




# Managing the dangers of Iran's nuclear program

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## Risks of Iran's nuclear program

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- ❑ Iran has the knowledge to produce nuclear weapons material and make nuclear weapons
- ❑ Has repeatedly violated safeguards obligations
- ❑ Iranian nuclear weapon could
  - Increase Iranian aggressiveness
  - Increase odds others in the region will pursue nuclear weapons, or be dominated by Iran
  - Constrain U.S. military options in future crises
  - Undermine global nonproliferation effort



Source: UN Panel of Experts on Iran Sanctions

## The stakes are high – and broad

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- ❑ Outcome of the current U.S.-Iranian disputes would affect:
  - Probability of an Iranian nuclear bomb (and attendant risks)
  - Proliferation risks in the Middle East
  - The global effort to stop nuclear proliferation – and the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency
  - Iranian politics
  - U.S. politics
  - Middle East security and politics
  - The credibility of the United Nations Security Council
  - U.S. relations with Iran on other issues
  - U.S. relations with Europe, China, Russia, and other parties in the Middle East – Israel, Saudi Arabia, other Arab states...
  - Oil markets
  - More...


## The problem as the Obama team saw it

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- ❑ Time was to some degree on Iran's side
  - Centrifuges, LEU stock increasing – breakout time declining
  - Arak construction continuing
  - Sanctions hurting Iran substantially – but likely to erode over time
  - P5+1 unity also likely to erode over time
  - Opportunity represented by Rouhani-Zarif team might not last
  - So: once best sanctions they thought they could get were in place, time to push for a deal
- ❑ Both sides had substantial leverage
  - Iran: threat to continue building centrifuges, etc.
  - U.S.: threat to maintain, toughen sanctions – and ultimate threat of military force if Iran moved toward nuclear weapons
- ❑ To work, agreement would have to serve both sides' national interests – a humiliated, coerced country would surely cheat

## Comparing the 2015 alternatives, as the Obama team saw them

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## The JCPOA: the Trump-Netanyahu-Saudi view

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- ❑ Negotiators could have gotten a much better deal
  - Negotiators compromised just when sanctions were really biting
  - Lifting sanctions gave Iran more resources to develop missiles, support terrorism, expand power in region
  - Sunsets legitimize Iran going right to the edge of nuclear weapons capability within a few years; verification also inadequate
- ❑ Through sanctions and threats, U.S. can force Iran to capitulate
  - Permanently eliminate nuclear program
  - Stop developing missiles
  - Stop support for terrorism, change regional behavior
  - If Iran refuses, sanctions will lead to regime collapse
  - If Iran tries to move toward nuclear weapons, military strikes can set back their program many years – and can be done again if Iran tries again

## SecState Pompeo's puzzling Iran speech

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- ❑ Fulsome description of U.S. complaints about Iran and the JCPOA
- ❑ Outlined 12 broad demands:
  - Including end to all enrichment and reprocessing, anytime, anywhere inspections, end to terrorist support, pulling out of all regional conflicts...
- ❑ Vanishingly unlikely Iran would agree to this full agenda – and other partners likely to see the approach as extreme
  - Offering such specific standards makes compromise more difficult
  - More difficult for Iran to back down once demands are public
  - What was the speech's purpose?
- ❑ Will give ammunition to those in Iran arguing U.S. will never accept the very existence of the Islamic Republic

## What happens now?

### Potential Iranian steps beyond the JCPOA

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- ❑ Initially, Iran says it will work with rest of P5+1 to see if it can secure sufficient benefits to stay in the deal
  - Will depend on whether EU, others will resist or comply with U.S. sanctions – how much non-U.S. trade will still go forward?
- ❑ Wide range of steps available to Iran not limited by JCPOA
  - Missile testing, Hezbollah actions, steps in Syria, Iraq, Yemen...
- ❑ If it decides to step partly or completely beyond the JCPOA, Iran has many options
  - Could constrain inspectors – return to “normal” IAEA safeguards
  - Could resume testing of advanced centrifuges, enriching to higher levels
  - Could begin building up installed fleet of IR-1 (or IR-2M) centrifuges
  - Could begin rebuilding Arak on original design
- ❑ *But*, too much aggression or moving too close to the bomb could provoke a military response

