

in academic debate and archaeological investigation of the subject that has over time largely substantiated his position.

With the 1960s in Russia came the thaw under Khrushchev and an easing of controls. Kazhdan was able to explore other topics in Byzantine history, such as Christianity. Kazhdan and other revisionists saw Christianity not as the religion of the rulers who exploited the masses, but as a major factor in the development of civilization. He then published several articles in the liberal periodical *Novyi mir*. This publication proved to be a forum that he could use to address delicate issues such as tyranny, bureaucracy, and the effect revolution had on both current and past culture and morality.

In 1976, Kazhdan's son David emigrated to the United States and immediately pressure was brought to bear upon Kazhdan that eventually forced him to leave academia in Russia and seek a new venue for his work. In 1978 Kazhdan emigrated to the United States and began an association with Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC that was to have a major impact on Byzantine studies in America. Soon after his arrival, Kazhdan was struck by the solitary nature of American scholars and scholarship. He, by contrast, was more interested in creating associations and partnerships in order to exchange ideas and theories. To help encourage collaboration, he published *People and Power in Byzantium* with Giles Constable in 1982 and *Change in Byzantine Culture* with Ann Wharton Epstein in 1985. These works succeeded in helping to foster an interest in collaboration among scholars in Byzantine history that is continuing to grow.

Kazhdan's most influential work was undoubtedly *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, which he initiated and edited. This mammoth project of 2,232 pages, published in three volumes in 1991, covers a broad array of subjects. While considered a major breakthrough by many scholars, the work was criticized by some for its inclusion of minor topics at the expense of more important ones. Kazhdan's influence is clear throughout the work, both in the many entries he wrote (often in collaboration with others) and in its general spirit.

R. SCOTT MOORE

See also *Byzantium*

Biography

Aleksandr Petrovich Kazhdan. Born Moscow, 3 September 1922, son of an engineer. Graduated from the Teachers' College, Ufa, 1942; studied at Institute for Universal History, Moscow, PhD 1946. Taught at provincial universities in Ivanovo, 1947-49; Tula, 1950-52; and Velikie Luki, 1953-56; senior research associate in Byzantine studies, Institute for Universal History, 1956-78; emigrated to US, 1979; senior researcher, Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, DC, 1979-97. Married Rimma (Musia) A. Ivanskaia, 1944 (1 son). Died Washington, DC, 29 May 1997.

Principal Writings

Agrarnye otnosheniia v Vizantii XIII-XIV vv (Agrarian Relations in 13th- and 14th-Century Byzantium), 1952

Sotsial'nyi sostav gosподstvennogo klassa Vizantii XI-XIV vv (Social Composition of the Ruling Class in 11th- and 12th-Century Byzantium), 1974

With Anthony Cutler, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Byzantine History," *Byzantion* 52 (1982), 429-78

With Giles Constable, *People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies*, 1982

With Simon Franklin, *Studies on Byzantine Literature of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*, 1984

With Ann Wharton Epstein, *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*, 1985

"Do We Need a New History of Byzantine Law?," *Jahrbuch für österreichische Byzantinistik* 39 (1989), 1-28

Editor, *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols., 1991

Further Reading

Cutler, Anthony, and Simon Franklin, eds., *Homo Byzantinus: Papers in Honor of Alexander Kazhdan*, Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1992

Kedourie, Elie 1926-1992

British historian of the modern Middle East

For forty years Elie Kedourie was the most formidable practitioner of a dissident historiography of the Middle East, one who rejected the postcolonial dichotomy between Western guilt and Eastern innocence. In detailed studies of British diplomatic history, he attributed the failure of British imperial will in the Middle East to romantic illusions about the Arab-Muslim world. In his studies of Middle Eastern politics, he documented the importation of radical nationalism that ultimately transformed the Middle East into what he called "a wilderness of tigers." A deep conservatism, born of a disbelief in the redemptive power of ideological politics, suffused all of Kedourie's writings. Armed with a potent and lucid style, he waged a determined defense against the siege of Middle Eastern history by leftist theory, the social sciences, and fashionable Third Worldism. Kedourie's iconoclastic work forms the foundation of a diffuse school that views the post-Ottoman history of the Middle East not as an "awakening," but as a resurgence of its own despotic tradition, exacerbated by Western dissemination of the doctrine of self-determination.

Kedourie made his first systematic critique of British policy in his Oxford thesis, later published as *England and the Middle East* (1956). The thesis constituted a closely documented indictment of the British for their encouragement of Arab nationalism during and after World War I, especially in Kedourie's native Iraq, where Britain had imposed a militantly Arab nationalist regime on a diverse society. It also included a devastating account of the adventurism of T.E. Lawrence, at a time when Lawrence was still an unassailable hero. (Richard Aldington's debunking biography would not appear until two years later.) Kedourie's thesis enraged one of his examiners, the Oxford Orientalist Sir Hamilton Gibb, who insisted that Kedourie alter his conclusions. In a decision that demonstrated the depth of his convictions, the 28-year-old candidate refused, withdrawing the thesis and forgoing the doctorate. By then, the conservative political philosopher Michael Oakeshott had extended a hand to Kedourie, bringing him back to the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1953, where he remained for his entire career.

