A Brief Analysis

of

DEA Coordination With

Patrol Forces on the

Southwest Border

(Draft)

DEA Survey Group

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Summary

The purpose of this report is to analyze the impact of patrol activities on DEA cases at the Southwest Border. The report begins with a theoretical analysis of patrol and investigative functions, and then offers an empirical analysis of two hypotheses implied by the theoretical analysis.

Theoretically, one can distinguish among three general strategies available to police to determine (and demonstrate) that a particular person committed a crime at a particular time. One strategy is retrospective investigation; after a crime is committed, the police attempt to reconstruct events and corroborate their reconstruction with the testimony of bystanders, blood stains and other pieces of physical evidence. A second strategy is prospective investigation: the police solicit information about specific crimes likely to be committed in the future and then concentrate their attention on the relatively small areas indicated by their leads. A third strategy is patrol: the police more or less superficially and more or less indiscriminately seek to monitor the space of all possible offenses.

Note that prospective investigation and patrol are opposites. While both strategies seek to put enforcement officials in a position where they can directly observe criminal offenses, prospective investigation does so by seeking prior information about specific future events while patrol does so by indiscriminately monitoring a large area. Note also that it is the indiscriminate nature of patrol which makes patrol exceptionally valuable as a deterrent, and as a device for uncovering criminal offenses that would never have been known to prospective investigation. Thus, while patrol can strive for efficiency gains by discriminating among broad classes of time, area, kinds of individuals, and activities which are relatively more likely to contain criminal offenses, the key to successful patrol functions is in the lack of discrimination and anticipation.

Patrol can complement both kinds of investigations in two different ways. First, violators arrested during patrol activities become potentially valuable leads for prospective investigation and potentially important witnesses in retrospective investigations.
Second, because patrol relies on large amounts of manpower, rapid mobility, and rapid communication, they can support those investigations which require this capability.

Patrol can also compete with and hamper investigations. Since patrol has both an incentive and an opportunity to take an investigative function, it will gradually encroach on investigations. Substantive losses result from this encroachment in three areas: 1) diminution of patrol activity; 2) duplication of effort; and 3) deteriorating morale among investigative personnel. Moreover, even when patrol sticks to its function, it can unwittingly hamper investigations by: 1) failing to protect the potential of leads they develop; 2) interrupting on-going investigations by "discovering" the offense prematurely; and most importantly, 3) overwhelming investigative forces with relatively poor leads. All of these losses get larger as the relative size of patrol forces to the investigative forces get very large.

Two hypothesis from this analysis are tested through an empirical analysis of the operations of DEA border offices. The first hypothesis is that a large number of patrol initiated cases relative to the available investigative manpower will shrink the proportion of cases that are initiated by investigators, and force a truncated development of cases - both in the investigation initiated sector and in the patrol initiated sector. A comparison of offices that differed dramatically in terms of the ratio of patrol initiated cases to available manpower, supported this hypothesis. The DEA initiated cases constituted 44% of the cases in the offices when manpower was relatively plentiful and only 22% of the cases in the office where manpower was relatively scarce. Moreover, within the DEA initiated cases, the average quality and development of the cases for the manpower rich office was much greater than the quality and development of the cases from the manpower poor office. Thus, it seems that patrol forces can overwhelm investigative forces with bad leads.

The second hypothesis was that poor cooperation at an operational level (e.g., failures to call DEA quickly; indiscriminate arrests; interference with DEA cases; etc.) would result in significant reductions in the quality and development of DEA investigations. A comparison of cases involving coordination with Customs among offices that perceived good operational cooperation and offices that perceived bad operational cooperation revealed no significant differences among the quality and development of cases. Several inferences are possible (e.g., perceptions are inaccurate; actual differences in cooperation were not large enough to show effect; etc.).
However, we think that the most likely explanation is that cases where operational coordination is important occur sufficiently, infrequently that the effect of bad cooperation will not show up in aggregate statistics. In effect, this explanation implies that operational coordination is not a major factor on the Southwest Border because it has an effect on only a small proportion of the cases. However this stark conclusion fails to take into account the terrible effect on morale on both sides that results from a small number of failures of coordination. It does not take many cases to poison the atmosphere.