## What happens now? The sanctions cat and mouse game

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- ❑ Investment:
  - U.S. sanctions likely to be effective – most companies won't want to take the risk (despite EU protective measures)
- ❑ Trade:
  - Sanctions threats will likely lead many companies to reconsider sales to, purchases from Iran
- ❑ *But*, effective sanctions difficult to achieve without international support
  - Likely to be widespread lack of enforcement, evasion, counter-sanctions... oil + banking key



Source: Money and Markets

## What happens now? The sanctions cat and mouse game (II)

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- ❑ Oil:
  - Trump admin. says will sanction anyone buying Iranian oil
  - China, India, largest purchasers – may not cut back
    - Will EU keep buying and risk sanctions?
    - Will Trump administration really sanction China, India, EU...?
  - May see “flag-swapping,” non-dollar sales, sole-purpose companies...
  - Overall, unlikely to see oil sales reduced anything like as much as they were in 2012-2013



CC-BY-SA Sludgepuller. Source: Flickr

## What happens now? The sanctions cat and mouse game (III)

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- ❑ Banking:
  - Trump admin. says will sanction anyone facilitating Iranian electronic transactions
  - Would U.S. really sanction SWIFT as an entity?
  - Will Europe kick Iran out of SWIFT to avoid the risk?
  - How much will this increase use of other channels – shadow banking, Chinese CIPS alternative, cryptocurrency transactions...
  - Major compliance complexities for all financial institutions
  - Can Norway, EU play roles?



Source: Event Chronicle

## What happens now? International politics

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- ❑ Trump's withdrawal undermines the credibility of U.S. promises and commitments, reinforces U.S. unilateralism
  - Likely major blow to U.S.-European relations
  - Further undermines already poor U.S.-Russian, U.S.-Chinese relations
  - Sanctioning businesses across the world may further inflame relations, heighten trade disputes, undermine perceptions of the United States
  - Ripping up a deal unanimously approved by the UN Security Council, and providing expanded options for the IAEA, undermines international institutions
  - Puts the United States firmly on the side of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the brewing Middle East regional conflict
  - Further increases risk of military conflict or nuclear proliferation in the Middle East – e.g., explicit Saudi nuclear pursuit threats
  - Adds to questions about the future of the NPT

## Coercive diplomacy: Promises have to be credible too

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- ❑ Thomas Schelling:
  - “Stop or I’ll shoot” only works if the adversary:
  - Believes you’ll shoot if he doesn’t stop
  - ALSO believe you WON’T shoot if he DOES stop
- ❑ This crucial credibility of promises does not get enough attention
  - Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA undermines the credibility of U.S. promises
  - May effect N. Korea talks, broad range of other diplomacy



Source: Boston Globe

Thanks to Reid Pauly for emphasizing these points

## The Supreme Leader already had doubts

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“Now they claim that if the Iranian nation ignores its nuclear energy, the sanctions will be lifted. They are telling a lie. They make decisions against the Iranian nation due to their long-cherished hostility.”

-- Ayatollah Khamenei, quoted in the *New York Times*, 10/11/12

“Any move which is made by the Americans and their allies and cohorts is for the sake of bringing the people of Iran to their knees and humiliating them... Our negotiating team... is trying to take the option of sanctions from this deceptive and treacherous enemy... which achieves its goals by breaking its promises...”

