OBSERVATIONS ON THE POLICE INDUSTRY

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I. Introduction

The society is ambivalent about what the police should be doing. We want the police to prevent traffic jams and promote safety on the roads, but are a little annoyed when they give us traffic citations and wonder why they aren't catching crooks rather than harassing us. We want them to be kindly, patient, and helpful in dealing with drunks or other people who seem no longer to be able to fend for themselves, but we want the same people to be relentless—even ruthless—in pursuing armed robbers. We want them to enforce all laws fully and impartially, fail to provide them with resources to come anywhere near this ideal, and are astonished when they announce that the enforcement of some laws will be given low priority. In short, we expect the police to accomplish inchoate, inherently contradictory, and expensive purposes with very limited resources. And since everyone feels entitled to their own view of what the police should do, they feel entitled to criticize whenever the police fail on one or more of their functions and obligations.

In the midst of this difficult situation, the police executive and those to whom he is responsible must think hard and long about the mission of the police. While the time necessary for such thought must compete with more immediately pressing demands, a clearer sense of mission can be invaluable in addressing all other issues. Indeed, one might claim that the questions of organizational mission ought to be the dominant concern of police executives as they shape society's response to a myriad of social needs and problems.
An organizational mission or strategy is not chosen in the abstract. What a given police force can be organized to do depends crucially on the existing institutional setting. If the external political environment will not support or the existing organization cannot be made to perform a given mission, it does little good to conceive of it. To be useful, a concept of the organization's mission must be sustainable in a given institutional setting. This principal may seem to imply that the continuation of the status quo is usually the right strategy. Reflection suggests, however, that this need not be the case. The institutional setting may have changed enough to have made the old organizational mission inappropriate. Or, there may be enough slack in the institutional setting to accommodate several different concepts of organizational mission. Alternatively, it might even turn out that deft and determined managerial action could alter the institutional setting to allow a new concept to emerge that would not have been sustainable before. In any case, the intellectual problem for the strategically minded is the have some alternative conceptions of an organizational mission, to consider how these might be fitted into a given political setting, and to see what problems would be created by adopting one mission rather than another.

This note seeks to provide grist for this particular intellectual mill which, if it is to be meaningful, must lead to practical results.
II. The Context of Urban Policing in the U.S.

Scale and Significance of Urban Policing

Viewed in strictly economic terms, urban policing is an unexpectedly large industry. More than 13,000 municipal police departments now exist in the U.S. Approximately $11 billion are expended each year to support their activities. And about 500,000 people are employed. These facts make urban policing one of the top industries in the U.S.

What makes policing so important to municipalities is not its economic impact, then, but the simple fact that it has come to be the most familiar and important representatives of government. The police achieve this prominence as a result of three characteristics. First, no government agency is more accessible to individual citizens than the police: they are open 24 hours per day, and on the street in visible cars and uniforms. If they are not within view, a free phone call can command a police officer's presence quickly. Second, partly as a result of their accessibility (some would say vulnerability) to citizens, the police have tended to develop a wide range of skills to accommodate diverse citizen demands. As individual patrol officers, they are capable of surprising burglars, chasing robbers, resolving family disputes, dispersing unruly groups that are frightening other residents, administering first aid, transporting injured or lost people, finding suspected gas leaks and opening locked houses. As departments, they not only field these generalized patrol officers, but also maintain specialized capacities to control traffic, keep the peace in public meetings and demonstrations, confront and control rioters, and monitor the
activities of organized crime. Ready availability and broad capabilities alone would make the police a very important municipal agency. But when we add to these observations the third characteristic—that the police are armed and empowered to arrest and charge people with crimes—their claim to primacy among municipal functions seems assured. As convenient handymen and as agents who wield government's most coercive powers against citizens, the police inevitably become the most significant representatives of urban government.
Historical Development

The police functions has not always been this central to urban government activities. In fact, policing as we now know it is a relatively new institution. Its growth and development have been retarded by our traditional distrust of government power. In both England and the U.S., the mandate to create large, specialized urban police forces was given reluctantly and only after other methods of keeping peace and protecting lives and property from attacks by others had failed.

In England, the earlier systems had relied almost exclusively on the moral, persuasive and punitive qualities of the law to dissuade citizens from illegal behavior and to maintain order. No specialized, governmentally sponsored institution existed to prevent crime, apprehend offenders, or quell disorder. The only existing institutional models for such forces were large paramilitary units brought in to control widespread disorder, and networks of informants and agent-provocateurs that were common in France. Since both these models threatened valued political freedoms, such forces were only occasionally deployed. The result was that the tasks of watching and arresting were left almost entirely to the voluntary efforts of private citizens. To compensate for the weak efforts to detect offenses and apprehend offenders, the laws of the time established truly Draconian punishments. Many petty offenses were subject to capital punishment.

As cities in England became more unruly, and as the demands for public order increased, it became apparent that private
efforts supported by a very small constabulary were simply not strong enough to maintain civil and political order. The traditional reluctance to deploy a specialized force to maintain order was breached in England in 1829 when persistent lobbying by Sir Robert Peel secured the passage of the Metropolitan Police Act. Shortly thereafter, "peelers," "bobbies," or "Peel's bloody gang" began patrolling the streets of London in force. In the U.S., the parish constable system was exported to the American colonies and seemed to work to the satisfaction of citizens until the early 1800's. Except in the South where cities like Charlestown, Savannah and Richmond had regular mounted and foot partols to deal with slaves and challenges to the slavery systems, the colonies (later the states) relied on night watches and unpaid police. But by the 1830's cities such as New York, Boston and Philadelphia were having many of the same difficulties as London. Immigration was increasing rapidly. Political, racial, economic, religious and moral cleavages developed in citied and resulted in sidespread disorder during the 1830's and 1840's. Finally, in 1845, New York City established a municipal police force based on the English model. Boston and Philadelphia followed shortly thereafter. By 1855 cities as far west as Milwaukee had established police departments.

Although modeled after the Metropolitan Police, there were at least two significant differences between the English and American police. First, the English police receive and still maintain, their mandate from the Crown, a central authority with
a strong traditional claim on legitimate authority. In the United States, police receive their mandate from local government units whose legitimacy is created more by political processes than traditional authority. Thus, the American police context is one of political pluralism, decentralization, and local control. Second, while rigid class distinctions divided England, English society is relatively homogenous when compared to the ethnic, religious, and moral diversity that overlay the class structure of the United States. From the beginnings of policing in the United States these issues—decentralized authority, sharply limited powers and legitimacy, and cultural diversity—have peculiarly affected American policing and distinguished its style from the British. The "bobby" was to be civil, but impersonal, distant, and remote. His aloofness was to ensure his impartiality. In America, policing was to be more democratic. The police officer was to be part of his beat and relate more personally to his charges.

