Police Integrity
Public Service With Honor

A Partnership Between the National Institute of Justice and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Epilogue

Mark Moore, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Mark Moore of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, was given the task of assessing the symposium process. Professor Moore was asked to listen throughout the symposium and provide the audience with an assessment of their thoughts. He spent 2 days pondering and sorting through the following questions: Did participants arrive at any understanding or consensus on actions that are needed? Did they encounter any significant obstacles, disagreements, or troubling issues? Based on the work of the symposium participants, he was able to successfully synthesize the dialogue and produce a blueprint to build police integrity. This epilogue is the result of his observations and reflections.

The national symposium on police integrity started with a set of seemingly disparate notions about police integrity: Other disciplines have significant systems in place that law enforcement should consider using; all police members have the right motivation to build an organization supported and admired within their communities; leadership, organizational structure, and police subcultures all make a difference; and all the individual internal subsystems of hiring, training, discipline, supervision, and rewards need to be consistent with each other and of a certain quality to be effective. What needed to be considered were the following important questions:

- What is meant by integrity?
- What does integrity encompass?
- What should be done to motivate police members to possess police integrity and the community to value it?
- How should the many subsystems, players, and principles of consistency and fairness be integrated across police service to maintain the public trust and thus protect our democracy?

Recognizing that we had several goals for the symposium and that they had to be integrated, I would like to start with an overall description of what I consider to be the most important goals of the symposium.

The first was to find or rediscover within ourselves the motivation to do the work of enhancing police integrity. I think an important part of the value of our being here together is a commitment we make to one another to accept the burden of overcoming our natural tendencies toward moral weak will or moral confusion and the responsibility of leading in the direction of enhanced police integrity. If nothing else gets accomplished, discovering and recommitting ourselves to that goal would be reason enough to be here.

The second goal was to understand what we mean by "police integrity," particularly in a world that has been changing, both with respect to the task that police face and to the expectations and general ideas and philosophies about policing that are out there. If all those things are in flux, then it is quite possible that our understanding of what we mean by police integrity might be undergoing some important
changes, and it would be important to understand what those changes are.

Third, having built the motivation and understood the direction in which we are trying to go, the last objective was to learn how to produce integrity in our organizations.

Let me now record our progress in each of those categories: (1) What is our motivation? (2) What is police integrity? (3) How can we produce police integrity in our organizations?

What motivates us to operate our police agencies with integrity? First, because it’s the right thing to do.

First question: Why pursue police integrity? Here I will exercise the kind of leadership that Sheriff Dan Corsentino had to exercise when talking to a group of people in his department who asked him, “What’s in it for me?” There’s a question we all should be asking ourselves. “What’s in it for me to exercise leadership on behalf of police integrity?”

Consider Betsy Watson’s account of command meetings to get a good description of what people mean by “follow-through” in executing a strategy and what it feels like as you go through it. Betsy explained that during those command meetings, she encountered one disciplinary problem after another and was getting recommendations from her staff that were inconsistent with what she thought was the right answer. Yet she persevered, worked her way through to a solution, and was able to get everyone to go along. There is a lot of pain and effort associated with that. So the question is, “Why is it worth spending so much hard emotional and intellectual work on this problem?” There are three quick answers.

It’s the right thing to do, and as Steve Vicchio said, we in this room could not be whole persons without doing it. It would be impossible for us to fulfill our aspirations to be virtuous police leaders if we didn’t do it. That assumes a lot; it assumes that we already have strong characters and would be motivated simply by the idea that this is the right thing to do. I’m happy to say that, as I go around the room, I find evidence everywhere of that being true; people want to do this, not because of complicated calculations, but simply because they know it constitutes virtue, and they would like to be virtuous. So, the first reason to press for police integrity is that it’s the right thing to do.

Second, our communities consider it more important to have integrity or to be trusted than to be effective or efficient.

Second, police integrity is crucial for the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of our departments. We cannot say as police executives that we are valuable or effective in leading our organizations unless we operate with integrity because integrity is part of what citizens expect from the police. Citizens aren’t just interested in the results of policing—whether crime rates are down and people are feeling secure. Citizens want to be certain that their police are behaving correctly as well as being effective. Chief David Walchak, for example, observed that it was more important to be accountable and do the right thing than to be efficient or effective.

I’d like to ask police chiefs this question when thinking about effectiveness and instrumental effectiveness, “How much more likely are you to be fired if your department engages in misconduct than if your department is less effective in controlling crime?”