Kedourie's criticism of Britain's indulgence of Arab nationalism animated much of his later work. This reached its culmination in his monumental study of the correspondence exchanged during World War I between the British high

commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, and the leader of the Arab Revolt, the Sharif Hussein. In *the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth* (1976) demonstrated how later British officials, motivated by a mixture of self-doubt and self-interest, accepted the Arab nationalist claim that Britain had promised the Sharif a vast Arab kingdom including Palestine. Kedourie argued that Britain had made no such promise, and that British self-reproach over "defrauding" the Arabs rested on a myth of Britain's own making.

In an earlier essay, his most famous, Kedourie traced the intellectual origins of this British loss of confidence. "The Chatham House Version" (1970), a reference to the influential Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, constituted a sharp critique of its guiding spirit, Arnold J. Toynbee. Kedourie regarded Toynbee's theory of civilizational decline, built on improbable analogies, as an exercise in moral self-flagellation that denied the civilizing role of empires, Britain's included. For Kedourie, the end of empires – of Hapburgs, Ottomans, British – tended to bring not national liberation but misgovernment, frequently followed by lawlessness and oppression. The failure of the Middle East to find political equilibrium figured as the theme of his last book, *Politics in the Middle East* (1992).

In his critique of modern nationalism, Kedourie ranged beyond the Middle East, as did much of his teaching at the LSE. In his book *Nationalism* (1960), he emphasized the fluid character of national identity, which rendered national self-determination "a principle of disorder." For Kedourie, nationalism represented an ideological temptation, which spread across the world in no discernible pattern, but largely in parallel with European influence. Ernest Gellner later criticized Kedourie for failing to explain the spread of nationalism in sociological terms, particularly as a feature of the early stages of industrialization. Kedourie pointed to many obvious exceptions to this postulate, and rejected any sociological explanation as a form of reductionist "economism."

In this as in many other debates, Kedourie vigorously resisted the penetration of the social sciences into history, maintaining the primacy of evidence over all theory. In his many general writings on historiography, he criticized Marxist determinism, the structuralism of the French Annales school, and psychohistory of any kind. Kedourie maintained that "history has no depths to be plumbed or main lines to be traced out," and that "history does not need explanatory principles, but only words to tell how things were." These views, combined with his conservative politics, made him an adversary of mainstream trends in Middle Eastern studies. Kedourie's own preferences governed *Middle Eastern Studies*, the quarterly he founded in 1964.

In his later years Kedourie became a well-known public intellectual in the United States, warning Americans against the same flagging of will that had diminished Britain. While his influence among conservative American intellectuals grew, he became disillusioned by the declining standards of British universities, including his own. He retired from the LSE in 1990, and was about to take up a new chair in modern Middle Eastern history at Brandeis University, when he died at the age of 66.

MARTIN KRAMER

Biography

Born Baghdad, 25 January 1926. Attended Collège A-D Sasson and Shamash School, Baghdad; BSc, London School of Economics, 1951; graduate work, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1951–53. Taught (rising to professor) at London School of Economics, 1953–90. Married Sylvia Haim in 1950 (2 sons, 1 daughter). Died 29 June 1992.

Principal Writings

England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921, 1956
Nationalism, 1960; revised 1993
Afghani and Abdub: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Islam, 1966
The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies, 1970
 Editor, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, 1970
Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies, 1974
In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914–1939, 1976
Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies, 1980
The Crossman Confessions and Other Essays in Politics, History and Religion, 1984
Politics in the Middle East, 1992
Hegel and Marx: Introductory Lectures, edited by Sylvia Kedourie and Helen Kedourie, 1995

Further Reading

Cowling, Maurice, *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England*, 2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980–85

Keegan, John 1934– British military historian

As the advocate of a new approach to military history, John Keegan has written academic works accessible to an interested but non-academic audience. He has written both general reference works and in-depth monographs. All of his works are united by the desire to discover what in history is applicable to our own circumstances and to apply such lessons to the way modern societies conceive and conduct armed conflict. Unlike many traditional military histories, which tend toward accounts of battles and campaigns and the decisions of great captains, Keegan's writings focus on what might be termed the culture or anthropology of war. Some of the issues Keegan has explored are why and how people become soldiers, what the experience of battle means to soldiers, and the way different societies conceive and conduct warfare.

Perhaps Keegan's most influential work was *The Face of Battle* (1976), which bridged the gap that often exists between academic and lay audiences. In the book's first chapter, Keegan situated himself within the sub-discipline of military history, offering a critique of his chosen field. He cited military history as a useful means for training officers but felt that this history too often fails to answer the main question of student officers: what is battle really like? Keegan felt that this shortcoming was inherent to the ways traditional military history has been written, focusing on generals, institutions, the mechanics of war (logistics, organization, etc.), and what he refers to as "the battle piece," which tends toward rationalized