**Tentative Conclusions are the Following**

1) First, it is absolutely essential to the overall effectiveness of a law enforcement effort that patrol and investigation forces be kept in balance. If patrol gets too large relative to investigation, then the effectiveness of both will suffer.

2) Second, when patrol gets too large relative to investigation, a second-best solution is to guarantee to investigation the right (indeed, the responsibility) to refuse even to examine some of the patrol developed leads. If investigation does not have this right or fails to exercise this responsibility, overall effectiveness will decline.

3) Third, it is valuable to arrange specific operating procedures which insure:

   a. That investigations are not interfered with by patrol; and

   b. That patrol does not compromise the potential of leads which they develop.

Such procedures are of value partly because they permit a few cases to be developed more effectively, but more importantly because successful co-ordination is vital to the morale of the enforcement agencies.
I. Introduction:

A successful narcotics enforcement effort on the Southwest Border is vital to DEA's strategic objectives. Intelligence indicates that Mexico is a major source of heroin and amphetamines. Moreover, DEA has recently committed 100 additional agents to the Border. Consequently, both effectiveness and efficiency demand that the energies of these men be harnessed to an effective enforcement program.

A potentially important factor influencing the success of DEA's operations at the Southwest Border is the degree of coordination we achieve with the large patrol forces that operate in the area. Ideally, these patrol forces would complement DEA's investigative activities. They can produce defendants who become potential informants or intelligence sources. And they can support those specific DEA investigations which require large amounts of manpower and equipment.

However, the patrol forces can also frustrate DEA's investigative activities. They can overwhelm DEA with unimportant violators to be handled. They can compromise the potential represented by a recently arrested violator either by revealing to counter-surveillance that the violator is under arrest or by incompetent debriefings. They can begin to compete with DEA for sources of information about narcotics activity and fail to exploit the full potential of the information they obtain. And they can even compromise on-going DEA investigations by prematurely "discovering" an operation which DEA had under counter-surveillance.

The purpose of this small study is to examine the effect that different levels of coordination between DEA and patrol forces have on the development of cases at the Southwest Border. Since we looked at only a few offices and since the description of the cases involved some "judgment calls" about the extent of development, the study cannot be considered definitive. Its purpose is only to influence our judgment slightly about the impact that patrol cases have on DEA operations.
The first section presents a theoretical analysis of patrol and investigative functions. The second section presents an empirical analysis of the impact of patrol-initiated cases on DEA's operations on the Border. The third section presents an empirical analysis of difference in the perceived degree of operational coordination on DEA's operations. The fourth section presents some tentative conclusions and a set of unresolved issues for further analysis.
II. A Simple Analytic View of Patrol and Investigative Functions

A. Defining Patrol and Investigative Functions:

The apprehension and successful prosecution of criminal offenders depends on being able to determine (and demonstrate) that a specific individual committed an offense at a particular location, in a particular moment, by a particular method. Basically, law enforcement officials have two ways of accomplishing this objective: they can directly witness the events, or they can reconstruct the event and corroborate the reconstruction through evidence which is consistent with the reconstruction (e.g., testimony of bystanders or participants; fingerprints; hotel bills, phone calls; broken clocks; etc.).

Exploiting the second possibility (i.e., reconstruction and corroborating evidence) is relatively easy and straightforward. The techniques are familiar to any reader of detective novels. One interviews witnesses, checks descriptions, and alibis, searches for fingerprints, analyzes blood stains, etc. The conclusion of all this activity is a story which explains how the crime was committed and is consistent with the observed evidence. We will define such activities as retrospective investigation.

Exploiting the first possibility (i.e., directly witnessing the event) is more difficult. There are two major problems for enforcement officials. First, the space within which possible offenses can occur is very large - too large to permit close, persistent scrutiny of all possible places. Second, most criminal offenders seek to hide their criminal offenses. Consequently, it is difficult for law enforcement officials to be in the right place at the right time.