While this democratic orientation was congruent with American decentralised political institutions of the time, it became the source of enduring problems with which police administrators and reformers have struggled since the earliest days of publicly sponsored policing. First, local, or even district accountability, led to struggles over control of police agencies, police districts and even beats. Individual officers, district commanders, chiefs, were all vulnerable to political control and manipulation for partisan or illegal purposes. Second, local control resulted in fragmentation of police services. Each city, jurisdiction, etc. had its own police agency, coordination was
minimal and lateral entry forbidden. Thus, early policing in the
U.S. both lacked a unifying mandate and an occupational culture.

The problem of political control of policing became a major
issue in the last decades of the nineteenth century. At this
time political machines were being constructed and operated in
the major cities of the country. A natural result was that, in
Robert Fogelson's phrase, police departments became "adjuncts to
the machine." As adjuncts to the political machine, the police
departments were managed as a source of jobs and upward mobility,
and their enforcement efforts bent to accommodate the cultural
diversity and decentralized power that characterized local
cities. In many ways, they were more a "central cog" than a mere
"adjunct" of the machine.

To the reformers in the progressive movement who despised the
disorder in the cities almost as much as the growing power of the
machines, the "corruption" of the police forces became a central
problem. In many cities throughout the country they waged reform
campaign which left the following institutional results: a
commitment to crime control as the primary objective of municipal
police departments; a paramilitary form of organization; an
organizational structure that centralized command at top levels
of the organizations and created functional rather than
geographic specialists beneath this top level; rigid civil
service systems; and specialized methods for appointing and
terminating police chiefs that guaranteed some independence from
the chief political executives of the cities. In short, the
legacy of the reform movement was the development of a strategic
conception of policing as a professionalized crime fighting force.

The first wave of reform did not succeed everywhere. In fact, it suffered serious setbacks during the era of Prohibition. But in the late 1940's-1960, the movement to create professionalized crime fighting police forces continued to advance. Starting the the 40's, the police began to make increasing use of transportation and communication technology. With cars, telephones and radios, it suddenly became possible to think of instantaneous responses to alarms as well as coordinated patrol operations. This meshed neatly with the paramilitary tradition and centralized authority of police departments. In addition, the Unified Crime Report came into existence and tied overall police department performance perhaps irrevocably to managing levels of Part I offenses (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). This accounting scheme meshed neatly with the crime control orientation of the reformers. Finally, in 1967, the President's Crime Commission issued its report and, as one of its major thrusts, recommended a substantial upgrading of police personnel standards. Each of these historical developments lent support to the original conception of an independent, professional crime fighting police force.

In the sixties, a challenge to this conception of policing developed. Several scholars began to voice concerns about the increasing distance between the police forces and the communities they policed. They began to talk about the need for close relationships with the community and emphasized the dangers of
independence rather than the benefits. This view gained credibility in the late sixties as the civil rights movement confronted the police.

The challenge posed by the civil rights movement was enormous. The movement embraced legitimate political groups that engaged in civil disobedience, disorderly riots that were sometimes characterized as political actions but seemed more often to be expressive collective outburst, and the emergence of terrorist groups. Coping with each aspect of the movement alone placed enormous demands on the police. But the real problem was sorting out which events were which. The riots posed a stark trade-off between the law enforcement and order maintenance functions of the police. Aggressive enforcement seemed to both spawn and spread the disorder. Similarly, coping with political groups that appeared to be capable of generating riots, sniping and terrorism created enormous tensions between commitments to protect first amendment political liberties, and at the same time protect cities from the violence of riots and terrorism. Thus, professional crime fighting came into conflict with order maintenance and the protection of important political rights.

At the same time that the police were struggling to accommodate a concern for political fights in their operations, the courts were expanding individual rights in criminal cases and substantially restricting police investigative procedures. Constitutional protections against electronic surveillance were extended to apply in all states. The exclusionary rule made illegally gathered evidence useless in prosecutions. And Miranda
required the police to inform defendants of their rights during police investigations.

These actions may or may not have "handcuffed" the police. But what the fuss about these actions did accomplish was to create a widespread perception that there was an important conflict between effective crime fighting and individual freedoms, and that the police had been willing to sacrifice important personal freedoms to control crime. This inevitably tarnished the image of crime fighting—at least among some segments of the population, most notably judges.

A third factor chipping away at the commitment to professional crime control was the emergence of militant police unionism in the 1970's. That rank and file patrol officers would band together for protection and reassurance in these last two decades cannot be considered surprising. They were poorly paid despite the fact that many people thought they should have professional status, and the cities at the time seemed able to provide for higher salaries. Moreover, they were under enormous stress. They were being shot at and spat upon. Concepts of how they should do their job were constantly changing. There were major efforts to place their professional careers in the hands of amateurs through civilian review boards. Recruitment, selection and training patterns were all changing so that social tensions were reflected in the locker rooms of the precinct stations. And if all this weren't enough, eventually affluence gave way to austerity in the cities and the police were threatened with layoffs, restricted promotional opportunities and threats to their pensions. No wonder they would seek protection and solace
in tight fraternities.

A fourth factor eroding confidence in the new orthodoxy of policies was the emergence of a substantial body of research on police procedures and crime. Reflection, research and experimentation all indicated that the police were probably less able to control street crime than was commonly supposed. Moreover, the standard methods of crime fighting that had developed during the reform eras all came in for criticism. Random patrol, rapid response to call for service, and standard investigative procedures among detectives were revealed to be less effective than their proponents had assumed. Where the police appeared to be able to apprehend offenders, it appeared to be largely due to the efforts of victims and witnesses who assisted the police in "solving" the crime. In effect, a century of experimentation with specialized police forces left the police still dependent on the voluntary efforts of private citizens to help solve crimes.
Basic Traditions and Continuing Tensions

Urban police forces have emerged from this period of historical development with strong commitments to a few basic traditions. These traditions help to define the culture of policing. And, to a degree, they reflect more or less stable resolutions of the continuing dilemmas of policing a free society. At the same time, however, there are some important factors which are tending to erode and transform these basic traditions.

The basic traditions appear to be the following:

Local Control of Police: Police forces in the U.S. will continue to be created and operated as agencies of local governmental units. This reflects our fundamental distrust of central authority, takes advantage of our federal governmental structure, and celebrates the potential for cultural diversity. It also makes difficult the emergence of a strong occupational structure since the tasks and styles of policing are apt to show substantial variation--more so probably than, say, the tasks of teaching or fire protection.

Paramilitary Organization and Style: Police forces in the U.S. also seem firmly committed to a paramilitary organization and style. They wear uniforms, are organized in a strict chain of command, march in formation on ceremonial occasions, etc. This style is consistent with many of the functions they have to perform: it reflects their desire to be impartial, and to use force if necessary. It also suggests their readiness to be deployed in larger units as the situation demands. The fact that
this concept of strict supervision is at odds with the actual conditions of police work creates some confusion in the internal management of police forces. Finally, a keen interest in technology—particularly command and control systems—seems to go along with this paramilitary style.

**Strong Emphasis on the Law Enforcement/Crime Control Objective:** The current strong commitment to effective crime control—particularly street crime—is likely to continue. That is the conception of the police officers and the political environment that supports and legitimates police operations.

