composition of the judiciary relates to its behavior. What, for instance, would result from a greater degree of social
heterogeneity in the largely homogeneous judiciary of modern America? What would result from an increase in the number of judges who are black, Hispanic, Asian-American, female, working-class, or who have other characteristics that have traditionally been excluded? If such characteristics are indeed associated with specifiable patterns of adjudication—such as lesser severity or a greater tendency to make compromise decisions—surely this knowledge would be relevant to legal policymakers and reformers, not to mention practicing attorneys and their clients. Similar questions might be raised about the social characteristics of juries, police officers, and all of the other third parties in the legal process. For present purposes, however, suffice it to say that a theory of the third party such as we envisage will present countless opportunities for legal engineering. It may also pose a challenge to conventional conceptions of justice.
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APPENDIX B

Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX C

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