I know of very few police chiefs or executives who have been fired when the crime rate goes
up. I know of many police chiefs and executives who have been fired when there was evidence of significant corruption and misconduct in their departments and they had failed to take action to deal with it. If that’s true, one way to interpret that is to understand that the public is at least as interested, and probably more interested, in the way we do police work than in how effective we are, though the public is interested in effectiveness as well.

So it’s crucial for our departments to promote integrity because that’s what effective policing means. It is also true that if we behave, if we have high integrity in a police department, we can reasonably expect support from the community; we understand very well that support from the community is crucial to our effectiveness. We may be able to get approval from our community with something other than high-integrity policing, but it would be wrong for us to do that. Therefore, for operational effectiveness, we have to police with integrity.

**Third, it is essential to create an environment with integrity so that idealistic subordinates who join the police department can realize their ideals.**

The third reason to be interested in integrity is that we owe it to our subordinates to make it possible for their idealism to be realized. This idea—that we begin with highly motivated, idealistic people who sustain that idealism and motivation over a long period of time under painful working conditions but gradually begin to feel disenchanted, confused, betrayed, angry, or cynical—was repeated over and over again at this meeting. As managers, part of the challenge we face in producing integrity in policing is to create the kinds of organizations within which that idealism can be realized. Those are the reasons, it seems to me, to try to find within ourselves the capacity to demand and push for policing with integrity throughout the country.

Now I want to emphasize this point. I think there is a relationship between integrity and effectiveness. If we are tempted to cut corners to achieve a little more justice and efficacy at the price of fairness, that is a bad bargain over the long run. The risk that that will take out of ourselves, our organizations, and our relationships with the community will end up costing us too much in self-esteem and in our performance to be worth undertaking. I want to pause here a minute, because the temptations to cut corners in policing are astonishingly strong. I think one of the things that makes them that way is that the public doesn’t always demand from us the highest level of performance that we are capable of giving or should give. Sometimes the public will collude with us in producing policing that has less integrity than ought to be there.

I think this was brought home most clearly to me when I was on a study task force for the Philadelphia Police Department about 10 years ago. It was shortly after the MOVE incident; the police had dropped a smoke bomb, and it burned down the block. A corruption investigation into the episode had reached rather high in the department. We were trying to figure out how we could restore this police department to effective functioning. We thought that an important part would be to get a strong external mandate for reform. Without that it would be hard to get reform inside the police department, so we sent out a survey to the citizens of Philadelphia. We were hoping the response would come back that the citizens were quite dissatisfied with the Philadelphia Police Department.

We asked the citizens, on a scale of one to five, “What did you think of the Philadelphia Police Department?” The answer came back about
4.5, a very high rating. We then asked another series of questions: Do you believe that police sleep on the job? Everyone thought the police slept on the job. Do you think they’re rude? Again, yes. Do you think they take bribes? One third of the people thought they often did. Do you think they sexually harass defendants? One-fifth of the people thought they did. They had all these particular bad pieces of behavior, yet they still rated the police department very high.

In a followup discussion with a group of captains from the Philadelphia Police Department, I asked: “What do you think this means?” They all looked down at their shoes for a bit and were embarrassed for me because I didn’t understand. I didn’t get it. Finally, one of them said, “Look, Doc, you have to understand that when you’re shoveling society’s garbage, you gotta be indulged a little bit.” And there was a kind of relaxation in the room because somebody had finally said something that was true. I suddenly realized that this was the understanding that existed between the Philadelphia Police Department and its community, that if the police were going to deal with society’s criminal elements, they had to be given some latitude. If that’s the way it is in Philadelphia, I thought, then how many other cities approach this issue the same way?

I found that in a large number of other cities, it was now the deal, and it could easily sink to that in other cities. What I’m saying is that the public will let us get away with more than we ought to get away with. I can see the police sometimes sensing the possibility that the citizens won’t hold us accountable, and then the police creep out to take advantage of the opportunity associated with that.