While these basic traditions are currently defining and lending stability to the urban police function, some old unresolved (and probably unresolvable) issues may once again surface as a result of new pressures, and some new information may encourage changes. Some of these volatile areas are the following:

**Ambivalence About the Influence of Local Politics on the Police** The police are now separated to some degree from local political control. While this allows them to get on with the job of being fair and efficient enforcers of the law, it tends to deny them the legitimacy and support that could come from closer collaboration with local political systems. Similarly, although the police in the past seemed committed to the idea of staying out of local politics as an organized body, the emergence of police associations which comment on the selection of police executives, help elect state and local political figures, and develop ideological positions on political questions beyond bread and butter issues of pay, work and promotion suggests that they
may now be slipping on this commitment. How responsive police should be to local political forces and what kind of local political forces they might themselves become are both difficult and unresolved issues.

Continuing Tension Among Enforcement, Order Maintenance and Service Functions: Despite the fact that the police are largely committed to narrowing their objective to effective crime control at least at the level of articulated purposes, they find it impossible to shed their other functions. In fact, with the movement to de-institutionalize disabled populations (such as the mentally ill) and with the aging of the urban population, the service function is likely to intrude even more deeply into police operations. Obviously, the responsibility for order maintenance and the tension between that objective and law enforcement will also not go away. The only way this tension might be resolved is if other agencies such as health, welfare, and mental health bureaucracies got on the streets 24 hours a day—an unlikely prospect.

Insufficient Indentification with the Goal of Protecting Individual Civil Rights: The police have been forced by the courts to pay more attention to the civil rights of individuals and groups that become the object of their investigations. While they now do so, it is not clear that they are in a stable position on this issue. The commitment to protecting civil liberties has not been internalized as a goal by most police departments and officers. Their reluctance to do so is a constant source of tension with prosecutors, judges and the parts
of the community that value civil rights very highly. How this issue will be resolved is unclear.

**Continued Experimentation with New Modes of Organization and New Operating Procedures:** The inevitable result of learning more about police activities (and, in particular, learning that old methods are not succeeding) is that police executives will innovate and experiment with new methods. In fact, fiscal austerity will give continued impetus for productivity oriented research. Within the admittedly tight limitations imposed by strong organizational commitments to traditional concepts of policing, then, we should expect to see the police innovating and experimenting with new organizational arrangements and new operating procedures.

**Great Pressures on Individual Patrol Officers:** For the officer in the trenches, the future will be like the past: he or she will be expected to be all things to all people and will bear the brunt of the criticism when a problem arises. This will inevitably continue to create stress and tensions among the officers.
III. Tasks, Organizations and Operations of Urban Police Forces

In discussing the functions and tasks of urban policing, it is useful to distinguish between what police emphasize as their most important or distinctive function and what they actually do. This distinction is not particularly important as a device for criticizing police. Although it is often assumed that congruence should exist between the functions emphasized by police executives and those performed by their force to promote democratic accountability or to harmonize expectations and reduce tensions, there may be important managerial reasons to leave the two quite divergent.

Surely there are prices to be paid for these incongruities. But in a world where people disagree about the appropriate purposes of police, where the tasks necessarily performed by the police are extremely heterogeneous, and where talk about "central mission" and "distinctive competence" is only one of the ways that police executives can influence the operations of their department, the police executive is often in a situation where his or her job is more to minimize the incongruities, or choose the incongruities that are most useful to him or her, rather than eliminate them. Thus, the mere discovery of incongruities between articulated mission and actual performance need not lead to criticism.

The real utility of distinguishing between articulated functions and tasks and actual functions and tasks is analytic. The only way to understand the actual determinants of police behavior is to focus on what they do and ask what combination of factors are causing them to behave in that way. One thing we do
know about urban policing is that the functions and tasks are very heterogeneous. It has become customary to describe four broad functions of the police: law enforcement/crime control; order maintenance; protection of constitutional rights; and services. Within each of these categories there is an astonishing variety of tasks. Crime control includes preventive patrol, stake-outs, undercover activity and detective work. Order maintenance includes handling domestic disputes, keeping people free from various forms of harassment on the streets, keeping political demonstrations within the bounds of civilized discourse, and coping with riots. Services include giving first aid to injured people, transporting sick or disabled people to places where they can receive help, helping people get into locked houses and cars when they have lost their keys, and even giving directions or advice to people who are lost or confused.

An important thing we don't know about policing is whether these functions are complementary (in the sense that performing well in one function will often aid in performing others) or antagonistic (in the sense that good performance with respect to one function will detract from performance with respect to others). If is often asserted, for example, that aggressive crime control efforts will lead to more disorder rather than less. In the background of such assertions are the images of police officers "causing" a riot by wading into a crowd to make arrests, or escalating a domestic quarrel into violence by arresting one of the parties, or antagonizing youths on the streets by subjecting them to close surveillance and supervision.
While this assertion seems plausible, it could also be true that a known police capacity and willingness to arrest will aid the police in performing order maintenance functions: the exercise of state authority and force may in some cases stabilize rather than inflame situations. Of course, knowing the right amount of force and authority to use in a given situation is part of the art of being a police officer or supervisor. But it is not always obvious at the outset that order maintenance is always or even often antagonistic to enforcement. Similarly, police are fond of insisting that the service function detracts from crime fighting partly by diverting effort from preventive patrol and partly by encouraging personal characteristics such as trust, sympathy and patience that may be hindrances when they deal with hardened, determined criminals. Given the fundamental reliance of the police on cooperation from citizens in locating offenses, indentifying offenders, and securing convictions, however, it may be that the service function dramatically improves the department's crime fighting capacities by creating what amounts to eager citizen auxiliaries.

Thus, while it is clear that large metropolitan police forces have diverse functions and tasks, the extent to which a police executive must choose among these functions is not clear. It is conceivable that the functions are quite complementary, that the only way we can distinguish enforcement oriented departments from service oriented departments is by looking at the margins of a few dimensions of performance (e.g., elevated rates of weapons arrests in enforcement oriented departments versus slightly more courteous treatment of citizens requesting services in service
oriented departments), and that these marginal differences mean little in terms of the overall effectiveness of police measured in terms of citizen security, satisfaction and rates of public violence. On the other hand, it may be that police forces differ dramatically, that these differences matter a great deal, and that the choice of orientation is quite a delicate one for police executives. We simply do not know.

In any event, what functions and tasks the police actually end up performing will be based partly on what police executives say they ought to be doing, but probably more importantly on how their job is defined, what aspects of it are monitored and rewarded and punished, and what kinds of orientation they bring to the job at the beginning.

