



The War in Ukraine: Impact on Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security

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Russia's war on Ukraine has upended much of the international order

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- ❑ A founding member of the United Nations – charged with ensuring international peace and security – is waging large-scale aggressive war
- ❑ A state that gave up the nuclear weapons on its soil in return for security assurances is being torn apart
- ❑ Impacts on security, food, energy are reverberating around the world



Source: Reuters

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The war in Ukraine requires rethinking most aspects of nuclear policy

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- ❑ With a more aggrieved Russia more willing to use military force, nuclear deterrence needs new thinking
 - With weakened conventional forces, Russia will be more dependent on nuclear weapons than before
 - U.S. allies seeking still stronger assurances
- ❑ The future of nuclear arms control is in doubt
 - Intense U.S.-Russian hostility means more nuclear danger, fewer chances to take steps to reduce it
- ❑ The future of nuclear nonproliferation is uncertain
 - Ukraine's fate may lead other countries to reconsider nuclear options
- ❑ Requires rethinking nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and nuclear security with the possibilities of wars, political unrest, state collapse in mind (more in a moment)

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There have also been other major changes in the nuclear landscape

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- ❑ China is building 100s of new nuclear missile silos
 - No participation in arms control or nuclear risk-reduction
 - Growing U.S.-Chinese hostility
- ❑ North Korea is dramatically strengthening its nuclear forces
 - Massive missile testing program, nuclear test could come any time
- ❑ Iran's nuclear program poses ever-growing dangers
 - Without return to the JCPOA, crisis likely in the next 2 years
- ❑ Evolving technologies may undermine nuclear balances
- ❑ Ongoing tensions between nuclear haves and have-nots
- ❑ Climate change, energy security, local pollution driving more countries to express interest in nuclear energy
 - Many advanced reactor concepts being explored – each has different implications for safety, security, nonproliferation

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The war's impact on nuclear energy is equivocal

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- ❑ Strengthens the search for alternatives to Russian gas
 - Including nuclear energy – though not a quick alternative
 - High energy costs make nuclear energy more attractive
- ❑ But the war offers a new reminder that war is one of the dangers nuclear plants may face
 - Over the long lifetime of a nuclear project, could be a problem almost anywhere
 - May increase concerns over widespread deployment




Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant
Source: Energoatom

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Nuclear energy and energy security

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- ❑ Churchill: “security lies in diversity, and diversity alone”
- ❑ Energy security, climate, and local pollution leading to more countries exploring nuclear options
- ❑ Japan’s experience after Fukushima suggests nuclear energy can also be a major energy security problem
 - Biggest disruption in Japanese energy system since World War II
- ❑ Plutonium fuel cycles are certainly not a reliable path to energy security
 - Nuclear terrorism anywhere would lead to major disruptions, calls for shutdown



Molten chloride fast reactor concept
Source: Terrapower

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Nuclear energy, war, state collapse, or social unrest...

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- ❑ With planning, construction, operation, decommissioning, a new nuclear plant is a 100-year proposition
- ❑ Who can predict where war, state collapse, social unrest may occur over 100 years?
- ❑ What if Syria had a 1-GWe LWR when the civil war began?
- ❑ Advanced reactors with enhanced passive safety may reduce concern
 - Should be seen in context of other terrible dangers of war



Source: AP

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Rethinking nuclear safety and security in light of the war in Ukraine

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- ❑ Past efforts have focused on accidents, small groups of adversaries
- ❑ Now need to at least consider the armed forces of a state
 - Accidental harm in the course of war
 - Intentional action to cause radioactive releases – “nuclear plants as weapons of the enemy”
- ❑ Clearly beyond what operators should be expected to defend against
 - States need to rethink their role in protecting against “beyond design basis” threats



Fighting at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant

Source: Energoatom

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Rethinking reliance on Russian nuclear supplies

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- ❑ Rosatom is the dominant nuclear reactor vendor in the world
 - Offers low prices, low-cost financing (including “BOO”), spent-fuel take-back...
- ❑ Rosatom is also a major player in international fuel markets
 - Enrichment, uranium, fabrication...
- ❑ Rosatom is taking part in the illegal occupation of Ukraine
 - Should they be subject to sanctions?
- ❑ Reaction to the war creates opportunities for other suppliers
 - Finland already canceled Russian-supplied reactor project – but others going ahead
 - Countries looking for non-Russian options for reactor supply
 - Governments in Europe, the United States, may be more inclined to subsidize expanding capacity in enrichment, other market segments to reduce reliance on Russian supply

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Rethinking nonproliferation

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- ❑ NPT remains highly successful, cornerstone of global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons
- ❑ But Ukraine’s fate – following those of Iraq and Libya – may lead some countries to reconsider their nuclear weapons options
- ❑ Expansion of nuclear energy implies spread of nuclear energy – but need not greatly increase proliferation risks
 - Key is limiting risks from the fuel cycle – enrichment and reprocessing
 - Reprocessing uneconomic, established enrichers likely lowest-cost suppliers



Source: AEOI

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Further reading and background material

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- ❑ Full text of *Managing the Atom* publications:
<http://belfercenter.org/mta>
- ❑ Selected Matthew Bunn presentations and publications:
https://scholar.harvard.edu/matthew_bunn
- ❑ Risk of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine:
<https://tinyurl.com/23newkw2>
- ❑ Why Russia's nuclear exports will continue:
<https://tinyurl.com/2c4fov8x>
- ❑ Impact of the war on the global nuclear order:
<https://www.conversationsix.com/p/BJxKYR27i52BBBHua>
- ❑ *Revitalizing Nuclear Security in an Era of Uncertainty* (2019):
<https://www.belfercenter.org/NuclearSecurity2019>