To be in the right place at the right time, two general strategies are available. One seeks to cover a large area superficially without investing any resources in gathering specific information.
The other invests resources in gathering specific information about possible future events and then concentrates its coverage on the small area indicated by the specific information.

The first strategy is defined as patrol: i.e., a more or less superficial observation of all the possible plans, times, people, and behavior in which a criminal offense could occur. The objective is to "happen" across a criminal offense while it is occurring, or to arrive so quickly after the offense has been committed that reconstruction from things that are directly observable is relatively simple. Typically, this strategy depends on large amounts of manpower, rapid mobility, and rapid communication.

Efficiency gains in patrol can be secured in one of two ways. First, one can distinguish broad classes of time, places, or behavior that are relatively more likely to contain criminal offenses and devote proportionately more intensive scrutiny of those classes. For example: One can determine that marihuana is very likely to be smuggled into the United States near Arrow Gulch and devote proportionally more time to observing Arrow Gulch. Similarly, one can identify a "profile" of the type of people who smuggle heroin through Ports of Entry and devote closer scrutiny to those who fit the profile. Second, one can develop better communication facilities and better patterns of patrol to insure faster responses to specific information that a crime is being committed.

The second strategy for witnessing crimes is defined as prospective investigation: i.e., the solicitation of specific information about offenses that are likely to be committed. The objective of prospective investigation is to anticipate particular offenses so that officials can focus their observation on very small nooks of the space of possible offenses. Typically, this strategy depends on: 1) developing sources of criminal information (e.g., informants; wiretaps; intelligence pieced together from past cases; etc.) and 2) covert observation (e.g., surveillance in unmarked cars; wiretaps; undercover agents). It may also, particularly in the narcotics business, depend on creating the antecedent conditions
for a crime to occur (e.g., the undercover buy). While some prospective investigations at some stage require large amounts of men, rapid mobility, and rapid communication, the most important aspects of investigative work can often be done by small numbers of men.

Efficiency gains in investigation can be secured in three different ways. First, investigators can get better at developing sources of information (i.e., they can secure a richer set of potential cases to develop). Second, investigations can get better at evaluating leads (i.e., they can more reliably distinguish good leads from bad leads). Third, investigators can get better at exploiting leads; (i.e., they can improve in their use of all the complicated tactics required to exploit a lead (e.g., surveillance, undercover work, using technical equipment to document events, etc.).

By way of summary, Figure 1 presents a simple, schematic diagram of the logical relationships between the different strategies for determining and documenting that criminal offenses occurred.

Given these definitions of patrol and investigation, it is possible to describe some important differences between the two functions. First, patrol does not seek to gather information about specific offenses. Instead, it seeks to monitor more or less indiscriminately the space of possible offenses. Investigation, on the other hand, does seek to gather specific information. Moreover, it does not do any monitoring until it has relatively reliable and specific information about possible offenses. And then investigation restricts its monitoring to the specific area indicated by the "lead."

Second, investigation proceeds both forward and backward in time. It seeks to anticipate future specific offenses (prospective investigation) as well as show the development and historical traces of past specific offenses (retrospective investigation). Patrol, on the other hand, is more or less limited to one point in time - the moment of discovery or pursuit. It does not anticipate specific future offenses. Nor does it seek to document the development of a past event.
The Logical Relationship Between Patrol and Investigation

- Investigation
  - Retrospective
  - Prospective

- Seek Specific Info.
  - to Anticipate
  - Do Not Seek Specific Information

- Reconstruc and Corroborate

- Determine and Demonstrate that a Violation Occurred

- Directly Observe

- Patrol
Third, the techniques of patrol are largely restricted to overt surveillance and pursuit - both of which require rapid mobility, rapid communication, and large amounts of men and equipment. The techniques of investigation include the patrol techniques when appropriate. But, in addition, investigative techniques include using intelligence from past cases, developing and using informants, covert surveillance, and undercover work.

B. Complementary Aspects of Patrol and Investigations:

With these definitions of patrol and investigation, it is possible to show how the performance of these two different functions can complement one another.