Organizational Structure, Resource Allocation, and Deployment:

A key decision that police executives make implicitly or explicitly is how to allocate their resources to given activities. One can usefully think of this as two different sets of decisions. One set of decisions is concerned with structural issues concerning the operational capacities to be developed and maintained within the organization. Should there be a special unit devoted to youth, to narcotics, to organized crime? How large should the Detective Bureau be and how should it be meshed with ordinary precinct patrol operation? Since these decisions about whether to create specialized units and where to place them in an organization always have important implications for the future allocation of resources, one can also think of these structural decisions as profoundly influencing, if not precisely
determining, the allocation of resources among these functions. The second set of decisions is concerned with how the operational capacities (created and fixed in resource terms by the first set of decisions) will be targeted in the world. Which geographic areas, situations or suspects will be given high priority?

When we view the decisions of police executives from this perspective, it becomes clear that a key decision the executive makes is how much of his or her force to commit to generalized patrol operations. The reason that this decision seems so interesting is that once resources are allocated to generalized patrol, the police executive loses most of his control over what his or her officers do. To be sure, within the constraints of union agreements and the preferences of commanders, the police executive can allocate the patrol force across time periods and geographic areas. But once he has done that, the patrol force largely does what the citizens request it to do via the dispatcher and on-view requests. Patrol officers may take some initiative in ferreting out potential crimes, and they may be motivated to do this by first line supervision. But still, what the patrol officers do is largely decided by people who call the police. In effect, the allocation of police effort is directly under the ad hoc control of individual citizens.

In contrast to patrol operations, however, the police executive maintains the discretion not only to establish, but also to deploy units such as detectives, narcotics, organized crime, anti-crime squads, and youth service bureaus. The reason is simply that these units are more insulated from ad hoc citizen
requests for service. Obviously, the size and deployment of these units depends to some degree on requests for services for the frequency with which circumstances occur that could require the special capabilities. But still, the day to day managements of these units is much more under the discretionary control of police managers than the patrol force is.

The implication of these observations is that the police executive can profoundly influence the aggregate pattern of activities carried out by his department by deciding how many of his resources will be sequestered in special units that are insulated from citizen calls and dispatchers, and what the special units will be. If much of the force is left as a generalized patrol force vulnerable to citizen calls for service, the police executive may inevitably be running a department that supplies a lot of services even if it isn't "service-oriented." If the executive fields large detective units, anti-crime units, and narcotics units, he or she may produce a lot of enforcement activity even if his or her patrol force is being trained and motivated to be enthusiastic about responding to calls for service.

In short, for the most part, the urban police function is determined by what patrol forces and detectives do since all the rest of the operational units add up to relatively little.

The Patrol Function:

Patrol is the backbone of urban police forces. It consumes most of the resources, occupies the attention of most mid-level managers, and is the searing, commonly shared occupational experience that binds the police department together. No wonder,
then, that it dominates our conceptions of policing and captures most of our research attention.

The current patrol practices developed over the period 1930-1960. If was during this period that use of the automobile as the basic means of patrol expanded from occasional to almost universal. At first, the automobile was seen as a means to extend foot patrol. Police officers were to patrol a beat on foot, use the car to go to another beat, and again patrol by foot. Slowly, however, O.W. Wilson and others developed the notion that it would be possible to create the feeling of police presence through use of the automobile. They hypothesized that if the police were to patrol city streets unpredictably, a feeling of police omnipresence would be created. Citizens would feel safe and be highly satisfied with police services. Criminals would be fearful of apprehension, deterred from their activities, or apprehended during the commission of a crime.

At first police were deployed on the basis of variations of O.W. Wilson's hazard model. Later, as operations researchers turned their attention from military to domestic issues, complex computer based allocation models were developed. All were based on the assumption that the movement of cars rapidly through city streets would create feelings of police omnipresence and that citizens would be able to, and would, call police after the commission of a crime.

Out of these theories police patrol as it is known today developed; one or two police officers patrolling city streets in an automobile, observing citizens, moving unpredictably,
monitoring hazards, and rapidly responding to calls for service. Essentially contacts with citizens are brief, generally only occurring after a call for service. The central tendency for patrolling officers is to get back "in service," to resume observing and driving as soon as possible.

This basic operation has been the most thorough evaluated activity of police departments. Evaluation studies began in the 1960's and continue to the present day. Without going into detail about the studies, the general thrust of the findings is that random patrol has not been effective in performing the crime control function of policing. No significant study has found that it has much, if any, effect on crime, citizen satisfaction, or fear. The most conservative conclusion which emerges from the research is that patrol can be removed from geographical areas for long periods of time without being missed or with any measurable consequence. This conclusion need not vitiate the current police commitment to patrol activities. Random patrol might be important for order maintenance or service functions of the police even if it is not terribly effective as a crime control strategy. But the conclusion does give a police executive a license to experiment. The executive can consider alternative ways of controlling crime, and can think of way of using the patrol force to achieve purposes other than crime control-- all because he no longer has to be committed to the notion that a patrolling, fast-reacting mobile force is necessarily the best way to control crime to say nothing of achieving other police purposes.
Criminal Investigation and Detectives:

The Detective Bureau is typically the second largest operating unit of a police force—comprising 10% to 15% of the available personnel. The activities and operations of these investigative units are not well understood either by the general public or students of police. Formally, criminal investigation deals with the task of gathering information regarding crimes already committed for the purpose of solving cases and presenting evidence. In practice, the detective function appears somewhat broader and different than this definition. Often detectives may be involved in thwarting crimes that have not yet happened as well as in solving crimes that have already occurred, their tasks are often simply to reassure the victim that something is being done and giving advice and to perform a variety of clearly clerical tasks in completing police records. And lurking in the background is the uncertain reliance of detectives on informants, and the uncertain price that is paid for informant contributions to crime solving.

Detective units from the beginning have been controversial and have presented special problems for police executives. They appeared in Anglo-American policing as the natural development of two separate traditions: a French tradition that emphasized the importance of using crooks to catch other crooks; and an English tradition of entrepreneurial crime solving. Detectives have always operated independently in close collaboration with "underworld elements." Since this made them suspect in the eyes of both administrators and citizens, their early role in policing
was marginal and perilous.

Yet in both England and France and later in the U.S. their success in several particularly notorious cases caught the fancy of journalists and novelists. In this incarnation, however, the detectives were seen as elite crime solvers whose successes depended more on their clever wits than their sources of information. From the combination of these traditions emerged the current conception of detectives. They are still considered elite and their operations are still shrouded in secrecy. Their work with informants, the secrecy of their operation, their close association with criminals and their broad discretion in developing cases, all made them appear to be vulnerable to corruption. Their stock in trade is information, and while they demand it from other operating units of the police department, they tend to jealously guard what they themselves know.

The basic nature of their operations would be cause for concern among police executives alone. What makes them even more difficult for managers, however, is their substantial political power. Since they are prestige units, they tend to be supported by other police officers who would like to curry favor with the detectives. Often, they dominate police associations and unions and use their position to advance the interests of detectives and detective units. They also seem to enjoy special relationships with the press—especially the reporters whose regular beat is the police department. All this makes it hard for police executives to subject detective bureaus to close supervision and control.