-- Ayatollah Khamenei, speech, 1/8/2015

## What happens now? Iranian politics

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- ❑ Likely devastating political blow to supporters of engagement with the West
  - Rouhani elected, reelected in part on promise of “I’ll negotiate to get us out from sanctions” – now sanctions are back
  - Hard-line view that the United States could not be trusted, just wanted to overthrow the regime, dramatically reinforced
  - Widespread view that this shows Iran needs more “leverage” – by building up its nuclear program – advocates of NPT pullout rising
  - Wild cards: rallying together, possible Supreme Leader succession (unknown timing), Presidential election (end of Rouhani term) 2021
- ❑ *But*, all sides understand need to avoid military strikes
  - Hezbollah rockets, Syria, Iraq positions seen as offering deterrence
  - Nuclear option also seen as offering longer-term deterrence
  - But the factions understand that near-term race to produce nuclear bomb material would risk military action (covert steps less unlikely...)

## Political impact on Iran’s decisions about getting the bomb

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- ❑ Iran has the technical capability to make nuclear bomb material and build nuclear weapons – it’s a political decision
- ❑ Trump’s withdrawal likely increases the odds of such a decision, by strengthening the arguments of Iran’s bomb advocates
  - Increases sense of military threat, at least over long term – U.S. and Israeli military strikes seem more plausible than with JCPOA
  - Frees Iran from technical constraints that made it harder for Iran to get to the bomb without being detected and stopped
  - Cuts flow of benefits – including to Iran’s most powerful actors – reducing perceived costs of moving toward nuclear weapons
  - Creates impression compromise with the West is impossible – undermines pro-engagement, anti-bomb faction
- ❑ Caveat: Iran’s politics murky, difficult to assess

## Models for possible Iranian responses

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- ❑ Rational Actor:
  - “To reduce the pain, I’d better compromise”
  - But what prevents future blackmail?
- ❑ Emotional Actor (or Rational Actor with the shadow of the future):
  - “I need to make this costly for him, and can’t afford to compromise, to show I can’t be bullied”
- ❑ Idealist/Legalist Actor
  - “I need to stand up for my national rights”
- ❑ Domestic politics:
  - “I need to show my faction is a good steward of Iranian interests”
  - Actions that serve most powerful interests – compromise may not be what any one faction wanted
- ❑ Bureaucratic standard operating procedures

## Possible medium-term (2-5yr) outcomes

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	Probability
Iran capitulates	
JCPOA survives w/Iran + P4+1	
JCPOA survives + U.S. returns w/ new President	
Iran leaves JCPOA fully or partly, increases nuclear capability, reduces inspections	
Iran gets nuclear weapons	
Military strikes	
Regime collapse	
Other	

## Possible medium-term (2-5-yr) outcomes

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	Probability
Iran capitulates	Very low
JCPOA survives w/Iran + P4+1	Medium-low
JCPOA survives + U.S. returns w/ new President	Low
Iran leaves JCPOA fully or partly, increases nuclear capability, reduces inspections	High
Iran gets nuclear weapons	Low
Military strikes	Medium
Regime collapse	Very low
Other	?

## Steps Norway might consider

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- ❑ Sponsoring dialogues on nuclear and clean energy for Iran and the region
  - Managing a safe, secure, peaceful nuclear program (including culture)
    - Could have dialogues to build regional cooperation on safety and security
  - Additional elements of clean energy for Iran
- ❑ Sponsoring dialogues on regional security
  - As warring parties grow exhausted, may be possibilities to mediate ends to conflicts in Yemen, Syria...
  - Will it be possible to find an Iran-Saudi modus vivendi?
  - Iranian proposal for OSCE-like regional forum deserves exploration – security, political “baskets” as OSCE has
- ❑ Easier for Americans to participate in other’s dialogues than to sponsor our own, given sanctions rules

## Could a long-term effort to save and build on the JCPOA still work?

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- ❑ If tempers cool, Europe might be able to explore approaches that could address U.S. and Iranian concerns
- ❑ Sunset clauses
  - Ways Iran could manage a robust civilian nuclear energy program, with reliable fuel supply, while posing little proliferation risk
    - Stockpiling years of fabricated LEU fuel?
    - Multinational ownership of key facilities?
- ❑ Missiles
  - Build on Iran's announcement that "for now" it does not need missiles with range >2,000 km?
- ❑ Regional issues
  - Mediate resolutions to key regional conflicts? Security assurances?
- ❑ Sanctions
  - With other issues addressed, could other sanctions be lifted?