I’m reminded of a Peanuts comic strip. Lucy says, “Come on. Kick the football.” Charlie Brown says, “No, no, you’ll pull the football away from me.” Lucy insists, “No, no, honest I won’t—I’ll leave it there.” Every time she pulls the football away. That’s what I think happens to policing over and over again. The citizens lose interest in demanding high performance from the police, so they relax for a minute. The police sense an opportunity to exploit citizens’ tolerance, and they rush forward to kick the ball, only to have the citizens, 5 or 10 years later, say, “Whoops, we changed our minds. We no longer want that dirty deal—we like the clean deal.” In that moment careers, reputations, organizations are shattered. So I beg you not to yield to that temptation and continue to find the motivation to insist on high-quality, high-integrity policing.

When we combine our first objective with our second, the subsequent question is, “Where do we get the motivation?” We get the motivation out of ourselves, out of a desire to produce effectiveness, out of a desire to create an opportunity for our subordinates.

**What do we mean by police integrity?**

**Primarily we mean the violation of standards, especially the abuse of authority. The only means to guarantee police professionalism is for all of us to be most concerned about protecting constitutional rights.**

What do we mean by police integrity? I was struggling with this question yesterday, and I feel a little bit clearer today. I also feel a little frustrated. I worry that in our discussions, we’ve been covering up some important disagreements about what the police should stand for, what values they should stand for, and how they should pursue them. We’ve been covering them up with what I would describe as the mantra of police integrity. When you get a distinguished group of police people together like this and talk about integrity and profes-
sionalism, you can get uniform agreement and enthusiasm for the idea that we ought to have more professionalism and integrity in police departments. But then the question becomes more difficult when you ask, “What do we mean by police professionalism and integrity?” I think there’s an easy answer to this, one orthodox answer that we developed over the last 30–40 years that everybody feels comfortable with. What we mean by integrity and professionalism is law-abiding character, technical confidence, neutrality, distance—in Steve Vicchio’s wonderful phrase, “the effacement of personal interest”—and probably some notion of courtesy and client responsiveness. The image of policing portrayed by Sergeant Joe Friday in “Dragnet” is a very powerful idea of a certain kind of professionalism in policing.

First, I want to honor that conception and say how valuable it has been to the field and to what extent that idea has carried us to astonishing success both operationally and in terms of our own interest. But I also want to argue that the Sergeant Friday concept of professionalism was not complete. It was unfinished with respect to constitutional rights in the operation of professional policing. One of the reasons I pressed Billy Johnston was that the Boston Police Department had put the protection of constitutional rights at the very top of the value statements for its department. I wondered whether that meant that the department had begun to view protection of constitutional rights as a goal and no longer a constraint. In my policing experience, the commitment to protect constitutional rights under professional policing was given a high degree of lip service, but in reality, constitutional rights were strongly resented. They were seen as inconsistent with substantive justice, and it was substantive justice that was the true goal of policing, not the protection of constitutional rights. To the extent that there was lip service given and distance created between what you might think of as professional policing and resentment of constitutional rights, a chink was created, a chink that could open up the door for something that I call “noble-cause corruption” (with a heavy emphasis on quotation marks because I don’t want this to be treated as a justification). It is the idea that, yes, I did something wrong, but justice demanded it, not tolerated it but demanded it, because I could put the guy away who otherwise wouldn’t be successfully prosecuted. I, the police officer, wouldn’t gain personally from it; I didn’t get anything from it. I only acted for the community in the community sense of justice to accomplish this goal. Of course, it’s in that chink that Dirty Harry emerges as an image of a valued and virtuous police officer.

The creation of this void between professional policing and constitutional rights was the point of Billy Johnson’s compelling story. The account of his experience was so powerful, I found myself thinking about it over and over again during the course of the afternoon. Let me try to retell the story in analytic terms and see what we might get out of it because I think it is very instructive to us, and it had a big impact on people in this audience.

Billy began his career as an officer seeking virtue; he responded to a set of experiences and moved over time to what now appears to be a deeply passionate and personal commitment to protecting civil liberties and fairness as important values in policing. He began as a tactical patrol officer and used force to enforce the law. He learned very early that using force did not win community support. That was a big moment, a turning point in his life. Then Billy became a member of the decoy squad, where he vicariously experienced victimization and the pain victims feel when they are disadvantaged members of society. I think that it was that moment that solidified his commitment.
But the strong desire to protect potential victims from crime was no longer an abstract goal. It became quite concrete and an additional rush of motivation for that goal—the protection of people—comes center stage. Now, what was also important in his role as a decoy—he also experienced something that many police officers don’t get a chance to experience quite as vividly—was the experience of discrimination against him on a personal level. The reason he experienced that was not because he was simply a crime victim but because he was a special kind of victim; he posed as a gay man coming out of a gay bar. In that moment, he experienced a kind of victimization that comes from being the target of discrimination and hate, not just the target of somebody who wants to take your money. An important part of that experience was that he began to sense that the attitudes in the police department he was a part of might be contributing to or reflecting conditions that expose people to the particular kind of victimization that is associated with discrimination. He labeled that, appropriately, the “loss of their personal dignity.”

