Gender All the Way Down:

Proposing a feminist framework for analyzing gendered climate security risks

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for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

According to mythical world views from many traditions, there is a World Turtle that rests on a larger turtle, and that larger turtle rests on an even larger turtle, and on and on the turtles go. In other words, earth is held up by turtles, all the way down.\footnote{Robert Rudnicki, “Turtles All the Way Down: Foundation, Edifice, and Ruin in Faulkner and McCarthy,” \textit{The Faulkner Journal} 25, no. 2 (2010): 26, https://doi.org/10.1353/fau.2010.0002.} Just as the World Turtle story, this study attempts to uncover what role gender may play in supporting or mitigating climate-related crises and conflict by offering a conceptual Gender-Climate-Security Framework for assessing the gendered climate-security risks within particular contexts. Using several theoretical traditions, including feminist political economy, feminist political ecology, and women, peace, and security (international security) theory, the study interrogates existing climate security frameworks with a gender lens. The resulting framework proposed in this study comprises two primary components: (1) gendered climate-related human security risks, and (2) gender intersections with each of four types of national/international security risks, including crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions. Each of 15 climate security factors (early warning, healthcare, WASH, food security, recent shocks, long-term adaptation, poverty, life expectancy, education, standard of living, unemployment, socioeconomic development, infrastructure, corruption, and state fragility) are analyzed regarding how gender, climate change, and security factors may intersect one another. The study finds
that there is ample evidence showing that women’s diminished human security is likely to lead to fewer system-level resources and tools that support climate security and aid in preventing climate-related conflicts. The study also finds an emerging body of research that suggests considering gendered factors in national/international climate security threats would be beneficial for avoiding or resolving climate-related tensions. As such, if gender is given due consideration in climate security contexts, it is likely to provide useful insights that could guide policy and program implementation. This proposed framework does not suggest there is a single best approach to assessing gendered climate security risks, but rather offers a diagnostic approach for engaging in bottom-up climate security assessments that are place-based and context-specific. A necessary next step is for policymakers and practitioners to test and evaluate this approach under various conditions. Ultimately, in seeking to build a framework to understand how gender intersects with climate security concerns, this study finds that, like layers of turtles that form the foundation of a mythical earth, layer upon layer, from the top all the way to the bottom, the impacts of climate change on Human Security and National/International Security cannot be understood without considering gender. In other words, it’s gender all the way down the climate security lifecycle, and humanity would be reckless to ignore it.
Author’s Biographical Sketch

Using data analysis and feminist foreign policy perspectives and theories, Maryruth Belsey Priebe’s research focuses on the nexus of gender, climate change, and peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. She was awarded Honours Standing with Distinction for her Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) Degree (Psychology), holds a post-graduate certificate in Sustainable Development, and graduated Magna Cum Laude with a Master of Arts in Religion Degree. Maryruth was also selected as a 2021-22 member of Harvard’s Climate Leaders Program for Professional Students, and is currently a member of the Research Network on Women, Peace and Security in Canada. She has published on issues of climate change, sustainability, gender equality, and women, peace, and security, including the following recent pieces: “Compound Gender-Climate-Security Threats and Vulnerabilities within the Indo-Pacific,” “The News Media: A Catalyst for Women, Peace and Security in Qatar,” “COVID-19’s Impact on American Women’s Food Insecurity Foreshadows Vulnerabilities to Climate Change,” “What the Biden-Harris Administration Means for WPS in the Indo-Pacific Region,” and “Women Parliamentarians’ Impact in Gender-Responsive & Climate-Inclusive Security Policymaking” (forthcoming). Maryruth’s circular food economy policy work has been selected for inclusion in the OpenIDEO Food Systems Game Changers Lab, and she has held several research and fellowship positions focused on women’s leadership. Going forward, Maryruth will serve in the role of non-resident Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Fellow at Pacific Forum International.
Dedication

To Jeffrey, my thoughtful, supportive, generous, enchanting husband.

For your encouragement to revel in the joy of learning. For your challenge to never stop growing. For reminding me now is always the time to pursue my passion. For your unwavering confidence that my thesis project would something useful and praiseworthy. For being a brilliant, supportive human.

Love and overflowing gratitude.
Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Janina Matuszeski, my thesis director, whose questions helped refine and focus my research, and whose cheerleading kept me excited about the work.

I am grateful to Dr. Ariane Liazos, my thesis advisor who has been an essential source of practical advice and guidance.

I would not have embarked on this project without the inspirational teaching of my professor, Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, who first introduced me to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda, and who later recommended me for a pivotal WPS fellowship program.

Thanks should also go to my Pacific Forum colleagues who gave me the room to test many of my theories and put my WPS learning into practice, namely Dr. Crystal Pryor and Mr. Rob York. Appreciation also to Kristine who has helped to keep me organized over many years.

A special thanks to Jeffrey, to whom this project is dedicated. You are willing to engage with the intellectual struggles and discomfort of having a partner who refuses to accept the role the patriarchy ascribes to women in the world. I am proud to have a partner who is actively engaged in redefining and redesigning gender roles in his own work, too.

I’d like to extend my deep gratitude to other family members who tolerated me during many distracted, stressed, and overwhelmed phases of the thesis journey. In particular, I am grateful to my parents, David and Pamela Belsey, who to this day push me to demonstrate determination in service of success. I count myself blessed to be part
of a climate fighting sisterhood with my two siblings who inspire me daily by their leadership in architecture and medicine. My sister Heather serves as my constant confidant and fierce defender, and never refuses an intellectual challenge. My sister Susan is always available to generously share her expertise and challenge me with new perspectives. To my in-laws, Harold and Becky Priebe, who shower me with encouragement, kindness, and good life advice. And to my cousin-in-law-come-friend, Larissa, who never fails to have time to listen to me prattle on about my most recent analytical milestones.

And I would be remiss in not mentioning the numerous scholars on whose work my research relies, including Dr. Valerie Hudson, Dr. Jacqui True, Dr. Marisa Ensor, and many, many more. Finally, I cannot forget my WPS classmates who inspire me every day with their perseverance and talent; my mind goes particularly to Tevvi Bullock and Melissa Deehring.

For all of you and many more, I give thanks.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSC</td>
<td>ASEAN Political-Security Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Community Electrification Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus Disease of 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Climate Risk Insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor</td>
<td>Climate Security Factor</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Phase</td>
<td>Climate Security Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSR</td>
<td>Depletion through Social Reproduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Fragile States Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAD</td>
<td>Gender and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSMA</td>
<td>Global System for Mobile Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSS</td>
<td>The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFA</td>
<td>Hyogo Framework for Action of the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPV</td>
<td>Human Papilloma Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displace People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPV</td>
<td>Intimate Partner Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRENA</td>
<td>International Renewable Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBGTQI+</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, and Allies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Regional Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals of the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFDRR</td>
<td>Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual- and Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Social Reproduction Feminism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small- to Medium-Sized Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDW</td>
<td>Unpaid Care and Domestic Work</td>
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</table>
UN United Nations
UN The United Nations
UNEP United National Environment Programme
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution 1325
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
US DOS US Department of State
VAW(G) Violence Against Women and Girls
WASH Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFI Work-Family Interface
WHO World Health Organization
WMG Women’s Major Group
WPS Women, Peace, and Security
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Chapter 1.
Introduction

Alarmingly, the impacts of climate change have come faster—10 years sooner—and more fiercely than most scientists thought likely, and are generating profound shifts in both human and international security. The World Climate and Security Report 2021 by the International Military Council on Climate and Security noted several important points: climate-related threats are already critical considerations for the security community; climate security risks will continue to intensify across all regions of the globe; militaries will be increasingly overstretched under intensifying climate change; and critically, “The global governance system is ill-equipped to deal with the security risks posed by climate change.”

As the second costliest year on record for natural disasters worldwide, 2021 provided vivid proof of this new reality, and the ways in which climate change is threatening human security, particularly the security of women. Crucially, little is yet understood about the role gender plays in understanding climate security risks.

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4 Refer to section 1.2.2.2 for an explanation on how the term ‘Human Security’ is used in this study.

Addressing the ways in which gender, climate change, and security intersect requires the integration of multiple lines of research. Given the complexity of the triple nexus of gender, climate change, and security, this study examines existing literature and research on climate change and security (international, national, and human security); gender and climate change; and gender and security (again, international, national, and human security) situated in both developed and developing countries from a variety of disciplines. Ultimately, the following study offers a proposed framework situated within the theoretical traditions of feminist political economy and feminist political ecology, and informed by several other traditions, including anthropology, psychology, human rights advocacy, and the security sector, including the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. The resulting framework is intended to provide humanitarian organizations, policymakers, and security institutions a system for employing a gendered perspective in addressing climate security scenarios, and will hopefully be a useful tool for conducting gender-transformative climate security assessments, and planning for climate security outcomes that are gender transformative.

1.1. Review of the Literature

Scholarship on climate change within national and global security circles has matured in recent decades. In several meta-studies, researchers have concluded that the relationship between climate change and conflict is complex and contested, noting that more research is required to determine the relative importance of climate among drivers

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of conflict, the mechanisms and conditions under which conflict and climate interconnect, and how future climate change impacts will differ from those experienced today—many of which will be discussed in the subsequent analysis. These arguments will be discussed in detail in the pages that follow. Despite scholarly contestation, there is a broad consensus that climate change hazards and events will affect armed conflict in a variety of ways and are expected to increase future conflict risks, especially when climate change interacts with low socioeconomic and government capacity and in regions where agriculture is a primary economic driver.

The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda, comprising United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and nine additional WPS UNSCRs, is a key framework for understanding women’s unique experiences of insecurity. However, the study of women’s climate insecurity within the WPS agenda has only lately commenced. Several recent studies and reports have explored ways in which climate considerations can be better integrated into the WPS agenda. Climate change and international security

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interactions have also begun to be explored in feminist political ecology (FPEcol) and feminist political economy (FPEcon) research.\(^\text{11}\) However, as yet, none have contained a thorough integration of all three elements of the nexus: gender, climate change, and security.

In 2019, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General acknowledged a pressing need to identify the linkages between gender, climate change, and conflict.\(^\text{12}\) Furthermore, the 2020 UN report *Gender, Climate and Security: Sustaining: Inclusive peace on the frontlines of climate change* (2020) suggested that challenging traditional gender norms has, “the potential to open-up new spaces for more inclusive peace and development processes.” However, the report went on to state:

> despite growing awareness and recognition that women are important actors and influencers in climate change policy, they remain largely underrepresented in decision-making and planning processes, especially at

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local levels, which can further exacerbate existing patterns of marginalization.\textsuperscript{13}

Significant knowledge gaps remain where gender, climate change, and security (both global and human) intersect. A robust, comprehensive analysis is needed to understand the unique gendered vulnerabilities to complex climate-induced security challenges and how gendered norms and structures influence climate security outcomes. In particular, a thorough understanding of how gender interacts with climate-induced vulnerabilities and fragilities to increase or decrease human security and/or the probability of conflict and violence is required. This study is an exploration of these outstanding questions, and adds to the literature by offering a unifying conceptual framework for understanding the triple nexus of gender-climate-security.

1.2. Methods for Conceptualizing a Framework to Analyze the Gender Dimensions of Climate Security

In developing a proposed framework, this study will draw upon a review of the literature on climate change and security (international, national, and human security); gender and climate change; and gender and security (again, international, national, and human security) situated in both developed and developing countries from a variety of disciplines. The proposed framework is intended to provide humanitarian organizations, policymakers, and security institutions a system for employing a gendered perspective in understanding and planning for a variety of climate security scenarios. The study outlines the push and pull between the three factors in the triple nexus, explaining the ways in

\textsuperscript{13} Sawas et al., “Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change,” 7, 24.
which climate breakdown is likely to contribute to individual and communal instabilities, how gender influences peoples’ vulnerabilities to climate change; and how climate change influences socially constructed understandings of gender and gendered structures. Additionally, the study outlines the scholarship that explains the pathways through which gender norms are impacted by climate security challenges (such as how destruction of critical urban infrastructure may intensify gender inequalities in transportation and telecommunications) and how gender impacts climate security outcomes (for example, how gender norms may encourage men to engage in riskier and perhaps more violent behaviour following an extreme weather event). The resulting framework and the diagnostic questions can be used to conduct gender-transformative climate security assessments, and examine gender and climate security outcomes.

1.2.1. Climate and Security Underpinnings of this Conceptual Framework

The climate-security structure of this framework is inspired by several existing frameworks, each of which variably focuses on international security, human security, or some aspect of both. The first is the Climate Security Assessment framework developed by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). The HCSS Index is a climate security risk assessment methodology based on a combination of multiple indicators delineating the probability of a climate-related disaster to occur, and the potential impact

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of the specific natural hazard.\textsuperscript{15} Table 1 provides a breakdown of the HCSS Index elements.

Table 1. HCSS Climate Security Index Elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong></td>
<td>Coping Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Long-term adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard-specific</td>
<td>Hazard-specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Susceptibility</strong></td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Standard of living</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hazard-specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional (in)stability</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exposure</strong></td>
<td>Persons in the hazard zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hazard zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Hazard</strong></td>
<td>Extreme Weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency and intensity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Summary of the HCSS Climate Security Assessment Report by the author. Note: While the HCSS Index includes gender, importantly, it is listed under only one element of the matrix (Susceptibility).}

\textsuperscript{15} Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 10.
The elements of the HCSS Index will be combined with the Climate-Diplomacy Conceptual Model, developed by The German Federal Foreign Office and adelphi (a think tank focused on climate change, the environment, and development), which work together to analyze climate diplomacy and security in international spaces. The two organizations have jointly developed a Factbook and Case Studies which provide analyses based on an open-ended Conceptual Model. Since the Climate-Diplomacy Conceptual Model is not outlined in its entirety (in the public domain), the author has conducted a survey of 68 of Climate-Diplomacy’s published Case Studies, and summarized common elements of their Conceptual Model in Table 2.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Climate-Diplomacy Conceptual Model.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate Change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gradual change in temperature/precipitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more frequent/intense extreme weather event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demographic change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infrastructure development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migration pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental/climate policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social and Economic Drivers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased water scarcity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pollution/environmental degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natural resource scarcity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increased land scarcity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extreme weather event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land use change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decline in fish stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>change in access/availability of natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduced state capacity and/or legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displacements/migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politicisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public health risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volatile food prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>border disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fragility and Conflict Risks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interstate tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-state grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime/violence/extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weakened state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediary Mechanisms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Results of a survey by the author of 68 Case Studies published by Climate-Diplomacy.*

The interlinkages between climate change and human and national/international security are complex and highly nuanced, and both matrices offer unique perspectives for analyzing climate insecurity scenarios. For this study, the HCSS Climate Security Index is the model best suited to mapping a comprehensive gendered climate insecurity analysis. For the purposes of this proposed framework, therefore, the “Dimension” elements of the HCSS framework (“Vulnerability,” “Susceptibility,” “Exposure,” “Natural Hazard”) will be referred to as Gendered Climate-Security Phases, or GCS-
Phases, of which this framework will cover two: “Vulnerability” and “Susceptibility.” (NB: While the “Exposure” and “Natural Hazard” “Dimensions” of the HCSS framework are important determinants of gendered climate security, it is beyond the scope of this study to cover them, though they may form the basis of future research by the author). Each GCS-Phase will be further broken down using the HCSS framework’s “Indicators,” which will be referred to in this study as Gendered Climate-Security Factors (GCS-Factors). Together, the GCS-Phases and GCS-Factors will be referred as the “Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle” (see Table 3). For each GCS-Factor, this study will offer a brief description of the dominant or conventional approach to examining it, which will be contrasted with a feminist approach. Following this, each GCS-Factor discussion will provide an analysis of the gendered human security risks and then an analysis of the gendered national/international security risks. Some elements of Climate-Diplomacy’s Conceptual Model have been added to the list of GCS-Factors in Table 3; additional notes on the use of Climate-Diplomacy’s Conceptual Model will be described in section 1.2.2.2.
Table 3. Proposed Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle Structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gendered Climate-Security Phase (GCS-Phase)</th>
<th>Gendered Climate-Security Factor (GCS-Factor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping Capacity</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food security <em>(volatile food prices)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent shocks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Early warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Long-term adaptation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Susceptibility</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>Natural Hazard</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Weather</td>
<td>Frequency and intensity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based primarily on the HCSS Climate Security Index, the table outlines all elements of the Gendered Climate Security Lifecycle in this study. Note that those elements of the HCSS framework which are not included in this study, such as “Exposure” and “Natural Hazard,” are indicated with strikeout font. In particular, “Gender” has been removed since it will be covered in every GCS-Factor. Elements of Climate-Diplomacy’s Conceptual Model have been added in purple.*
1.2.2. Feminist Theories Underpinning this Conceptual Framework

The primary purpose of this study is to offer a gendered perspective to climate security considerations. Addressing the ways in which gender, climate change, and security intersect involves the integration of multiple lines of research. As mentioned, the proposed framework in this study is situated within the theoretical traditions of feminist political ecology (FPEcol) and feminist political economy (FPEcon) and will build primarily upon existing scholarship in these fields. However, where FPEcol and FPEcon literature are scant or non-existent, the proposed framework will draw upon diverse fields including feminist thought within anthropology, psychology, human rights advocacy, as well as the security sector, in particular the work of WPS experts. Two important terms at the triple nexus of gender-climate-security (gender and security) and two important related issues (essentialism and gender binaries) must first be defined for the purposes of this study. A discussion of these two terms and two issues will be briefly explored here.

1.2.2.1. Defining Gender on Two Scales: Individual and System

First, within this framework, gender will be understood as both the social construct of an individual’s gender as well as the gendered structures within a community/system/state. On an individual level, feminist scholars hold that there is no universally accepted set of characteristics that are masculine or feminine, but rather that gender is socially constructed. Therefore, for the purposes of this framework, an individual’s gender will be understood as a socially contrived description of, “associated norms, behaviours, expectations and roles.”

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On a community/system/state scale, FPEcon literature suggests political and economic processes, structures, and institutions that inform how humans interact and relate to one another are inherently social processes in which gender is often obscured or ignored, resulting in unequal, gendered power relations. True and Tanyag describe a public/private spectrum of value that figures largely in FPEcon scholarship: within a political economy, structures and institutions functionally ascribe value to public, masculine work, while private, feminine work is overlooked; masculine production activities are visible and valorized, while feminine reproduction activities go unpaid, obscured, and devalued. Importantly, this public/private spectrum applies to security studies as well: through the privileging of masculinist structures within violence, conflict, and peace settings, women’s and girls’ security and freedom is frequently undermined, and thus so is the security of their communities. With this in mind, the proposed framework in this study will consider both the ways in which climate and security interact with a person’s individual (socially constructed) gender, as well as the gendered structures and institutions within communities, nations, and international systems that inform how we understand security.

1.2.2.2. Defining Security on Two Scales: Human and National/International

In addition to looking to FPEcon to understand gender and gendered structures, this framework will use FPEcon to define two conceptions of security: human security and national/international security. Since UNSCR 1325 was first established, feminist theory and WPS theory have interacted in both cooperation and tension. While

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19 True and Tanyag, “Global Violence and Security from a Gendered Perspective.”
acknowledging that the WPS agenda and international security in general must take the climate crisis into consideration, both FPEcon and FPEcol theorists have criticized the WPS theory for the ways in which it has become overly securitized, often resulting in narrow, militaristic responses to complex problems such as climate change. Conversely, WPS experts have insisted climate change will impact national/international security, and that a gender lens within the national security sphere is required to examine these interactions. As such, WPS experts are beginning to look at gendered climate security from a securitized perspective. For the purposes of this framework, each of these perspectives is necessary to adequately address both human and national/international security.

The concept of human security is a relatively new one. For essentially the first time, the 1994 United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP)’s Human Development Report posited a formalization of the term ‘human security.’ In contrast to conventional understandings of ‘security,’ which typically considers only national defense-based issues, such as threats to a country’s borders, conflict between states, and the use of arms for protection, the report offered the following definition of ‘human security:’

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development. The loss of human security can be a slow, silent process—Or an abrupt, loud emergency. It can be human-made due to wrong policy choices. It can stem from the forces of nature. Or it can be a combination of both—as is

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often the case when environmental degradation leads to a natural disaster, followed by human tragedy. In defining security, it is important that human security not be equated with human development. Human development is a broader concept—defined in previous Human Development Reports as a process of widening the range of people's choices. Human security means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely—and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow.

With this in mind, climate security cannot be understood without considering threats to human security. Indeed, underlying many national and international climate-related conflicts are issues of human insecurity, many of which are situated within highly gendered structures.

Due to the central role human security plays in climate change and national/international security spaces, feminist scholars have cautioned against using a solely national security approach to studying climate security. In the global north, for instance, climate change is increasingly referred to as a ‘threat multiplier,’ a phrase commonly used by those interested in protecting national security and political power hierarchies rather than the human security more broadly. Feminist political economists argue that the dangers of securitizing climate change include the following:

- Increasing military and security budgets and subsequently redirecting funds away from solving the climate crisis or addressing needs of peacebuilding and human security projects;

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• Expanding military operations, leading to increased use of fossil fuels that intensify climate change (Importantly: the US military is the world’s largest institutional user of petroleum and single largest producer of greenhouse gas emissions, while the UK military emits more carbon dioxide than that emitted by 60 nations);\(^{23}\)

• Pushing to return to the patriarchal status quo (rather than making the massive adjustments to the status quo required to address climate change); and

• Locating the threat of climate change as originating with its most vulnerable victims, the poorest and least powerful (rather than locating climate threats as originating with corporations and government policies most responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, especially those from developed nations).\(^{24}\)


Building on this idea, Cohn and Duncanson have outlined four ways in which the WPS agenda should centre the climate crisis and human security.\(^{25}\)

1. While woman’s human security was at the heart of UNSCR 1325, it will be impossible to protect women’s human security without addressing climate change.

2. In discussions based on only traditional conceptions of warfare and international security, climate change must be a consideration because of the ways in which it interacts with socioeconomic-political factors to complicate and amplify drivers of armed conflict.

3. Because of the multitudinous ways in which climate change will intersect with all matters of human and international security, climate change will be the context in which all peacebuilding occurs.\(^{26}\)

4. Climate change must figure in discussions of peacebuilding because it threatens the entire project of building peace by redirecting resources away from


\(^{26}\) Cohn, “The Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Climate Crisis: Inextricable Links.” In particular, Cohn notes that climate change complicates the project of peacebuilding to such an extent that it must transform the conception for how peace is built. First, climate change will impact the effectiveness of peacebuilding: peacebuilding requires jobs and livelihoods while climate change destroys the conditions for providing jobs and livelihoods; peacebuilding requires addressing reforms for land rights and restitution, while climate change reduces the quantity and quality of land available; peacebuilding requires addressing the health crises and injury caused by war, while climate change adds pressure on health services. Second, every decision within the context of peacebuilding will have impacts on climate change; specifically, standard economic strictures placed on post-recovery systems tend to worsen rather than ameliorate climate change by relying on extractive economic development.
peacebuilding toward recovering from climate-damaged economies, disrupted public service systems, and crumbling infrastructures.27

Importantly, by taking a gender-transformative climate approach to security challenges, focus is redirected away from the white, masculinist, capitalistic relationship between humans and nature, which prevent humanity from recognizing what is required to fix the climate crisis. In this study, therefore, ‘climate security’ will be framed crucially as a human security challenge with wide and deep implications. These themes will play important roles in this framework, especially those related to human security.

Nevertheless, as WPS experts have argued, conventional, defense-related conceptions of security cannot be ignored in understanding climate’s impact on security. There is now a growing scholarly literature showing how climate change may amplify armed conflict and inter- and intra-state security threats.28 Security scholars such as de Jonge Oudraat and Brown have noted a few examples of climate security threats that should not be overlooked because of the ways in which they multiply existing national/international security threats:

- Rising sea levels threatening the existence of small island nations along with the world’s coastal cities and populations; intensifying naval and resource competitions in the Arctic; the impact of extreme weather and rising temperatures on the viability of human habitats; and the impact of

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27 Cohn and Duncanson, “How the Women, Peace and Security Agenda Must Change in Response to the Climate Crisis”; Cohn, “The Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Climate Crisis: Inextricable Links.”
climate-generated population movements on governmental viability, national security, and regional stability.”

The authors go on to suggest that framing climate change as a security threat is one way to elevate it as a policy priority.

Thus, while a substantial portion of this study will address the role gendered human (in)security plays in increasing/decreasing state fragility and violence risks, this study will also examine how a gender lens can shed light on the complexities of climate security within conventional conceptions of National/International Security. Each section within this study will therefore contain a Human Security discussion as well as a National/International Security discussion. Furthermore, the central question in this framework can be approached in three ways: (1) how do culturally determined gender identities/structures/institutions increase/decrease climate resilience and Human Security, (2) how does climate breakdown interact with and/or change culturally determined gender identities/structures/institutions, and how do such interactions/changes increase/decrease climate resilience or Human Security, and (3) how do increases/decreases in resilience and Human Security through pathways (1) or (2) make climate-related National/International Security threats more likely? As the Human Development Report above recommends, any scenario discussed in this study may illustrate one or the other, or all three.

30 “New Dimensions of Human Security.” This report framed challenges within the development community – including health, environment, food, economic – as “Human Security” issues, thereby raising the need to address them to a higher policy level within the international community.
Climate-Diplomacy’s Conceptual Model contains elements that add to the specificity of the climate-security analysis. In particular, Climate-Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’—including crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions—will be used to inform the analysis and organize the findings in the National/International Security discussion of each GCS-Factor considered. The basic structure of the proposed framework is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Basic Proposed Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle Framework.

*Basic structure of this study’s proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework with the addition of security on two scales: human insecurity and national/international security, plus gender on two scales: socially constructed individual gender identity and gendered structures/institutions. Note the grey arrows which indicate the feedback loop between gender, climate change, and security factors.*
1.2.2.3. **A Note on Gender Essentialization and Gender Binaries**

Before exploring the various gender lenses used in this framework, it is important to address two common concerns within feminist theory: gender essentialization and gender binaries. First, on gender essentialization, which is understood as the reinforcing or reproducing of gender stereotypes as natural or inevitable: As Arora-Johnsson’s work has argued, theories describing women as only vulnerable or virtuous should be questioned, especially regarding climate change.31 As such, one of the primary aims of this study is to offer an approach to open up conversations about both women’s and men’s roles in climate-related violence and conflict within specific localities as a way to break typical gendered stereotypes. As such, to understand links between gender, climate, and security, this study attempts to describe the evidence available—evidence which primarily uses binary gender terms—on how gender is theorized, conceived, or governed, and therefore manifested, reinforced, and internalized in various climate change or security contexts. Using that evidence, the proposed framework attempts to provide a structure for interrogating problematic behaviours, institutions, or structures in order to dispel myths perpetuated by gender essentialism, and offer diagnostic questions for testing unique gender expressions within particular contexts that may complicate climate security matters.

Second, while gender binaries can exclude certain genders, they are useful analytic devices, especially for examining heavily binary social relations. Given that most systems globally (local communities and states alike) are primarily read and performed as

binary (socially and culturally), this study largely examines the intersections of Gender-Climate-Security using a binary lens. Nevertheless, issues related to the climate security vulnerabilities of members of the LGBTQI+ community will be raised when possible.

1.2.3. Lenses of Analysis for Conceptualizing Gender in Climate Security

As already discussed, to understand how gender, climate, and security are interlinked with each GCS-Factor, the proposed framework organizes each GCS-Factor section around two primary components: (1) Human Security and (2) National/International Security. These primary components are analyzed using the theories developed by several scholars. Human Security (1) is analyzed using the rubric developed by Forsberg and Olsson (section 1.2.3.1), with particular attention to women’s human insecurity as a predictor of national/international insecurity. The National/International Security component of each GCS-Factor (2) is structured around Climate Diplomacy’s four ‘Intermediary Mechanisms,’ namely crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions, and is analyzed by applying three existing theories: (2A) patterns posited by several authors, but especially Campaniello, that look at gender and crime, localized violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (2B) concepts developed by Rucht and Caren et al. to examine gender and civic unrest participation, particularly anti-state grievances (section 1.2.3.3); and (2C) theory developed by Wood, Eggert, and Thomas (as well as separately by Wood) to analyze gendered motivations for violent participation in anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions

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32 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, and Allies
The four theoretical foundations (1, 2A, 2B, and 2C) for the gender analysis are outlined briefly in the following sections.

1.2.3.1. **Gender and Human Insecurity: Women’s Safety as Predictor of National/International Insecurity**

Feminist security scholar Caprioli was one of the first to offer evidence of a strong relationship between gender inequality and armed conflict. Following this initial finding, Hudson et al. used extensive data analysis to show that when a system places a strong emphasis on the subordination of women at the household level via what they call the ‘Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome,’ that system (community or state) is more likely to experience instability and insecurity, lower levels of overall well-being, greater environmental degradation, and decreased prosperity. In fact, Hudson’s research suggests that data on the vulnerability/safety of a community’s women enhances predictions of state stability (and therefore also climate resilience) more than data on a state’s economics or form of government. Since then, numerous scholars have developed a robust literature that suggests, at the country level, both intrastate and interstate armed conflict is much more likely to occur in countries that display high levels of gender inequality. Building on this foundation, Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez have


35 Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, “The Effects by the Numbers,” 310.

argued that changes in gender equality such as reductions in women’s status, attacks on women, limiting of women’s rights, or increased discrimination against women in a country may serve as early warnings of increased risk of violent conflict.\textsuperscript{37}

Table 4. Three Mechanisms for Analyzing Interlinkages Between Gender Equality and Security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norms</strong></td>
<td>Violence is considered a legitimate form of conflict resolution in systems where severe forms of unequal gender norms are prevalent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
<td>Increasing women’s rights requires higher investment in women, which generates higher levels of social resources and networks, ultimately supporting more peaceful forms of conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic development</strong></td>
<td>In more gender equal societies, certain socioeconomic developments result in fewer young men being available for recruitment into armed groups, thereby lowering the chances of armed conflict along the following routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• state-based conflict due to surplus males in urban environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• non-state conflict due to surplus males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• surplus males and unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Concepts developed by Forsberg and Olsson and summarized by the author.*\textsuperscript{38}

Of particular relevance for this study is the work by Forsberg and Olsson which uses data at the sub-national level to posit three mechanisms for the relationship between gender inequality and insecurity, which are shown in Table 4.\textsuperscript{39} Analyzing each of these three mechanisms of *norms, societal capacity, and socioeconomic development*, Forsberg and Olsson found insufficient empirical support for the connection between their *norms*

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\textsuperscript{38} Erika Forsberg and Louise Olsson, “Examining Gender Inequality and Armed Conflict at the Subnational Level,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 17, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa023.

\textsuperscript{39} Forsberg and Olsson, “Examining Gender Inequality and Armed Conflict at the Subnational Level.”
mechanism and sub-national armed conflict, however they suggest gender inequality norms may play an indirect role, especially when combined specifically with ideological ideas of male toughness. However, their study found strong support for the societal capacity mechanism, noting that specific investments in women such as education, empowerment, women’s networks, and political representation strengthen society overall. For the gendered socioeconomic development, they found results differed depending on the conditions. When a substantial young male surplus (often due to a strong, persistent son preference) in an urban environment is combined with strong family or tribal networks for reaching potential recruits, the relationship is strong between gender inequality and state-based violence (violence perpetrated by the state), and increases in strength the denser the urban population. When examining non-state violence (non-state armed groups that are partly or completely independent of government), they find that a young male surplus has a similar effect in both urban or rural conditions, suggesting an increased likelihood of low-scale, localized non-state violence and riots in rural and urban settings in which recruitment can take place using family or kin ties. Finally, they found that when large groups of young men experience economic conditions that prevented some from fulfilling masculine role expectations (such as marriage or employment), this might allow for higher likelihood of gathering and organizing into
networks through which recruitment can be directed. As such, “the effect of a male surplus may be more pronounced under higher levels of male unemployment.”

Figure 2. Five Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms Applied to the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle.

*The Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms will be applied in the Human Security aspects of this Gender-Climate-Security Framework to analyze how various climate factors may impact security.*

The framework presented in this study will apply Forsberg and Olsson’s gender equality-national/international security mechanisms to each GCS-Factor (though *norms* will only be applied to one, the *Education* GCS-Factor, given Forsberg and Olsson’s

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*40 Forsberg and Olsson, “Examining Gender Inequality and Armed Conflict at the Subnational Level.”*
findings noted previously). For each GCS-Factor, existing research will be analyzed and categorized within this rubric according to which of the mechanisms may be at work in potential climate-related insecurity pathways, especially those that pertain to gendered Human Security. Within this framework, the mechanisms will be referred to as ‘Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms,’ and will include: ‘societal capacity’ and one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD) mechanisms, (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’). Figure 2 shows a cross-comparison of the two variables in this part of the analysis. An illustration of how this element appears within the proposed framework can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Five Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms as Illustrated in the Proposed Framework.

*Forsberg and Olsson model applied to the proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework.*

The persistent gender gap in violent crime is well-documented in literature, with rates remaining stable since 2000.\textsuperscript{41} According to the 2019 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on homicide, 90% of all homicides globally were committed by men, and men make up 80% of all homicide victims.\textsuperscript{42} In particular, young men living with poverty are significantly more likely to engage in crime, and be victims of crime.\textsuperscript{43} The UNODC estimates that 19% of all homicides are related to criminal activity and gangs, resulting in many more deaths than those caused by armed conflict.\textsuperscript{44} In the case of organized crime, it is more likely than not that men will play outsized roles in violence according to a wide literature that also shows women are typically sidelined to auxiliary roles within gangs.\textsuperscript{45} Similar patterns have been observed in extremist groups (more on this in section 1.2.3.4). Furthermore, should grievances between societal groups take the...
form of organized crime, it is more likely than not that men will play outsized roles in violence according to a wide literature that also shows women are typically sidelined to auxiliary roles in such groups.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, research by Campaniello of women in crime over the past 50 years shows that in recent decades, women’s participation in the commission of crimes has increased, though not yet to the level of men.⁴⁷ For instance, Olcott and Udalova noted that women’s involvement in drug trafficking in Kazakhstan increased from 3% in 1996 to 12.2% in 2000, and similar trends were detected in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.⁴⁸ Campaniello posits that participation differences between women and men are likely due to women’s lower criminal earnings and the fact that having children lowers a woman’s propensity to engage in criminal activity.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Campaniello shows that women are twice as likely to engage in non-violent property crime as they are violent crimes, suggesting perhaps that the level of violence originating with acts taken by women is much lower.⁵⁰ Consequently, gender must be considered when addressing climate-related criminal activity and its impact on conflict and violence rates. This framework will attempt to outline studies that link gendered criminal activity within individual GCS-

⁴⁹ Campaniello, “Women in Crime.”
Factors. An illustration of how this element appears within the proposed framework can be seen in Figure 4.

![Gendered Roles in Crime, Violence, and Extremism](image)

Figure 4. Theoretical Roles of Women and Men in Crime, Violence, and Extremism as Illustrated in the Proposed Framework.

*Illustrated summary of concepts developed by Campaniello and other scholars as used within the proposed framework.*

1.2.3.3. **Gender and National/International Security: Women’s and Men’s Roles in Anti-State Grievances**

Looking at how gender may play a role in whether civic action becomes destabilizing, a study by Rucht shows that men are far more likely to participate in disruptive action, such as occupying buildings or factories.\(^1\) Where violent civic participation is concerned, men are more likely to participate in disruptive action,

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especially when attended by unemployed working-class men who have experienced ongoing marginalization.\textsuperscript{52} However, when action is considered less risky, Caren et al. find that women are more likely to engage, such as with boycotts or petition-signing.\textsuperscript{53} As such, within this study, where possible, specific studies will be provided to illustrate how gender intersects with civic violence in that particular GCS-Factor. An illustration of how this element appears within the proposed framework can be seen in Figure 5.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure5.png}
\caption{Theoretical Roles of Women and Men in Anti-State Grievances as Illustrated in the Proposed Framework.}
\end{figure}

Illustrated summary of concepts from Rucht and Caren et al. as used within the proposed framework.

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
1.2.3.4. Gender and National/International Security: Gendered Motivations for Participation in Anti-State Grievances, Grievances Between Societal Groups, and Interstate Conflict

Understanding who participates in armed violence—whether it’s climate-fueled *anti-state grievances*, or *grievances between societal groups*, or *interstate tensions*—may be one way to comprehend how to resolve and prevent conflict and build peace. Ideologies of all types usually form the foundations on which motivations are built, while motivations offer language for naming and prioritizing goals, and coordinating actors. Many motivations have their roots in gendered ideologies that determine different priorities for women and men. As such, understanding gendered motivations may be instrumental in identifying who is most likely to engage in a particular form of conflict and perhaps what unexpressed needs must be met in order for them to engage in peacebuilding instead.

Furthermore, considering gendered motivations in climate-related violence and conflict is important for guarding against the essentializing of women and men as virtuous/victims (women) or violent/conflicted (men). For instance, there is some data suggesting that men are far more likely to be involved as armed combatants. Data on the gender balance of fighters in guerrilla, rebel, and paramilitary groups is difficult to find, though historically, men accounted for 90% of all war-related deaths. However, this

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does not provide a full picture of why men more often than women may be recruited as combatants, nor does it elucidate when and why women may participate in the same conflagrations, or why they do so less frequently. Importantly, feminists have argued that essentializing women and men in such ways robs them of their agency and glosses over the complex reasons that they go to war.\textsuperscript{57}

From an FPEcon perspective, “all human beings, from gestation in the womb through to old age, are influenced by the circumstances they experience and confront across different life stages.”\textsuperscript{58} Using essentialist terms, some have suggested that because women are socialized to perform tasks related to their reproductive roles within the private sphere (childbearing, socialization of children, caring for family members, management of the household), they are therefore less likely to have the time or inclination to be involved in conflict and war.\textsuperscript{59} Reif outlines how these patriarchal attitudes operate:\textsuperscript{60}

1. The sexual division of labour reflects natural differences between women and men.
2. Women's identity comes through their relationship with men.
3. Women achieve their highest fulfillment as wives and mothers.
4. Women are childlike.
5. Women are apolitical.

Such essentialist conceptions of the nature of women and men have received wide feminist criticism. Nevertheless, it is true that gendered beliefs have informed deeply embedded patriarchal norms which have generated gendered structures that have largely

\textsuperscript{57} Gül Pembe Akbal, “Female Combatants: Same Goals, Different Motivations?” (University of Kent, 2017), 2, https://www.e-ir.info/2017/06/02/female-combatants-same-goals-different-motivations/.
\textsuperscript{60} Reif, “Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements,” 148.
excluded women from participating in armed conflict. Understanding potential gendered differences in motivations is therefore important.

Research has shown that, while women combatants are rare, women have been increasingly involved in paramilitary and armed insurgent groups. For instance, in 2005, the National Liberation Army of Colombia had close to 50% women, while in Nepal, approximately 30% of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists were women. Yet the motivations, sense of agency, and roles women and men play in combat groups can vary substantially based on unique cultural and gender norms.

While several studies, such as that by Mazurana et al., note that women and girls are often forcibly recruited into armed groups, and may lack agency in their roles, a growing literature has teased out women’s and men’s different motivations for participation in armed conflict. In particular, work by Wood suggests women, like men, may join militant groups as a way to increase their chances of survival, to avoid abuse, or to achieve greater opportunities than those available prior to the conflict. For instance, groups such as the FMLN and the Sandinistas (Nicaragua) that advocate for economic redistribution, gender equality, or Marxist-oriented ideologies are more likely to attract women combatants. Though less common, groups espousing fundamentalist Islam or

61 Akbal, “Female Combatants.”
nationalist ideologies have also been effective in recruiting women, even as suicide bombers, suggesting that groups do not have to necessarily attract women with promises of greater gender equality.\textsuperscript{67} The issues that motivate men to join militant groups are often different than those driving women. Work by Eggert suggests men’s motivations may include the pull of existing networks and desire for camaraderie; personal exposure to violence against friends and family or state repression; desire for revenge for acts of violence; and concerns over personal physical security (though less common, these same issues may also motivate some women to engage in armed conflict).\textsuperscript{68}

Table 5. Gendered Motivational Mechanisms.Roles in Violence and Conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical motivations and roles for women combatants</th>
<th>Common Motivations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase chances of survival;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Avoid abuse by rebel or government forces;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enjoy greater range of opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Common Motivations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fundamentalist ideologies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Affiliation with motivations common among men (below).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical roles played</th>
<th>Typical Roles Played:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Auxiliary roles: cooking, logistics, transportation, operations, media, child rearing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical motivations and roles for men combatants</th>
<th>Common Motivations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pull of existing networks;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fundamentalist ideologies;
• Exposure to violence or state repression;
• Desire for revenge.

Less Common Motivations:
• Concerns over personal security.

Typical Roles Played:
• All roles, including leadership.

Findings by Wood, Eggert, and Thomas and Wood summarized and organized by the author.  

On the issue of roles, Luciak notes that traditional gendered hierarchies found in peacetime are often replicated in wartime organizations, with such organizations reflecting the specific gendered norms within their communities. As such, Thomas and Wood have found that, as in gangs, women in armed groups and rebel organizations often fill support roles (though these are often crucial) and are frequently denied positions of power, though Coulter et al. and others have found that women fighters often have some degree of authority within their groups. Furthermore, research by Kampwirth shows that women’s participation in such groups may lead to structural changes between genders, in which case new opportunities for women to take leadership roles in the home and in social and political life may be created. Moreover, Thomas and Wood argue that as women take on greater roles in social, economic, and political processes they are also perceived as capable of participation in rebel organizations. They identify three mechanisms for these changes: (1) greater skills and knowledge gained through

Wood, Female Fighters; Eggert, “Female Fighters and Militants During the Lebanese Civil War.”
education; (2) increased socialization with men that increase men’s confidence in women’s abilities; and (3) network growth through education and socialization, which leads to smoother pathways into rebel groups. Feminist scholars such as Steenbergen critique notions of reintegration, since such processes often result in a snap-back to previous gendered hierarchies and backlash against women who held more power or played non-traditional roles within conflict settings. Where applicable, therefore, studies that explain how women’s involvement in various armed violence may offer opportunities for transforming gendered norms will be noted.

With the above findings in mind, this study looks for ways to understand how climate security threats are likely to attract individuals along various pathways. As such, exploring how motivations and roles impact why women and men join armed groups is important for understanding how climate-related conflicts develop, and critical for understanding gendered structural conditions post-conflict and in peacebuilding. See

Table 5 for a brief summary of the combined rubrics of Wood, Eggert, and Thomas and Wood describing gendered motivations and roles of women and men in conflict.

Figure 6. Gendered Motivations Applied to the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle.

The climate and security research by various scholars will be analyzed in the National/International Security subsections of this Gender-Climate-Security Framework; those that suggest gendered motivational mechanisms that may impact climate and security will be identified and categorized according to the rubric in the above figure. In cases where studies do not explain motivational mechanisms, it will be noted that there is a lack of evidence and a need for additional research.

In the National/International Security subsection of each GCS-Factor in this proposed framework, studies connecting climate and security will be explored, and any that offer strong evidence for (gendered) motivations for participation and roles played
will be identified. See Figure 6 for how this data will be organized and for a visual representation of how these rubrics will fit into this proposed framework. Note, however, that one of the goals of this study is to determine whether enough research has been conducted to be able to categorize various climate security factors based on gendered motivations. As will be shown, in the majority of cases, much more research is yet required to ascertain the specific role gendered motivations may play in engagement in various climate insecurity scenarios. As such, within each GCS-Factor National/International Security analysis, it will also be noted where little or no evidence exists for (gendered) motivations for involvement in climate-related conflict or violence. A summary of all findings in this study will be offered in the conclusion as well.
1.2.4. Gender-Climate-Security Linkages: The Proposed Framework

Combining the theory within the various analytical models outlined above allows for the organization of research on the complex intersection of gender, climate change, and security, and a linking of theoretical questions with existing analysis across a broad range of disciplines, including feminist political economy, feminist political economy, security and foreign policy, and women, peace, and security. Ultimately, the analysis within this framework will offer the following findings:

- Gender + GCS-Factor $\rightarrow \Delta$ (increased or decreased) Human Security

Illustrated summary of concepts developed by Wood, Eggert, and other scholars as used within the proposed framework.
• Gender + GCS-Factor + \( \Delta \) Human Security \( \rightarrow \) changes to gender roles/institutions

• Gender + GCS-Factor + \( \Delta \) Human Security \( \rightarrow \) \( \Delta \) National/International Security
  
  (crime/violence/extremism, grievance between societal groups, anti-state grievances, interstate tensions)

• Gender + GCS-Factor + \( \Delta \) National/International Security \( \rightarrow \) changes to gender roles/institutions

In subsequent chapters, this framework will be used in the following manner.

1. **Chapter Structure:**

The proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework is organized into two main chapters: Chapter 2 – Vulnerability and Chapter 3 - Susceptibility. Within each chapter, the proposed framework will consider each Gendered Climate-Security Factor (GCS-Factor) in
Table 3 in turn.

2. GCS-Factor Analysis Structure:

Each GCS-Factor section will be organized with the following subsections, which are described below:

- Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches
- Short Overview of the Gender-Climate-Security Linkages
- GCS-Factor and Human Security
- GCS-Factor and National/International Security
- Conclusion
- Diagnostic Questions

- **Comparison of Dominant vs. FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor:**

  Each GCS-Factor section will begin with a brief description of the dominant definition of that GCS-Factor, contrasted with an FPecon/FPEcol approach to defining that GCS-Factor.

- **Short Overview of the GCS-Factor Gender-Climate-Security Linkages:**

  Each GCS-Factor section will include a summary of the Gender-Climate-Security linkages found in the discussion to follow.

- **GCS-Factor and Human Security:**

  Gendered considerations of the GCS-Factor will be analyzed for their impact on *Human Security* using the *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms*:

    - *societal capacity*
one of three socioeconomic development (SD) mechanisms, referred to as:

SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict, SD-surplus males-non-state conflict, and SD-surplus males-unemployment

- norms (for the Education section only)

- GCS-Factor and National/International Security:

Four types of National/International Security threats will be analyzed using several different gender lenses:

- Crime/violence/extremism:
  - Gendered motivations/roles: Typical motivations for women and men to engage in various types of security threats, including:
    - typical motivations for women: *increase survival, avoid abuse, greater opportunities, fundamentalist ideology*; and typical motivations for men: *pull of networks, fundamentalist ideologies, exposure to violence/repression, revenge, personal security*.
    - Gendered crime types (property crime (typically women) or violent crime (typically men))

- Grievance between societal groups:
  - Gendered motivations/roles (see list under crime/violence/extremism above)

- Anti-state grievances:
  - Gendered motivations/roles (see list under crime/violence/extremism above)
Gendered protest types (low-risk/high violence protests (typically women) or higher-risk/high violence protests (typically men))

- Interstate tensions:

  Gendered motivations/roles (see list under crime/violence/extremism above)

- Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and GCS-Factor:

  A brief visual of the findings for each GCS-Factor section will be offered at the end of each subsection.

- GCS-Factor Diagnostic Questions:

  At the end of this study in the Appendix is a list of Diagnostic Questions for each GCS-Factor based on the study findings. They offer a way for practitioners and policymakers to apply the proposed framework to their own analyses.

  All elements of the proposed framework are visualized in .
Figure 8. Illustration of Proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework.

All elements of the proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework combined.
Chapter 2.

Vulnerability

The *Vulnerability* of a system is a measure of its response to pressures and stressors and its ability to recover and maintain political stability following crises. In essence, it refers to a system’s ability to plan for, mitigate, and prevent stressors such as climate hazards from developing into serious disasters, and as such *Vulnerability* is an important factor to consider when assessing gender-climate-security risks.\(^{75}\) Climate disasters will intensify existing vulnerabilities in systems without adequate, gender transformative adaptation plans or funding to support those plans.\(^{76}\)

The following chapter is divided into two GCS-Phases of a system’s *Vulnerability*: (1) *Coping Capacity* and (2) *(Lack of) Resilience*. Each GCS-Phase will cover several GCS-Factors, each of which will first be explored in terms of conventional versus feminist conceptions. This will be followed by an extensive exploration of the gendered *Human Security* aspects of that GCS-Factor, as well as the gendered *National/International Security* aspects of that GCS-Factor. At the start of each GCS-Factor section will be a table summarizing the *Gender-Climate-Security Linkage* findings within that section. These *Linkages* will be categorized based on the lenses of analysis developed in Chapter 1, and will be numbered and later identified in the longer text.

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explaining the Linkage. For Human Security, (1) categories are based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, and one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’). For National/International Security, findings are (2) organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (2A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (2B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (2C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4). At the end of this study, a list of diagnostic questions will be provided for each GCS-Factor section to facilitate the use of this proposed framework in analysis of real life climate insecurity scenarios.

2.1. Coping Capacity

The GCS-Phase *Coping Capacity* considers whether a system’s elements-at-risk can efficiently cope with or recover from the physical shocks of climate-caused disasters in a timely fashion, “including the protection, rebuilding, or enhancement of its fundamental assets, structures and functions in the short to medium term.” Social adaptive and *Coping Capacity* literatures have been used to describe the ways in which a

---

system is able to adapt to internal or external shocks such as those caused by climate change. Though concerns about oversimplification of the political and policy elements of climate vulnerability have been raised by Turner and others, there is a general agreement on the strong linkages between Coping Capacity, climate change, and instability. Naess et al. suggest that improving adaptive capacity by increasing access to capital, assets, and good governance can increase how well a system is able to absorb both short-term and longer-term climate- and conflict-related shocks, while conflict and fragility can weaken stability by intensifying political grievances, ideological and ethnic differences, state capacity and legitimacy, elite resource capture, cross-border and geopolitical dynamics, as well as economic and social inequalities. Furthermore, Adger, et al. have found that climate and environmental hazards impact individual Human Security (an important element of collective adaptive and Coping Capacity) by decreasing physical, mental, and economic health and sources, while increasing fear of crime and violence. This Coping Capacity section will be divided into five sub-sections, one for each of the following GCS-Factors: Early Warning; Healthcare; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; Food Security, and Recent Shocks.

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2.1.1. Early Warning

Table 6. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Early Warning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>The HCSS Framework uses Early Warning to refer to a system’s capability to reduce vulnerabilities to rapid-onset climate events through limits on the losses, damages, and consequences of the event. The immediate impacts of an extreme climate event can be ameliorated through timely and well-communicated warning information that allows individuals to take action to reduce their exposure to the hazards. As such, the HCSS Framework relies on several indicators that enable an effective warning system, including mobile cellular subscriptions, use of the internet, adult literacy, and access to electricity.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</td>
<td>Foundational to examining every indicator within this proposed framework from a feminist perspective is the acknowledgement that gender inequalities are the result of uneven power relations within households and communities. Feminist scholar Kabeer conceptualizes empowerment as the combination of resources, agency, and achievement:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Empowerment thus refers to the expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them. Changes in the ability to exercise choice can be thought of in terms of changes in three inter-related dimensions which make up choice: resources, which form the conditions under which choices are made; agency which is at the heart of the process by which choices are made; and achievements, which are the outcomes of choices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This framing is useful in differentiating a conventional conception of access to Early Warning systems from a transformative feminist one, since unequal power structures commonly prevent women from accessing and using mobile technology, the internet, electricity, and educational systems. Traditional development philosophy focuses on the mechanics of improving access to cellular and internet service, electricity, and literacy training in order to deliver “functioning achievements,” but is usually conducted in a gender-blind fashion. While this approach may offer overall functional improvement in access, it does nothing to transform the underlying gender roles that produced the gender inequalities that impact women. Thus, the following discussion will examine each of these elements of Early Warning to understand gendered

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differences in access, and then turn to what a gender transformative approach to *Early Warning* systems would look like.

*Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Early Warning.*

Table 7. Short Overview of the Early Warning Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Human Security</strong>85</th>
<th><strong>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.1.A.</td>
<td>Women lack access to electricity because of lower levels of education; finance/resource access and control; distribution of care responsibilities; restrictions on women’s use of space and mobility services; lack of agency over their time/work; occupational segregation; different networks → women may not be able to power electronic early warning technologies → women may be unaware of impending climate disasters or evacuation instructions → women may not be able to engage in appropriate or timely responses to early warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.1.B.</td>
<td>Women are less likely to own and use mobile phone and internet technology due to social norms; lack of financial independence; cost of use and network quality/coverage; and gendered cyber violence → women may be unaware of impending climate disasters or evacuation instructions → women may be unable to engage in appropriate or timely responses to early warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.1.C.</td>
<td>Women lack early warning technology operations skills due to gender norms and illiteracy → women may be unaware of impending climate disasters or evacuation instructions → women may not be able to engage in appropriate or timely responses to early warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.1.D.</td>
<td>Gender norms may tie women to their homes and/or often preclude women from having control over decisions to evacuate → women often are responsible for evacuating all extended family members → women cannot engage in appropriate or timely responses to early warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85 *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including *societal capacity*, or one of three *socioeconomic*
The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2.

2.1.1.1. Early Warning and Human Security

To understand how the gendering of GCS-Factor Early Warning fits into the larger Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle, the following discussion will examine aspects of four Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages related to the following aspects of early warning systems: electricity, digital technology (mobile and internet), technology literacy, and evacuation agency. The first three linkages connect to Kabeer’s conception of resources (conditions) necessary for making strategic life choices, while the fourth illustrates how women’s lack of agency can increase their vulnerability...
to extreme climate events. Given the central role Early Warning systems play in people’s ability to prepare for and recover from climate disasters, the Gender Equality-Security Mechanism most relevant to this discussion will be societal capacity.88

Starting with electricity as necessary for Early Warning system access (Linkage 2.1.1.A), at baseline, and under ideal conditions, service provision to low-income urban regions is often challenging for centralized utility providers. Research by Kayaga et al. finds climate breakdown including floods, droughts, heatwaves, landslides, and other conditions are all expected to interrupt electricity services, and consequently Early Warning systems as well.89 Governments and utility providers can take measures to prevent service disruptions, such as pulling energy systems back from coastlines to prepare for sea level rise; managing and forecasting river flooding; decentralizing the grid; adding energy power systems; and of course transitioning to renewable energy; however many of these solutions will be unattainable in the global south.90

According to broad consensus, even before climate disasters impact electricity availability, a system’s gendered institutions and structures may put women (especially those living in poverty) significantly behind men in terms of electricity access.91 Although there is a dearth of FPEcon literature on the subject, several other feminist

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88 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
disciplines have noted important resource constraints that play outsized roles in unequal access to electricity. Osunmuyiwa and Ahlborg suggest that tangible and intangible resource restrictions like knowledge, networks, finance, and infrastructure may all impinge on women’s electricity access. According to feminist scholars Pueyo and Maestre, women often do not benefit from electrification because of gendered structures that limit the roles they play in the labour market. They suggest that women’s roles as workers and entrepreneurs shape how they consume electricity, with fewer opportunities to act as electricity customers or benefit from the productive use of energy:

Women’s chances to be in employment are lower than those for men; they are more likely to be employed informally as contributing family workers or as self-employed workers; they are responsible for the largest share of unpaid work; and are overrepresented in a narrow range of sectors and occupations. … women more likely to be engaged in agriculture, personal services, food preparation, retail trade and textiles. Men, on the contrary have businesses distributed across a wider range of sectors, and in particular in energy intensive sectors like construction, manufacture and repair… Women entrepreneurs concentrate in low productivity, profit, technology and growth sectors; are overrepresented in the smallest and informal enterprises; and are more likely to operate from home, which in some cases damages business performance.

Consequently, Pueyo and Maestre conclude there are multiple intersecting resource and context dimensions of gendered hierarchies that are responsible for shaping women’s use of electricity, including: education access; resource access and control; unequal distribution of care responsibilities; restrictions on women’s use of technology spaces and mobility services; women’s lack of agency over their time and work; and occupational

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segregation.94 Ultimately, without access to reliable, affordable electricity, women may not be able to power the systems that provide Early Warning of predicted climate disasters.

Many of these same structural resource and context challenges are evident in persistent gender inequalities in ownership and use of telecommunications technologies that make accessing Early Warning systems difficult for many women (Linkage 2.1.1.B).95 Women (as well as indigenous groups and older adults) fall behind men in terms of use and access to the internet and mobile phones.96 According to the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSMA), women are 14% less likely to own a mobile phone (38% less for South Asian women) due to lack of financial independence and social norms that discourage women from access to mobile technology.97 The GSMA has identified cost and network quality/coverage as the first and second most important factors preventing women from accessing mobile phone technology.98 However, design of systems and services may also play a role. A report by the International Telecommunication Union on information and communication technology (ICT) use in disaster risk reduction (DRR) showed that women are rarely consulted during the design

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94 Pueyo and Maestre, “Linking Energy Access, Gender and Poverty.”
97 Santosham and Lindsey, “Connected Women: Bridging the Gender Gap - Mobile Access and Usage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries.”
98 Santosham and Lindsey, “Connected Women: Bridging the Gender Gap - Mobile Access and Usage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” 42.
of ICT systems. Additionally, gender-based cyber violence, misogyny, and harassment are now recognized as global threats to the safety of women and girls, and consequently, are deterrents to the uptake of these technologies among women. On the other hand, safe access to digital technologies has been shown to be a lifeline of safety to women and girls, and a means by which to report and receive support following acts of violence, including during natural disasters. As such, women lacking both electricity as well as telecommunications technology are at a significant disadvantage in terms of receiving Early Warnings of expected extreme weather events.

Third, as will be discussed at length in GCS-Factor Education, gendered power structures also limit women’s access to skill development resources and educational systems which can impede their trust and confidence in using such systems (Linkage 2.1.1.C). Notably, cultural norms may preclude women from learning how to use mobile phones, the internet, and electricity technology, leading to women’s decreased confidence and avoidance of these tools. Combined, gender inequalities in digital (mobile and internet) technology, electricity, and literacy access increase women’s risk in climate disaster scenarios. By way of example, a study by Brown et al. of Early Warning systems in Nepal and Peru showed most men (71%) received alerts through formal systems (such as government officials, NGOs, meteorology and hydrology departments, and the like), while only 51% of women received any kind of warning, and most of the warnings

women received came through informal systems (such as family members, community members, neighbours, and task groups).\textsuperscript{103}

Adding to these challenges are two gendered power hierarchy factors that further hamper women’s ability to effectively make strategic life choices through information garnered from Early Warning systems (Linkage 2.1.1.D). The first is that, as household heads, men often make decisions for their entire families (often without consulting their women partners) about how to respond to Early Warnings, leaving women little choice about whether or not to evacuate.\textsuperscript{104} Second, because of a lack of agency in choosing whether or not to evacuate, as well as due to the fact that women’s household and care responsibilities are far more likely to keep women at home prior to disasters (often without their male partners), women are frequently tasked with evacuating all remaining family members to safety alone.\textsuperscript{105} This adds extra complexity to women’s already precarious circumstances. Any disruption of an individual’s ability to access Early Warning systems may result in their being late or the last to evacuate, putting them at greater risk of injury or death.\textsuperscript{106}

The preceding discussion has argued that important elements of Early Warning systems (electricity, digital technology including mobile and internet, technology literacy, and evacuation decision-making) play important roles in people’s climate Coping

\textsuperscript{105} Brown et al., “Gender and Age Inequality of Disaster Risk,” 29.
Capacity, yet are highly gendered. Gendered barriers preventing women from taking advantage of Early Warning systems include a lack of agency, limited access to resources such as electricity, and mobile and internet technology, as well as limited experience and confidence with these technologies. Without Early Warning system access, women’s climate Coping Capacity may be severely hindered in the face of climate breakdown. Using Forsberg and Olsson’s model, these types of gendered barriers that decrease women’s education, empowerment, and networks may result in fewer social resources available to a community, and an increased likelihood of the community resorting to non-peaceful conflict resolution as a result.

Considering gender transformative solutions that invest in women to counter these challenges, FPEcon suggests that rather than merely looking at solving the mechanics of access to the components of an Early Warning system, the gendered nature of technologies must be examined for ways to transform the underlying gendered power imbalances. Feminist technoscience scholar Faulkner contends that technology such as Early Warning systems are gendered, and primarily the domain of men; men make decisions about how technologies are developed and experience far better access to technology as well. Furthermore, Bray argues that gender and technology coproduce one another, in that those who design technologies also design society, often in highly gendered ways. Going beyond conventional Early Warning access approaches allows for these gendered systems and technologies to be re-designed in ways that transform

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power hierarchies, and offer every human a full range of choices for accessing *Early Warning* systems. Consequently, “functioning achievements” become “transformative agency,” which offers improved skills, knowledge, and capabilities, as well as women’s input on design and service delivery, to achieve higher order choice for women and other marginalized groups.\(^{109}\)

### 2.1.1.2. Early Warning and National/International Security

Examining the *National/International Security* aspects of the *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle*, literature on the connection between lack of access to *Early Warning* systems and climate change concerning crime/violence/extremism, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions appears to be scant.\(^{110}\) However, when governments fail to provide public *Early Warning* systems and timely messages of impending disasters to their people, anti-state grievances are not uncommon (Linkage 2.1.1.E). Williams has noted the possibility for there to be significant ramifications for governments should *Early Warning* systems not be in place for natural disasters such as those caused by climate change: “The failure to ensure adequate preparedness against such predictable risks [hurricanes, droughts] would indicate obvious negligence on the part of government, expose leaders to heavy criticism and thus create a very high political cost.”\(^{111}\) Furthermore, Choudhury, Cohen and Werker, Ide, and others have noted the

\(^{109}\) Mininni, “Can Energy Empower Women?”

\(^{110}\) For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).

possible development of unrest and uprisings in response to poor government preparedness and response to natural disasters throughout history.\textsuperscript{112} Though the literature does not provide a gender perspective, given that disruptions related to a lack of \textit{Early Warning} access could result in significant damage to property and loss of life, it may be reasonable to study whether \textit{anti-state grievances} are motivated either by desire to \textit{increase survival} (typically women) or \textit{personal security} (typically men).

2.1.1.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Early Warning Systems

A summary visualizing how *Early Warning Systems* factor into the *Gender-Climate-Security* framework can be found in Figure 9. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 49 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Figure 9. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities Due to Lack of Early Warning Systems.](image)

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Early Warning Systems.*
2.1.2. Healthcare

Table 8. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Healthcare.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Measures the availability and quality of health and medical care services as a determinate of natural disaster Coping Capacity. The HCSS framework tracks number of hospital beds per 1,000 persons as well as current health expenditure as a percentage of GDP.(^{113})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</td>
<td>Measuring Healthcare only by the availability of hospital beds and health expenditures does not provide an accurate picture of the role Healthcare may play in the Coping Capacity of a community or for individuals. In fact, there is a strong body of literature showing that excessive Healthcare spending does not increase welfare.(^{114}) For instance, the United States spends close to twice as much as 10 other high-income countries on medical care, and yet performs less well on many health outcomes.(^{115}) Of particular importance to understanding the status of a state’s Healthcare system is unpacking who has access to Healthcare, and who can afford and therefore receive the Healthcare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPEcons argues that power and privilege inequalities that exist because of a system of patriarchy result in women and men typically having different experiences of and access to health and Healthcare systems on various levels.(^{116}) These include inequities within and without Healthcare systems, on individual, structural, and global levels. A helpful feminist theory for this discussion is social reproduction.(^{117}) In particular, this proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework will frequently return to the following three elements of social reproduction theory as outlined by Rai et al.:(^{118})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Biological reproduction (including producing labour) as what is required to maintain family and intimate relationships, including the provision of the sexual, emotional, and affective services;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{118}\) Shirin Rai, Catherine Hoskyns, and Dania Thomas, “Depletion and Social Reproduction,” in Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (University of Warwick, 2010), 3.
• Unpaid production of goods and services in the home, including various types of care, and meeting community needs through social provisioning and voluntary work;
• Reproduction of culture and ideology, including activities that stabilize dominant social relations.

The ensuing discussion on GCS-Factor Healthcare will examine the broad gendered inequalities within Healthcare systems globally using this model, with particular attention to three key issues for women: sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), child marriage, and sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV). Other sections within this proposed framework will explore healthcare-related topics in greater depth, including water, sanitation, food security, life expectancy, and so on.

*Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Healthcare.*


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security(^\text{119})</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.A. Increased carbon emissions deteriorate human health → climate change drives up healthcare expenses → women living with poverty may find they cannot afford medical care following climate breakdowns/disasters</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.B. Unique health vulnerabilities during pregnancy may increase a pregnant person’s exposure to climate-related health risks → pregnant persons may be more likely to contract infectious diseases during pregnancy or experience lower birth weights, increased likelihood of preterm birth, preeclampsia, hypertension, or other pregnancy complications during heatwaves</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.C. Gendered norms/behaviours related to firefighting and first responder work, boys’ play behaviour, and migration for work may increase men’s exposure to climate-related health risks → men may be more likely to perish in bush fires, contract urban vector-borne diseases, suffer from depression, or higher rates of flood/storm or heatwave mortality (depending on the community norms)</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{119}\) Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.2.D.</strong> Cultural norms may hamper women’s access to sexual and reproductive health services → infant and maternal health may be compromised → women may have more pregnancies and contract more STDs → larger family sizes and poorer health may increase economic and unpaid care pressures on women</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.2.E.</strong> Gender inequalities may prevent disaster planners and relief/recovery planners from consulting women → women’s unique healthcare needs and requirements for hygiene, breastfeeding, and menstruation support may be ignored → women may face increased mortality risks following disasters if their needs are not taken into consideration → women may have lower capacity to contribute in community disaster recovery</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.2.F.</strong> Gender inequalities in food distribution following climate disasters may result in women receiving less food → women may face higher rates of food insecurity</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.2.G.</strong> Climate disasters may prompt increases in rates of child marriage and reductions in the age at which girls are married → young married girls may experience higher rates of food insecurity, STDs, and early pregnancy → young pregnant girls may experience higher rates of eclampsia, postpartum hemorrhage, obstructed labour, fistula, and maternal mortality</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.2.H.</strong> Climate disasters may prompt increases in rates of child marriage and reductions in the age at which girls are married → young married girls may experience lower rates of education, literacy, and emotional support → young married girls may exhibit lower resiliency to future climate or traumatizing events</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.2.I.</strong> Slow- and sudden-onset climate breakdown tends to increase SGBV rates → SGBV undermines women’s food and economic security → SGBV may restrict women’s access to information, decision-making; opportunities to learn, experiment, and explore climate adaptation; or power to hold leaders accountable</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/International Security&lt;sup&gt;120&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.J. Health crises increase both obstacles to and opportunities for criminal activity → may lead to increases in street crime, illicit/illegal trade, cyber crime, grifting, organized criminal group activity, trade in counterfeit medical supplies, corruption, or attacks on politicians/journalists/minorities → such activity may be overlooked by law enforcement due to overwhelm or tasks related to the health crisis → communities may experience increased fragility</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.K. Weakened state capacity (especially when combined with higher inequality, lower economic growth, or existing social unrest) may lead to an inability to handle a climate-caused health crisis → may drive increases in dissatisfaction with government → anti-state actors may seize the opportunity to exploit government weaknesses through propaganda/misinformation → civil unrest and political violence may increase</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.L. Climate-induced health crises may trigger economic/political instability (especially in fragile regions) → may increase fears/resentment of the ‘other’ → can trigger backlash against ‘othered’ groups (especially if viewed as ‘disease carriers’)</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.2.M. Infections disease crises triggered by climate breakdown may weaken military personnel through heightened infection rates → may reduce military readiness → as governments and international bodies are</td>
<td>Interstate tensions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>120</sup> For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a §; those with no research with ¢. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2.