## Switching themes...

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## North Korea talks: will lack of the best be the enemy of the good?

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- ❑ Highly unlikely any achievable set of incentives and pressures would lead to near-term N. Korean total nuclear disarmament
  - Nuclear weapons seen as central to regime survival, prestige
- ❑ Churchill: “Jaw, jaw” better than “war, war”
  - Recent process has offered months of reduced risk of war
- ❑ Many types of intermediate steps would serve U.S., world security interests
  - Freezes on further testing, production; reductions in some aspects of capabilities; military confidence-building measures
- ❑ Danger: disappointment over lack of total disarmament could lead to return to “maximum pressure,” “fire and fury”
  - Volatile situation could lead to military conflict
  - Intermediate opportunities may be missed

## Other Managing the Atom/Belfer Center research that may be of interest

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- ❑ Broad analysis of nuclear security worldwide
  - Progress and gaps since the last summit
  - Recommendations to fill gaps, sustain momentum
- ❑ Study on deterrence and the DPRK
  - Risks of living with a nuclear-armed North Korea, versus risks of military action
- ❑ Mitigating long-term risks of Iran’s nuclear program
  - Revising research effort after Trump’s withdrawal
- ❑ Stopping illicit trade in dual-use technologies
  - Forthcoming book pulling together many pieces – intelligence, export controls, internal corporate compliance...
  - Planning workshop in China

## Other Managing the Atom/Belfer Center research that may be of interest (II)

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- ❑ Rebuilding U.S.-Russian relations
  - Options for resolving arms control disputes – arms control regime could collapse after New START if relations, INF disputes not resolved
  - Restarting nuclear energy, nuclear security cooperation
  - Just-published analysis of how nuclear security is evolving
  - Mil-mil and intel-intel dialogue (“Elbe Group”)
- ❑ Cybersecurity – norms, conflict, deterrence
  - Active research program – many publications
  - “Defending Digital Democracy” project
- ❑ Nuclear dialogue with Pakistan
  - Group led by Gen. Kidwai

## Other Managing the Atom/Belfer Center research that may be of interest (III)

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- ❑ Chinese nuclear forces, policies
  - Recent report reassessing Chinese HEU, Pu stocks
  - Forthcoming study reassessing Chinese weapons design, testing
  - Studies on reprocessing, enrichment, uranium supplies
- ❑ Future of nuclear energy, and implications
  - Constraints on, risks of scale of growth needed to contribute significantly to climate mitigation – how they might be addressed
    - Current paper on how growth to that scale might affect proliferation risks, disarmament prospects
  - Analyses of proliferation resistance, terrorism resistance, of nuclear energy systems
- ❑ Intelligence project, and Recanati-Kaplan fellows program

## Illicit trade in nuclear and dual-use technology remains a critical issue

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- ❑ North Korea still shopping; surprisingly, India and Pakistan still shopping; Iran may return
- ❑ New book explores steps to strengthen global efforts to stop this trade
  - Intelligence
  - Law enforcement
  - Export, financial controls
  - Internal corporate compliance
  - Sanctions and interdiction
  - Nonproliferation culture in organizations
  - International organizations

<https://tinyurl.com/yakbop8h>

### Preventing Black-Market Trade in Nuclear Technology

Edited by Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S. Spector



## Insider threats are the most dangerous nuclear security problem

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- ❑ The known HEU and Pu thefts, and most sabotages, involved insiders
- ❑ People don't want to believe their friends and colleagues could betray the organization
  - Leads to serious lapses in protection against insider threats
- ❑ Getting people to report suspicious behavior is very difficult
- ❑ Often even obvious "red flags" go unreported, unaddressed
- ❑ Bunn-Sagan book offers case studies, "Worst Practices Guide" on lessons learned from past mistakes