We started with a man who was concerned about protecting people from being victims of crime, like all police. Then he noticed there are some classes of people that are vulnerable to a particular kind of victimization—discrimination—in some ways a more painful kind of victimization. Then suddenly, his interest in protecting crime victims grew to a commitment to protecting people from the excruciating pain of loss of personal dignity that occurs only as the result of discrimination. This protection can be fully and fairly exercised only if civil liberties are protected. That’s a wild leap, so I’ve been thinking hard about exactly how that happened. If I can reproduce his logic, it progressed like this: Constitutional rights are what gives everyone dignity in society. Police have to be committed to protecting the civil rights of people from attack by other citizens. We all understand that we need to stop hate crimes so often perpetrated through vandalism of property. But we also are charged with protecting those who are particularly vulnerable to the blatant exercise of hatred. Protecting constitutional rights is the only means we have of ensuring a person’s dignity. It’s important to protect constitutional rights; it is the contribution the police make to society. It’s important to protect people who are vulnerable to discrimination. The police have to refrain from giving only tacit support to those victims, a very dangerous and half-hearted position.

Now this is the big moment, the most important point of Billy’s experience. The police have to refrain from attacking the civil liberties of disadvantaged people. Therefore, it’s important that the police be committed to civil liberties, and the whole idea of a police department then becomes not just to protect us from them but also to protect them from us. And that’s a clarifying and peak moment, at least in Billy’s life.

There’s a way of trivializing this point, I suppose, and I run the risk of doing that, but let me do it anyway. We all know the old saw that says a conservative is a liberal who just got mugged. Everyone knows that line. There’s a response to that, which is a liberal is a conservative who just got arrested. I think that reminds us that some of the thugs, or some of the most heinous threats in society, come from the State, and some of the people who are the most obvious representatives of the State are police officers.

Now let me share one or two other thoughts. Billy’s story is a recounting of how he came to view the protection of civil liberties as the ultimate goal of policing, not as a constraint on what were once other particular goals. If it is true that our commitment to the protection of civil liberties is a goal and not just a constraint,
I think that would turn out to be a very stern requirement, particularly if we enlarge the idea of civil liberties not just to be the protection of rights that are described in the Fourth Amendment but also to be “accountable.” I think those issues would then challenge us to think more deeply about what we mean by police integrity.

Let me be more concrete. I listened throughout the symposium to find examples of failures of integrity or instances of corruption. In our discussions, we focused on the following things: We focused a great deal on the misuse of force and authority, including extortion, brutality, “testifying,” and simple rudeness. That, of course, aligns well with the civil liberty concern that we not use too much force and authority, that we use it only when it’s justified. We also alluded to, but didn’t discuss very intensively, bribery and corruption, even though I thought in a discussion of corruption and integrity that bribery would figure more prominently. Somehow, that didn’t come on to our screen as much. We talked a bit about theft from the department and about personal conduct, both on and off the job. But if you were to go back to our transcript and try to find particular concrete actions we were talking about as instances of misconduct and the lack of integrity, it would have been principally about misuse of force and authority.

At other times during the discussion, particularly when Hubert Williams was speaking, we talked about another potential kind of corruption, discriminatory practices and their threat to equal treatment and fairness. I don’t know whether we want to think of that as a part of police integrity. But if we were to take the concern for civil liberties and widen it to be about fairness in general, then it might turn out to be of great interest. We must be concerned about the extent to which police departments are engaged in discriminatory practices or are perceived as being engaged in discriminatory practices and how one might be able to deal with that.