2.1.2.1. Healthcare and Human Security

While it may be obvious that Healthcare is a significant GCS-Factor within Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle, the Gender-Climate-Security Linkages may not be immediately be apparent. Given the toll climate change is likely to have on human bodies, the societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism will be most relevant to the analysis on what gendered impacts climate change will have on Healthcare systems. The following discussion of Healthcare’s role in human (climate) security will cover factors external to Healthcare systems that impact health outcomes (unpaid care work and social reproduction responsibilities), as well as five gendered pathways to inequalities within the Healthcare system (exposure; health behaviours; healthcare access; biased health systems; and biased health research, institutions, and data collection). Three special climate-healthcare topics (sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), child marriage, and sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV)) will also be discussed in greater detail.

121 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
A growing literature demonstrates a strong link between climate change and the quality and availability of Healthcare. A study by Akbar et al. shows a robust causal relationship between Healthcare expenditures, carbon emissions, and human development index: Healthcare investments increase with increased carbon emissions, while carbon emissions significantly deteriorate human health and wellness.\textsuperscript{122} The increase in demand for Healthcare services may come from many sources, including due to an increase in infectious water-borne and vector-borne disease types and geographical reach; air pollution that exacerbates asthma and cardiovascular diseases (to name a few health conditions); extreme heat that drives increases in depression and deaths from congestive heart failure; natural disasters that cause widespread injuries and death; and droughts that lead to food insecurity and nutrition-related diseases.\textsuperscript{123} The WHO estimates that between 2030 and 2050, climate change will cause 250,000 excess deaths annually due to malnutrition, malaria, heat stress, and diarrhea, noting that many developing countries are ill-prepared to cope with the added strain on their already fragile health systems.\textsuperscript{124}

The health consequences of climate change will not be felt equally by women and men. Before women even enter a Healthcare system, they often lag behind men due to cultural and ideological structures and attitudes outside the Healthcare system. For instance, unpaid care responsibilities for children and other family members often prevent

women from pursuing advanced education, thereby lowering lifetime earning capacity, intensifying rates of poverty, and consequently reducing health outcomes.\textsuperscript{125} Lower rates of compensation for paid work in traditional sectors also modifies women’s health outcomes due to women’s lower earnings and therefore smaller budgets available for healthy food; health, medical, dental, and vision care expenses; healthy housing and commutes; etc. (Linkage 2.1.2.A).\textsuperscript{126}

Additional barriers and inequities within the \textit{Healthcare} system may further trigger poorer health outcomes for women. Rai et al.’s social reproduction theory, for instance, suggests women and men have gendered individual physiological differences, including women’s biological reproduction health needs, that require unique biomedical research foci and approaches.\textsuperscript{127} Heise et al. succinctly describe the baseline structural disadvantages that contribute to gender inequities in \textit{Healthcare} and health outcomes:

\ldots gender inequality and restrictive gender norms impact health through differential exposures, health-related behaviours and access to care, as well as how gender-biased health research and health-care systems reinforce and reproduce gender inequalities, with serious implications for health. The cumulative consequences of structured disadvantage, mediated through discriminatory laws, policies, and institutions, as well as diet, stress, substance use, and environmental toxins, have triggered important discussions about the role of social injustice in the creation and maintenance of health inequities, especially along racial and socioeconomic lines.\textsuperscript{128}

Furthermore, at a system’s level, in biomedical research, even after 20 years of reform globally, women’s health concerns are underfunded due to complexity, and women are

\textsuperscript{126} Syed, “Feminist Political Economy of Health.”
\textsuperscript{127} Syed, “Feminist Political Economy of Health.”
\textsuperscript{128} Lori Heise et al., “Gender Inequality and Restrictive Gender Norms: Framing the Challenges to Health,” \textit{The Lancet} 393, no. 10189 (June 15, 2019): 2440, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30652-X.
still underrepresented as research participants and researchers, suggesting women’s unique health needs are less understood and addressed than those of men, including those impacted by climate change. Inequalities are further intensified in societies where girls and women are discriminated against because of their perceived lower value compared to boys and men.

Heise and colleagues offer five gendered pathways to health outcome inequality: gendered differences in exposure; gendered health behaviours; gendered impacts on accessing care; gender-biased health systems; and gender-biased health research, institutions, and data collection. Crucially, these factors result in less favourable health outcomes for many women globally. In a meta-analysis of gendered climate-related health inequalities, Sellers provides an overview of the latest research, which is summarized in Table 10. Sellers’ findings are organized according to Heise et al.’s pathways, excluding the fifth pathway related to research, institutions, and data (as this category has less immediate relevance to climate security).

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131 Heise et al., “Gender Inequality and Restrictive Gender Norms,” 2443.
132 Larme, “Health Care Allocation and Selective Neglect in Rural Peru”; Vlassoff, “Gender Differences in Determinants and Consequences of Health and Illness.”
Table 10. Four Pathways to Gendered Climate-Related Health Inequalities.

**Gendered differences in exposure**

Studies on gender and heat wave mortality show mixed results, with some indicating men are far more likely to die, and some finding women are more likely to die.

Men have a much higher mortality risk related to bush fires.

Women-headed households are more likely to experience food insecurity, and girls and women tend to reduce the number of meals they eat as a result.

Men may be at greater risk of contracting dengue fever due to the fact that the disease is more common in urban areas (migration may increase the flow of men into urban areas more readily than women).

Some studies show women may experience higher rates of exposure to flood waters leading to higher rates of skin conditions.

Following natural disasters or periods of food insecurity, women tend to experience higher rates of stress-related disorders (such as PTSD or acute stress disorder), depression, and anxiety, though rates of depression among men who are first responders appears to be equal to that of women.

Women and men appear to be equally likely to commit suicide following a heatwave. However, in regions where climate change has increased drought, men who farm land impacted by drought are more likely to commit suicide that women.

Pregnant persons are more likely to contract some infectious diseases like dengue and malaria, and experience more adverse effects of many infectious diseases, including cholera, dengue fever, malaria, and schistosomiasis. Negative outcomes in pregnancy and maternal health include miscarriage, premature birth, and anemia.

Pregnant persons are more susceptible to adverse effects of extreme temperatures and stress from natural disasters, resulting in lower birth weights, increased likelihood of preterm birth, preeclampsia, hypertension, and other pregnancy complications. Children of such pregnancies may also be more likely to be diagnosed with autism or developmental delays.

Young boys who play near the water are at greater risk of schistosomiasis if those waters transmit the disease.

**Gendered health behaviours**

Heat wave-related deaths are higher among the isolated elderly; gendered mortality risks may be higher in societies where one gender of the elderly population is more socially isolated than the other.

There is a growing literature that shows in developing countries that women experience higher mortality rates due to storms and floods. Some studies suggest cultural norms are to blame, such as those that prevent women from learning to swim, removing heavy clothing, or seeking help from men. However, men may be more likely to perish in developed societies where men take part in risky rescue efforts, or where they are more likely to use a vehicle to try to escape the disaster.

Cultural practices such as son preference in many countries may lead girls and women to be the first to skip meals following a natural disaster, during periods of drought, or because of general food insecurity. Higher infant mortality among girls has been recorded in many regions as a result.
Gendered health behaviours
Women are more likely than men to be engaged in caring for sick individuals, and therefore may have a higher risk of contracting an infectious disease.
Women often cook in the early morning and late evenings, times when malaria vectors are more likely prevalent. However, men who work in the forest industry may be at greater risk due to their exposure to mosquito bites.
Men who are firefighters and construction workers may be more likely to come in contact with contaminated flood waters, resulting in higher rates of skin conditions.
Rates of SGBV, human trafficking, and sexual exploitation of vulnerable women and children tend to increase following all manner of natural disasters.
In disaster shelters, migrant camps, and congregant facilities are often inadequate for gender-specific uses (such as bathrooms, washing facilities, etc.), leaving many women open to higher risks of SGBV.

Gendered impacts on accessing care
Some research indicates that cultural practices that forbid women from leaving their homes may prevent them from seeking care following a natural disaster, leading to a higher mortality risk.
Natural disasters tend to hamper access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services.

Gender-biased health systems
Disaster planning that ignores women’s needs may be a factor in women’s increased mortality risk during floods and storms.
In regions where men control food distribution, there may be a gender bias that results in women and children receiving less food.
In some societies, especially those in which women’s modesty is culturally important, shelters are often constructed without consideration for women’s hygiene, breastfeeding, menstruation privacy needs.

Gendered climate-health research summarized in Sellers, organized into Heise et al. four of five health pathways by this author. The table contains discussion on Linkage 2.1.2.B, Linkage 2.1.2.C, Linkage 2.1.2.D, Linkage 2.1.2.E, and Linkage 2.1.2.F.

Based on the findings in Table 10, it’s clear that climate Coping Capacity is dependent on access to good quality Healthcare. Importantly, dismantling the gendered structures that underpin the gendered health inequities will be extremely important for women to achieve the robust health outcomes they need to withstand the challenges of

134 Sellers, “Gender and Climate Change.”
climate change. Furthermore, feminists generally argue against biological determinism, suggesting that socioeconomic, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences are important determinants of human health. Arora-Johnsson, Carr, and Thompson, find that when assessing the vulnerability of a population to climate change, a binary approach to gender tends to overlook the specific challenges facing the most marginal and vulnerable. Consequently, when examining the culture, institutions, and structures that inform how gender intersects with climate security in a particular locale, it would be important to employ an expanded, rigorous intersectional gender analysis for understanding gender and identity on topics such as Healthcare.

Three of the Healthcare topics summarized in Table 10 require additional exploration because of their uniquely gendered impacts on women’s Coping Capacity in a warming world (all of which relate to the societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism): SRHR, child marriage, and SGBV. SRHR are central to women’s health and Coping Capacity in crises, yet SRHR are frequently neglected in crisis situations (Linkage 2.1.2.D). The links between SRHR and a woman’s wellbeing are many. SRHR services are recognized as a human right, in part because readily available SRHR services improve child and maternal health, and reduce rates of sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs) and other communicable diseases. Crucially, without full sexual and

135 Syed, “Feminist Political Economy of Health.”
reproductive health rights, women and girls cannot fully participate in all social, political, and economic levels of society.\textsuperscript{139} For instance, since lower fertility rates offer women more opportunities to improve their socioeconomic standing, greater sexual agency is critical for reducing poverty, and has been shown to have economic benefits across generations.\textsuperscript{140} As such, the power structures that underpin the lack of SRHRs must be removed for full gender equality to be achieved.

Furthermore, SRHRs are directly tied to climate \textit{Coping Capacity}, especially given that SRHR services are often disrupted following a natural disaster.\textsuperscript{141} The Population Reference Bureau has summarized numerous studies that show when women have access to sufficient SRHR tools such as family planning and reproductive health services, they achieve greater \textit{Coping Capacity} along several pathways.\textsuperscript{142} First, they and their children are healthier (a fundamental element of climate \textit{Coping Capacity}). Second, women are more empowered, which gives them greater ability to engage in adaptation efforts. And third, smaller families have smaller demands for climate-sensitive resources like food and water. Similarly, a study of linkages between family planning, maternal and child health, and \textit{Coping Capacity} in Tanzania by Hardee et al. shows households that

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
score highly on questions related to SRHR factors also score higher in factors related to overall Coping Capacity.\textsuperscript{143}

Closely related to SRHR is the issue of child marriage and the ways in which it intersects with climate breakdown (Linkage 2.1.2.G). Studies in Bangladesh, Uganda, Kenya, Pakistan, South Sudan, and Niger, among others, have demonstrated that rates of child marriage may increase and the age at which girls are married may decrease following natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, droughts, and tornadoes.\textsuperscript{144} There are several reasons for earlier and more frequent marriage of girl children. During periods of strained natural resources such as food or water, parents facing malnutrition and hunger may choose to marry off their girls to allocate resources for family survival.\textsuperscript{145} Similarly, marriage may be used as a way to generate income for a family through bride price or dowry payments, which become even more important during crises.\textsuperscript{146} Since young girls are often perceived as likely to engage in acts of sexual immorality, marriage is seen as a way to avoid impropriety during periods of greater strain.\textsuperscript{147} Marriage may


also be viewed as protection against sexual violence, which tends to increase following natural disasters and slow-onset climate crises like droughts.\textsuperscript{148} However, it should be noted that unmarried girls are often victims of sexual violence, and may be forced into early marriage to the perpetrators of rape, making such relationships highly coercive and traumatizing.\textsuperscript{149}

Child marriage is therefore a Healthcare challenge that may increase in intensity as climate change accelerates, compounding the health risks to young girls. Despite the fact that early marriage is often used to ensure the survival of girl children, girls often find their health declines following marriage at a young age. For instance, they may lack the nutrition they need and are often hungry.\textsuperscript{150} Additionally, studies by Laga et al. and Nunn et al., among others, show married girl children are more likely to become infected with sexually-transmitted disease (STDs), especially HIV and human papilloma virus (HPV).\textsuperscript{151} Consequently, girls who marry young are also at higher risk of cervical cancer (caused by HPV).\textsuperscript{152} Very young girls are often married into families eager for more children, resulting in pressure from the husband and mother-in-law to conceive as soon as

\textsuperscript{149} Felten-Biermann, “Gender and Natural Disaster”; Myers, “Untying the Knot,” 25.
Both pregnancy and the delivering of children by young girls results in higher health risks. Pregnant girls are at greater risk of contracting diseases like malaria, which is more deadly because of increased complications during pregnancy. The health risks to girl children delivering their babies includes higher rates of eclampsia, postpartum hemorrhage, obstructed labour potentially leading to a fistula (fecal and/or urinary incontinence and peroneal nerve palsy which causes humiliation and ostracism), and maternal mortality. Additionally, girls who give birth as children often come to the experience without education or emotional support, and therefore find the experience traumatizing and difficult. Needless to say, all of the health risks associated with child marriage are likely to decrease the climate Coping Capacity of these girls and their children and communities.

Finally, SGBV also reduces the Coping Capacity of its victims, most commonly women and girls (Linkage 2.1.2.I). SGBV is an overt expression of unequal power relations between women and men, resulting in a cascade of negative consequences that further entrenched these gender inequalities—consequences such as inability to access and exchange information; inaccessibility to decision-making processes; inability to learn, experiment, and explore new ideas; and inability to hold leaders accountable or question power relations. SGBV may also increase a woman’s food insecurity according to Lentz’s research which suggests that domestic violence may prompt women to reduce the

153 Hamad et al., “‘No One Should Be Terrified Like I Was!’ Exploring Drivers and Impacts of Child Marriage in Protracted Crises Among Palestinian and Syrian Refugees.”
155 Nour, “Health Consequences of Child Marriage in Africa.”
156 Hamad et al., “‘No One Should Be Terrified Like I Was!’ Exploring Drivers and Impacts of Child Marriage in Protracted Crises Among Palestinian and Syrian Refugees.”
number of meals or food quality they eat in order to avoid violent interactions with a partner, which may lead to nutritional deficiencies.\textsuperscript{158}

Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that SGBV impacts women’s ability to work, often decreasing the number of hours and quality of output she can produce.\textsuperscript{159} A reduction in work can therefore increase women’s economic insecurity as well. Several larger studies have shown a link between SGBV and overall \textit{Coping Capacity}. Tsirigotis and Łuczak use the ‘Ego Resiliency Scale’ to demonstrate that the psychology and physical trauma of domestic violence lowers victim \textit{Coping Capacity} below that of the general population, especially if perpetrated by father figures.\textsuperscript{160} Le Masson et al. have used empirical evidence to show that ‘everyday violence’ undermines coping capacities during environmental change at the individual, household, and community level.\textsuperscript{161}

Not surprisingly, these combined elements—unpaid care and social reproduction work disadvantaging women outside of the Healthcare system; five gendered pathways to health inequity within the Healthcare system such as exposure, health behaviours, healthcare access, biased health systems, and biased health research, institutions, and data collection; and in particular, child marriage, SRHR, and SGBV—suggest that Healthcare


is likely to play an important role in the Human Security of many, but especially women. In the words of Forsberg and Olsson, gender discrimination in Healthcare suggests low investments in women’s education, empowerment, networks, and political representation, triggering lower societal stability overall, and possibly greater risks of national or international fragility as a result. A climate-responsive, gender transformative Healthcare system would take seriously the impacts that social reproduction and cultural/institutional inequalities have on women’s health by addressing the norms underlying such disparities. Serious attention would also be paid to investments made to changing the attitudes, laws (customary and judicial), and institutional structures that support practices such as child marriage, lack of SRHR, and high rates of SGBV.

2.1.2.2. Healthcare and National/International Security

Looking at the National/International Security implications of GCS-Factor Healthcare, it’s obvious that all four types of security risks may be impacted. In the crime/violence/extremism pathway, Healthcare crises may fuel an increase in a wide variety of malign activities, as criminals and organized crime groups find both obstacles and opportunities for their illicit activities (Linkage 2.1.2.J). One only has to look at the increased illegal activities perpetuated during the COVID-19 pandemic. While social distancing and travel restrictions had a dampening effect on some criminal activities in the early days, with police forces focused on pandemic-related activities, there were also

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162 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
opportunities for organized crime groups to scale up their activities. A Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime report describes the situation in Guinea-Bissau where drug production and trafficking saw an increase during the pandemic, along with attacks on journalists and opposition figures, and corruption within the judiciary. In South Africa, Nairobi, Switzerland, and other countries, cyber scammers became increasingly active. Street crime, trade in illegal wildlife products, and many other types of criminal activity have also increased.

Importantly, the health sector has seen a significant uptick in health-related fraudulent activity as smugglers steal and traffic in medical supplies, and scammers have peddled counterfeit medical devices and fake cures in 90 countries, with seizures of potentially dangerous pharmaceuticals worth $14+ million in 2020 alone. The health sector has also been victim to diversion of funds, misallocation of resources, bribes for preferential medical treatment, and rampant corruption around the world. Though no research has been completed regarding gendered motivations, a whole range of motivations may drive people to be involved in criminal activity during a health crisis. It may be reasonable to surmise that women may be motivated by a desire to increase survival, especially if pregnancy health concerns or the health of children are an issue. Additionally, perhaps motivations related to greater opportunities will motivate women to engage in criminal activity, especially if healthcare costs increase. For men, pull of networks and personal security may be most likely. [Noting again, as discussed in section

164 “Coronavirus,” 6.
165 “Coronavirus,” 7.
166 “Coronavirus,” 7.
1.2.3.2, as crime rates increase following Healthcare crises, men may be more likely to
be involved in violent crimes and in leadership roles, while women may be more
involved in property-related crimes and low-ranking positions within crime
organizations, however no research has been completed to connect gendered roles related
to health-based criminal activity.]

Weakened state capacity due to an inability to handle a widespread Healthcare
crisis may also lead to increases in anti-state grievances (Linkage 2.1.2.K). According to
Campbell, “Loss of confidence in government’s ability to protect its citizens makes
people vulnerable to extremists who promise near-term solutions, leading to civil unrest
and political violence, refugee migrations into neighboring states, insurgencies and
disruption of regional security.”167 A data analysis of historical pandemic and political
violence by Sedik and Xu shows social unrest increases at about 14 months following a
pandemic’s start, and peaks around 24 months post-pandemic. Systems with lower
growth, existing social unrest, and higher inequality experience the impact more intensely
and may become locked in a vicious cycle.168

In particular, erosion of public trust in the state may drive individuals or groups to
take matters into their own hands, a trend that has been seen in the wake of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project, which has
tracked political violence before and during the pandemic, showed an initial decline in
political violence and demonstrations (likely linked to pre-pandemic negotiations and

ceasefires in high-incidence countries like Syria and Afghanistan), though this trend reversed over the long term, with rates of political violence rising to their highest levels in 2020 shortly after the initial drop-off.169 During the initial phases of the pandemic, while state leadership and institutions were distracted, some groups hostile to the state seized the opportunity to gain military advantage in the field or exploit state weaknesses, especially through propaganda and misinformation; meanwhile acts of state repression increased 30% globally.170 Seeing this in the light of the gendered nature of political unrest, criticism of governments made on the basis of failure to protect public health might conceivably motivate protesters through the avoid abuse mechanism (likely women) and exposure to violence/repression mechanism (likely men), though no specific research on political unrest motivations related to Healthcare is readily available. [Noting that, as discussed in section 1.2.3.3, men are more likely to be involved in violent protests; women may be more involved in low-risk anti-state demonstrations, however more research is required to connect gendered protest participation trends related to Healthcare].

Healthcare crises also appear to trigger grievances between societal groups (Linkage 2.1.2.L). According to Peterson, epidemic disease outbreaks may lead to economic and political instability, resulting in heightened risks of conflicts between groups, especially in fragile regions.171 A study by Barrett and Chen confirms these

findings, and suggests that in the long run, pandemics lead to an increase in civil unrest and violence due to scarring effects of epidemics, such as increased fears of the ‘other,’ backlash against certain groups, the negative effects of containment and mitigation efforts, and severe economic damage especially for the poor.\textsuperscript{172} ACLED has recorded an 11\% increase in mob violence since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, with 1,800 incidents in dozens of countries in the first 16 weeks following the declaration of a pandemic as people attempted to use non-state violence to correct perceived wrongs and punish those suspected of spreading the disease.\textsuperscript{173} Notably, violence against civilians by communal militias increased 70\%.\textsuperscript{174} Additionally, mass movements of people continued in many regions, with some reports that migrants and refugees were being scapegoated as disease carriers.\textsuperscript{175} Furthermore, pandemic-related economic challenges in many regions may lead to mass migrations, adding to local and international tensions. It is reasonable to posit that such activity may be motivated by \textit{increase survival} (typically women) and \textit{personal security} (typically men), though research on motivations is not available.

\textit{Interstate tensions} may also prove problematic during health crises (Linkage 2.1.2.M). Peterson speaks of health crises such as pandemics as possible vectors for changing regional balances of power caused by heightened infection rates among military personnel that weaken military readiness.\textsuperscript{176} Additionally, Mustasiltä suggests that


\textsuperscript{173} Pavlik, “A Great and Sudden Change.”

\textsuperscript{174} Pavlik, “A Great and Sudden Change.”


\textsuperscript{176} Peterson, “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” 77.
distraction of international bodies opens opportunities for conflicts to erupt or worsen. These trends have been evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, the conflict in the Donbas between Ukraine and Russia had been moving forward prior to the pandemic, but border closures slowed people’s movements and hindered international monitoring, while distractions permitted ceasefire violations. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has also resulted in stalling or cessation of peace efforts in some regions. This is likely due to distractions within fragile systems that demand significant attention, and lack of money due to budget cuts to peacekeeping efforts. Motivations for engaging in *interstate tensions* could conceivably be similar to those of *grievances between societal groups*: *increase survival* (typically women) and *personal security* (typically men), though here, too no research is available.


2.1.2.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Healthcare**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *Healthcare* can be found in Figure 10. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 50 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Figure 10. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Healthcare.](image)

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Healthcare.*
2.1.3. Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH)

Table 11. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor WASH.

| Dominant Approach: | Measures the percentage of a population that has access to basic sanitation services (flush/pour flush to piped sewer systems, septic tanks, pit latrines, composting toilets) that they do not share with other households, as well as basic drinking water services (from improved water sources such as piped water, borehole or tube well, protected springs, protected dug wells, or packaged water) that requires no more than 30 minutes round trip for collection.  

| FPEcon/FPEcol Approach: | In conventional development and environmental sustainability theory, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services are viewed as commodities to which all humans should have equal access. While FPEcon and FPEcol scholars would agree that equal access is a requirement, scholars in these theoretical traditions suggest that human relationships to water are far more complex and nuanced, and often highly gendered and unequal. For instance, feminist scholar Saltana argues that components of nature such as water are important factors in re/producing gendered social relations in terms of whether or not people’s time/labour/work are valued; decisions made about how far/from where to get water, how often, how much, and how to use it; and whether people feel empowered or powerless to change their access to safe water.  

In conventional market-focused conceptions of WASH, water should be commoditized as much as possible to encourage conservation and prevent pollution, and decentralized structures should be employed in its management, in which special roles are reserved for women in managing and conserving water. FPEcols Cleaver and Elson, however, argue that dealing with water as an economic resource ignores water’s role in health and social wellbeing and therefore doesn’t calculate the economic benefits it offers. Furthermore, privatizing water for the purposes of selling it takes a natural resource away from those who often cannot pay for it. Finally, Green and Baden suggest that rather than empowering women, a market-driven approach to water may trap women in

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domestic roles as household water managers, and that anti-pollution incentives may add to women’s unpaid labour workloads.\textsuperscript{184}

Jackson recommends avoidance of two potential pitfalls when discussing water and gender. First, “an overemphasis on the separation of genders, rather than the integration and interdependence of gender relations,” looking instead at dynamic and complex gender identities, and shared/divided interests of water. Second, “an excessive reliance on materialist analysis, in particular a reduction of “resources” to mean only physical assets,” in favour of considering culture as well as land and labour.\textsuperscript{185}

Using a feminist political ecology approach provides a way of asking nuanced questions to understand the gender-water nexus and overcome some of the pitfalls Jackson mentions. Specifically, FPEcol problematizes gendered water relations by probing whether women are negatively impacted by large-scale water projects that cause environmental degradation; whether or not divisions of labour between women and men function well; how much time and effort water collection requires; whether a particular community’s gender differences in relation to water are important; whether the commodification of water impacts women and men differently; and whether women and men have specialist knowledge about how water is accessed, controlled, or valued.\textsuperscript{186} The discussion that follows will attempt to examine many of these gendered elements of \textit{WASH} and how they may or may not add or subtract from individual and community and individual \textit{Coping Capacity}.

\textit{Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of \textit{WASH}.}

\textsuperscript{185} Jackson, “Gender, Irrigation, and Environment,” 315.
\textsuperscript{186} Jackson, “Gender, Irrigation, and Environment,” 315.
Table 12. Short Overview of the WASH Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security 187</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.A.</td>
<td>Due to gendered norms, women/girls are often tasked with WASH-related household duties (cooking, laundry, cleaning, and caring for sick family) → climate-caused water shortages may increase time/effort required to complete WASH-related tasks → time spent on WASH tasks reduces time available to women/girls for economic/education activities → reinforces household/socioeconomic gendered inequalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.B.</td>
<td>Climate-related water shortages may complicate WASH-related tasks → women/girls may face increased structural, psychological, physical, and SGBV risks, especially in water-stressed rural regions, urban slums, and displaced-persons camps → SGBV intensifies existing gender-based inequalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.C.</td>
<td>Climate-caused WASH-related task complications may increase risks of physical injury to women/girls → women/girls may experience higher rates of neck pain, spinal injuries, spontaneous abortion, uterine prolapse, and increase caloric expenditures → bodily depletion further reinforces gender inequalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.D.</td>
<td>Lacking adequate WASH facilities may challenge women’s ability to address unique biological needs such as urination, defecation, menstruation, and pregnancy → may reinforce ideas that bodily functions are dirty/impure → may prevent women from seeking information/healthcare support and/or may limit women’s ability to participate in educational/economic spaces and reinforce gender inequities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.E.</td>
<td>Climate change makes WASH-related tasks more difficult and increases stress related to SGBV and shame → women experience higher levels of distress and mental health challenges → women lack empowerment and report lower levels of happiness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

187 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.F. Governments may fail to address care economy-related infrastructure investments (pipe water systems, wells, sewer systems) due to climate-stressed budgets → further reinforces structural gender power imbalances with all of the effects previously noted</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.G. Climate change is expected to cause widespread water shortages → may fuel elite- or criminal/rebel groups capture/securitization of water provisioning → hypermasculine, militant, and terrorist approaches may be used to instil fear of violence and amplify feelings of water deprivation</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>Men more likely to be involved in violent crime // Avoid abuse§ (typically women) and pull of networks§ or exposure to violence/repression§ (typically men) motivations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.H. Climate change is expected to cause widespread water shortages → hypermasculine, militant, and terrorist approaches may be used to instil fear of water-related violence and amplify a sense of water deprivation → may deteriorate community’s mental health → may feed into negative feelings that fuel violence</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>Increase survival§ (typically women) and personal security§ (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.3.I. Climate change is expected to cause widespread water shortages → both women and men may protest, sometimes violently (some women defy norms that restrict them to the home) → protests may result in violent clashes with police</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances</td>
<td>Avoid abuse§ and increase survival§ (typically women) and exposure to violence/repression§ and personal security§ (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.3.J.</strong> Climate-caused water shortages may prompt governments to privatize water supplies → women (and men, who are more often in leadership roles) may organize demonstrations against resulting restrictions, frustrations, and injustices → demonstrations may result in violent clashes with police</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances</td>
<td>Women defy gender norms to be involved in protests, sometimes violent / Avoid abuse$^\S$ (typically women) and possible cross-over into exposure to violence/repression$^\S$ (typically men but may also be expressed by women) as well as revenge$^\S$ (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.3.K.</strong> Climate change may increase water shortages → may amplify tensions between existing rival groups or create tensions with new intrastate competitors (especially when combined with socioeconomic factors)</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] Increase survival (typically women) and pull of networks or personal security (typically men) $^\O$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.3.L.</strong> Climate change may increase water shortages → may intensify existing or trigger new interstate tensions → should hydrodiplomacy fail or power balances become skewed, water wars may result</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>Avoid abuse$^\S$ (typically women) and revenge$^\S$ (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.3.M.</strong> Climate change may increase water shortages → may intensify existing or trigger new interstate tensions → should hydrodiplomacy fail or power balances become skewed, water wars may result</td>
<td>Interstate tensions</td>
<td>[Requires research] NA $^\O$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a $^\S$; those with no research with $^\O$. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.3.2.
2.1.3.1. **WASH and Human Security**

Within the larger *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle*, GCS-Factor *WASH* may be one of the most studied in terms of climate change’s impact, the role of *WASH* in *Human Security* and *National/International Security*, and the gendered nature of *WASH* challenges. In fact, an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on climate change and water noted, “water and its availability and quality will be the main pressures on, and issues for, societies and the environment under climate change.”

Access to water and *WASH* resources are particularly key to *Human Security* because of the ways in which they are tied to food security and socioeconomic development, and because of the gendered nature of such access. From an FPEcol perspective, socioeconomic disadvantages due to lack of affordable and direct access to natural resources like water generally decrease *Human Security*, making individuals, families, and communities more vulnerable to climate security risks. With this perspective in mind, most of the following discussion will focus on the societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism. In particular six *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* for how climate change may intensify *WASH*-related gender inequalities and reduce women’s climate *Coping Capacity* will be discussed: (1) increasing the time required to complete *WASH*-related tasks; (2) increasing threats of SGBV in carrying out *WASH*-related tasks; (3) increasing physical injury due to more difficult *WASH*-related tasks; (4) amplifying modesty/privacy concerns that may hold women back from seeking medical help or

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190 *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
engaging in the economic/education opportunities; (5) increasing rates of mental health distress; (6) limiting government investments in care economy WASH infrastructure, thereby reinforcing structural power imbalances.

Both slow-onset climate breakdown and climate-caused natural disasters are already damaging WASH facilities. In particular, climate change is expected to increase intensity of rainfall in some regions, causing flood damage and contaminating water supplies; increased rainfall variability, resulting in frequent droughts that impact seasonal water supplies and could result in water contamination; and causing longer term declines in rainfall and run-off, leading to reductions in river flows and groundwater supplies, and impacting sanitation systems.\(^{191}\) One recent example is cyclone Amphan in Bangladesh, following which Rafa et al. found that water sources became contaminated and toilets were destroyed, resulting in lack of safe water, open defecation, and outbreaks of skin conditions and diarrhea.\(^{192}\) Kohlitz et al. studied the intersection of climate and WASH by examining three theoretical approaches to the problem: outcome vulnerability, contextual vulnerability, and resilience (summarized briefly in Table 13).\(^{193}\)

\(^{191}\) Naomi Oates et al., “Adaptation to Climate Change in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene” (Water Policy Programme, Overseas Development Institute, January 2014), 4–5, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a089b9ed915d622c000381/61463-ODI_Adaptation_to_Climate_Change_in_WASH_Final.pdf.


Table 13. Three Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Climate-WASH Interactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome vulnerability</th>
<th>Contextual vulnerability</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on climate impacts on society and nature as a function of a system’s exposure and sensitivity to future hazards.</td>
<td>Focuses on non-climatic drivers of climate susceptibility that result in an inability to cope with external pressures and changes.</td>
<td>Focuses on the interaction of social-ecological systems as understood as the amount of change or disturbance a system can absorb without shifting to a new state with different structural and functional properties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific climate-impacted WASH infrastructure systems impacted include:
- Wells and latrines
- Spring-fed water systems
- Groundwater supplies
- Small-scale sand dams
- Small-scale water supplies
- Mountain spring-fed water systems
- Rural groundwater supplies

Specific points of susceptibility within WASH systems include:
- How people draw on religious and cultural values to secure water
- Power relations that result in unequal access to land or resources
- Social and economic factors

Specific approaches to understanding WASH resilience include:
- Adaptive co-management, focused on analyzing complex, cross-scale interconnections between factors and processes affecting water management
- Integrated water resources management, focused on how water systems interact with one another

Solutions include:
- Improve utility capacity
- Repair and modify water infrastructure
- Finance systems for rural communities
- Climate-proof WASH infrastructure

Solutions include:
- Addressing power structures within influential organizations
- Improving feelings of self-efficacy
- Empowering individuals to overcome local barriers to adaptive action
- Alleviating poverty

Solutions include:
- Continual monitoring and information gathering to support learning and adaptation
- Diversification of water supplies to spread risk
- Increased redundancy through storage and multiple water sources
- Deeper wells/boreholes to prevent depletion
- Decentralizing water infrastructure to maximize use of different skillsets

Climate-driven WASH risks and approaches to addressing them as outlined by Kohlitz et al., summarized by this author.\(^\text{194}\)

\(^{194}\) Kohlitz, Chong, and Willetts, “Climate Change Vulnerability and Resilience of Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Services.”
While all three of the above theoretical perspectives are important for conceptualizing how climate change is likely to impact WASH systems, given the focus on gender equity within the proposed framework of this study, the six Gender-Climate-Security Linkages for how climate change may intensify WASH-related gender inequalities explored in the following discussion will fall into the “contextual vulnerability” approach, however the “resilience” approach is likely to offer the most in terms of gender transformative approaches to addressing gender inequalities in WASH systems.

First, due to women’s and girls’ culturally prescribed roles in the household related to cooking, laundry, cleaning, and caring for children and sick family members, the collection and management of household water resources is an important factor in their wellbeing. Numerous studies have shown that lack of access to affordable, local WASH resources often results in women and children (especially girls) spending significant amounts of time fetching water and carrying out cleaning tasks—responsibilities which will require even more time as climate change accelerates and water sources become more scarce.\textsuperscript{195} The time required for water collection and management reduces time available to women and girls for undertaking economic

activities and education, and may reinforce gender norms about the value of women’s time and abilities, as well as their lower household status (Linkage 2.1.3.A).  

Second, in communities where WASH facilities are lacking, ranging from water-stressed rural regions to urban slums to displaced-persons camps, women may become more vulnerable to SGBV. Nunbogu and Elliott’s research suggests there are four types of WASH-related gender-based violence: structural, psychological, physical, and sexual.

1. Structural: In communities without discrete, gender-specific toilets and washing facilities, women frequently report harassment and violence when attempting to urinate, defecate, or wash, and often wait hours to find a private location rather than risk attack.

2. Psychological: Intra-household conflicts may also develop if there are disagreements between water use for livestock and household needs, in some cases leading to increased mental strain and higher risks of SGBV. Mental distress related to WASH may also arise due to harassment by community leaders.

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for practices of open defecation where sufficient toilet facilities are lacking. For practices of open defecation where sufficient toilet facilities are lacking. (Notably, some men and boys also face violence in similar situations, and often avoid reporting incidences due to masculine stigmas).

3. Physical: Women who migrate to internally-displaced people (IDP) camps (possibly due to climate change) may skip meals in order to avoid the challenges of finding safe and hygienic toilets.

4. Sexual: In the act of fetching water, girls and women may need to travel increasing distances, putting them at greater risk of SGBV.

As discussed in section 2.1.2.1, all forms of SGBV may be used to marginalize women and reinforce unequal power structures, increasing gendered human insecurity and reducing climate Coping Capacity (Linkage 2.1.3.B).

SGBV isn’t the only physical threat to the health of women. In a third category of gendered disadvantage related to WASH, heavy loads of water may cause a variety of injuries in the bodies of the girls and women who collect and transport water by hand, adding to their bodily depletion. For instance, research by numerous scholars suggests that women tasked with carrying water experience neck pain, spinal injuries, spontaneous

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abortion, uterine prolapse, and increase caloric expenditures. As will be discussed in depth in a section on Life Expectancy, failure to include the bodily depletion that this kind of work may generate means ignoring the subsidy many women’s bodies make to their households and the economy more generally (Linkage 2.1.3.C).

Fourth, women and girls face unique biological challenges with the physical acts related to WASH systems such as urination, defecation, menstruation, and pregnancy. For instance, a systematic review of research on menstruation by Hennegan et al. shows that in many cultures, stigmas regarding menses are common, and include restrictive gender norms and conceptualizations of menstruation as ‘dirty’ or ‘impure’ that stress requirements that women maintain modesty norms, resulting in inhibition to speak about and seek information on personal care. When WASH systems are insufficient, such as in many schools worldwide, these stigmas prevent women from partaking in a full educational experience and ultimately hold them back in terms of personal and economic achievements. Sufficient WASH facilities are also crucial to maternal and newborn health, yet similar restrictions on access to water or stigmas about pregnancy and delivery may put women’s and babies’ lives at risk. These stigmas often reinforce gendered

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207 Yael Velleman et al., “From Joint Thinking to Joint Action: A Call to Action on Improving Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene for Maternal and Newborn Health,” *PLOS Medicine* 11, no. 12 (December 12,
power imbalances by fueling feelings of shame that may impinge on a woman’s freedom to leave the house, and consequently ability to attend school or work, and may inhibit a woman’s feelings of empowerment and confidence. In communities facing WASH constraints due to climate change, the effects of such gender norms are likely to be even more profound (Linkage 2.1.3.D).

Fifth, women and girls often experience high mental distress levels and increased SGBV incidents when the management of WASH tasks is not fulfilled according to gendered expectations due to water shortages (which may be caused by climate change). For instance, Karim et al., found that, although a groundwater development project facilitated water provision, seasonal water shortages made it difficult for women to fulfil their household water-related obligations, often leading to male partners using violence against women as punishment. Furthermore, Hadley and Wutich show that the mental distress caused by water insecurity is particularly acute for women who normally access piped water (though this same effect was not present in women who rely on natural seasonal water sources), which may stem from the gendered distribution of responsibilities for household water procurement and management.

208 Hennegan et al., “Women’s and Girls’ Experiences of Menstruation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries.”
209 Stevenson et al., “Water Insecurity in 3 Dimensions.”
Sixth, in addition to the household and community-level gender norms already discussed, government-level investment in the care economy may either reinforce gender inequalities, or enact gender transformative changes that demonstrate a value for women’s time and labour, particularly related to WASH activities. Care-related infrastructure investments, such as piped water systems, wells, and sewer systems, are frequently lacking in government budgets due to an emphasis on infrastructure projects that benefit masculine work.\textsuperscript{212} Lack of WASH infrastructure has been shown to increase rural poverty, particularly of women who are often locked into unpaid work that takes away from more productive activities.\textsuperscript{213} As climate breakdown intensifies, government budgets for the care economy are likely to shrink, compounding the gender inequalities such systems support.

Viewed as a whole, these six ways in which WASH, gender, and climate change intersect (time required for WASH-related tasks; SGBV threats related to WASH-related tasks; physical injury due to WASH-related tasks; amplifying WASH-based modesty/privacy concerns; mental health distress; and reinforcing structural power imbalances through lack of government investment in care economy WASH infrastructure) are likely to decrease women’s Coping Capacity. Applying Forsberg and Olsson’s model, these six barriers to women’s Human Security may limit women’s access to education and political representation, and may hinder women’s abilities to engage in networking or empowerment programs. Lowering women’s societal capacity in

\textsuperscript{213} Chakraborty, “Deficient Public Infrastructure and Private Costs,” 69.
this way will have a deleterious impact on community strength, and may contribute to increased risks of National/International Security.

Investments in gender-transformative policies, on the other hand, would meet women’s WASH needs while also addressing the underlying gender inequalities within the realm of water, sanitation, and hygiene. MacArthur et al. frame the challenge this way:

There is a growing appeal to move beyond instrumental motives, towards a practice that supports inherent needs, while aiming to transform the integral roles of women and girls by embracing a transformative ideological imperative. … gender-transformative thinking asserts that research and practice can and should ‘contribute to change in gender relations in wider society.’ Such research explores transformative concepts such as structures, agency and relations; values a diversity of voices; and utilises cross-disciplinary, participatory, and change-oriented approaches.\(^{214}\)

One way to address these inequities is to make use of the ‘resilience’ approaches already mentioned in Table 13. Applying Kabeer’s agency-resources-achievement empowerment framework to the issues of gender and WASH, as Dery et al. have done, we see that when women have equal access to WASH systems and resources, and are free to make purposeful choices in finding solutions to their unique WASH challenges, they are able to obtain WASH achievement, and therefore empowerment. This is evidenced through, “improved access to safe drinking water and sanitation, reduction in water-related diseases, healthcare savings, adequate time for engaging in economic activities for income, etc.”\(^{215}\) Oxfam estimates that in Tanzania alone, investment in water

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infrastructure improvements would save women 1,128 million hours of work annually (Linkage 2.1.3.F).

Additionally, addressing *WASH* needs of women in these basic areas of life tends to increase feelings of dignity and confidence. Looking at the psychological aspects of *WASH* constraints, Hirve et al. and Stevenson et al. show women experience an increase in overall sense of empowerment and happiness when *WASH* stress is alleviated, and find that women may even use their freed-up time for personal care, leading to higher levels of wellbeing, all of which are essential elements of *Coping Capacity* in response to future climate breakdown (Linkage 2.1.3.E).

2.1.3.2. **WASH and National/International Security**

As a necessary component of life, it should come as no surprise that water scarcity may be one of the most animating forces behind climate-fueled *crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, tensions between groups, and interstate tensions.* FPEcol scholar Sultana explains why struggles over life-sustaining resources like water excite emotional responses from people:

> Such a focus fleshes out the complexities, entanglements and messy relations that constitute political ecologies of resources management, where practices and processes are negotiated through constructions of

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219 For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
gender, embodiments, and emotions. Abstractions of ‘resource struggles’ and ‘resource conflicts’ are thereby grounded in embodied emotional geographies of places, peoples, and resources, enabling us to better understand the ways resources and emotions come to matter in everyday survival struggles. … In other words, we are better able to conceptualize and explain how and why people access, use, and struggle over resources the ways they do.220

It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive summary of the literature on these subjects, but the ensuing discussion will offer a review of the gender-related research.

There are several pathways by which shortages of water may lead to increases in crime/violence/extremism. In a study of water wars in Mumbai, India, Graham et al. discuss criminal theft of water that threatens public health, as well as the complex overlaps between organized criminal groups and municipal officials in providing illegal piped water supplies and water tanker deliveries (Linkage 2.1.3.G).221 A study of water provisioning and the securitizing of water in Karachi, Pakistan by Anwar et al. demonstrates several interesting gender dynamics related to criminal behaviour and political unrest.222 For instance, in writing of water mafias and (sometimes violent) political parties that control water resources, they note the masculinization of water provisioning:

In the form of union councillors and valve men, local leaders, middlemen or strongmen (note the gender dynamic), these figures play an important role in the financing of new water supply schemes and timing water deliveries through private tankers. … a patriarchal stereotype of the militant- or terrorist-controlled water supply is wielded with the aim of

upholding statist national security concerns that undermine women’s and men’s daily security in water provisioning.\textsuperscript{223}

Anwar and colleagues go on to say that the response of the state is often to frame water scarcity issues using national security logic by speaking of breaking the water mafia (who they refer to as militants). This research suggests that, should such repression of water access trigger crime and violence, women may be motivated to engage because of a desire to \textit{avoid abuse} by water mafias or the government, while men may be motivated by \textit{pull of networks}, or \textit{exposure to violence/repression}, though further research is required to confirm this linkage.

\textit{Anti-state grievances} over water shortages have also become more frequent in many states. Escalation of the securitization of water has had the effect of exacerbating uncertainty felt by residents of affected regions by intensifying their exclusion from water sources.\textsuperscript{224} Fear of violence and lack of water is likely to intensify emotional and psychological distress already caused by water scarcity (Linkage 2.1.3.H). Research by Vuong et al. has shown that household limits of <50 litres of water per person per day were associated with lower physical and mental health, and that mental health declined even further when this was combined with food insecurity.\textsuperscript{225} Consequently, mental health issues may amplify community instability and further increase the likelihood of violence. Given the strong links between climate-induced water stress and the emotional strain caused by threats to human wellbeing, it may be reasonable to posit that women could be motivated to join in \textit{crime/violence/extremism} out of a desire to \textit{increase survival}, while

\textsuperscript{223} Anwar, Sawas, and Mustafa, “‘Without Water, There Is No Life.’”
\textsuperscript{224} Anwar, Sawas, and Mustafa, “‘Without Water, There Is No Life.’”
men may be more likely to engage in such activity due to motivations around personal security.

Women’s involvement in anti-state grievances is often prominent in water-related political unrest. Here again, research on the gendered nature of water protests in Karachi by Anwar and colleagues is instructive. Even though gender norms around sexual propriety restrict women to private, household spaces, many women have weighed the risks of struggling without water against the risks of protesting in public spaces and have chosen to protest their local officials about water services (though men have also been known to protest) (Linkage 2.1.3.I).226 In Khartoum, North Africa, women partook in and often organized demonstrations in several quarters—demonstrations which sometimes included blocking of streets with burning tires (though the management of these protests was passed to young men at night, during which time clashes between the men and the police would often break out).227 Environmental, demographic, and political feelings of injustice were often cited for these demonstrations (Linkage 2.1.3.J).228 Similarly, in Bolivia, research by Beltrán shows that women were a mobilizing force for citizen response to the privatization of water resources, and though they did not play leadership roles in the unrest, they were instrumental in the socialization of information and consultations.229 In Monterrey, Mexican women also transgressed restrictive gender norms between the 1950s and 1980s to organize public protests, lobby local and state

226 Anwar, Sawas, and Mustafa, “‘Without Water, There Is No Life.’”
government, and hijack water trucks in response to water shortages. Collins outlines many motivations for women’s water protests in Mexico: women wanted to avoid work absences due to waiting for water deliveries; they were frustrated with the increased workloads poor water management brought to them; and women wanted to right the wrongs of unequal water distribution. Such research suggests that perhaps women may be motivated to participate in demonstrations based on a desire to reduce exposure to violence/repression, a motivation that typically motivates men as well (more research required to confirm the gendered nature of these motivations).

Political unrest over water scarcity has been recorded in many other settings. In Syria, where the connection between drought and political unrest has been well-documented, “early warnings were prescient: some of the earliest political unrest began around the town of Dara’a, which saw a particularly large influx of farmers and young unemployed men displaced off their lands by crop failures.” In Nigeria, the government violently clashed with a Maitatsine Islamist sect in the 1980s, and more recently with Boko Haram, though it was found that in both cases, the mobs were largely populated by dispossessed farmers and pastoralists who had been driven from their land by drought, most of whom were young men. Two other water-related uprisings of note are the

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Thirst Revolution in Egypt, and widespread protests in Iraq where water shortages for agriculture, weak or non-existent water infrastructure, reduced river flows, and pressure on water systems due to influxes of migrants dominated political grievances, though little is known about the gender mix of the demonstrators.\textsuperscript{234} From this body of literature, one could reasonably infer that water shortages may trigger several motivations for women participating in protests/demonstrations related to \textit{WASH}, in particular \textit{increase survival} and \textit{avoid abuse} (by those that control water sources). Though less clear from the literature, for men, it might be reasonable to assume that \textit{personal security} and \textit{exposure to violence/repression} (should water be withheld) are potential motivating factors. However, research by Mankad et al. suggests that socio-demographic differences may influence risk perception more than gender.\textsuperscript{235} Moreover, research by Hunnicutt and Gbaintor-Johnson shows healthy democratic structures such as responsive, trusted government representatives, can have a mediating influence over the likelihood of political unrest erupting over climate-caused stressors like water shortages.\textsuperscript{236}

On the issue of whether climate-induced \textit{WASH} challenges contribute to 
\textit{grievances between societal groups}, there have been conflicting findings, though most appear to confirm the linkage. Raleigh and Urdal find that water scarcity increases the


risk of civil conflict onset (though these links are often weak or negligible). Detges shows that communal violence is more likely in regions where the population lacks access to improved water systems. In an HCSS report on interprovincial water challenges in Iraq, for instance, disputes between various of the 18 provinces have broken out in recent years, some of which have resulted in deadly conflict. Additionally, from the work of Graham and colleagues, it is evident that tensions between classes, as well as between host populations and immigrants have erupted as a result of water shortages. On the other hand, Theisen finds that there is no effect of water scarcity on conflict risk, and in a separate study finds that previous drier years tend to reduce conflict risks.

Though these results are somewhat contested, there is enough evidence to suggest that water scarcity may play a role in causing or exacerbating grievances between societal groups, especially when combined with other socioeconomic factors (Linkage 2.1.3.K). As with the previous findings, the gender elements of grievances between societal groups are complex. Looking purely at how civil water conflicts impact women, it is important to note that, as with many types of political conflicts between groups, SGBV is often used as a weapon of revenge, intimidation, or fear, or as a means to

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achieve the other’s acquiescence (Linkage 2.1.3.L). For instance, in research by Premchander on disagreements over the Cauvery river in India, men often use rape against the women in opposing groups in order to shame the other into complying with demands.242 Beyond direct attacks on women over water tensions, just as WASH-related duties are frequently organized according to gendered roles, so, too are the leadership roles in WASH management. In both Premchander’s and Elstrott’s work, gender-specific divisions of labour resulted in women doing most of the water-related work, but rarely ever serving in positions of power in water management or water dispute resolution.243 It may be reasonable to therefore assume that, since women don’t lead in water management, women are likely less involved in direct political or kinetic conflict between groups over WASH resources. Nevertheless, given women’s willingness to transgress gender norms to express anti-state grievances related to WASH services and resources, it is conceivable to imagine that motivations such as increase survival may also drive women to engage in conflict between societal groups as well. Furthermore, responding to rape used as a weapon of inter-group conflict, one could infer that women may be motivated to become involved in WASH-based violence or conflict by a desire to avoid abuse, though more research is required to confirm this hypothesis. Examining men’s potential motivations for joining militant groups in WASH tensions, the pull of networks or concerns over personal security may be reasonable hypotheses to test regarding what would draw some into violence against other groups (no research is

242 Maria Ines Fernandez Alvarez et al., *Gender and Sustainable Development: Case Studies*, ed. Smita Premchander and Christine Muller, Perspectives of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North South, University of Bern 2 (Bern: NCCR North-South, 2006).
Currently available. Furthermore, negative feelings about rape used against women may motivate feelings of revenge in men (and perhaps women) as well, though again, this must be tested to confirm the gender linkage.

Concerns over water scarcity have been cited as one of the most likely pathways along which climate-related interstate tensions might develop. The water war theory suggests that as water scarcity accelerates, along with ballooning populations, thirsty states will resort to violence against their neighbours—violence that may eventually spill over into full-scale water wars (Linkage 2.1.3.M). Yet, this perspective is also a contested one. Arguing against the theory is research by Ahmad et al., who contend that historical tensions over water resources have often resulted in international water management agreements and treaties dating back to 2500 BC. Indeed, Ahmad and colleagues suggest that through hydrodiplomacy (negotiation over and peaceful management of water resources), thousands of water management agreements have been established globally, most of which have remained intact, allowing communities to cooperate rather than engage in conflict. In a recent quantitative study, De Angelis et al. find that bilateral virtual water trade (the exchange of goods and services in which virtual water is embodied), openness may reduce the likelihood of the eruption of interstate tensions, suggesting the opportunity cost and loss of trade gains are important factors in a

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state’s war calculations (and therefore possible angles for achieving peaceful resolution to water-related tensions).\textsuperscript{247}

On the other hand, the literature countering this perspective is also growing. For instance, using empirical evidence of abundance/scarcity and uncertainty, Schmidt et al. show that a higher rate of volatility due to climate change increases the risk of new diplomatic conflicts and militarization of ongoing tensions over marine and river resources, as well as territory tied to water consumption (such as agricultural land).\textsuperscript{248} They note that climate variability can result in intensified competition over resources, as well as uncertainty about future resource shocks, either of which may initiate or intensify conflicts.\textsuperscript{249} Simmering tensions between Afghanistan and Iran have resulted in military rivalries that have delayed construction projects, and meant the construction of several dams by Afghanistan without consulting neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{250} In particular, violent incidents over the Salma dam in Herat resulted in the deaths of some Indian contract workers, and there is widespread belief among Afghans that transboundary water disputes could lead to war.\textsuperscript{251} A look at the global Water, Peace and Security tool shows that these countries are not alone in their struggles to agree on water management—large regions across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are experiencing ongoing and emerging water-related conflicts.\textsuperscript{252} In research on transboundary water treaties, Safi found that power

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{249} Schmidt, Lee, and Mitchell, “Climate Bones of Contention.”
\textsuperscript{250} Gareth Price et al., \textit{Attitudes to Water in South Asia} (London: Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2014), 41.
\textsuperscript{251} Price et al., \textit{Attitudes to Water in South Asia}, 26.
\end{flushright}
imbalances between water treaty states may contribute to ongoing water conflicts, even after treaties are signed; treaties with a balance of power and resources, on the other hand, tend to decrease rates of conflict. Additionally, Katz’s research shows projects such as desalination plants used to solve water scarcity problems may even exacerbate existing tensions by changing power balances and putting new bodies of water in contention. Finally, Gizelis and Wooden’s research suggests water scarcity alone isn’t enough for intrastate conflict, but when combined with poor political institutions, it is far more likely. The preceding research hints that personal security may play a role in engaging men in interstate tensions over water resources, though pull of networks may also be at work should there be an element of ethnic or religious tension as well (though research is lacking). Finally, should women may become directly involved in WASH-related conflict, increase survival and greater opportunities are possible motivations, though no research is available on women’s involvement in such conflicts.

No simple conclusions are possible when summing up the literature on WASH and National/International Security concerns. Certainly, climate change is expected to contribute to water scarcity. Governments may be ill-equipped to equitably distribute such resources to the public, and likewise malign actors may seize WASH-related resources, controlling them for private use or profit. Additionally, elites or rebel/extremist groups may capitalize on sentiments of fear, deprivation, or injustice, using hypermasculine messages such as the need to securitize water resources to gain or

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254 Katz, “Desalination and Hydrodiplomacy.”
maintain power and provide support to those aligned with them. Water shortages are likely to act as a pull factor to mobilize groups to protest government or ruling elite failures, with women even overcoming conventional gender norms to make their dissatisfaction known. Furthermore, climate-induced water shortages may create or amplify tensions between existing rivals—tensions which may also spill over into *interstate tensions*. Nevertheless, numerous case studies demonstrate that hydrodiplomacy may well be a path to avoiding conflict over water resources.
2.1.3.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and WASH**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to WASH can be found in Figure 11. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 51 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 11. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in WASH.

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor WASH.*
2.1.4. Food Security

Table 14. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Food Security.

| **Dominant Approach:** | Measured in two ways. First, by the prevalence of undernourishment, which looks at the percentage of the population with below-minimum dietary energy consumption. Second, by the average dietary energy supply adequacy, as indicated by the Dietary Energy Supply (DES) as a percentage of the Average Dietary Energy Requirement (ADER).  
256 |
| **FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:** | Examining only the daily energy and nourishment requirements of a population not only ignores the gendered inequalities perpetuated by the culture and laws that determine how food is distributed within individual households and communities, it also invisibilizes the gendered ways in which the food system functions, to the detriment of women and other minority genders and populations. Looking at gendered discrimination in the provision of food, Sachs provides an analysis of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) four pillars of food security (availability, access, utilization, and stability) from a feminist perspective, which is summarized in the following discussion and analyzed in terms of climate change connections.  
257 |

Beyond the basic biophysical aspects of food security, FPEcon also uses the concept of social reproduction as outlined by Rai and colleagues to interrogate the socioeconomic structures that underpin food systems.  
258 This aspect of food security will also be explored further in the ensuing discussion. Considering these aspects of food security opens up important discussions about food sovereignty (a concept explored in greater depth in the *Human Security* section that follows).

*Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Food Security.*

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Table 15. Short Overview of the Food Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.A. Women’s farm work is invisible/devalued/underpaid → the climate-related information/education needs of women farmers are often excluded → climate adaptive extension services are dominated by men and not delivered with women’s needs in mind (impacting food availability)</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.B. Women’s farm work is invisible/devalued/underpaid → the climate-related asset security concerns of women farmers are often ignored → women are barred from protecting/replacing lost assets due to discriminatory ownership and access (to financial services) norms and laws → women lose land and assets (impacting food availability)</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.C. Women’s farm work is invisible/devalued/underpaid → women have fewer climate coping financial assets and cannot hire additional labour to support adaptation (due to financial limitations) → the climate adaptive support needs of women farmers are often overlooked (impacting food availability)</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.D. Climate change may damage or destroy women’s kitchen gardens and yard livestock assets → women are likely to have a harder time feeding their families (impacting food access)</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.E. Climate change is likely to cause lower food quantity and nutritional quality → women are likely to experience higher rates of malnutrition → increased nutritional requirements during pregnancy may increase risks of pregnancy complications, poor infant health → women may experience lower quality of life and higher rates of depression and anxiety (impacting food utilization)</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

259 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security²⁵⁹</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.4.F.</strong> Climate change may impact food quality and nutritional availability → gendered power imbalances may prevent women from controlling food use within the home → women may eat last and least (especially following climate disasters), resulting in higher rates of food insecurity among women → women may experience higher disease risks due to malnutrition (impacting <em>food utilization</em>)</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.4.G.</strong> Climate change may impact women’s personal food security due to all other factors mentioned → women’s overall wellbeing may suffer → breastfeeding may become more difficult, impacting family food security (impacting <em>food utilization</em>)</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.4.H.</strong> Climate change is expected to cause food price fluctuations and increases → women may have lower control over household emergency supplies due to family power imbalances → women’s food insecurity may increase (impacting <em>food stability</em>)</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.4.I.</strong> Climate change is expected to cause food price fluctuations and increases → food price instabilities impact women and children the most profoundly → women may be compelled to shift funds from other necessities to food purchases → women’s lower earnings will be further diminished, decreasing their overall climate coping capacity (impacting <em>food stability</em>)</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/International Security²⁶⁰</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.J. Climate-caused food insecurities may lead to ‘insufficient quantity’ of food → may trigger feelings of frustration or inequity as well as uncertainty/worry → may increase crime rates, especially among low-income populations/countries</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.K. Climate change may increase food scarcity → may lead to feelings of shame, embarrassment, and inequity → may trigger frustration or anger at inadequate quality or social unacceptability of food choices (food insecurity tensions mediated by economic decline)</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.L. Climate change may cause changes rainfall/temperature patterns → agricultural productivity may decline → economic growth may be stunted → elite flight may lead to evisceration of state institutions → inequities and price gouging may trigger anger/frustration → political instability and protests may develop (food insecurity tensions mediated by economic decline)</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁶⁰ For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.M. Climate change is likely to increase scarcity of food resources (land, water, etc.) → insufficient quantity may trigger uncertainty/worry → conflicts/protests over geographic areas or agricultural resources may arise (a food access issue leading to tensions mediated by economic decline)</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups / Interstate tensions</td>
<td>Increase survival(^6) (typically women) and personal security(^6) (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.N. Climate change is likely to increase scarcity of food supplies → insufficient quantity may trigger uncertainty/worry → supply-side tensions may arise over available food supplies (a food availability issue leading to tensions mediated by economic decline)</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups / Interstate tensions</td>
<td>Increase survival(^6) (typically women) and personal security(^6) (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.O. Climate change may decrease availability of productive land → women and men may have to actively defend their land against theft/appropriation</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>Increase survival(^6) (typically women) and personal security(^6) (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.P. Climate change leads to food scarcity → worries over insufficient supplies may lead the public to experience anger/frustration due to inequities/price gouging → weak states lacking democratic systems and good governance (especially with existing tensions) may experience intra and interstate violence/conflict (food insecurity tensions mediated by economic decline)</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups / Interstate tensions</td>
<td>([Requires research]) Increase survival (typically women), pull of networks, and concern over personal security (typically men)(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.Q. Climate change may lead to food resource scarcity (land, water, etc.) → elites may engage in land grabbing, neoliberal economic development, and other approaches, resulting in formation of a landless peasant class → may engender feelings of anger, frustration, inequity → may trigger violence and conflict (food insecurity tensions triggered by power imbalances in food resource management distortions)</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances / Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>([Requires research]) Increase survival (typically women), pull of networks, and concern over personal security (typically men)(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/International Security</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
<td>Motivational Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.4.R. Climate change may trigger significant land development à in regions formerly operated by customary land tenure, transformation of social/economic/political structures may create new rich/poor divides (much more severe for women in patriarchal societies) à anger and frustration over inequities may lead to conflicts between the community and government/militaries and/or community and corporations (food insecurity tensions triggered by power imbalances in food resource management distortions)</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances / Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>Greater opportunities§ (typically women), exposure to violence/repression,§ pull of networks, and revenge (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a §; those with no research with Æ. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 2.1.4.1 and 2.1.4.2.

2.1.4.1. Food Security and Human Security

Within the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle, GCS-Factor Food Security is expected to be severely impacted by climate breakdown that affects both agriculture and marine ecosystems. Drawing from the concept of social reproduction, as well as Sachs’ feminist critique of FAO’s four pillars of food security (availability, access, utilization, and stability), the following analysis will develop nine Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages related to women’s roles in farm work; women’s responsibility for kitchen gardens and yard livestock; the impact of nutritional quality of food on women (especially when pregnant and breastfeeding); and the impact of food price fluctuations.
With these concepts in mind, gendered climate-based food security is certainly within the societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism of Human Security.  

Temperature and rainfall variations, the increase of extreme heat and weather events, salt water infiltration, and other climate-related factors are expected to have a detrimental impact on agricultural crop yields and economics in both large-scale and smallholder farms and aquaculture systems (though data on agriculture yields in developing countries and smallholder farms needs further development). Food insecurity will also increase due to climate change impacts in marine and fishery environments, such as sea level rise, ocean acidification, increased tropical storm and hurricane activity, and rising coastal water temperatures. Given that marine-based foods provide 17% of animal protein (7% total protein) consumed globally, any reduction in marine and fishery yields will have a significant impact on human health.

Global food security will depend in large part on how well subsistence and commercial farmers alike are able to adapt to climate change, a large percentage of whom are women. Employing two of the three social reproduction pillars developed within FPEcon (unpaid production of goods and services and reproduction of culture and

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261 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).


ideology), we can examine women’s contributions to food systems that are frequently invisible, devalued, underpaid, and unpaid. As feminist scholars Picchioni et al. explain:

> Not only do women provide key contributions by producing, preparing, processing and marketing most of the food, especially in the rural areas of the global South, they are also responsible for myriad other critical activities, productive and ‘reproductive’, that allow households, communities and food systems to function and thrive, particularly in periods of crisis and in the absence of well-functioning public welfare systems.²⁶⁵

Picchioni and colleagues go on to suggest that food systems within the neoliberal economy can only function because of the contributions of low-skilled, low-paid workers, the majority of whom are women, especially migrant, indigenous, and rural women. Gendered disadvantages within the global food system are further compounded by local laws and governance structures that prevent women from owning or accessing land, finance systems, agricultural technology, and markets.²⁶⁶

Looking first at food availability, conventional understandings focus primarily on agricultural production and yield at the global, national, and regional levels, and include domestic production and imports.²⁶⁷ Sachs points out that this definition fails to consider women as agricultural producers who are responsible for generating approximately 40% of the world's food. According to Huyer, 60% of women in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceania, and 80% of women in in least-developed countries, work in the agriculture sector.²⁶⁸ Women also make up 50% of the fisheries and aquaculture

workforce. Furthermore, women agricultural workers often produce food with greater variety and for local consumption, and therefore directly contribute to dietary diversity and nutrition within their communities. Yet women are systematically denied access to six key resources and inputs required for agricultural and fisheries production: land ownership/control (often due to discriminatory inheritance/property rights that limit women to owning only small plots of land); financial systems (denying them access to loans); agriculture technology (such as irrigation infrastructure and other machinery that may be too heavy or culturally inappropriate for women to use); information/education and extension support systems (often government- or NGO-run systems that provide information and tools); and (farmworker) labour, resulting in significant power imbalances that often stunt women farmers’ productivity. In the fisheries and aquaculture sectors, women also face wage discrimination, lack access to productive resources, technology, and markets.