<http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/insider-threats>



## For further reading...

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- ❑ Full text of Managing the Atom publications
  - <http://belfercenter.org/mta>
- ❑ Belfer Center's "Iran Matters" website
  - <http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/>
- ❑ Belfer Center's "Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal"
  - <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/decoding-iran-nuclear-deal-0>
- ❑ Insider Threats
  - <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/insider-threats>
- ❑ Preventing Black-Market Trade in Nuclear Technology:
  - <https://tinyurl.com/yakbop8h>

## Backup slides...

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## Iran and the United States: Much more than just nuclear issues

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- ❑ The Iranian view
  - United States is relentlessly hostile, will never accept the Islamic Republic
  - Constant sanctions, threats – helped Iraq in Iran-Iraq war
  - Iran is a peaceful country, with only a peaceful nuclear program
- ❑ The U.S. view
  - Iran is a dangerous actor – sponsors terrorism (kills U.S. troops), threatens Israel, disrupts the region, violates agreements
  - Iran's nuclear program offers a weapons option – could threaten the region and beyond



Source: Wikipedia

## Iran's nuclear program in 2013-15

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- ❑ Power reactor at Bushehr
- ❑ ~20,000 centrifuges, 2 sites
  - Enough to produce material for a nuclear bomb in months (esp. w/LEU)
- ❑ Arak reactor under construction
  - Well suited for plutonium production
- ❑ Repeated violations of safeguards agreement
- ❑ Evidence of past weapons design work (highlighted with new Israeli intelligence trove)



Source: Iran Times

## The Obama administration approach

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- ❑ “Extend a hand”
  - But efforts to start talks disrupted by violence surrounding Iranian suppression of Green Movement, 2009
  - Iranians continued to build
- ❑ Obama team strategy:
  - Pursue talks (limited to nuclear)
  - Pursue much tougher sanctions
  - Slow Iranian program by any means necessary (e.g., Stuxnet), threaten military action if Iran moves toward the bomb
  - BUT, compromise on enrichment, duration, as otherwise there would be no deal



## The JCPOA in short

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- ❑ Iran:
  - Cut its deployed centrifuges by 2/3
  - Cut its stock of LEU (which offered 2/3 head start on enriching bomb material) by 98%
  - Poured cement into the core of Arak, agreed to redesign so would produce much less Pu of lower quality
  - Allowed much expanded verification (AP, further steps)
  - Committed never to pursue nuclear weapons, and never to conduct particular weaponization-related activities
- ❑ Sunsets:
  - Key enrichment restraints expire over 10-15 years, some other provisions at 25 years, some last indefinitely
- ❑ P5+1:
  - EU + UN nuclear sanctions lifted (w/ provision for “snapback”)
  - U.S. nuclear sanctions waived (others remained in place)

## The JCPOA: the Obama (and rest of P5+1) view

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- ❑ Negotiators got the best deal that was realistically attainable
  - Greatly restrains U pathway, almost completely blocks Pu pathway, for substantial period of time
  - Substantially expands verification
  - Sanctions could not have forced Iranian capitulation, and military strikes would run huge risks without solving the long-term problem
- ❑ Deal avoided war or an Iranian bomb
- ❑ Deal provided a foundation that *might* enable agreements on other issues (e.g., missiles, terrorism, regional issues)
- ❑ Pulling out of the deal greatly increases risks
  - Frees Iran to expand enrichment, pursue Pu, constrain inspectors
  - Undermines credibility of U.S. diplomacy, makes future deals unlikely
  - Sanctions will be impossible to rebuild effectively