Still, the critical issue for the police executive is how to
use detectives and detective units to advance police department objectives. Here, research has not been particularly helpful. The studies that have focused on the activities of detectives have been exploratory—useful for generating hypotheses and puzzles, but too superficial to permit definitive conclusions. Studies have focused on improving the efficiency of investigative units through administrative reforms such as case screening.

Police Use of Technology and Equipment:

It should be clear by this stage that along with organizational structure and community elements, police operations have been profoundly influenced by technology and equipment police departments have created, or borrowed and adopted for their purposes. Beginning with call boxes and handcuffs, technology has gone on to provide the patrol car, one- and two-way radios, helicopters, computers, computer aided dispatch, and, finally, the automatic vehicle locator system. Each new advance in technology has been heralded by an enthusiastic belief that it would revolutionize the effectiveness of the police.

Despite the enthusiasm for the prevalence of fancy equipment in police departments, the role of technology in improving policy has generally been disappointing and plausibly even counter productive. A variety of explanations have been offered for these disappointments:

Since equipment and information systems designers do not fully understand the nature of police work, these innovations turn out to be poorly suited to police operations.
Instruments like the radio and automatic vehicle locator system are used for both strategic and supervisory purposes. Because staff at the operational level resist the supervisory uses, the strategic purposes are frustrated.

New information systems could not improve the quality and relevance of available information in police departments, nor could it alter traditional patterns of information sharing. Since these are the fundamental problems in police efforts to use information systematically, the computers added little to police performance.

Regardless of whether some, or all, of these explanations are correct, some police scholars have argued that the failure to adapt technology to policing represents more than just a waste of funds. Some, for example, argue that the use of automobiles, first without radios, and then automobiles with one and two-way radios, then heated and air conditioned, then cars with computer terminals, has substantially changed how police relate to citizens, to each other and to the police organization itself. They argue that at each stage of this progression, the police have become increasingly isolated and remote from the citizens and communities they serve, less responsible to those communities, and more self-contained and impervious to the attempts of citizens and communities to affect their behavior. While no evidence exists to validate these claims, they seem plausible.

Police Productivity:

A serious problem arises when one begins to discuss police
productivity. Because the concept of productivity sounds technical and quantitative, people immediately begin thinking in terms of hard numbers that might be used to measure levels of police performance and their impact on the environment. Because we think of the police as being primarily or exclusively in the crime control business, (and because the numbers are more or less conveniently available), we look first at crime rates and arrest or clearance rates to measure police performance.

There are at least two problems with this approach. On one hand, the police may be intentionally trying to do many more things than make arrests, solve crimes, and keep the crime rate down. To the extent that they are doing other valuable and useful things such as resolving disputes that could flair into violence, assisting disabled people to get help, providing recreational opportunities for youth, managing the flow of traffic, and providing first aid to injured people, measures of productivity tied directly to crime control objectives and a single device for coping with crime will under-estimate current levels of police performance and conceivably lead to inappropriate distortions in the way they operate. Second, these measures do not really capture the nature of police anti-crime efforts or their impact on levels of crime. Obviously, some kinds of crime are more deterrable than others: street muggings by a few inexperienced kids may be easier to control than burglaries; domestic assaults may be harder for police to control than fights in bars; and so forth. Unfortunately, the categories in which crimes are reported are too crude to allow police
executives to determine whether changes in aggregate crime rates are occurring in components where it is conceivable that they could have an impact, or in categories that are more independent of police efforts. Moreover, as noted above, arrests and clearance rates fail to capture the full array of police efforts to prevent and control crime. So, the police productivity measure of first choice is somewhat misleading.

The only reason to make these well-known points about the limitation of our current conception of police productivity is to emphasize a broader point that is less well understood. The definition of police productivity depends in the first instance on the definition of the goals and objectives of the police force. And this is not an objective or technical issue. The question of what the police should be trying to accomplish is an important issue for police managers to face in the context of local political and legal systems. It is fundamentally a normative question.

Moreover, the technical aspects of measuring performance with respect to some goals may be very difficult—even impossible. But the difficulty of measuring performance in a given area does not eliminate the importance of the objective or its role in defining what we mean by police productivity. No technical imperative requires that all police objectives be quantifiable.

In sum, "productivity" must be defined in terms of the full set of goals and objectives of policing, not just those that are conveniently or traditionally measured.

How might one structure a set of goals for a police department? The simple idea of crime control is probably too
narrow to properly direct or credit police activity. The three functions of policing--law enforcement, order maintenance, and personal services--are a little too vague. Perhaps the idea that comes closest to structuring a set of goals or objectives for the police is the list of eight objectives presented in the American Bar Association's report on the urban police function:

1. To prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property (serious crime).
2. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victim of a criminal attack.
3. To protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right to free speech and assembly.
4. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles.
5. To assist those who cannot care for themselves: the intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the old, and the young.
6. To resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups of individuals, or individuals and their governments.
7. To identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems for the individual citizen, for the police, or for government.
8. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.

Once a police executive has a clear sense of his objectives, and has given them operational definitions where possible, he then faces the problem of deploying the resources of his department and motivating his managers, first-line supervisors,
and operational officers to perform well with respect to the objectives. One can think of "productivity" as applying to the department as a whole, to subordinate functions and operational units, or to individual officers.

But before focusing our attention on patrol it is worth noting that aggregate productivity across the full range of police department functions could conceivably involve substantial re-deployments of the police force among operational units. Our current lack of knowledge of the activities and accomplishments of activities other than patrol hurts us a great deal. We simply do not know how different allocations to different specialized functions would effect aggregate productivity.

Managing Police Activity:

Given the current structure and deployment, the key resource to be managed effectively is the conduct of individual patrol officers. This, if we ignore the potential for cost reductions or improvements in performance that might result from aggregate deployments among functions or the replacement of expensive labor with cheaper labor in areas where the tasks would allow this, police productivity resolves itself into two deceptively simple questions: how do we want patrolment to behave, and how can we get them to behave that way. The reasons that these questions are deceptively simple are worth restating since whatever effort we make to promote police productivity must be capable of handling the difficulties that make these issues deceptively simple.

The first issue—decising how we want the police to behave—is difficult for at least three reasons. First, the general tasks and specific situations that the police encounter are
sufficiently numerous and heterogeneous that it is hard to imagine that we could anticipate them all and have in mind an appropriate response. In fact, if we consider the unpredictability and variety of tasks and the inventiveness that had to be displayed in responding to the tasks as the defining characteristic of professional rather than operative or clerical positions, it would be difficult to imagine any job competing with the job of the patrol officer in terms of its claim for professional status. Dentists, teachers, maybe even M.D.s and social workers all face environments that are fairly well structured and routinized when compared with the job of the patrol officer. From a control point of view, the variety makes it difficult to imagine establishing a set of procedures to guide patrol officer's activities.