I think there’s a significant consensus in society that we don’t like bribery, we don’t like stealing from the department, and we don’t like conduct unbecoming officers. I think the issues of whether we don’t like excessive use of force or unfair and discriminatory police practices and whether we demand accountability of the police to the external community are much less firmly rooted. So there’s a discussion about whether police integrity requires us to root out inappropriate uses of force, to root out discriminatory practices, and to make our operations accountable and transparent to the broader public. Now all of those things that I just mentioned—eliminate excessive use of force, eliminate discriminatory practices, make yourselves accountable and transparent to the community—are part of the philosophy of community policing. They are also an important part of the philosophy of professional policing. They are consistent with the concern for civil liberties and fairness and for being the kind of police department that can deal with particular challenges to police integrity. This is how can we make sure that police departments serve all their constituents. If there’s one challenge to police integrity, I would argue that police departments should be there for everyone in this society, not just for some people.

**How can we produce integrity in our police departments? It means alignment between police and community, between management and officers, and between officers and their officer colleagues.**

Let me now turn to the question about how to produce integrity, which was our last goal. I think that if you were listening to the conversations, you would conclude that we have an
ordinary, valuable asset when trying to produce integrity in police departments. Integrity in police departments would be in the good service of officers, in their yearning to be led to do the right thing, to work in right relationships to one another and toward the purposes that are set for them. The important problem is how to align those aspirations (to use Betsy Watson’s word) with the opportunities that the work in the organization will present to them. We should also consider alignment in this context as an alignment among what Judge Milton Mollen described as three important relationships: police to community, management to officers, and officers to officers. Our challenge as managers is to align aspirations of people in the organization with community needs and wants, with leaders’ demands of officers, and with officers’ demands of one another.

Let’s begin with the management of our relationship with the community. Presenters throughout the day thought that getting that alignment right would be quite important to produce high-integrity policing. District Attorney Robert Colville said bluntly, “If you are going to change anything, you need the political will to execute the change. Otherwise, you’re kidding yourself.”

We also know that the philosophy of community policing is both an end and a means to develop strong relations with the community. Howard Safir described the efforts of the New York City Police Department to establish relations with the community by saying, “We are their police and make ourselves accountable.” Yet my story about Philadelphia suggests that the public’s demand for high-integrity policing may be a bit fickle. Therefore, the reason that these 20-year cycles of reform and scandal occur in New York City may be a function of the public’s interest in reform as much as of what the police departments are able to control. This then leads to Judge Mollen’s interesting question: “To what extent do we as managers, interested in producing high-integrity police departments, need the voltage that would come from a sustained, external body demanding from us high-integrity policing, and to what extent could that functional need to have people expect and demand from you high-integrity policing be produced by creating an external body to which you could be accountable?” I know that makes everybody very nervous, to have the police accountable to an external body. In its discussions, the Mollen Commission was trying to deal with this problem and grapple with two facts, both of which they took to be true but which seemed inconsistent on their face. First, they were quite convinced the police would be unable to control corruption if left to themselves. There had to be some external pressure or they wouldn’t be able to get the job done. At the same time, they were quite convinced that unless the police did it themselves, they would be ineffective in successfully controlling corruption. That’s the paradox. On one hand, the police can’t do it themselves; on the other hand, unless the police do it themselves, it isn’t going to work.

This leads to the idea about how to construct an external advisory board, or an external control board, that would audit the police department’s systems for controlling its use of authority, both for corruption and abuse of force, but not conduct individual investigations. It would issue reports periodically on the state of corruption and the department’s systems for dealing with it, but it would be up to the chief and the department to take actions that would be necessary to accomplish their goals. I don’t know whether that’s the right answer, but I think it is an interesting question for you to contemplate. That is, to what extent would you, as leaders of police departments, be aided or disadvantaged in your efforts to find the moti-
vation, define what constitutes integrity, and produce it in your departments by an external organization demanding from you what you would like to produce. It seems it would get easier to produce if there was an external body. I think that one of the lessons from Pat Murphy and the Knapp Commission was that, in many respects, the Knapp Commission helped Murphy accomplish the goal of cleaning up the department, and I think that’s true for most of the important examples of reform we’ve seen.

Let’s look next at the management team. Again, I want to reference Betsy Watson’s stories about the construction of her management team both to set high standards for appropriate performance and to commit to a particular philosophy of policing. Additionally, there needs to be recognition of the grueling work that it takes to hang in there. What constitutes “followthrough” in this case is to continually raise the issue, have the courage to face concrete questions, and resolve the questions in a way that is consistent with your understanding of the problem. However, you also need to talk with people about why you are deciding something a certain way. It is very tough to construct a management team, as you all know, when facing hard questions about concretely defining high-quality policing and, in particular, the acts that lie outside the boundaries of the organization’s tolerance.