## Categories of approaches to reduce the risk

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- ❑ ~~Engage~~
  - Work to build less conflict-prone relationship over time – pursue common interests (including in avoiding war)
- ❑ *Deter and contain*
  - Work to deter Iran from moving to nuclear weapons or threatening U.S. allies and partners, and ensure those partners are adequately defended
- ❑ *Sanction and sabotage*
  - Work to convince Iran to change course, and reduce resources and degree of success it will have if it does not (e.g., Stuxnet)
- ❑ ~~Constrain and watch~~
  - Negotiate constraints on Iran's nuclear program (e.g., JCPOA)
  - Ensure verification + intelligence are as effective as possible – maximizing chance of timely detection at overt OR covert sites

## Categories of approaches to reduce the risk (II)

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- ❑ *Entangle*
  - Work to embed Iran's nuclear program in a web of international cooperation, in a way that would make it seem a substantial cost for that cooperation to be cut off
- ❑ *Threaten and coerce*
  - Work to change Iran's behavior by threatening or imposing major costs
- ❑ *Attack or overthrow*
  - Launch military strikes on nuclear facilities, or seek to overthrow the Iranian regime
- ❑ *Approaches are not independent*
  - Some can be used together (e.g., sanctions pressure to help convince Iran to negotiate nuclear constraints)
  - Some can conflict if not managed carefully (e.g., engagement and threats, or engagement and attempted overthrow)

## Areas for research and policy outreach

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- ❑ *Sanctions implementation and impact*
  - What are the key challenges to implementing really effective sanctions? How might they be overcome?
  - What impact on Iranian behavior and capabilities can realistically be expected from sanctions?
  - What unintended impacts might sanctions have, and how might they be mitigated?
- ❑ *Iranian and regional politics and decision-making*
  - How can the United States best increase the chance of Iranian decisions that serve U.S. interests, and best reduce regional risks?
- ❑ *Potential agreements and arrangements*
  - What future agreements might reduce risks, and be acceptable to all sides? How might they be reached?
  - How can agreements best be verified – including building confidence in the absence of major secret sites?

## The U.S. narrative

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- ❑ Iran's "civil" nuclear programs is a fig leaf for a weapons program – otherwise no need for enrichment
- ❑ Iran threatens U.S. and world security – supports terrorism, threatens Israel, props up Assad, sponsors militias that have killed U.S. soldiers, seeks to dominate the Gulf
- ❑ Iran has repeatedly violated its safeguards obligations, continues to conceal its past nuclear weapons work (reconfirmed by recent Israeli intelligence trove)
- ❑ Iran needed to rebuild confidence in the peaceful nature of its program with major cuts in its nuclear program, broad inspections
- ❑ Iran was defying the entire international community – JCPOA limits were the minimum needed to rebuild confidence

## The Iranian narrative

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- ❑ Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful, within the NPT
- ❑ Iran has the same rights as all other NPT members
- ❑ Iran was forced into concealment by Western efforts to stymie nuclear supply
- ❑ Iran needs nuclear power to avoid using up its valuable oil and gas, needs enrichment to fuel reactor if there's a cutoff of supply
- ❑ Iran has given the IAEA transparency far beyond what it is obligated to provide, corrected all past issues – only remaining disagreements are over Western fabrications, in areas far beyond the IAEA's mandate
- ❑ Sanctions are an unjust assault on Iran's sovereignty and must be removed; problem will be solved if U.S. and Israel drop their hostility and unjust demands

## The Iranian narrative (II)

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- ❑ Iran does not support terrorism; it supports legitimate social movements (Hezbollah, Hamas...)
- ❑ Iran has not threatened or waged aggressive war against any other state for centuries
- ❑ Much of the world supports Iran's legitimate rights
- ❑ The United States and Israel have waged an unrelenting campaign of threats, sabotage, murder, and intimidation, and have manipulated the IAEA and the Security Council
- ❑ Some Iranians:
  - The United States will never accept the very existence of the Islamic Republic – so JCPOA cannot bring lasting security for Iran
  - The EU3 and the P5+1 have never negotiated with Iran in good faith – demanded far-reaching Iranian action for small, easily reversible Western action (and the United States is now renegeing on its promises)