Second, even if we could somehow capture the variety of situations which the police encountered, we might very well be at a loss in defining the appropriate response. It is difficult to father information about the results of different kinds of police conduct in given situations at a level of detail that would allow us to develop a strong basis for recommending specific kinds of interventions. While this seems to have been done successfully in the area of domestic disputes, we have been less successful in developing methods for handling noisy kids, public demonstrations, riots, and so forth. But even with research into effective modes of intervention, chances are that the recommended actions would work only most of the time. Often, completely faithful execution of the recommended procedure would produce an
unsuccessful result. This is true in medicine and other areas as well as policing. So while we might be able to improve interventions on average, the response selected on an ad hoc basis by a talented patrol officer could often be superior to the prescribed procedure.

Third, there are important value issues embedded in the concept of a successful or unsuccessful intervention. It is likely, for example, that some modes of intervention by police might lead (on a probabilistic basis) to a satisfying resolution of a conflict, but only at the price of increasing (again on a probabilistic basis) the risk of injury to the patrol officer or innocent bystanders. This kind of trade-off is often what is at stake in discussion of police use of force, and it is only partly an empirical issue of how often a given level of force will protect the policeman from a real danger rather than antagonize the citizen. It is also a value question involving trade-offs between risks to patrol officers and risks to citizens. This adds a layer of complexity to the design of appropriate police interventions.

It would be difficult to get the police to behave in accord with the procedures even if we could decide what they should be. In the first place, the procedures would probably be too complicated to keep easily in mind. This is an inevitable consequence of the varied situations that the police encounter, and the variety we can imagine in their responses.

A second difficulty is that the individual interests of the patrol officer will often be at odds with the prescribed response. Moreover, since officers on patrol operate largely alone (or in
the company of people who are in some degree compromised because they have also experienced the dilemmas of "going by the book" and running what appear to be foolish personal risks on one hand versus ignoring the book and protecting themselves on the other and resolved it in favor of ignoring the book), they are relatively free to pursue their own interests. In short, the conduct of patrol officers cannot be reliably supervised.

Finally, even if officers on patrol could be reliably supervised, it is not clear that anything important to them depends on their performance. Promotions and salary increases are typically determined by civil service examinations or length of service rather than favorable performance ratings. dismissals and suspensions are painful, but can only be accomplished through elaborate procedures. The most important rewards and punishments that can be made contingent on performance are probably assignments and the willingness of one's peers to provide support when one gets in trouble. Typically these incentives are controlled by sergeants and peers who may or may not use that power to support procedures.

Thus, it is hard to specify appropriate responses in advance and hard to insure compliance with the procedures even if they could be designed. Given this situation, it is important to see that some aspects of our current systems for managing patrol officers are counter-productive. In particular, the concept of a paramilitary force regulated by narrowly drawn procedures and supervised through a tight chain of command creates a dangerous illusion about how the police force is actually controlled.
This system may be counter-productive for at least three reasons. First, the current procedures may give inappropriate or incomplete guidance to police. Reading any random section of a police manual tends to give credence to this notion since they are often full of useless advice about unimportant parts of the policeman's job and silent or unrealistically pious on the crucial issues. Second, the strict accountability and close supervision is an obvious fiction. It is hard to monitor the patrol officer's behavior, and hard to make things contingent on his performance. Those who can monitor the officer's performance and make things of value contingent on this performance may well wield that power in opposition to the dictator of the apparent command structure. Third, the lack of congruence between the real requirements of the job and the apparent requirements of the formal control system tends to make officers cynical about the control system and feel little commitment to it. Even worse, since substantial punishments can and occasionally are administered for small violations of procedures, and since the higher level of the department profess continuing commitment to these procedures, the officers are reluctant to talk about the areas in which the procedure seems useless or counter-productive. In effect, potentially useful information about appropriate and realistic responses to given situations is suppressed. Instead, it becomes embedded in the informal craft knowledge of policing which is understood to be partly in opposition to the formal control system. Thus, the formal control system fails to reliably guide and control police officers in their daily work, focus conversation about how they
might perform more effectively, and creates antagonism between the formal hierarchy and the patrol officers.

It is all well and good to complain about alleged deficiencies in current methods of controlling police conduct and motivating successful performance. The crucial operational question, however, is what system would be superior. After all, to say that controlling police conduct is difficult cannot mean that we should abandon the effort.

What is needed is a system that provides a more realistic and flexible kind of control over police operations. While it is not clear what such a system would look like, it is likely that it would try to capture, and elevate by status of informal conversations going on among patrol officers, and sergeants about how the police should behave. Since that is the nexus of advice, help and control that is now effectively controlling police conduct, and since a vast amount of experience and information is also lodged at this level of the organization, any effective solution to the problem of guiding police conduct must operate through these channels of informations and control.

If police executives are to effect police behavior they must enter into a conversation with those who can accomplish this purpose.

In entering that conversation, they are duty bound to insist on the legitimacy of the department's overall objectives, to promote predictability and consistency in the department's responses to specific situations, and to write down the things for which the department will be accountable. But they should be
prepared to fit their conceptions to some degree to the experience and best practice of their officers. They should in any case abandon the naive idea that their departments are now being run by the elaborate structure of rules and supervisor characteristics of the paramilitary style, or the cynical idea that they can pretend to be accountable by writing new rules and occasionally firing a patrol officer who is caught operating outside the procedures.
IV. Sources of Continuing Authority and Resources to Operate

One of the current rituals of urban politics is for police executives to demand and political leaders to solemnly promise independence from "political interference." This commitment to an "independent" police force is a legacy of the era when police departments in metropolitan areas operated as adjuncts of the political machines.

The reform movement which centralized control of the police at the municipal level and established civil service systems was an appropriate response to some important abuses of police power. After all, when local political bosses primarily interested in maintaining their capacity to win elections can control the personnel and operations of a police force it is very likely that police officers will be selected more for their vote getting than their crook catching abilities, and that the police will operate more aggressively against their opponents than against their political supporters.

Clearly it was wrong for municipal police to operate as adjuncts of political machines, and it was right for the reformers to make structural changes that struck directly at the machines' levers of control --decentralization of power and authority to the precincts, and the vesting of broad appointing and promoting powers among local politicians.

But it seems a dangerous illusion to think that these reforms took the politics out of policing.

The police are inevitably and necessarily involved in politics for the simple reason that they wield state power. How
such power is wielded will always be of substantial concern to the citizenry and their leaders. In fact, the willingness of a heterogeneous citizenry to accept the legitimacy of police operations is both a key indicator and a key ingredient of a successful police force. Thus, police executives must be concerned about legitimizing their operations in the eyes of the citizenry, and this will inevitably involve them in politics both in the broad and narrow sense.

It is important to understand that in seeking to establish their legitimacy, the police have a more difficult time than many other public agencies. Herman Goldstein makes the point nicely:

"The policy by the very nature of their function are an anomaly in a free society. They are invested with a great deal of authority under a system of government in which authority is reluctantly granted and, when granted, sharply curtailed. The specific form of their authority— to arrest, to search, to detain and to use force—is awesome in the degree to which it can be disruptive of freedom, invasive of privacy, and sudden and direct in its impact upon the individual. And this awesome authority, of necessity, is delegated to individuals at the lowest levels of the bureaucracy, to be exercised in most instances without prior review and control."