One of the things the team thinks about, it seems to me, is what general approach will be used. What kind of management systems will be put in place to control corruption or promote integrity inside the police department? Yesterday, I mentioned that there seem to be two broadly different approaches. One is to “detect and respond, find the bad guys, and get them out of the department.” The second is to “promote a good-behavior approach through cultural means.” I thought there would be some tension between those two, but I think the group has reasonably agreed that to be successful in controlling corruption and promoting integrity, you’ll have to rely on both of those things together. You’ll have to have both a cultural push in supporting good conduct and an investigative focus that allows you to find and respond to misconduct in the force. I think we came to understand that those two things were not necessarily in opposition and would probably have to be integrated in any successful effort to control corruption and promote integrity.

Let me talk about each of those approaches: the cultural approach and the investigative approach. The cultural approach depends on leadership and value statements, which we’ve already talked about, but it also depends on recruitment and selection on the one hand and training on the other.

I believe that we spend a little too much time talking about recruitment and selection. One way to view this issue is that people are either honest or dishonest when they come into the police department. If we could screen out the dishonest ones, we would have an honest police department for the future. However, I think there’s evidence to suggest that people change when they get into police departments, and they change as a function of both their work and the environment in which they find themselves. So the department’s practices can either make bad people out of good people or good people out of bad. To the extent that that’s true, it doesn’t do us a lot of good to make sure that the people coming in are honest or dishonest.

I also am worried about the quality of the tests we use to distinguish good people from bad, and I think that not many departments are replacing veteran officers at a high enough rate so that incoming officers will constitute a large proportion of the organization any time soon.
Therefore, it will nearly always fall to a police department that is trying to promote integrity to work on practices and internal organization as well as concentrate on recruitment and selection. Spending too much time on recruitment and selection, however, is essentially to delay and render impotent a major initiative to control police corruption or to foster police integrity. There are some circumstances in which what I’ve said is not true, but often it is true.

I also think there’s a lot of emphasis placed on training. We tend to focus on academy training, hoping that we can inoculate our officers and not have to worry about them again. I don’t think that’s a reasonable expectation. I think our police have to be trained over and over and over again. Many people at the symposium made that point as well, and I’m reiterating it. One thing I want to add is that I’m an educator, so I know about teaching. I would make a distinction between hot pedagogic techniques and cold pedagogic techniques. What I call a cold pedagogic technique involves the classic technique: The instructor talks and the audience takes notes. A hot pedagogic technique is more interactive: it can involve verbal wrestling with one another, arguing, or drawing pictures.

The police academy training now offered not only does not spend much time on questions of ethics but uses cold pedagogic techniques: Instructors talk about constitutional law and read codes of ethics. Topics taught through hot pedagogic techniques are driving, shooting, and self-defense. Those are compelling things. Through these devices, as someone observed, we also train people for war, and that gets people questioning who the enemy is, and the answer is ambiguous. I think the big challenge is to develop hot pedagogic training for integrity issues.

Focusing on supervision, we shift to the investigative approaches, for reasons I think would be appropriate. I don’t believe anyone here thinks we could get away with, or would want to get away with for long, not having a powerful investigative apparatus for detecting and responding to misconduct in our officers. That should be a part of every organization’s portfolio of responses to misconduct. We haven’t spent much time yet talking about the details of that system. I think there are three important questions about the details that need to be addressed.

One is: What will be the focus of that investigative system—all kinds of misconduct, certain kinds of misconduct—and how will we set priorities among the different kinds of misconduct? Are we going to focus on corruption and bribery, or uses of force, or rudeness, or administrative misconduct? We need to develop a vocabulary to classify the different kinds of misconduct and decide which are going to be high priority and which are not as important to undertake.

The next question is: What investigative methods are we going to authorize? We need to ask ourselves the following: To what extent are we going to use citizen complaints, or accumulations of citizen complaints? What status will citizen complaints have in triggering serious investigations? To what extent are we going to rely on covert surveillance? To what extent are we going to rely on stings? Commissioner Howard Safir said that 1,000 stings were being run each year in the New York City Police Department, and in a conversation I had with him, he said that 60 percent of the stings are conducted on a random basis, and only 40 percent have a predicate for focusing the stings. It is a very interesting and tough investigative practice. Is it standard practice now, and are people doing more or less of it? Are we going to use turnarounds? Are we going to use field associates—people recruited early in their careers to report secretly on the conduct of
other people in the organization? This is a very tough set of questions about the kinds of investigative apparatus we’re going to deploy to ferret out misconduct in our organizations.