Patrol can complement investigation in two important ways. First, when patrol discovers an offense that involves more people than those apprehended at the scene, it often furnishes a lead to investigators. Thus, patrol can become an important source of investigative leads. Second, when investigation is seeking to exploit a lead and the required tactics involve large amounts of men, rapid mobility, or fast communication, the patrol forces can usually support the investigation.

Investigation complements patrol in only one important way. Investigation occasionally develops evidence necessary to support the conviction of patrol discovered offenders. However, this occurs only when the evidence developed by patrol (usually eye witness accounts) is not sufficient and when the case is sufficiently important to merit some of the scarce investigative time.

C. Competitive Aspects:

Patrol and investigative functions can compete with one another as well as complement one another. The competition takes two general forms. First, patrol can encroach on the jurisdiction of investigation. Second, patrol can directly interfere with investigative functions. In both cases, there is a net loss to the enforcement effort.
Jurisdictional encroachment occurs because there is an incentive and an opportunity for patrol organizations to take on investigation function. The incentive exists for two reasons: First, investigative work is inherently more interesting than patrol work. Second, since increased efficiency in patrol (in terms of additional numbers of defendants) can apparently be secured by obtaining increasingly specific information about the areas¹, individuals and methods which are likely to contain criminal offenses, both individual patrol officers and patrol managers will strain to develop more specific information about criminal offenses; i.e., they will take on investigative functions. For both reasons, patrol officers will encroach on investigative functions.

The opportunity for patrol to take on investigation functions exists because there is a substantial "gray area" between patrol and investigation. This "gray area" consists of information that is not quite specific enough and not quite reliable enough to be followed up enthusiastically by investigation, but which is more specific and more reliable than any leads available to patrol. Table #2 indicates this "gray area" in the space of information available to enforcement agencies.

¹ This gain in efficiency is only apparent. The reason is that while patrol may be able to arrest more people by relying on specific information, they fail to achieve the benefits of continuing their patrol functions - namely deterrence and making arrests of people not previously known to be involved in criminal activities. Since these benefits are difficult to measure, it seems as if patrol has become more efficient. In fact, it has become less effective in performing the unique patrol functions.
### Table 2

Ambiguity in Defining Information Which May be Used by Patrol in Allocating Forces and Information Which Constitutes an Investigative Lead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Information</th>
<th>Properly Affects Patrol Allocation</th>
<th>Degree of Generality</th>
<th>Properly Requires Investigative Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very General</td>
<td>Less General</td>
<td>More Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Space</strong></td>
<td>S.W. Border</td>
<td>Near San Diego</td>
<td>Around 14th Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>Afternoons or Evenings</td>
<td>In the next two weeks</td>
<td>June 28th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individuals</strong></td>
<td>White, Males; aged 15-25</td>
<td>People who hang out in Joe's Bar &amp; Grill</td>
<td>A guy in checked pants with a scar on his face; named Willy something</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td>Young white females with black male companions</td>
<td>Young white females with Black male companions meeting on U.S. side of Border. Coming across in 5-10 min. intervals</td>
<td>Trucks bearing the name Gonzalez' produce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since at any given time there will be some leads that investigation will not wish to pursue, and since these leads will look more promising to patrol officers than indiscriminate patrol, patrol officers will often have the opportunity to start doing investigative work.  

The incentive and opportunity for patrol to do investigations implies that there will inevitably be encroachments of the investigation function by patrol personnel. The effect of this encroachment is not necessarily bad. At a functional level, it may have the effect of simply increasing the total amount of investigative work that is being accomplished. However, at some level, the encroachment results in a deteriorating enforcement effort. The losses accumulate in three different areas.

First, encroachment implies a diminution of patrol efforts. As a result, the deterrent effects of patrol diminish. In addition, the supply of leads furnished by patrol arrested defendants decreases. Since deterrence stops and since investigation is not supplied by leads outside of its own domain, the scope of enforcement efforts narrow significantly.

Second, encroachment increases the probability that patrol and investigation will unwittingly work on the same case. This is costly not only because of the duplication of effort, but also because patrol could compromise the case as a result of incompetence in exploiting the lead.