The aforementioned gender inequalities are the baseline for many women farmworkers around the world. However, as climate breakdown intensifies, such gender
discrimination within the agriculture production sector is likely to intensify these inequities, severely hampering women’s *Coping Capacity*, particularly within three spheres: information/education, asset security, and access to climate adaptation measures. The first factor of *food availability*, information and education, looks at women’s and men’s levels of access to information that would assist in adapting to climate change (Linkage 2.1.4.A). For instance, Jost et al. note that men are far more likely to access weather forecasts and use information services about market opportunities or price changes since women are less likely to own a mobile phone or have access to a radio or electricity. Huyer has shown that when women farmers have access to more information on agricultural production practices, not only do they gain confidence and increase their yields, they also increase their power within their households, resulting in greater decision-making control and control over finances and assets. In the second factor of *food availability* is asset security. Goh finds that climate change will affect both women’s and men’s agricultural assets depending on the context; in regions where gender disparities prevent women from owning assets and land, women are more likely to have to sell off their small livestock and other small assets to survive, leaving them with a higher degree of exposure to future climate shocks (Linkage 2.1.4.B). Additionally, rarely are women’s agricultural tools and techniques supported by extension services and agricultural innovation, further entrenching gender inequalities in agricultural systems.

Looking at the third factor of *food availability*, access to climate adaptation measures, gender inequalities within farm work frequently restrain women’s opportunities to participate in climate adaptation projects. Financial and resource constraints, men’s domination of education and extension spaces, and the need for greater labour inputs to manage climate adaptation systems (challenging for women due to their unpaid care work responsibilities) often preclude women’s participation in such initiatives (Linkage 2.1.4.C.).

Seen as a whole, these *food availability* factors frequently result in women having fewer resources and abilities to draw upon to adapt to climate change, with gender gaps expected to widen as the effects of climate change intensify. A gender transformative approach to *food availability* would therefore address the underlying gender inequalities within the agriculture sector, customary family laws, and education systems.

Next, looking at *food access*, the traditional definition focuses on a household’s access to resources to produce, buy, or receive food (from the government or other agency). However, as noted, women’s ability to produce food as farmers is often limited due to lack of access to land, water, and education. In addition to formal farm work, women frequently are responsible for operating/maintaining very precarious kitchen gardens and yard livestock used to feed their families, both of which may come under increasing threat as climate breakdown intensifies (Linkage 2.1.4.D). In a study of hurricanes Mitch and Stan in Chiapas, Mexico, Jungehülsing shows that many of these

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277 Jost et al., “Understanding Gender Dimensions of Agriculture and Climate Change in Smallholder Farming Communities.”


assets were lost due to rising water levels, a problem that is likely to be repeated globally, affecting many women’s abilities to feed their families. Women may also possess fewer resources with which to buy food due to their lower earnings, a reality that will intensify for many women as their unpaid care burdens increase due to climate change, taking them away from income- and food-generating activities. Gender transformational approaches within how people access food would therefore require similar changes to those recommended for food availability, in addition to addressing unequal responsibilities for unpaid care work and gender pay disparities.

*Food utilization* typically refers to an individual’s ability to meet their nutritional and dietary needs, and considers food quality, safety, and nutrition, as well as access to safe water. Through breastfeeding, women physically provide *Food Security* in their roles as mothers, and women the world over do the vast majority of food sanitation, preparation, and cooking. Yet a gender-blind understanding of the utilization of food ignores gender norms that often prevent women from receiving breastfeeding/nutrition education, which has knock-on effects for the health of their families (Linkage 2.1.4.G). Importantly, women are often unable to control the utilization of food, even within their own households, due to gendered power imbalances (Linkage 2.1.4.F). For instance, numerous studies have found that women often eat and drink less often due to

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lower bargaining power within the household (reinforcing the reality that many women often eat ‘last and least’). These studies suggest that women’s meal-skipping practices tend to increase during natural disasters (such as those caused by climate change), especially to ensure their children have sufficient food. According to Behrman et al., missed meals can lead to malnutrition in women (and also children)—a significant threat since it can increase the risks of contracting diseases (such as malaria, diarrheal infections, and acute respiratory infections) in post-disaster scenarios. Additionally, given women’s increased nutritional needs during pregnancy and breastfeeding, food insecurity poses heightened risks of pregnancy complications (gestational diabetes, anemia, hypertension); poor infant health outcomes (low birth weight, increased birth defects, poor developmental outcomes); as well as women’s lower quality of life and increased risks of depression and anxiety (Linkage 2.1.4.E). Crucially, due to the social reproduction roles women play in meeting family Food Security and nutrition needs, a woman’s health is often intimately tied to that of her children, “both in the womb and

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287 Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 22.


from birth,” and other dependents. Primarily, household-level changes to gender norms are required for gender transformation of food utilization.

Finally, food stability refers to the year-by-year stability of food supplies, which is affected by seasons, storage facilities, prices, and access to emergency supplies (Linkage 2.1.4.H). An IPCC analysis of food insecurity and climate change found the following regarding climate change’s impacts on food systems:

models projected a 1–29% cereal price increase in 2050 … Declining food availability caused by climate change is likely to lead to increasing food cost impacting consumers globally through higher prices and reduced purchasing power, with low-income consumers particularly at risk from higher food prices. Higher prices depress consumer demand, which in turn will not only reduce energy intake (calories) globally, but will also likely lead to less healthy diets with lower availability of key micronutrients and increase diet-related mortality in lower and middle-income countries.

However, crises such as conflict and climate change impact food price stability differently for various groups, with women and children often the most severely impacted. Instability in food prices typically prompt those living with poverty to shift their income from other necessities to food purchases, however for women who earn less and have less control over household finances, such shifts are often extremely challenging, if not impossible (Linkage 2.1.4.I).

Here, too, gender pay disparities and

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inequalities in the distribution and control of emergency supplies should be addressed within a gender transformative approach to food insecurity.

The preceding discussion considered how gender intersects with FAO’s four pillars of Food Security (availability, access, utilization, and stability), contributing to gendered inequalities in farm work; increased unpaid household work; poorer nutritional quality and quantity available; and more challenging food economics. Lack of political representation, empowerment, networks, and education are likely to constrain women farmers and women seeking food for their families. As climate change intensifies food insecurity in these ways, women’s societal capacity is very likely to suffer, along with that of their communities, raising the risk of further political instability and exposure to conflict and violence.

A concept known by feminists such as Sachs as ‘food sovereignty’ is helpful in examining Food Security with a gender transformative lens. Food sovereignty refers to the ability of farmers and farm workers, small producers, and local residents to control their own food systems, including production modes, food cultures, food environments, and markets.²⁹⁵ For instance, rather than seeing food through a neoliberal lens which views food as a global commodity, Sachs explains that food sovereignty is the basic right to healthy, culturally appropriate food, and produced using small-scale agriculture systems using a variety of seeds saved rather than through the use of industrial-scale monoculture systems that rely on the patenting of seeds as genetic commodities.²⁹⁶ Seeing food this way makes women’s contributions to the food system visible, including women’s careful protection and preservation of local seeds, production for the family,

production through sustainable farming for the market, and performance of food-related activities as part of social reproduction. For instance, in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, women are typically responsible for holding knowledge regarding rainfall, temperature changes, soil health, local plans, and livestock. True food sovereignty would transform the underlying gender inequalities in the agriculture, fisheries, and household systems that increase women’s exposure to the impacts of climate change. Glazebrook et al. suggests that effective investment in women farmers would require, “systemic interventions into agricultural policy, governance, education, and industry; be directed at men as well as women; and use gender metrics, for example, quotas, budgets, vulnerability and impacts assessments, to generate assessment reports and track gender parity in agriculture.”

2.1.4.2. Food Security and National/International Security

Within the *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle*, the GCS-Factor of *Food Security* has been connected to all four types of *National/International Security* concerns by numerous authors. Like water scarcity, food shortages have been associated with a range of strong and highly personal reactions which may be the impetus for violent responses by those impacted. Agnew, for instance, suggests food insecurity can lead to

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300 For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
anger, frustration, and a sense of inequity, especially when others have more, or because of corporate or government price gouging.\textsuperscript{301} More specifically, in a cross-country meta-analysis, Coates et al. found four core experiential domains of household food insecurity (findings summarized in

Table 16), with virtually no gender variation, suggesting that although the magnitude and timing of food insecurity may impact women and men differently, it is likely to trigger similar emotional responses in individuals regardless of gender. Coates’ experiential domains and subdomains will help to inform the analysis of who may perpetuate crime, violence, and conflict in response to food insecurities.

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Table 16. Four Core Household Food Insecurity Experiential Domains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Uncertainty and worry</th>
<th>Inadequate quality</th>
<th>Insufficient quantity</th>
<th>Social unacceptability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worry about short-term food security</td>
<td>Worry about short-term food security</td>
<td>Not eating balanced meals/healthy, nutritious foods</td>
<td>Ran out of food</td>
<td>Resorted to socially unacceptable food acquisition methods (like stealing; gender-inappropriate work roles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about long-term food security</td>
<td>Limited variety within-meals or between meals</td>
<td>Limited ability to have preferred / luxurious / less expensive / culturally acceptable foods</td>
<td>Quantity of food consumed is insufficient</td>
<td>Resorted to eating socially unacceptable foods (shame, embarrassment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdomain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resorted to eating socially unacceptable foods (shame, embarrassment)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Typical meal patterns disrupted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relied on unsafe or stale foods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research conducted by Coates et al. summarized by the author.\textsuperscript{303} These findings will be useful in analyzing the motivations behind acts of crime, violence, and conflict related to food insecurity.

Though the relationship between food insecurity and rates of crime/violence/extremism is complex, some recent studies show a strong connection. A study by Islam of 2001-2018 data from 25 developing countries (where severe food shortages are more likely to occur) shows a significant positive relationship between violent crime and hunger, whereby a 10% increase in hunger raises violent crime by 3.6%.\textsuperscript{304} Food security (and therefore crime rates) in developed countries will also be impacted by climate change, especially among low-income populations within those

\textsuperscript{303} Coates et al., “Commonalities in the Experience of Household Food Insecurity across Cultures.”

countries (Linkage 2.1.4.J). An empirical study of food insecurity and violent crime rates in the US by Caughron, for instance, shows that for every one percent increase in food insecurity, there is an increase in violent crime of approximately 12%. [NB: as discussed in section 1.2.3.2, men are more likely to be involved in violent crimes such as assaults, while women may be more involved in property crimes, however more research is required to connect gendered crime patterns to Food Security issues]. While these studies do not identify specific motivations, when considering climate-related motivations for crime/violence/extremism, the most obvious of Coates’ domains are ‘insufficient quantity’ or ‘uncertainty and worry,’ which may trigger motivations such as increase survival in women or personal security in men. Additionally, it may be reasonable to postulate that feelings related to ‘inadequate quality’ or ‘social unacceptability,’ both of which can trigger shame and embarrassment and perhaps feelings of inequity, may prompt fundamentalist ideology in both women and men (related to food customs), as well as avoid abuse by rebel/government forces (women) and/or exposure to violence/repression (men) (Linkage 2.1.4.K).

The research related to anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions is somewhat contested, though more sophisticated and confident findings are published each year supporting the hypothesis that food insecurity may trigger tensions and violence. O’Loughlin and colleagues offer two useful ways to group research findings for understanding the result: (1) one group of research that shows a

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306 Jonathan Randel Caughron, “An Examination of Food Insecurity and Its Impact on Violent Crime in American Communities” (PhD Dissertation, South Carolina, Clemson University, 2016), https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3571&context=all_theses.
complex, though positive, relationship between (food) scarcity and grievances/tensions mediated by changes in the economy, and (2) a second body of research that finds resource-based violence and conflict results when place-based power relationships distort the management of food resources. In the first group, for instance, Homer-Dixon as well as Koubi et al. postulate that climate change will impact volatility of rainfall and temperature, and therefore also agriculture productivity, resulting in stunted economic growth, which is the ultimate source of political instability and potential trigger for tensions and conflicts (a pathway to anti-state grievances) (Linkage 2.1.4.L). By way of example, climate change may reduce food production, leading to mass flight of the rich and intellectual classes, which could eviscerate universities, institutions, and courts, and cripple the economy, leading to political instability. This pattern of food insecurity, mass elite exit, and economic insecurity is common in many Latin American countries, but especially Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, with levels of violence and civil conflicts on the rise in recent years. Though no research is available on gendered motivations, it may be reasonable to suggest feelings of anger and frustration over inequities and possible price gouging would lead to motivations to engage in anti-state grievances such as avoid abuse (typically women), as well as revenge and exposure to violence/repression (typically men), though this hypothesis requires testing. [Noting in

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309 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 80.
particular that more research is required to align with gendered patterns of anti-state grievances regarding food insecurity as discussed in section 1.2.3.3.

Economically focused research by Koren and Bagozzi utilizes the FAO’s concepts of food access and food availability to talk about tensions over food insecurity that may lead to grievances between societal groups (Linkage 2.1.4.M, Linkage 2.1.4.N):

From the demand side, violent conflict is most likely to revolve primarily around access to food sources. When food insecurity produces higher demands for food, these demands will directly compel groups and individuals to seek out and fight over existing food resources, rather than leading these actors to pursue and fight over geographic areas that lack any (or have very little) agricultural resources. Thus, access to croplands and food is a necessary condition for food insecurity-induced conflict. … From the supply side, and within those areas that do already offer access to agriculture and/or food, conflict is most likely to occur in regions that offer lower levels of food availability, or insufficient food supplies. This is because lower food availability (or supplies) in these contexts directly implies higher levels of resource scarcity, which can engender social grievances, and ultimately, social and political conflict.  

Additionally, this research suggests that issues with food access and food availability may spill over into interstate tensions as warring factions seize land in order to support their troops by foraging and pillaging. The existential threat food scarcity poses may suggest motivations such as increase survival among women and concern over personal security among men, though research on gendered patterns is required.

Staying with the topic of how food scarcity mediated by the economy can lead to tensions and violence, there is a growing body of research that shows possible pathways to grievances between societal groups and interstate tensions. For instance, Ahn et al.

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312 Koren and Bagozzi, “From Global to Local, Food Insecurity Is Associated with Contemporary Armed Conflicts.”
have found that in Liberia, owners of productive agricultural land were likely to experience land appropriation by others, resulting in increased conflict. In households where men were displaced by conflict or migration, women would have to engage in active defense of their land. These findings suggest that the increase survival and personal security motivations may play into conflict and violence between groups (Linkage 2.1.4.O). Koubi and Bagozzi find that only in weak states lacking democratic systems (such as constraints on the executive, separations of power, strong property rights, and rule of law) is food scarcity likely to lead to armed (internal or interstate) violence and conflict (Linkage 2.1.4.P). Similarly, Shaffer finds that adequate support systems and good governance tend to increase the likelihood of sharing limited food resources and distributed reserves between groups, and conversely, that institutional failures may leave vulnerable populations feeling as though their only recourse to achieving Food Security is violence. Such risks may increase when combined with existing tensions between various identities or alliances. These are just two possible pathways for climate-caused food scarcity to drive economic strain which ultimately causes political instability that could lead to anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, or interstate tensions. Given the economic roots of this theoretical frame, when considering involvement in any of these forms of violence, motivations such as increase survival may hypothetically animate women, while men may be hypothetically

314 Koubi et al., “Climate Variability, Economic Growth, and Civil Conflict.”
motivated by pull of networks or concern over personal security, though research on
gender differences is lacking in this area.

Using political ecology, the second body of research suggested by O’Loughlin
and colleagues focuses on place-based power relationships that distort the management of
food resources, resulting in resource-based violence and conflicts. Research by
Nyantakyi-Frimpong shows both anti-state grievances and grievances between societal
groups. While peasant agriculture systems in Northern Ghana are able to cope with
climate variability, external factors such as land grabbing, neoliberal economic
development, and the adoption of Green Revolution technologies in farm regions has
created a landless peasant class which may see conflict and violence with other groups or
the government as their only recourse to achieving land (and therefore food) security
(Linkage 2.1.4.Q). Notably, Nyantakyi-Frimpong finds that some of these conflicts
may take place at the household level between women and men. In such circumstances,
motivations such as increase survival (typically women), as well as pull of networks and
concern over personal security (typically men) may prompt people to engage in conflict
and violence, though this warrants further study to determine if there are gender
differences in such cases.

In another example that includes both anti-state grievances and grievances
between societal groups, Julia and White explore the gendered nature of anti-state

318 Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong, “Hungry Farmers: A Political Ecology of Agriculture and Food Security
in Northern Ghana” (London, Ontario, Canada, The University of Western Ontario, 2014),
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3708&context=etd.
319 Nyantakyi-Frimpong, “Hungry Farmers: A Political Ecology of Agriculture and Food Security in
Northern Ghana.”
grievances in oil palm (a cash crop) expansion in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. As oil plantations replace local food products, local Food Security is jeopardized. Concurrently, land formerly cultivated under customary tenure undergoes a rapid and radical transformation of social, economic, and political structures as some farmers become rich and others experience deep impoverishment (Linkage 2.1.4.R). Tensions between groups, between farmers and the government/corporations form, and are further intensified by the mismatch between what the plantation organizations promise and what they deliver by way of benefits to giving up their land. Consequently, conflicts have broken out between the community and the government/military, as well as between the community and the oil plantation organizations. Gender-based allocation of land tenure rights in an already patriarchal society have resulted in further exclusion of women from taking part in oil plantation benefits. As such, women have defied gender norms to participate in (and in some cases, organize) protests; yet they have been largely prevented from participating in discussions and negotiations with the oil palm corporations, further entrenching gender inequalities. This is an important omission since, as Shaffer argues,

Women are often more willing to seek non-violent and innovative solutions in resource scarce situations to ensure that their families are prepared for climate disasters and recover afterward. And while men may take more risks, they are also more willing to cooperate with people they do not know well under stressful conditions. Increasing women’s participation in climate adaptation and mitigation decision-making could lead to reduced violence in response to climate changes.

321 Julia and White, “Gendered Experiences of Dispossession.”
From this FPEcol perspective that centres discussions of food insecurity-caused violence and conflict on shifting power relations, it may useful to test if motivations animating women to participate in protests or political violence could include greater opportunities and avoid abuse, or if men are motivated by the exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, or revenge when contemplating participation in protests, conflicts with other groups, or interstate armed conflict (though more research is required).

The preceding discussion outlined how climate change may impact the food access, food availability, food utilization, and food stability, and that people may experience anger, frustration, or a sense of injustice, especially related to uncertainty and worry over short-term Food Security; inadequate quality of food; insufficient quantities of food; or social unacceptability of food. Such negative emotions may be channeled into increased levels of crime/violence/extremism. Additionally, when combined with economic uncertainty or changes in place-based power relationships, food scarcity may lead to increased levels of anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, or even interstate tensions. Though some studies indicate varying types of gendered motivations and involvement in these types of National/International Security threats (for instance, women may be subjected to greater injustices due to changes in power balances, and may defy gender norms in order to protest such treatment), more research is required on most subjects to better define gender’s impact on threats related to food insecurity.

Despite these findings, there are some rays of hope. For instance, climate change is expected to open new regions to agricultural production (especially in places like Canada and Russia), which may allow for increases in food yields, thereby offsetting some of the losses in other regions and potentially staving off scarcity-based conflicts,
though more research on this subject is required. Additionally, as already mentioned, tensions over scarce resources such as land, water, or food supplies are often opportunities to engage in greater cooperation and sharing, leading to greater levels of peace.

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2.1.4.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Food Security**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *Food Security* can be found in Figure 12. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 52 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Figure 12. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Food Security.](image)

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Food Insecurity.*
2.1.5. Recent Shocks

Table 17. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Recent Shocks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Takes into consideration the number of people impacted by disasters within the past 3 years.(^{324})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| FPEcon/FPEcol Approach: | Simply counting the number of people impacted by recent disasters doesn’t allow for a nuanced view of the different ways a disaster may impact individuals based multiple intersecting aspects of their identities, such as class, race, ethnicity, religion, or disability. Furthermore, this approach ignores how people use the experience of recent shocks to assess and prepare for future risks, often using knowledge based on their gendered experiences. According to feminist scholar Enarson, much of women’s ability to cope with shocks is determined even before the shock occurs due to the gendered nature of socio-economic roles.\(^{325}\) By ignoring gender or essentializing women, conventional approaches to disaster risk reduction (DRR) often reinforce and too frequently exacerbate pre-existing unequal gender relations. In particular, Kimber and Steele argue, “perception of women as a socially constructed vulnerable group, as dependent, weak and subordinate, ironically often isolates women from planning and further leads to women's exclusion from decision-making processes.”\(^{326}\) The following discussion will therefore focus on the ways in which existing gendered structures and institutions inform responses to recent shocks, and how those gendered responses impact individual and collective Coping Capacity in the face of subsequent climate shocks.

Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Recent Shocks.

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\(^{324}\) Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 76.


Table 18. Short Overview of the Recent Shocks Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security$^{327}$</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.A.</strong></td>
<td>Climate shock occurs → women’s risk perception at baseline may be higher than men’s → gendered norms inform women’s and men’s risk perception of what’s harmful differently in comparison with other concerns → women and men may each eschew preparatory activities, but for different reasons (Wachinger’s Reason 1 for not taking adaptive action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.B.</strong></td>
<td>Climate shock occurs → gendered norms may inform women’s and men’s risk perceptions of what’s harmful differently (e.g. men: crop/livestock loss; women: household food shortage) → gendered power imbalances may give men the means and agency to take preparatory activities, but prevent women from doing the same (Wachinger’s Reason 3 for not taking adaptive action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.C.</strong></td>
<td>Individuals are exposed to repeat climate-related disasters → those with additional demographic vulnerabilities (such as gender inequality) experience negative health and economic outcomes more acutely → may increase likelihood of poorer outcomes in subsequent disasters (often women, especially those from single/divorced/widowed and/or low-income households)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.D.</strong></td>
<td>A climate-related disaster may leave many injured or ill → women often lack affordable or culturally acceptable access to medical care following disasters → women may experience long-term health impacts (bodily depletion) → women may experience lower Coping Capacity to future shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.E.</strong></td>
<td>Climate disasters will strain emotional/psychological resources (self-esteem, basic beliefs, relationships) → <em>repeat</em> climate shocks (especially with relocation) are more likely to trigger mental health crises and PTSD → women’s unpaid care burdens may amplify feelings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{327}$ Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security&lt;sup&gt;327&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of anxiety, desperation, helplessness → women may severely diminish psychological resources and may result in women demonstrating increased suicidality risks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.F.</strong> Climate disasters may reduce women’s socioeconomic status (especially with relocation) → women may face challenges competing for emergency aid → ability to manage subsequent crises may be diminished</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.G.</strong> Climate disasters often increase women’s likelihood of experiencing SGBV → SGBV intensifies the psychological/physical stress of disasters → women’s recovery is slowed/stunted → women may possess lower Coping Capacity in future disasters</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.H.</strong> Tyranny of the urgent may reduce focus on gender equality in climate-related humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) responses → women’s unpaid care burdens may increase → women are rarely consulted or given leadership in DRR projects → gender inequalities may increase (rather than being transformed)</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/International Security&lt;sup&gt;328&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.I.</strong> A large-scale climate disaster strikes → systems with weak governance are likely to experience disaster more acutely (compared to stable systems with fair elections and media) → (property) crime rates may increase due to poor response to recent shocks</td>
<td><strong>Crime/violence/extremism</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>328</sup> For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.J.</strong> A climate shock hits a region → communities with high rates of blight may recover more slowly → rates of crime (burglary, assault, etc.) may increase more than in less fragile states</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Women more likely to be involved in burglary/property (versus violent) crime; Men more likely involved in assaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.K.</strong> Repeat flooding or extreme weather events may damage maritime fish stocks and infrastructure → local social, political, and economic systems may suffer → incentives for criminal behaviour (illegal fishing, human trafficking/illegal migration, drug trafficking, arms smuggling) may increase in degraded marine environments</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Greater opportunities (typically women) and pull of networks (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.L.</strong> Natural (climate-caused) disasters may expose institutional weaknesses/corruption → people’s basic needs may not be met (food, water, medical care, electricity) → the public may blame government for such failures → protests may develop and grievances may be used as recruitment tools</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance</td>
<td>[Requires research] Increase survival (typically women), pull of networks, and personal security (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.1.5.M.</strong> Climate-related disasters trigger the distribution of humanitarian assistance → discrimination and favouritism may exacerbate or create social cleavages → may trigger protests or intrastate tensions</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances / Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] Increase survival, avoid abuse (typically women), exposure to violence/repression, and pull of networks (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.1.5.N. A recent climate disaster may increase expectations of future disasters → some climate disasters can be predicted to advantage some and disadvantage others → expected beneficiaries may purposefully shift power balances ahead of disasters → may trigger interstate conflicts</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] Increase survival (typically women) and personal security or revenge (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a $\ddagger$; those with no research with $\ddagger$. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 2.1.5.1 and 2.1.5.2.

#### 2.1.5.1. Recent Shocks and Human Security

The scholars behind the HCSS framework for climate security certainly had good reason to include recent shocks as one of the factors that plays a powerful role within the (Gendered) Climate-Security Lifecycle. In many ways, GCS-Factor Recent Shocks is a meta-category for much of what is described throughout this proposed framework.

Looking first at GCS-Factor Recent Shocks in terms of Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, the following discussion will focus on how the experience of recent climate-related shocks impacts four important factors that determine Coping Capacity:

1. recent shocks play a role in forming an individual’s risk perception and subsequently their willingness to engage in adaptive and preparatory activities;
2. recent shocks diminish Coping Capacity in response to future shocks by destroying an

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328 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
individual’s/household’s assets; (3) recent shocks can severely hamper mental health, thereby lowering an individual’s internal reserves for addressing future risks; and (4) responses to recent shocks can have a substantial impact on existing gender inequalities, often intensifying and further entrenching inequalities that make women more vulnerable in the first place. These four factors are highly gendered, and as such are a good way to frame the GCS-Factor *Recent Shocks* climate-security linkages, all of which fit into the *Gender Equality-Security Mechanism of societal capacity*.

First, risk perception, which is often informed by recent shocks, is central to understanding what actions individuals and communities are willing to take to mitigate and adapt to climate change. There are two main ways to approach the concept of risk perception. Taking a hazards approach to understanding risk perception involves the simple idea that people perceive risk based on the type of hazard and its perceived frequency and severity.  

A socio-cultural approach, on the other hand, suggests risk perception is based on cultural and social norms (such as gendered norms) about what is considered harmful, combined with an individual’s sense of harm tolerance. Using a socio-cultural approach, research by Wachinger et al. shows that direct experience of a climate-related event (such as a flood) can demonstrate to the individual the potential for future risk, thereby leading to a higher risk perception and possibly to adaptive or precautionary actions to mitigate future threats.  

However, a higher risk perception

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332 Wachinger et al., “The Risk Perception Paradox-Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards.”
doesn’t always result in taking preparedness measures. Wachinger and colleagues outline three possible reasons for why victims of an extreme river flood (for instance) may not take adaptive action against future flood risks:\(^{333}\)

Reason 1: Individuals understand the risk but choose to accept it due to the fact that the perceived benefits of not preparing are outweighed by the negatives of preparing (for instance, living close to the river may appear to outweigh the potential negative impacts of leaving).

Reason 2: Individuals understand the risk but do not realize any agency for their own actions; the responsibility for action is transferred to someone else.

Reason 3: Individuals understand the risk but have few resources to affect the situation.

A further three mediating factors should be noted in understanding how recent shocks impact an individual’s risk perception of future shocks. First, Wachinger et al. suggest that risk perception is highly impacted by level of trust in authorities and experts, as well as personal ability.\(^{334}\) Second, low-severity or seldom-experienced events may result in a false sense of security or a misjudgement of individual’s ability to cope.\(^{335}\) Third, according to reinforcement learning theory, recent events generally have more weight in determining a person’s risk perception, while distant events tend to fade in salience over time.\(^{336}\)

Because rare events have a smaller probability of having occurred recently, they tend (on average) to have a smaller impact on the decision than their objective likelihood of occurrence would warrant. When they do occur, however, they have a much larger impact on related decisions than warranted by their probability. This makes learning and decisions from

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\(^{334}\) Wachinger et al., “The Risk Perception Paradox-Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards.”

\(^{335}\) Wachinger et al., “The Risk Perception Paradox-Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards.”

experience more volatile across respondents and past outcome histories than learning and decisions from description.\textsuperscript{337}

In recent years, there has been an increase in interest in the gendered nature of climate risk assessments, particularly related to Wachinger’s \textit{Reason 3}. Several researchers find that women tend to have a higher level of concern that more climate crises will occur in the future.\textsuperscript{338} Bee takes an FPEcol approach by arguing that risk perception (and therefore adaptation and the capacity to adapt) is shaped by and inseparable from the complex relationship between social relations, material practices, and lived realities seen through the dynamic relationship between the mundane activities of women, their environmental knowledge, and their risk perceptions.\textsuperscript{339} Bee’s research illuminates how women’s, institutional and socio-political context, such as the changing context of water management and the gendered relations of power, shape women’s understandings of climatic change and variability … through their daily tasks of providing for the care and maintenance of their families and their communities, women acquire knowledge and skills about social–environmental change that have important implications for adaptation and risk-reduction policy and practice.\textsuperscript{340}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{bee2} Bee, “Power, Perception, and Adaptation.”
\end{thebibliography}
For example, women agriculture workers in Guanajuato, Mexico remember (a form of knowledge acquisition) climatic changes based on the performance of their gendered activities, such as washing in the river or crossing the river.\textsuperscript{341} Furthermore, ranking of climate risks against other concerns is impacted by attitudes and circumstances of the local context, such as the price of consumables, lack of jobs, local drug and alcohol addiction, migration of family members, and so on, much of which is also gendered (Linkage 2.1.5.A).\textsuperscript{342} Similar results were obtained in a survey on the perceptions of future climate change risks in Tanzania, which found gendered norms played a major role in women’s and men’s rankings of risks to crops and livestock (perceived as a greater risk by men) versus household food shortages (a larger concern for women).\textsuperscript{343}

Importantly, although recent shocks may increase women’s level of risk perception, women do not always possess the power or resources necessary to take preparatory steps to protect against future threats. Bee suggests that highly gendered political and institutional arrangements play important roles in climate risk perception. For instance, men tend to have the power on local water/resource management committees; women are often excluded from legally controlling resources and land; and men typically control the prioritization of people’s needs—all factors that significantly impact one’s ability to act on risk perceptions (Linkage 2.1.5.B).\textsuperscript{344} Several subsequent GCS-Factors in this study will explore in depth how gender inequities in Poverty levels

\textsuperscript{341} Bee, “Power, Perception, and Adaptation.”
\textsuperscript{342} Bee, “Power, Perception, and Adaptation.”
\textsuperscript{344} Bee, “Power, Perception, and Adaptation.”
further challenge women’s abilities to act upon heightened risk perceptions caused by 
*Recent Shocks*.

This leads to the second way in which recent shocks can have gendered impacts on *Coping Capacity*, and that is by diminishing assets and reserves (including health reserves) that could be used to cope with future shocks. In a study of the effects of cumulative disaster exposure on *Coping Capacity*, Mohammad found that exposure to recent disasters alone was not sufficient to determine negative health and economic outcomes in subsequent disasters, but that repeat exposure *plus* other demographic vulnerabilities (such as gender) and/or existing socioeconomic conditions together increased the likelihood of poor outcomes in subsequent disasters (Linkage 2.1.5.C).345

For instance, a hurricane may severely damage a family’s shelter, water well, livestock, crops, and vehicle, and with few to no resources for repair and replacement, such families will find themselves increasingly vulnerable to repeat disasters. In a study of gender and disasters, Rezwana found that poor inhabitants already live in precarious conditions that are more quickly and thoroughly destroyed by such storms.346

Women in particular were prone to poorer outcomes, especially if they were from single/divorced/widowed and/or low-income households, according to Mohammad.347

Moreover, Ashraf and Azad suggest that intersecting inequalities based on class, race, ethnicity, religion, or disability places different groups of women differently at risk, and

347 Mohammad, “Cumulative Disaster Exposure and Coping Capacity of Women and Their Children in Southeast Louisiana.”
that without intervention, these risks compound upon one another, whereby women may become increasingly affected by repeat, intensified climate disasters. Mohammad further found that:

The most vulnerable women and children also experienced severe, direct and secondary disaster induced problems including: long and unstable displacements; stigma during displacement; displacement to shelters; unsanitary shelters and hotels and/or cramped housing; loss of home, social support networks, and jobs, often simultaneously or in short order; unsafe living conditions; and uncertainty about disaster impacts to impeded coping and recovery.

Households with higher incomes, greater social support systems, and more material resources generally tend to fair better following multiple disasters. Given that Mohammad’s study was based in a developed country (USA), participants likely benefited from higher economic/asset security than people (especially women) in developing countries, suggesting that the effects of multiple disasters on women in the least-developed regions would be even more profound.

Physical health reserves, a type of resource that is important for Coping Capacity, can also be significantly diminished as a result of previous disasters. The issue of Life Expectancy and bodily depletion will be discussed at length in a future GCS-Factor of this study, but it is important to note here that multiple disasters can greatly reduce a person’s physical capacity to deal with subsequent crises. For instance, frequently, cultural and social norms will exclude women from spaces where they could receive treatment and care for disaster-related injuries or illnesses, and as a result, men and boys

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350 Mohammad, “Cumulative Disaster Exposure and Coping Capacity of Women and Their Children in Southeast Louisiana.”
often receive care at higher rates than women.\textsuperscript{351} Importantly, as Shreve and numerous other scholars have found, the effects of recent shocks on women’s and girls’ access to sexual and reproductive health resources are frequently disrupted during crises, which “places women at greater risk of infections, premature births, malnutrition, unwanted pregnancies, and pregnancy losses during disasters.”\textsuperscript{352} Without adequate treatment of injuries and health concerns following a climate disaster, women may especially have reduced bodily health for coping with future climate disasters (Linkage 2.1.5.D).

A third pathway by which recent shocks impact \textit{Coping Capacity} is the mental health strain climate-caused disasters may trigger. Natural disasters such as those caused by climate change in and of themselves can be significant stressors for all those who experience them. Each individual will come to a shock event with a set of psychological resources, including self-esteem, socioeconomic status/position, employment, basic beliefs, relationships—the circumstances of a natural disaster will act as a stressor that threatens each of these resources.\textsuperscript{353} Survivors of climate disasters (whether slow-onset or acute) can experience a range of mental health consequences, including “shock, disbelief, anxiety, sleep disturbances and impaired personal relationships. … alcoholism, depression, child and spouse abuse, psychosomatic complaints.”\textsuperscript{354} Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) results from significant acute stressors (armed conflict, rape, criminal

\textsuperscript{351} Rezwana, “Disasters and Access to Healthcare in the Coastal Region of Bangladesh: A Gendered Analysis,” 144.
\textsuperscript{354} Wiest, Mocellin, and Motsisi, “The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies.,” 23.
activity, etc.) or through longer-lasting stressors, and can trigger recurrent, intrusive memories, sleep disturbances, hypervigilance, aggression, and other mental health challenges. Numerous studies have shown that the cumulative effective of multiple traumas is likely to significantly increase rates of mental health stress and PTSD. Many of these mental health challenges have been seen to more profoundly impact women. Twigg suggests the following reason for this disparity:

Even in rapid-onset disasters, women are expected to carry out their normal domestic tasks, in addition to dealing with the consequences of the disaster itself. After disasters, their bargaining position in the competition for relief aid and other scarce resources may be weaker: single women and woman-headed households are particularly likely to lose out.

Looking at how poor women in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal have coped with recent environmental changes (such as increased flooding) in the Ganga river basin, Mitchell et al. show that women suffer great distress following floods, but usually are tasked with the additional burden of caring for affected family members. This results in higher levels of anxiety, desperation, helplessness, and lack of sleep compared to men (Linkage 2.1.5.E). Similarly, Ethiopia and Mali where women’s pastoralist lives and Food

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359 Mitchell, Tanner, and Lussier, “‘We Know What We Need,’” 10.
Security depend on a healthy environment, climate stressors may adversely impact women’s mental health as they perceive greater risks to their livelihoods. Furthermore, relocating as a response to a recent shock often diminishes women’s social safety nets, further hampering their mental health. Similarly, research by Reifels et al. shows that repeat (but not single) exposure to human-caused events (such as conflicts) or natural disasters increase the risk of suicidal behaviour. Women tend to have higher rates of suicide in the general population; this same trend is seen among women following multiple disaster exposures according to Reifels and colleagues.

Gender inequalities that arise due to socioeconomic disadvantages, such as persistent poverty and economic marginalization (see sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.6), “may condition maladaptive responses to the occurrence of disaster stress. Consequently, disaster stress, if not efficiently managed, can be manifest in severe psychosocial incapacitation, either short-term or long-term.” Socioeconomic marginalization may so diminish an individual’s Coping Capacity that they no longer have the psychosocial resources to manage another disaster (Linkage 2.1.5.F). Furthermore, as discussed in the Healthcare section of this study mentioned, SGBV tends to increase following natural disasters, which intensifies the psychological and physical stress of such events on women, slowing their recovery and diminishing their Coping Capacity to face future disasters (Linkage 2.1.5.G).

361 Mitchell, Tanner, and Lussier, “We Know What We Need,”” 10.
363 Reifels et al., “Suicidality Risk and (Repeat) Disaster Exposure.”
Finally, in HA/DR or DRR efforts, the tyranny of the urgent often relegates gender equality to a lower priority, with little consideration for how post-disaster development programs may exacerbate and further entrench gender power imbalances (Linkage 2.1.5.H). For instance, relief and recovery projects may target heads of households (usually men) with job, training, and recovery assistance, while also expecting that women will contribute significant time and effort to labouring on reconstruction projects (with little or no remuneration). Crucially, rarely are women put in positions of leadership in relief and recovery planning (even when organizations profess to have a gender policy for their work) which can embed gender inequalities in DRR efforts. In fact, in many cases, women possess, “considerable technical knowledge and skills” that could contribute to DRR efforts, but very often they are not consulted according to Twigg.

As the preceding discussion has suggested, Recent Shocks can have a profound impact on an individual’s or system’s climate Coping Capacity due to the ways previous shocks contribute to the formation of risk perception and willingness to engage in adaptive and preparatory activities; destroy important assets; hamper mental health and lower internal reserves; and amplify gender inequalities. In terms of Forsberg and Olsson’s research, these gender disparities have their roots in lack of women’s empowerment, women’s networks, and women’s political representation. Under such

circumstances, it is likely that women’s *societal capacity* will decrease under climate stresses, leaving their communities with less *Coping Capacity* for future climate shocks.

The exclusion of women from DRR planning and implementation, therefore, amounts to a significant opportunity missed to engage in gender transformative work. The time immediately following a recent shock often represents a period of temporary social constraint relaxation—an opportune time to engage in the transformation of gender norms that could increase women’s self-confidence, skill level, and perhaps even bargaining power—important factors in *Coping Capacity*.\(^{369}\) By including women in gender transformative DRR, systems could better understand different gendered risk perception and willingness to engage in adaptive and preparatory activities and how recent shocks have impacted individual/household assets and mental health in gendered ways. More importantly, by involving women in leadership roles within DRR structures and programs, more could be known of how recent shocks have either reinforced or liberated existing gender inequalities.

### 2.1.5.2. Recent Shocks and National/International Security

As a type of meta-category in climate security, GCS-Factor *Recent Shocks* encompasses many of the other GCS-Factors described throughout this proposed framework. One lens through which to examine the impact of recent shocks on conflict and violence is through what Magen and Richemond-Barak call the, “fluid, stealth-like … layered tipping points” (cumulative shocks), often including climate breakdown, that can severely weaken systems, making such systems highly susceptible to future shocks.\(^{370}\)


Nigeria is one of the examples they offer: uncontrolled urbanization, climate change impacts, demographic pressures, and an oil-based resource curse, combined with religious and tribal tensions, has generated conditions perfect for the incubation of organized crime, terrorism, and insurgencies, and made the country highly vulnerable to future shocks. As with virtually every GCS-Factor within this proposed framework, when combined, such layered tipping points are often not immediately visible or sequential, but the accumulation of impacts can cause the “crystallization of risks into threats.” Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Recent Shocks can have significant impacts on all four of the National/International Security categories examined here. Rather than provide an in-depth analysis for each type, the following brief discussion will outline some of the general layering and compounding patterns that connect Recent Shocks to this to National/International Security.

Looking at patterns of crime/violence/extremism following recent shocks, several studies show an increase in criminal activity following natural disasters. Examining the effects of disasters in India, Roy finds that crime rates (property crimes in particular) increase following big disasters (measured by number of human deaths), but that elections, when timed well and with good media coverage, can ameliorate crime rates

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371 Magen and Richemond-Barak, “Anticipating Global and Diffuse Risks to Prevent Conflict and Governance Breakdown.”
372 Magen and Richemond-Barak, “Anticipating Global and Diffuse Risks to Prevent Conflict and Governance Breakdown.”
373 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
following disasters.\textsuperscript{374} [NB: as discussed in section 1.2.3.2, women are more likely to be involved in property (versus violent) crime (Linkage 2.1.5.I), however no research is available to connect gendered property crime rates to recent shocks]. Similarly, Curtis and Curtis find that following Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, crimes (including assaults and burglaries) occurred more frequently in neighbourhoods lacking a return to normal where the overall condition was characterized by blight and abandonment (Linkage 2.1.5.J).\textsuperscript{375} [Noting again: as discussed in section 1.2.3.2, men are more likely to be involved in violent crimes such as assaults; women may be more involved in burglaries than they would in violent crime, however research is required to connect gendered violent crime rates to recent shocks].

In the maritime environment, the structure and services of coastal and marine ecosystems are sensitive to the impacts of climate change, and can face disruption due to floods or extreme weather which may reduce fish stocks or damage maritime infrastructure. Given the role these ecosystems play in social, political, and economic systems of numerous states globally, Germond and Mazaris suggest degraded maritime environments become vulnerable environments in which incentives tend to increase for criminal behaviour, such as illegal fishing, human trafficking and illegal migration, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and so on (Linkage 2.1.5.K).\textsuperscript{376} Looking at motivations, research could be conducted on whether desires for \textit{greater opportunities} (typically women) or \textit{pull of networks} (typically men) could be at work. Reviewing all types of

\textsuperscript{374} Susmita Roy, “The Impact of Natural Disasters on Violent Crime” (University of Canterbury, 2010), 38.
crime rates following recent shocks is beyond the scope of this study, however given the variety of criminal activities that appear to increase following crises such as climate-caused disasters, it seems reasonable to surmise that both may be involved, depending on the local context and conditions.

Recent shocks also appear to open pathways for increases in anti-state grievances as well due to the ways in which governments are expected to assist residents following disasters and crises. Research by Peters on the pathways from disaster to conflict risk suggests that one conduit for the formation of anti-state grievances following recent shocks is in response to institutional failures to meet basic needs, such as food, water, medical care, and electricity (Linkage 2.1.5.L) (refer to section 2.2.1.2 for a discussion on Maslowian needs).\(^\text{377}\) Relatedly, Wiest et al. find that in the case of natural disasters, people often assign blame for poor outcomes to the government and political systems (by contrast, human-caused disasters such as conflict often result in self-blame).\(^\text{378}\) The connection of these types of grievances to the lack of provision of basic needs suggests repeat disasters may become recruitment tools, though research is needed on whether desire for increase survival (typically women) and the pull of networks or personal security (typically men) may motivate people to be aggrieved in this way. Some interesting research could be conducted on whether anti-state grievances that develop due to an unfair distribution of aid following cumulative disasters would motivate women to join protests or rebel groups by a desire to avoid abuse and or motivate men because of exposure to violence/repression or revenge (Linkage 2.1.5.M). On a positive note,


Petrova shows that, though the cumulative long-term socioeconomic health, fluctuation of resources, and communal conflict risks may be negatively impacted by repeated flooding, flooding itself is unlikely to lead to communal violence in the presence of highly trusted local government councils and judicial courts.\textsuperscript{379}

On the subject of grievances between societal groups, there is also a growing literature connecting multiple disasters with increases in intragroup tensions. Again, Peters’ research is useful: when the distribution of resources following a natural disaster exacerbates existing inequities or creates new ones, political conflict and social cleavages often form—a reality common in poor countries where relief is often distributed by governments and other organizations strategically to retain loyalty of politically-aligned target groups.\textsuperscript{380} Additionally, uneven distribution of resources following recent shocks may result in severe resource constraints that consequently prompt disadvantaged groups to use violence to satisfy unmet needs. Peters notes, “Disasters can motivate people to strengthen intragroup ties and ‘other,’ exclude, and even place blame on outsiders, particularly where there is a turbulent history of interactions between groups.”\textsuperscript{381}

Strengthened cleavages may therefore further destabilize communities, reducing collective and individual *Coping Capacity* when faced with future shocks. Motivations in such situations could be tested: might women be recruited into protest movements due to motivations such as *increase survival* or desires to *avoid abuse*, or might the *pull of networks* and/or *exposure to violence/repression* to attract men (Linkage 2.1.5.M)?


\textsuperscript{380} Peters, “Disasters as Ambivalent Multipliers.”

\textsuperscript{381} Peters, “Disasters as Ambivalent Multipliers.”
Finally, looking at *interstate tensions*, a growing literature suggests repeat natural disasters and shocks are likely to increase such tensions. Reinhardt and Lutmar offer a three-pronged approach to understanding the interlinkages: “disasters are endogenous social phenomena; disasters and conflict are intertwined processes or cycles; and disasters and conflict are co-determined.” One example is that a climate disaster may create resource shortages, triggering deprived populations to engage in violence to gain access to territory with resources. Bas and McLean note that costly conflicts may become more attractive if a population must consider the trade-off between “peaceful starvation and fighting to gain new territory.” The authors also go on to find that in the light of bargaining failures among states, the anticipation of future disasters can shift power balances, leading to increased likelihood of conflict in disaster-prone regions:

Anticipated major disasters can contribute to existing sources of power shifts, and the country that is relatively less vulnerable to disasters compared with its adversary and that is expected to become relatively stronger due to environmental shocks may be unable to credibly commit to upholding existing resource allocations when the power balance shifts in its favor. Thus, in areas that experience more frequent and severe disasters with differential effects on states, the likelihood of conflict may be higher, all else being equal.

As such, recent shocks can play an educational role, informing decision-makers’ understandings of disasters and potentially fueling a sense of anticipated vulnerability or

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383 Reinhardt and Lutmar, “Disaster Diplomacy.”


385 Bas and McLean, “Expecting the Unexpected.”
power shift, thereby contributing to a higher likelihood of violence and conflict developing between states (Linkage 2.1.5.N). Under such circumstances, it may be reasonable to test whether recent shocks may fuel motivations such as increase survival in women decision-makers and personal security or revenge concerns in men decision-makers.

This preceding overview of some of the ways recent climate disasters may impact National/International Security offer a glimpse into the complex ways cultural, social, political, and economic institutions may interact to increase rates of crime, extremism, tensions, and conflict. Of particular importance is the strength and stability of existing systems, which may be impacted by gender inequalities and whether women are invited into decision-making and peacebuilding spaces. As has been noted in earlier GCS-Factor discussions, however, natural disasters, especially multiple ones, may have a pacifying impact on existing tensions and violence by reducing the relevance of sources of conflict; damaging military materiel or reducing funds available for military expenditures, thereby reducing military readiness; or damaging infrastructure, such as transportation systems, that support military movements. Moreover, the experience of recent shocks can be harnessed to increase collaboration and work toward peacebuilding. Peters suggests effective DRR design can work along several pathways to improve social stability. For instance, communities can use post-disaster environmental clean-up, such as clearing of waterways to prevent future floods, to establish cooperative relationships. Working through political channels may motivate political cooperation following shocks to improve local power relations and conditions. For example, borders may be opened to

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386 Bas and McLean, “Expecting the Unexpected.”
allow the flow of humanitarian aid and displaced people following a natural disaster, or previously opposed groups may band together to hold government leaders accountable (such as happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Finally, Peters surveyed how effective DRR may work through improved societal relationships between formerly adversarial groups to push for prosocial changes together, such as has taken place in Egypt where groups are encouraged to create safer societies together.387

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387 Peters, “Disasters as Ambivalent Multipliers.”
2.1.5.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Recent Shocks**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *Recent Shocks* can be found in Figure 13. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 53 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Diagram of Gender-Climate-Security Connections](image)

**Figure 13. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Recent Shocks.**

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Recent Shocks.*
2.2. (Lack of) Resilience

Unlike GCS-Phase *Coping Capacity* which addresses whether a system’s elements-at-risk can efficiently cope with or recover from the physical shocks of climate-caused disasters in the short- to medium-term, GCS-Phase *Lack of Resilience* “represents the ability of a system and its component parts – i.e. people, livelihoods, buildings, infrastructure, assets – to adapt to climate security risks and to anticipate potential natural hazards which contributes to the mitigation or even prevention of future disaster risk.”\(^{388}\) In other words, *Resilience* is concerned with whether individuals and communities can respond to climate risks, anticipate hazards, and prevent disasters over the long term.\(^{389}\) In the HCSS Report on climate security, *Lack of Resilience* contains only one section with two indicators—what this proposed framework will refer to as GCS-Factor *Long-Term Adaptation*.


\(^{389}\) Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 65.
2.2.1. Long-Term Adaptation

Table 19. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach: Measured in two ways, first by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) gross insurance premium indicator (measured as a percentage of GDP to reduce the favourability of this indicator for larger economies), and second as implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in relation to a country’s achievements regarding the seven global targets of the Sendai framework, which are as follows:390</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global target A: Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 global mortality between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global target B: Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average global figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global target C: Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global target D: Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global target E: Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global target F: Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of this framework by 2030.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global target G: Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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FPEcon/FPEcol Approach: As with many traditional understandings within climate security, looking only at Long-Term Adaptation in a gender-blind fashion results in oversights that are bound to reinforce gender inequalities and leave women less resourced and supported to deal with future climate hazards. For instance, conventional conceptions of climate insurance are typically gender blind—they fail to take into consideration the ways in which the financial industry is highly gendered and often exclusive to men, as well as how, “differences between women and men affect their life cycle risks with implications for their needs and preferences for inclusive insurance products and services.”  

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) is also not without problems related to gender equality. It has four main priorities: (1) understanding disaster risk; (2) strengthening disaster risk governance to better manage disaster risk; (3) investing in disaster risk reduction resilience; and (4) enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to encourage ‘build back better’ recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction schemes. The SFDRR touches only very lightly on gender issues, and suffers from many of the same problems that plague sustainable development and disaster literatures as well. In particular, FPEcon scholars have argued that the SFDRR uses problematic gendered perspectives that cast women as only victims or virtuous actors. In the context of Long-Term Adaptation and DRR, and with the pressures of social reproduction in mind, Arora-Jonsson, Bradshaw, Rao, and others critique recent turns toward the gendering of development and disaster planning for either casting women as passive victims and recipients of humanitarian aid, or for the instrumentalization of virtuous women—both approaches lack a focus on the transformation of foundational gender inequalities that underpin women’s lack of power to improve their Long-Term Adaptation, and ignore women’s active roles in climate resilience. As such, the following discussion will focus on the power imbalances at the core of failed DRR approaches and how to transform them to ensure an equitable level of resilience can be achieved.

Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Long-Term Adaptation.

393 Arora-Jonsson, “Virtue and Vulnerability.”
Table 20. Short Overview of the Long-Term Adaptation Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security395</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.A.</td>
<td>Pre-disaster, women may experience deeper poverty than men → women may be more likely to work in sectors which are prone to be impacted by climate change (like agriculture) → women may have fewer resources/assets with which to adapt to climate change in the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.B.</td>
<td>Depending on the type and location of a climate disaster, women may be more profoundly impacted → gendered norms may result in women being unable to receive/access support and aid → social protection schemes may exclude women → women’s resources/assets may be further diminished/degraded, further complicating long-term adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.C.</td>
<td>Post-disaster, women’s unpaid care burdens are likely to increase more than men’s → women may experience higher levels of SGBV → resultantly, women’s physical and emotional reserves may be taxed severely, making long-term adaptation difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.D.</td>
<td>Post-disaster, women’s economic reserves may be exhausted, especially if her economic activity is disrupted → women may feel compelled to engage in maladaptive coping mechanisms (pulling children out of school, selling assets, taking on expensive informal loans) → women’s long-term adaptability will be further restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.E.</td>
<td>Gendered norms may prevent women from purchasing CRI and other financial products that would ensure long-term adaptation → post-disaster, women may only be able to access informal networks for aid (family, friends, etc.) → women may have insufficient funds to adapt and prepare for future crises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

395 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
**Human Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 2.2.1.F.</th>
<th>The SFDRR does not routinely require sex-disaggregated data collection → women’s and girls’ needs for long-term adaptation are often unknown</th>
<th>Societal capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.G.</td>
<td>The SFDRR does not uniformly promote gender equality in meaningful/substantive DRR leadership → when leadership is mentioned in the context of gender, women are grouped with youth and people with disabilities (downplaying women’s authority and failing to recognize intersectionalities) → DRR plans frequently do not consider women’s unique requirements for long-term adaptation and HA/DR implementation</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.H.</td>
<td>VAWG (violence against women and girls) tends to increase and SRHR services are often limited following disasters → The SFDRR does not recognize these risks → women’s adaptability is ultimately curtailed</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.I.</td>
<td>Women are referenced as ‘resources’ in the SFDRR → women’s roles are understood in service to DRR efforts, rather than DRR plans serving women → women may be over-burdened by additional DRR responsibilities, further limiting their adaptability</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National/International Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 2.2.1.J.</th>
<th>Pre-disaster, states facing economic constraints and low law enforcement may be unable to complete long-term adaptation projects → post-disaster such states may see recovery/reconstruction projects as opportunities for crime infiltration, corruption, elite capture, rent-seeking, and other inequities</th>
<th>Crime/violence/extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[Requires research] Greater opportunities (typically women) and pull of networks (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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396 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.2.1.K.</strong> Poor adaptation + climate disasters may exacerbate existing tensions and conflicts → extremist groups may use disasters to recruit new members</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Pull of networks (typically men)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.2.1.L.</strong> Governments are likely to prioritize short-term issues over long-term challenges like climate change → states may have poorly developed DRR plans → may lead to poor disaster responses → may prompt protests related to lack of government capabilities, competence, compassion, correctness, credibility, or anticipation</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance</td>
<td>Avoid abuse§ while men may be motivated by exposure to violence/repression§</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.2.1.M.</strong> Poorly prepared governments may demonstrate low ‘competence’ in disaster recovery and may lack ‘compassion’ for the public’s challenges → may stimulate or exacerbate tensions between groups</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>Avoid abuse§ (typically women) and exposure to violence/repression or revenge§ (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.2.1.N.</strong> Poorly prepared governments may deliver disaster aid without transparency or fairness (low ‘correctness’) → may prompt feelings of inequity and unfairness → may trigger or intensify tensions between various groups</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] Avoid abuse (typically women)² and exposure to violence/repression or revenge (typically men)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 2.2.1.O.</strong> Poorly prepared governments may not have sufficient (insurance-based) social safety net funding → what is available may be distributed with prejudice (low ‘correctness’) → may prompt feelings of inequity and unfairness → may trigger or intensify tensions between various groups</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>Avoid abuse§ (typically women) and exposure to violence/repression§ or revenge (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Country may have a DRR planning deficit due to funding, corruption, incompetence, or other reasons when a climate disaster hits, it is likely to be poorly managed in such states should the disaster trigger mass migration, existing intrastate and interstate tensions may be amplified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 2.2.1.P.</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups / Interstate tensions</td>
<td>[Requires research] Fundamentalist ideologies (both women and men), revenge, and pull of networks (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a §; those with no research with ©. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2.

2.2.1.1. Long-Term Adaptation and Human Security

Climate change has already exacted heavy costs on society, and continues to test the abilities of communities to adjust and anticipate future climate threats. In this GCS-Factor section on Long-Term Adaptation, the discussion will start by exploring the two indicators used by the HCSS Report to measure a system’s or individual’s resilience—(1) insurance premiums and (2) how well a system is performing in terms of meeting the goals for Disaster Risk Reduction set out in the Sendai Framework (SFDRR). From there, particular focus will be given to the ability to adapt over the long term through analysis of several societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms: economic stability before and after a climate shock; the gendering of insurance; the impact of unpaid care burdens and SGBV on long-term adaptability; and the ways in which the SFDRR falls short of adopting a thorough gender analysis.

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396 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three "socioeconomic"
Looking first at the need for Long-Term Adaptation to climate risks, insurance is an important mechanism for raising precautionary funds and/or planning to share the costs for relief, recovery, and reconstruction following future disasters. Climate risk insurance (CRI) in particular is important for protecting affected populations, communities, and individuals from climate vulnerabilities and impacts. Indeed, in terms of long-term adaptability to a changing climate, CRI “builds financial resilience, cushioning individuals, households, businesses, and communities from economic shocks, preventing them from falling into poverty or becoming poorer.”

However, while climate disaster costs are increasing, the trend is that few assets globally are covered by insurance. Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister suggest annual economic losses worldwide due to climate disasters are currently at $520 billion (including the costs of lost consumption and wellbeing). Yet, only 30% of all catastrophic losses globally over the past 10 years were covered by insurance. Adding to the risk is the fact that millions of households are increasingly choosing to relocate for better economic, educational, health, and social opportunities, but in the process, many of the poorest households relocate to regions prone to disasters and are often unable to purchase insurance for their assets following their relocation. Hallegatte et al. find that, “from 1970

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to 2010 the world population grew by 87%, while the population in flood plains increased by 114% and in cyclone-prone coastlines by 192%.”402 Trends both of mass migration of human populations and lack of insurance, especially for the poorest, are expected to increase as climate breakdown intensifies.

When looking at the role insurance plays in gendered Long-Term Adaptation, societal capacity is the most applicable Gender Equality-Security Mechanism, and as such will be the focus for the remainder of this discussion in the context of Human Security. Of the many power imbalances explained throughout this study that limit women’s resilience and long-term adaptability to climate threats, climate risk insurance is of particular importance. Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister note the following climate vulnerabilities pertinent to this discussion (Linkage 2.2.1.A, Linkage 2.2.1.B, Linkage 2.2.1.C):403

1. Women may face higher rates of poverty and lower economic participation;
2. Women are more likely to participate in the economy through the agricultural sector which is generally the hardest impacted by climate change;
3. Women generally have fewer assets and resources with which to build resilience;
4. Disasters may impact women more profoundly than men;
5. Social norms and unconscious bias can result in women receiving less support, and suffering higher rates of gender-based violence, in the aftermath of a disaster;
6. Social protection (public benefit) schemes often exclude women;

7. Women are more likely to see their unpaid care and domestic burdens increase following a disaster, leaving them with less time for recovery and economic activity.

Having insurance may protect against many of these risks, and may also allow women to forgo other post-disaster coping mechanisms, such as pulling children out of school, selling assets, or engaging in expensive informal lending programs (Linkage 2.2.1.D).404 However, feminist critiques of western financial institutions point out that traditional insurance markets and products revolve around the private sector, which has typically adopted policies and processes that further entrench gender inequalities in the drive for profits over social welfare.405 Without gender transformative insurance products and services, women may only have informal networks of help to aid them during crises.406 Furthermore, according to the World Bank, 155 of 173 states still have at least one law that restricts women’s economic opportunities, with a total of 943 gender differences across all 173 economies studied (unfortunately the data does not specify how many restrict access to insurance in particular).407 Other barriers to gender inclusive insurance markets include lack of awareness and marketing of insurance options for women and lack of financial literacy programs for women.408 Importantly, central bankers, financial policymakers, and insurance providers frequently fail to tailor financial

406 Power, “New Ways or Old Tricks?”
services to women’s unique needs, including different risk profiles, unique protection needs, longer life expectancies, gender-specific health risks, fluctuating cash flows, fewer assets, restrictive ownership and inheritance laws, and higher rates of self-employment and participation in the informal economy (Linkage 2.2.1.E). Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister offer some suggestions for incorporating gender into CRI models, which are summarized in Table 21.

Table 21. Gender Transformative Climate Risk Insurance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRI Model</th>
<th>Gender Transformative Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect Insurance:</strong></td>
<td>Intended beneficiaries (public or private entities) do not hold the insurance policy, though they may contribute to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Macro-level:</em> Policyholder is a public entity (national or local government) which pays premiums on behalf of the vulnerable, with payouts made rapidly for government services, cash flows, disaster-related operations, and targeted assistance while humanitarian assistance is organized.</td>
<td>Can provide assistance to the most vulnerable women, though gender-inclusive eligibility would have to be specified in the policy. Need to consider gender-specific needs, direct enrollment of women, and perhaps financing women’s premiums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Meso-level:</em> Policyholder is an institution (NGO, cooperative, employer, agribusiness) that acts as a risk aggregator, while the enrolled (clients, members, or employees) maintain a relationship with the policyholder. Payouts are used to provide direct/indirect benefits to the enrolled.</td>
<td>Can provide insurance for women-owned institutions or institutions that primarily serve women. May need to encourage and motivate institutions to provide outreach to women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CRI Model | Gender Transformative Considerations
---|---
**Direct Insurance:** | Intended beneficiaries hold the insurance policy, pay the premiums, and receives payouts directly.  
*Micro-level:* Policyholder is a group or an individual beneficiary, usually provided on a commercial basis with the insurer marketing the insurance product directly to consumers or groups. Example: agricultural, weather-based insurance. | Direct outreach to women may be required, unless women make up the bulk of client base already. Need to consider women-specific products, coverage, and payout processes; develop awareness raising among women; encourage women’s participation in workplace insurance.  
*Description of Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister’s CRI gender mainstreaming models, summarized by the author.*  

In addition to examining the ways in which gender transformative CRI may increase women’s long-term adaptability, the HCSS framework also considers communal resilience and *Long-Term Adaptation* planning that realizes the DRR needs and expectations of affected groups. The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) defines disaster risk as, “The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society, or a community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and capacity.” Here, too, the *societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* applies, since DRR plans inevitably impact the most vulnerable in societies. In particular, the HCSS framework examines the role of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) developed by the United Nations (UN) in 2015. Understanding the implications of the SFDRR on long-term gendered adaptation requires a bit of history.

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**Notes:**


https://archive.unescwa.org/file/106215/download?token=1ifHHOFB.
about transnational movements to address climate risk and gender equality. The precursor to the SFDRR was the UN’s Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which was established in 2005. The HFA was critiqued for merely mentioning the need to integrate a gender perspective in all disaster risk management policies, plans, and processes; gender was not actually integrated into the HFA itself.\textsuperscript{412} The SFDRR was purported to have remedied this omission in part through consultations with the Women’s Major Group (WMG) and women’s civil society organizations around the world. As a result, SFDRR was the first to call out the need to recognize women as leaders and agents of change.\textsuperscript{413} However, it too has received criticism for changing little in terms of gender mainstreaming compared to the HFA.\textsuperscript{414} Missing from the SFDRR are several important gender mainstreaming factors, including those offered by Bradshaw (which are summarized in Table 22).

Table 22. Lack of Gender Mainstreaming in the Sendai Framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex-Disaggregated Data</th>
<th>Demand for routine collection of sex-disaggregated data (this was mentioned, but not uniformly throughout) (Linkage 2.2.1.F).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women as DRR Leaders</td>
<td>Call for women to be designated as leaders in DRR, not just victims of disasters (Linkage 2.2.1.G). There are two short leadership statements: under ‘guiding principles / promotion of women and youth leadership’; and under Priority 4 (see above), ‘empowering women and persons with disabilities to publicly lead and promote gender equitable and universally accessible response, recovery rehabilitation and reconstruction approaches are key.’\textsuperscript{415} However, these mentions are problematically framed. For instance, in the ‘guiding principles,’ women and youth leadership is listed together with no distinction, suggesting women’s effectiveness as leaders is given very little recognition. Listing women and those with disabilities also intimates that an</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{413} Kimber and Steele, “Feminist Advocacy on International Agreements for Disaster Risk Reduction.”
\textsuperscript{414} Bradshaw, “Gendered Rights in the Post-2015 Development and Disasters Agendas,” 64.
\textsuperscript{415} “Sendai Framework at a Glance,” 8,17.
individual cannot be both, thereby ignoring intersectional risks.\textsuperscript{416} These mentions are also overshadowed by the more dominant victim discourse. Additionally, the WMG suggested that the mention of the ‘critical role of women in managing disaster risk’ be ‘recognised and valued’ but only one statement mentioned women in ‘role of stakeholders’ section.

**Violence Against Women and Girls**  
Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is not mentioned at all (Linkage 2.2.1.H).

**Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights**  
Recognition of women’s post-event specific sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR)—there is only one mention of SRHR under ‘access to basic health care service’ but nowhere else (Linkage 2.2.1.H).

**One Short Gender Statement**  
The SFDRR has a single standalone gender statement that is problematic. First, it constricts women’s roles in DRR only as resources, placing women in service to DRR rather than DRR serving women. Second, women’s needs are confined to ‘capacity building’ and post-event ‘alternative livelihoods,’ thereby focusing on efficiency rather than equality, and precluding the possibility of the SFDRR filling a gender transformative role.