The last question about investigative approaches is also a very important one: Should we concentrate the investigative capabilities in centralized units, called IAD [Internal Affairs Divisions], or should we decentralize and let precinct or borough commanders conduct the investigations as well? People who are interested in guaranteeing the quality of police investigations tend to want to centralize investigations. But there is an argument for decentralizing as well. If we hope to change the culture of the organization by pushing out the accountability for controlling corruption to precinct commanders and midlevel managers, then they should be given not only that authority and responsibility but also the resources to carry out the investigations as well as the central IAD.

Police Commissioner Safir said that he was now asking precinct commanders to do minor investigations. As he pointed out, that produces a lot of allies in the department. I remember Pat Murphy telling me a story about 20 years ago when he was working on reducing police corruption in New York City. He described why he had decided to decentralize the investigative responsibility from a centralized IAD to the precincts and boroughs and to give them the responsibility for carrying it out. He said to me, “You know, Mark, what would happen in a precinct when they caught a couple of cops for misconduct. Guys from IAD would come down, and they would put the cuffs on the guys, and they would take them out of the precinct house and take them down to the station. Right after they got out of the precinct, the precinct commander would stand up and get everybody together and would say, “Those thugs from IAD came and took John and Charlie, two of the finest cops I ever knew.”

Why would they say that? Because they’d be worried about the morale of the troops, and they’d want to build up the morale again, but in that moment, they were disowning the responsibility for controlling corruption and were leaving it in the hands of “those bastards from IAD.” When you said to them, you do the investigation, you lock them up, what happened inside the police department? Well, that forced a behavioral change. Some precinct captains said they couldn’t do it and left. Others said they would, but when they did, what happened to them? They became part of the group that was against corruption, not supportive of it, and in that moment, the number of people in the organization who were looking for and trying to deal effectively with corruption went up dramatically, and the power of the people who were in those positions went up dramatically. With that, the total investigative apparatus that was focused on corruption increased, and supervision improved, and the culture was transformed.

Whether you centralize or decentralize and under what circumstances you can hold people in the police department accountable is an important question. I’ve discussed the relationship between police leaders and community and suggested that it’s important to mobilize external political accountability. I’ve talked about leadership in the management team and about making a choice between investigative and cultural approaches. I’m now facing up to the last challenge, which I think is the subject of one of our most important panels. How do you bridge the gap to the street cop, and particularly, how do you penetrate the cop-to-cop loyalty and build loyalty to the values of the organization rather than to one another?
I think our union colleagues have something to tell us about the right way to reach into that set of relationships. Let me go through the following points: First, recognize how demanding the standards and the jobs are that we're imposing on police departments. I think Gilbert Gallegos made the strongest point about that, reminding us that as far as he could tell, only Christ had lived up to the responsibility of these challenges. So if we're imposing very high standards on the officers and we write them vaguely—remember how cynical the responses can be to the standards—the officers will feel insufficiently guided. But if we write them concretely, they will see them as protection of the bosses against claims that the bosses have been part of the problem to make sure that the officers themselves are the ones who end up being blamed if something goes wrong.

Also recognize that if we want to ask for more by raising the standards, we then have to find a way to provide support inside the organization. It's unreasonable to raise standards without giving people more assistance. We may also have to recognize that management ambivalence is part of the problem that produces corruption. What would all that mean if we were to devise a program for controlling corruption and enhancing integrity in an organization? I think without a doubt we'd have to include officers in the planning and development of that system. I think we'd be surprised to discover unexpected allies in the organization who share our yearning to accomplish the right goals. Organizing ourselves in this way, setting up these kinds of working relationships within the police department, we would be doing internally what we're also trying to do externally—namely, learning how to treat all the people in our organization and all the people in our society, even the people about whom we feel anger and contempt, with respect and a hope that we might find something in common we could do together. The point of the symposium to which we all agreed is that we ought to take advantage of this opportunity at this particular moment to produce excellence everywhere, every day, in our departments.

You thanked me for spending the time here. I can't imagine any more valuable time for me to spend than on this subject with this group of highly motivated people. I'm very grateful to have had the opportunity to speak for you, and I wish you well in your subsequent conversations. Thank you.