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2 There can also be encroachments by investigations personnel on patrol functions. This will occur if the usual investigative techniques have failed to turn up potential leads. Investigations personnel will begin giving casual surveillance to areas in which crimes frequently occur hoping to witness a criminal event. While such instances are rare, they can occur.
Third, encroachment will result in deteriorating morale among investigative personnel who will feel frustrated and threatened by the incursions. The deteriorating morale will undoubtedly have an impact on productivity.

Thus, encroachment of the investigative function has more than bureaucratic significance. When it occurs, the substance, as well as the form of the enforcement effort, will suffer.

Even when patrol organizations restrict themselves to their appropriate functions, there can be significant losses associated with poor coordination between patrol and investigation. There are at least three notable cases here.

First, patrol can fail to preserve the potential of the leads they develop. This occurs when patrol reveals to counter-surveillance that a defendant is under arrest. It also occurs when patrol fails to exploit the extraordinary psychological vulnerability of defendants shortly after their arrest to obtain information or promises of cooperation.

Second, patrol can interfere with investigations by interrupting the investigation in the course of its development. For example: An undercover buy on a covert convoy can be compromised if patrol officers discover them in the course of normal patrol functions.

Third, and most importantly, patrol can overwhelm investigation forces with relatively bad leads. If every offense discovered by patrol is considered a potential lead; and if, on average, these leads are worse than the leads investigation would develop on its own; and if the number of offenses discovered by patrol gets large relative to the number of investigators; then the capability of investigations both to develop their own leads and exploit their most attractive leads from the available set, will be dramatically diminished. As a result, the effectiveness of investigation will suffer.

Thus, even when patrol forces operate only as patrol forces, they can unwittingly reduce the effectiveness of investigative forces.
One should notice that these pernicious aspects of the relationship between investigation and patrol are most likely to occur when the two different forces get out of balance in terms of their relative sizes. If patrol forces are very large relative to investigative forces, then the chances of jurisdictional encroachment, premature discovery, and swamping of investigational activities all become very great. If investigation forces are very large relative to patrol forces, then one is likely to observe encroachment of investigation on patrol. What constitutes the appropriate ratio of patrol forces to investigative forces is uncertain. In general, one would expect the appropriate ratio to depend on particular areas. Consequently, one should make adjustments as one accumulates experience in an area about the best possible ratio.

In the remainder of this report, we will analyze the relationship between patrol and investigative functions in enforcing narcotics laws on the Southwest Border. There are four different organizations involved. The Drug Enforcement Administration is the organization that is responsible for investigation. The patrol organizations include the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Patrol, and U.S. Customs Inspectors.  

Two different hypotheses developed in this section will be tested. In the first study, we will analyze the impact of a large number of patrol initiated cases on the investigation activities of two DEA offices. In the second study, we will compare DEA offices that have different (perceived) degrees of operational coordination with the patrol forces.

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Footnote: 3 It may not be obvious that the Customs Inspectors have a patrol function. However, according to the functional definition of patrol suggested in this report (i.e., a more or less superficial monitoring of the space of all possible offenses), the Customs Inspectors are clearly a patrol force. They do not roam about in geographic space, but they do roam around in the space of "people crossing the Mexican Border." "Space" in this report is defined in terms of time, people, and behavior as well as in terms of territory.
III. The Impact of Patrol Initiated Cases on DEA's Investigative Activities

The theory of patrol and investigation indicates that patrol produces leads which are potentially valuable to investigation. Investigation has the responsibility of developing its own leads, evaluating the entire set of leads available to them, and successfully exploiting those leads deemed most valuable. It seems apparent that patrol can overwhelm investigations with potential leads. If the number of patrol developed leads gets very large relative to the number of investigators; and if investigation seriously evaluates each patrol produced lead; then it is clear that investigation will be forced to reduce the effort it expends on developing its own leads and fully exploiting the leads that are available.

We tested this hypothesis by examining the case files of two DEA offices for the period of January 1, 1973, to the present. The offices were chosen because they were similar in all respects except that one office had a relatively large ratio of patrol initiated cases to manpower; while the other office had a relatively small ratio of patrol initiated cases to manpower.

They were alike in that they were both border offices, had similar absolute levels of manpower, had good management and supervision, and were composed of similar proportion of former Customs and former BNDD Agents.