*Bradshaw’s gender critiques of the SFDRR, as summarized by the author.*\textsuperscript{417}

Crucially, feminists and WPS experts have also called out the lack of women as leaders in SFDRR framing. The WPS Agenda recognizes the cumulative effects of existing norms, values, laws, and institutions that often bar women from full and meaningful participation in all aspects and levels of society. The WPS theory of change framework is structured around several feedback loops. Important for this GCS-Factor are two in particular. The first is that women’s resiliency is strongly linked to women’s leadership and participation in decision-making at the village or community level, and that when women have community-level leadership positions, the entire community

\textsuperscript{417} Bradshaw, “Gendered Rights in the Post-2015 Development and Disasters Agendas,” 64.
experiences concrete benefits.\textsuperscript{418} Agarwal has argued that as women lead more decision-making bodies, outcomes improve in part due to the varying ways in which women are situated within different layers of society which changes the perspectives and needs they raise.\textsuperscript{419} The second feedback loop is that as more visible, senior leadership roles are held by women, implementation of other WPS principles accelerates, thereby leading to more stable, peaceful, and resilient societies.\textsuperscript{420} Building from feminist principles, the WMG has advocated for displacing essentialist understandings of women and gender, integrating evidence-based indicators for incorporating gender equality, and investing in the inclusion of women at all levels of DRR decision-making and implementation, yet very little of this has yet transpired.\textsuperscript{421}

Clearly the metrics by which a system’s or individual’s resilience are typically measured—insurance premiums and how well a system is performing in terms of meeting the DRR goals set out in the SFDRR—are inadequate for considering the gendered nature of long-term resilience. The SFDRR has received criticism for lack of thorough gender mainstreaming and continued entrenchment of gender inequalities—an unfortunate reality given the possibility to seize upon opportunities during post-disaster relief and rebuilding as times when social norms are relaxed and therefore open to transformation. Furthermore, the metrics typically used to measure \textit{Long-Term Adaptation} fail to consider gender and economic stability before and after a climate shock; the gendering of insurance; and the impact of unpaid care burdens and SGBV on long-term adaptability. In

\textsuperscript{419} Bina Agarwal, \textit{Gender and Green Governance} (Oxford University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199569687.001.0001.
\textsuperscript{421} Kimber and Steele, “Feminist Advocacy on International Agreements for Disaster Risk Reduction.”
terms of Forsberg and Olsson’s research, without the social resources and networks that would support women’s long-term resilience, the community will have fewer alternatives to stabilizing against fragility and resolving conflict should the need arise.

Systems such as the SFDRR can only offer genuine increases in women’s Long-Term Adaptation when they transform the fundamental gendered structures that disadvantage women before disasters strike. Without a gender transformative approach to long-term adaptability, women are likely to continue to experience economic instability before and after a climate shock; an inability to obtain appropriate insurance for their needs; cultural barriers to achieving long-term adaptability such unpaid care burdens and SGBV; and institutional DRR systems, such as the SFDRR, that fall short of addressing gender in every aspect.

Two important considerations must be mentioned, however. The first is that, rather than merely layer DRR leadership responsibilities on to women’s already long task lists (due to unpaid care and domestic work), care must be taken to recognize and compensate women for any additional time and effort new leadership roles require of them (Linkage 2.2.1.I). Writing of women’s roles in sustainable development projects, Arora-Jonsson and Leach discuss the challenge in the following ways:

‘Success’ in the projects was secured at the expense of women while new environmental chores were added to their already long list of caring roles. In addition, it obscured the interests of women not represented in the women's groups or targeted by the projects and further ignored issues concerning property and power.⁴²²

⁴²² Arora-Jonsson, “Virtue and Vulnerability.”
This meant that programmes ran the risk of giving women responsibility for ‘saving the environment’ without addressing whether they actually had the resources and capacity to do so.\textsuperscript{423}

A thorough and sensitive consideration of existing unpaid care responsibilities often requires basic adjustments to cultural norms and expectations, as well as changes to customary and legal statutes that entrench gender inequalities in institutions and structures. A gender transformative SFDRR therefore would take this consideration seriously.

Second, as in planning for increases in women in leadership, any future version of the SFDRR must avoid appointing women in token leadership positions. In Ban and Rao’s discussion of tokenism, they note women are often chosen for political and community leadership roles based on their manipulability, lack of education, and poverty in order to ensure their ineffectiveness.\textsuperscript{424} To guard against this possibility, DRR processes and implementation must involve women in meaningful, consequential leadership roles (Linkage 2.2.1.G).

2.2.1.2. Long-Term Adaptation and National/International Security

As extreme climate events have increased in number, DRR programs have gained more attention in recent years, especially in more vulnerable regions of the world. Unfortunately, a 2022 UN Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reductions suggests that global investment in climate adaptation for developing countries will need to be somewhere between $140 billion to $300 billion annually by 2030, and total


resilience-focused infrastructure investments worldwide will need to be in the trillions of dollars annually, yet added together, global public and private investments in climate adaptation was only $30 billion in 2018.\textsuperscript{425} Unfortunately, the complexity of good DRR planning is frequently a challenge for weak states or poor economies due to the significant costs associated with long-term risk assessments and adaptation/mitigation projects. Can a state’s lack of planning for future disasters and their potential effects increase a system’s \textit{National/International Security} risks? As the following two passages from UN reports on disaster and conflict risk management suggest, responses to complex, interrelated risks, such as combined development, humanitarian, and security risks require that:

\ldots institutions act in concert in support of common objectives using different instruments. This requires a level of integrated planning that is often challenging. Actors working on poverty reduction, disaster risk reduction, social service delivery, and environmental management need to come together, at different levels of government, to identify and prioritize conflict risks and responses.\textsuperscript{426}

For effective risk management, it is critical to understand risks for all types of hazards; interlinkages between hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities; and comparison of different types of risk. Key considerations include identifying and compiling existing input data, assessing government management capacities and determining the sources and drivers of risk, the direct and indirect impacts, and potential cascading risks.\textsuperscript{427}

As such, those states that fail to meet the challenges of preparing for disaster and bolstering the long-term adaptability of their people, infrastructure, and institutions are


\textsuperscript{427} “Trends and Impacts in Conflict Settings, No. 6: Developing a Risk-Assessment Framework for the Arab Region,” 11.
likely to face additional National/International Security challenges along all four pathways due to poor Long-Term Adaptation at the state or system level.\textsuperscript{428}

For instance, as will be discussed at length in a later section on GCS-Factor Corruption, climate breakdown can open the door for the increase in criminal activity, suggesting a link between lack of Long-Term Adaptation (weak or non-existent DRR planning) and crime/violence/extremism. Imperiale and Vanclay, for instance, explore the DRR response to the April 6, 2009 earthquake in L’Aquilla, Italy, noting in particular some of the challenges in implementing the four priorities of the Sendai Framework.\textsuperscript{429} Specifically, they explain that pre-earthquake reports on deficiencies of the built environment were ignored, and post-earthquake, many large projects were funded and implemented without Italian Parliament oversight, control over the use of the funds, or transparency on the results.\textsuperscript{430} Instead, the government’s response facilitated disaster capitalism, which worsened social risks through increases in organized crime infiltration, corruption, elite capture, rent-seeking, and other inequities (Linkage 2.2.1.J).\textsuperscript{431} Given that this malign activity often originates with organized criminal groups, men may lead the way more than women (as previously shown in section 1.2.3.2), though women may still take on support roles within organized crime groups (research connecting Long-Term

\textsuperscript{428} For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).


\textsuperscript{430} Imperiale and Vanclay, “Barriers to Enhancing Disaster Risk Reduction and Community Resilience,” 236.

\textsuperscript{431} Imperiale and Vanclay, “Barriers to Enhancing Disaster Risk Reduction and Community Resilience,” 236.
Adaptation to gendered criminal activity is required. Here, it is possible to imagine that women may find motivations related to greater opportunities a draw to criminal activity, while men may be motivated by pull of networks, though research is required to align with findings outlined in section 1.2.3.2.

Additionally, there is a growing literature calling for ways to prevent disasters from intensifying existing tensions and conflicts, since extremist groups may amplify tensions in poorly adapted states following disasters as a way of recruiting new members (Linkage 2.2.1.K). Peters and Peters suggest that, “a more critical approach is needed to ensure that DRR measures do not inadvertently reinforce systemic drivers of or vulnerability to disaster and conflict risk.” For involvement in extremist groups, it is not clear which of the common motivations might drive women to get involved (though it is increasingly common that they are doing so), and while it may be reasonable to hypothesize that men may be motivated by pull of networks, research is required to understand the gendered motivations for lack of Long-Term Adaptation-related extremist involvement.

Long-term adaptation (or lack thereof) impacts all of the remaining types of conflict and violence (anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) when a system has a DRR planning deficit. Looking at the impacts of poor DRR on the likelihood of anti-state grievances developing, Olson and Gawronski

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suggest the politics of disaster should be understood in terms of “Maslowian Shocks.”

They postulate that the public typically evaluates government disaster management along six dimensions (‘5C+A’), which are summarized in Table 23.

Table 23. The 5C+A Maslowian Shocks as Drivers of Anti-State Grievances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Resources available or easily mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Appropriate/efficient application of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>Concern/affect demonstrated for victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctness</td>
<td>Fairness, honesty, transparency in applying resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>Consistent/reliable disaster information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipation</td>
<td>Pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness, or DRR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As proposed by Olson and Gawronski, summarized by this study’s author.

Public perceptions of government disaster response generally devolves down to issues and problems on any of these six dimensions (Linkage 2.2.1.L). Even in developed countries, achieving high marks for responses in all six dimensions can be challenging due to weak governance, corruption, finances, etc. Unfortunately, In reality, most governments prioritize short-term thinking and ignore long-term vulnerabilities in attempts to deal with urgent national, regional, and local priorities that are more likely (counter to what the SFDRR attempts to accomplish) to garner political attention and

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435 Olson and Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis.”
436 Olson and Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis.”
437 Olson and Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis.”
therefore votes.\textsuperscript{438} Under such circumstances, dissatisfaction with a government’s response is likely to be quite a bit higher than cases in which governments have adequately prepared, making political instability and protests far more likely. Gender may play a role in which of the 5C+A Maslowian shocks drive \textit{anti-state grievances}. According to a climate-fragility risk case study of Mali, Nagarajan found that existing rent-seeking, corruption, and misuse of financial resources (including international aid) has fueled a breakdown in state-citizen relations and trust, leading to a loss of security, increased conflict, and failure to uphold rule of law.\textsuperscript{439} Both women and men are motivated to engage with armed opposition groups, but as Nagarajan has shown, their involvement is frequently determined by prescribed gender norms and roles.\textsuperscript{440}

While engagement in direct fighting tends to be the preserve of men, women play crucial roles of gathering intelligence and serving as informants, providing supplies and goods, contributing economic services, and encouraging family members to join. Women have significant influence over (potential) fighters, with older women mobilising communities to support causes and either encouraging men to fulfil their ‘masculine’ role by taking up arms to avenge wrongs or dissuading them from committing violence. Women’s affinity for AOGs comes from similar social exclusion dynamics as pertain to men in addition to their desire for the education that is often denied to them. AOGs offer protection, advantages and opportunities. A partner or spouse is the primary influencer for both women and men in deciding to join or leave an AOG, followed by mothers.

Applying this gender lens, the following discussion suggests that it would be reasonable to posit that any number of gendered motivations may be behind \textit{anti-state grievances},

\textsuperscript{438} Olson and Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis.”
\textsuperscript{440} Nagarajan, “Climate-Fragility Risk Brief: Mali,” 7.
grievances between societal groups, and even spillover into interstate tensions when states fail to deliver adequate DRR plans.

One example of grievances between societal groups due to the lack of ‘competence’ and ‘compassion’ dimensions is a 1970 hurricane that struck the Bay of Bengal in East Pakistan, killing 500,000 people and causing massive flooding (Linkage 2.2.1.M). The government’s response was slow and lacked compassion, and resulted in an intensification of resentment of West Pakistani by East Pakistani groups. In such cases, avoid abuse (typically women) and exposure to violence/repression or revenge (typically men) could conceivably be reasons for group-based tensions, though research on these particular linkages is needed.

In addition to ‘competence’ and ‘competence,’ a government’s ‘correctness’ (transparency and fairness) in delivering assistance programs may play into anti-state grievances and grievances between societal groups, especially if there is favouritism of one group and marginalization of others that spark intrastate tensions (Linkage 2.2.1.N). Natural hazards such as those caused by climate change turn into disasters when groups of people are left vulnerable and unprepared, and disasters are far more likely to exacerbate existing tensions and conflicts when there is no disaster management plan. Here disaster and climate risk insurance will also be a factor in the public’s perception of a government’s correct response to extreme climate hazards. In a UN report on pathways to achieving peace, the authors note that as changes come to economies, adaptation to shifts in the role of labour in the economy can generate social stress, which can lead to violent conflict (they write in particular of technological change in a post-industrial era,

441 Olson and Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis.”
though the same might also apply to disaster-caused economic shifts. The authors point out that social safety net and distributive policies like unemployment insurance are often required to mitigate the potential social stress in order to prevent violence and tensions. Similar social stresses post-disaster may also trigger political conflict and violence, especially when such distributive policies are lacking or managed unequally (Linkage 2.2.1.O). In particular, the report suggests that financing for regional prevention efforts could come in the form of insurance that offers states reasonable, predictable, coordinated disbursement of funds with escalating risks (preventing spillover impacts from *interstate tensions* or disasters). Such insurance would require states to have risk management plans in place that address development, diplomacy, and security needs (arguably climate security needs), plans which may further strengthen a state’s long-term adaptability to climate risks. Taking the Maslowian perspective offered by Olson and Gawronski, a reasonable hypothesis may be that these types of inter-group tensions draw participation of both women and men along *avoid abuse* (typically women) and *exposure to violence/repression* or *revenge* (typically men), though research on gendered motivational mechanisms is required.

Another way a disaster could trigger tensions between groups in poorly prepared states is by triggering the dimensions of ‘correctness’ or ‘mitigation,’ which may increase feelings of resentment for other groups. For instance, Hilhorst and colleagues explain that, should a poorly managed disaster displace large groups of people, triggering mass migration, such movements of people may exacerbate or even spark new interstate

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442 “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 55.
443 “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 56.
444 “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 288.
445 “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 288.
They go on to note, “Whether a disaster negatively impacts conflict depends on a variety of factors; for example, low DRR investments or a weak government response. These factors in turn increase the likelihood of disasters, as weak DRR, government incapacity, and political instability increase vulnerability and compromise disaster preparedness.” Under such circumstances, it may be possible to imagine that motivations such as fundamentalist ideologies (both women and men), revenge, and pull of networks (typically men) draw people to participate in such conflicts, however research on this linkage is lacking as well.

Clearly, systems that make an effort to plan and save for climate-based shocks are likely to fare much better following such disasters, and therefore be less likely to experience increases in crime, violence, extremism, grievances, tensions, and conflicts at all levels of society. Prepared local institutions and national governments are far better equipped to deliver support and services that measure up to the public’s Maslowian expectations for capability, compassion, competence, correctness, credibility, and anticipation, thereby also diminishing the likelihood that new or amplified grievances between groups or across borders develop. However, such high levels of efficiency and effectiveness require long-term thinking and prioritizing risks that may seem remote, and as such require governments to act with courage and foresight. They also require the global community to act in solidarity with fragile and developing states to fund their Long-Term Adaptation plans. Furthermore, including women in such planning and

preparation may reduce rates of corruption, improve overall outcomes for women, and thereby improve community security to decrease the chances of future instability.

2.2.1.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Long-Term Adaptation

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to Long-Term Adaptation can be found in Figure 14. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 54 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 14. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Long-Term Adaptation.

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation.*
Chapter 3.

Susceptibility

Susceptibility to climate change hazards, the focus of this chapter, is a fundamentally important GCS-Phase that determines an individual’s or system’s ability to adapt to and recover from climate breakdown. An individual’s or region’s Susceptibility to climate hazards is determined by the tendency of climate-exposed vital elements to suffer loss, damage, or other adverse effects because of climate hazards, and is often determined by socially constructed elements such as government stability.\textsuperscript{448} There is a negative feedback loop at work since increased susceptibility to climate-related hazards also affects a state’s ability to recover from and maintain stability following repeated crises.

This chapter is divided into two GCS-Phases of a system’s Susceptibility, including (1) GCS-Phase Socioeconomic which covers several GCS-Factors, including Poverty, Life Expectancy, Education, Standard of Living, Unemployment, Socioeconomic Development, and Infrastructure; as well as (2) GCS-Phase Institutional which includes two GCS-Factors: Corruption and State Fragility. As in the previous chapter, each GCS-Factor will first be explored in terms of conventional versus feminist conceptions. This will be followed by an extensive exploration of the gendered Human Security aspects of that GCS-Factor, as well as the gendered National/International Security aspects of that GCS-Factor. At the start of each GCS-Factor section will be a table summarizing the Gender-Climate-Security Linkage findings within that section. These Linkages will be

\textsuperscript{448} Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 27.
categorized based on the lenses of analysis developed in Chapter 1, and can be referenced based on the Linkage numbering employed in the longer discussions explaining Gender-Climate-Security Linkages. As before, for Human Security, (1) categories are based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, and one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’). For National/International Security, findings are (2) organized first by Climate Diplomacy’s four ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (2A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (2B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (2C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4). Each GCS-Factor section will offer a list of diagnostic questions (in the Appendix) to facilitate the use of this proposed framework in analysis of real life climate insecurity scenarios.

3.1. Socioeconomic

The following portion of Chapter 3 offers an examination of how the socially-constructed gender inequalities shaped by socioeconomic norms and institutions may increase the Susceptibility of certain individuals and systems to climate security risks. Social and economic inequality, supported by globalization, colonialism, and

\[\text{Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 81.}\]
imperialism, and reinforced by poor governance and cultural norms and beliefs, may intensify societal divides that, when stressed by climate hazards, trigger increases in instability, violence, and conflict.¹⁴⁵⁰ The socioeconomic factors covered in this section include Poverty, Life Expectancy, Education, Standard of Living, Unemployment, Socioeconomic Development, and Infrastructure.

3.1.1. Poverty

Table 24. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Poverty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Measures the percentage of a population living at $1.90 a day at 2011 international prices.¹⁴⁵¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| FPEcon/FPEcol Approach: | According to Johnsson-Latham, conventional understandings of gender generally frame the poverty conversation in terms of ‘tradeables’ such as those allocated to the market and (often primarily men’s) paid work, thereby ignoring women’s unpaid contribution to economies.¹⁴⁵² As such, conventional theory tends to overlook laws, norms, and attitudes about gender that create barriers to prevent women from entering a trade-based market to overcome poverty, such as limits in access to education, mobility, employment, inheritance, land, and personal freedoms.¹⁴⁵³ A more useful and positive framing, according to Johnsson-Latham, is the gender and development (GAD) discourse, which emphasizes power structures, focusing on the problem of male privilege and how to transform dominant power structures.¹⁴⁵⁴ |

Expanding on this concept, feminist political economist Kabeer frames the issue of poverty and gender in terms of horizontal inequalities (defined by social identities, such as gender, caste, and race) and vertical inequalities (defined by income/wealth

¹⁴⁵³ Johnsson-Latham, “Power, Privilege and Gender,” 42.
¹⁴⁵⁴ Johnsson-Latham, “Power, Privilege and Gender,” 43.
Combining both horizontal and vertical dimensions draws attention to the intersection of overlapping inequalities stemming from discrimination and social exclusion that are often at the heart of persistent poverty. Rather than viewing poverty as a reflection of average household income, viewing poverty using these hierarchies makes it possible to understand how multiple, reinforcing inequalities make it very challenging for people to overcome poverty, and importantly, makes visible that individuals within a household may not be equally poor or well-off. FPEcon True in particular links structural inequalities of capitalism, based in part on gender, with social inequalities that determine the roles women and men play at home and on the warfront.

Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Poverty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.1.A. Climate change intensifies demands on women’s unpaid labour as a crucial variable of adjustment to shocks → women have less time available for income-generating activities → women’s poverty deepens → women have fewer financial resources available for adapting to further climate shocks</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.1.B. Expectations for women to take on more unpaid labour are amplified due to climate breakdown → women’s wellbeing and mental health may be impacted → burnout becomes more likely → women have fewer emotional resources available for adapting to further climate shocks</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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456 Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 190.
457 Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality.” 191.
459 *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
### Human Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.1.C.</th>
<th>Climate breakdown may disrupt local labour markets → men may find gaining new employment difficult and therefore may lack the financial capacity to get out of poverty → if men’s economic status is diminished relative to women’s, rates of SGBV against women may increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.1.D.</th>
<th>Climate change requires adaptive responses → women’s resources are consumed or sold off before men’s → women’s poverty deepens → women’s climate exposure to climate risks increases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.1.E.</td>
<td>Climate-caused poverty may increase economic inequality → crime rates may increase (violent crime by men and to men, property crime by women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Increase survival (typically women) and pull of networks or personal security (typically men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Linkage 3.1.1.F. | Climate-driven increases in poverty may impact women’s and men’s economic security → violent civic disruption may increase |
| Anti-state grievances | [Requires research] Increase survival (typically women) exposure to violence/repression or pull of networks (typically men) |

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460 For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a $\S$; those with no research with $\bigcirc$. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2.

3.1.1.1. Poverty and Human Security

The poorest segments of society are likely to feel the impacts of climate breakdown most acutely. A systematic review of research by Hallegatte et al. found that there is a reinforcing feedback loop between climate change and Poverty, in that Poverty
intensifies the *Susceptibility* of people and communities to climate shocks and stressors, while climate *Susceptibility* keeps people in *Poverty*.\textsuperscript{461} Yet climate change will not impact all people living in *Poverty* in the same ways. In examining GCS-Factor *Poverty*, it’s important to examine the gendered power imbalances that result in people’s different adaptive responses—the decisions people living in *Poverty* make that determine their chances of recovering from climate-caused crises in the future. In particular, the ensuing discussion will explore how climate change will impact women’s unpaid care and domestic work (UCDW) burdens and the effects that increased demands will have on women’s mental and physical health; the changes to labour markets and how such changes will impact women and men; as well as the ways in which gendered adaptive responses may increase individual *Susceptibility* to climate shocks in the future. Looking at gendered power structures, it is easy to see how *Poverty* is felt by groups differently, resulting in varying impacts on *Human Security*. As such, the first *Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* we examine is that of *societal capacity*, particularly related to how inequalities impact women’s economic power.\textsuperscript{462}

FPEcon theory of social reproduction suggests higher value is typically placed on public, masculine work while private feminine work is often devalued and unpaid. When women and men are burdened unequally due to different expectations for unpaid care work, women may experience a form of horizontal gender-based inequality that deepens climate-caused *Poverty* and insecurity (Linkage 3.1.1.A).\textsuperscript{463} Privileged masculinist

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\textsuperscript{461} Hallegatte, Fay, and Barbier, “Poverty and Climate Change,” 2018.

\textsuperscript{462} Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including *societal capacity*, or one of three 'socioeconomic development' (SD), (referred to as 'SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,' 'SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,' and 'SD-surplus males-unemployment').

\textsuperscript{463} True and Tanyag, “Global Violence and Security from a Gendered Perspective.”
structures inevitably deepen women’s and girls’ existing poverty relative to that of men and boys, and thus also the stability of their communities.\footnote{True and Tanyag, “Global Violence and Security from a Gendered Perspective.”} Furthermore, in times of climate crisis, FPEcon research suggests that women’s time is a crucial variable of adjustment to shocks because of the roles women play at home, in the community, and in the wider market. Under pressure of climate-induced disasters, impoverished women may take on more unpaid labour to compensate for lost public services (education, family health care, child care, etc.) or to produce high-cost items themselves (such as clothing or food).\footnote{Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 199.} For instance, Sogani has found that in India, the workload of women (including girl children) has increased significantly due to climate breakdown: “fruit and vegetable production has become more demanding, family members fall ill more often, it takes more time to find fuel and drinking water, and women must undertake more frequent repairs and maintenance to the household.”\footnote{Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 19.} Lawson et al. note, “Existing economic systems have already pushed carers and their dependents to the brink, and now the environmental degradation they promote could tip them over the edge.”\footnote{Max Lawson et al., “Time to Care: Unpaid and Underpaid Care Work and the Global Inequality Crisis” (Oxford: Oxfam International, January 28, 2020), 41, https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/time-care.} Moser has also found that under such circumstances, women in Ecuador often burn out, exhausted by the competing responsibilities (Linkage 3.1.1.B).\footnote{Caroline Moser, The Impact of Recession and Adjustment Policies at the Micro-Level: Low Income Women and Their Households in Guayaquil, Ecuador. (Santiago, Chile: UNICEF, 1988).}

Women’s ability to handle new climate stressors may also decrease their societal capacity due to power imbalances that lead to maladaptive shock-based adaptations made by people living with poverty. An FPEcon perspective suggests that these adaptations should be understood as existing on a loose continuum, along which earlier responses to
shocks such as climate breakdown pose little threat to the household’s productive base, while later responses entail greater risks.\footnote{Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 196.}

These might include cutting back on number of meals consumed, purchasing less nutritious foods, foraging for wild food, borrowing from neighbours or money lenders, turning to wealthier patrons, letting illness go untreated, depletion of household stores, selling off smaller consumer durables, taking children out of school, and temporary migration in search of work. Much later in the sequence came the selling off of producer assets, which was likely to undermine the household’s chances of recovery. The final stages could include permanent migration, and the breakdown of the family unit.


Within the Poverty sphere, the SD-surplus males-unemployment Gender Equality-Security Mechanism may also be a factor. At baseline, men experience lower rates of Poverty than women, and the impact of economic crises is usually less in the formal economy (relative to women), and for shorter periods of time (though sometimes this effect is reversed in the informal economy).\footnote{Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 193, 201.} Nevertheless, men living with Poverty face some of the similar economic threats women face during climate-caused shocks.\footnote{Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 193, 201.}

Furthermore, additional economic stressors, especially in armed conflict zones, may
threaten men’s masculinity. Ultimately this may lead to increased rates of SGBV, further diminishing women’s societal capacity (Linkage 3.1.1.D).473

In examining GCS-Factor Poverty, the preceding discussion has shown that there exists a reinforcing feedback loop between climate change and Poverty, with Poverty intensifying the vulnerability of people and communities to climate shocks and stressors, while climate vulnerability keeps people in Poverty.474 Those living with the most extreme levels of Poverty—which are often women, especially women-headed households—are likely to feel the impacts of climate change most acutely, and are therefore more susceptible to the impacts of climate change. Transforming the gendered structures and institutions that keep women in Poverty will be an important tool for increasing women’s societal capacity—and boosting community stability.

Transformative approaches should address household level changes in UCDW responsibilities, cultural norms around SGBV, and the need to support women following climate shocks to ensure their resources and assets are not lost at a relatively faster rate than others.

3.1.1.2. Poverty and National/International Security

There is a general consensus that Poverty and conflict reinforce one another, and that climate change has already begun to increase Poverty globally. Some research also suggests that increased Poverty rates may amplify threats of National/International

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Insecurity along several pathways (though there is some contestation as to how).\textsuperscript{475} Regardless of the cause, it’s important to note that the economic impacts of climate-induced conflict can generate direct costs to victims and governments in lost food systems, energy, and water infrastructure, and increased costs of policing; as well as indirect costs such as economic losses, physical and physiological trauma, displacement, loss of education, and lost productivity.\textsuperscript{476} These combined losses have a multiplier effect that feeds into the vicious cycle of Poverty and conflict.\textsuperscript{477} The Institute of Economics and Peace describes it this way: costs associated with increasing violence hinders economic growth, which deteriorates peacefulness, which in turn leaves fewer viable alternatives to using violence to deal with grievances, violence, and conflict, thereby increasing climate Susceptibility.\textsuperscript{478}

Along the crime/violence/extremism pathway, findings are somewhat contested. Historically, quantitative studies suggest that only when loss of livelihood or property is combined with temperature increases, water scarcity, land degradation, or population displacements does increased Poverty lead to increased crime.\textsuperscript{479} However, some case studies provide supporting data for the hypothesis that alone, climate-induced Poverty will stimulate higher crime rates. A recent meta-analysis by Pratt and Cullen shows that

\textsuperscript{475} For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).


\textsuperscript{478} “Economic Value of Peace 2021,” 47.

\textsuperscript{479} Agnew, “Dire Forecast,” 29.
Poverty is among the most stable macro-level predictors of crime (as well as racial heterogeneity and family disruption).\textsuperscript{480} Additionally, it is increasingly well-established that climate change is expected to negatively impact Poverty levels, and that the impact is likely to be felt far more profoundly by those already poor, thereby increasing economic inequality over time.\textsuperscript{481} Poverty and inequality (measured by the GINI Index) combined are the best indicators of increased crime rates, according to Anser et al.\textsuperscript{482} Similarly, Agnew notes that increased inequality “will exacerbate the effect of increased Poverty on crime.”\textsuperscript{483} This will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.1.6.1.

While no studies have yet examined changes in crime/violence rates based on how gender intersects with climate-induced Poverty, as discussed in section 1.2.3.1, in general, there is a persistent gender gap in who commits violent crime.\textsuperscript{484} In particular, young men living with Poverty are significantly more likely to engage in crime, and be victims of crime (possibly motivated by motivations such as pull of networks or personal security).\textsuperscript{485} Regardless, women are increasingly involved in criminal activity (particularly property crimes). As such, though women are likely to see lower earnings from criminal activity than men, it is important to consider whether climate-induced Poverty may lead to more property-related crimes committed by women (Linkage

\textsuperscript{481} Hallegatte, Fay, and Barbier, “Poverty and Climate Change,” 2018.
\textsuperscript{483} Agnew, “Dire Forecast,” 29.
\textsuperscript{484} Zhong et al., “Understanding Women’s Antisocial and Criminal Behavior.”
\textsuperscript{485} Smith and Ashiabi, “Poverty and Child Outcomes,” 840.
3.1.1.E). Research could be done to test whether women might be driven to engage in criminal activity by motivations such as increase survival.\textsuperscript{486}

Along the \textit{anti-state grievance} pathway, Parpart argues that since the Cold War, ‘new wars’ are being fought which, unlike previous shock and awe wars, focus on conflicts within a state’s borders.\textsuperscript{487} Parpart posits that the inability of weak states to adjust to global economic neoliberal restructuring and participate in globalization leads to social unrest within their borders, unrest which is intensified by ethnic and religious divides, and sometimes gender divides.\textsuperscript{488} As noted in 1.2.3.3, where violent civic action is concerned, men are more likely to participate in disruptive activities. No gender-based studies have been done on motivations connecting climate-fueled Poverty to political unrest, so testing if unemployed working-class men who have experienced ongoing marginalization are motivated by \textit{exposure to violence/repression} or \textit{pull of networks}, or if \textit{increase survival} may motivate women to contribute to political unrest might be beneficial (Linkage 3.1.1.F).\textsuperscript{489} One example for how climate-caused Poverty may lead to increased demonstrations is that, in some cultures, men are perceived as untrustworthy due to norms about male alcohol abuse, making it difficult or impossible for them to borrow money during times of economic hardship and potentially increasing feelings of shame.\textsuperscript{490} Should climate-induced shocks deepen Poverty levels for large groups of young men and prevent them from fulfilling masculine roles (such as getting married, which is

\textsuperscript{486} Campaniello, “Women in Crime.”
\textsuperscript{488} Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” 674.
\textsuperscript{489} Sikweyiya and Nkosi, “Violent Protests and Gendered Identities”; Rucht, “The Spread of Protest Politics.”
\textsuperscript{490} Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 23.
often tied to finding employment), extremist groups may find it easier to recruit such men via the *SD-surplus males-unemployment Gender Equality-Security Mechanism*, especially in urban environments, while these men may also be more inclined to resort to violent protest to redress their concerns (Linkage 3.1.1.G).

Gender and climate change may also intersect with *Poverty* to increase rates of grievances between societal groups. Burke et al. have argued that *Poverty* is one of the best indicators for within-state conflict engendered by climate change.\(^{491}\) State-level *Poverty* can lead to a breakdown of public authority, and a blurring of public and private security/combatants, resulting in a privatization of violence.\(^{492}\) In such states, the aggrieved poor may be more likely to rebel, while ‘greedy’ war entrepreneurs find ways to profit off of the conflict (Linkage 3.1.1.H).\(^{493}\) Offering a gender lens, Parpart suggests that the new wars are cheap, especially because the constant flow of unemployed young men offers a “permanent source of recruitment.”\(^{494}\) (This aspect of *Poverty* also aligns with the *Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* of *SD-surplus males-unemployment*).

These young men may find fighting to be a pathway to meeting masculine cultural expectations—when traditional paths to adult manhood are barred by *Poverty*, achieving social recognition and prestige may come through militant prowess.\(^{495}\) For instance, in Somalia where a, “newly hegemonic form of masculinity” contingent on the generation and control of wealth for the clan has led to increased armed violence; those who cannot obtain wealth on their own may be compelled to join groups that can aid in increasing

\(^{492}\) Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” 675.
\(^{493}\) Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” 675.
\(^{494}\) Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” 676.
\(^{495}\) Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” 677.
their status. Similar sentiments have been manipulated by groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa Province to recruit young men in the Lake Chad region. These findings suggest the pull of networks (Linkage 3.1.1.G) may be strongly at work. However, as discussed in 1.2.3.4, research has shown that women combatants are growing in numbers in armed/rebel groups (possibly due to desires to increase survival) so the gender link Poverty and climate change rebel group involvement needs to be studied. Furthermore, through complex relationships between cultural norms and combat participation, women may find it easier to participate in rebel groups, and conversely that women’s participation may boost community gender equality within.

Looking at the interstate tensions pathway, Rice makes the case that national-level Poverty diminishes a state’s capacity to provide four critical goods: basic physical security, government legitimacy, economic growth, and social welfare (Linkage 3.1.1.I). A fragile state that is unable to meet the needs of its people may see increased Poverty rates among its poorest groups, potentially leading to spillover effects for cross-border and global security. Under such circumstances, motivations related to greater opportunities (women) and pull of networks (men) may be useful lines of research into how women and men may engage in activities that risk state security in this way.

Thomas and Wood, “The Social Origins of Female Combatants.”
Kampwirth, Women & Guerrilla Movements; Thomas and Wood, “The Social Origins of Female Combatants.”
Rice, “Poverty Breeds Insecurity,” 32.
This GCS-Factor Poverty discussion has centred on the ways in which Poverty may intersect with existing cleavages (along ethnic, religious, socioeconomic class, or gender divides), and how the combined factors may contribute to increased political instability or higher crime rates. Economic inequality between groups may be of particular importance when diagnosing how gender and Poverty may intensify existing grievances, especially for young unemployed men. Furthermore, attention should be paid to how increased government impoverishment may diminish the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions to deliver basic goods and services, thereby contributing to increases in Poverty and potential amplification of economic grievances. In economic matters, government benefit programs should benefit all genders—decreasing Poverty among women may help to stabilize communities, while addressing Poverty among men may help to alleviate anxieties that drive feelings of shame that may lead to greater involvement in violence and conflict.
3.1.1.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Poverty**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to Poverty can be found in Figure 15. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 55 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Poverty](image)

**Figure 15. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Poverty.**

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Poverty.*
### Table 26. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Life Expectancy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant Approach:</strong></td>
<td>On average, the number of years a newborn can expect to live, assuming current death rates remain the same. An increase in life expectancy at birth is a reflection of rising living standards, better education, access to quality health services, and improved lifestyle conditions. 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</strong></td>
<td>Looking at life expectancy without a gender lens obscures the differential impact climate change has on the number of years women and men live, and ignores the broader security implications of gendered population changes that may result. As before, the concept of social reproduction will be useful in this discussion on life expectancy, which will make use of all three elements of social reproduction feminism (SRF) theory noted previously (biological reproduction, unpaid production, and reproduction of culture and ideology). 503 Many systems for measuring economic activity do not reflect the gendered hierarchies of the political economy, making it difficult to value activities of social reproduction, and rendering such measurements inaccurate and flawed. 504 In particular, the exclusion of social reproduction results in a failure to consider the often uncounted depletion of the body due to fewer resource inputs compared to resource outputs, resulting in a de facto bodily subsidy to the economy. 505 As previously discussed, Rai et al.’s depletion through social reproduction (DSR) model arises from social inequities that eventually lead to unaccounted-for harm: damage, injury, detriment, impairment, or violence. 506 In speaking of the concept of depletion of the body, the authors write: while discrete, it is relational, while being depleted on an individual basis, it does so within social frameworks that position it in relations to other bodies. These relations are historically specific and contested and as such these influence the ways in which bodies are viewed, used/abused, work and are worked upon, depleted and replenished. What needs to be thought through here is what the body needs for its continued existence, without which it can deteriorate faster than it need, affecting the individual body but also the social institutions within which it remains embedded. 507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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As such, an examination of Gender-Climate-Security linkages to Life Expectancy must consider how women’s bodies are depleted by climate change, and consequently how that DSR affects the community as a whole. The concept of DSR will therefore form the foundation of the discussion of gender and climate security in the following section on life expectancy.

*Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Life Expectancy.*

Table 27. Short Overview of the Life Expectancy Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.A.</strong> Climate crises may create economic stress → may impact rates of sex-selective abortion (a son preference practice)</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.B.</strong> Climate extreme weather events may amplify son preference practices → girls may receive less breastmilk; lower quality food; lower vitamin supplementation; fewer vaccinations → may cause an increase in excess female under-5 mortality rates</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.C.</strong> Intense climate disasters may cause significant loss of life → such disasters are more likely to kill women when gender inequality is high, especially when cultural norms create barriers for women fleeing extreme weather → mortality rates among women may be higher than men in a disaster</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.D.</strong> Cultural norms may prevent women from learning survival skills such as swimming → women’s clothing may create barriers to getting out of the path of a disaster → cultural norms about modesty may supersede a woman’s desire to get medical help following a disaster → mortality rates among women may be higher than men in the immediate aftermath of a disaster</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Human Security</strong></th>
<th><strong>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.2.E.</td>
<td>A climate disaster may have indirect consequences → women are more likely than men to be impacted by damage to agriculture, public health systems, infrastructure, the social order → women’s indirect mortality rates may be higher due to poor sanitation, overcrowding, poor living conditions; malnutrition; sexual disease; obstetrical/pregnancy-related disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.2.F.</td>
<td>Pre-disaster, power structures may result in unequal choices and resources (denial of access to reproductive choice; affordable public benefits; access to safety-net programs; lower or zero compensation for feminized labour) → women may have fewer life reserves → a climate disaster may more profoundly impact women’s bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.2.G.</td>
<td>Performance of social reproduction depletes women’s bodies due to an imbalance in unpaid care burdens → following an extreme climate-related event, demand for women’s social reproduction labour may intensify → women’s bodies are likely to be further depleted → women may have a increase susceptibility to climate risks when the next crisis arrives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.2.H.</td>
<td>A climate crisis may increase population sex ratio imbalances → rates of SGBV may increase → SGBV may further deplete women’s life reserves and life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.2.I.</td>
<td>A climate crisis may increase rates of SGBV even without sex ratio imbalances → SGBV may further deplete women’s life reserves and life expectancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/International Security</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.J.</strong> Climate change may impact the gender balance at birth and in childhood brackets through sex-selective abortion or son preference practices during childhood → the population sex ratio may become imbalanced → more young men in urban/rural state-based and non-state violence</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.K.</strong> Intense climate disasters may cause significant loss of life → such disasters are more likely to kill women when gender inequality is high, especially when cultural norms create barriers for women learning survival skills or fleeing extreme weather → mortality rates among women may be higher than men in the immediate aftermath of a disaster → may lead to population sex imbalances → may lead to more young men in urban/rural state-based and non-state violence</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.2.L.</strong> A climate disaster may have indirect consequences → women are more likely than men to be impacted by damage to agriculture, public health systems, infrastructure, the social order → women’s indirect mortality rates may be higher due to poor sanitation, overcrowding, poor living conditions; malnutrition; sexual disease; obstetrical/pregnancy-related disease → may lead to population sex imbalances → may lead to more young men in urban/rural state-based and non-state violence</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^3]: For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
Climate disasters may change life expectancies more in one gender than the other → may impact population sex ratios → may result in more unpartnered men that women or unpartnered women (context specific) → may increase men-to-men violence (especially when stable social bonds are absent) and crime rates (drug abuse, prostitution, trafficking of women)

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a §; those with no research with ⊙. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.

3.1.2.1. Life Expectancy and Human Security

A growing list of studies project that climate change will have a deleterious effect on Life Expectancy around the world. As discussed in the GCS-Factor Healthcare, the mechanisms by which climate change is expected to negatively impact public health and human mortality are many. Notably, a recent Lancet report finds that climate breakdown will expose vulnerable populations to new and increased infectious diseases, lower Food Security, contaminated air, and reduced quantities and qualities of drinking water.

Hauer and Santos-Lozada’s research shows that extreme weather events such as heat

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waves, cold waves, coastal and river flooding, wildfires, droughts, and windstorms will also shorten human life, even in developed regions.\textsuperscript{512} Obviously, environmental change that fundamentally threatens people’s life expectancies is a \textit{Human Security} concern.

Centring the issue of DSR, this analysis will start with the \textit{Gender Equality-Security Mechanism of societal capacity} by examining the direct ways that climate insecurity may shorten girls’ and women’s life expectancies, followed by a discussion of the indirect ways in which DSR and unequal power structures may limit women’s choices and resources resulting in lower life reserves.\textsuperscript{513} Third, still within the realm of the \textit{societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms}, the discussion will turn to the ways in which climate change may impact population sex ratios, and how that might contribute to women’s climate insecurity.

First, a look at climate’s direct impacts on girls’ and women’s life expectancies. There are two primary time periods in which climate change may limit girls’ lives—during gestation and into childhood. Starting at pregnancy, through sex selective abortion, parents may choose to prefer bearing sons, (though importantly, the decision to continue or end a pregnancy may not be in a woman’s control). Ultimately, this type of son preference practice literally shortens girls fetus’ life expectancies to zero.\textsuperscript{514}

\textsuperscript{512} Hauer and Santos-Lozada, “Inaction on Climate Change Projected to Reduce European Life Expectancy.”

\textsuperscript{513} \textit{Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages} are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s \textit{Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms} including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).

\textsuperscript{514} Rai, Hoskyns, and Thomas, “Depletion and Social Reproduction”; For instance, climate-related fertility changes could result in an excess of males as measured by ‘sex ratio at birth,’ which is defined as the number of male live births for every 100 female live births, a measure that has remained remarkably consistent across human populations at 105-107 male births for every 100 female births. Hesketh Therese and Zhu Wei Xing, “Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences,” \textit{Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences} 103, no. 36 (September 5, 2006): 13271–75, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0602203103; Studies have shown a variety of ways climate change may impact human sex ratios at birth. The first is that changing weather patterns and climate-caused disasters
Interestingly, several other biological factors may also cause an imbalance in sex ratios at birth. Common in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, parents may adopt a son preference for many reasons: perceived higher earning capacity of males; concerns over continuation of the family line through males; the need for a male inheritance recipient; and the economic burden of girls due to dowry systems and lifelong financial support.

Exposure to climate shocks is a relatively new factor on the list of reasons for adopting son preference practices at conception. Jung has shown that extreme weather shocks could cause an increase in the rate of sex-selective abortion, likely due to economic stressors that increase preferences for boy children (Linkage 3.1.2.A).

Beyond gestation, son preference norms are often practiced into childhood, further shortening the life expectancies of girl children. Several studies have shown that, at baseline in some cultures, girl children receive lower parental investment, resulting in girls receiving less breastmilk; lower quality food; lower vitamin supplementation; and so on, which may impact sex ratios at conception. Helle et al. found that for every 1 degree Celsius (1.8 degree Fahrenheit) temperature increase, there was a 0.06 percent increase in ratio of boy to girl newborns in the Sami people of Northern Finland, suggesting a 3 degree Celsius increase could result in thousands of ‘extra’ boys in larger populations. Samuli Helle, Samuli Helama, and Jukka Jokela, “Temperature-Related Birth Sex Ratio Bias in Historical Sami: Warm Years Bring More Sons,” Biology Letters 4 (November 27, 2007): 60–62, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2007.0482; However, Fukuda et al. and Catalano et al. have found links between temperature fluctuations and other environmental events that create extreme stress and increased parental cortisol secretion, resulting in lower male-to-female sex ratios at birth, due in large part to the vulnerability of Y-bearing sperm cells, male embryos, and/or male fetuses to maternal stress. Misao Fukuda and Kiyomi Fukuda, “The Male to Female Ratio of Newborn Infants in Japan in Relation to Climate Change, Earthquakes, Fetal Deaths, and Singleton Male and Female Birth Weights,” Early Human Development 140 (January 2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eahumdev.2019.104861. As such, it is difficult to predict what sex ratio impact a specific community may experience, and may depend on whether parents experience slow-onset or extreme acute climate breakdown. Nevertheless, should fertility-level changes in sex ratio at birth persist into young adulthood, communities may find higher rates of state- and non-state violence by disaffected men.


Therese and Xing, “Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences.”
fewer vaccinations. Several studies have demonstrated that pre-existing discriminatory practices that disadvantage the health of girls become exacerbated during crises (such as climate disasters), intensifying the health impact on girls (and women). For instance, a study by Thamarapani concludes that natural disasters between 2002 and 2007 in Indonesia resulted in girls showing measurable differences in health outcomes (they were shorter and more stunted) compared to boys. This type of gender discrimination against girl children has been shown by Kashyap, Behrman, and Krishnan to result in excess female under-5 mortality (Linkage 3.1.2.B).

Finally, looking beyond childhood, studies have shown that emergencies such as climate disasters tend to heighten both short-term mortality rates and long-term health deterioration among women during adulthood. Several recent studies have noted that natural disasters such as those caused by climate change, including floods or droughts, may kill more women than men, with the disparities increasing as disaster intensity and

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In many cases, the performance of cultural norms and ideologies (leading to higher DSR rates) may lead to direct increases in mortality rates among women. For instance, according to Hunter et al., norms against women learning to swim leave them more vulnerable to water-related disasters. Pittaway et al. find that the risk to women in such circumstances is even higher when combined with heavy and voluminous clothing that prevents women from being able to run to high places, climb trees, or swim, and when their clothing is removed during the crisis, women often refuse rescue offers from men or medical care by men in order to maintain their modesty.

Moreover, Neumayer and Plümper, posit that when the socioeconomic status of women is low, natural disasters kill more women and at younger ages indirectly at higher rates due to post-disaster events. [Notably, however, as discussed in the Healthcare section of this study, some disasters and contexts men’s mortality rates are higher than women’s.]

Some research also suggests that indirect consequences of damage to agriculture, public health systems, infrastructure, and the social order, result in a greater burden on the well-being of women (increased bodily depletion) over the entire disaster/conflict period due to increases in social reproductive labour. In particular, women tend to die

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at higher rates in post-conflict (and post-disaster) situations because of indirect consequences such as poor sanitation, overcrowding, and poor living conditions; malnutrition; sexual disease; and obstetrical/pregnancy-related disease (Linkage 3.1.2.E).\(^{527}\)

Furthermore, looking at the role DSR plays in women’s life expectancies, a growing literature suggests climate change will intensify the devaluation of women’s social reproduction labour, further amplifying impacts on women’s health and wellbeing (and potentially Life Expectancy).\(^{528}\) At baseline, the social and political structures of power, and the economic effects of these structures (social reproduction of unpaid production), tend to privilege and benefit men (though as will be seen, not always), resulting in unequal life circumstances for women and men that in crisis may impact Life Expectancy. For instance, women often face both symbolic and material circumstances that diminish their life reserves. According to Estes, such circumstances may include denial of access to reproductive choice; affordable public benefits such as health care and safety-net programs; and lower or zero compensation for labour because of dichotomies that value masculinized labour and invisibilize feminized labour (Linkage 3.1.2.F).\(^{529}\) Barriers to accessing healthcare or safe havens are particularly troubling for women following natural disasters—in communities where women are forbidden to leave the house without a male family member, a shortage of ‘appropriate’ male family members (due to a disaster or conflict) may prevent women from traveling to obtain the public health care they need.

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\(^{529}\) Estes, “Women’s Rights, Women’s Status, Women’s Resistance in the Age of Trump.”
services they need to remain safe and healthy. These effects are even more profound for those experiencing intersectional challenges such as race, class, disability, and Poverty. The devaluing of women’s labour is also evident in the everyday invisibilizing of the impact of women’s participation in neoliberal economies and the impact on their bodies. As mentioned in several other places in this study, today’s economies could not function without the social reproduction work carried out women, largely unpaid and devalued. A normal, baseline level of social reproductive work tends to wear women’s bodies, and during crises, expectations on women to fill the gaps tend to increase significantly, putting even further strain on women to hold up the economy and their families. Elias and Rai show that in times of crisis, such as conflict and natural disasters, demand for women’s social reproduction labour is intensified, leading to an increase in bodily harm. As Tanyag describes it,

Gaps in crisis responses and interventions … suggest that survival and recovery are contingent on women’s willingness to make the necessary sacrifices – subordinating their personal needs to that of the family, community, and the state. … During times of crisis, there may be a widening of pre-existing gaps between the intensified provision of care and the contributions to sustain the very bodies that meet heightened care

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demands precisely because this is when gendered expectations of altruism and self-sacrifice operate the most.  

The performance of social reproduction of culture and ideology, therefore, may deplete women’s bodies before a crisis, increase the unpaid care and domestic work responsibilities after a crisis, and ultimately leave women physically less resilient to future crises (Linkage 3.1.2.G).

In addition to the direct climate-driven increases in girls’ and women’s mortality during climate crises and the increased burdens of social reproduction on women’s bodies, SGBV should also be considered under the Gender Equality-Security Mechanism of societal capacity. As already discussed, climate crises may increase son preference practices, or result in higher mortality among women, either of which may cause an imbalance in the ‘population sex ratio,’ which is defined as the number of males for every 100 females in the population, and is determined by the sex ratio at birth, losses and gains through population movements, and differential mortality rates of the sexes at various ages. SGBV has been shown to increase in the presence of population sex ratios with a surplus of unmarried men. This may be because as women experience greater partner choice, jealous male partners may increase violence against their female partners to deter infidelity (Linkage 3.1.2.H). These findings, however, have been contested by Kaur et

535 Therese and Xing, “Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences.”
al. who find that as sex ratio rises are skewed in favour of men, crime rates tend to fall.538

As discussed more extensively in the Poverty and Standard of Living sections, SGBV can reduce a victim’s ability to obtain economic prosperity, psychological well-being, and sufficient nourishment through food, thereby increasing women’s overall climate Susceptibility (Linkage 3.1.2.1).

As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, during climate-related crises, women’s life expectancies may be impacted along three pathways: through direct increases in mortality rates due to climate disasters and increased son preference practices, through bodily depletion due to increased UCDW/social reproduction expectations, and through population sex ratio changes that may increase rates of SGBV, lowering women’s life reserves. With Forsberg and Olsson’s rubric in mind, communities that fail to consider the gendered ways neoliberal economies and patriarchal households are structured are likely to overlook how these expectations shrink women’s life expectancies, ultimately diminishing social resources and networks, leading to less stable and safe communities. Gender transformative approaches must address gendered power imbalances (especially those that increase women’s unpaid work, while exposing them to higher rates of SGBV) and economic systems that devalue social reproductive work.

3.1.2.2. Life Expectancy and National/International Security

Within the National/International Security context, little is yet understood about whether climate-induced changes to Life Expectancy contribute to interstate tensions or


anti-state grievances. However, given the direct connections between Life Expectancy and the potential for generating surplus males within a system, further exploration of the Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms of SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict / SD-surplus males-non-state conflict is warranted as an aspect of the GCS-Factor Life Expectancy’s National/International Security outcomes.\textsuperscript{539} According to Forsberg and Olsson, when a substantial young male surplus (often due to a strong, persistent son preference) in an urban environment (with strong family or tribal networks for recruitment), the gender inequality and state-based violence connection is strong. In non-state violence, Forsberg and Olsson suggest a young male surplus has a similar effect in both urban or rural conditions, suggesting an increased likelihood of low-scale, localized non-state violence and riots in rural and urban settings (where family/kin ties ease recruitment). With this in mind, the following brief analysis will look at connections between Life Expectancy in the National/International Security context.

Briefly first, however, a review of Life Expectancy in the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle must first address how climate change and climate-related conflict are likely to impact the life expectancies of girl children and adult women, and therefore population sex ratios.\textsuperscript{540} Should practices such as sex selective abortion or son preferences

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{539}] Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’). For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
decrease the life expectancies of girl children, population sex ratios may become skewed toward men (Linkage 3.1.2.J). Similarly, should the direct (Linkage 3.1.2.K) or indirect (Linkage 3.1.2.L) impacts of climate disasters increase the mortality rate among either women or men, this, too, may lead to measurable changes to population sex ratios. In any of these cases, it may be fruitful to conduct research to explore whether \textit{SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict / SD-surplus males-non-state conflict} may increase political instability or lead to increased rates of crime, violence, and conflict.

A factor that may counteract a climate-caused male surplus is the fact that, during climate-related disasters, men’s bodies also experience greater exposure to waterborne and vector-borne diseases and higher rates of heatstroke because of their work outside of the home (Linkage 3.1.2.M).\textsuperscript{541} Additionally, men have been shown to die more frequently than women during armed conflict such as through battle-related deaths; suicide and self-inflicted injury; homicide and purposeful injury inflicted by another; mental disorders; and other violence.\textsuperscript{542} As such, population sex ratios may be impacted in unique ways in each context, and should be examined locally to determine what, if any, a sex ratio imbalance might impact the political stability of a community or its women.

Looking next at crime/violence/extremism and grievances between societal groups, there are contested findings from a variety of disciplines (psychology, biology, demography, sociology). On the one hand, there are findings that support predictions that male-skewed populations increase rates of violence. Some scholars, including Hvistendahl, Hudson, and den Boer, argue that if the population sex ratio skews toward men, leaving more men without partners, competition between men may lead to increased

\textsuperscript{\textit{541}} Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 20.
\textsuperscript{\textit{542}} Marsh Ormhaug, Meier, and Hernes, “Armed Conflict Deaths Disaggregated by Gender.”
male-on-male violence, especially when men lack stable social bonds. This may be due in part to the fact that testosterone concentrations tend to fall in men who are fathers or in stable marriages or cohabitation relationships, thereby reducing both violent and non-violent criminal offending among men with partners or children. Research by Brooks shows that rates of local warfare, crime, drug abuse, prostitution, and trafficking of women, and other forms of political instability increased in Asia as a result of a lower number of women in the population (Linkage 3.1.2.M). Contradictorily, some research has shown that female scarcity may decrease rates of male violence. Schacht et al. find that, in situations with “male-biased sex ratios, men are more likely to marry, be part of a family, and be sexually committed to a single partner when women are in short supply.” In partner market theory, crime and violence rates may fall because the more numerous sex is required to exhibit traits desired by potential partners; in male-skewed sex ratio scenarios in which females tend to prefer men interested in long-term mating, males will generally avoid male-to-male violence.


On the other hand, female-skewed sex ratios may also result in higher rates of crime and grievances between groups. Barber’s research shows that rates of violence decrease with female-skewed sex ratios through different mechanisms: for instance, violence may increase as men vie with one another to increase their own desirability to women; and in societies where women engage in casual or cohabitating relationships, resulting in later establishment of stable marriages and higher rates of single parenthood, men may engage in greater mating effort and thus generate higher rates of violence.  

Evidently, there remains a debate regarding the strength of evidence for the impact of sex ratio imbalances on rates of violence. Filser et al. have attempted to provide clarity by analyzing individual-level, longitudinal data, and have found that at one level, the ‘more-men-more-violence’ hypothesis holds true, with a somewhat weak positive association for ‘male-on-female violence,’ and a stronger association for ‘male-on-male violence,’ particularly for unmarried men competing for partners, however they note that more research is required. They also suggest that confounding variables such as socioeconomic deprivation and sex-selective out-migration may drive the association. Consequently, sex ratios should be considered and analyzed with local

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2014.02.001; Schacht, Tharp, and Smith, “Marriage Markets and Male Mating Effort.”


551 Filser et al., “Are Skewed Sex Ratios Associated with Violent Crime?”
cultural and demographic data in mind to determine whether a system is particularly vulnerable to climate-driven gender imbalances and changes in violence rates.

3.1.2.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Life Expectancy

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *Life Expectancy* can be found in Figure 16. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 56 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Figure 16. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Life Expectancy.](image)

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Life Expectancy.*
3.1.3. Education

Table 28. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Education.

| **Dominant Approach:** Measures gross school enrollment ratios, which are the ratios of total enrollment (in either primary or secondary education, regardless of age) to the population of the age group in that level of education. “Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music.”

“Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.”

| **FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:** A climate security framework that fails to consider the gendering of educational spaces and outcomes would be incomplete. FPEcon’s and SRF’s focus on the gendered nature of structures and institutions that determine whether a system achieves equitable education levels for all genders offers a more nuanced way to examine the role education of children and adults plays in increasing or decreasing climate security. Backer and Cairns argue that an integrated approach to SRF examines what types of social reproduction (“feeding, clothing, cleaning, socializing, transporting”) are necessary to make schooling possible, as well as how educational systems replicate the hierarchies and structures of patriarchal/capitalist systems.

The implications for women are explained by Blackmore this way: “Maintaining the ‘gender order’, in many instances, is equated variously to protecting tradition, culture and religion, which inevitably means protecting male dominance, particularly in more traditional religious societies.”

Understood as such, the link between education and climate security is not only about education *rates*, but also about how educational systems reinforce and reproduce structures of oppression.

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Table 29. Short Overview of the Education Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security\textsuperscript{556}</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.A. Lack of education reduces women’s economic stability → climate-related shocks may limit availability of education (due to damage to infrastructure, teacher losses, psychological distress) → women may have fewer resources for weathering future climate shocks</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.B. Low education levels may result in higher fertility rates → may produce larger families → with fewer resources, childhood and maternal health may suffer → women may be unable to take advantage of climate adaptation resources due to economic and time constraints → women’s overall susceptibility to climate risks is amplified</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.C. Climate change stressors may reduce household income → families may prioritize boys’ education if budgets are tight → girls’ susceptibility to climate risks against future shocks will be lowered</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.D. Climate breakdown may strain household resources → families may cope by having girls/women increase unpaid social reproduction responsibilities (helping sick or injured, collecting water/fuel, caring for children) → women have less time for education</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.E. Climate shocks may prompt households to use relocation as an adaptation strategy → education opportunities in new locations may be limited → if choices for which family members access education are limited, gender norms are likely to prioritize boys/men</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.F. Climate change may reduce government budgets → governments that view education as a public good (and not useful for market production) are likely to make cuts to education → where gender norms are conservative, such cuts are more likely to negatively impact women’s and girls’ education access</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{556} Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Human Security</strong></th>
<th><strong>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.G. Climate breakdown may hinder delivery of climate adaptation education → gender norms may prioritize men/boys for learning climate adaptation skills → women may be less prepared for further climate breakdown</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.H. Gendered norms may prevent women from partaking in climate-related skill development → community climate-adaptation programs may achieve lower success without women’s participation → communities may be less resilient to further climate breakdown</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.I. Climate adaptation training may specify the prioritization of gender and racial/ethnic minorities → men may have a difficult time accessing climate adaptation skill development and/or funding → men’s susceptibility to climate risks may be amplified</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.J. Climate disasters may strain household resources → families may choose to send their girls into child marriage (at younger ages) as an adaptation strategy → girls’ coping capacities will be severely limited (due to mutually exclusive nature of marriage and school and lower non-domestic skill, confidence, and network acquisition) → likely to reinforce gender inequalities by reducing the cultural transformation achieved by having girls in school</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.K. Education may be used to perpetuate unequal gender norms, especially to men/boys → men/boys may adopt patriarchal attitudes toward gender roles and equality → may increase rates of SGBV and other violence</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.3.L. Climate change may lower the quality and availability of educational opportunities, including for men and boys → men and boys may achieve low levels of education → may encourage men and boys to support female genital mutilation/circumcision and other discriminatory practices → men and boys may believe violence is the only way to address conflict → rates of SGBV may increase</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.3.M.</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Local gender norms may define masculinity in terms of higher intelligence than women \(\rightarrow\) climate change may limit access to educational opportunities \(\rightarrow\) men and boys may be unable to perform their masculine roles (higher intelligence) \(\rightarrow\) criminality may increase among men and boys | Crime/violence/extremism | [Requires research]  
Fundamentalist ideologies or pull of networks (among men) \(\nabla\) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.3.N.</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Climate change may strain government budgets for education \(\rightarrow\) denial of education may be used as a weapon of war against some groups \(\rightarrow\) tensions between groups may increase | Grievances between societal groups | [Requires research]  
Avoid abuse (typically women), \(\nabla\) exposure to violence/repression (typically men), fundamental ideology (both) \(\nabla\) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.3.O.</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Climate breakdown may strain tensions between groups \(\rightarrow\) the government may use education as a wedge issue to garner support from ideologically aligned groups \(\rightarrow\) may increase tensions between groups | Grievances between societal groups | [Requires research]  
Avoid abuse (typically women), \(\nabla\) exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, revenge (typically men), \(\nabla\) fundamental ideology (both) \(\nabla\) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.3.P.</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Climate breakdown may amplify tensions between groups \(\rightarrow\) education systems may be used to perpetuate othering philosophies via ethnocide (rob minority groups of their language, traditions, cultural values), or by manipulating history, instilling authoritarian/chauvinistic values/identities, stoking fundamentalization of national identities \(\rightarrow\) may trigger open violence/conflict | Grievances between societal groups | [Requires research]  
Pull of networks, revenge (typically men), \(\nabla\) and fundamental ideology (both) \(\nabla\) |

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For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
### National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention of:</strong> Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td><strong>May nullify avoid abuse</strong> (typically women), exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, revenge (typically men), and fundamental ideology (both)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Linkage 3.1.3.Q.** Though climate change may amplify anti-state grievances and intra-state tensions, governments can choose to prioritize and fund educational systems can demonstrate to the public that the government is attempting to improve lives, may lower tension levels.

**Prevention of:** Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups

**Motivational Mechanisms:**
- May nullify avoid abuse (typically women), exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, revenge (typically men), and fundamental ideology (both).

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**Linkage 3.1.3.R.** Though climate change may increase all types of intra- and inter-state tensions, governments and NGOs can invest in peacebuilding education programs, may give people tools to resolve disputes peacefully, may increase stability.

**Prevention of:** Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups // Interstate tensions

**Motivational Mechanisms:**
- May nullify avoid abuse (typically women), exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, revenge (typically men), and fundamental ideology (both).

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**Linkage 3.1.3.S.** Though climate change may threaten education for women, governments and NGOs can choose to prioritize peacebuilding skills for women, women may be more likely to be involved in peacemaking discussions, has been shown to increase durability and length of peace agreements.

**Prevention of:** Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups // Interstate tensions

**Motivational Mechanisms:**
- May nullify pull of networks and revenge (typically men), and fundamental ideology (both).

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The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with a §; those with no research with ⊙. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.2.
3.1.3.1. **Education and Human Security**

*Education* is an extremely important factor for the climate security of girls and women. As *Education* rates increase, so do girls’ and women’s chances of breaking free of restrictive gender inequalities, allowing them to achieve higher levels of human and climate security against shocks such as natural disasters. As Bargawi suggests, *Education,* “enhances future output and human well-being directly through creating and maintaining what some economists call ‘human capital.’” Yet traditional gender hierarchies often erect significant barriers that make gender equality within educational systems difficult or impossible to achieve, suggesting that the *societal capacity* Gender Equality-Security Mechanism is particularly relevant when looking at how climate-impacted *Education* systems may contribute to higher rates of political instability and conflict. The ensuing discussion will focus on several ways climate change will complicate *Education* for girls and women, and lower their climate security overall. First, this analysis will examine how climate change is likely to lower educational opportunities due to impacts at household and community levels. Second, gender inequalities in adult *Education* systems may limit women’s uptake of climate adaptation and resilience training. Third, *Education* may be a venue by which gender inequalities are

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either transformed or reinforced, thereby being a primary method by which to increase women’s climate security.

At baseline, before climate breakdown has an impact on educational systems, there are often significant obstacles to girls’ school retention rates. These include female genital cutting (also referred to as female mutilation and circumcision), household responsibilities, absence of gender-specific toilets, lack of menstruation support and supplies, and son preference where funds for Education are limited.\textsuperscript{561} Additionally, gendered violence is often prevalent in schools, making them unsafe especially for girls, LGBTQI+ students, and racial minority children.\textsuperscript{562} Not surprisingly then, though the Education of girls and women has seen improvement globally since the 1990s, gender disparities in low-income countries remain high, with only 20\% of girls achieving parity in primary Education, 10\% in secondary Education, and 8\% in tertiary Education.\textsuperscript{563}

For women, achieving higher levels of Education is critically important to achieving economic stability and therefore climate security. Education offers a way to enhance women’s capabilities and is a means of empowerment by allowing greater participation in the paid economy, while also transforming unpaid work into paid work for many women (Linkage 3.1.3.A).\textsuperscript{564} Additionally, research by Klasen and others has shown that Education equality promotes economic growth by increasing human capital,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{562} Edström et al., \textit{EMERGE Engendering Men}, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{563} Edström et al., \textit{EMERGE Engendering Men}, 54.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
while lowering mortality and fertility.\textsuperscript{565} Greater economic security increases the
resources and assets a woman has, making weathering a climate shock much easier.\textsuperscript{566}
Moreover, higher \textit{Education} rates among girls and women (in 141 countries) has been
shown by Götmark and Andersson to have the strongest inverse relationship to fertility
rates, stronger than GDP per capita, contraceptive prevalence rate, and religiosity.\textsuperscript{567}
Lower fertility rates improve childhood and maternal health, allow women to take greater
advantage of adaptation resources, and produce smaller families which have fewer
demands for climate-sensitive resources like food and water (Linkage 3.1.3.B).\textsuperscript{568}
Gender equality within schools therefore has a profound impact on women’s economic
\textit{Susceptibility} to climate risks across numerous functional areas of life.

The first way climate change is expected to impact schooling is through
reductions in the delivery of \textit{Education}, which may amplify many existing gender
inequalities, resulting in a more profound impact on girls' and women’s educational
access and therefore their \textit{societal capacity}. At the household level, climate change
stressors may reduce rural and urban livelihood incomes, consequently curtailing
investments in the \textit{Education} of girl children, especially where son preference practices
are common (Linkage 3.1.3.C).\textsuperscript{569} As already discussed, disasters often increase social
reproduction responsibilities by expecting women and girls to spend more of their time

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{566} Klasen, “Low Schooling for Girls, Slower Growth for All?”