## Facts Obama team had to cope with

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- ❑ Iran had ~20,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow
- ❑ Iran had more advanced centrifuges in testing
- ❑ Iran had substantial enrichment knowledge – couldn't be destroyed or negotiated away
- ❑ Major portion of the Arak reactor was already built
- ❑ Military strikes could set back Iran's program several years – but Iran could rebuild, hide at covert sites, and could hurt U.S. interests in response
- ❑ Intense U.S.-Iranian hostility, distrust
- ❑ U.S. had many issues with Iran – Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, terrorism, Israel, missiles, etc. – going well beyond nuclear issue. And Iran has many issues with the United States

## Facts Obama team had to cope with (II)

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- ❑ Many other states – Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Gulf states, etc. – also had major interests at stake
  - Iran has huge reserves of oil and gas – impossible to completely isolate, exclude from world economy
  - Israel, Gulf states have major concerns over growing Iranian power, will push hard for their preferred outcomes
- ❑ All outcomes would have an impact on nonproliferation regime, credibility of Security Council, regional politics, and more
- ❑ Iranian government has been sclerotic, factionalized, legitimacy-challenged—difficulty making hard choices
  - Deal would require giving Iranian advocates of compromise enough to convince Ayatollah Khamenei to say “yes”
  - No faction could afford to be seen as buckling to foreign pressure; some did not believe compromise would bring any benefit

## Iranian memories

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- ❑ U.S. government helped overthrow democratically elected Mossadeq government in 1953
  - Installed Shah Mohommed Reza Pahlavi
  - Brutal regime was overthrown in the 1979 revolution
- ❑ In 1981, Iran was attacked by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
  - United States sided with Iraq – provided weapons, intelligence
  - Virtually no international support for Iran – even when it was attacked with missiles, chemical weapons
  - United States shot down a civilian airliner in Iranian airspace in 1988, killing 290 civilians
- ❑ Iran helped the United States overthrow the Taliban – and was then branded part of an “axis of evil”
- ❑ United States has (they believe) sponsored sabotage, assassination, military threats, supported Iran’s enemies (Israel, Saudi Arabia)...

## Balancing objectives

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- ❑ U.S. objectives:
  - No Iranian nuclear weapons
  - To the extent still practicable, broad and verifiable gap between permitted nuclear activities and a nuclear weapons capability
  - Preserving the NPT regime
  - Addressing Iranian behavior on missiles, Iraq, Syria, terrorism, Israel...
- ❑ Iranian objectives:
  - Preserving regime, avoiding attack
  - Repeal of sanctions
  - Status and prestige as leader of developing, Islamic worlds
  - Recognition (and expansion?) of its regional power and role
  - Economic development
  - Civilian nuclear energy
  - Nuclear weapons option (or more?)

## Deep obstacles to a deal

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- ❑ Genuinely conflicting interests
  - Iran wants as much of a bomb option as possible – if not a bomb itself
  - The United States wants Iran to have as little of a bomb option as possible
- ❑ Deep mutual mistrust, hostility
  - Trump's action drastically ratchets up Iranian mistrust
  - Both sides mistrust everything the other side does – interpret each action or statement in most negative light
  - Credibility of U.S. promises low; credibility of Iranian promises doubted by Trump, Netanyahu
- ❑ Spoilers may be able to block
  - Trump already pulled out of the JCPOA
  - Trump and Rouhani both face deal skeptics with substantial influence over the outcome

## Elements of Iran's nuclear program

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Program element	Status	Safeguards
Uranium mining	operating	N
Uranium conversion	operating	Y
Uranium enrichment	operating	Y
Suitable plutonium reactor	constr.	Y
Reprocessing	no	n.a.
<i>Weaponization</i>		
Conversion to metal	tested	Y
Casting to weapons shapes	docs.	N
Precisely timed detonators	exper.	N
Explosives arranged to crush sphere	exper.	N
Neutron initiator	materials	N
Missile reentry vehicle for warhead	docs.	N