The first thing we looked at was the relative proportions of the cases that were DEA initiated versus patrol initiated. The hypothesis was that the office with the high ratio of patrol initiated cases to manpower would have a high proportion of its cases be initiated by patrol. In effect, the pressure of the patrol cases would drive out the effort of DEA Agents to develop their own leads. Table #3 shows that the hypothesis is strongly supported by the evidence. As patrol initiated cases get large relative to the number of investigators, the sector of DEA investigation initiated cases gets very small.
Table 3

Impact of the Total Number of Patrol Initiated Cases on the Proportion of Cases That are DEA Initiated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion of Cases That are DEA Initiated</th>
<th>Proportions of Cases That are Patrol Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower is Plentiful Relative to Number of Patrol Initiated Cases (R= 6.2)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower is Scarce Relative to Number of Patrol Initiated Cases (R= 24.6)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second thing we looked at was the relative value and development of the cases developed in the different sectors (e.g., patrol initiated vs. DEA initiated). The hypothesis was that the office with a low ratio of patrol initiated cases to manpower would be able to develop cases in both sectors more fully, and that the average class of the violators arrested would be greater. Table #4 and Table #5 present the results of this analysis. If one compares the quality of the cases in the DEA initiated sector of the office A with the quality of the cases in the DEA initiated sector of office B, it becomes apparent that a large number of patrol initiated cases can stymy the development of cases as well as diminish the size of the DEA initiated sector.

Taken together, this evidence indicates that when the number of patrol initiated cases gets large relative to the investigative work force, the net overall productivity of the investigative activity declines. This finding argues strongly for keeping the investigative manpower levels in step with patrol manpower levels. Alternatively, it argues for investigation being permitted to take its pick of the patrol initiated leads and ignore the others.
The Value and Development of DEA

Initiated and Patrol Initiated

Cases in Office A

(Manpower is Plentiful Relative to Patrol Initiated Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Number of Defendants Per Case</th>
<th>Average G-DEP Class of Defendants</th>
<th>Proportion of Cases in Which Investigation Continued</th>
<th>Proportion of Cases in Which Investigation Yielded New Defendants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. DEA Initiated Cases (69)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Domestic (53)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Mexico (11)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cross Border (5)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. All Patrol Initiated Cases (87)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Inspectors (33)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. C.P.O.'s (9)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Border Patrol (45)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Value and Development of DEA Initiated
And Patrol Initiated Cases In
Office B

(Manpower is Scarce Relative to Patrol Initiated Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Number of Defendants Per Case</th>
<th>Average G-DEP Class of Defendants</th>
<th>Proportions of Cases in Which Investigation Continued</th>
<th>Proportion of Cases in Which Continued Intl. Yielded Additional Defendants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. DEA Initiated Cases (76)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Domestic (61)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Mexico (6)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cross Border (9)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Patrol Initiated Cases (271)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Inspectors (152)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. C.P.O.'s (42)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Border Patrol (77)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. The Impact of Perceived Degrees of Operational Coordination Between DEA and Patrol Forces

The analysis of patrol and investigative functions also indicated that patrol could directly interfere with investigative functions at an operational level (e.g., in the handling of specific cases). Perhaps the two most important forms of operational interference are when patrol fails to preserve the potential of the leads they develop, and when patrol compromises an ongoing investigation by prematurely "discovering" it.

Critical factors in preserving the potential of patrol developed leads (e.g., defendants) are time and discretion. If investigators are not called quickly following an arrest, then much of the psychological leverage which is valuable in obtaining promises of cooperation or securing intelligence information is lost. Moreover, delays in delivery may signal that a smuggler has been arrested to the receiving party. Consequently, a long delay will destroy the potential development of the case even if the defendant is willing to cooperate. Similarly, if patrol officers are indiscreet in arresting the defendants, they may reveal to counter-surveillance that the defendants have been arrested. This also destroys the potential development of the case.