\textsuperscript{568} Mogelgaard and Patterson, “Building Resilience through Family Planning and Adaptation Finance.”

\end{footnotesize}
on care and household responsibilities, such as helping injured or sick family members, collecting water and firewood, and caring for children, all of which may reduce school retention rates among girls and women (Linkage 3.1.3.D).

Additionally, if climate crises (including climate-fueled conflict) result in household displacement, lack of educational facilities and resources are likely to severely hinder school enrolment and academic attainment, often primarily for girls and women (Linkage 3.1.3.E). In Nepal, for instance, civil war prompted many young people to abandon their educational endeavours in order to migrate to find work elsewhere.

At the community level, climate-related disasters may damage school infrastructure, lead to teacher losses, and cause psychological distress, with the impact particularly severe as death tolls rise, especially for those living in Poverty. Disease outbreaks, malnutrition due to Food Insecurity, and loss of WASH Infrastructure at school facilities also hinder attendance. Additionally, governments may impose austerity measures during crises, thereby decreasing investments in public services such as Education, especially when Education is classified as a public consumption good and not something that creates assets that contribute to the production of future economic


Such cutbacks often disproportionately impact women and girls (Linkage 3.1.3.F).\textsuperscript{576}

Looking beyond standard primary and secondary Education curricula, learning climate adaptation techniques and approaches in particular will be extremely important to enhancing women’s societal capacity, but ironically, climate change may have direct impacts on the delivery of this type of learning as well. The effect of lost Education due to a changing climate is particularly profound when gender norms that prioritize boys’ and men’s Education hinders women from learning climate adaptation skills, such as climate-smart agriculture (Linkage 3.1.3.G).\textsuperscript{577} Education (particularly that of women and girls) has been identified as a highly effective strategy for reducing climate emissions and for increasing climate adaptability.

Not only are education levels correlated with increased adaptive capacity and reduced risk to climate-related disasters—especially for women—but education also promises to increase the knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary to mitigate against further environmental damage. Studies show that there is a strong positive correlation between education, concern for the environment, and the kinds of skills (e.g., problem solving and critical thinking) and behaviors (e.g., signing petitions or participating in demonstrations) that support policies or political decisions that have a positive impact on the environment.\textsuperscript{578}

Specifically, Streissnig et al. and Blankespoor et al. have identified the most important Socioeconomic factor for reducing Susceptibility to extreme weather events as girls’ and women’s secondary Education.\textsuperscript{579} As such, it may be true that as women are denied

\textsuperscript{577} Aastha Bhusal, Lakpa Sherpa, and Laxman Khatri, “Climate-Smart Agriculture Takes off, Thanks to ‘women-Friendly’ Tools and a Gender-Smart Approach” (CDKN: Laxman Khatri’s Lab, September 2020).
climate adaptation skill development, whole communities may suffer from inadequate preparation and adaptation (Linkage 3.1.3.H). Depending on the context, constrained climate-related education facilities and resources may also impact men: Nightingale found that men may find that accessing climate adaptation programming and funds is challenging given the prioritization of marginalized groups, such as women (Linkage 3.1.3.I).\(^{580}\)

In addition to direct impacts, climate-caused disasters are also likely to have indirect impacts on girls’ and women’s education, further intensifying their climate susceptibility to climate risks (i.e. the societal capacity gender equality-security mechanism). For instance, McLeod et al. have found that natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, droughts, and tornadoes tend to increase child marriage rates and decrease child marriage ages, which is likely to take girls out of school.\(^{581}\) When combined, child marriage and lack of education have a significant impact on girls’ human security. In a meta-study by Malhotra and Elnakib, girls’ education was found to have a strong and consistent inverse relationship with child marriage.\(^{582}\) Several factors are likely responsible, with three standing out as reinforcing institutions of oppression: being in school and early marriage may be mutually exclusive; skill, confidence, and network acquisition may offer non-domestic opportunities; and a critical mass of girls going to

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\(^{580}\) Nightingale, “Power and Politics in Climate Change Adaptation Efforts.”


school may create social norm change (Linkage 3.1.3.J). In general, boys do not suffer the same levels of discrimination and harm due to gendered educational systems. Looking at boys’ Education, while boys may demonstrate educational underachievement due to gender norms (such as academics being considered anti-masculine) in some regions, this generally has not hindered their economic or political success.

Finally, Education may be a venue by which gender inequalities are either transformed or reinforced. If curricula are designed to reform girls’ and boys’ concepts of gender relations, Education may be a primary pathway to increasing girls’ and women’s climate security. Here Forsberg and Olsson’s norms Gender Equality-Security Mechanism may be relevant. Though in their study gendered norms did not show significant promise as a security mechanism, if gendered norms play a role anywhere in the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle, it would be through the Education GCS-Factor. Crucially, according to Durrani and Dunne, in communities where educational curricula espouses patriarchal and masculinized understandings of gender norms, the Education of boys and men may influence how those men and boys interact with and treat women, and therefore has a direct impact on the safety and security of girls and women. According to Edström et al., men’s educational attainment has been found to be a key factor in forecasting men’s attitudes toward gender roles and equality; those with lower Education tend to have more rigid attitudes and are more likely to be perpetrators of SGBV under the mistaken belief that violence is the way to end conflicts (Linkage 3.1.3.K). As in

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583 Malhotra and Elnakib, “20 Years of the Evidence Base on What Works to Prevent Child Marriage.”
584 Edström et al., EMERGE Engendering Men, 55.
586 Edström et al., EMERGE Engendering Men, 61.
other GCS-Factors, communities often revert to more conservative norms and ideas when under stress of shocks such as climate breakdown or disasters, suggesting this kind of ideology may become more common as climate change intensifies. Similarly, Marcus and Harper find that men with higher levels of Education are less likely to support gender-based violence such as female genital mutilation and circumcision or condone SGBV; experience less anxiety and depression; engage less with alcohol abuse and delinquency; and are less likely to engage in violence or be imprisoned (Linkage 3.1.3.L)—all factors which may help to stabilize communities.587 As in nearly all gender-climate-security challenges, gender transformational work at the fundamental level of norms would be the most direct way to improve women’s climate security in such communities. However, should climate change damage gender transformative educational programs, gains in gender equality may also be lost as climate breakdown intensifies.

As the preceding analysis has shown, Education is pivotally important for ensuring girls’ and women’s climate security. Applying Forsberg and Olsson’s theory, without investments in girls’/women’s Education, overall social resources and networks will be diminished, possibly limiting a community’s choices for resolving conflict in the future. Through infrastructure destruction, loss of teachers, and trauma, climate crises are likely to increase the barriers and challenges to offering Education to both children and adults. In particular, climate breakdown may impact girls and women more than boys and men and is likely to threaten increases in gender inequality, especially if finances of

households and communities are stretched, and social reproductive responsibilities of
girls and women increase. Gender transformative approaches, however, can counter the
impacts of climate change on gender equity—well-designed curricula combined with
keeping girls in school (in party by eschewing child marriage) can be powerful tools for
improving community stability in the face of future crises.

3.1.3.2. Education and National/International Security

In the *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle*, the *Education CS-Stage* is also
inextricably linked to *National/International Security*. In fact, *Education* may play both
positive and negative roles in the four potential *National/International Security*
pathways. Looking first at the *crime/violence/extremism* pathway, *Education* may be
used to reinforce larger narratives emphasizing the importance of gender hierarchies,
which places men in masculinized leadership roles over women, invisibilizes women’s
roles in history, conveys women’s roles only in service of men, and may condone the use
of sexual- and gender-based violence. As previously noted, on a macro-level, Hudson
et al. have used extensive data analysis to show that when a system places a strong
emphasis on the subordination of women at the household level via the
‘Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome,’ that system is more likely to experience instability and
insecurity, lower levels of overall well-being, greater environmental degradation, and

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588 For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s
‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal
groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime,
vigence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state
grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation
(particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section
1.2.3.4).

589 Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli, eds., *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a*
Peacebuilding Education for Children, *Innocenti Insight* 4 (Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre,

decreased prosperity.\textsuperscript{591} When an \textit{Education} system that reinforces gender inequities comes under pressure from climate change, loss of learning opportunities may make it difficult for men and boys to perform many aspects of their masculine roles (in some cases, this may include greater educational achievement than women). If men’s feelings of emasculation (due to limitations in the availability of educational opportunities) are combined with lower levels of \textit{Education}, or educational messages that amplify discriminatory gendered norms, men and boys may resort to engaging in higher levels of criminality (Linkage 3.1.3.M).\textsuperscript{592} It may be reasonable to suggest that such increased criminality among men would be motivated by \textit{fundamentalist ideologies} or perhaps \textit{pull of networks} also, though no research is available to verify and align existing research with gendered trends in rates of violent crime (see section 1.2.3.2).

In literature on \textit{anti-state grievances} and the \textit{grievances between societal groups} pathway, there are several studies that support a connection to \textit{Education} and climate breakdown. As with many other public services, if climate change squeezes government budgets, the state’s ability to deliver \textit{Education} programs may be severely diminished.\textsuperscript{593} Under such circumstances, the government may choose to prioritize \textit{Education} for one group over the other or to use \textit{Education} as a wedge issue, thereby stoking dissatisfaction with the government and/or tensions between groups (Linkage 3.1.3.N, Linkage 3.1.3.O).\textsuperscript{594} For instance, the uneven distribution of educational ‘commodities’ between different ethnic groups can be a source of friction, and in some cases, denial of \textit{Education}

\textsuperscript{591} Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, “The Effects by the Numbers,” 310.
\textsuperscript{594} Bush and Saltarelli, \textit{The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict}, 10.
can be used as a weapon of war. Bush and Saltarelli suggest that restricted access to Education should be viewed as sign of deteriorating relations between groups. Here, it could be posited that when Education is used as a weapon of war, individuals may be motivated to participate in protests or violence against the ‘other’ by avoid abuse (typically women) or exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, or revenge (typically men), while fundamental ideology may motivate both, however gender-disaggregated research on this subject is not yet available.

Governments or non-state actors under climate strain may also use educational curricula as a form of ethnocide, robbing minority groups of their language, traditions, and cultural values. Similarly, Education may be used to manipulate history, inculcate authoritarian and chauvinistic values and identities, and lead to fundamentalization of national identities. Furthermore, Education may be wielded as a way to instill hatred or blame for the ‘other’ (for climate breakdown, for instance), and may intentionally be used to separate others in an effort to perpetuate systems of inequality (Linkage 3.1.3.P), such as between the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, in the apartheid system in South Africa, or in gender-separated systems in many countries globally. In these ways, it might be reasonable to suggest that Education could stoke tensions between groups with motivations such as fundamentalist ideologies (women and men), pull of networks

595 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, 9,11.
596 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, 10.
597 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict, 10.
(typically men), or revenge (typically men), though since no gender-related research is available, these are hypotheses that require testing. In all of these ways, the weaponization and masculinization of Education perpetuates structural inequalities and institutional violence against minorities, often against women and girls, diminishing the, “collective, emancipatory importance attributed to Education by those who live under oppression.”

While the preceding discussion has demonstrated that poorly designed or intentionally weaponized educational programs can contribute to ratcheting up tensions and conflict between groups, Education can play a transformative role, and is often pivotal to avoiding conflicts along the anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions pathways. Research by Thyne shows that Education can play a mediating role in preventing civil war in two ways: (1) preventing grievance by demonstrating to people that their government is attempting to improve their lives (Linkage 3.1.3.Q), and (2) adding stability by giving people tools to resolve disputes peacefully, making them less likely to join an armed group or rebellion (Linkage 3.1.3.R). As such, Education may also play a positive role in transforming gender norms, in peacebuilding, in preventing conflict and violence, and in aiding post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. On a programmatic level, intentionally-designed curricula can help to foster and sustain ethnically and linguistically tolerant environments; cultivate attitudes of desegregation and inclusive citizenship; or even to disarm history and defy

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600 Pherali and Turner, “Meanings of Education under Occupation.”
state oppression. Government investments in Education signal inclusiveness which may be interpreted as the active honouring the settlement of rebel groups, thereby reducing conflict risks. A study by Barakat and Urdal also finds that even poor countries can reduce the risk of violence and conflict through increased educational opportunities, particularly for young people, and particularly for young males. These findings could be further tested to determine whether gender transformative approaches to education would nullify motivations such as avoid abuse (typically women), exposure to violence/repression, pull of networks, revenge (typically men), or fundamental ideology (both).

Importantly, women’s involvement in peacebuilding increases both the durability and quality of peace, and Education has been shown to be key to preparing women for participating in peace processes through peacebuilding skill acquisition and learning the attitudes necessary for such engagement (Linkage 3.1.3.S). For instance, in a study of the Mosintuwu Women’s School in Indonesia by Kristimanta, a grassroots training program for women taught peace Education, trauma healing, and social training, essentially preparing women to participate in peacebuilding efforts. The training proved

extremely beneficial for resolving communal conflicts, especially because women’s roles in grassroots movements strengthened peacebuilding because of, “their contribution to creating sustainable peace, restoring social conditions, implementing peace treaties, disseminating peace issues, establishing a culture of peace, teaching the understanding of conflict and peace, and facilitating societal independence.” As such, in a warming world, Education will become increasingly important for dismantling hierarchical power structures, engendering values of tolerance and peace, and educating people of all genders who can participate in peacebuilding projects.

Kristimanta, “Grass-Roots Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.”
3.1.3.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Education

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to Education can be found in Figure 17. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 57 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 17. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Education.

A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Education.
3.1.4. Standard of Living

Table 30. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Standard of Living.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Measures the quality of material goods and services, and the level of comfort and wealth available to the population within a state.(608) Measured by the HCSS climate security framework as gross national income (GNI), which reflects the income available to residents of the country.(609)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</td>
<td>Focusing on income alone results in a too-narrow view of living standards because of a failure to consider the multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination that impact people’s quality of life based on their level of comfort and wealth. Here it’s helpful to again use FPEcon’s concept of social reproduction, comprising processes that allow human social structures to self-perpetuate, including activities related to the production of goods for markets (a proxy here for income), as well as those activities that support the production of people.(610) Living standards can therefore be understood within the concept of social reproduction by examining how governments balance investments in markets and people. As McNally suggests, governments that emphasize neo-classical economics design policies to increase the power and private wealth of elites, and allocate national income investments to military expenditures and securing markets for reproducing capital, all of which lowers available funds for vital programs that raise the living standards of the majority of people.(611) On the other hand, Gallo suggests there are basic or fundamental goods that contribute to living standards which the state is obligated to provide, including those goods required for physical integrity, access to services, longevity, environment, health, and family and social life, which are necessary for social justice.(612) A gendered understanding of climate security, therefore, is rooted in part in policies that deliver comfort and wealth for all by offering comprehensive public services, including those that support people working within the care economy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(612\) As noted by Villani and Viscolo: “A Fiscal Revolution Inspired by the Capabilities Approach to Reduce Socio-Economic Impact of Climate Change and Strengthen the Resilience of Tax Systems,” Environmental Research Communications 2, no. 10 (November 7, 2020): 15, https://doi.org/10.1088/2515-7620/abc5ac.
Table 31. Short Overview of the Standard of Living Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security&lt;sup&gt;613&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.4.A. Climate change may limit domestic/international budgets for public services → women may be expected to pick up the slack by increasing their workloads → without sufficient support, women’s capacity to absorb increased demands on their time/energy may be fully spent → can contribute to bodily depletion and collapse → may result in deaths of despair</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.4.B. Women typically hold more jobs in the public sector than men → climate change may trigger governments to impose austerity measures → public sector employment cuts will cause more women to lose jobs → women’s economic stability will be reduced</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.4.C. Women are over-represented in in lower-income groups due to structural inequalities (pay gaps, UCDW) → women rely more on public services than men → climate change may trigger governments to impose austerity measures → women’s economic stability will be reduced</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.4.D. Climate change may cause public service cuts → men’s standard of living grievances may increase → could intensify scapegoating of public service employees for standard of living grievances → may increase the mental strain and social stigma experienced by public service employees (mostly women) → may accelerate women public sector employees’ bodily depletion, increasing climate susceptibility as well</td>
<td>SD-surplus males-non-state conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>613</sup> Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>National/International Security</strong>[^614]</th>
<th><strong>Pathway</strong></th>
<th><strong>Motivational Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.4.E.</strong> Climate-related austerity measures may lead to cuts in funding for law enforcement → may lead to lower police effectiveness (caused by lower deterrence, reduced clearance rates) → may increase cost of citizen reporting, leading to lower reporting rates → could lower citizen welfare</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] <em>Greater opportunities</em>, (typically women), pull of networks, and exposure to violence/repression (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.4.F.</strong> Climate-caused budget shortages may lead to cuts to public services → both property and crime rates may increase</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Avoid abuse, (typically women), pull of networks, and exposure to violence/repression (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.4.G.</strong> Climate-induced austerity measures may induce a widespread drop in standard of living (rising food prices, lack of affordable housing, pension reforms, removal of energy subsidies) → may fuel feelings of abandonment, neglect, discrimination (if remaining public support is distributed unequally → the public may be galvanized into violent protest</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance</td>
<td>[Requires research] Avoid abuse, (typically women) and exposure to violence/repression (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.4.H.</strong> Climate change may prompt austerity measures → factors that may increase women’s participation in austerity demonstrations: lower risk of violence, state-level democratic regime, non-institutionalized political activism (limited by social norms), lacking full-time employment (women)</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance</td>
<td><em>Greater opportunities</em> and avoid abuse (among women)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^614]: For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.4.I.</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change may prompt austerity measures → factors that may increase men’s participation in austerity demonstrations: institutionalized political activism (no social norm limitations), unemployed working-class men (men typically are not deterred by violence in protest movements)</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linkage 3.1.4.J.</th>
<th>Grievances between societal groups</th>
<th>[Requires research]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National or local austerity measures may be instituted to compensate for climate change losses → minorities, women (as public support recipients or if austerity leads to gendered employment disparities), public sector workers may be blamed for austerity measures → may result in increased violence against scapegoated groups</td>
<td>SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict[2] // Avoid abuse (typically women),[2] exposure to violence/repression or revenge (typically men)[2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with §; those with no research with ø. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.4.1 and 3.1.4.2.

3.1.4.1. **Standard of Living and Human Security**

This discussion aims to take a wider view of Standard of Living than what is offered by conventional economists—one that goes beyond the quantity of material goods and services an individual can purchase with their income to achieve a reasonable level of comfort and wealth. Since women frequently operate primarily in the informal economy more than men, their incomes are often lower and benefits fewer—as such, women’s standards of living cannot be lumped in with those of men who can purchase more goods and services with their higher incomes. Examining standards of living by
another measure—quality and availability of public benefits—makes it clearer how women’s lives are impacted by climate-caused economic changes. Given that women are responsible for more social reproductive work (unpaid care and domestic work (UCDW)), and often disproportionately supplement their income with public benefits in order to enjoy a good *Standard of Living*, climate is likely to have a much more profound impact on women. Under stress due to climate change, these public service systems may be reduced, consequently reinforcing and amplifying gendered inequalities, and making women more vulnerable to climate shocks and disasters. As such, this discussion of standards of living centres first on the *societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism*, covering climate’s impacts on women’s social reproductive work, public sector employment, and receipt of public services. It will also cover the scapegoating of women and public sector employees and the resultant bodily depletion of women (with an exploration of whether *SD-surplus males-non-state conflict mechanisms* are also relevant).  

In economic systems designed around neo-classical theory and practice, government budgets and policies are typically structured with elite profits and market performance in mind. Public benefits, such as employment or other financial assistance; healthcare, social security, or disability insurance; education systems; housing assistance; libraries; hospitals; affordable child and elder care services; piped water services; subsidized food and energy; or transit systems, are provided as budgets permit, but are not considered essential to healthy functioning markets. When budgets become tight,

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615 *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including *societal capacity*, or one of three ‘*socioeconomic development*’ (SD), (referred to as ‘*SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict*,’ ‘*SD-surplus males-non-state conflict*,’ and ‘*SD-surplus males-unemployment*’).
governments frequently begin trimming expenditures that are considered ‘public benefits’—meaning those that are not in direct service to the production of goods and services. Importantly, Picchio argues that under normal levels of strain, neo-classical systems depend on women’s UCDW to expand and contract as a way to subsidize the production and accumulation of capital as market forces change. Therefore, though women’s UCDW is often overlooked and devalued in government budgeting processes, it is an absolutely essential element to the production and accumulation of capital in the formal market.

Climate change is expected to have a significant negative impact on governments’ finances, especially in developing economies, and is likely to severely hamper governmental capacity to provide a good *Standard of Living* to its people. In 2022, the IPCC raised concerns about how climate change and urbanization create complex risks, especially when basic services are lacking. For instance, countries in the global south are already experiencing the twin challenges of debt crises (aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic) and increasing climate disaster management expenses, both of which may trigger austerity measures. In these conditions, governments are likely to divert more of

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their budgets away from public services through a series of ‘reforms’ (see Table 32.

Sample Austerity Reforms.)\(^\text{619}\)

Table 32. Sample Austerity Reforms.

- Eliminating or reducing food, agricultural, or fuel subsidies;
- Enacting wage cuts, caps, and hiring freezes, particularly for teachers, social workers, health workers, and civil servants;
- Reducing social protection coverage, often for the poorest, in welfare programs;
- Changing pension systems by reducing employer contribution rates, prolonging retirement age, increasing eligibility periods, indexing retirement age to increase life expectancy, and lowering/freezing/cutting pension subsidies;
- Passing labour reforms to revise minimum wages, weaken collective bargaining, make employment protection procedures more flexible, and limit salary adjustments to cost-of-living benchmarks;
- Changing health systems by increasing fees and co-payments, lowering quality/availability of services, and introducing cost-saving measures;
- Increasing consumption tax rates on goods and services, or introducing progressive tax approaches to increase taxes on income, inheritance, property, corporations, and the financial sector;
- Privatizing essential public services and assets, including agriculture and food production, social security, health, natural resource management, and education – changes which are often accompanied by layoffs and lower quality or more expensive services/goods;

*As found in Ortiz and Cummins, “The Austerity Decade 2010-20” and Donald and Lusiani, “The Gendered Costs of Austerity.”*\(^\text{620}\)

Cuts to public spending such as those listed above adversely and disproportionately affect women in three main ways according to a Bretton Woods Project report on the IMF and austerity requirements. First, nearly all austerity measures result in increases to women’s UCDW, including cuts to affordable child and elder care.

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services, piped water services, public transport infrastructure, and the like.\textsuperscript{621} Noting in particular the problems associated with social reproduction, the report states that, “it is not just that expenditure cuts inadvertently increase women’s unpaid care work. Rather, such cuts are made based on the implicit or explicit assumption that women will fill the gaps created.”\textsuperscript{622} The reality, as Luxton explains it, is that when facing shocks and disasters, women do not have an infinite capacity for absorbing expanded demands on their time, and without sufficient support, extreme bodily depletion may lower women’s \textit{Standard of Living}, potentially causing physical and mental collapse (Linkage 3.1.4.A).\textsuperscript{623} In worst case scenarios, individuals may give up the struggle to reproduce themselves, eschewing marriage and childbearing, and even succumbing to ‘deaths of despair.’\textsuperscript{624}

Second, austerity measures impact women’s income and economic security in two ways: (A) the share of women in public sector employment exceeds that of their total (national-level) employment in most countries, and so cuts to public sector wages, benefits, and jobs directly impacts women (Linkage 3.1.4.B); and (B) women are over-represented in lower-income groups due to structural gender inequalities (such as gender pay gaps), and therefore rely heavily on public services (including pensions), and suffer more when they are cut (Linkage 3.1.4.C).\textsuperscript{625}

Third, public investment cuts can cause restrictions in women’s access to essential services, such as shelters for survivors of SGBV, *Healthcare*, job training, *Education*, reproductive services, and refugee support. As with many other gender inequities, these austerity impacts are even more severe for groups subject to intersectional discrimination based on sexuality, nationality, migrant status, ethnicity, disability, class, or religion.

Finally, with a lens of *socioeconomic development Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* (specifically *SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict*), diminished standards of living due to climate change may result in easier recruitment of disaffected young men into non-state groups or extremist organizations such as white supremacist groups, particularly when economic grievances are combined with grievances against other ethnic or religious groups. Some research has shown that population-level decreases in living standards may lead to violent scapegoating of social welfare recipients and public sector workers. Research by Marron documents how, under austerity measures, health service employees in Ireland were characterized as grossly inept, incompetent, “inefficient, over-paid and privileged.” While such verbal violence, supported by gendered inequities and institutional structures, may not result in bodily harm, it nevertheless creates mental strain and social stigma that contributes to bodily depletion, and is more likely to impact women than men given their higher rates of employment in the public sector (Linkage 3.1.4.D). Furthermore, if such scapegoating occurs through male networks, it could contribute to increased rates of civic unrest and conflict further down the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle (more on this topic in section 3.1.6.2).

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An FPEcol perspective, which emphasizes the centrality of care and life and the biophysical limits of the planet, would allow for the development of gender transformative budgets that maintain equitable standards of living.629 Addressing the significant gendered disparities in UCDW would require consideration of the bodily depletion that comes from the unrealistic expectation that women’s time and energy can expand infinitely to fill gaps in public services. On the contrary, women’s unpaid and undervalued work must be fairly compensated in climate-sensitive budgets. In the absence of such considerations, rather than cutting public service budgets under climate-stressed conditions, governments should consider expanding public services in order to ensure women are not further disadvantaged.

3.1.4.2. Standard of Living and National/International Security

As an important GCS-Factor in the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle, the rise and fall of a system’s Standard of Living may play a pivotal role in climate-related National/International Security considerations.630 Understanding how gender intersects with standards of living is important for teasing apart how the two may counter or increase Susceptibility to climate-induced conflict and violence.

Looking first at crime/violence/extremism pathway, it should not be surprising that austerity measures may lead to smaller budgets for law enforcement and crime prevention, which may have the effect of producing environments in which crime can

629 Fresnillo Sallan, “Debt and Climate.”
630 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
thrive. For instance, recent austerity-related cuts to police services and housing in the UK were followed by an increase in crime rates, with the effect more pronounced in already "deprived areas." In a similar study, Facchetti suggests that reduced funding for police services resulted in a sizable reduction in citizen welfare because of, "a persistent significant increase in violent crimes, consistent with lower deterrence, and reduced clearance rates, indicating lower police effectiveness. ... with reduced reporting of non-violent crimes, as citizens internalise a higher reporting cost" (Linkage 3.1.4.E). No research exists to specifically analyze motivations for increased criminology due to climate-related austerity cuts to law enforcement, however studying whether motivations like greater opportunities might motivate women to engage in more crime, or whether men may be motivated to engage in criminal activity because of pull of networks or exposure to violence/repression might be useful.

Cuts to public support services other than law enforcement also appear to trigger increases in crime rates. This pattern was observed in Greece following their austerity measures dubbed “anti-social policy” measures that were later blamed for a rise in social ills such as violent crime. Looking at it another way, research by Andersen and others shows public service programs tend to reduce criminal activity (Linkage 3.1.4.F).

These various studies indicate increases in both property and violent crimes, suggesting

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that both may increase offending during times of climate-based austerity (see section 1.2.3.1). Research is required to test whether motivations such as avoid abuse among women and pull of networks or exposure to violence/repression among men may increase criminal involvement. As such, given the ways in which climate change may shift budget priorities for local and national governments, social support services should be seen as a mechanism for reducing overall crime rates and stabilizing communities. [Noting that more research is specifically required to determine whether women and men participate in violent or property crimes more readily, as outlined in section 1.2.3.2].

Declining standards of living are also implicated in anti-state grievances, especially as they relate to political unrest/protests and violent scapegoating measures in the face of austerity measures, such as those likely to be used in response to climate change disasters and resulting economic challenges. It’s important to note that the relationship between public services and protests is multi-faceted and complex. In a study by Brady et al., results suggest that the provision of social services has the effect of increasing protest activities, since money, time, and civic skills enable non-violent political protest.635 Additionally, the more universal and generous public services are, the more widespread civic participation tends to be.636 Nevertheless, in a study by Ortiz et al. of world protests between 2006 and 2013, unrest (including violent protests) over rising food prices, lack of affordable housing, pension reforms, the removal of energy subsidies,
and low living standards in general occurred in numerous countries (Linkage 3.1.4.G).\textsuperscript{637} Furthermore, they found that 488 total protests occurred within the time period related to economic justice and austerity measures.\textsuperscript{638} Sierra Leone is an example of this; austerity measures that included cuts to subsidies on essentials like staple foods and petroleum products shocked the country into “intense relative deprivation,” which galvanized the public into violent action.\textsuperscript{639} Taydas and Peksen have found that when social services are delivered unequally (based on gender, race, ethnicity, class, and so on) and/or when poorly-designed or absent public services contribute to lower Standards of Living, they can fuel a sense of abandonment, neglect, and discrimination which can increase incentives to engage in protests and anti-state violence.\textsuperscript{640} However, these feelings do not specify a gender component. Research is therefore required to test whether avoid abuse among women and exposure to violence/repression among men may drive engagement in political unrest, and to align with findings outlined in section 1.2.3.3.

Participation in austerity-related protests can also be examined in terms of the gendered norms that influence who is involved and why. When civic action is considered less risky, Caren et al. find that women are more likely to engage, such as with boycotts or petition-signing.\textsuperscript{641} In a survey of protest responses to the great recession in Spain, Sweden, and the UK, Roth and Saunders found that at a country level, gender

\textsuperscript{638} Ortiz et al., “World Protests 2006-2013,” 5.
\textsuperscript{641} Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas, “A Social Movement Generation.”
regime/empowerment matters: women participated more in austerity demonstrations in
democratic gender regimes (Sweden) and less in neoliberal gender regimes (Spain and
the UK). Individually, women are more likely to become anti-austerity protesters when
not in full time employment, suggesting they had more time, but also that they may have
been experiencing greater employment precarity as a result of the economic downturn,
i.e. they may be more likely to demonstrate as part of a ‘new loser’ group. These
findings suggest that women’s UCDW may be a driving factor in whether they
participate in protests (Linkage 3.1.4.H). With these insights, it is possible to suggest that
women may be motivated by a desire to greater opportunities and avoid abuse, though
specific research on this is required.

There is also a robust literature supporting the gendered nature of unrest related to
austerity measures, confirming findings discussed in section 1.2.3.3 that when civic
action becomes violent, gender plays a role in determining who participates in
demonstrations and the tenor of civic unrest related to standards of living. A study by
Rucht shows that men are far more likely to participate in disruptive action, such as
occupying buildings or factories. Marien et al. show that men tend to be more active in
institutionalized forms of political activism, whereas women are more likely to
participate in non-institutionalized forms of political activity, suggesting the structures
and institutions that determine where women are permitted to operate results in gendered
forms of political participation. Furthermore, Sikweyiya and Nkosi have found that

642 Silke Roth and Clare Saunders, “Do Gender Regimes Matter? Gender Differences in Involvement in
Anti-Austerity Protests - a Comparison of Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom,” Social Movement
643 Roth and Saunders, “Do Gender Regimes Matter?,” 317.
644 Rucht, “The Spread of Protest Politics.”
645 Sofie Marien, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier, “Inequalities in Non-Institutionalised Forms of
Political Participation: A Multi-Level Analysis of 25 Countries,” Political Studies 58, no. 1 (February
protests are more likely to become violent when they are attended by unemployed working-class men who have experienced ongoing marginalization, while women are virtually absent from such civic action (Linkage 3.1.4.1). These findings, therefore may suggest that the *Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* of *SD-surplus males-unemployment* is at work, though more research is required to tease out this relationship to climate change and living standards in particular.

In terms of grievances between societal groups, the previously noted verbal scapegoating of minorities, women, and public sector workers may also develop into acts of physical violence against anyone considered ‘other.’ In Carastathis’ feminist exploration of violence against migrants and women in Greece caused by the politics of austerity, “Some bodies are rendered vulnerable and precarious, while others assert an entitled relation to national space while being economically disentitled by austerity measures.” Both recipients of social services and public sector employees have been shown to experience violent reprisals during times of austerity. Reports of physical assaults against prison workers, ambulance operators, housing officers, and other public sector workers as a result of austerity policies have been common in recent years.

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646 Sikweyiya and Nkosi, “Violent Protests and Gendered Identities.”
Those who benefit from public services are frequently victims of assault and violence during times of austerity. Violent attacks against people with disabilities, migrants, and the homeless, and sexual violence against women have been widely reported.650 O’Flynn et al. summarize such misguided hostilities in this way: “What the above evidences are systematic efforts to transfer culpability for deteriorating economic and social conditions to the putatively inefficient and parasitic public sector.”651 These findings do not offer gender-disaggregated data, however it is possible that the SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict mechanism may combine with climate pressures on standards of living to increase socioeconomic development-based violence and crime (Linkage 3.1.4.J), though examination of all factors within a particular context would be required to ascertain whether this is true. Other motivations that move people to engage in intrastate violence could be tested, such as avoid abuse (typically women) or exposure to violence/repression or revenge (typically men).

Finally, there is a lack of research on whether climate-caused declining standards of living are likely to fuel interstate tensions. Nevertheless, this discussion has shown strong evidence that climate-related austerity measures may reduce standards of living, and resultantly impact rates of crime, anti-state protests, and tensions between groups, suggesting governments should look for other means by which to cut budgets. Doing otherwise may inadvertently increase the precarity of people’s lives and destabilize

communities. Applying a gender lens to austerity-related National/International Security threats may offer ideas for how to alleviate such pressures.

3.1.4.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Standard of Living

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to Standard of Living can be found in Figure 18. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 58 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 18. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Standard of Living.

A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Standard of Living.
3.1.5. Unemployment

Table 33. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Unemployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Share of the total workforce without paid work, but that is available for and seeking employment. 652</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</td>
<td>Given the central role employment plays in the stability of people’s lives, a climate security framework would be incomplete without taking UCDW into consideration. FPEcon’s idea of social reproduction offers a way to interrogate the paid/unpaid work continuum within and beyond the household to examine the links between unemployment and the triple nexus. 653 Unlike the neoliberal understanding of society which values ‘legitimate’ (often masculine) work, social reproduction theory also assigns value to the familial and communitarian work required to sustain and reproduce societies. 654 In free economies, Luxton notes: although the kinds of sex/gender-specific work vary widely, women typically are expected to do more of the labours involved in having babies, raising children, providing care and immediate provisioning – labours that are outside the purview of formal production but essential for the continuation of human life on a daily and generational basis. 655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, Luxton also suggests that there is a constant negotiation between capitalist profit-making requirements and the needs of labouring populations for increases in wages; employers will always attempt to keep labour costs as low as possible in the production of market goods, while employees strive to achieve the highest wages and benefits possible in order to attain a good standard of living. 656 Given that women are often at the bottom of pay scales, they frequently must bear the financial burden of profit-focused cuts to wages and benefits.

As such, the ensuing discussion will centre on an understanding of unemployment that includes the impact of familial and communitarian work (unpaid care and domestic work or UCDW) on a person’s availability to work as a more comprehensive picture of unemployment’s role in gendered climate (in)security.

Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Unemployment.

654 Bhattacharya, Social Reproduction Theory.
656 Luxton, “The Production of Life Itself,” 43.
Table 34. Short Overview of the Unemployment Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Human Security</strong>(^{657})</th>
<th><strong>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.A. Climate breakdown will increase food insecurity and overall human health → women/girls will be expected to increase time spent in growing/procuring food and caring for sick family members → women/girls will have less time for paid work and may experience higher economic insecurity</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.B. Climate change will cause precipitation levels to increase/decrease → UCDW (fetching water, fuel wood, performing washing duties) will require more time and effort → women/girls will have less time for paid work and may experience higher economic insecurity</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.C. Government budgets may be strained due to climate change → governments may choose to make cuts to public benefit services (healthcare, food security, piped water, etc.) → social protection services will be transferred to women/girls → women/girls will have less time for paid work and may experience higher economic insecurity</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.D. Climate-caused constraints may increase the time required to complete UCDW tasks → men family members may feel women are not living up to UCDW expectations → it may be culturally acceptable to express this dissatisfaction with women’s performance through SGBV → injuries/shame associated with SGBV may reduce a woman’s ability to work and productivity</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.E. Climate change may decrease the availability of vital natural resources (water, fuel) → UCDW tasks related to these resources that require long journeys (gathering water/fuel) may require even longer journeys → women may be at higher risk of SGBV on these journeys → injuries/shame associated with SGBV may reduce a woman’s ability to work and productivity</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{657}\) *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security657</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.F.</strong> Climate change is expected to negatively impact environment-based livelihoods (rain-fed agriculture, subsistence farming) → women often make up majority of ag workers → women may experience higher unemployment</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.G.</strong> Environment-based livelihoods can be salvaged with climate smart investments (tools, implements, training) → women are frequently barred from owning land → women often cannot access loans to make climate smart investments → women may see increased hardship</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.H.</strong> Sustainable livelihood interventions can help environment-based workers adapt to climate change → women are often excluded from interventions due to gender norms → when women can engage, they may see increased income but also increased labour burdens</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.I.</strong> Climate-based crises are likely to increase unemployment for women and men → in low-paying sectors, women’s job losses typically exceed men’s → women in low-pay work who lose jobs frequently receive less/no severance payments (men are more likely to receive customary amounts) → men are hired back sooner than women when the economy starts to recover → when women re-enter the workforce, they often must accept low pay, little/no worker protections, long hours, difficult commutes</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.J.</strong> Climate disasters are likely to cause drops in employment → sometimes, men lose jobs more readily than women → some households will be composed of an unemployed man and an employed woman → such conditions often increase rates of SGBV</td>
<td>SD-surplus males-unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.K.</strong> Climate-caused extreme weather will damage property/infrastructure and agricultural land → men working in affected sectors are likely to lose their jobs</td>
<td>SD-surplus males-unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.5.L.</strong> Climate change is straining the fishing industry → fishing companies are resorting to human trafficking/forced labour → as men migrate for work, they may be trapped in slave-like working conditions</td>
<td>SD-surplus males-unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/International Security</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.M. Climate disasters may leave many men jobless → men may feel they cannot fulfill their culturally ascribed masculine roles (lost status or loci of struggle over ideological norms) → extremist/armed groups may find it easier to recruit new members</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism // Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.N. Climate change may lead to many job losses → men may be more likely to migrate to urban areas to find work → the numbers of unemployed young men may increase significantly in a given area → state-based and non-state-based violence rates may increase</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.5.O. Climate change may increase unemployment rates → government may reduce public benefit programs → criminal offending and re-offending are likely to increase (especially among men)</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with §; those with no research with ⊙. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.5.1 and 3.1.5.2.

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658 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
3.1.5.1. **Unemployment and Human Security**

An examination of *Unemployment* in terms of social reproduction and the commodification of labour reveals that, due to gendered norms and climate change, women’s employment security is likely to be diminished in multiple ways. Without stable employment that pays a living wage, women are likely to suffer increased economic instability, which suggests that the *Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* of *societal capacity* is most relevant to this *Unemployment* GCS-Factor within the *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle*. The *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* reviewed in the following discussion will cover how climate change is expected to intersect with employment and gender to increase women’s UCDW burdens (thereby diminishing time/energy available for employment); to increase women’s exposure to SGBV (thereby lowering physical wellbeing needed to engage in employment); to cause environment-based and urban-based job losses; and to limit women’s ability to adopt climate adaptive tools and techniques. Additionally, risks to men’s *Human Security* due to job losses will also be discussed.

Before launching into a full discussion of the interactions between *Unemployment*, climate change, gender, and security, central to understanding the precarity of women’s employment in a warming world are the responsibilities of UCDW. Care work can include providing childcare; offering medical and support care to sick or frail adults; or performing domestic work such as laundry, cooking, and collecting fuel or water. UCDW is essential to the economy and society, yet it is largely invisible, unpaid,
and unvalued the world over. Numerous studies have found that gendered norms and roles often require women to spend more hours than men on UCDW, either as a primary or secondary activity, which reduces their capacity to engage in income-generating activities. Furthermore, UCDW and employment responsibilities are often at odds with each other. Through the work-family interface (WFI), women’s economic standing can be seen as lagging behind men in one of two ways, according to Jennings and McDougald, which are summarized in Table 35.

Table 35. Gender Differences in Addressing the Work-Family Interface (WFI).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Reasons Women Experience WFI as a Conflict Between Competing Work and Family Demands</th>
<th>Three Strategies Women Use for Coping with WFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time-based conflict: finite time available to handle responsibilities in both domains</td>
<td>Compensation: they over-invest in one domain to compensate for dissatisfaction in the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strain-based conflict: stress from one domain spills into the other</td>
<td>Accommodation: they limit psychological/behavioural investments in one sphere to satisfy demands in the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviour-based conflict: behaviours in one domain are incompatible with those required in the other</td>
<td>Boundary management: they develop principles and practices for creating, maintaining, and crossing borders between the spheres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief description of the Work-Family Interface developed by Jennings and McDougald, summarized by this study’s author.

663 Jennings and McDougald, “Work-Family Interface Experiences and Coping Strategies,” 748.
These experiences and strategies feed into a self-reinforcing cycle of income and time-poverty for women (even for girls, starting as early as childhood), which lowers their time available for employment and lifetime earning capacity at almost every societal level and in nearly every industry.\textsuperscript{664} (While men may have a similar need to develop strategies to cope with such strains, since men tend to do less UCDW, they may typically rely less on such strategies.) Due to UCDW responsibilities, women’s employment baseline often lags behind that of men. Climate change is expected to increase demands on women to perform UCDW by intensifying the difficulty level and time required to perform such tasks, putting women even further behind.\textsuperscript{665}

There are several direct pathways through which climate change may increase women’s UCDW, and therefore increase their Susceptibility to climate risks. First, climate breakdown is expected to increase food insecurity and rates of sickness, requiring women and girls to spend more time growing or fetching food and caring for sick family members (Linkage 3.1.5.A).\textsuperscript{666} Second, changes in precipitation may require more time and effort to fetch basics, such as water, fuel wood, or perform washing duties (Linkage 3.1.5.B).\textsuperscript{667} Third, as already mentioned in the GCS-Factor section Standard of Living, cuts to public services and social protection systems will transfer many public service burdens on to women’s shoulders as well (Linkage 3.1.5.C).\textsuperscript{668}

In addition to the direct impact of UCDW on women’s economic productivity and employment prospects, climate-induced UCDW pressures on women may indirectly

\textsuperscript{664} Lawson et al., “Time to Care,” 32.
\textsuperscript{665} Lawson et al., “Time to Care,” 42.
\textsuperscript{666} Lawson et al., “Time to Care,” 16.
\textsuperscript{667} Lawson et al., “Time to Care,” 13.
\textsuperscript{668} Lawson et al., “Time to Care,” 16.
deepen *Unemployment* by increasing rates of SGBV in two ways (as discussed elsewhere in this study). First, SGBV is often a culturally acceptable response when women do not live up to the UCDW expectations placed on them (Linkage 3.1.5.D). Second, increased UCDW responsibilities can also expose women to new risks of SGBV, such as when the collection of fuelwood or water requires longer journeys through unsafe regions (Linkage 3.1.5.E). As explained in greater detail in the *Healthcare* GCS-Factor, Cadilhac et al. find that intimate partner violence (IPV), a form of SGBV, seriously impacts emotional and physical wellbeing, which in turn hampers an individual’s ability to work and reduces total productive days as employees and caregivers. Combined, increased UCDW responsibilities are likely to reinforce gender inequalities, thereby complicating women’s abilities to maintain paid work, and lowering their *societal capacity*.

The *societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* is also at work in climate’s impact on *Unemployment* trends among women. Climate change is expected to have different impacts depending on location and sector. In rural settings, studies conducted in Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America all show that climate change is expected to decrease women’s employment security, especially where environment-based livelihoods (such as rain-fed agriculture, subsistence farming, etc.) are the primary

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drivers of economic activity (Linkage 3.1.5.F).\textsuperscript{672} Environment-based employment opportunities will be a key determinant of climate adaptation for many individuals, and therefore \textit{Human Security}. However, as Demetriades and Esplen explain, due to customary laws that prevent women from owning land or receiving loans, women are often unable to invest in the tools and implements needed to adapt their income-generating activities to climate change (Linkage 3.1.5.G).\textsuperscript{673} These challenges become even more problematic for women-headed households. Additionally, since men define livelihood strategies for women in many cultures, women may not have the agency they need to learn and implement new adaptation strategies.\textsuperscript{674} A systematic review by Call and Sellers has shown that, (1) women tend to engage less with sustainable livelihood interventions (i.e. interventions fail to reduce gender disparities), often due to restricted mobility, but (2) when women do engage, income gains are often accompanied by labour burden increases as well—the costs and competition for labour may be more challenging for women if their overall income is less than men’s (Linkage 3.1.5.H).\textsuperscript{675}


\textsuperscript{674} Kheira Tarif, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict in West Africa: Assessing the Evidence” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2022), 7, https://doi.org/10.55163/VHIY5372.

\textsuperscript{675} Maia Call and Samuel Sellers, “How Does Gendered Vulnerability Shape the Adoption and Impact of Sustainable Livelihood Interventions in an Era of Global Climate Change?,” \textit{Environmental Research Letters} 14, no. 8 (July 2019): 083005, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab2f57.
In urban environments, studies of shocks on employment, such as those that are likely to arise due to climate change, underscore the low value placed on women’s labour force participation. A World Bank meta-study of crises showed that both women and men faced lost work and reduced incomes, accompanied by increased psychological stress, and pressure to find alternative work.\(^\text{676}\) In most countries, however, women in low-paying occupations experienced the highest job losses, received less or no severance payments (compared to men who receive customary amounts), and when companies began to recover, faced gender discrimination by employers who prefer to re-hire men (Linkage 3.1.5.1).\(^\text{677}\) When women are able to re-enter the workforce, they often work within the informal sector for low pay, little to no worker protections or benefits, long hours, and difficult commutes.\(^\text{678}\) Moreover, in terms of intersectionality, when women enter urban work environments, they may be exposed to exploitative employment systems (especially with multiple and overlapping identities) which reinforce gender disparities and prevent women from acquiring climate-smart vocational skills and training.\(^\text{679}\) Also of note is the Gender Equality-Security Mechanism of SD-surplus males-unemployment at work: when a woman’s higher labour force participation or employment is combined with a man’s unemployment, this can increase rates of SGBV against


women, which, as already stated, can increase a woman’s Susceptibility to climate risks and impact community stability (Linkage 3.1.5.J).  

One final note: climate change is likely to have an impact on rates of Unemployment among men as well. As with women, men who work in the agricultural sector may need to adapt or find new work, though as Call and Sellers point out, men are often better able to adapt to such shifts. Extreme weather events that cause flooding and waterlogging may decrease labour opportunities for men, and can lead to significant material and financial losses as well. When men experience economic instability as a result of lost employment, their Human Security will also be negatively impacted, making many men less able to weather future climate crises (Linkage 3.1.5.K). For instance, as climate change has increasingly threatened the fishing industry, fishing companies have resorted to human trafficking and forced labour to operate, often trapping men in slave-like working conditions (Linkage 3.1.5.L).

Importantly, however, some communities have complex livelihood adaptation strategies which allow them to adopt new sources of income when such environmental changes occur. Livelihood interventions, new (agriculture) technologies, and adaptive

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681 Call and Sellers, “How Does Gendered Vulnerability Shape the Adoption and Impact of Sustainable Livelihood Interventions in an Era of Global Climate Change?”

682 Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 19.


strategies are often designed for men or taken up more readily by men than women, which may insulate them from some climate-related employment and conflict risks.\textsuperscript{685} Furthermore, in many cases, changes in men’s employment (such as due to displacement) frequently leads to a reconstruction of masculinities narratives as men look for new ways to find meaning. For instance, in a study of men’s displacement in several Asian countries, Sikka found that across several different groups, reconfiguration of masculinities was often accompanied by shifts in gender relations, in most cases resulting in a maintenance of power imbalances in favour of men.\textsuperscript{686}

The preceding analysis has shown that both women and men need stable employment that pays a living wage in order to maintain climate security, but that women tend to be more deeply impacted by increased Unemployment caused by climate change due to increased UCDW burdens (and therefore lower paid employment); increased exposure to SGBV (and therefore diminished ability to work); greater environment-based and urban-based job losses; and fewer opportunities to learn climate adaptive tools and techniques. Resultantly, the hindering of women’s empowerment, political representation, and climate adaptive education will lower women’s resources and networks, and is likely to diminish their contributions to community stability and conflict resolution, according to Forsberg and Olsson’s theory.

Despite the difficulties that women are likely to face in staying employed in both rural and urban environments (as noted: increased UCDW burdens, increased exposure to

SGBV higher job losses, and lack of access to climate adaptive tools and techniques), as climate disruption intensifies, urban environments may offer women greater economic empowerment. As such, a gender transformative approach to addressing climate-caused Unemployment would capitalize on opportunities to offer women skill development, investment resources, entrepreneurship opportunities, strategic development, and innovation options, all of which can support higher rates of employment among for them.\textsuperscript{687} Research has also shown that when empowered, women tend to take active roles in supporting one another through livelihood shifts. Coppock and Dest have found that women’s collective action in pastoral regions of Kenya (especially in poorer communities in densely-populated regions) has resulted in the formation of groups that pooled funds for communal savings which were used to support larger collective farming operations, ultimately reinvesting profits over time into Education, WASH systems, and supporting the sick, elderly, and vulnerable members.\textsuperscript{688} This is yet another example of how women may prevent fragility in active, transformative roles. To take advantage of the benefits urban spaces offer, many women will have to migrate from their rural homes into urban centres, though in many communities, women may be less likely to migrate during periods of climate shock (though the opposite has also been found to be true).\textsuperscript{689} Nevertheless, once women do migrate, finding new work can offer women many

\textsuperscript{687} “Gender and Prosperity of Cities, State of Women in Cities 2012/2013 | UN-Habitat,” 46.
advantages. For instance, new or better employment may give women greater bargaining power within the household.

Several challenges would need to be addressed in a gender transformative approach to Unemployment. To start, as noted, when women gain better employment, they often also experience physical reprisal/backlash from unemployed men partners.690 This would need to be addressed at the household, gender norms level. Furthermore, Lama et al. have noted, “Empowerment programmes and policies – particularly those promoting alternative livelihoods – may in fact become a burden without actual benefits or ownership of resources, and may end up doing very little when it comes to reducing gender inequities.”691 Consequently, new employment opportunities for women should be accompanied by innovative structures and institutions that support women’s ownership of assets and land, bank accounts, and so on.

3.1.5.2. Unemployment and National/International Security

Aside from the gendered Human Security impacts of climate change on employment, GCS-Factor Unemployment may also play a role in increasing National/International Security risks along several pathways.692 Staying first with the Gender Equality-Security Mechanism of SD-surplus males-unemployment, certainly there

692 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
are risks that climate change will have a deleterious impact on men’s employment as well as women’s, depending on the location and sector. Climate-related triggers that lead to a larger number of men without employment, especially when such conditions prevent men from fulfilling their culturally ascribed masculine roles, could go on to facilitate their recruitment into extremist or armed groups (Linkage 3.1.5.M). Additionally, whether because of slow-onset environmental changes or acute climate-caused disasters, men are more likely than women to migrate in order to find work, which would have a deleterious impact on men’s Human Security in general. Furthermore, if such migration leads to a surplus of males in urban environments, such conditions may trigger state-based conflict in densely populated centres, suggesting the SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict Gender Equality-Security Mechanism may come into play as well (Linkage 3.1.5.N).

What other potential impacts might increase Unemployment have on rates of crime/violence/extremism? There is a rich literature showing a direct link between Unemployment rates and criminal offending and re-offending, with relative criminology rates among men increasing more than among women, though rates among women also tend to increase (Linkage 3.1.5.O). Empirical analysis of crime and socioeconomic


factors in Europe by Coccia suggests a possible link between lower socioeconomic status due to \textit{Unemployment} and intentional homicides.\textsuperscript{695} Furthermore, as noted in section 3.1.4.2, research by Andersen and others suggests public support programs offered to unemployed individuals reduces criminal activity.\textsuperscript{696} This aligns well with the \textit{Gender Equality-Security Mechanism} that suggests in communities with \textit{Socioeconomic Development} issues that result in \textit{surplus unemployed males}, recruitment of these males into criminal organizations and rebel groups may be much easier. Likewise, there is a growing body of research showing a strong connection between \textit{Unemployment} and violent extremism, especially among young men (Linkage 3.1.5.M).\textsuperscript{697} The links between \textit{Unemployment} and \textit{anti-state grievances} are also well-established in research globally.\textsuperscript{698} As such, motivations related to the \textit{pull of networks} as well as perceived exposure to...
violence/repression may play roles in men’s involvement in crime, extremist violence, or anti-state grievance protests, though explicit research into these motivations is required to confirm this hypothesis.

Climate-caused Unemployment among men in rural environments may also trigger grievances between societal groups. As previously discussed, research by Forsberg and Olsson suggests that recruitment into rebel or paramilitary networks is much more likely along gendered Socioeconomic Development pathways when climate change generates high Unemployment rates among surplus males, thereby increasing state-based violence and non-state based violence in both rural and urban centres. Their research is backed up by numerous studies. For instance, in rural Turkana (Kenya), Omolo has found that where environmentally based livelihoods such as animal husbandry are primary sources of employment, traditional raiding practices have been used neighbour-against-neighbour to expand grazing land, gain water access, restock of livestock, and increase status. Increased drought has intensified competition over herding resources, and this has increased ‘sponsored’ raiding using ever-more guns, which has led to a rise in rates of conflict and death. Diving further into the motivations for Unemployment violence, Cramer finds that Unemployment is relevant in discussions of violence because of employment’s role as a source of status or loci of struggle over norms of ideologically-validated identity and fairness, particularly for men (but also where issues of fairness of identity intersect with race, ethnicity, or religion). Cramer

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699 Forsberg and Olsson, “Examining Gender Inequality and Armed Conflict at the Subnational Level.”
700 Omolo, “Gender and Climate Change-Induced Conflict in Pastoral Communities.”
701 Omolo, “Gender and Climate Change-Induced Conflict in Pastoral Communities.”
also finds two pathways (more commonly observed among men) for understanding *Unemployment* and violence:

1. Broader structural and policy factors (such as unjust social orders) combined with unemployment are often the impetus for joining violent rebellions, rather than unemployment in isolation.

2. Reasons for joining guerilla forces, gangs, and militias often stem more from a desire to escape boredom, stifling family situations, or gerontocracy than from unemployment alone.

Cramer also notes that employment that is demeaning and monotonous with little chance of promotion or skill development, poor wages, and exploitative or coercive conditions, can also lead to individuals joining insurgencies, gangs, and militias. With Cramer’s findings in mind, motivations such as *pull of networks* and *exposure to violence/repression* may be important determinants of whether men are recruited and engage in violence. However, while this literature suggests that *Unemployment* in urban environments could play an important role in *grievances between societal groups*, some recent research has indicated that it’s not a straightforward connection. Further exploration of this linkage is therefore required.

Women’s climate-induced *Unemployment* can be examined on the *interstate tensions* context through a labour force participation lens. As already noted, in their ‘Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome’ study, Hudson et al. show that countries with high Syndrome scores have significantly lower female labour force participation (this likely

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reflects the relative human insecurity of women, and therefore lower overall societal capacity in such communities). As such, climate-induced Unemployment among women may indicate increased climate Susceptibility to conflict given that high scoring countries tend to experience greater instability and insecurity, lower levels of overall well-being, and decreased prosperity. Here, too, more research is required.

As the previous analysis suggests, of all the GCS-Factors discussed in this study, Unemployment may have the strongest ties between gender, climate change, and security. Given the role employment plays in culturally ascribed roles, particularly for men, lack of employment can be a significant motivating factor for people looking to express their frustration and find solutions to their emotional distress. Nevertheless, due to the ways in which Unemployment may also impact women’s climate security, and the role women’s economic security plays in community stability, addressing both women’s and men’s employment challenges would be necessary to minimize the negative consequences of this gendered factor.

706 Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, “The Effects by the Numbers,” 233.
707 Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, “The Effects by the Numbers,” 233.
3.1.5.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Unemployment

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to Unemployment can be found in Figure 19. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 59 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 19. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Unemployment.

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Unemployment.*
3.1.6. Socioeconomic Development

Table 36. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Socioeconomic Development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Dominant Approach</strong>:</th>
<th>Examines the degree to which inequality and poverty exclude significant parts of the population from society, thereby limiting their socioeconomic development.²⁷⁰</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach</strong>:</td>
<td>A gender-blind understanding of socioeconomic development flattens the hierarchies that impact how different groups access society. Importantly, the WPS agenda has begun to take socioeconomic development into consideration through UNSCR 2122 of 2013, which is an amendment to UNSCR 1325 that provides a justification for considering socioeconomic elements of security in the WPS agenda. It states:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sustainable peace requires an integrated approach based on coherence between political, security, development, human rights, including gender equality, and rule of law and justice activities … [and recognizes] the need to address the gaps and strengthen links between the United Nations peace and security in the field, human rights and development work as a means to address root causes of armed conflict and threats to the security of women and girls in the pursuit of international peace and security.²⁷⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several feminist theories offer perspectives for understanding socioeconomic development in the gender and climate security nexus. First, in writing about the importance of women’s equal power in all aspects of the WPS agenda (participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery), FPEcon True argues, “Putting SCR 1325 into practice by promoting women’s participation in peace processes, however, depends on efforts to change the gendered social and economic inequalities that currently constrain their participation and underlie their vulnerability in conflict and post-conflict settings.”²⁷¹ Here, social reproduction theory will once again be useful in understanding the role paid and unpaid work plays in socioeconomic development and how that connects to climate security. Furthermore, FPEcols Goldman and Schurman have developed a framework for examining how gendered political economic structures determine resource access, use,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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and control. Adding to this, Souyeon suggests that customary laws and gender norms often impede women’s access to systems, such as property rights and resource ownership. According to Kansanga et al. and Jarosz, FPEcol also considers how gendered divisions of labour, women’s environmental knowledge, and family hierarchies impact social and natural resource use and distribution. With these theories in mind, FPEcol informs a gendered understanding of climate security by illuminating how social structures and institutions often impede women’s socioeconomic advancement and by extension their climate security. Importantly, FPEcol also takes seriously intersectional discrimination that further diminishes socioeconomic development of various groups of minority women.

While socioeconomic development involves many elements, such as urban/rural infrastructure, economic activity, education, social institutions and structures, and demographics, many of these elements are covered in detail under other GCS-Factors. For the purposes of this proposed framework, therefore, socioeconomic development will consider primarily how inequalities exclude significant parts of the population from broader societal structures (financial, digital, and decision-making), thereby increasing their susceptibility to climate change.

*Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Socioeconomic Development.*

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Table 37. Short Overview of the Socioeconomic Development Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.A. Climate change is likely to increase rates of SGBV and human trafficking → survivors may experience lower socioeconomic status → may be exposed to increased risks of SGBV and human trafficking in a vicious cycle</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.B. Climate disasters often create a need for financial support (cash, insurance payments, loans) → women are frequently excluded from all types of banking and property ownership → women are more likely to be at risk for further financial impacts and lower socioeconomic status</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.C. Following climate shocks, financial tools become important for recovery → financial exclusion commonly bars women from accessing tools and services because of ‘individual effort/entrepreneurship/market opportunities’ criteria that replicate gendered power structures → when women can access financial support services, they often use the funds for social reproduction, which adds to feminized responsibilities for recovery → women may recover more slowly and less completely</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.D. Women’s lower socioeconomic status (due to UCDW (time constraints), lack of education, gendered norms, and economic/legal barriers) frequently prevents their participation in decision-making spaces → women may be unable to address their unique climate preparation and adaptation concerns in the public sphere</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.E. The lower socioeconomic status of women (and indigenous peoples) may prevent their involvement in natural resource management → may result in higher rates of deforestation and land degradation → may lower the climate security of entire communities</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

714 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security(^{714})</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.F. Higher UCDW burdens (which impact women more than men) tend to encourage greater natural resource consumption → may intensify poverty and environmental integrity → may increase a community’s susceptibility to climate breakdown</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.G. Poor socioeconomic conditions (high food insecurity and energy costs) for low-income households (especially in less-developed states) make climate policies (such as increasing women’s education to decrease population growth) more difficult to implement → may increase costs and lower efficacy of climate policies → may further decrease system-level ability to adapt to and recover from climate change</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security(^{715})</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.H. Climate breakdown is expected to increase social and economic disparities → criminal offending tends to increase due to adverse socioeconomic conditions in both women and men (though stronger in men)</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>Greater opportunities (more likely women)(^8); exposure to violence/repression or revenge (typically men)(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.I. Changes to the climate are likely to increase socioeconomic inequalities → may lead to increased rates of lethal violence, especially among men (more profound in states with weak collective institutions and social protections)</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>Greater opportunities (more likely women); exposure to violence/repression(^8); and pull of networks(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.J. Climate change is expected to increase rates of human migration → migrants may feel economic exclusion in</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>Requires research; Greater opportunities (more likely women)(^2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{715}\) For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security^{715}</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>host country $\rightarrow$ may precipitate increased crime rates</td>
<td></td>
<td>exposure to violence/repression or revenge (typically men)$^\oplus$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.K. Environmental, economic, sociocultural, and political-socioeconomic marginalization of groups may intensify due to climate breakdown (more profound for women) $\rightarrow$ may amplify existing grievances or generate new ones (over water, grazing land, herds, and resources) $\rightarrow$ may erupt into intrastate/interstate conflicts</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups // Interstate tensions</td>
<td>Increase survival (both women and men), pull of networks$^\oplus$ (typically men), and exposure to violence/repression$^\oplus$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.6.L. Climate change may deteriorate land-based livelihoods $\rightarrow$ young men may find it difficult to achieve socioeconomic milestones ascribed to manhood $\rightarrow$ may be more likely to join militant groups to regain status and an income</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>SD-surplus males-unemployment (Gender Equality-Security Mechanism) and pull of networks$^\oplus$ (gendered motivation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with $^\oplus$; those with no research with $^\oplus$. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.6.1 and 3.1.6.2.

3.1.6.1. Socioeconomic Development and Human Security

Socioeconomic Development is considered a pre-existing factor that impacts the extent to which a system or individual can adapt to and recover from future crises, such as climate breakdown.\textsuperscript{716} Climate change and Socioeconomic Development are likely to interact with gendered structures, institutions, and resources along several pathways that

effect *Human Security*. Critically, taking direction from True, gendered socioeconomic inequality should be examined not as the experience of absolute inequality levels, but rather as relative levels of inequality that give some people access to assets and spaces while barring others from those assets and spaces, for instance women’s level of insecurity relative to that of men in their communities.\(^{717}\) With this in mind, the *societal capacity* Gender Equality-Security Mechanism is most relevant for this GCS-Factor within the *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle* because of the ways in which socioeconomic insecurity diminishes people’s (and therefore their community’s) ability to adapt to and recover from climate change, potentially pushing a system closer to climate-related crime, violence, and conflict.\(^{718}\) The ensuing discussion will cover several *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages*, including how socioeconomic status increases risks of SGBV and human trafficking (which may intensify inequalities and lower climate adaptability and recovery); gender inequalities in access to financial tools and property ownership; gendered access to decision-making bodies; and the role that socioeconomic+gender inequality play in reducing the efficacy of climate policies, which may further entrench socioeconomic imbalances and impede systems from adapting and recovering from climate change.

First, and perhaps most obviously, as True has found, women who experience greater socioeconomic inequality compared to men may more frequently be victims of SGBV and of human trafficking.\(^{719}\) As discussed in several other GCS-Factors, climate


\(^{718}\) *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).

\(^{719}\) True, “The Political Economy of Violence Against Women.”
change will likely increase rates of SGBV in several ways (due to increased UCDW responsibilities and the risks therein; following climate-related disasters; because of increased household food insecurity; or due to lower levels of education). Consider that femicides have increased in some economic development zones in reaction to the feminization of labour, and as previously mentioned, male violence against women has been shown to increase in reaction to male Unemployment or when a man’s household power is undermined.\footnote{True, “The Political Economy of Violence Against Women.”} Additionally, Smith notes that climate change is expected to increase rates of human trafficking (whose victims are frequently women and children, but also men and boys).\footnote{Mikaila V Smith, “Applying the United Nations Trafficking Protocol in the Context of Climate Change,” \textit{Chicago Journal of International Law} 22, no. 1 (June 22, 2021): 299–334.} Since SGBV and human trafficking reduce a person’s economic stability, physical and mental health, and sometimes social standing, in a vicious cycle, SGBV and trafficking may very well increase levels of socioeconomic inequality, and further erode individuals’ abilities to adapt to and recover from climate disasters (Linkage 3.1.6.A). Moreover, the research of Castañeda et al. shows that when gendered norms and laws remain unchanged, SGBV is often used as an intimidation tactic (especially against low-power women) to gain control of resources and/or to scare those attempting to protect resources.\footnote{Carney I. Castañeda et al., \textit{Gender-Based Violence and Environment Linkages} (IUCN, 2020), https://doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.CH.2020.03.en.} As such, gendered power imbalances within the home and society must be addressed in order to effect change in rates of SGBV, human trafficking, and resulting socioeconomic inequalities.

Second, social structures and institutions within the financial sector often impede women’s socioeconomic advancement and, by implication, their climate security as well.
Human Security depends in part on one’s ability to access savings accounts, loans, and insurance to invest in climate-resilient agriculture equipment, businesses, and Education (topics covered in other GCS-Factors).

On the topic of access to digital spaces (a crucial component of modern Socioeconomic Development), concepts developed in other GCS-Factors are relevant here. In particular, as explored in greater depth in the Early Warning section of this study, there are significant gender divides in ownership of mobile phones and use of the internet, both of which are required for many modern banking and financial services.

Furthermore, section 2.1.1.1 explores aspects of gendered access to land (phone) lines, mobile phones, the internet, etc., as well as how digital spaces involve coproduction between men and technology (those who design technologies also design society, often in highly gendered ways).