In effect, the whole idea of policing runs counter to all our instincts and tracitions about government. It is too much power, and it is not controllable by elaborate procedures or codes.

To the extent that the police have had a strategy for legitimizing their activity it has tended to be based on two
ideas. First, they have emphasized their impartiality in enforcing current laws. This not only shields them from accusations of favoritism and corruption, but also cloaks them in whatever legitimacy is contained in the existing structure of laws. Second, they emphasize their professional capacities to control crime—primarily street crime. Since large segments of the community support the objective of reducing crime, the police legitimate their activities by aligning them with this objective.

Both of these concepts have become a bit tattered with age and usage. The concept of impartiality in enforcing laws remains central to urban policing, and to a great degree, the police are now widely perceived to enforce some laws (notably those concerned with interpersonal violence) with diligence and fairness. The problem with impartiality is that when we look across the range of laws for which the police are responsible it is impossible to prove that enforcement in fact impartial. Enforcement is much less than full, and it is not clear how the police decide which laws to enforce, and which offenders to arrest. Some offenses seem trivial and not worth the effort to mount systematic enforcement campaigns. Still, some people will occasionally be arrested, and because of the rarity of the event, they will feel entitled to claim that they were victims of discriminating and arbitrary enforcement. For other offenses such as vagrancy, drunk and disorderly conduct, weapons carrying, drug dealing, et., the police play an important role in defining and locating the offense as well as investigating it. Without the concrete reality of an attack and a victim to focus
police attention, the question of exactly why the police looked in a given area and decided to define some behavior as a crime become quite important. Finally, for some groups in the society, the impartial enforcement of all current laws would not be appropriate because the laws themselves are unjust: they attack some conduct and some parts of the population in an allegedly discrimintory way. While none of these observations taken alone seem sufficient to destroy police claims of impartiality, the combinations of the observations cumulatively asserted has taken its toll—despite the fact that in all likelihood the police have become more impartial rather than less in the last 15-20 years.

The concept of professional crime control has also been eroded. We are no longer confident that police can do much to control crime. To many criminal acts take place in areas protected from police scrutiny by combinations of physical and constitutional restrictions. Moreover, when the police are successful in coping with crime, we often find that crucial forms of assistance were provided by private citizens. So police are less capable of coping with crime by themselves than we used to suppose. But another part of the problem is that as we conceive of more effective crime control tactics, we often find that we come up against painful trade-offs between guarding individual rights to privacy and increasing police opportunities to observe and control crime. Going beyond uniformed patrol of public areas by staking out individuals or areas, disguising police as victims or potential collaborators in a crime, or recruiting informants to help extend the scope of police surveillance may yield handsome dividends in terms of reduced crime, but they do so only
at the price of profoundly altering customary forms of official surveillance. To the extent that effective crime control does require sacrifice in personal privacy and individual freedom from government surveillance, the crime control objective begins to conflict with a commitment to faithfully uphold the laws of the republic. After all, individual protections against unwarranted governmental intrusion are among our oldest and most fundamental laws. Moreover, the deployment of these investigative tactics often create charges of discrimination and bias in official surveillance. Thus, somewhat ironically, to the extent that the police determinedly pursue crime reduction objectives, they may cast doubt on their commitment to the full and impartial enforcement of the laws.

How the police might describe their purposes to capture widespread support and legitimacy remains an acute problem for police executives to solve. But beyond the question of objectives is the question of how police executives should interact with the political environment that surrounds them. They need the political environment to support them not only so that they can stay in office and see their personal and organizational goals accomplished, but also so that the community will help the police do their job rather than resist them. Attracting such support requires police executives to interact effectively with at least five different features of their political environment: the chief political executives of their city; current public opinion towards the police; the media—both print and T.V.—; community groups and their political
representatives; police unions; and other elements of the criminal system.

Relationships with Elected Representatives and City-Wide Executives:

Despite the rhetoric of police independence, police officials are creatures of local governments and ultimately responsible to those who man positions in the local governmental structures. Thus, police executives are often drawn into webs of complex relationships with the elected officials who wield governmental power at the local level.

The influence of these local government bodies over the police stems from several kinds of formal administrative powers. In the first place, these bodies often have broad legal powers to direct police operations. To be sure, they cannot lawfully order the police to violate law or constitutional principles. But within these broad constraints, they can do what they want. They can create or dissolve organizational units within the police department; they can establish goals and priorities for the department; they can specify patrol deployments and place limitations on investigation procedures; they can even specify armament policies for the department.

In addition to broad authority to direct police operations, mayors and elected representatives usually have control over police budgets and expenditures. There are no special revenue sources for the police. They must compete for city funds with garbage collection, fire protection, parks, libraries, and consumer protection, hospital, well-baby clinics and all the
other diverse services provided by a modern city. The people who ultimately decide the winners and losers in this competition for funds are the mayor and councils assisted by specialized budget agencies.

The final power typically granted to political executives is the power to hire and fire the head of the agency. But it is in this area that the movement to reduce political influence on police forces has had the most effect. Many cities have adopted rather special procedures for appointing and removing police chiefs lest the chiefs become too responsive to the political leaders of the city.

It is significant that only about 30% of city and county enforcement executives are selected by political appointment. Moreover, police chiefs often have protection beyond these specialized selection methods. Often they cannot be fired except for cause and are entitled to a public hearing on the merits of the charges against them.

The fact of the matter is the police chiefs enjoy greater formal security than many other public executives.

Public Opinion, Community Groups, Special Interest Groups, and Political Parties:

Police executives have a strong interest in insuring that the attitudes of the public at large are favorable toward the police. The fact of the matter is that the attitudes of citizens towards the police play a decisive role in determining how successful the police can be in achieving crime control
to depend largely on hearsay.

Thus, the police executives have a strong interest in maintaining a general climate of confidence and support. To some degree they can do this by responding to citizen demands. But since only an imperfect connection exists between being "responsible" and generating favorable public attitudes, and since many collectively expressed demands on the police should be rejected as inappropriate special pleadings by one part of the community at the expense of others, there are real limits to what can be accomplished by being "responsive." To build a climate of support, police executives must seek to build on current public attitudes, and must develop opportunities for citizens to express demands in appropriate channels where the demands can be heard, evaluated, responded to or not, and the police action explained. The current evidence on public attitudes towards policing contains some good news and some bad news. The good news is that the public's attitudes towards policing are generally involved with criminal justice has lost support, that the public generally regards the police as honest and decent people, and that the public seems to have sensible views about the police use of force and violence. Harris polls conducted in 1964, 1966, and 1970 reveal that two-thirds of the population rated the police favorably. Surveys conducted in 1972 and 1975 show 75% to 80% of the population rating police performance as good or average and only 10% rating police performance as low. Similarly, more than a third of the population rates the police as having "very high" or "high" standards of honesty and ethical behavior. Only about
a tenth rate the police as "low" or "very low." This contrasts favorably with lawyers who are rated "very high" or "high" by only about a quarter of the population and "low" or "very low" by more than a quarter.