We tried to examine the impact of different degrees of operational coordination by comparing cases of DEA border offices which perceived different degrees of cooperation with patrol forces. We examined cases which required coordination with patrol forces in two offices that perceived poor cooperation with the patrol forces, and in two offices that perceived good cooperation with the patrol forces. The hypothesis was that the cases developed by offices which perceived bad cooperation would be less frequently and less fully developed than those cases developed by offices with perceived good cooperation.

Table #6 presents the results of this investigation. Little difference between the offices with perceived good cooperation and those with perceived bad cooperation is apparent.
The Value and Development of Cases Involving Coordination Between DEA and Customs in Offices Where Operational Coordination is Perceived to be Bad Compared to Offices Where Operational Coordination is Perceived To Be Good

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Bad Operational Coordination</th>
<th>Defendants Case</th>
<th>Average Class of Defendants</th>
<th>Proportion of Cases w/follow-up</th>
<th>Follow-up and Defendants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office A</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office B</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Good Operational Coordination</th>
<th>Defendants Case</th>
<th>Average Class of Defendants</th>
<th>Proportion of Cases w/follow-up</th>
<th>Follow-up and Defendants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office C</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office D</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The inference one draws from this finding is not clear. It is possible that perceptions about degrees of cooperation were inaccurate reflections of the actual amount of operational coordination. It is also possible that the number of cases in which operational coordination is an important factor is so small that the effects of good or bad cooperation are swamped by the large number of cases where operational coordination is not important. (Note that if one believes this hypothesis is true, then one begins with a presumption that degrees of operational coordination is not a major factor influencing the productivity of DEA offices in the area, and one searches for the relatively small effect of this factor by looking at anecdotal cases). It is also possible that in the four offices we observed, there was not enough actual variation in degrees of cooperation to show how important this factor can be. In all of the offices, cooperation was all so bad (or so good), that the effect of the different degrees of cooperation could not be observed.

While one cannot be certain about which inference is true, my hunch is that the degree of operational coordination is a factor in only a small minority of cases. Such cases can be galling and leave lasting scars when coordination fails, or they can be thrilling and leave a residue of good will when the coordination succeeds. But these cases are not likely to occur so frequently or be so important that they have a significant impact on DEA's activity. Their greatest impact is likely to be an indirect one - they may threaten the morale, enthusiasm, and confidence of our Agents.
V. Tentative Conclusion and Unresolved Issues

On the basis of this analysis, the following tentative conclusions are warranted:

1) First, it is absolutely essential to the overall effectiveness of a law enforcement effort that patrol and investigation forces be kept in balance. If patrol gets too large relative to investigation, then the effectiveness of both will suffer.

2) Second, when patrol gets too large relative to investigation, a second-best solution is to guarantee to investigation the right (indeed, the responsibility) to refuse to even examine some of the patrol developed leads. If investigation does not have this right or fails to exercise this responsibility, overall effectiveness will decline.

3) Third, it is valuable to arrange specific operating procedures which insure:

   a. That investigations are not interfered with by patrol

   b. That patrol does not compromise the potential of leads which they develop

These arrangements are of value partly because they allow a few cases to be developed more effectively. But more important, successful coordination is vital to the morale of both law enforcement organizations.

I suspect that the factor of coordination with patrol forces (both at the level of their relative sizes and at the level of the operational details of specific cases) is only one of many factors influencing DEA
operations on the Border. Here is an initial list of other factors which may be important.

1) Coordination with MFJP in making arrests and allowing DEA investigations to continue.

2) Inter-regional coordination within DEA (e.g., moving south across the 26 kilometer line and moving east and west through regions).

3) The supply and capabilities of informants in the area and their willingness to work with DEA.

4) The supply of fluent Spanish-speaking agents.

5) The difficulty of conducting covert operations in small rural areas where everyone is well known to everyone else.

6) The available intelligence on narcotics operations.

7) The investigative procedures of the agents stationed in the area.

Each of these factors may hold the key to improved operations on the Southwest Border. While there is a reasonable chance that simply sending more men to the Border will improve our enforcement effort, it is also possible that factors other than shortages of manpower are at work. It seems imperative to me that we gather additional evidence and hold discussions to develop a strategy for improving operations on the Southwest Border.