Digital technologies are crucial lifelines for addressing the urgent financial needs of people facing climate disasters that are predicted to cause property damage, destroy livelihoods, and displace people. Mobile money and digital wallet services will be of particular importance for receiving disaster support from governments and NGOs, social cash from family and friends, and insurance payments.

Yet, it is well-established that gendered structural barriers frequently prevent women from accessing digital (and traditional) financial tools and services (such as bank

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724 Santosham and Lindsey, “Connected Women: Bridging the Gender Gap - Mobile Access and Usage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries”; Melhem, Morell, and Tandon, “Information and Communication Technologies for Women’s Socio-Economic Empowerment.”
725 Faulkner, “The Technology Question in Feminism”; Bray, “Gender and Technology.”
accounts, loans, and insurance), owning land, or participating in household financial
decision-making, all of which increase women’s Susceptibility to climate risks. All of
these factors will make women more susceptible to climate risks and impacts, thereby
further lowering their socioeconomic status (Linkage 3.1.6.B).

Financial inclusion policies have been developed by governments and
organizations to meet UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) such as SDG-1 which
aims to end poverty everywhere, yet despite such inclusion goals, these policies are still
highly gendered according to feminist scholar Natile. First, Natile suggests that
commercially oriented means to solve financial exclusion problems will be unsuccessful
if they do not address the deep structural gender inequalities within formal markets.
Second, Natile argues that the instrumentalization of financial inclusion for gender-equal
Socioeconomic Development falls short because: (A) when predicated on individual
effort, entrepreneurship, and market opportunities, such programs don’t redistribute
power, and instead replicate existing structures of exclusion; and (B) women use
financial tools for social reproduction of their communities (and not solely for
themselves), and therefore increased financial access may serve only to add ‘feminized
responsibility’ to women’s existing burdens (Linkage 3.1.6.C) (though one could argue
men do this as well, though perhaps the extent differs).

Of note are green financial
inclusion (GFI) policies which attempt to simultaneously invest in the environment and

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728 James M. Naughton and Anne K. Brady, “Building Resilience to Crisis through Digital Financial
Services with a Gender Lens,” Enterprise Development & Microfinance 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 28–44,
Inclusion: The Critical Role for Holistic Programming.” Development in Practice 29, no. 8 (November 17,

729 Serena Natile, The Exclusionary Politics of Digital Financial Inclusion: Mobile Money, Gendered
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367179618.

enhance sustainability, as well as improve access, usage, and quality of financial products and services, especially for socioeconomically marginalized groups. However, if GFI programs are not truly gender-transformative (and many do not address underlying power imbalances at all), they may further entrench gendered hierarchies and risk women’s ability to adapt to and recover from climate breakdown.

Third, globally, women are commonly barred from access to decision-making bodies such as community councils and elected government positions that determine crisis prevention and response. As True points out, resolving gendered social and economic inequalities, especially in decision-making spaces, is crucial to women’s full participation in peace processes, including those impacted by climate change. However, when excluded from crucial community-level decisions, women may be unable to have their unique concerns addressed, cannot provide input to environmental peacebuilding, and subsequently may be less prepared for and able to adapt to climate crises (Linkage 3.1.6.D). A World Bank report notes numerous ways in which gendered structural barriers prevent women from participating in decision-making, and thus diminish their access to natural and other resources and increase their Susceptibility to climate risks, all of which is summarized in

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731 Ulrich et al., “Inclusive Green Finance: From Concept to Practice,” 5.
Table 38.\textsuperscript{732}

Table 38. Gendered Structural Barriers That Prevent Women from Participating in Decision-Making Positions and Spaces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Barriers to Women Participating in Decision-Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time constraints combined with limited public infrastructure (transit for instance) and distance to public offices that hinder women from participating in public decision processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application processes that are burdensome, including those that require land ownership verification, language skills (often non-Indigenous languages), technology access and skills, and expensive fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tight timelines that preclude communal decision-making by all community members, especially women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of understanding of government institutions, programs, and processes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Barriers to Women Participating in Decision-Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household gendered roles and inheritance patterns that exclude women from owning or controlling property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of land tenure, a pre-requisite for applying for incentives or receiving technical assistance or participating in community decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered community norms that prevent women from holding positions on local assemblies and governing bodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Barriers to Women Participating in Decision-Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female-headed households trapped in poverty often lack the education required (and exposure to the world outside of their communities) for participation in decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid work responsibilities limit women’s time for participation in decision-making spaces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief enumeration of structures that frequently prevent women from participating in decision-making as outlined by the World Bank and summarized by the author.733

Finally, there are several routes by which socioeconomic inequalities may themselves contribute to climate change—an important consideration when exploring negative feedback loops that may intensify societal inequities and increase Susceptibility

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733 “Closing the Gender Gap in Natural Resource Management Programs in Mexico,” 49,55.
to climate risks for individuals and communities alike. For instance, socioeconomic inequality can lead to lack of access to land or inadequate land rights, especially for indigenous peoples and women; studies have shown that without indigenous peoples and women’s involvement in resource management, higher rates of deforestation and land degradation, and therefore climate change acceleration, often result. Consequently, such natural resource mismanagement may make entire communities more susceptible to climate breakdown (Linkage 3.1.6.E). Similarly, people who experience UCDW overloads, which typically disadvantage women’s social progress, are likely to increase their consumption of natural resources, and further intensify Poverty and climate disruption (Linkage 3.1.6.F). On a transnational level looking at the interaction of climate policies and socioeconomic conditions, research by Liu et al. demonstrates that more favourable socioeconomic conditions, especially in less developed states, increases the efficacy and reduces the costs of climate policies; conversely, poor socioeconomic conditions such as higher food insecurity or energy costs for low-income families make climate policies more difficult to implement (Linkage 3.1.6.G). For instance, increasing women’s access to Education in less-developed regions could help to reduce population growth, which could slow climate change.

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737 Liu et al., “The Importance of Socioeconomic Conditions in Mitigating Climate Change Impacts and Achieving Sustainable Development Goals,” 8.
The preceding investigation offers several pathways through which Socioeconomic Development may threaten women’s climate security: it may lower socioeconomic status that increases risks of SGBV and human trafficking; gender inequalities in access to financial tools and property ownership may increase and further hinder women’s Socioeconomic Development; gendered lack of access to decision-making bodies may stunt women’s abilities to influence socioeconomic conditions; and socioeconomic+gender inequality may play a role in reducing the efficacy of climate policies, which may further entrench socioeconomic imbalances and impede systems from adapting and recovering from climate change. According to Forsber and Olsson, these types of limitations to women’s empowerment, political representation, and network development may significantly hamper women’s societal capacity, and reduce the resources and capabilities they have to participate in community strengthening and peacebuilding.

Addressing the imbalances in power that support the structures barring women from full participation in decision-making (outlined in
Table 38) would be required to achieve equal socioeconomic status (and therefore greater climate security), including household and community hierarchies, unequal UCDW responsibilities, access to Education and property ownership, and the feminization of Poverty. Women’s inclusion in decision-making is especially important when it comes to community response plans related to climate breakdown. Only substantive gender equality in decision-making circles produces more equitable and sustainable outcomes by ensuring excluded groups are permitted to champion their own causes. As previously mentioned, particular attention must be paid to avoiding tokenistic inclusion of women for the purposes of fulfilling the goals of those in power. This is more crucial when considering intersectional gender and ethnic minority inequalities. Critically, feminist criticisms of the women’s empowerment movement, such as that by Chant and Tantoh et al., point out that if women’s inclusion in decision-making is based on essentialist understandings of gender and/or is only symbolic (without the dismantlement of gender disparities), the benefits to women will be few, if not absent entirely.

3.1.6.2. Socioeconomic Development and National/International Security

As discussed in the previous section, socioeconomic inequalities are expected to increase due to climate change. The research connecting disparities in socioeconomic status and National/International Security are at various stages of development regarding

739 Elias, Joshi, and Meinzen-Dick, “Restoration for Whom, by Whom?”
the four pathways in this proposed framework.\textsuperscript{741} To begin, social and economic marginalizations have long been recognized for their links to crime/violence/extremism.\textsuperscript{742} According to research by Steffensmeier and Haynie on within-sex comparisons of criminal offending rates, structural disadvantages such as adverse socioeconomic conditions increase criminal offending rates amongst both women and men, though the effect is stronger in men (Linkage 3.1.6.H).\textsuperscript{743} Several studies have shown an increase in lethal violence (more likely perpetrated by men; see section 1.2.3.1) and economic inequality, and though contested, research by Savolainen suggests the impact of socioeconomic inequality on lethal violence is especially strong in nations characterized by weak collective institutions and social protections (Linkage 3.1.6.I).\textsuperscript{744} Similarly, Coccia posits that within rich countries that serve as destinations for migrants, a precipitating factor for crime may be immigrants’ experiences of exclusion from the

\textsuperscript{741} For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).


formal economy. An intersectional lens is important for understanding drivers of crime related to socioeconomic marginalization. Heimer shows, for instance, that violent race-based victimization also appears to play a significant role in shaping criminal activity. Combined, these results suggest motivations related to a desire to greater opportunities (more likely women) and perhaps exposure to violence/repression or pull of networks (more typically men), though more research is required.

*Anti-state grievances and grievances between societal groups* is the most likely pathway for climate-related socioeconomic inequalities to contribute to *National/International Security* risks. According to a World Bank report on the social dimensions of climate change, socioeconomic marginalization of groups can take many forms in conflict-related settings: environmental (living in low-potential areas); economic (poor market access and low share of public expenditures); sociocultural (ethnic prejudices); and political (any combination of the above). Such marginalization is even more profound for women and indigenous groups. As climate change intensifies, grievances felt by disadvantaged groups may erupt into violence and conflict, such as protests or disagreements over control of water, grazing land, or herds (Linkage 3.1.6.K). Extractive resources such as minerals, fossil fuels, and forestry resources which are considered critical revenue sources have been strongly connected to conflicts

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745 Bellitto and Coccia, “Possible Relations between Crime, Immigration and Socioeconomic Factors.”
746 Heimer, “Inequalities and Crime.”
as different socioeconomic groups disagree over their control.\textsuperscript{750} For instance, in the Niger Delta, climate change exacerbates environmental degradation brought on by oil drilling which has deteriorated fishing and agricultural practices. Young men living in these regions have lately found they are unable to achieve the socioeconomic milestones associated with manhood, and as a result, are more likely to join militant groups to obtain income and regain status, according to Ashamole (Linkage 3.1.6.L).\textsuperscript{751} This research suggests that \textit{pull of networks} (typically men) may be associated with violence that results (and also indicates a connection to the \textit{SD-surplus males-unemployment Gender Equality-Security Mechanism}). Note that women have also been known to engage in violent protests due to socioeconomic grievances. For example, the Aba Women Riot of 1929 was led by women to oppose the excesses of the British colonial administration including the collection of (unfair) taxes.\textsuperscript{752}

Furthermore, \textit{grievances between societal groups} may become enmeshed with \textit{interstate tensions} as well as \textit{anti-state grievances} (Linkage 3.1.6.K).\textsuperscript{753} For instance, some research suggests that as climate change weakens state and customary authorities, existing or unresolved land access disputes between states may arise, especially if land claims seem invalid or unjust for particular groups.\textsuperscript{754} In such circumstances, motivations such as \textit{increase survival} (both women and men), \textit{pull of networks} (typically men), and

\textsuperscript{750} “Women and Natural Resources,” 23.
\textsuperscript{754} “Women and Natural Resources,” 16.
exposure to violence/repression if government policies limit access to resources (typically men) may all play roles in climate- and Socioeconomic Development-related conflicts (though again, more studies should be conducted to explore the gendered nature of these potential motivational mechanisms).

To prevent social exclusion from developing into conflict, equitable development policies will need to be based on gender-transformative approaches that acknowledge (and extend) property rights and empowerment of local people to fully participate in climate-related management decisions and dismantle unequal gendered institutions.755

Important for tempering all these potential National/International Security pathways are women’s roles in peacemaking. A UN report on women and natural resource management suggests that the involvement of individual women’s and men’s networks in decision-making bodies may increase the likelihood of conflict mitigation between groups (acknowledging that women, too, can be perpetrators of violence).756 More specifically, as an oft socioeconomically marginalized group, a UN Environment Programme report notes that in a warming world, women’s and men’s networks are critical to peace processes related to natural resource management.757 One example is the case in the South Sudan where women have been key decision-makers in natural resource conflict management.758

756 “Women and Natural Resources,” 33, 35.
757 “Women and Natural Resources.”
758 “Women and Natural Resources,” 33, 35.
3.1.6.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Socioeconomic Development**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *Socioeconomic Development* can be found in Figure 20. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 60 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 20. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Socioeconomic Development.

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Socioeconomic Development.*
3.1.7. Infrastructure

Table 39. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Quality of overall infrastructure at a country level, including energy, transport, and telephony.(^{559})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</td>
<td>The conventional understanding of infrastructure is limiting in terms of scope and fails to consider the gendered ways in which infrastructure is designed, built, and used. Many feminist theorists have examined how patriarchal values and gender norms connect to physical spaces such as transportation and telecommunications systems, energy infrastructure, and housing. For instance, according to bodily depletion theory, infrastructure that is not designed with the social reproduction responsibilities most often carried out by women is likely to add to their bodily depletion burdens. Infrastructure design also impacts how it feels to use it. Fernandes shows how cultural norms may suggest urban spaces are, “foreign, dangerous, and male,” thereby engendering a sense of fear about public spaces and discouraging women from utilizing them.(^{60}) Moreover, Wesely and Gaarder argue that in masculinized spaces, women often have to use coping mechanisms to deal with fear and vulnerability.(^{61}) Nevertheless, Bondi suggests that, since women can challenge, rework, and reshape gendered meanings and experiences within a given space, they can be active participants (and not simply passive victims) in reimagining how infrastructure works and functions—if empowered to do so.(^{62}) Furthermore, using social reproduction theory, urban political ecologists suggest that the notion of infrastructure should be extended beyond the physical elements of a system to include people’s activities (often women’s). Simone, for instance, argues that urban infrastructure is underpinned by a complex web of objects, spaces, persons, and practices that support the social reproduction of a broad range of spatial, economic, residential, and transactional positions.(^{63}) In other words, physical infrastructure cannot function without the social reproduction activities that fuel its purpose. Beyond the ways in which spaces become gendered, in a climate susceptibility context, infrastructure is often not designed with the unique needs of women in mind. Building</td>
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\(^{559}\) Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 95.


on Natile’s critique of development projects that take a gender-blind approach, when infrastructure projects are launched without considering how to dismantle structural gender inequalities, such projects may only reinforce existing exclusions. As such, infrastructure projects must be designed to redistribute power to avoid feminizing responsibility for meeting climate challenges and to prevent adding to women’s existing burdens.

Finally, by defining infrastructure to include only energy, transportation, and telephony, traditional conceptions of infrastructure remain squarely in masculinized arenas. As such, this section will add the ‘feminine’ space of housing to the list of areas to explore. And while technology access has been examined in previous sections, here it will be studied in relation to infrastructure. Water and sanitation, arguably feminine spaces and heavily intertwined with infrastructure, have already been thoroughly explored in previous sections (the WASH section) and so will not be discussed here. The analysis that follows will focus on how the design of most Infrastructure components worldwide entrench gendered hierarchies in terms of how they are used and what burdens they place on different groups.

**Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Infrastructure.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Human Security</strong></th>
<th><strong>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.A.</strong></td>
<td>Energy insecurity at baseline increases women’s UCDW burdens → climate change is expected to damage energy infrastructure → energy insecurity is likely to increase, especially for the poorest (often women) → women’s drudgery will intensify, learning will become even more challenging, air pollution will intensify, injury and burn risks will mount, SGBV rates may increase, and health systems will become even less safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.B.</strong></td>
<td>Investments in transportation are made first to high-cost (high-carbon) systems like roadways for private vehicle owners (typically men) → when improvements are required (such as following a climate disaster), public transit, walkways, and bicycle lanes are generally not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

766 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prioritized → women’s transportation routes become more complex and time consuming (and sometimes more expensive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.7.C. Transportation systems are designed around masculine work schedules → without private vehicles, women’s night-shift, service-based employment may require trip-chaining and slower transit routes → women have less time for work or UCDW</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.7.D. Women often must use public transit in the ‘urban nightscape’ which is perceived as perilous → women may prefer not to use public transit → may have to rely on slower modes of transit (walking, bicycling) → increases time required for work and/or UCDW</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.7.E. Patriarchal gender norms may render women invisible/unapproachable and public transit systems as forbidden or not permitted → some women may have no acceptable means of transportation at all → women’s climate adaptability and recovery are severely limited</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.7.F. Gender norms around technology ownership and use often limit women’s access to the internet and mobile phones → women often cannot take advantage of benefits offered by digital technology (such as time savings, increased safety, increased independence, banking access, business support, healthcare access, access to legal advice and support for SGBV survival, staying in touch with family and friends following disasters) → women’s ability to adapt and recover from climate shocks is hampered</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.7.G. Gender norms often confine women to their homes → gender norms may prevent women from owning/renting/insuring their homes → women cannot make decisions of how to prepare their homes for climate shocks → may increase women’s vulnerability to climate disasters</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.1.7.H. New infrastructure projects (due to climate damage or to address climate change) may disrupt land use → women often inhabit lands (using it for livelihoods, food, water, shelter) needed for new infrastructure → infrastructure projects may not have equitable plans for how to</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong>&lt;sup&gt;766&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</strong></td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>address the needs of current residents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.I.</strong> Climate disasters and climate change projects often require new infrastructure development → women are frequently not consulted in their design → women’s climate adaptation needs may not be met</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.J.</strong> New infrastructure built in response to climate change often creates many new jobs → gender norms regarding education and job roles may bar women from being employed in infrastructure-building roles → women may not benefit from the economic opportunities offered → women’s climate/economic stability may fall behind that of men’s</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.K.</strong> New infrastructure projects may generate an influx of men seeking jobs → may reduce women’s status → may create an increase in rates of SGBV</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity//SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict</strong></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th><strong>National/International Security</strong>&lt;sup&gt;767&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th><strong>Pathway</strong></th>
<th><strong>Motivational Mechanisms</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.L.</strong> Climate disasters may prompt infusions of rebuilding funds into regions with damaged infrastructure → criminal/extremist actors may seize funds (with shell companies or by other means) to use for their own purposes or to garner support</td>
<td><strong>Crime/violence/extremism</strong></td>
<td>[Requires research] <em>Increase survival, avoid abuse</em> (typically women),&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; and <em>pull of networks, exposure to violence/repression</em> (typically men)&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<sup>766</sup> For *National/International Security*, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.M.</strong> Climate disasters may cause loss of basic services due to infrastructure damage (such as energy, piped water) → criminal activity may increase as a result</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Increase survival, avoid abuse (typically women), pull of networks, exposure to violence/repression (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.N.</strong> Poorly-developed road infrastructure may increase the likelihood of classes between rebel groups and government forces → such tensions may intensify following a climate disaster that further damages roadways</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances</td>
<td>[Requires research] Avoid abuse (typically women), pull of networks, and exposure to violence/repression (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.O.</strong> Climate-damaged infrastructure will require repair → funds for repair may be allocated unequally along gender, racial, ethnic, class, or religious lines → may create or exacerbate anti-government or intrastate grievances</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] Fundamentalist ideology (both women and men), as well as avoid abuse (typically women), pull of networks, and exposure to violence/repression (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.1.7.P.</strong> Climate change may trigger the need for infrastructure investments → infrastructure projects may result in job losses → unemployed men may migrate to urban centres to find work → may result in easier pathways to recruit men into rebel groups</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances // Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] SD-urban surplus males-unemployment</td>
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</table>
Climate change is already prompting governments to engage in large-scale infrastructure projects to manage water needs, tensions over the governance of shared water resources between states can develop.

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with §; those with no research with Æ. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.1.7.1 and 3.1.7.2.

### 3.1.7.1. Infrastructure and Human Security

Climate change is expected to take a significant toll on both urban and rural Infrastructure, causing damage that is likely to further reinforce gendered power imbalances, and will therefore play a role in whether communities are able to adapt to and recover from climate breakdown. Looking at Infrastructure and gender in this way, there are many links to the societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism, though the SD-urban surplus males-unemployment mechanism is also a consideration. The following discussion on GCS-Factor Infrastructure will therefore go beyond traditional conceptions of Infrastructure and climate change to consider various Gender-Climate-Security Linkages related to telecommunications, energy, transportation, and housing, noting how each either contributes to or detracts from gendered Human Security in a warming world. Furthermore, the discussion includes how efforts to build new or

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768 Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
refurbish climate-damaged *Infrastructure* could consider gender transformative approaches that offer greater climate adaptation possibilities for all.

A discussion of climate’s impact on *Infrastructure* requires first a basic understanding of the gendering of *Infrastructure*. Certainly, poor *Infrastructure* impacts both women and men—especially in developing countries and rural areas where irregular power, poor roads, inadequate housing, and underdeveloped communication systems are prevalent. Yet, as Adatti and Catta argue, there are many ways conventional *Infrastructure* either supports or adds to the burden of the care economy. Since *Infrastructure*’s design and function generally adds to the workloads of those responsible for social reproduction—usually women who provide family and household care and management—poor *Infrastructure* has an even more profound impact on women. Castells explains the gendering of *Infrastructure* and women’s roles within urban *Infrastructure* spaces in this way:

The subordinate role of women … enables the minimal maintenance of [the city’s] housing, transport and public facilities... because women guarantee unpaid transportation (movement of people and merchandise), because they repair their homes, because they make meals when there are no canteens, because they spend more time shopping around, because they look after other’s children when there are no nurseries and because they offer "free entertainment" to the producers when there is a social vacuum and an absence of cultural creativity... if women who "do nothing" ever stopped to do "only that", the whole urban structure as we know it would become completely incapable of maintaining its functions.

Likewise, Chopra and Zambelli note: “Lack of transportation technologies, water pumps, modern cooking fuels, electric appliances, and other tools that require energy access

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mean that women in poor households have to exert much more of their own energy.\textsuperscript{772} In other words, most urban spaces do not contain \textit{Infrastructure} that supports the care economy—instead most \textit{Infrastructure} is built in the service of the market economy, or in other word, in support of masculinized work. Without care \textit{Infrastructure}, women’s UCDW responsibilities generally increase along with long-term bodily depletion, requiring levels of exertion that may result in women experiencing higher levels of poor physical and mental health, and ultimately burnout.\textsuperscript{773} With this in mind, \textit{Gender-Climate-Security Linkages} related to how gendered \textit{Infrastructure} disadvantages women (generally), as well as how these disadvantages will be amplified due to climate change, must be explored.

First, it’s important to examine how energy-related \textit{Infrastructure} supports gendered power structures and often fails to alleviate the UCDW burdens women commonly experience. According to Jessel et al., a household is considered energy insecure when it cannot meet its energy needs, a scenario that results from inadequate or faulty \textit{Infrastructure}, service disruptions, or cost challenges.\textsuperscript{774} Gender is a social factor associated with energy insecurity, and gender disparities commonly result in negative health impacts. Women are frequently expected to make up energy shortfalls by using their own energy to trek to gather fuel or do the work that conventional energy might

otherwise do.775 As Rewald explains, lack of adequate energy Infrastructure generates several additional burdens for women: increases women’s drudgery in cooking, processing food, and collecting fuel/water; makes Education and learning more challenging for girls; imposes significant health impacts on women’s bodies through air pollution, spinal injuries from heavy loads, and burn risks from fires; increases risks of SGBV when collecting fuel; and reduces efficiency of Healthcare services due to lack of electricity and light.776 Climate change is expected to increase wear-and-tear on energy systems, which will intensify energy insecurities, especially for the poorest groups.777 All the ways in which energy Infrastructure failed to take the care economy into consideration at baseline will be amplified, magnifying women’s UCDW burdens and bodily depletion as a result—drudgery will intensify, learning will become even more challenging, air pollution will intensify, injury and burn risks will mount, SGBV rates may increase, and health systems will become even less safe (Linkage 3.1.7.A). For example, as climate disruption intensifies and energy sources become scarcer, women caretakers (especially single mothers) may have to take on financial burdens to access more expensive energy or rely on dirtier fuel for cooking and heating, which may increase rates of respiratory illness.778

775 Institute for Women’s Policy Research, “Gender, Urbanization and Democratic Governance,” 17.
776 Rebecca Rewald, “Energy and Women and Girls: Analyzing the Needs, Uses, and Impacts of Energy on Women and Girls in the Developing World” (Oxfam, 2017), 13–15, https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/media/files/energy-women-girls.pdf; That said, not all women experience gendered energy poverty. For example, in the Union of the Comoros where communities are built on matriarchal, matrilineal, and matrilocal values, homeowners are generally women, and therefore have more control over energy consumption choices. Interestingly, however, according to consultations by Castel, men and boys in this community often use their technical skills to make illegal connections to energy infrastructure, and 60% of those caught for such practices are women: Maria Beatriz Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure: Lessons from Electricity Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Projects,” Technical Paper, Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (Washington, DC: World Bank, January 2018), 78, https://doi.org/10.1596/29259.
777 Jessel, Sawyer, and Hernández, “Energy, Poverty, and Health in Climate Change.”
778 Jessel, Sawyer, and Hernández, “Energy, Poverty, and Health in Climate Change.”
Second, there are many ways in which gendered power structures constrain the design of and impede women’s use of shared transportation Infrastructure such as roads and mass transit. Crucially, Rivera finds that transport system policies are often biased toward high-cost systems such as roadways used by private vehicle owners (often men), and little attention is paid to bicycle and pedestrian systems (frequently women’s mode of transportation) (Linkage 3.1.7.B). These challenges are compounded for the elderly and those with disabilities.

Additionally, transportation systems are frequently planned around men’s labour needs, allowing for travel from rural and peri-urban regions to urban centres during peak hours. Kunieda and Gauthier note, however, that women often work during off-peak hours in non-central locations, requiring women to make multiple stops to achieve multi-purpose trips (a process called trip chaining). This results in commutes taking much more time for many women, constricting time available for work and UCDW (Linkage 3.1.7.C). Patel notes that, due to time and economic constraints, without access to private vehicles, and because of night-shift, service-based employment, women must often use public transit in the ‘urban nightscape’ which may be considered perilous.

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transit system. Monahan argues that modern surveillance systems (such as video) put women under observation through the monitoring of feminine spaces (shopping, public transport), and unlike physical security personnel, video surveillance does not detect verbal sexual harassment, but may itself be a subtle form of harassment.\footnote{Torin Monahan, “Dreams of Control at a Distance: Gender, Surveillance, and Social Control,” \textit{Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies} 9, no. 2 (April 2009): 288, \url{https://doi.org/10.1177/1532708608321481}.} [One might argue, however, that if video surveillance is used to prosecute those who physically harass women, it may have an overall benefit.] When not designed with consideration of their needs, women may avoid certain \textit{Infrastructure} spaces, such as using poorly-lit walkways or refusing to use public transit that lacks ramps or is poorly sanitized and maintained.\footnote{Kareem Buyana and Lwasa Shuaib, “Gender Responsiveness in Infrastructure Provision for African Cities: The Case of Kampala in Uganda,” \textit{Journal of Geography and Regional Planning} 7, no. 1 (February 28, 2014): 1–9, \url{https://doi.org/10.5897/JGRP2013.0424}.} When public transit systems are considered either unsafe or unsanitary, women may opt for other modes of transportation, such as walking or bicycling—options which often require even more time than public transit (Linkage 3.1.7.D). Importantly, in many conservative cultures, women are not even permitted to use public transit, leaving women very few options for movement. According to Chant, women are often rendered invisible or unapproachable and confined to separate transportation spaces due to, “symbolic dimensions surrounding the ‘forbidden’ and ‘permitted’ use of spaces governed by patriarchal power relations and norms of female propriety, which may require certain modes of dress, behaviour, and limitations on social interaction.”\footnote{Sylvia Chant, “Cities through a ‘Gender Lens’: A Golden ‘Urban Age’ for Women in the Global South?,” \textit{Environment and Urbanization} 25, no. 1 (2013): 9–29, \url{https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247813477809}.}

Lacking freedom to transit efficiently and safely to where they need to go, many women face often substantial obstacles to climate adaptation and recovery (Linkage 3.1.7.E).
According to McGuirk et al. and Ji et al., climate change is likely to cause significant damage to both public transit and roadways (their findings are summarized in Table 41; NB: these findings do not cover potential damage to underground transportation systems, which will face different but also significant climate damage).\textsuperscript{785}

Table 41. Climate Change Impacts for Surface Transportation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>Type of Climate Event</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Precipitation</td>
<td>Freezing/liquid precipitation changes, extreme rain</td>
<td>Flooding (road closures, re-routing); roadway washout; softened railroad or roadway beds (reduced structural integrity due to soil moisture); roadbed/bridge scouring; landslides/mudslides; rock slides; blocked roadways/railroads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Heat</td>
<td>Air and surface temperature increases,</td>
<td>Rail buckling (sun kinks); asphalt cracking/aging/oxidation/softening; migration of liquid asphalt; catenary wire sag; failed expansion joints; reduced speeds on rails; concrete pavement blow-ups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season Shift in Temperature</td>
<td>Changes in first occurrence of season, heat index changes</td>
<td>Increased freeze-thaw damage cycles; more landslides/mudslides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Level Rise / Storm Surge / Coastal Flooding</td>
<td>Tropical hurricanes, open-water sea ice, high surf, storm surge, abnormal high/low tides, hurricane winds</td>
<td>Road/railway closures; more frequent/intense flooding in low-lying areas; obstructions/blocked rails/roadways; sea-level rise causing infrastructure damage; erosion of road base/bridge supports/bridge scouring; land subsidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weather</th>
<th>Type of Climate Event</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>Precipitation decreases; extreme dry seasons</td>
<td>Wildfire risk increases; road/railway closure (wildfire risk and visibility loss); increased flooding in deforested areas; increased debris in stormwater management system; loss of pavement integrity due to ground shrinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highlights of climate change impacts on transportation systems as suggested by McGuirk et al. and Ji et al., summarized by the author.\textsuperscript{786}

The masculine designs and investments made to transportation systems create baseline challenges for many women looking to get to and from work and transporting between places for UCDW. Any additional transportation constraints caused by climate change, such as those described in Table 41, will only increase the time required and physical/economic burdens women face in engaging in paid and unpaid work and completing tasks.

Third, digital and mobile communications technologies are increasingly important for Human Security, as discussed in the Early Warning section of this study. Digital service access is crucial for women to save time, increase safety, gain independence, access banking services, run businesses, access health services, seek legal advice and support for SGBV survival, and stay in touch with family and friends, especially during crises such as climate breakdown.\textsuperscript{787} Critically, digital technologies are increasing in

\textsuperscript{786} McGuirk et al., “Weather and Climate Change Implications for Surface Transportation in the USA”; Ji et al., “The Impact of Climate Change on Urban Transportation Resilience to Compound Extreme Events,” 4.

\textsuperscript{787} Santosham and Lindsey, “Connected Women: Bridging the Gender Gap - Mobile Access and Usage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” 12; Peters, “Gender and Sustainable Urban Mobility. Official Thematic Study for the 2013 UN Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements”; “Mobile Phones and Women’s Empowerment in Maasai Communities: How Men Shape Women’s Social Relations and Access
importance within the political participation sphere; without adequate internet and mobile technology access, women’s civic engagement may be extremely limited, according to Dersnah.\textsuperscript{788} However, as with other Infrastructure elements, lack of access to digital technologies may reinforce gender inequalities, which is evident in the fact that women continue to lag behind men in their use.\textsuperscript{789} As discussed, women have lower mobile phone ownership and use rates due to cost and network quality/coverage, as well as due to cultural norms that perpetuate gendered cyber harassment and prevent women from becoming competent and confident in their use.\textsuperscript{790} Additionally, as Gomez finds, public internet and telephone access points such as libraries, cybercafes, and telecentres may not be welcoming to women due to cost, lack of women attendants, and gender norms.\textsuperscript{791} The fact that women are rarely consulted in the design of telecommunications Infrastructure systems likely further alienates them.\textsuperscript{792}

A recent McKinsey report on the impacts of climate change on Infrastructure suggests that, though the telecommunications industry is younger and perhaps more nimble than other types of Infrastructure, it will nonetheless experience damage and destruction due to a changing climate.\textsuperscript{793}


\textsuperscript{790} Santosham and Lindsey, “Connected Women: Bridging the Gender Gap - Mobile Access and Usage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” 42; Gomez, “Gender and Public Access Computing”; “Gender and ICT.”

\textsuperscript{791} Gomez, “Gender and Public Access Computing.”

\textsuperscript{792} Mallalieu, “Women, ICT and Emergency Telecommunications: Opportunities and Constraints.”

The risks climate change presents for telecom are primarily acute. High winds or trees can fell cell phone towers and telephone poles, blow down telephone lines and base stations, and knock microwave receivers out of alignment. Above-ground cabling is at more risk than buried lines of support and pole failures, damage from debris and falling objects (such as trees), and breakage from tension caused by extreme wind speeds. Flooding and hurricanes are the biggest threats… These threats interfere with the system just when it is needed most for disaster recovery. Communication blackouts can hamper disaster relief and the management of infrastructure repair efforts. Even systems that survive hazards can become congested and fail… Chronic impacts also exist, but this risk is typically lower. Higher heat can increase data centers’ cooling costs, which make up 40 percent of their total energy consumed. Rain can affect mobile signals (“rain shading”), but this is predominantly a problem above 10 gigahertz and so is rare.

As noted, the normative social structures that shape telecommunications and technology access and reinforce gender inequalities at baseline in numerous spheres of society are likely to be amplified due to these climate impacts, rendering women less equipped to adapt to and recover from climate crises (Linkage 3.1.7.F). On the other hand, having women’s input in the design of new technologies could significantly increase women’s digital use and climate adaptation, especially related to access to information and cash, engagement, learning, and participation, as well as perceptions of gender norms.794

Finally, while housing is of concern for both women and men, because of gendered norms around the care economy, women and girls tend to be responsible for maintaining and sustaining the home: cooking, cleaning, washing, looking after family members, and tending kitchen gardens, making the quality of housing crucial for women’s Human Security. Women frequently lack land and property ownership rights, which creates housing insecurity, especially for women-headed households and for

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women who identify as LBGTQI+. Urban centres, however, may give women greater freedom to own property, though frequently even when women’s rights are greater in cities, property is registered in the names of men. Women are also often barred from renting property due to issues of propriety; lack of employment and earnings, credit, and finance; and high costs. Furthermore, even though women often face barriers to home ownership and home rental, the household is typically the location of UCDW as well as income generation for women, and may be an important aspect of a meaningful pathway out of Poverty, according to Moser.

Crucially, gendered norms often dictate that the home is a woman’s domain, nevertheless patriarchal norms often result in a woman’s father, grandfather, husband/partner, or son dictating the nature of a woman’s relationship to her home. She may have little choice as to how to build, rebuild, or prepare the house due to climate impacts (Linkage 3.1.7.G). Yet according to Satterthwaite, some of the most serious climate risks within cities arise from poor quality housing. Poor housing is often built precariously on sites vulnerable to wildfires, (pluvial or riverine) flooding, sea level rise and storm surges, and landslides, with little to no protective Infrastructure, water

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797 Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Kiwala, “State of Women in Cities 2012-2013: Gender and the Prosperity of Cities,” 44.
Infrastructure, or shelter from extreme temperatures. As such, climate change is likely to severely damage or completely destroy the housing of millions around the globe, a fact that will increase the perilousness of the lives of most vulnerable to climate disasters.

When damaged by climate change, strained energy, transportation, telecommunications, and housing Infrastructure may intensify structural gender inequalities and diminish women’s societal capacity to adapt to a warming world, especially when care-related Infrastructure is lacking. As mentioned, both slow-onset climate change and acute climate-related disasters, including everything from heatwaves to floods to forest fires, will severely damage roads, telecommunications systems, public transit systems, housing, energy systems (including renewable systems), public buildings, concrete structures, and more. Importantly, by disrupting basic services in the economy, such as power and water supplies, sanitation, and transportation, climate change can strip communities of their livelihoods and assets, and disrupt their social fabric, exacerbating Poverty, and reinforcing inequalities. Additionally, public Infrastructure will come under increasing strain as more people migrate from rural to urban centres, yet according to Roy, current urban Infrastructure in most settings is

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801 Satterthwaite, “How Urban Societies Can Adapt to Resource Shortage and Climate Change.”
considered inadequate for the influx of climate migrants that are expected to move into
cities in the coming decades.\textsuperscript{804}

New \textit{Infrastructure} projects (transportation, telecommunications, energy, or
housing) developed due to increased demand from climate migrants or due to climate-
related damage done to systems may offer tremendous opportunities to benefit a
community’s most vulnerable, however if not zoned and constructed with equity in mind,
new systems may also reinforce existing inequalities. For instance, in many cases, new
\textit{Infrastructure} is incompatible with previous commercial, industrial, or residential uses of
land and resources, which requires thinking about how to equitably address the needs of
current and future residents of the land.\textsuperscript{805} In the case of energy \textit{Infrastructure} projects,
\textit{Infrastructure} development is often accompanied by natural ecosystem disruptions, such
as deforestation, river dams, farmland clearing, and increased water consumption,
according to ENERGIA (an organization focused on gender and sustainable energy).\textsuperscript{806}
These land use changes may have disproportionate impacts on women who rely on the
environment for their livelihoods, food, water, and shelter (Linkage 3.1.7.H).

Furthermore, as a World Bank report on women in \textit{Infrastructure} works notes,
women are more likely than not to be excluded from the design and implementation of

\textsuperscript{804} Sen Roy, \textit{Linking Gender to Climate Change Impacts in the Global South}, 7.
\textsuperscript{805} James H Williams, “International Best Practices for Assessing and Reducing the Environmental Impacts
of High-Voltage Transmission Lines” (Third Workshop on Power Grid Interconnection in Northeast Asia,
Vladivostok, Russia, 2003), 2, https://www.nautilus.org/wp-
(Ministry of Energy Mozambique, Embassy of Norway in Mozambique, Norad and ENERGIA
International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy, August 2012), 55,
https://www.energia.org/assets/2016/09/Mozambique-Manual/Mainstreaming-Gender-in-the-Energy-
Infrastructure projects (Linkage 3.1.7.1).807 Relevant gender issues in new Infrastructure projects include health, livelihood, and displacement concerns, as well as consideration of Kabeer’s horizontal inequalities (gender, caste, and race) and vertical inequalities (income/wealth hierarchies).808 Women, who are often responsible for subsistence farming, gathering food, collecting water and fuel, laundering clothes, and cooking meals, experience greater disruptions due to land use changes because of the increased time and effort required to carry out these tasks.809 Furthermore, when water sources are polluted because of Infrastructure projects (by energy production, for instance), those using water for domestic purposes (primarily women) may experience higher rates of illness.810

When Infrastructure projects require the displacement of people, this also has gender implications. Since most land titles are registered in the name of male family members, women are often disproportionately impacted by land use changes, such as those for new Infrastructure.811 For instance, in countries where informal (rather than formal) land tenure and use of common property for kitchen gardens is the norm, marginalized groups (the poor, women, indigenous people, and migrants) are considered ‘squatters’ and evicted, often without notice, to make way for new projects.812 Consultation with women is therefore important for bolstering their climate security, however this may prove challenging since, in many cases, a certain level of literacy and

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808 Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 190.
809 Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 39.
812 Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 45.
Education may be required to participate in community decisions about Infrastructure-related land use changes and project environmental monitoring. According to Clancy, in communities where gender norms prevent women from accessing Education, women are often less involved in Infrastructure negotiations and consultations.\(^\text{813}\)

Finally, as public Infrastructure systems are rebuilt following climate deterioration, gender must be considered in employment as well since women are frequently excluded from job growth in Infrastructure development (Linkage 3.1.7.J).\(^\text{814}\) Men often benefit from new job creation as new Infrastructure is built; however new Infrastructure projects may also generate an influx of men into communities.\(^\text{815}\) Clancy argues that when Infrastructure projects increase the number of men in communities, it can lead to gender imbalances and an increase in marginalization of women, particularly in relation to decisions made about development efforts.\(^\text{816}\) These shifts in gender norms and reduction of women’s status has been shown to increase rates of SGBV (Linkage 3.1.7.K) (which may suggest the surplus males-state-based conflict mechanism is also at work).\(^\text{817}\)

A habitable and inclusive city, according to FPEcol scholar Agostino, is one that includes, “rights to adequate housing, water and sanitation, energy, information and communication, mobility, public spaces and services, … and infrastructure for all.”\(^\text{818}\) The

\(^{815}\) Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 55.
\(^{817}\) Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 55.
\(^{818}\) Ana Agostino, “Towards an Urban Agenda from a Feminist Political Ecology and Care Perspective,” in Feminist Political Ecology and the Economics of Care: In Search of Economic Alternatives, ed. Christine
above discussion on GCS-Factor Infrastructure expanded conceptions of the impacts of climate-damaged Infrastructure to include how destruction of telecommunications, energy, transportation, and housing Infrastructure is likely to entrench gendered power imbalances. Putting this in the context of Forsberg and Olsson’s research, it is likely that climate-impacted Infrastructure will limit women’s empowerment and lower their resources and networks, thereby diminishing their societal capacity and capability of contributing to community strength.

While poor Infrastructure and lack of care Infrastructure increases climate Susceptibility and lowers Human Security, MacGregor et al. suggest that one of the most gender-transformative ways to redistribute care work is in part through the development of better-designed Infrastructure:

Physical infrastructure and labor-saving technologies that are compatible with the needs and practices of users and that facilitate daily care work … can make a positive difference and are essential for meeting the challenges presented by climate change impacts when they succeed at reducing the time demands and drudgery of care work.819

For instance, in a meta-study of the effects of electrification, improved access to electricity was shown to increase educational enrolment by 7% (with a greater median impact for girls), increase women’s labour market participation by 15%, and increase household incomes by 30%.820 Indeed, Adatti and Catta recommend that care-related Infrastructure be universally accessible (rural or urban, regardless of class, race, or

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gender), affordable, and designed in consultation with local people to meet their needs. Feminist scholar Listo argues that there are three problematic myths in the energy-gender nexus literature which are helpful in properly situating gender in the Infrastructure-climate security nexus: (1) energy poor women are vulnerable, helpless, virtuous, and hardworking; (2) energy poverty can be solved through technical solutions (stoves, lights), thereby empowering women; and (3) gender inequality is a result of energy poverty and can be solved through energy interventions. These arguments, suggests Listo, co-opt feminist principles and instrumentalize them to support development agendas rather than addressing the underlying power imbalances between the genders.

A more beneficial approach to gender transformative Infrastructure development may be the gender and development (GAD) discourse, which emphasizes power structures, focusing on the problem of male privilege and how to transform dominant power structures. Infrastructure design and implementation could therefore be used to transform structural inequalities, thereby contributing to the project of gender equality and climate security.

3.1.7.2. Infrastructure and National/International Security

A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) report on climate change and conflict notes:

The contextual changes impacting agriculture, water, health, and infrastructure will create new ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ These could either

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824 Johnsson-Latham, “Power, Privilege and Gender,” 43.
(1) exacerbate existing social tensions related to the environment and natural resources, or (2) create new tensions.825

Looking at the range of pathways along which National/International Security risks may develop due to climate-impacted Infrastructure, it is possible to see potential collisions in all four, as well as the SD-urban surplus males-unemployment Gender Equality-Security Mechanism.826

There are several routes by which climate-ravaged Infrastructure may contribute to the crime/violence/extremism pathway. For instance, public funds may be captured by malign actors and used for their own purposes or redistributed to partners to garner support (Linkage 3.1.7.L). For example, in a report by La Tribuna it was shown that Honduran drug traffickers used shell companies established to carry out state-paid Infrastructure repair projects to launder their illicit drug funds.827 Similarly, a report on Latin America and the Caribbean by the Climate Security Expert Network and adelphi notes that in urban settings with dense populations, loss of basic services such as energy can increase the likelihood of criminality following a climate shock (Linkage 3.1.7.M).828

826 For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4). The Gender-Climate-Security Linkages may also be categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
In section 1.2.3.1, the well-documented gender gap in violent crime rates was discussed, though women’s criminal activity rates have been on the rise, especially related to property crimes. However, no research tracks gendered trends in property and violent crimes related to Infrastructure and climate shocks. Furthermore, should grievances between societal groups related to unfair allocation of public Infrastructure resources take the form of organized crime, men may play outsized roles in leadership and violence according to a wide literature that also shows women are typically sidelined to auxiliary roles in gangs and organized crime. Given who and how climate-impacted Infrastructure breakdown is likely to impact, it may be useful to study whether motivations of increase survival or avoid abuse may drive women to engage in more criminality, or whether men may be motivated by pull of networks or exposure to violence/repression (research is lacking).

There are several ways in which risks of both anti-state grievance and grievances between societal groups may increase when allocation of climate-related mitigation and adaptation resources for Infrastructure projects creates or exacerbates inequalities. Research in Sub-Saharan Africa by Detges finds that civil conflict between rebel groups and governments is more likely in regions with poorly developed road Infrastructure (Linkage 3.1.7.N). Moreover, Raleigh posits that political violence may result when the development of Infrastructure, such as roads or sanitation systems, is subject to a high

network.org/sites/climate-security-expert


830 Reiling and Brady, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 25.

831 Detges, “Local Conditions of Drought-Related Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.”

Though no research on motivations exists, research may be useful for understanding if cases of weak government performance on \textit{Infrastructure}, could trigger \textit{avoid abuse} (for women) and \textit{pull of networks} and \textit{exposure to violence/repression} (for men) as motivations for joining anti-state or non-state groups. Another hypothesis is whether \textit{fundamentalist ideology} motivations may increase the likelihood that women and men will respond with violence to government favouritism. However, research could also be conducted on how a gender-relational approach to mitigation and recovery from such damage can prevent conflict and violence.\footnote{Judy El-Bushra, “Gender in Peacebuilding: Taking Stock,” June 30, 2012, 19, https://www.international-alert.org/publications/gender-peacebuilding-taking-stock/.}

Additional studies are available on the \textit{anti-state grievances} pathway, however, especially related to the economics of \textit{Infrastructure} projects. The World Bank has noted that when new \textit{Infrastructure} projects result in both new jobs for some people as well as livelihood losses or cultural changes for others, those who lose may feel political unrest and violence are the only ways to express their dissatisfaction.\footnote{Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 63.} Similarly, a study by Mehta suggests that when land use changes result in the loss of income, men are often forced to migrate to urban centres to look for new sources of income (notably, this type of demographic change can thrust women into household-head roles which may offer both benefits and additional burdens, as will be discussed in greater depth in the \textit{State}
Fragility section of this study). These shifts in men’s employment may generate a surplus of unemployed males in urban centres, which could create opportunities for armed group recruitment in state-based conflicts—this suggests the SD-urban surplus males-unemployment Gender Equality-Security Mechanism may be at work (Linkage 3.1.7.P), though research is needed on possible gendered trends in protests to align with findings outlined in section 1.2.3.3. Nevertheless, some development organizations have designed Infrastructure investment as compensation schemes; if designed with gender in mind, climate-related Infrastructure projects could benefit both women and men and prevent out-migration.

Finally, once Infrastructure development is complete, tensions may increase after cash incentives are gone, in particular where capacity building measures have concluded and where there is the presence of former militants looking for ways to avoid re-engaging with armed groups. Studying whether recruitment into rebel groups may be easier using motivations like pull of networks (primarily men) would be useful. What’s more, as previously noted in section 1.2.3.3, gender is a mediating factor that may increase the likelihood of violence caused by grievances about climate-induced damage to Infrastructure because of the greater likelihood that men engage in violent civic action relative to women.

836 Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 44.
There is a burgeoning literature on *interstate tensions* related to climate-caused *Infrastructure* damage or development. For instance, Akter has studied the intersection of hydro-politics, ecological integrity, and interstate governance required to manage hydro-energy *Infrastructure* in ways that avoid conflict over the Ganges–Brahmaputra Meghna.\(^\text{839}\) Should such conflicts erupt, the *increase survival* motivation (women) and perhaps *pull of networks* or *personal security* (men) may be the most prominent, though research on this topic is required. Gökçe et al. explore how energy *interdependence* (such as through trade relations which require *Infrastructure* development) between states may have a pacifying effect between states that might otherwise be in conflict.\(^\text{840}\) Similarly, the USAID report on climate and conflict (previously mentioned) suggests that climate adaptation initiatives related to *Infrastructure* can be opportunities for promoting peace and dispute resolution, and that,

> there are many more examples of cooperation over shared water resources than there are instances of violent conflict. … At the local level, specific projects – from flood protection infrastructure to early warning systems – can bring adversaries together through collaborative, transparent, and participatory implementation processes.\(^\text{841}\)

No studies as yet, however, explore what role gender might play in conflict or peacebuilding between nations looking to develop *Infrastructure* projects on shared resources.

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\(^{841}\) Reiling and Brady, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 17.
3.1.7.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Infrastructure**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *Infrastructure* can be found in Figure 21. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 61 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Figure 21. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Infrastructure.](image)

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Infrastructure.*
3.2. Institutional (In)stability

In the HCSS Climate Security framework, institutional conditions consider the regulatory norms, instruments, and bodies that govern society, and in particular the ways in which policy is set and implemented related to sustainable development, DRR strategies, and climate adaptation.\textsuperscript{842} The effective policy integration at all levels of the government is a necessary component to managing climate-related prevention and adaptation, as well as disaster relief and recovery, without adding to or creating new tensions: “Government legitimacy, accountability, and transparency are important drivers of the receptivity and success of government policies. Moreover, they reduce the risk of political fragmentation and tensions.”\textsuperscript{843} Those governments that are unable to meet the challenges of climate change are more likely to see public support and legitimacy erode, which will increase the likelihood of suffering, losses, severe damage, and other adverse effects. Two GCS-Factors are covered by GCS-Phase \textit{Institutional (In)stability}: Corruption and State Fragility.

\textsuperscript{842} Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 96.
\textsuperscript{843} Remmits, Dick, and Rademaker, “Climate Security Assessment,” 96.
3.2.1. Corruption

Table 42. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor Corruption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach:</th>
<th>Measured by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which examines corruption of a country according to experts and businesspeople. 844</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPEcon/FPEcol Approach:</td>
<td>A corruption factor that takes opinions only from elite experts and businesspeople will lack a full view of a system since structural barriers prevent many, especially women, from accessing such spaces. Alternatively, there are two ways to examine gender in terms of corruption and climate change. The first is from the bottom-up, with an analysis of how corruption impacts public service delivery to the poorest in many systems (often made up primarily of women). From this perspective, individual women and women-headed households may be more profoundly impacted by higher levels of corruption in a warming world. The second gender lens is more top-down since it addresses the role women can play in reducing rates of corruption through government leadership. The presence of women in spaces of power has been shown to have an ameliorating effect on corruption. While there is a rich literature justifying the belief that women are less likely to be corrupt or corruptible based on the theory that women are more nurturing, or that women’s caretaking roles make them averse to corruption, this essentialist view has been challenged by feminists. 845 Instead, two feminist arguments suggest that rather than women being inherently less corrupt/corruptible, patriarchal structures are likely at work. The first theory by feminist political scientists Johnson et al. suggests that gendered ideology is often used to justify corruption, leading to gendered institutionalized corruption that paves the way for continued male dominance. 846 They suggest that a tension exists between a prerogative regime which consists of ‘shadowy arbitrary arrangements’ that challenge the constitutional state. In such systems, the informal institutions and practices of the prerogative regime, based on chummy networks and neoliberal/gender ideologies, privileged male elites are permitted to transgress.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

proclaimed values of accountability, transparency, and equality. Johnson and colleagues suggest institutionalized corruption is responsible for what they call the ‘gender equality policy, weak practice’ paradox, in which countries like Iceland (with an extremely high rating on the UN’s Gender Inequality Index) can fare well in terms of constitutional policies that promote gender equality, while also having a high degree of corruption (as they did following the 2008 financial crisis). Furthermore, they posit that globalization has shifted the centre of power from government elsewhere so that typically male-dominated elite institutions within the new global finance economy maintain their power despite increased gender equality in many advanced governments.\textsuperscript{847} Hence, women may be permitted to serve within such systems, but are not permitted into the chummy networks, and therefore do not actually have any influence over rates of corruption.

Similar, but with some important differences, is the second theory which comes from Blanes et al. who propose the following alternative mechanisms that may explain the correlation between an individual’s gender and their propensity to engage in corruption.\textsuperscript{848}

- Within a political democracy, policies may encourage women’s increased participation in government while also discouraging corruption.\textsuperscript{849}
- Women are typically excluded from the clientelistic, old-boys social and political networks through which corruption flows.\textsuperscript{850}
- Corrupt acts entail greater risk to women since such acts produce a stronger backlash against women due to social expectations that hold women to higher standards than men, and hence they cannot afford to be corrupt.\textsuperscript{851}

A combination of these factors may be at work to explain why a higher percentage of women in government may lower corruption levels. Understanding corruption’s role in climate security—both from the bottom-up and the top-down—therefore must take gendered structures into consideration, which the following discussion will do.

\textit{Brief comparison of dominant and feminist definitions of Corruption.}

\textsuperscript{847} Johnson, Einarsdóttir, and Pétursdóttir, “A Feminist Theory of Corruption.”
Table 43. Short Overview of the Corruption Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.A.</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption may lead to elites siphoning government funds out of public coffers ➔ climate change may prompt governments to adjust public service budgets ➔ public services may be reduced while corrupt practices remain in place ➔ women are likely to be more profoundly impacted by loss of public services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.B.</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change may reduce funds available for government programs and/or individual government officials’ income ➔ bribery and extortion may become more commonplace ➔ gender norms that erect more barriers to women accessing government services may offer additional points for increased corruption ➔ women face the unique extortion practice of sexual exploitation requests ➔ women may lack the education to understand the criminality of corrupt practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.C.</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are generally perceived as less corrupt and more transparent than men ➔ gender norms may prevent women from meaningful participation in government and as policymakers ➔ fewer women in government may increase the public’s perception that the government is corrupt ➔ political instability may increase, especially following a climate or conflict crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.D.</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of honesty within peacebuilding spaces is crucial to durable peace ➔ women are generally perceived as acting more transparently and less corruptly ➔ increasing women’s representation on peacebuilding tends to increase the chances that a peace agreement will last longer and be more robust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^852] Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict’, ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security&lt;sup&gt;853&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.E. Men tend to pay more in bribes than women → climate-induced government cutbacks may increase corruption and result in curtailment of men’s employment or increases in bribes required → increased unemployment among men in urban and rural spaces may make recruitment of men into armed or rebel groups easier</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism // Anti-state grievance</td>
<td>[Requires research] SD-surplus males-unemployment&lt;sup&gt;♀&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.F. Climate change may spark or worsen water scarcity → tensions may exist in how governments manage it → government corruption may fuel increases in criminal gang activity</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Avoid abuse (typically women)&lt;sup&gt;♀&lt;/sup&gt; and exposure to violence/repression (typically men)&lt;sup&gt;♂&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.G. Climate change may escalate tensions between groups regarding resource management → corruption in government/court systems (especially early in disagreements) may increase likelihood of violence developing</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism // Anti-state grievances</td>
<td>[Requires research] Avoid abuse (typically women)&lt;sup&gt;♀&lt;/sup&gt; and pull of networks or revenge (typically men)&lt;sup&gt;♂&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.H. Climate change may change weather patterns that disrupt environmental resources → political corruption may disrupt economic systems connected to the environmental resources → may increase recruitment of young men into rebel groups</td>
<td>Anti-state grievances</td>
<td>[Requires research] Pull of networks (typically men)&lt;sup&gt;♂&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>853</sup> For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
3.2.1.1. **Corruption and Human Security**

*Corruption* impacts the *Human Security* of women and men differently. Analyzing GCS-Factor *Corruption* and its gendered impacts within a climate-warming world requires focusing on the individual voices explaining how their lives have been affected by *Corruption* rather than relying solely on the opinions of elites on state-level conditions. As such, the *societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* will be the primary focus of the ensuing discussion, with particular attention paid to the following *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages*: first, the bottom-up gendered ways in which *Corruption* disrupts the provision and costs associated with public benefit services (*Healthcare*, piped water, electricity, etc.); and second, the top-down methods for achieving gender balance in government may reduce *Corruption*, and therefore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security(^{553})</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.1. Development programs may be beset by corruption (especially where there is weak rule of law) (\rightarrow) may create tensions between groups (\rightarrow) the addition of climate-fueled migration may amplify tensions (\rightarrow) the likelihood of violence may increase</td>
<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] <em>Fundamental ideology</em> (either women or men)(^\varnothing) and <em>pull of networks</em> (typically men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage 3.2.1.J. Resource-rich industry often suffers from corruption (\rightarrow) climate change may intensify competition for resources (\rightarrow) tensions between groups may exist (including across borders)</td>
<td>Interstate tensions</td>
<td>[Requires research] <em>Increase survival</em> (typically women)(^\varnothing) or <em>personal security</em> (typically men)(^\varnothing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages*, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. *National/International Security Linkages* with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with \(^\S\); those with no research with \(^\varnothing\). For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2.
stabilizing system’s against climate hazards in order to avoid disasters or conflict.\footnote{Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).} The role of the Gender Equality-Security Mechanism known as SD-surplus males-unemployment will also be briefly discussed.

As perhaps humanity’s greatest transnational challenge, climate change prevention, mitigation, and recovery initiatives are attracting vast sums of money, and as such are at high risk for Corruption. According to an Anti-Corruption Resource Centre report, 41.9% of all climate finance is currently going to the riskiest states in the world in terms of Corruption.\footnote{Michael Nest, Saul Mullard, and Cecilie Wathne, “Corruption and Climate Finance,” Brief (Chr. Michelsen Institute; U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2020), https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-climate-finance.} Likewise, climate-related disasters attract significant investments as well, often under time-pressures that limit oversight and scrutiny. Given the urgent nature of natural disasters, and the sudden and massive influx of donations from humanitarian organizations, the possibilities for Corruption and mismanagement are multiplied in the aftermath.\footnote{Gretta Fenner and Mirella Mahlstein, “Chapter 5: Curbing the Risks of and Opportunities for Corruption in Natural Disaster Situations,” in International Law and Standards Applicable in Natural Disaster Situations, ed. Erica Harper (IDLO, 2009), 243, https://baselgovernance.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/Corruption%20in%20natural%20disaster%20situations.pdf.} Without a gender lens, the Corruption of such funds may generate projects that amplify gender inequalities, keeping women from seeing the benefits of climate-related initiatives.

Additionally, looking at the bottom-up ways in which Corruption impacts those most vulnerable to climate change, it’s important to see how Corruption gives greater power to those who possess money and influence, and is a way for those currently in power to maintain that power. Corrupt practices are common in the provision of public
services such as for *Education, Healthcare, WASH* services, electricity, and land/property rights, as well as in environmental sectors, such as energy, water, natural resources, and land access. Hossain et al. note that, at baseline, those at the bottom (typically women in patriarchal or neoliberal systems) have less power, and are more reliant on public services; consequently, from a bottom-up perspective, *Corruption* frequently has a disproportionate impact on women’s security.

One way that climate-related *Corruption* has a differential gendered impact is in how governments handle public service provision, both in slow-onset and acute climate crises (Linkage 3.2.1.A). As discussed numerous times throughout this study, climate change is expected to constrain government budgets, which may result in the introduction of austerity measures. Any lowering of public benefit spending (resulting in fewer available services) or higher public service costs may cause those who rely on the public services to bear the costs (typically women more than men) due to lost support or rising out-of-pocket expenses. For instance, a WHO study in South India found that women had to pay bribes to have a doctor present during delivery or to see their babies after giving birth. Women also frequently experience extortion when looking to obtain official documentation (proof of identity, marriage, death, or residence), seeking employment, or trying to gain access to financial services for running their businesses.

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859 Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, “Corruption, Accountability and Gender: Understanding the Connections.”

860 As found in: Blanes et al., “Mapping Controversies Gender and Corruption April 2016,” 53.
Bottlenecks in trying to obtain documentation further curtail women’s *Human Security* by slowing down many formal processes, and potentially barring women from participating in processes like voting. Women also face the unique corrupt practice of sexual extortion, which often goes unreported because of cultural norms around such practices. As with other types of *Corruption*, climate breakdown may invite higher levels of bribery and extortion as individuals and governments attempt to make up financial shortfalls. If corrupt practices become an intrinsic part of life, women with low *Education* levels or without connections to civil society are often unaware of the criminality of *Corruption* and therefore may be ill equipped to oppose it.

It is important to note that men may face similar bribery requirements to overcome barriers to government spaces, though men typically have a greater understanding of how to engage with corrupt systems, and more resources to deal with extortion. Nevertheless, data indicate that men often pay more bribes than women, and may experience greater economic disadvantages due to corrupt systems (Linkage 3.2.1.E). Research could be done to test whether the *SD-surplus males-unemployment* mechanisms is at work and whether it increases susceptibility to recruitment into armed or rebel groups.

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864 Purushothaman et al., “Seeing Beyond the State - Grassroots Womens Perspectives on Corruption and Anti-Corruption,” 35.
Examining how women’s meaningful participation in government impacts Corruption is another way to measure human and climate insecurity. As discussed in section 3.1.6.1, numerous studies demonstrate that due to gender norms, women often lack the experience, Education, and access to serve in government. However, when such barriers are removed and women make up a higher share of policymakers, rates of government Corruption tend to decrease, while willingness to compromise and perceived government honesty increase. In post-conflict areas in particular, women are often perceived as acting more transparently and making higher investments in public goods compared to men. As previously noted in the introduction to this GCS-Factor, it’s unlikely that women are inherently less corrupt; however, for the purposes of analyzing how Corruption may influence political stability, given the role perceived Corruption plays in public confidence in government (or lack thereof), whether or not women are less corrupt is irrelevant. Instead, what matters is whether audiences perceive women

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868 Laura McGrew, Kate Frieson, and Sambath Chan, “Good Governance from the Ground Up: Women’s Roles in Post-Conflict Cambodia,” Women Waging Peace Policy Commission (Hunt Alternatives Fund; The Policy Commission, March 2004), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Laura-Mcgrew/publication/237288787_Good_Governance_from_the_Ground_Up_Womens_Roles_in_Post-Conflict_Cambodia/links/5f636721458515b7cf39c44e/Good-Governance-from-the-Ground-Up-Womens-Roles-in-Post-Conflict-Cambodia.pdf?_sg%5B0%5D=7Bxmv_xvHalZpyCGduvB4hhzpwrQ4RjybiKH1KmKpg3X88gPaa2i_AcVATP6eZTSjqQyrQXx9TVxgaWSICQ.itbB1-Qjti5dcVXM-u168-9RedGC9ymaX10bCgBCFhxJyfR9FB9kw-LQOp11KyV4dAcrxvUcG8_6FdrALUj3CA&_sg%5B1%5D=M94PCZ3PP3yKhELf3p_j6E68TOqRoo12tFfC2rOu2Kkfrb1773gs6lStN_QizoqAyWWbkKgHOflp_HGqauAYH0oUU53WYctnoi9rOppMj.itbB1-Qjiti5dcVXM-u168-9RedGC9ymaX10bCgBCFhxJyfR9FB9kw-LQOp11KyV4dAcrxvUcG8_6FdrALUj3CA&_iepl=. 
leaders as more committed to honesty and trustworthiness. Greater trust in government can ensure political stability and may be an important aspect of avoiding catastrophic violence when climate shocks strike. As such, increasing women’s representation has high potential for benefiting the delivery of public services and maintaining stability following climate crises (Linkage 3.2.1.C).

Beyond the delivery of public services, there is the possibility that achieving gender balance in government or in peacebuilding spaces may also reduce the perception of Corruption and therefore make peace agreements more robust (Linkage 3.2.1.D). In a study of the link between women’s representation and the durability of post-conflict peace, Shair-Rosenfield and Wood find strong empirical support for a correlation between women’s representation rates in government and prolonged peace, due in part to a perception that women are more accountable/less corrupt.869

In sum, there are two important reasons for using a gender lens to examine how Corruption impacts institutional stability and climate Susceptibility: (1) Corruption impacts individual women more profoundly than men due to the ways in which Corruption uses gender norms to take advantage of the most vulnerable from the bottom-up, thereby limiting women’s Human Security; and (2) the influence of women’s meaningful involvement in government may have an ameliorating influence on the perception of government Corruption from the top down, thereby increasing overall political stability. Consequently, a gender transformative approach to reducing the ways in which Corruption threaten Human Security would require examining which patriarchal

mechanism(s) influence both bottom-up and top-down (those of Johnson et al. or Blanes et al.) impacts.

3.2.1.2. Corruption and National/International Security

Though still nascent, there is growing interest in exploring the connections between climate change, GCS-Factor Corruption, and National/International Security. This short discussion will explore a handful of studies examining Corruption’s role in anti-state grievances and grievances between societal groups, and perhaps interstate tensions as well.\(^{870}\)

On crime/violence/extremism, there are few studies to offer. However, in the context of the West Bank where there is climate-fueled water scarcity and the need to find equitable ways to distribute and conserve water resources, Messer talks of the intersection of Palestinian Authority Corruption and Israeli government neglect and the resultant failure to regulate criminal elements (Linkage 3.2.1.F).\(^{871}\) In such cases, research to test what might motivate women or men to participate in organized crime (for instance, avoid abuse for women or exposure to violence/repression for men) could be done, and to study whether there are gendered trends in violent crimes as noted in section 1.2.3.2.