The only bad news is that what dissatisfaction exists about police performance is not evenly distributed over the population. Minority populations are twice as likely to say that the police are doing a poor job than whites are. Additional evidence about minority views of the police reveals that they feel discriminated against in all their encounters with the police: when they request services as well as when they are the subjects of police investigations. When asked how the police might improve their performance they are much more likely than whites to suggest that the police should be more prompt, that they should be more courteous and concerned, and that they should patrol or investigate more. In fact, about two-thirds of the minority respondents feel that blacks are discriminated against in the amount of protection against crime they receive, in the way they are treated by the police in casual encounters, and in the way they are treated if arrested for a crime.

The strong sense of discrimination among minority groups is troubling—particularly when one notes the rising proportion of minority residents in urban areas.

The strong sense of community dissatisfaction has led to some important efforts to create new channels of communication between community groups that had collective grievances and demands. The first ideas in the area were nearly disastrous. One idea, for example, was to create Civilian Review Boards that would allow
the community to participate in hearing and adjudicating complaints against individual police officers. Upon reflection, this seems like a singularly inappropriate way to involve the community in police operations. It invites the community into areas that are extremely sensitive and anxiety provoking to the police, and draws neither on the competence nor the real interests of the communities.

A second idea was to establish "community relations" officers. Typically, though, these positions were conceived of as devices to "sell" the police to the community, or to "catch flak." The officers had little power or influence over police operations.

More recent innovations may be more promising in terms of their capacity to admit citizen influence into police departments without the police department becoming either subordinated to special interests in a community, or hopelessly tossed and torn by shifting, amateurish conception of how the police should do their job. These devices include special citizen boards established at precinct or neighborhood levels, and to some degree, the concept of neighborhood police teams.

In practice, it has proved difficult to make the boards work well. Exactly which citizens should be selected to serve on the boards, how much influence the boards would have in what areas of police operations, and how much freedom the local commander would have to negotiate with the citizen boards without clearing operational decisions with police headquarters were often left ambiguous. Still, the concept seems a useful one if the basic
demands for changes in police operations. They would like to acquire the support and legitimacy that comes from being responsive to collectively expressed needs, but must protect the force from manipulation by special interest groups in the community, or from frivolous innovations.

In short, police executives must be shrewd politicians to protect the independence of their organizations without cutting them off from broad community support.

Police Unions

The tradition of local control and autonomy which has characterized police agencies is also characteristic of the police union movement. Although loosely affiliated with national organizations (The International Union of Police Associations--IUPA, The Fraternal Order of Police--FOP, and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers--IBPO, are the three largest) the support of local unions for national organizations has been relatively limited. The IUPA recently was formed from the now defunct International Conference of Police Associations (ICPA) and has affiliated with the AFL-CIO. That occurred only after a bitter internal struggle at a loss of 60,000 of its members, primarily from the northeast. (The IUPA now claims 100,000 members, the FOP 100,000, and the IBPO 8,000.) One of the primary reasons for this split was the substantial increase in dues which the local organizations would have to pay to the IUPA. It remains to be seen whether this affiliation will have much impact on the traditions of local autonomy.

The local unions themselves vary widely in the extent to

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which they are trade unions rather than fraternal associations. Some like New York, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Phoenix are extremely sophisticated unions with equally sophisticated leadership. Others are purely fraternal associations. Many range between those two poles, but clearly most are moving toward union status. In many departments, competition is acute among groups identified with the FOP, IUPA, and/or IBPO.

The growth of the police union movement has been fraught with controversy since its inception. Unfortunately most of the debate has been heavily tainted by ideology. The union accuses management of union busting, unwillingness to bargain in good faith, and frequent violation of collective bargaining agreements. They also complain about antiquated and arbitrary personnel procedures. Management accuses unions of illegal strikes, and complains that unions are usurping important management prerogatives.

What seems clear in all the sound and fury is that we are witnessing the initiation of new labor relations procedures. The unions are not likely to go away. In fact, they are becoming more sophisticated and aggressive. Police executives will have to adjust.

The Police as Criminal Justice Experts

The organization of the criminal justice system follows the traditional American penchant for dividing power wherever it exists: rigid distinctions are created and maintained between those who do the arresting and investigating, those who do the prosecuting, those who do the defending, those who preside over courts and decide on sentences, and those who supervise persons
convicted of crimes. Despite the interdependent aspects of their work, no formal system requires them to be responsive to the concerns and interests of the other parts of the system, and separate traditions of recruiting, training and staffing tend to exaggerate differences among the parts that would have been large in any event due to the differences in their jobs and settings. Consequently, the criminal justice system is less well coordinated system than it is a loose collection of organizations bound together by their interdependent tasks (e.g., working with the same people), but institutionally committed to warring with one another about the appropriate way to handle their "clients"—not only in individual cases, but in general.

Two important implications for police executives emerge from this simple fact. The first is obvious: just as police executives must work to build a climate of support among the citizenry to help them accomplish their operational objectives, so they must work to build support among other elements of the criminal justice system. The prosecutors are the most attractive target since they are within reach and inclined to be sympathetic to police concerns. Indeed, the potential for an effective collaboration between police and prosecutors is seen in the success of the "career criminal" projects that have been introduced throughout the country. Probably the key to an effective relationship with prosecutors is to insure high quality case preparation so that their work becomes easier and chances of professional embarrassment are minimized.

The second important implication of the fragmented criminal
- What the response of the police should be to social gambling.
- The kinds of requests for assistance to which the police will not respond.
- The extent to which arrest records maintained by the police should be made available to others.
- The amount of police resources to be devoted to investigating organized crime.
- Whether police officers should seek to prosecute a known assailant when the victim refuses to cooperate in the prosecution.
- The extent to which police pay informants for information.
- The content of police training curricula.
- The procedures for investigating complaints against police officers.
- Whether an intoxicated person should be taken home, to jail, or to a detoxification facility.
- Whether a speeding motorist should be warned, issued a summons, or taken into physical custody.

The current strategic concept seems to be primarily law enforcement with an emphasis on the control of "street crime." Goldstein suggests a concept of "urban governmental services" which suggests the central involvement of the police in many of the government's most important functions: not only crime control, but the regulation of traffic and some commercial relationships, assistance to disabled people, even the protection of individual and political freedoms and the maintenance of the
civic order. There are undoubtedly others. The real challenges to police executives are first to use their knowledge, experience and imagination to develop concepts of the mission of policing that are sustainable (i.e., that can attract durable, broad based political support, and that are consistent with the operating capacities of police agencies); and second, to make their concepts real by using their limited sources of managerial influence to create appropriate expectations in the external environment and appropriate capacities and orientations in the internal environment.