Anti-state grievances and grievances between societal groups may also erupt because of corrupt practices. In an analysis of eleven resource-based case studies of disputes that escalated into violence in the Sahel, Seter et al. find Corruption within

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\(^{870}\) For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).

public institutions (such as courts) to be a critical factor in violence escalation, particularly when it hinders conflict resolution early on (Linkage 3.2.1.G).\footnote{Hanne Seter, Ole Magnus Theisen, and Janpeter Schilling, “All about Water and Land? Resource-Related Conflicts in East and West Africa Revisited,” \textit{GeoJournal} 83, no. 1 (February 2018): 169–87, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-016-9762-7.} Similarly, political ecologist Messer has suggested that the combination of low rainfall and political \textit{Corruption} decimated pastoral occupations in Mali, driving young Tuareg men into rebel groups (Linkage 3.2.1.H).\footnote{Messer, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict;,” 66.} Messer notes that social and economic development programs in Bangladesh by organizations like BRAC and Grameen Bank have been beset by \textit{Corruption}, which, when combined with weak rule of law in a region with climate-fueled migration, have been associated with outbreaks of violence (Linkage 3.2.1.I).\footnote{Messer, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict;,” 84.}

[Noting that, as discussed in section 1.2.3.3, men are more likely to be involved in violent protests; women may be more involved in low-risk anti-state demonstrations, however no specific research to connect gendered demonstration trends within GCS-Factor \textit{Infrastructure} are available]. It may be useful to study which motivations (for instance, \textit{avoid abuse} (typically women) and \textit{pull of networks} or \textit{revenge} (typically men), and even \textit{fundamental ideology} (both women and men) if ethnic, religious, or racial tensions are involved) for participation in \textit{anti-state grievances} due to \textit{Corruption} combined with climate-caused tensions (no research is available).

\textit{Interstate tensions} are certainly possible due to corrupt practices. In a case study on Indonesia, Blondel notes the complex relationship between the forest sector, climate change, and conflict: “Addressing the adverse characteristics of Indonesia’s forests sector, in particular the \textit{Corruption} within this dynamic, would underpin peace and
security by both mitigating climate change and cutting links between timber and insecurity” (Linkage 3.2.1.1). Future research might hypothesize whether increase survival (typically women) or personal security (typically men) motivations are involved in violence in this regard.

3.2.1.3. Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and Corruption

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to Corruption can be found in Figure 22. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 62 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

Figure 22. Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in Corruption.

A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor Corruption.

3.2.2. State Fragility

Table 44. Comparison of Dominant versus FPEcon/FPEcol Approaches to GCS-Factor State Fragility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Approach: At the state level, this is a measure of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• An inability to provide reasonable public services;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Fragile States Index (FSI) lists various indicators to measure fragility; the following are some covered in the section to follow: ability to collect taxes or draw on citizen support; involuntary dislocation of the population; sharp economic decline; and demographic pressures (any of which can combine with environmental breakdown, another indicator that may increase fragility). In addition to these indicators, the FSI also includes group-based inequality/discrimination/persecution; brain drain; among others, but these are either covered in other sections of this study, or lack sufficient literature to explore.

| FPEcon/FPEcol Approach: Traditional approaches to understanding state fragility tend to focus on outcome-based indicators (noted above), rather than looking at the root causes of state fragility. Such a focus runs the risk of overly emphasizing national security at the expense of the state’s people, the social welfare of which is foundational to state security. Furthermore, if not designed with gender transformation in mind, solutions to state-level fragility (such as improving delivery of basic services without addressing UCDW burdens related to water and energy) are likely to reinforce gendered structures that disadvantage those less privileged, particularly women. A feminist approach to state fragility, on the other hand, centres gender inequality (and other inequalities) in the discussion, thereby revealing the gender inequities that have far-reaching implications for a system’s legal, social, economic, and political stability. True argues that gendered structures that differentiate issues as masculine and feminine, public and private play an important role in how states define their |

877 “What Does State Fragility Mean?”
identities and their diplomatic systems. By rendering some identities (typically men) as valued and legitimate, gendered structures necessarily sideline other identities to obscurity (typically women, but also people of minority ethnicities and genders, and people with disabilities). When national and international structures fail to reflect the diversity of the people within their systems, excluded groups will inevitably refuse to ascribe legitimacy to those structures. As such, achieving economic and social justice for marginalized groups would not only provide greater legitimacy for international order, it would generate the constituency to activate and reinforce shared international values and norms. In that respect, the realization of justice for half the world’s population—as part of global movements for women’s rights to bodily integrity, to equal participation in decision-making, to equal economic opportunity, and to recognition of domestic and care labor—is essential to the prospects for international peace and security.

Importantly, True argues that because of the very foundational ways in which patriarchal structures support state identities and interstate relations, “patriarchal unraveling may take unusual and violent forms, threatening the stability of international order and the values upon which it has rested.” As such, due to the ground-shifting nature of dismantling patriarchal foundations on which many societies are built, though reversing gender inequalities may lower state fragility in the long term, in the short-term transition to a more gender-just society, a state may become more fragile (and women may experience greater backlash) before stability sets in.

For the purposes of this proposed framework, root causes of state fragility, including population dislocation, state legitimacy, as well as gender inequalities in the politics and law, will be explored in depth to understand what role they play in gendered climate insecurity. Other sections of this study have explored the provision of public services, needs of the care economy, and favouritism/persecution, so these topics will not be covered in this section on GCS-Factor *State Fragility*.

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881 True, “Bringing Back Gendered States.”

882 True, “Bringing Back Gendered States.”
Table 45. Short Overview of the State Fragility Gender-Climate-Security Linkages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security&lt;sup&gt;883&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.A.</strong> Climate disasters are likely to prompt many to relocate as a form of adaptation → host states may view migrants as threats → states may use hypermasculine language (‘migrant threat’) and approaches (‘securitizing borders) to address the challenge → renders humans as a menace and shifts responsibility to vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.B.</strong> Gendered norms and structures bar women from accessing/owning spaces related to education, healthcare, mobility, ability to work, bodily health, ability to network, private property → women may lack the capabilities to migrate or choose to adapt in place if they so choose → women’s susceptibility to climate hazards may intensify over successive disasters → women’s climate insecurity may contribute to state fragility</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.C.</strong> At the household level, gender norms around work typically restrict women to UCDW responsibilities and often exclude women from decisions about asset control → women are often excluded from migration decisions → lack of information, preparation time, and choice may shrink women’s relocation choices and lower mental/physical health → women are less able to contribute to state stability</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.D.</strong> At the macro level, women are often excluded from government leadership and community decision-making structures → climate change may require entire communities to relocate → women are frequently not consulted regarding these decisions → lack of information, preparation time, and choice may shrink women’s relocation choices and lower mental/physical health → women are less able to contribute to state stability</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.E.</strong> Slow-onset and acute climate breakdown may trigger population relocations → along the journey, women (and children) may face higher SGBV risks → physical</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>883</sup> *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including societal capacity, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Security(^{883})</th>
<th>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and psychological trauma from assault may increase climate susceptibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.F.</strong> Climate disaster may cause sudden relocations → individuals may experience psychological trauma from climate disaster, the move, breaking of social ties, the responsibility to care for family → women may experience higher rates of PTSD → may increase susceptibility to climate impacts and decrease state stability</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.G.</strong> Climate change may induce women-headed households to relocate → women are often refused aid at their destinations without a male head of household</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.H.</strong> Climate migration often leads people to IDP camps → camp systems are often maintained in part by residents → women are often tasked with additional camp maintenance/caretaking duties on top of their existing UCDW tasks → women’s bodily depletion and adaptation may be diminished</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.I.</strong> Many climate migrants end their journeys in IDP camps → often gender-separate toilets/showers are unavailable → men are more frequently given security access to many spaces that women are not → women face increased risks of SGBV → women’s climate susceptibility may increase</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.J.</strong> Climate migrants often land in IDP camps → decisions about camp management are often made by community members → women are typically barred from taking leadership positions on such committees → women are unable to advocate for their needs → women’s climate susceptibility may increase</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.K.</strong> Men may migrate from villages into urban centres to seek better employment opportunities → men may not achieve the socioeconomic mobility they expected → men may face frustration that lowers their ability to adapt to and recover from crises</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.L.</strong> Climate-induced gender-selective migration may result in the feminization of the household → gendered norms regarding marriage, land/property ownership, divorce/child custody laws, kinship systems may impact a woman’s ability to adapt without her partner → women face expulsion/exploitation by other family members, increased poverty, more social reproduction demands, lower education, greater physical burdens → may diminish women’s physical/mental health and adaptability</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.M.</strong> A changing climate requires more state-based decision-making to prepare for and respond to climate crises → gender norms frequently exclude women from science/technology education and climate decision-making spaces → women’s needs and perspectives may be excluded from plans and may render the state illegitimate to women (Bellina et al.’s input/process legitimacy) → may increase women’s susceptibility and state instability to climate change</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.N.</strong> Patriarchal norms and structures may limit women’s access to but also greater dependence on public benefit services → climate change is likely to strain government budgets → governments may be less capable of delivering public benefits → may erode women’s trust in their government (Bellina et al.’s output or performance legitimacy) → may increase state fragility</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.O.</strong> Lack of a shared belief (Bellina et al.’s shared belief system) in gender equality may render a government less legitimate in the eyes of women (and some men) → systems that are imbalanced and male-dominated (divorce, child custody, inheritance, property laws favour men; polygamy/child marriage are legal; sexual aggression is permitted; gendered power structures are common) tend to normalize other inequities and violence → such systems are less stable and more susceptible to climate shocks</td>
<td><strong>Societal capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security (^{883})</td>
<td>Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.P.</strong> International actors make judgements about a state’s legitimacy (Bellina et al.’s international legitimacy) → states that lack gender justice/equality are generally perceived as less legitimate → international intervention may result → overly high international aid or long-term presence of international actors can undermine legitimacy → lowers overall state stability</td>
<td>Societal capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security (^{884})</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.Q.</strong> Climate change is likely to increase involuntary population dislocation → migrant populations are often targets for human trafficking and other organized criminal activity → both women and men can be trapped in human slavery for different reasons → state legitimacy is harmed as a result</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] Men more likely to be involved in violent crime (^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.R.</strong> Climate-induced gender-selective migration may result in population sex ratio imbalances in sending or destination systems → such imbalances may increase rates of crime and violence as discussed in 3.1.2.2</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>[Requires research] SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict (^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.S.</strong> Many countries will take a hypermasculine approach to dealing with climate migration → may result in rhetoric concerning migrants as ‘threats’ and the need to ‘securitize borders’ → ‘unpalatable’ populations will be forcibly turned into punishable criminals → if denied legal employment and residency, in attempts to survive, climate migrants will de facto become criminals</td>
<td>Crime/violence/extremism</td>
<td>NA (involuntary) (^2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{883}\) For National/International Security, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation (particularly anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
<th>Pathway</th>
<th>Motivational Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.T.</strong> Men may be more likely to engage in climate-based migration → men may relocate into a region with climate-caused budget-constraints → if employment opportunities are insufficient, men may have a lower sense of state legitimacy → may be easier to recruit men into armed/rebel groups</td>
<td>Anti-state grievance // Grievances between societal groups</td>
<td>[Requires research] SD-urban surplus males-unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.U.</strong> Populations may migrate due to climate change → cleavages between groups may form or deepen → lack of socioeconomic mobility, ill health, fear of eviction, harassment, violence, trauma, alienation may stoke grievances → governments unable to deal with the tensions may lose credibility → may be easier to recruit into protests or rebel groups (depending on social networks)</td>
<td>Increase survival or avoid abuse$^8$ (typically women) and pull of networks,$^8$ exposure to violence/repression,$^8$ or revenge$^8$ (typically men)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkage 3.2.2.V.</strong> Climate change may trigger mass movements of people → state legitimacy may decline in sending countries → destination countries may initiate conflict with countries severely impacted mass exodus of their people</td>
<td>Interstate tensions</td>
<td>[Requires research] SD-urban surplus males-unemployment (Gender Equality-Security Mechanism)$^\Theta$ and motivations such as increase survival (more typically women),$^\Theta$ revenge (typically men), or the pull of networks (typically men)$^\Theta$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table offers Gender-Climate-Security Linkages, which can be referenced in the discussion that follows by the Linkage number. National/International Security Linkages with strong findings for Motivational Mechanisms are marked with $^\S$; those with no research with $^\Theta$. For a full explanation of each Linkage, see sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2.
3.2.2.1. **State Fragility and Human Security**

The following section will discuss two broad climate-impacted factors that affect the State Fragility GCS-Factor within the *Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle*—population dislocation and state illegitimacy. Specifically, the population dislocation discussion looks at how gender inequalities lead to the triggering of several *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* related to who migrates, the impacts of gender-selective migration on household and community stability, and the gendered conditions people find themselves in post-decision to migrate. In the discussion on state illegitimacy, focus turns to the intersection of climate, gender, and four sources of state legitimacy: input/process legitimacy, output/performance legitimacy, shared belief systems, and international legitimacy, with *Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* for each. Primarily, these linkages underpin the *societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism*.\(^{885}\)

Population dislocation may be a significant source of state fragility in a warming world. The US National Intelligence Council has identified migration into areas of economic opportunity and away from climate and conflict instability as one of the biggest drivers of population movements globally.\(^{886}\) A 2021 World Bank Group report estimated that by 2050, there could be as many as 216 million internal migrants.\(^{887}\) The largest

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\(^{885}\) *Human Security Gender-Climate-Security Linkages* are categorized based on Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* including *societal capacity*, or one of three ‘socioeconomic development’ (SD), (referred to as ‘SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict,’ ‘SD-surplus males-non-state conflict,’ and ‘SD-surplus males-unemployment’).


number is expected in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and North Africa, with the poorest and most climate-vulnerable regions likely to also lack the economic, social, and livelihood safety nets to handle such movements of people. Over the past 60 years, the gender mix (including children) of migrants has remained relatively stable: ~52% male and ~48% female according to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, though women have started to outpace men who migrate in Oceania and Europe.

The interactions between climate change, migration, and State Fragility are numerous and complex. Climate change may drive drought and food insecurity, water shortages, riverine and coastal flooding, or landslides and wildfires, any combination of which may push populations to migrate internally or internationally, temporarily or permanently. Such mass migrations may contribute to increased strain on public services and Infrastructure, shifts in unemployment levels, and unrest and State Fragility which can take place in one state and have spill-over effects into neighbouring states.

Discursively, national rhetoric on population dislocation often reflects hypermasculine views of mass migration using terms such as ‘threat’ and ‘securitizing borders,’ as well as

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888 Clement et al., “Groundswell Part 2,” xxii.
treat ing migrants (including women) as national threats in need of control (Linkage 3.2.2.A).  

Some feminist critiques suggest that approaching migration as a State Fragility issue is problematic for Human Security, and that instead, migration should be viewed as an adaptation strategy rather than a security threat, though other feminists have argued that doing so shifts responsibility for handling the burden of migration from the state to vulnerable communities themselves.  

According to Barnett and Adger, an individual’s, household’s, or system’s ability to return to a previous state following external shocks is often a powerful factor that will determine whether there is sufficient ability (including capabilities, rights, choices) to adapt-in-place to climate change, and if not, prompt relocation as a form of adaptation.  

They state:

As a matter of principle, people should have the right to remain living where they choose to, and so this suggests that a right to adaptation in place is as important as a right to migration. Capabilities, rights, and freedoms … enable people to respond in ways that suit their needs and values. … By the same token, many people can and may choose to utilize mobility as a form of adaptation, and so freedom of movement within and across borders will be an increasingly important determinant of demographic and environmental futures.

Yet the capabilities and rights/freedoms to choose may be highly gendered, thereby preventing some from migrating when they wish to do so, or forcing others to migrate when they do not wish to do so, either of which may have deleterious impacts on climate

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security. Looking at capabilities and rights/freedoms in turn, it is easy to see how the intersection of gendered population dislocation and \textit{State Fragility} rest foundationally in the \textit{Gender Equality-Security Mechanism} of societal capacity.

To start, Barnett and Adger define capabilities in the migration context as including: \textit{Education}, \textit{Healthcare}, mobility, ability to work, bodily health, ability to affiliate with others, and ability to hold property.\textsuperscript{896} Hunter and David take a slightly different approach by considering assets, such as human capital (labour), financial capital (savings), physical capital (vehicles), social capital (networks), and natural capital (such as wild foods).\textsuperscript{897} In either approach to the capabilities question, cultural norms and gendered power structures may vastly limit women’s access to and control over resources in spaces that support each of these capabilities, discussed at length in other sections of this study.

Consequently, capabilities, which are often contingent on gender- and location-based conditions, play a role in determining who can migrate, and may result in gender-selective migration. Consider the many ways in which changes in capabilities create push factors for migration, impacting women and men differently. Sudden climate-induced disasters are more likely to result in immediate capabilities losses, generating local (often temporary) displacements, while gradual climate changes may create long-term capabilities losses, and are expected to diffuse displacements over larger areas and time spans as regional economic trends, incentives and disincentives, and urbanization processes develop.\textsuperscript{898} The following are a few examples of the interaction of gender,

\textsuperscript{896} Barnett and Adger, “Mobile Worlds.”
\textsuperscript{897} Hunter and David, “Climate Change and Migration: Considering the Gender Dimensions,” 2.
\textsuperscript{898} Barnett and Adger, “Mobile Worlds,” 249.
climate, and capabilities. Meze-Hausken has found that capital-rich households (typically headed by men) tend to delay migration for longer, but when they do migrate, capital-rich households tend to travel further.\textsuperscript{899} Examining climate migration in Southern Ecuador, Gray found that when women migrate, they tend to stay closer to their original homes compared to men, possibly due to lower capital wealth, suggesting that should they be unable to travel far enough to find new opportunities, adaptation capacity may be limited.\textsuperscript{900} In studying Nepal, Massey et al. found when climate change impinged on people’s fuel collecting capabilities, the impacts were gendered; when gathering firewood (typically done by men) required an extra 100 minutes, men were 16\% more likely to migrate (no impact on women’s tendency); when gathering fodder (typically done by women) required an additional 100 minutes, women were 21\% more likely to migrate (no impact on men).\textsuperscript{901} This suggests that the same number of additional minutes required to complete gendered task results in a different level of migration urgency in women and men, indicating that gender-based responsibilities should be examined locally to determine how they may influence climate-driven migration patterns. Meze-Hausken also find that out-migration starts sooner in smaller families, likely due to the ability to accommodate all members of the household in a new location and availability of funds


for transport. Consequently, such gender-based capability barriers as those noted here can trap households, including many headed by women, in severe climate vulnerability.

Climate change can also shift capabilities to create gendered pull factors that impact a person’s ability to migrate. Research by Annecke and Masika et al. notes that men often migrate to find work, especially following natural disasters or in the face of diminishing resources (implying combined push-pull factors). Increasingly, however, studies show that women migrate as well, usually to urban centres, because of the availability of employment. In particular, while men often migrate for high-skill employment (higher human capital capabilities which lead to higher paying jobs), women increasingly are recruited into low-skill employment, especially social reproduction roles such as caregivers, cleaners, or travel industry support workers (requiring low human capital capabilities and offering lower paid employment). Such pull factors are location-dependent, according to Chant, and are contingent on the types of jobs and levels of income offered in each region. A woman’s ability to migrate if she chooses may be a crucial determinant in her ability to adapt to climate change; those for whom migration is necessary but not an option due to lack of capabilities may experience severe lack of adaptive ability, potentially detracting from a community’s ability to weather the challenges of climate change (Linkage 3.2.2.B).

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902 Meze-Hausken, “Migration Caused by Climate Change,” 397.
903 Lama, Hamza, and Wester, “Gendered Dimensions of Migration in Relation to Climate Change.”
905 Hunter and David, “Climate Change and Migration: Considering the Gender Dimensions,” 8.
In addition to varying capabilities determining the likelihood of migration, gendered freedom to direct one’s life (one’s right to relocate and freedom to choose) also plays an important role in the Human Security aspect of population dislocation. For instance, Huber argues that crises (such as climate breakdown or even migration itself) locate women in situations that reduce their human rights.\textsuperscript{907} Women’s rights and choices for when and how far to migrate tend to be linked to norms around care responsibilities, divisions of labour, and asset control, as well as how quickly a household begins to feel the pain of a changing climate. Critically, gendered power hierarchies within families and communities frequently determine how much choice women have about whether or not to migrate (Linkage 3.2.2.C).\textsuperscript{908} Chant has found that most women have little to no influence over decisions related to their own migration or that of family members.\textsuperscript{909} Crucially, women may not even be able to contemplate a migration journey if discriminatory practices prevent them from obtaining passports without the permission of a male family member.\textsuperscript{910}

On a macro level as well, women are frequently left out of decision-making regarding community relocation (Linkage 3.2.2.D). Bertana found that Fijian women were not invited to discussions on relocation with government officials, nevertheless the government stated there was “complete consensus.”\textsuperscript{911} Similarly, Tanyag and True found

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Huber, “One Step Forward, One Step Back: The Micro-Level Impacts of Conflict and Aid on Women’s Rights.”
\item Chant, “Households, Gender and Rural-Urban Migration.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
women in Vanuatu were barred from participation in village decision spaces regarding the nature and timing of forced relocation.\textsuperscript{912} Without decision-making control over their own lives, women’s capacity to cope with climate change may be diminished due to lack of information, preparation time, and choice over where and how she relocates.

Post-decision to migrate, the journey itself may be gendered and hence also has an impact on women’s \textit{Human Security}. Two points are of particular importance: (1) the migration journey and destination conditions will be different for women and men, and (2) a climate migration may change the gender composition of a household, which may profoundly impact its ability to adapt to climate change and stability in the wider state context. First, women and men who migrate will experience various levels of positives and negatives from the journey and in the final destination which will impact their ability to adapt and recover from climate breakdown. To begin, both during the journey to a new location and after resettlement, women tend to experience greater risk of SGBV due to lack of safe routes and lack of safe shelters (Linkage 3.2.2.E).\textsuperscript{913} The combined trauma of a climate disaster, the need to migrate, the breaking of social ties, and the responsibility to care for other family members has been shown by Mitchell et al. to pose a greater psychological burden on women than men (Linkage 3.2.2.F).\textsuperscript{914} Additionally, once a woman arrives in a new location, she may be denied access to aid if she is not the head of her household (Linkage 3.2.2.G).\textsuperscript{915}


\textsuperscript{913} Chindarkar, “Gender and Climate Change-Induced Migration.”

\textsuperscript{914} Mitchell, Tanner, and Lussier, “‘We Know What We Need.’”

\textsuperscript{915} Chindarkar, “Gender and Climate Change-Induced Migration.”
Should migration lead women to IDP camps, they may face additional challenges (and opportunities). Work by Cheesman and Farrelly notes that, due to strained resources amidst expectations of women’s engagement in social reproduction activities, women in IDP camps must often perform more caretaking duties than they would otherwise. Additionally, women are frequently expected to undertake additional tasks around the camps, such as cleaning and building houses (Linkage 3.2.2.H). Furthermore, SGBV and exploitation are frequent problems in IDP camps due to lack of separate sanitation, hygiene, and sleeping areas for women and men, and because men from within the camps are often given security responsibilities, and use that power to gain access to women’s private spaces (Linkage 3.2.2.I). Many of these challenges could be addressed if women’s needs were made known to camp committees, however women are frequently barred from participating in such decision-making spaces (Linkage 3.2.2.J). Combined, these pressures leave women with less time for income generating activities and greater bodily depletion.

Dislocation can have downsides for men as well. For instance, while relocating may offer new employment opportunities, men don’t always make upward socioeconomic mobility when they migrate (Linkage 3.2.2.K). What’s more, Sharma explains:

Work also involves bodily harm, fatigue, social dislocation, and debt entrapment. While an increasing number of men seek to assert their masculinity through labour mobility, both in the form of earnings and wider experience beyond village life, this does not automatically translate

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919 Note, however, that gifts can be used as a way to build social networks. Hedström, “4. A Feminist Political Economy Analysis of Insecurity and Violence in Kachin State,” 81.
into affirmation of identity, as many struggle to save money and end up working in difficult environments that offer very little possibility for social mobility. Moreover, social pressure often results in spending whatever savings are accrued on gifts or conspicuous consumption rather than on more productive endeavours.  

These types of risks may endanger men’s ability to adapt to and recover from climate disasters, and therefore should also be considered in climate migration contexts.

Nevertheless, well-designed approaches to addressing population dislocation may offer opportunities for undoing gender inequalities through the re-writing of laws and redistribution of wealth and land; such gender transformative approaches may even have the effect of stabilizing governments rather than destabilizing them. For instance, should migrant women relocate to urban centres, they may experience increased access to Education and public services, higher levels of income (and remittances sent back to families), and increased social networking and risk sharing. Additionally, Huber shows that while crises such as migration often reduce women’s rights, in some cases, crises can offer opportunities for the advancement of women’s rights (for instance, through exposure to liberal ideas on women’s rights, encouragement to receive aid that improves women’s rights, as well as better living standards).

In addition to the gendered impacts of a migration journey and destination conditions, the second important post-migration factor to consider is how the transition

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may change the gender composition of the household. The feminization of a household (in a cis-gender relationship between a woman and a man) results when one or the other partner migrates alone. Regardless of whether she is the one to migrate or stay home, in such cases, women typically take responsibility for caring for the household’s other family members in the absence of her male partner. According to Chant, household feminization may be both positive and negative for women, and is mediated by many other factors such as marriage, land and property ownership, laws on divorce and child custody, and kinship systems, among others, resulting in significant variation between countries. Women-headed households face challenges such as increased Poverty (and increased intergenerational Poverty); intensification of social reproduction demands on a woman’s time; lower health outcomes due to poor socioeconomic status and high physical burdens; decreased mental health; and lower rates of literacy, to name a few that may impact her adaptive abilities. Lacking rights to land and asset ownership, when male household heads leave, women may have to shift livelihood responsibilities, and extended family members and community members may expulse and/or exploit those who are left behind, especially if there are existing tensions between families or groups (Linkage 3.2.2.L). Nevertheless, women’s climate Susceptibility may be improved through household feminization. For instance, a woman may prefer to be without a male

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partner, and on her own, may enjoy freedom from emotional abuse and SGBV, and therefore improved mental health.\textsuperscript{928} The lack of a male partner may offer a woman increased autonomy over her finances, how she structures her time, and how many unpaid household tasks she performs.\textsuperscript{929} Chant also notes that household feminization may also have knock-on benefits for children: girls may have increased access to educational opportunities and a household’s children may receive more nutritious food.\textsuperscript{930}

The interactions between gender, involuntary climate-induced population dislocation, and \textit{State Fragility} are therefore nuanced and complex, requiring a context-based approach to understanding the specific dynamics in each region. Determining to what extent gender may erode state stability requires understanding who can make decisions when population dislocation is inevitable; whose needs are taken into consideration during the journey and in the destination; what rights are conferred on climate migrants in destination countries; and so on. Referring to Forsberg and Olsson’s work, more than likely, systems that devalue the lives and contributions of women (lower their societal capacity) will experience higher levels of instability and therefore greater risk of fragility sliding into violence and conflict.

Turning now to how climate-caused state illegitimacy can impact \textit{State Fragility}, the following portion of this GCS-Factor discussion will show that rendering of some identities as valued and legitimate (masculine) and others as invisible and unvalued (feminine) increases the risks state illegitimacy, and therefore its political instability. Feminist literature on the interaction of state illegitimacy, climate change, and gender is

\textsuperscript{928} Chant, “Households, Gender and Rural-Urban Migration,” 17.
\textsuperscript{929} Chant, “Households, Gender and Rural-Urban Migration,” 17.
\textsuperscript{930} Chant, “Households, Gender and Rural-Urban Migration,” 17.
scant, nevertheless, some inferences based on other disciplines can be made. This
discussion will be guided by four sources of state legitimacy defined by Bellina et al.
(input/process legitimacy, output/performance legitimacy, shared belief systems, and
international legitimacy), each of which intersects with gender and climate security
within the societal capacity Gender Equality-Security Mechanism.931

Bellina et al. define the first source of state legitimacy as input or process
legitimacy, which includes the rules or procedures through which people participate in
state decisions and hold power to account, and through which the state makes binding
decisions—rules and procedures which are codified through law or informed by
customary practices and rules.932 The importance of input legitimacy to State Fragility is
illustrated by a 2008 Brookings State Weakness index, which notes that states are more
susceptible to destabilizing events when they offer fewer civil liberties and political
rights.933 Given the likelihood of increased climate-related emergencies, it is important to
understand gender’s role in input legitimacy. A 2019 OECD Social Institutions and
Gender Index report concluded that gender discrimination in civil liberties globally is
29%, and that in 49 countries women still have fewer legal rights than men.934 As with
women’s civil liberties and political rights in general, in climate security policymaking,
women have largely been absent from framing discussions and decision-making, and

931 The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, Conflict and Fragility (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010),
932 The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, 23–24.
933 Susan E. Rice and Steward Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World” (Brookings,
February 2008), 31, https://www.brookings.edu/research/index-of-state-weakness-in-the-developing-
world/.
934 OECD, SIGI 2019 Global Report: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities, Social Institutions and
therefore are rarely involved in state decision-making or able to hold power to account.\textsuperscript{935} MacGregor argues this may be due to the masculinist nature of climate discourses which frequently centre on science and security.\textsuperscript{936} No doubt women’s alienation from the academic disciplines of science and technology (particularly climate science) has played a role in women’s lower engagement with climate security policymaking as both scholars and voters.\textsuperscript{937} When women are left out of climate security negotiations and policymaking, it invisibilizes their perspectives and needs, which may ultimately result in women experiencing increased climate Susceptibility and consequently holding a lower level of trust for their governments (Linkage 3.2.2.M). Conversely, a study by Asongu et al. shows that when women are politically empowered through women’s groups, in civil society, and through political debates, their vulnerability to climate change decreases, especially in small and fragile states.\textsuperscript{938} Including women in climate security policymaking may also play a role in re-balancing gendered power structures and further stabilize societies. Research by Chen and Hansen shows that empowered women in


\textsuperscript{936} MacGregor, “A Stranger Silence Still.”


China helped effect their country’s ‘environmental turn’ and in the process, went some way to transforming gender norms about women’s involvement in public activities.\textsuperscript{939}

Second, Bellina and colleagues write about output or performance legitimacy, which is determined by state performance, effectiveness, and quality of services and goods.\textsuperscript{940} As discussed in several other sections of this study, climate change is expected to have widespread deleterious impacts on a state’s ability to deliver public services. Examining just one area of impact—population growth—we see that climate change is expected to put increasing demands on the provision of basic services such as health care (medical, water, sanitation, and food); housing; \textit{Education}; access to democratic elections and institutions; legal and justice services (including police services); civil registration; as well as safety net or social service programs, such as \textit{Unemployment}, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, and other livelihood securities.\textsuperscript{941} At baseline, when \textit{State Fragility} creates scarcity of public services, women are likely to face more obstacles than men to accessing basic services. This may be due to patriarchal and traditional beliefs about gender roles, masculinities, and femininities, as well as because of low literacy levels, lack of exposure to politics, policy spheres, and government planning processes, and low levels of representation in institutions.\textsuperscript{942} During times of crisis, such as natural disasters caused by climate change, a fragile state’s inability to perform its functions will intensify

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{940}] The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, 23–24.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
women’s and girls’ lack of access to social and legal protections, ability to exercise their rights, or freedom to use public services critical to their well-being (Linkage 3.2.2.N). Consequently, output illegitimacy is likely to further erode women’s trust in their government, and could strengthen women’s anti-state grievances.

A shared belief system is the third source of state legitimacy, which is based on a sense of political community that allows people to see the state (or other public authority) as having rightful authority. There appears to be no literature on how shared belief systems about climate change might interact with gender. Nevertheless, looking at a study on adaptation to just one climate-induced crisis—drinking water scarcity—Thaker et al. examine the role collective efficacy (people’s shared beliefs about their group’s capabilities to accomplish collective tasks) plays in people’s Susceptibility to climate risks. Study results show individuals in communities with robust collective efficacy were more likely to participate in activities designed to ensure adequate water supplies. Belief systems about climate change, therefore, are likely to play a role in community Susceptibility to climate risks. One could argue that, as climate change intensifies, people’s beliefs about the need to address climate change will also shift, in both urgency and expressed need, as will the public’s trust in the government’s ability to address climate security concerns. Should there be a mismatch between belief systems of the public versus elites regarding solutions to climate insecurity, the public may lose faith in their government for failing to act appropriately or soon enough. Given all the ways

943 Institute for Women’s Policy Research, “Gender, Urbanization and Democratic Governance,” 19.
944 The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, 23–24.
946 Thaker et al., “The Role of Collective Efficacy in Climate Change Adaptation in India.”
climate insecurity is expected to impact women and men differently (already outlined in other GCS-Factors), this is an area in need of further exploration, especially given its potential impact on State Fragility.

As a subset of shared beliefs regarding state legitimacy, gender equality under the law is an important factor to consider within this State Fragility discussion. A large body of literature supports the view that equality under the law (and the rule of law), whether customary or statutory, is pivotal to building and maintaining state legitimacy, maintaining political stability, and resolving conflict.\textsuperscript{947} Equality amongst different ethnic, religious, cultural, and class groups is critical to shared belief systems, but crucially, so is gender equality under the law, though this is frequently left out of state legitimacy discussions.\textsuperscript{948} Through empirical analysis, Bowen et al. are able to enhance predictions of a state’s level of stability and security by examining a measure of Inequity in Family Law in addition to other conventional markers such as level of democracy, literacy rate, or civilizational influence.\textsuperscript{949} Those systems that are male-dominated (whereby divorce, child custody, inheritance, and property laws favour men; polygamy and child marriage are legal; sexual aggression is permitted; and imbalanced family power structures based on gender are common) tend to normalize other inequities and violence, and structure economies based on parasitical and monopolistic rent-based systems (Linkage 3.2.2.O).\textsuperscript{950}

A final source of state legitimacy, international legitimacy, stems from a recognition by external actors of a state’s sovereignty, which has knock-on effects for

\textsuperscript{948} The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, 27.
\textsuperscript{950} Bowen, Hudson, and Nielsen, “State Fragility and Structural Gender Inequality in Family Law.”
internal legitimacy.\textsuperscript{951} Gender justice and equality are often conditions for international recognition and legitimacy, and have been used as justification for international intervention.\textsuperscript{952} International interventions may take the form of military action or humanitarian aid, which in and of itself may prove problematic for state legitimacy.

Moen and Sundstøl Eriksen note that the long-standing presence of international actors in a state may undermine legitimacy by making the state accountable to external actors (Linkage 3.2.2.P).\textsuperscript{953} Furthermore, Hoeffler suggests that if outside aid is too high, it may have a negative impact on state legitimacy.\textsuperscript{954}

Looking more closely at international governing bodies, we see that transnational climate policies are increasingly tied to measures of gender equality as well.\textsuperscript{955} Several main international governance bodies now oversee international cooperation on the fight against climate change, including the IPCC, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol (KP), the World Bank, the Green Climate Fund, the UN Security Council (focused on climate security specifically), among others including numerous NGOs as well as funding agencies. Any combination of these international organizations may confer legitimacy on a state based on the adequacy of its climate response (either its greenhouse gas reductions or its climate adaptation efforts). As such, a lack of internal gender equality may diminish a state’s international ranking,

\textsuperscript{951} The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, 23–24.
\textsuperscript{952} True, “Bringing Back Gendered States.”
sidelining poorly performing states on the margins of the international community.\footnote{956}{True, “Bringing Back Gendered States.”}

Residents of poorly performing states may believe their governments illegitimate as a result of poor records on gender equality within international climate law, compounding already fragile conditions.

It’s important to reiterate that gender transformative approaches to addressing involuntary population dislocations, state illegitimacy, and gender equality under the law will require both state-level and household-level changes in understandings of gender norms and the gendering of structures and institutions. As Bowen states:

\begin{quote}
international efforts to increase female secondary and tertiary education rates, female participation in the police and the armed forces, and female participation in government, only go so far. The deeper level of inequitable family law must also be addressed for societies to escape from an endless cycle of state fragility.\footnote{957}{True, “Bringing Back Gendered States.”}
\end{quote}

Yet, as True rightly points out, the very foundational ways in which patriarchal structures support state identities and interstate relations makes such changes incredibly disruptive and destabilizing.\footnote{958}{True, “Bringing Back Gendered States.”} In many ways, therefore, improving state stability at the household level may result in temporary setbacks in security before a new level of stability can set in.

\subsection*{3.2.2.2. State Fragility and National/International Security}

As climate-caused migration intensifies, it could have an impact on

\textit{National/International Security} along several pathways.\footnote{959}{For \textit{National/International Security}, findings are organized first into one of four of Climate Diplomacy’s ‘Intermediary Mechanisms’ (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions), and then further categorized according to (A) patterns of gender and crime, violence, and extremism (section 1.2.3.2); (B) patterns of gender and civic unrest participation (anti-state grievances) (section 1.2.3.3); and (C) patterns of gendered motivations for armed combat participation.}

First, there are multiple ways
in which to look at how increased *State Fragility* may impact rates of *crime/violence/extremism*. To start, as a driver of migration, climate change is expected to increase rates of human trafficking and other organized criminal activity. Migrant workers and people seeking employment opportunities or safe havens following natural disasters are especially at risk, especially women and children according to Sheu et al. (Linkage 3.2.2.Q). As already noted in 1.2.3.1, men are far more likely to spearhead organized criminal activity, especially when violence is involved, though connections between climate migration and human trafficking have not been studied.

Furthermore, through gender-selective migration, population sex ratios may change, and, as previously explored in section 3.1.2.2, imbalanced population sex ratios may have an impact on *crime/violence/extremism* rates. In particular, surplus males in densely populated urban areas may suggest the activation of the *SD-urban surplus males-state-based conflict Gender Equality-Security Mechanism* (Linkage 3.2.2.R). China and India are most at risk of population displacements that result in sex ratio imbalances given their strong son preference norms, regions with extreme exposure to climate change, and very dense populations—the two countries represent 38% of the world’s population. [Noting again: as discussed in section 1.2.3.2, men are more likely than women to be involved in violent crimes and in leadership roles, however connections between gendered violent crime due to imbalanced population sex ratios and GCS-Factor *State Fragility* remains unstudied].

(partially anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions) (section 1.2.3.4).


961 Hudson and den Boer, “Missing Women and Bare Branches: Gender Balance and Conflict.”
Importantly, Stanley explains that as states increasingly perceive migrants in hypermasculine terms as threats to national security, they will enact policies to impose greater border restrictions and constrain definitions for refugee status in order to exclude, detain, and expel such populations. By othering ‘unpalatable’ populations in this way, states will force entire groups into criminalized categories to legitimize punishments and expulsions, and in the process, disconnect large groups from lawful employment, public support, and legal standing. Importantly, such policies may have the effect of leaving migrants with few options other than criminal activity to survive (Linkage 3.2.2.S).

Several recent studies outline potential pathways connecting state illegitimacy and anti-state grievances or grievances between societal groups. As already discussed in 3.1.4.2, as a source of State Fragility, climate-driven population displacements can result in the mass movement of people into new regions where religious or ethnic traditions may be different. These population shifts may result in increased strain on employment opportunities, natural resources, or public services, such as government provision of Poverty reduction, public health, improved Infrastructure, affordable foodstuffs, and improved supply chains. Failures of local and national governments to deliver such services may have a negative impact on state legitimacy. Theoretically, rebel groups

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963 Stanley, “Climate Change and Migration.”


may seize upon sentiments of illegitimacy to increase recruitment for men to participate in sabotaging governmental relief efforts, though these claims have been contested. For instance, Petrova provides empirical evidence that flood hazards combined with loss of assets increase internal migration, leading to an increase in protest frequency in migrants’ districts of destination.\footnote{966} Likewise, Ash and Obradovich find that climatic stress increased internal migration in Syria from 2005 to 2010, which contributed to anti-government civil unrest.\footnote{967} If this pathway is a route by which rates of state illegitimacy increase, such conditions may make recruitment into rebel or paramilitary groups much more likely. One hypothesis is that the SD-urban surplus males-unemployment Gender Equality-Security Mechanism may be at work and may increase a system’s tendency toward State Fragility (Linkage 3.2.2.T), though again, research on gendered trends has not been developed.

Similarly, though context-specific and complex, massive shifts in population composition may also trigger or deepen cleavages between local and transplant populations and may lead to decreases in state legitimacy and increases in anti-state grievances and grievances between societal groups.\footnote{968} Several studies hint at motivations for these grievances. Research by Adger et al. in Chattogram, Bangladesh finds:

\footnote{
environmental hazards represent an increasing source of perceived insecurity to migrant populations over time, with longer-term migrants perceiving greater insecurity than more recent arrivals, suggesting lack of upward social mobility in low-income slums. Ill-health, fear of eviction, and harassment and violence are key elements of how insecurity is experienced, and these are exacerbated by environmental hazards such as flooding.\textsuperscript{969} They conclude that these types of social stressors on \textit{Human Security} create conditions in which social unrest becomes more likely.\textsuperscript{970} Furthermore, Ahsan et al. find that a change of social status in the aftermath of climate-caused migration leads to feelings of trauma and a sense of alienation.\textsuperscript{971} According to Mkutu, these dynamics can be seen in many pastoralist communities such as those in Uganda with strong, socially prescribed manhood roles, such as paying a dowry for marriage. In these communities, young men may have to migrate out of their usual territories to engage in raiding as a way to generate an income or bride price resources. In such cases, women may encourage young men’s raiding activities even providing weapons. Such practices inevitably increase group-based tensions and may result in violence and conflict.\textsuperscript{972} These findings suggest motivations of \textit{increase survival} or \textit{avoid abuse} (typically women) and \textit{pull of networks, exposure to violence/repression}, or \textit{desire for revenge} (typically men) may pit migrants against advantaged groups or host residents against migrants, through more study is needed (Linkage 3.2.2.U).

\textsuperscript{969} Adger et al., “Human Security of Urban Migrant Populations Affected by Length of Residence and Environmental Hazards.”
\textsuperscript{970} Adger et al., “Human Security of Urban Migrant Populations Affected by Length of Residence and Environmental Hazards.”
Notably, however, Leenders finds the nature of climate migrants’ networks have a determining impact on whether they are recruited into protest or conflict networks.\textsuperscript{973} Intensive social networks (dense intragroup connections, high trust, but few connections to other groups) may discourage easy recruitment, while extensive networks (dense intragroup connections and connections to other groups) increase integration more likely to facilitate recruitment.\textsuperscript{974} Those within intensive social networks may experience higher levels of alienation due to an inability to advocate for their needs.\textsuperscript{975} Further complicating the picture, Abel et al. show that droughts contribute to internal conflicts, which can trigger migration, suggesting that the relationship between climate, migration, and conflict may be multi-directional and highly nuanced.\textsuperscript{976}

Finally, there is a growing literature debating how climate change and mass migration may impact \textit{State Fragility} to increase risks of \textit{interstate tensions} (Linkage 3.2.2.V), though there are several recent meta-studies that contest these findings. Von Uexkull and Buhaug find that the empirical research has faced challenges with quantifying migrant flows and connecting such flows specifically to changes in the climate.\textsuperscript{977} Some empirical research is attempting to solve these challenges. Cattaneo and Foreman have shown that countries severely impacted by climate change may experience mass exodus of their people, and that destination countries for migrants may initiate conflict with sending countries as a result.\textsuperscript{978} Boas et al. also stress that the causes of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{973} Reinoud Leenders, “Social Movement Theory and the Onset of the Popular Uprising in Syria,” \textit{Arab Studies Quarterly} 35, no. 3 (July 1, 2013), https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.3.0273.
\item \textsuperscript{974} Leenders, “Social Movement Theory and the Onset of the Popular Uprising in Syria.”
\item \textsuperscript{975} Petrova, “Natural Hazards, Internal Migration and Protests in Bangladesh.”
\item \textsuperscript{976} Abel et al., “Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration.”
\item \textsuperscript{977} von Uexkull and Buhaug, “Security Implications of Climate Change.”
\end{itemize}
Migration are complex and usually not solely related to climate change, and that much more research is required to understand not if climate change will impact human movements, but how it may amplify existing conditions to increase the likelihood of migration, and how such flows of humans may impact state stability and conflict risks. Notably, Koubi et al. find that conflict perceptions, which are dependent on the type of climate change experienced, may contribute to conflictive behaviour. In particular, they argue and confirm with empirical analysis:

Sudden, short-term environmental incidents should affect most individuals equally and people are exposed to these environmental changes for only a short period of time. The likelihood of developing relative deprivation and grievances that will lead to an increased conflict perception is therefore low. In contrast, gradual, long-term environmental events, by fostering relative deprivations arising from differences in adaptive capacities and a longer time period of exposure, should induce heightened grievances and migrants should be likely to perceive conflicts at their new locations.

By implication, this research suggests that perceptions (in particular perceptions of inequalities between groups over longer periods of time) play an important role in understanding climate-migration and interstate tensions risks. Studying such perceptions may provide insights into whether increase survival (more typically women), revenge (typically men), the pull of networks (typically men), or other motivations would be most at play should conflicts arise (research is currently lacking).


3.2.2.3. **Summary of Gender-Climate-Security and State Fragility**

A summary visualizing Gender-Climate-Security connections to *State Fragility* can be found in Figure 23. A list of Diagnostic Questions in Table 63 offers practitioners and policymakers a way to operationalize this framework for specific scenario analysis.

![Gender-Climate-Security Connections](image)

**Figure 23.** Gendered Climate Security Vulnerabilities in State Fragility.

*A visual summary of the proposed framework findings regarding Gender-Climate-Security Links related to GCS-Factor State Fragility.*
Chapter 4.

Conclusion

The impacts of climate change are already being felt around the world, and gender is a factor in virtually every aspect of it. As such, the proposed conceptual framework presented here offers the beginnings of a comprehensive method for uncovering the ways in which gender is talked about, imagined, governed, manifested, reinforced, and internalized in order to understand gender’s role in climate security challenges, and how to develop gender transformative approaches to addressing such challenges.

Drawing from the lessons offered by interrogating several existing climate-security frameworks using various FPEcon/FPEcol, feminist, and WPS theories (among others), this study has proposed a framework to assess the gendered climate-security risks within particular local contexts. The proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework comprises two primary components based on the analytical theory of several existing models: (1) scrutinize gendered Human Security and (2) interrogate how gender intersects with each of four types of National/International Security (crime/violence/extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions). First, the practitioner or policymaker may use the framework to examine how women’s context-specific Human Security conditions may help predict National/International Security risks (employing the rubric developed by Forsberg and Olsson section 1.2.3.1). Second, the framework provides a structure for exploring gender’s role in National/International Security risks by applying three existing theories: (2A) patterns in the intersection of gender and crime, localized violence, and extremism (applying theories from Campaniello and other scholars, section 1.2.3.2); (2B) patterns in
the intersection of gender and civic unrest participation, particularly *anti-state grievances* (making use of theory by Rucht and Caren et al., section 1.2.3.3); and (2C) patterns of gendered motivations for participation in *anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions* (using separate theories offered by Wood, Eggert, and Thomas and Wood, section 1.2.3.4).

In examining the gendered elements of *Human Security* and climate change, the existing research applicable to each GCS-Factor was analyzed and categorized within Forsberg and Olsson’s *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* rubric. Findings for which *Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms* applied to which GCS-Factors are summarized in Table 46.
Table 46. Findings on Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms in the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal capacity</th>
<th>Early Warning Healthcare</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Recent Shocks</th>
<th>Long-Term Adaptation</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Standard of Living</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Dev</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>State Fragility</th>
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<td>SD-urban surplus</td>
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<td>males-state-based</td>
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<td>non-state conflict</td>
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</table>

Summary of the GCS-Factors in which Forsberg and Olsson’s Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms may be applicable within the Gender-Climate-Security Framework based on an analysis of existing research. Dotted cells indicate some evidence is available.

Clearly, there is strong evidence to support the theory that climate change is likely to impact women’s Human Security due to the erosion of their societal capacity within every GCS-Factor in this framework. Consequently, policymakers and practitioners would be wise to consider how investments in women’s Education, empowerment, networks, political representation, and other areas may strengthen communities and perhaps insulate them against climate-related instability.

While only a handful of studies supported the theory that climate-caused socioeconomic development (SD) mechanisms may impact both Human Security and National/International Security due to Gender Equality-Security Mechanisms, like SD-
urban surplus males-state-based conflict, SD-surplus males-non-state conflict, or SD-surplus males-unemployment, the studies that propose some ways gender intersects with socioeconomic indicators offer important insights into how the presence of surplus males under various conditions may contribute to climate insecurity. As noted previously, there is also some evidence to connect norms with GCS-Factor Education. Additional research is needed to further explore the connections between gender, SD, and surplus males, particularly in GCS-Factors related to economic conditions.

Importantly, this study has highlighted that the root cause of many gendered climate insecurities is unequal power and gender relations. Any approach to tackling climate insecurities that ignores gendered hierarchies and the institutions that support them is likely to be inadequate, for as long as imbalanced power relations between women and men make women more vulnerable to climate threats, women’s Human Security cannot be assured, and therefore their communities will remain at risk.

Recommendations for gender transformative ways of approaching climate insecurities in each GCS-Factor have been offered throughout this study. These recommendations as well as the Diagnostic Questions (see the Appendix) offer a pathway for identifying how to transform unequal power and gender relations in order to help women become true agents for climate security.982

The National/International Security subsection of each GCS-Factor in this study also contained analysis regarding whether the gendered motivational mechanisms offered by Wood, Eggert, and Thomas and Wood were a useful framework for examining climate

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982 Arora-Jonsson, “Virtue and Vulnerability.”
security scenarios. Those GCS-Factors that had studies connecting climate and security to gendered motivational mechanisms are identified in Table 47.

Table 47. Strong Research Findings on Gendered Motivations in the Gendered Climate-Security Lifecycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime/Violence/Extremism</th>
<th>Early Warning</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Recent Shocks</th>
<th>Long-Term Adaptation</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Standard of Living</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Dev</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>State Fragility</th>
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<td>Anti-state grievances</td>
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<td>Grievances between societal groups</td>
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<td>Interstate tensions</td>
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Summary of the compelling research findings that define gendered motivations (various scholars) applicable to GCS-Factors and National/International Security risks within the proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework. Dotted cells indicate good evidence is available.

Compelling links between gendered motivations and climate security risks were found in 25 of the 60 possible areas of linkage between gendered motivations and GCS-Factors. These findings support previous studies that have challenged essentialist perspectives based on women-as-victim/virtuous and men-as-villain binaries. Indeed, in many instances, evidence is available that suggests that there are many pathways by which women may be involved in climate-related violence or criminal activity that may increase national or international security risks. Likewise, men may fall victim to climate-caused destructive forces due to community-defined masculine roles, thereby putting their
community’s security at risk. As such, more research on this topic could expand awareness of how culturally shaped gender norms and identities inform who engages in activity that may threaten National/International Security, and why. In particular, by seeking more information from women and men about their motivations for participating in extremism, anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, and interstate tensions, it may be possible to avoid essentializing men as violent and women as merely victims, virtuous saviours, or ‘resources’ in climate security, and instead view both women and men as capable of violence and conflict, as well as emphasize opportunities for women to act as active leaders in helping to address climate security challenges.

Furthermore, understanding gendered motivations within a particular place and context may offer a fruitful way to assess a system’s specific climate security weaknesses and areas where gender transformative initiatives could prove effective at stemming trends in increasing grievances or tensions.

This study also set out to examine the research related to women’s and men’s participation in crime/violence/extremism, and though there is some research offering a gendered perspective, in most cases, more research is required to understand whether gender is a factor that helps predict participation in crime and violence in particular (slightly more research has been completed on gendered extremism involvement). Likewise, in terms of women’s and men’s roles in climate-related anti-state grievances, some promising studies have made the connection between gender and violent or low-risk political protests. However, significant gaps remain regarding many GCS-Factors, and as such much more research is required to determine how women and men
participate in climate-related violent civic unrest. A summary of these findings can be found in Table 48.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent vs Property Crime/Violence/Extremism</th>
<th>Early Warning</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>Food Security</th>
<th>Recent Shocks</th>
<th>Long-Term Adaptation</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Standard of Living</th>
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<th>Infrastructure</th>
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<th>State Fragility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent vs Low-Risk Anti-State Grievances</td>
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Summary of the well-defined research findings that describe gendered crime/violence/extremism or protest participation trends (by various scholars) applicable to GCS-Factors and National/International Security risks within the proposed Gender-Climate-Security Framework. Dotted cells indicate good evidence is available.

A common theme running throughout this proposed framework is the need to address gender inequalities that hinder Human Security and National/International Security at the local level, with particular contexts in mind.

Questions call for renewed attention to relations of social marginalization and exclusion that often fall out of sight as the locus of analysis shifts beyond the local scale. For instance, gender research and praxis, including FPE, tend to focus on everyday and quotidian issues at the intrahousehold and community levels, with gender equity issues reducing in visibility as one goes up in scale.⁹⁸³

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⁹⁸³ Elias, Joshi, and Meinzen-Dick, “Restoration for Whom, by Whom?”
Likewise, as noted in a recent report with stories from women in Mali, Colombia, and Yemen on their perspectives on climate, security, and gender:

> Given the specificities of climate security issues between and within regional and national contexts, research, policy and programming responses need to be informed by localized knowledge and experience. We need to hear from women as well as men from different places with different types of experiences, both because they have specific knowledge and because they have a right to be heard and their views taken into account. \(^984\)

Recognizing that this framework needs testing and additional development, the goal has been to enable practitioners and policymakers to analyze, discuss, and then design context-specific approaches to meeting complex climate change risks using gender lenses at all levels of security. As such, the proposed framework (and specifically the Diagnostic Questions outlined for each GCS-Factor in the Appendix starting on page 388) may be a valuable way to engage in bottom-up evaluation processes of climate insecurity scenarios and gendered climate security outcomes, with participation from all stakeholders, particularly women, to understand the gendered barriers to achieving climate security for all.

According to mythical world views from many traditions, there is a World Turtle that rests on a larger turtle, and that larger turtle rests on an even larger turtle. \(^985\) In other words, earth is held up by turtles all the way down. Just like the World Turtle story, this study has attempted to uncover what role gender may play in supporting or mitigating climate-related crises and conflict by offering a conceptual Gender-Climate-Security

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Framework for assessing particular contexts. This study finds that there is ample
evidence showing that women’s diminished Human Security is likely to lead to fewer
system-level resources and tools that support climate security and aid in preventing
climate-related conflicts. This study also finds some emerging research to suggest
considering gendered factors in national/international climate security threats would be
beneficial for avoiding or resolving climate-related tensions. As such, if gender is given
due consideration in climate security contexts, it is likely to provide useful insights that
could guide policy and program implementation. In the end, this framework does not
suggest there is a single best approach to assessing gendered climate security risks, but
rather offers a diagnostic approach for engaging in bottom-up climate security
assessments that are place-based and context-specific, and that contribute to the gender-
disaggregated data gaps on this topic. A necessary next step is for policymakers and
practitioners to test and evaluate this approach under various conditions.

Ultimately, in seeking to build a framework to understand how gender intersects
with climate security concerns, this study finds that, like layers of turtles that form the
foundation of a mythical earth, the impacts of climate change on Human Security and
National/International Security cannot be understood without considering gender. At the
top layer there is growing evidence that suggests gendered motivations may play a role in
fueling various types of National/International Security involvement, including crime
and localized violence and anti-state grievances, as well as tensions between societal
groups, and interstate tensions. On the next layer below Human (In)security are gendered
patterns of malign climate-fueled activities that may lead to increases in crime and
localized violence and anti-state grievances. At the bottom layer, and most
foundationally, climate change is likely to increase *Human (In)security* and transform gender norms, in many cases leading to the destabilization of households and entire communities. Layer upon layer, from the top all the way to the bottom, gender is an important climate security consideration. In other words, it’s gender all the way down the climate security lifecycle, and humanity would be reckless to ignore it.
Table 49. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Early Warning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Early Warning: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>What gendered structures might result in women’s lesser access to electricity services, and therefore to early warning systems? For instance, do any of the following resource constraints reduce women’s access to electricity?</td>
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<td>• Restricted access to banking services needed for electric contracts</td>
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<td>• Restricted access/control over economic resources</td>
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<td>• Lack of agency over time and work</td>
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<td>• Occupational segregation from men</td>
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<tr>
<td>What gendered structures limit women’s access to internet and mobile phone services and technology? In particular, how might the following reduce their access to technology resources:</td>
<td>• Shireen Santosham and Dominica Lindsey, “Connected Women: Bridging the Gender Gap - Mobile Access and Usage in Low- and Middle-Income Countries” (GSMA, 2015), <a href="https://www.gsm.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Connected-Women-Gender-Gap.pdf">https://www.gsm.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Connected-Women-Gender-Gap.pdf</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of affordable mobile/internet services</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of reliable telecommunications services (low network quality or coverage)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GCS-Factor Early Warning: Diagnostic Questions</strong></td>
<td><strong>References/Sources</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do gendered norms prevent women from leaving their homes without accompaniment of a male family member? Do women’s typical unpaid care responsibilities tie women to their homes? If</td>
<td>• Brown et al., “Gender and Age Inequality of Disaster Risk,” 29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Early Warning: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| yes to either of these questions, are programs in place to aid women in evacuating, along with other family members in the home? | • Wendy Faulkner, “The Technology Question in Feminism: A View from Feminist Technology Studies,” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 24, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 79–95, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-5395(00)00166-7.  
<p>| In what ways could early warning systems be re-designed to transform unequal gendered power structures? | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Early Warning: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National/International Security</strong></td>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Early Warning within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 50. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Healthcare.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do any local healthcare laws, policies, and institutions restrict women from accessing care services or facilities?</td>
<td>Lori Heise et al., “Gender Inequality and Restrictive Gender Norms: Framing the Challenges to Health,” The Lancet 393, no. 10189 (June 15, 2019): 2440, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30652-X">https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30652-X</a>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Syed, “Feminist Political Economy of Health.” |
| • Lowering earning capacity  
• Modulating rates of poverty  
| Do people of all genders have equal access to cooling centres during heatwaves (especially pregnant women and the isolated elderly)? |                    |
| Are women/girls exposed to higher climate health risks based on |                    |
### GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>their gendered roles or gender norms, such as:</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Domestic and care work that prevent evacuation (flood-related skin conditions)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Propriety norms that prevent women from learning to swim, removing heavy clothing, or seeking help from men (drowning)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Family sick care responsibilities (infectious disease exposure)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Early morning/late evening cooking (malaria exposure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Water and fuel collection (SGBV exposure)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Are men/boys exposed to higher climate health risks based on their gendered roles or gender norms, such as:</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Fire fighting (bush fire fatalities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Working in urban environments (dengue fever)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Working in construction (heatwave exposure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Dangerous rescue efforts (related fatalities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Playing in local water sources (boys and schistosomiasis exposure)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do all adults have equal access to and control over food aid within the community? At the household level, do women/girls consume meals of equal number and size compared to men/boys?</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are there any unique, local mental health needs following a climate crisis that would increase rates of PTSD, acute stress</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Are disaster shelters, migrant camps, and congregant facilities (bathrooms, washing facilities, breastfeeding, menstruation) designed to protect women from SGBV? | • “Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights” (UN OHCHR Department for International Development, July 2004), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/docs/rights_reproductive_health.pdf; Preethi Sundaram, “Sexual and


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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has a recent climate crisis increased rates of child marriage, thereby curtailing young girls’ climate resilience?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Felten-Biermann, “Gender and Natural Disaster:</td>
<td></td>
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Has a recent climate crisis increased rates of child marriage, thereby curtailing young girls’ climate resilience?
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<th>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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<td>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National/International Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has a climate-related health crisis led to an increase in medical-related fraudulent activity or peddling of counterfeit devices and cures? Have there been any gendered trends in participation in such activity?</td>
<td>“Coronavirus,” 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have malign actors attempted to use the climate-related health crisis to increase public loss of confidence in government through misinformation or propaganda? If so, are these messages perpetuated by or targeted to women or men in particular?</td>
<td>Martin Bricknell, Ramon PACHECO Pardo, and Christoph O Meyer, “How the COVID-19 Crisis Has Affected Security and Defence-Related Aspects of the EU” (European Parliament SEDE Committee, January 2021), 11, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/653623/EXPO_IDA(2021)653623_EN.pdf">https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/653623/EXPO_IDA(2021)653623_EN.pdf</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Has a recent climate-caused health crisis resulted in economic or political instability? If so, have any groups engaged in scapegoating of other groups based on:  
  - Citizen/immigrant status  
  - Ethnicity or race  
  - Gender  
<p>| Has a climate-caused pandemic increased infectious disease rates among military personnel, lowering military readiness and impacting regional balances of power? | • Peterson, “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” 79. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Healthcare: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Healthcare within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 51. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor WASH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are gender-specific WASH facilities available? If not, have rates of SGBV due to lack of separate facilities increased (especially women looking for safe places to urinate, defecate, or wash? If not, have women adopted any maladaptive coping mechanisms (such as avoiding eating/drinking to limit the need to use the toilet, or waiting long periods before relieving themselves)? Has the lack of separate WASH facilities increased women’s mental distress? Or limited women’s participation in other community/leadership activities?</td>
<td>Countries: Water Fetching in Current Times,” <em>Social Science &amp; Medicine</em> 72, no. 9 (May 2011): 1522–26, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.03.010">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.03.010</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have private gender-specific WASH facilities become less available or more difficult to access due to climate change?</td>
<td>Bernadette P Resurrección et al., “Gender-Transformative Climate Change Adaptation: Advancing Social Equity” (Stockholm Environment Institute, 2019), 21, <a href="https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GenderTransformativeClimateChangeAdaptation.pdf">https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GenderTransformativeClimateChangeAdaptation.pdf</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have concerns about modesty intensified to the point where women/girls are unable to participate in economic/educational activities?</td>
<td>Edward G. J. Stevenson et al., “Water Insecurity in 3 Dimensions: An Anthropological Perspective on Water and Women’s Psychosocial Distress in Ethiopia,” <em>Social Science</em></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Do local gender norms dictate that women/girls are responsible for a higher percentage of WASH-related unpaid care and domestic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>work (UCDW)? If yes:</td>
<td>&amp; Medicine 75, no. 2 (July 1, 2012): 392–400, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.03.022">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.03.022</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If so, has this increased the mental distress women/girls experience if they are not able to meet expected UCDW duties?</td>
<td>Craig Hadley and Amber Wutich, “Experience-Based Measures of Food and Water Security: Biocultural Approaches to Grounded Measures of Insecurity,” Human Organization 68, no. 4 (2009): 451–60, <a href="https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.68.4.932w421317680w5x">https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.68.4.932w421317680w5x</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have any investments in local infrastructure been targeted at the care economy? Has the local government considered providing support for WASH-related work to allow women/girls greater access to economic/educational activity?</td>
<td>Lekha S. Chakraborty, “Deficient Public Infrastructure and Private Costs: Evidence for the Water Sector,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 31 (2008): 69.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National/International Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>How does water relate to local “embodied emotional geographies of places, peoples, and resources”, and therefore how are local culture and norms wrapped up in WASH-related identities and activities? Has climate change threatened any of these norms, identities, or activities? If so, have such changes increased levels of grievance or tensions between groups?</td>
<td>● Farhana Sultana, “Suffering for Water, Suffering from Water: Emotional Geographies of Resource Access, Control and Conflict,” <em>GeoForum</em>, Themed Issue: New Feminist Political Ecologies, 42, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 163–72, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.12.002">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.12.002</a>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Have elites or rebel/criminal groups captured/securitized water resources for private use or illegal distribution?  
  ● Have hypermasculine messages been used to justify such capture/securitization?  
| Have water limitations increased emotional distress or declines in mental health among women or men or both? If so:  
  ● Has talk of anti-state grievances or inter-group tensions increased as a result of emotional distress?  
  ● Have expressed anti-state grievances insinuated gendered allocation of WASH resources?  
  ● Have women indicated a willingness to transgress gender norms in order to protest water shortages? If so, has there been opposition or a backlash from men to such activity? | ● Anwar, Sawas, and Mustafa, “‘Without Water, There Is No Life.’”  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Have tensions between groups been exacerbated by ethnic, religious, racial, tribal, or socioeconomic favouritism?</td>
<td>• Graham, Desai, and McFarlane, “Water Wars in Mumbai,” 122,126.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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</table>
| Have tensions between groups involved SGBV, including rape used as a weapon of war, revenge, intimidation, or fear? | - In particular, is SGBV used to gain access/control of WASH resources?  
- Do women face higher SGBV risks in journeys to collect water or use WASH facilities?                                                    |
| Have climate-caused tensions over water resources resulted in violent rhetoric or actions between states? If yes: | - Have marine or land-based water systems been militarized/securitized along interstate borders?  
- Have tensions over cross-border water disputes resulted in armed clashes/violence?  
- Have changes in water control triggered shifts in regional power balances?  
- Is any party to interstate water tensions plagued by weak institutions (and therefore greater political instability)? |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maria Ines Fernandez Alvarez et al., <em>Gender and Sustainable Development: Case Studies</em>, ed. Smita Premchander and Christine Muller, Perspectives of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North South, University of Bern 2 (Bern: NCCR North-South, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryam Safi, “‘We Are Fighting a Water War’: The Character of the Upstream States and Post-Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor WASH: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor WASH within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 52. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Food Security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have women and men generally produced different foodstuffs (i.e. different in terms of variety and/or whether it is used for local consumption)?</td>
<td>• Sophia Huyer, “Closing the Gender Gap in Agriculture,” <em>Gender, Technology and Development</em> 20, no. 2 (2016): 105–16, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0971852416643872">https://doi.org/10.1177/0971852416643872</a>; Sachs, “Feminist Food Sovereignty: Crafting a New Vision.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have women lacked equal access to key resources needed for producing food?</td>
<td>• Gopal et al., “Expanding the Horizons for Women in Fisheries and Aquaculture.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land ownership/control (often due to discriminatory inheritance/property rights that limit women to small plots of land)</td>
<td>• Christine Jost et al., “Understanding Gender Dimensions of Agriculture and Climate Change in Smallholder Farming Communities,” <em>Climate and Development</em> 8, no. 2 (March 14, 2016): 133–44, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2015.1050978">https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2015.1050978</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial systems (denying them access to loans)</td>
<td>• Amelia H. X. Goh, “A Literature Review of the Gender-Differentiated Impacts of Climate Change on Women’s and</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Agriculture technology (such as irrigation infrastructure and other machinery that may be too heavy or culturally</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>References/Sources</strong></th>
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| inappropriate for women to use)                 | Men’s Assets and Well-Being in Developing Countries:,”  
CAPRi Working Papers, CAPRi Working Papers (International  
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2012), 6,  
| • Information/education                         |                        |
| • Extension support systems (often government- or NGO-run  
systems that provide information and tools)           |                        |
| • (Farmworker) labour, resulting in significant power  
imbalances that often stunt women farmers’ productivity |                        |
| Has such lack of access/ownership intensified due to climate  
change?                                                 |                        |
| [Related to FAO’s *food availability*]            |                        |
| Have women been permitted to access climate smart  
agriculture/fishing educational opportunities, extension services,  
and other resources that would support their adaptation to climate  
change?                                                 |                        |
| [Related to FAO’s *food availability*]            |                        |
|                                                 | • Jost et al., “Understanding Gender Dimensions of Agriculture  
and Climate Change in Smallholder Farming Communities.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has climate change triggered changes in land-based or marine-based food outputs? If yes:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Are there local gender disparities in land access/ownership, hourly wages, unpaid care and domestic work (UCDW), and other social reproductive responsibilities? If yes:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have large-scale farms been impacted by climate-related output shortages? If so, is there a gendered impact in terms of jobs lost, wages reduced, or employment security overall?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have smallholder farms been impacted by climate-related output shortages? If so, is there a gendered impact of such changes, such as higher rates of bankruptcy/land forfeitures among women?</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Related to FAO’s <em>food availability</em>]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do women generally maintain/operate kitchen gardens and/or yard livestock? If yes:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do women generally have access to the tools and/or funds to effectively manage them?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have households lost these assets in recent climate disasters? If so, have women been supported to replace/repair their lost assets?</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Related to FAO’s <em>food access</em>]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have shortfalls in food production had impacts on local food security? If so:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do both women and men possess the economic resources to purchase food during times of shortages from home gardens/livestock?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Has climate increased UCDW for either women or men? If so, has this unpaid work curtailed economic earnings and therefore increased food insecurity for either women or men? [Related to FAO’s <em>food access</em>]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do gender norms suggest that women are not in direct control of household food use? If yes:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have climate-caused food shortages prompted women and girls to skip meals or eat less?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has there been a change in women’s and girls’ overall nutritional health levels?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have women shown an increase in disease contraction (such as malaria, diarrheal infections, and acute respiratory infections) due to food insecurity and meal skipping, especially following climate disasters? [Related to FAO’s <em>food utilization</em>]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sachs, “Feminist Food Sovereignty: Crafting a New Vision,” 5.</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Are pregnant women and nursing mothers experiencing higher rates of pregnancy complications (gestational diabetes, anemia, hypertension); poor infant health outcomes (low birth weight, increased birth defects, poor developmental outcomes); as well as lower quality of life and increased risks of depression and anxiety?</td>
<td>• Sachs, “Feminist Food Sovereignty: Crafting a New Vision,” 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are budget shortfalls in local NGOs or governments shrinking women and baby educational programs, including breastfeeding support?</td>
<td>[Related to FAO’s food utilization]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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</table>
| Have the prices of basic foodstuffs changed in response to climate breakdown or climate disasters? If the prices have increased:  
  • Are families shifting income from food to other necessities?  
  Has this impacted women or men differently?  
  • Has food insecurity been on the rise among particular genders? Or women-headed households in particular?  
| Have local policymakers and/or community leaders considered food sovereignty as a means of increasing food security and transforming gender norms?  
  • Is food viewed as a human right instead of as a commodity?  
  • Could local las improve farmers and farm workers’ control over their food systems (production, culture, environments, markets)?  
  • Is the community investing in seed saving and other small-scale, climate smart adaptations?  
• Tricia Glazebrook, Samantha Noll, and Emmanuela Opoku, “Gender Matters: Climate Change, Gender Bias, and Women’s Farming in the Global South and North,” *Agriculture* 10, no. 7 (July 3, 2020), https://doi.org/10.3390/agriculture10070267. |
## GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions

### National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have food shortages evoked feelings of anger, frustration, or inequity in local people? If yes, have such feelings been triggered by any of the following ‘experiential domains,’ and are there gender differences in reactions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Uncertainty and worry: Worry about short-term food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inadequate quality: Not eating balanced meals / healthy, nutritious foods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient quantity: Ran out of food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social unacceptability: Resorted to using socially unacceptable methods for acquiring food (such as stealing or having to work in gender-inappropriate roles)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### References/Sources


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has there been an increase in property or violent crime as a result of climate-fueled food scarcity? If so:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Can gender differences in type and frequency of criminality be observed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is increased criminal activity connected to any of the four ‘experiential domains’?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### References/Sources


- Jonathan Randel Caughron, “An Examination of Food
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Has food scarcity combined with economic uncertainty to trigger increases in anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, or interstate tensions? For instance:  
  - Have precipitation and temperature changes triggered lower agriculture productivity, and subsequently stunted economic growth?  
  - Has low economic growth mass accelerated elite exit and deepened economic insecurity?  
  - Have groups/individuals experienced tensions with others over food resources (croplands and food)?  
  - Are local democratic institutions (constraints on the executive, separations of power, strong property rights, and rule of law) lacking? If so, national/international security threats may increase.  
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Food Security: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have placed-based power relationships been distorted due to climate-caused changes in food resources, leading to increases in anti-state grievances, grievances between societal groups, or interstate tensions? For instance:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have land grabbing and neoliberal economic policies created a disempowered landless peasant class? If so, these groups may see conflict/violence as the only recourse to resolve power imbalances.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have corporations, government agencies, or elites been given control over food resources without consultation with indigenous peoples or residents, thereby engendering grievances between the community and governments/corporations/elites? If so, conflict and violence may appear the only way to resolve such grievances.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there gender differences in terms of motivation or involvement level within these types of tensions or conflicts?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding food security/scarcity?</td>
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</table>

These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Food Security within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.
Table 53. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Recent Shocks.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following a recent climate-related shock, are there any individuals in your community that did not subsequently take adaptive or precautionary actions to mitigate future threats? If so, could one of the following reasons explain why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reason 1: Individuals understand the risk but choose to accept it due to the fact that the perceived benefits of living close to the river appear to outweigh the potential negative impacts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reason 2: Individuals understand the risk but do not realize any agency for their own actions; the responsibility for action is transferred to someone else.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reason 3: Individuals understand the risk but have few resources to affect the situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>If either Reason 2 or 3 are common in your community, could gender inequalities be the cause?</td>
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</table>
### GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do any of the following conditions hinder increases in risk perception following a recent shock in either women or men?</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• False sense of security or a misjudgement of individual’s ability to cope due to low severity or rare events</td>
<td>• Wachinger et al., “The Risk Perception Paradox-Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recent events are over-weighted compared to distant events that may have been more common or serious</td>
<td>• Elke U. Weber, Sharoni Shafir, and Ann-Renee Blais, “Predicting Risk Sensitivity in Humans and Lower Animals: Risk as Variance or Coefficient of Variation,” <em>Psychological Review</em> 111, no. 2 (2004): 430–45, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.430">https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.430</a>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### In what ways do women’s relationships to the natural environment shape their knowledge and skills about social-environmental change, and therefore their understanding of recent shocks and subsequent risk perception and preparatory steps? For instance, how do the following considerations mediate women’s risk perceptions?

<p>| • Lack of jobs |  |
| • Local drug and alcohol addiction |  |
| • Migration of family members |  |</p>
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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What gender inequalities form barriers to women taking preparatory steps against future threats?</td>
<td>• Bee, “Power, Perception, and Adaptation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of power on local water/resource management committees</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Exclusion from owning assets, land or property</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Decision-making power related to prioritization of needs following a shock</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Having intersectional identities based on class, race, ethnicity, religion, or disability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increased UCDW responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those fitting any of these categories are more likely to face &quot;long and unstable displacements; stigma during displacement; displacement to shelters; unsanitary shelters and hotels and/or cramped housing; loss of home, social support networks, and jobs, often simultaneously or in short order; unsafe living conditions; and uncertainty about disaster impacts to impeded coping and recovery” and suffer mental health consequences as a result</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| • Cultural and social norms or economic barriers that prevent women from obtaining medical treatment for injuries or illnesses  
• Disruptions in SRHR services, placing women at higher risk of infections, premature births, malnutrition, unwanted pregnancies, and pregnancy losses | |
| In what ways have recent shocks stressed women’s and men’s self-esteem, socioeconomic status/position, employment, basic beliefs, relationships? As a result, have there been increases in any of the following mental health conditions (and if so, are there gendered patterns in such increases)?  
• Anxiety  
• Sleep disturbances  
• Impaired personal relationships  
• PTSD (from acute or chronic trauma)  
• SGBV  
• Psychosomatic complaints | • Wiest, Mocellin, and Motsisi, “The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies.,” 22.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| How have UCDW demands been impacted by a recent shock?  
  - Increased demands for care of sick/injured family members  
  - Lowered bargaining power in negotiations for disaster relief  
  - Diminished social safety net  
  Have increased UCDW demands on women impacted their mental health by raising levels of suicidal ideation, anxiety, desperation, and helplessness, or contributing to lack of sleep? | • John Twigg, “Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practice Review 9” (London, UK: Overseas Development Institute, 2015), 091, https://odiihn.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/GPR-9-web-string-1.pdf.  
University, 2015), https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2135&context=oa_dissertations. |
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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Have disaster responses amplified existing gender equalities in the name of efficiency, time-management, or budget controls? Have any of the following approaches been used in recent shock responses? | • Fordham, “Gender, Disaster and Development: The Necessity for Integration,” 57.  
• Twigg, “Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practice Review 9,” 091. |
| • Targeting relief efforts through the head of household (typically men) with job, training, and recovery assistance  
• Expecting women to contribute to unpaid reconstruction projects (in addition to UCDW)  
• Barring women from leadership positions within DRR institutions | |
| Is the period following a recent shock, during which social constraints may be temporarily relaxed, viewed as opportunities to implement gender transformative programming by working to improve women’s confidence, skill levels, bargaining power, and involvement in decision-making? | • Twigg, “Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practice Review 9,” 092–095. |
Have crime rates increased locally following a recent shock (including gal fishing, human trafficking and illegal migration, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, etc.)?

- Have shocks occurred in regions that had been impacted by further shocks (perhaps impacted by blight or abandonment)?
- Have recent shocks impacted social, politically, or economically important natural resources (such as marine environments)
- Has the government offered an effective/efficient response or demonstrated incompetence or lack of compassion?

References/Sources

### GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions

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<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Peters, “Disasters as Ambivalent Multipliers.”</td>
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<tr>
<th>Has disaster response demonstrated favouritism to one particular group based on race, ethnicity, religion, class, socioeconomic status, or gender?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Has ‘othering’ rhetoric increased, stoking intragroup tensions and/or ties?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has blame been assigned to the government or another societal group?</td>
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</table>

If so, have tensions between communities and governments or between societal groups erupted or intensified as a result?

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<tr>
<th>Do post-shock intrastate or interstate tensions follow the pattern suggested by Reinhardt and Lutmar:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Disasters are endogenous social phenomena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disasters and conflict are intertwined processes or cycles</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Disasters and conflict are co-determined</td>
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</table>

If so, conflicts may be more likely to occur.

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<tr>
<th>Have local populations approached conflicts as a trade-off between peaceful starvation or fighting to gain new territory to overcome the impacts of recent shocks? If so, the anticipation of future disasters can shift power balances, leading to increased likelihood of conflict in disaster-prone regions.</th>
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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Recent Shocks: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have attempts been made to view climate shocks as opportunities to pacify tensions and work toward peacebuilding? Good DRR design that is gender transformative can engage communities in post-disaster clean-up that improves relationships.</td>
<td>• Bas and McLean, “Expecting the Unexpected.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding DRR?</td>
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</table>

*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Recent Shocks within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 54. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the ability of local governments to purchase formal climate risk insurance, as well as other raise precautionary funds and/or plan to share the costs for relief, recovery, and reconstruction? Furthermore:</td>
<td>• Katherine Miles and Martina Wiedmaier-Pfister, “Applying a Gender Lens to Climate Risk Finance and Insurance” (Bonn, Germany: The InsuResilience Global Partnership Secretariat, November 2018), 7, <a href="https://www.insuresilience.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/insuresilience_applygender_181128_web.pdf">https://www.insuresilience.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/insuresilience_applygender_181128_web.pdf</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What percentage of the community’s assets are covered by climate risk insurance? Who are the beneficiaries of that which is covered, and what is the gender balance of the beneficiaries of that insurance?</td>
<td>• Martina Wiedmaier-Pfister and Katherine Miles, “Mainstreaming Gender and Targeting Women in Inclusive Insurance: Perspectives and Emerging Lessons A Compendium of Technical Notes and Case Studies” (The Women and Inclusive Insurance Project, 2017), 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If precautionary funds have been raised, how are they allocated, and what is the gender balance of the beneficiaries of those funds?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When dislocated populations arrive in the community, are they able to settle in regions that are safe from future climate disasters? Or do they relocate to regions susceptible to climate hazards? What is the gender composition of the most vulnerable communities?</td>
<td>• Stéphane Hallegatte et al., “From Poverty to Disaster and Back: A Review of the Literature,” <em>Economics of Disasters and Climate Change</em> 4, no. 1 (April 1, 2020): 223–47, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s41885-020-00060-5">https://doi.org/10.1007/s41885-020-00060-5</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the pre-existing, gendered climate-related economic risks in the community? In particular:</td>
<td>• Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister, “Applying a Gender Lens to Climate Risk Finance and Insurance,” 8–10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do women or men tend to face higher poverty levels? Or lower socioeconomic participation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What percentage of women in the community work in the agriculture sector, and how vulnerable is that sector locally?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do women or men tend to own more of the household assets?</td>
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### GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation: Diagnostic Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does UCDW responsibilities or rates of SGBV increase following a crisis in the community, and how do such changes impact women economically?</td>
<td>Wiedmaier-Pfister and Miles, “Mainstreaming Gender and Targeting Women in Inclusive Insurance: Perspectives and Emerging Lessons A Compendium of Technical Notes and Case Studies,” 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What different adaptation strategies are used by women and men following a climate crisis, such as:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Pulling children out of school (if so, what is the gender make-up of those who stay and those who leave school?)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Selling assets?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Taking out expensive loans?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Borrowing from informal networks?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What barriers to local women face to purchasing CRI? For instance:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Laws that restrict women’s access to financial services or ownership of property</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of awareness of insurance options for women</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of financial literacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• No financial services tailored to women’s unique needs: different risk profiles, unique protection needs, longer life expectancies, gender-specific health risks, fluctuating cash flows, fewer assets, restrictive ownership and inheritance laws, and higher rates of self-employment and participation in the informal economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Which of the gender transformative climate risk insurance considerations could be implemented locally (see Table 21).</td>
<td>• Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister, “Applying a Gender Lens to Climate Risk Finance and Insurance,” 21.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Is sex-disaggregated data collected before and after a crisis?  
• Are women meaningfully included in leadership roles within DRR planning and implementation institutions (is tokenism avoided)?  
• Are women’s groups consulted in every aspect of DRR planning and implementation?  
• Do DRR plans mention SGBV and do they offer approaches for preventing and addressing it when it does occur?  
• Are specific plans in place for continuity of SRHR services for women and girls? | |
| When including women in DRR planning and implementation, is care taken not to increase women’s unpaid work burdens through remuneration or other forms of support? | • Melissa Leach, “Earth Mother Myths and Other Ecofeminist Fables: How a Strategic Notion Rose and Fell,” *Development and Change* 38, no. 1 (2007): 67–85, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00403.x. |
## GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation: Diagnostic Questions

### National/International Security

What role does criminal activity play in the local economy, and are steps in place to avoid increased criminality following a climate crisis? For instance:

- Is the local government corrupt? Are laws and guidelines in place to prevent further corruption following a climate disaster?
- What level of organized crime occurs locally? Are laws in place to prevent criminal capture of recovery efforts and funding?
- How much rent-seeking activity takes place now? In what ways will increased elite capture be avoided in a crises scenario?
- In what ways is the local criminal landscape gendered and how does a gender lens increase prevention methods?
- Are women permitted to serve in meaningful government roles?

How is local criminality gendered and how might a gender lens aid in preventing crime and corruption?

How strong are government institutions? What tensions exist between local groups along religious, ethnic, racial, socioeconomic, class, or gender lines that could be utilized by extremist groups to recruit members (especially in weak states)?

### References/Sources

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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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</table>
| In a DRR scenario, how is the local government performing in terms of Maslowian drivers of anti-state grievances or grievances between societal groups?  
- Capability: Resources available or easily mobilized (short-term versus long-term planning is important on this point)  
- Competence: Appropriate/efficient application of resources  
- Compassion: Concern/affect demonstrated for victims  
- Correctness: Fairness, honesty, transparency in applying resources  
- Credibility: Consistent/reliable disaster information  
<p>| In what ways are public grievances gendered (along Maslowian lines), and how much the tendencies of women (who typically avoid violent demonstrations) and men (who are typically more likely to engage in protest violence) plan for future conflagrations? | |</p>
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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have local government institutions planned for disasters by developing public benefit programs and distributive aid policies? If so, in what ways do such plans reinforce gender/sociocultural inequalities and potentially contribute to grievances between societal groups or interstate tensions? For instance:</td>
<td>“Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 288.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is compassion and correctness shown to all groups equally?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Are distributions of aid provided free of favouritism?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do states offer reasonable, predictable, coordinated, equitable disbursement of funds with escalating risks?</td>
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If disasters do lead to increased tensions and/or grievances, are women typically involved in peace negotiations?

*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Long-Term Adaptation within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 55. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Poverty.

<table>
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<th>GCS-Factor Poverty: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kinds of care and domestic work are unpaid in the local community, and who is responsible for these unpaid care and domestic work (UCDW) tasks?</td>
<td>• Stephane Hallegatte, Marianne Fay, and Edward B. Barbier, “Poverty and Climate Change: Introduction,” <em>Environment and Development Economics</em> 23, no. 3 (June 2018): 217–33, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X18000141">https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X18000141</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kinds of UCDW tasks have increased in complexity or time required given climate change impacts, and who is responsible for these UCDW tasks?</td>
<td>• Hallegatte, Fay, and Barbier, “Poverty and Climate Change,” June 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• When a crisis strikes, how do expectations on women and men change relative to UCDW?</td>
<td>• True and Tanyag, “Global Violence and Security from a Gendered Perspective.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What types of UCDW tasks are added to women’s and men’s responsibilities following a crisis (tasks related to the replacement of public services (education, family health care, child care, etc.) or to produce high-cost items themselves (such as clothing or food))?</td>
<td>• Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 199.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 19.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Max Lawson et al., “Time to Care: Unpaid and Underpaid Care Work and the Global Inequality Crisis” (Oxford: Oxfam International, January 28, 2020), 41,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCS-Factor Poverty: Diagnostic Questions</td>
<td>References/Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How does the increase in UCDW impact women’s or men’s mental and physical health?</td>
<td><a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/time-care">https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/time-care</a>.</td>
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</table>

What types of adaptive responses to women and men make to climate shocks?

- Possible adaptive responses: cutting back number of meals, purchasing less nutritious foods, foraging for wild food, borrowing from neighbours/money lenders, turning to wealthier patrons, letting illness go untreated, depletion of household stores, selling off smaller consumer durables, taking children out of school, temporary migration, selling off of producer assets, permanent migration, breakdown of the family unit
- Is there an order to adaptive responses (i.e. are women expected to make the first adaptations or men?)?
- How do their different responses impact their long-term resources and assets?

• Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 196.

Have climate-based economic stressors prompted men to relocate in search of work?

- Has the percentage of men in your community increased? Have SGBV rates increased as a response?

• Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 193, 201.
## GCS-Factor Poverty: Diagnostic Questions

### National/International Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has climate breakdown impoverished local/national government, and impeded their ability to provide basic physical security, government legitimacy, economic growth, and social welfare to the community? For instance:</td>
<td>• “Economic Value of Peace 2021” (Sydney: Institute for Economics &amp; Peace, January 2021), 28,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Indirect costs such as economic losses, physical and physiological trauma, displacement, loss of education, and lost productivity.</td>
<td>• Jane L. Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” in <em>The International Handbook of Gender and Poverty</em>, by Sylvia Chant (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 675, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805162.00123">https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805162.00123</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alternatively, has the inability of the government to provide services contributed to increased anti-state grievances, tensions between societal groups (perhaps along ethnic, religious, class, socioeconomic, or gender cleavages), or spillover of either into interstate tensions?</td>
<td>• Susan E. Rice, “Poverty Breeds Insecurity,” in <em>Too Poor for Peace?</em>, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet, Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 32, <a href="http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpfc8.5">http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpfc8.5</a>.</td>
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</table>

<p>| • Have higher poverty rates on their own increased rates of crime? If so, are the poorest most like to engage in crime? If so, what types of crimes and are there gendered patterns to the | • Travis C. Pratt and Francis T. Cullen, “Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis,” <em>Crime and Justice: A Review of Research</em> 32 (2005): 378. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Poverty: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have inequality levels (measured by the GINI Index) between different groups increased? If so, have crime rates increased among those most impacted by inequality?</td>
<td>• Sikweyiya and Nkosi, “Violent Protests and Gendered Identities”; Rucht, “The Spread of Protest Politics.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes to either, is there a gender difference? If so, does this information help provide targeted support to prevent further stability breakdown?</td>
<td>• Sogani, “Gender Approaches in Climate Compatible Development,” 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do government benefit programs or local loan programs offer services equally to all genders, without disadvantaging any? Men in particular may experience shame if they cannot access financial services or public benefits.</strong></td>
<td>• Marshall B. Burke et al., “Climate Robustly Linked to African Civil War,” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</em> 107, no. 51 (October 30, 2010), <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1014879107">https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1014879107</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Are malign actors using increased poverty rates to stoke grievances between societal groups or against the government?</strong></td>
<td>• Parpart, “Masculinity, Poverty and the ‘New Wars,’” 675.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In particular, does recruitment messaging centre on gendered notions of economic stability and socioeconomic status?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have such recruitment campaigns increased the number of individuals joining rebel or extremist groups? If so, what is the gender balance of those joining? Related: is the flow of unemployed young men a ‘permanent source of recruitment?’</td>
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<td>Have malign actors encourage violent unrest or demonstrations? If so, what is the gender balance of those who participate?</td>
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<td><strong>GCS-Factor Poverty: Diagnostic Questions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding poverty and economic decline? If not, how might increasing women’s involvement lower the chances that increased poverty leads to political instability?</td>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Poverty within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
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<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the local community have gendered power imbalances that value masculine bodies and work, and devalue feminine bodies and work? For instance, such power imbalances may result in:</td>
<td>Sophie Harman, “Ebola, Gender and Conspicuously Invisible Women in Global Health Governance,” <em>Third World Quarterly</em> 37, no. 3 (March 10, 2016): 524–41, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1108827">https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1108827</a>; Shirin Rai, Catherine Hoskyns, and Dania Thomas, “Depletion and Social Reproduction,” in <em>Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation</em> (University of Warwick, 2010), 21.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Denial of access to reproductive choice</td>
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<td>• Affordable public benefits such as health care and safety-net programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lower or zero compensation for labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Barriers to accessing safe havens</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Restrictions on movement, dress, and conduct in public</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has survival of the family/community/state through the crisis become contingent on women’s willingness to sacrifice, subordinating her own health needs for others?</td>
<td>Deepa Chopra and Caroline Sweetman, “Introduction to Gender, Development and Care,” <em>Gender &amp; Development</em> 22, no. 3 (October 29, 2014): 409–21, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2014.975486">https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2014.975486</a>; Barbara Sutton,</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Life Expectancy: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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| wear down women’s bodies?  
  - Have women been asked to be directly involved in reconstruction/recovery projects, (with or without compensation?), thereby adding to bodily depletion with inadequate support for personal health?  
| Have son practices decreased the life expectancies of girl fetuses and girl children? For instance:  
  - Have rates of sex selective abortion increased in response to climate crises?  
  - Do parents routinely use son preference practices that lower girl children’s health, such as offering less breastmilk, lower quality food, lower vitamin supplementation, and fewer vaccinations?  
  - Have there been measurable differences in girls’ health outcomes compared to boys?  
  - Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, “Missing Women and Bare Branches: Gender Balance and Conflict,” |
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<th><strong>GCS-Factor Life Expectancy: Diagnostic Questions</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Do cultural norms directly increase women’s life expectancies during climate disasters? For instance:</td>
<td>• Neumayer and Plümper, “The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Did women or men die at higher rates during a recent climate crisis (such as flooding or drought)?</td>
<td>• Lori M. Hunter et al., “Swimming and Gendered Vulnerabilities: Evidence from the Northern and Central Philippines,” <em>Society &amp; Natural Resources</em> 29, no. 3 (2016): 380–85, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2015.1046097">https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2015.1046097</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Do gender norms forbid women from removing traditional clothing, making it difficult to be rescued by or received medical care from unrelated men?</td>
<td>• Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper, “The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy,” <em>International Organization</em> 60, no. 3 (August 9, 2006): 723–54, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060231">https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060231</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following a climate crisis, has the bodily depletion of adult women (through increased social reproductive responsibilities) resulted in increased mortality rates among women? For instance:</td>
<td>• Christin Marsh Ormsaug, Patrick Meier, and Helga Hernes, “Armed Conflict Deaths Disaggregated by Gender,” PRIO Paper (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2009), <a href="https://www.prio.org/publications/7207">https://www.prio.org/publications/7207</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Has damage to agriculture or increased barriers to obtaining food decreased increased women’s food insecurity and social reproductive labour related too food?</td>
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<td>- Has poor sanitation due to loss of WASH systems increased women’s UCDW and exposed women to additional diseases?</td>
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<td>- Has overcrowding or poor living conditions due to a climate crisis impacted the unpaid care workloads and health conditions of women?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Has damage to public health systems increased women’s family care duties and decreased women’s access to health services, particularly during pregnancy and while breastfeeding, lowering women’s overall health?</td>
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<td>- Has a loss of social order or networks left women isolated and</td>
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Have population sex ratios become imbalanced following a climate crisis, and if so, have rates of SGBV increased in response?

- SGBV rates may increase in the presence of surplus men or surplus women, depending on the local gender norms and culture.
- SGBV tends to contribute to bodily depletion, lower women’s physical and mental wellbeing.
- If SGBV rates have increased, are adequate support services and safe havens available for women?

## GCS-Factor Life Expectancy: Diagnostic Questions

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<tr>
<th>National/International Security</th>
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</table>
| Have climate crises disrupted population sex ratios? For instance: | - Hudson and den Boer, “Missing Women and Bare Branches: Gender Balance and Conflict.”
| - Have son preference practices increased due to climate-related impacts? | |
| - Was there a differential impact on mortality rates among women or men following a recent climate disaster? | |
| - Have the long-term impacts of climate change shortened women’s life expectancies? | |
| If any of these factors are at work locally, have such disruptions in population sex ratios impacted levels of crime, violence, or conflict? | |

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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Life Expectancy: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Life Expectancy within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 57. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Education.

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<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A baseline, do girls face barriers to being enrolled in and maintaining high retention rates? For instance:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do girls have household responsibilities that prevent them from attending school regularly?</td>
<td>• Kate Sims, “Education, Girls’ Education and Climate Change,” Emerging Issues (Education Development Trust, March 2021), 14, <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/16523/EIR_29_Education_Girls%27_Education_and_Climate_Change.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/16523/EIR_29_Education_Girls%27_Education_and_Climate_Change.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do son preference practices limit funds for girls’ education?</td>
<td>• Edström et al., <em>EMERGE Engendering Men</em>, 55.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Is SGBV (against girls but also LGBTQI+ students) prevalent in the schools?</td>
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How do education levels among adult women compare to other indicators of the economic and social stability of women? For instance:

• How do local fertility rates compare to national or regional averages?
• What size is the average local family compared to national or regional averages?
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<th><strong>GCS-Factor Education: Diagnostic Questions</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• How do women’s rates of employment and salary/wage levels compare to men’s? Lower fertility rates, smaller families, and higher rates of employment among women are all good indicators of higher education levels and potentially greater community stability.</td>
<td>• “Global Education Monitoring Report 2020: Gender Report, A New Generation: 25 Years of Efforts for Gender Equality in Education” (UNESCO, 2020), <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000374514">https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000374514</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have families resorted to pulling girl children (more than boy children) out of school as an adaptation strategy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have increased social reproductive responsibilities of girl children (cleaning, cooking, gardening, caring for sick family members) lowered girls’ school attendance and retention levels?</td>
<td>• Lois Onigbinde, “The Impacts of Natural Disasters on Educational Attainment: Cross-Country Evidence from Macro Data” (Master’s Thesis, The University of San Francisco, 2018); Vidya Diwakar et al., “Child Poverty, Disasters and Climate Change” (Chronic Poverty Advisory Network, March 2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has a climate disaster destroyed community school infrastructure, lead to teacher losses, or generated significant psychological distress that has disrupted education of girls or boys more?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have governments imposed austerity measures in the wake of a climate disaster that have contributed to reductions in education availability for either girls or boys?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has household displacement resulted in relocation to a community without adequate school facilities? If so, is there a</td>
<td>• Hannah Bargawi, Giovanni Cozzi, and Susan Himmelweit, eds., <em>Economics and Austerity in Europe: Gendered Impacts and Sustainable Alternatives</em>, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2016), 21, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315627762">https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315627762</a>.</td>
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### GCS-Factor Education: Diagnostic Questions

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<th>Question</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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| Difference in girls’ and boys’ rates of education in the new location? | • McLeod, Barr, and Rall, “Does Climate Change Increase the Risk of Child Marriage?,” 115.  
• Malhotra and Elnakib, “20 Years of the Evidence Base on What Works to Prevent Child Marriage.” |
| Have rates of child marriage increased following a climate crisis? If so, has this had an impact on girls’ participation in school? | • McLeod, Barr, and Rall, “Does Climate Change Increase the Risk of Child Marriage?,” 115.  
• Malhotra and Elnakib, “20 Years of the Evidence Base on What Works to Prevent Child Marriage.” |
| Are adult women and men permitted to participate in climate adaptation educational opportunities equally? Do women’s social reproductive responsibilities or finances limit their participation? | • Aastha Bhusal, Lakpa Sherpa, and Laxman Khatri, “Climate-Smart Agriculture Takes off, Thanks to ‘women-Friendly’ Tools and a Gender-Smart Approach” (CDKN: Laxman Khatri’s Lab, September 2020).  
• Edström et al., *EMERGE Engendering Men*, 61. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Education: Diagnostic Questions</th>
<th>References/Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>attempt to stress the importance of gender equality?</td>
<td>• Durrani and Dunne, “Curriculum and National Identity,” 232–33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How do women’s and men’s educational attainment levels compare (since men’s attainment levels are a key factor in forecasting men’s attitudes toward gender roles and equality, and in forecasting whether men believe that violence/conflict, including SGBV, are the best ways to solve problems)?</td>
<td>• Shon Michael Reed, “Boys to Men: Masculinity, Victimization, and Offending” (Master’s Thesis, Las Vegas, University of Nevada, 2015), 1, <a href="https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/3316">https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/3316</a>.</td>
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<th>National/International Security</th>
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<td>Do larger narratives emphasize any of the following beliefs about the role of gender hierarchies in the community?</td>
<td>• Men hold masculinized leadership roles over women</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Women’s roles are invisibilized in history</td>
<td>• Systems that emphasize the subordination of women at the household level via the ‘Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome’ are more likely to experience instability and insecurity, lower levels of overall well-being, greater environmental degradation, and decreased prosperity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Women’s roles are spoken of primarily in service of men</td>
<td>• Sexual- and gender-based violence is condoned to solve problems between genders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sexual- and gender-based violence is condoned to solve problems between genders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systems that emphasize the subordination of women at the household level via the ‘Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome’ are more likely to experience instability and insecurity, lower levels of overall well-being, greater environmental degradation, and decreased prosperity.</td>
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## GCS-Factor Education: Diagnostic Questions

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<tr>
<th>Have education levels for men and boys fallen following a recent climate crisis? Lower education levels have been associated with feelings of emasculation (if their educational achievement is lower than women’s), which may contribute to higher rates of criminality among men.</th>
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<td><strong>References/Sources</strong></td>
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<td>• Reed, “Boys to Men,” 1.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Have climate-caused government budget cuts resulted in the delivery of education to elites or allied groups only rather than universally? Favouritism in delivery of public services such as education has been linked to higher rates of anti-state grievance and may increase rates of political unrest. Denial of education may also be used as a weapon of war, or may include a gender component (denying education to girls but not boys). Restricted access to school may be an early warning sign of deteriorating tensions between societal groups.</th>
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<tr>
<th>Have local education systems been weaponized and masculinized as a way of perpetuating structural inequalities and institutional violence against minorities, often against women and girls, by reinforcing racial/ethnic/religious/class/socioeconomic ‘othering’? And have the curricula been adjusted in the wake of a recent climate crisis? For instance:</th>
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<td>• Has education been used to instill hatred of the ‘other’?</td>
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<td>• Have curricula been used as a form of ethnocide, robbing minority groups of their language, tradition, and values?</td>
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<td>• Has education been used to manipulate history, inculcate authoritarian and chauvinistic values and identities, and lead to fundamentalization of national identities?</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Education: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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| • Preventing grievance by demonstrating to people (regardless of identity) that their government is attempting to improve their lives  
• Adding stability by giving people tools to resolve disputes peacefully, making them less likely to join an armed group or rebellion  
• Fostering and sustaining ethnically and linguistically tolerant environments  
• Cultivating attitudes of desegregation and inclusive citizenship  
• Disarming history and defying state oppression | |
| If yes to any of the above, have women also been included in the peace-based educational programming? This is often necessary in order to meaningfully involve women in peacebuilding and decision-making. | |

*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Education within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 58. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Standard of Living.

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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>At baseline, does your local government provide any public benefits, such as employment or other financial assistance; healthcare, social security, or disability insurance; education systems; housing assistance; libraries; hospitals; or transit systems? If so:</td>
<td>• Antonella Picchio, <em>Social Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour Market</em> (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are they offered to women and men equally?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• When government budgets get tight, who in the community picks up the slack to provide the public benefits? Is women’s UCDW expected to expand and contract to subsidize lost public systems?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In general, have cuts been made to services that support the care economy (child care, elder care, health care, etc.) or the production economy (those businesses that produce goods and services for profit)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Is the assumption that women’s UCDW/social reproductive work will fill the gaps created by spending cuts to public services?</td>
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<td>• Has the economic impact of austerity measures been tracked for women and men?</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Standard of Living: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have increased demands on women’s UCDW/social reproduction resulted in a higher level of bodily depletion, demonstrated through more health concerns, sick days, absences from work, doctor’s visits, or mental health strain?</td>
<td>• Meg Luxton, “Feminist Political Economy in Canada and the Politics of Social Reproduction,” in <em>Social Reproduction: Feminist Political Economy Challenges Neo-Liberalism</em>, ed. Kate Bezanson and Meg Luxton (Canada: McGill Queen University Press, 2006), 38.</td>
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### GCS-Factor Standard of Living: Diagnostic Questions

Has scapegoating of public sector employees or public benefit recipients increased due to climate-caused financial strains? Is there a gender divide in terms of who perpetuates and who is victim of scapegoating? Have such attacks added mental/emotional strain (and possibly bodily depletion) to the burdens of those impacted?

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### National/International Security

Have climate-induced austerity measures included cuts for law enforcement and crime prevention? If so, have crime rates increased as a result?

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If your local government has made austerity cuts to public services, have criminality rates been measured before and after to track whether reduction in public support is a possible cause? Is there a gender divide in terms of who is engaging in which types of criminal activity?

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| Have there been gender differences in the types of cuts that animate women and men?  
Have there been gender differences in the types of protests they’re willing to engage in (violent or not)?  
### GCS-Factor Standard of Living: Diagnostic Questions

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<td></td>
<td>Interestingly, non-institutionalized forms of participation generally reinforce educational inequalities (higher levels of education are found in those participating in formal political spaces), and therefore are not effective means for lower-education groups to gain access to decision-making spheres.</td>
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<td>Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding threats that may arise from austerity measures?</td>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Standard of Living within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 59. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Unemployment.

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<th>GCS-Factor Unemployment: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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| What kinds of care and domestic work (childcare; providing medical/support care to sick or frail adults; performing domestic work such as laundry, cooking, and collecting fuel or water, etc.) are unpaid in the local community, and who is responsible for these unpaid care and domestic work (UCDW) tasks? | • Leyla Karimli et al., “Factors and Norms Influencing Unpaid Care Work: Household Survey Evidence from Five Rural Communities in Colombia, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Uganda and Zimbabwe,” Evaluation Report (Oxfam Policy & Practice, November 15, 2016), 15, https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/factors-and-norms-influencing-unpaid-care-work-household-survey-evidence-from-f-620145/.  
<p>| • How do women’s and men’s wages, benefits, and other compensation compare to one another? |                   |
| • What is the difference in time spent between women and men, girls and boys on paid work? Unpaid work? |                   |
| • Do local gender norms dictate that women/girls are responsible for a higher percentage of unpaid care and domestic work (UCDW)? |                   |
| • Compensation: over-invest in one domain to compensate for dissatisfaction in the other |                   |
| • Accommodation: limit investments in one sphere to satisfy demands in the other |                   |
| • Boundary management: develop principles/practices for creating, maintaining, crossing borders between the spheres |                   |
| Do their coping mechanisms feed into a self-reinforcing cycle of low income and time poverty? |                   |</p>
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<th>GCS-Factor Unemployment: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>What kinds of UCDW tasks have increased in complexity or time required given climate change impacts, and who is responsible for these UCDW tasks?</td>
<td>• Lawson et al., “Time to Care,” 41.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• When a crisis strikes, how do expectations on women and men change relative to UCDW?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What types of UCDW tasks are added to women’s and men’s responsibilities following a crisis? Tasks related to the replacement of public services (education, family health care, child care, health/medical care, etc.)? Tasks related to the DIY production of high-cost items (such as clothing or food))?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How does the increase in UCDW impact women’s or men’s mental and physical health?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have SGBV rates increased as ‘punishment’ for unmet UCDW expectations? Or due to increased risks on journeys to gather water, fuel, food, etc.?</td>
<td>• Amiera Sawas et al., “Gender, Climate &amp; Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change” (UN Environment Programme. UN Women, UNDP, UNDPPA/PBSO, June 2020), 19, <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/32638/GCS.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/32638/GCS.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have SGBV-related injuries or illness increased women’s absentee days from work?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has women’s mental/emotional health declined due to increases in SGBV, causing extra missed days of work?</td>
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</table>
Have climate-induced economic impacts affected the unemployment rate among women and men? Has the impact been more profound for one gender? For instance:

- Have those who work in environment-based or agriculture-based employment seen a more significant unemployment increase?
- When businesses begin to re-hire, do they tend to hire back women or men first?
- When businesses begin to re-hire, are women and men offered the same wages, benefits, and hours?
- Do governments offer re-skilling and re-training opportunities equally to women and men following an economic crisis?
- Have men experienced greater unemployment due to extreme weather events such as flooding or waterlogging?
- Do women or men have better livelihood adaptation strategies for adjusting to impacts on the economy from climate change?

References/Sources


- Christopher Cramer, “Unemployment and Participation in
Are women finding new opportunities for employment in the wake of a climate-caused economic disruption (especially in urban environments)? For instance:

- Greater skill development opportunities?
- New entrepreneurship opportunities?
- Strategic development options?
- More space for work-based innovation?

Furthermore, do increased employment opportunities in urban environments offer women greater bargaining power in the household?

References/Sources

### GCS-Factor Unemployment: Diagnostic Questions

Have new employment opportunities for women offered by a climate-shifted economy come with some downsides? If so:

- Have women experienced a backlash or reprisals by men (who may be experiencing less employment security) in response to taking advantage of new employment opportunities?
- Do new employment opportunities come with new UCDW responsibilities (or at least no decrease in existing social reproductive work)?

### References/Sources


### National/International Security

Has climate change triggered increased unemployment among men (particularly young men)? If so, has lack of employment made it difficult for young men to perform their culturally-ascribed masculine roles (finding work, getting married, etc.)? If yes, then:

- Have criminal offending and re-offending increased more among women or men? If so, what types of crimes are generally committed by women and men?
- Have rebel or extremist groups used negative sentiments regarding unemployment to recruit young men?
- Have rates of anti-state grievances or state- or non-state violence increased with increased unemployment (particularly among young men)?
- Have tensions between societal groups increased as unemployment rates have increased? If so, are these complicated by differential impacts based on identity (race, gender, etc.)?

### References/Sources

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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Unemployment: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>ethnicity, class, socioeconomic status, gender, etc.?</td>
<td>134–45, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.023">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.023</a>.</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Unemployment: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have scarce job opportunities prompted men to take jobs that are demeaning and monotonous or offer little chance of promotion or skill development, poor wages, and exploitative or coercive conditions?</td>
<td>Refugee%20youth%2C%20unemployment%20and%20extremism.pdf; Mohamed Abdel Jelil et al., <em>Unemployment and Violent Extremism: Evidence from Daesh Foreign Recruits</em> (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018), <a href="https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8381">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8381</a>.</td>
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<td>• If so, have rates of recruitment of men into insurgencies, gangs, and militias increased?</td>
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<td>Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding the challenges of Unemployment?</td>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Unemployment within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 60. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Socioeconomic Development.

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| • Due to increased UCDW responsibilities and the risks therein  
• Following climate-related disasters  
• Because of household food insecurity  
• Due to lower levels of education  
• Due to a decrease in men’s employment levels compared to that of women’s  
• In response to a surplus of men in economic zones |                    |
| Do women with lower socioeconomic status experience higher rates of violence as an intimidation tactic to gain control over natural resources or intimidate those protecting natural resources? | Carney I. Castañeda et al., *Gender-Based Violence and Environment Linkages* (IUCN, 2020), https://doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.CH.2020.03.en. |
| Does a woman’s socioeconomic status impede her ability to own or use a mobile phone, the internet, climate risk insurance, or banking and financial services? If so:  
• Do women with less socioeconomic power find it difficult to access emergency finances following a climate disaster?  
• Do women rely on social cash from family and friends as an emergency stopgap during a climate crisis?  
• Are women able to access emergency information if they are not able to access the internet or mobile phone technology? | Volz Ulrich et al., “Inclusive Green Finance: From Concept to Practice” (Kuala Lumpur; London: Alliance for Financial Inclusion and SOAS, University of London, 2020), https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/34540/1/AFI_IGF_SOAS_digital.pdf.  
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<tr>
<th>GCS-Factor Socioeconomic Development: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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| Do financial and telecommunication systems reforms address the deep structural gender inequalities within neoliberal markets that may limit women’s access to the emergency services they need following a climate crisis? For instance:  
  - Do reforms redistribute power, or replicate existing structures of exclusion that rely on individual effort, entrepreneurship, and market opportunities to grant loans/insurance, etc.  
  - Do financial and telecommunications systems consider how women use their services to perform social reproductive activities within their communities (and not solely for themselves), and therefore increased access may serve only to add ‘feminized responsibility’ to women’s existing burdens? | Faulkner, “The Technology Question in Feminism”; Bray, “Gender and Technology.”  
Ulrich et al., “Inclusive Green Finance: From Concept to Practice,” 5. |
What barriers to women’s participation in decision-making spaces limit their ability to influence how climate adaptation and resilience systems are designed and implemented? For instance, do women face any of these conditions (see also Table 38):

- Basic barriers: Time constraints; burdensome application processes; time timelines for communal decision-making
- Legal barriers: Land/property ownership pre-requisites to leadership roles or incentive/assistance programs; community norms that bar women from leadership
- Economic barriers: Educational requirements for participation in leadership (precluded by women’s low- or unpaid work that make education unaffordable); UCDW responsibilities that preclude involvement
- Tokenistic positions: Allowing women’s involvement but only as tokens and not in substantively important roles

References/Sources:

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<tr>
<td>• Do racial tensions exclude some groups from the economy, and do rates of criminality increase among such groups? If yes to any of the above, are there gender patterns to changes in malign activity?</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Socioeconomic Development: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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| Do socioeconomic inequalities contribute to marginalizations in the form of environmental (living in low-potential areas); economic (poor market access and low share of public expenditures); sociocultural (ethnic prejudices); or political (any combination of the above)? If so, do such exclusions from the market (especially regarding minerals, fossil fuels, and forestry resources) contribute to increased rates of tensions between societal groups or anti-state grievances? | • Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton, “Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World,” New Frontiers of Social Policy (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2010), 209, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2689/520970PUB0EPI11C010disclosed0Dec091.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  
| Are gender-transformative approaches used to reform socioeconomic policies? For instance, have barriers to property rights and empowerment based on gender or other identity factors been dismantled? | • Mearns and Norton, “Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World,” 278. |
| Are both women’s and men’s networks included in conflict mitigation processes regarding Socioeconomic Development? | |

*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Socioeconomic Development within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 61. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Infrastructure.

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<td>• What is the condition of infrastructure that supports the care economy (housing, childcare systems, modern cooking energy systems, public transportation)?</td>
<td>Sonal Jessel, Samantha Sawyer, and Diana Hernández, “Energy, Poverty, and Health in Climate Change: A</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Infrastructure: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<td>• Does the average household struggle with energy insecurity (inadequate or faulty infrastructure that results in service disruptions or cost challenges)?</td>
<td>Institute for Women’s Policy Research, “Gender, Urbanization and Democratic Governance,” 17.</td>
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<td>• Has studying and learning become more difficult due to climate-damaged energy infrastructure? If so, has this impacted girls/women and boys/men equally?</td>
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<td>• Has climate increased the drudgery or health risks (air pollution, spinal injuries, burns) of food preparation due to lack of modern cooking energy? If so, has this impacted women and men equally?</td>
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<td>• Has climate-damaged energy infrastructure increased the costs of household energy? If so, has this impacted women- or men-headed household equally?</td>
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<td>• What are the most significant risks of climate-related damage to local energy systems?</td>
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<p>| • Which transportation systems receive the highest government investments: private vehicle roads or mass transit? | |
| • What is the average time women and men spend | |</p>
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<th>GCS-Factor Infrastructure: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Do women and men use human-powered transportation (walking or bicycling) equally? Or does one gender typically use such transportation systems more than the other?</td>
<td>• Reena Patel, Working the Night Shift: Women in India’s Call Center Industry, Working the Night Shift (Stanford University Press, 2010), <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804775502">https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804775502</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How are public transportation schedules designed to support market economy work (typically 9-5 from outer neighbourhoods to the centre of town) versus the care economy (frequently off-peak hours to and from non-central locations)?</td>
<td>• Torin Monahan, “Dreams of Control at a Distance: Gender, Surveillance, and Social Control,” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 9, no. 2 (April 2009): 288, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/15332708608321481">https://doi.org/10.1177/15332708608321481</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In what ways are current public transportation systems unwelcoming to women (due to gender norms that restrict their access, SGBV risks, or safety or cleanliness concerns)?</td>
<td>• Kareem Buyana and Lwasa Shuaib, “Gender Responsiveness in Infrastructure Provision for African Cities: The Case of Kampala in Uganda,” Journal of Geography and Regional Planning 7, no. 1 (February 28, 2014): 1–9, <a href="https://doi.org/10.5897/JGRP2013.0424">https://doi.org/10.5897/JGRP2013.0424</a>.</td>
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<td><strong>GCS-Factor Infrastructure: Diagnostic Questions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Are both women and men able to access digital/mobile technology to save time, increase safety, gain independence, access banking services, access health services, seek legal advice, find support for SGBV survival, stay in touch with family and friends (especially during crises), or participate in civic engagement?</td>
<td>• Sigita Strumskyte, “Gender Equality and Sustainable Infrastructure” (OECD Council on SDGs, 2019), 4, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/gov/gender-mainstreaming/gender-equality-and-sustainable-infrastructure-7-march-2019.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/gov/gender-mainstreaming/gender-equality-and-sustainable-infrastructure-7-march-2019.pdf</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is gendered cyber harassment common in the local community?</td>
<td>• Mallalieu, “Women, ICT and Emergency Telecommunications: Opportunities and Constraints.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are both women and men consulted in the design of mobile/internet systems?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• How is climate change expected to impact local ICT infrastructure?</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Infrastructure: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Can women own or rent property independently of men (due to issues of propriety; lack of employment and earnings, credit, and finance; and high costs)?</td>
<td>• Oyebanji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lucia Kiwala, “State of Women in Cities 2012-2013: Gender and the Prosperity of Cities” (Kenya: UN-HABITAT, 2013), 44, <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/Gender%20and%20Prosperity%20of%20Cities.pdf">https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-manager-files/Gender%20and%20Prosperity%20of%20Cities.pdf</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• What gender norms dictate whether women or men are responsible for management of the household? Do patriarchal norms dictate who makes decisions about how the household is managed (including how to build, rebuild, or prepare the home due to climate impacts)?</td>
<td>• Caroline Moser, “Asset-Based Approaches to Poverty Reduction in a Globalized Context: An Introduction to Asset Accumulation Policy and Summary of Workshop Findings,” Working Paper (Rochester, NY: Global Economy and Development, Social Science Research Network, November 2006), <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1011176">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1011176</a>.</td>
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In what ways could newly built and rebuilt infrastructure projects transform gender inequalities?

• Could women and men be included equally in designing and implementing infrastructure projects?

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<tr>
<td>• Are both women and men impacted by displacements related to infrastructure projects? If so, could they be consulted and compensated equally?</td>
<td>• Kabeer, “Gender, Poverty, and Inequality,” 190.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do women lack the education, literacy, or familiarity with consultation processes to participate meaningfully? If so, how could this be remedied?</td>
<td>• Clancy, “Mainstreaming Gender in the Energy Sector Training Manual.”</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Infrastructure: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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Are systems in place to prevent government funds designated for climate-impacted infrastructure from capture by malign actors (such as organized crime groups that use shell companies to redirect state funds to their projects? If so, are there gender differences in who is involved and why?


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| Is work on infrastructure projects designed to positively impact one or more groups over others? Or to disadvantage one or more groups more than others? Are any disadvantaged groups likely respond with violence, or be motivated by fundamentalist ideology to engage in conflicts with the government or with ‘othered’ groups? If so, are there gendered patterns in who engages in tensions or conflicts and/or why they are involved? | • Kirby Reiling and Cynthia Brady, “Climate Change and Conflict: An Annex to the USAID Climate-Resilient Development Framework,” Technical Report (Washington, DC: USAID, February 2015), 16, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Clim ateChangeConflictAnnex_2015%20with%20Final%20Web.pdf.  
• Detges, “Local Conditions of Drought-Related Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.”  
| Do new infrastructure projects offer more new jobs, greater livelihood losses, or more profound cultural changes to one or more groups more than others? If so:  
  • Have livelihood changes impacted more men than women? If so, has this resulted in a surplus of unemployed men (especially young men)?  
  • Do tensions increase between groups once cash incentives for infrastructure projects are gone (leaving men without a source of income)? If yes, have non-state actors or extremist/rebel groups used related grievances to recruit unemployed males to their causes? | • L. Mehta, “No Plot of One’s Own - How Large Dams Reinforce Gender Inequalities,” World Rivers Review 26, no. 1 (2011), https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/3876/No%20Plot%20of%20One's%20Own%20L.20Mehta.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.  
• Orlando et al., “Getting to Gender Equality in Energy Infrastructure,” 44.  
• Sikweyiya and Nkosi, “Violent Protests and Gendered Identities”; Rucht, “The Spread of Protest Politics.” |
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<th>GCS-Factor Infrastructure: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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| Has infrastructure shared across borders been damaged by climate change? If so:  
  • Are measures being taken to minimize interstate tensions regarding such projects?  
  • If tensions are increasing, is there a gender component for who is involved and why?  
• Reiling and Brady, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 17. |
| Are women typically involved in peace negotiations regarding tensions over Infrastructure projects? |  |

*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Infrastructure within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
Table 62. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor Corruption.

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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Due women lack power due to patriarchal and/or neoliberal norms and structures?</td>
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<td>• Are women or men more reliant on public support systems?</td>
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<td>• Has climate change constrained government budgets, and have austerity measures been introduced, thereby shrinking public benefit programs or increased costs for participation in such programs? If so, are women or men impacted more? And does corruption play a role in amplifying this impact?</td>
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<td>GCS-Factor Corruption: Diagnostic Questions</td>
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| What types of extortion practices are at work in the local community due to corruption and which have increased due to climate change? For instance: | • Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes, “Corruption, Accountability and Gender: Understanding the Connections.”  
| In particular, are women and men impacted equally in terms of extortion when trying to gain access to financial services or documentation (proof of identity, marriage, death, or residence), seek employment, or obtain medical services? | |
| Do women face sexual extortion more than men? | |
| Do women face higher risks of bribery or extortion due to a lack of education that would inform them of which practices are permitted and which are corrupt? | |
| Are women perceived as more trustworthy government officials than men serving in official government roles? If so: | |
| Have rates of corruption in government decreased? | |
| Have women’s needs and opinions been more effectively incorporated into government policies, including those related to climate susceptibility? | |
| Have perceptions of government trustworthiness and/or honesty changed since women’s representation in government increased? | |
| Have improved perceptions of government increased political stability and helped to protect against institutional | |
**GCS-Factor Corruption: Diagnostic Questions**

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<th>Question</th>
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<td>• Laura McGrew, Kate Frieson, and Sambath Chan, “Good Governance from the Ground Up: Women’s Roles in Post-Conflict Cambodia,” Women Waging Peace Policy Commission (Hunt Alternatives Fund; The Policy Commission, March 2004), <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Laura-McGrew/publication/237288787_Good_Governance_from_the_Ground_Up_Women's_Roles_in_Post-Conflict_Cambodia/links/5f636721458515b7cf39c44e/Good-Governance-from-the-Ground-Up-Womens-Roles-in-Post-Conflict-Cambodia.pdf?_sg%5B0%5D=7Bxmv_xvHalZpyCGtluvB4h">https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Laura-McGrew/publication/237288787_Good_Governance_from_the_Ground_Up_Women's_Roles_in_Post-Conflict_Cambodia/links/5f636721458515b7cf39c44e/Good-Governance-from-the-Ground-Up-Womens-Roles-in-Post-Conflict-Cambodia.pdf?_sg%5B0%5D=7Bxmv_xvHalZpyCGtluvB4h</a> hpwrsQ4RjybiKH1KmkPg3X88gPaa2i_aVATP6cZTSjqQyrQHxa9TIVxgaWSiCQ_itbB1-Qjit5dcVXM-u168-9RedGC9ymaX10bCgBCFHxJyfR9FB9kw-LQOp11KyV4dAcrxvUcG8_6FdrALUj3CA&amp;_sg%5B1%5D=M94PCZ3PP3yKhELf3p_j6E68TOqRoo12tFfC2rOu2kKfrb1773gs6lstn_QizoqAyWwbkKqHOpfLfp_HGqaUAYH0oU53WYctnio9rOppMj_itbB1-Qjit5dcVXM-u168-9RedGC9ymaX10bCgBCFHxJyfR9FB9kw-LQOp11KyV4dAcrxvUcG8_6FdrALUj3CA&amp;_iepl=.</td>
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| Do men also face barriers to accessing government systems due to bribes or extortion fees? If so:  
  - Is it more than women (in terms of percentage of income)?  
    Do they have sufficient resources to handle bribes, and how does this compare to women’s resources?  

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<td>Have resource constraints offered criminal groups opportunities for resource revenue capture, and has corruption played a role in making this kind of activity less likely to be prevented?</td>
<td>- Blanes et al., “Mapping Controversies Gender and Corruption April 2016,” 53.</td>
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</table>
Is there corruption within the local government systems that has hindered peacebuilding mechanisms, especially as climate change intensifies? For instance:

- Has corruption within the judiciary hindered conflict resolution, especially early on in a conflict?
- Has weak rule of law combined with corruption within international banking systems that distribute social and economic development funding to fuel grievances between groups or between the public and the government?
- Has natural resource-based corruption at the state level impeded peacebuilding measures with neighbouring states?

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- Messer, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict:,” 83.

Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding Corruption?

These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor Corruption within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.
Table 63. Diagnostic Questions for Assessing a System’s Vulnerability to GCS-Factor State Fragility.

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<th>GCS-Factor State Fragility: Diagnostic Questions</th>
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<td>What is the state of population movements locally? Have mass population displacements increased or decreased population size in the local community? If so:</td>
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<td>• Has the change in population demographics increased or decreased the strain on public services? If so, are there gender patterns to who is now accessing public benefits?</td>
<td>“Gender and Migration,” IOM Migration Data Portal, accessed May 10, 2022, <a href="https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/gender-and-migration">https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/gender-and-migration</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have the media, public officials, or leaders of non-state groups begun to use hypermasculine rhetoric (terms such as ‘threat,’ ‘securitizing borders,’ speaking of migrants as national threats)? Or is migration viewed as an adaptation strategy borne of necessity?</td>
<td>Phudoma Lama, Mo Hamza, and Misse Wester, “Gendered Dimensions of Migration in Relation to Climate Change,” Climate and Development 13, no. 4 (April 21, 2021): 326–36, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2020.1772708">https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2020.1772708</a>.</td>
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<td>• Have the media, public officials, or leaders of non-state groups begun to use hypermasculine rhetoric (terms such as ‘threat,’ ‘securitizing borders,’ speaking of migrants as national threats)? Or is migration viewed as an adaptation strategy borne of necessity?</td>
<td>Delf Rothe, “Gendering Resilience: Myths and Stereotypes in the Discourse on Climate-Induced Migration,” Global Policy 8 (March 30, 2017): 40–47, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12400">https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12400</a>.</td>
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**GCS-Factor State Fragility: Diagnostic Questions**

In decisions regarding migration, how do the capabilities of women and men compare to one another? For instance:

- Consider how women’s and men’s education, health care, mobility, ability to work, bodily health, ability to affiliate with others, and ability to hold property compare?
- Or how do they compare when you approach capabilities as including: human capital (labour), financial capital (savings), physical capital (vehicles), social capital (networks), and natural capital (such as wild foods)?
- Do capabilities allow for temporary displacement following a sudden climate disaster? Are they sufficient to allow for permanent displacement in response to long-term climate breakdown?
- Do push and pull factors interact with women’s and men’s capabilities differently to result in varying migration trends?

**References/Sources**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Are women permitted to obtain official documentation on their own (without the permission of a male family member) necessary to cross a state border?</td>
<td>• Chant, “Households, Gender and Rural-Urban Migration.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do women and men have the same human rights in their destination, or have their rights been reduced as a result of the dislocation? In particular, how have women’s rights changed in terms of care responsibilities, divisions of labour, and asset control?</td>
<td>• Gaëlle Ferrant et al., “The Role of Discriminatory Social Institutions in Female South-South Migration” (OECD Development Centre, April 2014), 9, <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/SIGI%20and%20Female%20Migration_final.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/SIGI%20and%20Female%20Migration_final.pdf</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In cases of entire community relocation, are women meaningfully included in community decision-making regarding whether or not to move?</td>
<td>• Maria Tanyag and Jacqui True, “Gender-Responsive Alternatives on Climate Change from a Feminist Standpoint,” in <em>Climate Hazards, Disasters, and Gender Ramifications</em> (London: Routledge, 2019), 17, <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429424861-2">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429424861-2</a>.</td>
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</table>

| How do the migration journey and IDP camp experiences of women and men compare? For instance: | • Chindarkar, “Gender and Climate Change-Induced Migration.” |
| • Do women and men both have access to safe routes and housing during their migration journeys? | • Mitchell, Tanner, and Lussier, “‘We Know What We Need.’” |
| • Do women face higher risks of SGBV during while migrating? Or within IDP camps? | • Chindarkar, “Gender and Climate Change-Induced Migration.” |
| • Do women and men face similar mental health strain as a | • Jenny Hedström, “4. A Feminist Political Economy Analysis of Insecurity and Violence in Kachin State,” in *Conflict in Myanmar: War, Politics, Religion*, ed. Nick Cheesman and |
### GCS-Factor State Fragility: Diagnostic Questions

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<tr>
<th>Result of the migration journey (related to the precipitating climate disaster, the need to migrate, the breaking of social ties, and the responsibility to care for other family members)?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Are women and men able to access aid/support equally in their destination? Or is aid/support restricted to men heads of households?</strong></td>
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<td><strong>In IDP camps, do women and men face similar household caretaking roles? Or similar camp-related duties and burdens?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Are women and men permitted equally to serve on IDP camp leadership committees?</strong></td>
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### How does a migration journey change household composition? For instance:

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<th>Are women or men more likely to migrate to a new region?</th>
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<td>Do family members (elderly, children, sick individuals) follow/stay with women or men? Does the UCDW increase for the individual most responsible for family members?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is household feminization positive or negative for women? How do marriage, land and property ownership, laws on divorce and child custody, rates of intimate partner violence (without one’s partner), and kinship systems impact whether household feminization is beneficial or harmful for women?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do women’s and men’s experiences of household feminization compare related to poverty; intensification of social reproduction demands; health outcomes due to poor socioeconomic status and high physical burdens; decreased mental health; and lower rates of literacy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do employment experiences of women and men in destination regions compare?</td>
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<td>• Are women and men equally permitted to work in their chosen destination?</td>
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<td>• Are both women and men able to move upward within their chosen work environments?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Do either women or men face more bodily harm, fatigue, social dislocation, or debt entrapment as a result of their new employment situations?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have gender transformative approaches been considered to addressing the needs of dislocated peoples? For instance:</td>
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<td>• Could laws in destination states be re-written to offer gender equality? For instance, might laws offer increased access to education and public services, higher levels of income (and remittances sent back to families), and increased social networking and risk sharing for women?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Could wealth and land be redistributed in ways that shrinks gendered power hierarchies?</td>
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### GCS-Factor State Fragility: Diagnostic Questions

What is the current condition of input/process legitimacy rules and procedures that guide how people participate in state decisions and hold power to account? In particular:

- Do women have the same legal rights as men in terms of civil liberties?
- Are civil liberty rules/procedures codified in law or part of customary practices and rules?
- Have women been involved in policymaking and decision-making in local or state government? On climate-related issues?
- Are women politically empowered through women’s groups, in civil society, and through political debates in general? On climate-related issues?

### References/Sources

- Simplice Asongu, Omand O. Messono, and Keyanfe T. J.
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Institute for Women’s Policy Research, “Gender, Urbanization and Democratic Governance,” 19. |
| • Has climate change increased demand for or strained basic services such as health care (medical, water, sanitation, and food); housing; education; access to democratic elections and institutions; legal and justice services (including police services); civil registration; as well as safety net or social service programs, such as unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, and other livelihood securities? |  
• *The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 23–24.  
• Institute for Women’s Policy Research, “Gender, Urbanization and Democratic Governance,” 19. |
| • How do patriarchal and traditional beliefs about gender roles, masculinities, and femininities, as well as low literacy levels, lack of exposure to politics, policy spheres, and government planning processes, and low levels of representation in institutions limit women’s access to public services, especially due to climate breakdown? |  
Institute for Women’s Policy Research, “Gender, Urbanization and Democratic Governance,” 19. |
<p>| • How might lack of input/performance legitimacy erode local government and state legitimacy and potentially lead to growth in anti-state grievances? |<br />
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| Does the public share a belief system that supports state legitimacy, allowing people to see the state or local government as having rightful authority? As climate breakdown intensifies, do people trust that their government is working for the public good? | • *The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 23–24.  
| What shared beliefs do people share about gender equality and how might these beliefs impact state legitimacy? In particular:  
• Does the public believe that women and men have equal rights under the law (whether codified or customary)?  
• Are local gender-based laws designed around patriarchal belief systems that give men more rights than women regarding divorce, child custody, inheritance, and property laws? Are the following gender-based issues legal locally: polygamy and child marriage; sexual aggression against women; gender-based imbalanced family power structures? Inequity in Family Law has been shown to enhance predictions of a state’s level of stability and security and may be an important factor in determining state legitimacy. | • Casey P. Hayden, “A Hierarchy of Needs in International Relations: (66212010-001)” (American Psychological Association, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1037/e662112010-001.  
• *The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 23.  
| What is the local sense of international (state) legitimacy in terms of recognition by external actors of a state’s sovereignty (which has knock-on effects for internal legitimacy)? In particular:  
• How does local and state government measure up to international standards for gender justice and equality?  
• Have international agencies intervened with military action or humanitarian aid to improve gender equality? Has agency presence been short-term or long-term? | • *The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations*, 23–24.  
• Eli Moen and Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, “Political Economy |
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<td>Has climate breakdown increased rates of migration in to or out from the region, and had a negative impact on state legitimacy? If so:</td>
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<td>• Have criminal activities such as human trafficking increased along with increased migration?</td>
<td>• Jessica C. Sheu et al., “Potential Impact of Climate Change on Human Trafficking: A Narrative Review,” <em>The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease</em> 209, no. 5 (May 2021): 324–29, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0000000000001312">https://doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0000000000001312</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Has migration resulted in a surplus of males in densely populated urban areas that may increase local instability?</td>
<td>• Hudson and den Boer, “Missing Women and Bare Branches: Gender Balance and Conflict.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have tensions or conflicts between societal groups increased as a result?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Have climate events been sudden and intense? If so, disagreements over climate migration may not spark interstate tensions.</td>
<td>• Adger et al., “Human Security of Urban Migrant Populations Affected by Length of Residence and Environmental Hazards.”</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Has climate breakdown been gradual and long-term? If so, the relative deprivations arising from differences in adaptive capacities and a longer time period of exposure may induce heightened grievances between states.</td>
<td>• Reazul Ahsan, “Climate Induced Migration: Lessons from Bangladesh,” <em>The International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses</em> 5, no. 2 (2014): 1–16.</td>
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<td>• Reinoud Leenders, “Social Movement Theory and the Onset of the Popular Uprising in Syria,” <em>Arab Studies Quarterly</em> 35, no. 3 (July 1, 2013), <a href="https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.3.0273">https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.3.0273</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are women typically involved as policymakers, as decision-makers, or in peace negotiations regarding disagreements over climate migration or other issues related to state legitimacy?</td>
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*These diagnostic questions can be used by policymakers and practitioners to assess the gendered nature of GCS-Factor State Fragility within a spatially explicit and time-specific setting.*
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