as a medium of inevitably dialectic; he can take it rather as a system of signs, 'evoking' meaning rather than 'constituting' it. Rosen's chapter on language is a splendid example of clear insight and concentrated discussion; the references it makes to Hegel's theory of art are particularly apt.

The dialectic gap that lies between Hegel and Kant also impresses. Rosen makes clear that Kant was already familiar with the problems about thought and its presentation that concerned Hegel, but drew back from any Hegelian solution of them because of his commitment to what he called in one place 'our discursive intellect-regulating understanding'. Rosen succeeds again in showing the continuity between the account of the transcendental subject in the first Critique and Hegel's theory of the Idea as constituting the objective world. What Kant tried to express in terms of synthesis Hegel dealt with by reference to the activities of the Notion. It is hard, however, to believe that Hegel 'reduced' Kant to the extent of supposing that his own content-producing subject is identical with the Kantian unity of consciousness, the more so as Kant went out of his way to exclude the possibility. The truth seems rather that Hegel thought it must be there in embryo, since it had to be present for the doctrine to be intelligible, thus reading his own view into a text he knew would not allow of such an interpretation. If this is correct, it is one more example of fraudulent 'immanent critique'.

Two things in particular are striking about Rosen's work: his complete mastery of the relevant texts, and the way in which he goes straight to the point and settles an issue. The 'innocence' of his thought may have had an adverse effect on the clarity of his presentation, for it is responsible; I suspect, for a number of passages which are only marginally relevant to the main argument, including the introductory chapter on the interpretation of past philosophers and the long essay at the end on the negative dialectic of Moro. The first is an interesting item in itself, but is not needed for the argument of the book; the second is brought in as if it were intended to throw light on the main text, but by arguing that 'reasoners are necessary if we are to understand Moro. It is there, I suspect, because Rosen is fascinated, amongst other things, by contemporary German philosophy. In this way as well his remarkable book stands out clearly from others on its general subject.

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The fact that Hegel's dialectic generates striking conclusions is hardly a sign of its merit; it is just what one would expect from such contradictory beginnings.

The classic version of this objection is, undoubtedly, Karl Popper's 'What is Dialectic?' (Mind, 1940). While Popper does not deny the importance of contradiction in reasoning - it is fundamental for his own 'method of trial and error' - he argues that contradiction is not a necessary feature of a scientific theory itself; it has no place: 'Once a contradiction were admitted all science would collapse.'

The very fact that contradictions undermine structure gives dialectic this heuristic role; the presence of a contradiction shows that a theory is radically undetermined and that it is time to look for a new one. Dialectic works, for Popper, against the fulcrum of logic, as it were, and so the assimilation of one to the other is a crucial fallacy. 'It is ... about an inappropriate use of dialectic as being opposed to logic, as it would be to take, say, the theory of evolution.' By no conventional counter to Popper's objection is quite familiar in the literature. It is an argument made natural by Popper's own contrast between logic and dialectic. If it can be shown that he is wrong about Hegel's use of dialectic, and that Hegel does not propose dialectic as a substitute for the traditional logician's principles, then dialectic will be as safe from the logician as in Popper's example, the theory of evolution.

In support of this we may note that Hegel, in fact, offers no criticism of the traditional rules of deductive inference. Deduction has, indeed, he says, an essential role in 'mathematics and any other science of the understanding' (Philosophy of Right). But deduction is essentially limited: 'this deductive method of the understanding has nothing to do with the method of the understanding of reason or of scientific understanding.' In deductive reasoning every conclusion depends upon premises which (at the price of a regress) cannot themselves be the outcome of deductive reasoning. It belongs, therefore, only to 'extreme cognition'.

Why, then, does Hegel describe his central work as a science of logic? The answer is simple. Hegel is not concerned with logic in the sense that this implies a restriction to the study of deductive inference. Hegel's logic combines the Greek idea of the logos (the idea of a rational intelligence presenting reality) with the modern idea of scientific reasoning. It is Hegel's logic which deals with what form the reality we experience must take in order for certain concepts to be necessarily applicable to it.

Taken together, these two ideas project a task for Hegel's logic: much more ambitious than that of mapping the routes from true premises to true conclusions; this is not a priori study which tells us, at the same time, something about the essential structure of reality. Modern commentators have been more concerned to assess such transcendental claims than to search in Hegel's logic for a formal calculus. The point of Günther's Contributions to the Foundation of an Operational Dialectic - now presented in three hefty volumes by the Felix Meiner Verlag - is thus represents a considerable exception to orthodoxy. Günther's case for the dual relevance of formal logic and dialectic has two elements; the first, the claim that the central concern of Hegel's logic is ontological - common ground between Günther and the majority of contemporary commentators - and that, specifically, it is concerned to give expression to the fundamental and distinctive role played by subjectivity in thought, this role being articulated in the form of logic and the role of self-reflection (consciousness) is fully amenable to formalisation.'

Hence, he thinks, a connection runs directly from Hegel's dialectic to twentieth-century cybernetics; for: 'It seems to be beyond controversy that the novel science of cybernetics involves the problem of subjectivity.'

In his fourth and final chapter Vaught presents his criticism of Hegel. Hegel seeks for a wholeness that will respond to human fragmentation. But he confuses wholeness with completeness, postulating an absolute standpoint that transcends fragmentation altogether. Yet the Phenomenology in particular proceeds in a way that suggests incompleteness. For Vaught, the descriptions of various stages are not literal definitions but metaphors, suggesting a truth that cannot be expressed. And stage lends on to stage not via necessity, but through metaphor; hence sensus analogia, despite differences, similarities justify associating the various 'scenes' in a single perspective. Since both metaphor and analogy are incomplete, they leave room for mystery and transcendence.

This inherent structure of Hegel's philosophy of experience is vitiated by his theoretical claim that representation is to be transformed into concept. The metaphors and analogies of experience - and in particular, of religious experience - do not have the last word. They are incorporated into a theoretical system in which mystery is dissolved, and immensity reigns.

In reaching this conclusion Vaught has himself used metaphor and analogy. His first chapter, on Melville's Moby Dick, considers the voyage of the Pequod to be a metaphor of the human quest. Ishmael is compared with his namesake, the son of Abraham, and the whale is the symbol of mysterious eternity. From art, Vaught turns to religion. His second metaphor is the loneliness of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Moses in their encounters with transcendence. Wholeness is thus the result of two different processes. Once moves out into the vast expanse of the world; the other moves into the depth of a single encounter with the ultimate.

Vaught emphasises the incompleteness of this 'bi-directional' movement in this third chapter, on Plato's Euthyphro. By leaving the discussion unresolved Plato suggests that Euthyphro's depth encounter with divinity is in no way extinguished by Socrates' search for universal analogy. These analogies, however, are not modelled on philosophical theses. Nothing is as true or false as Euthyphro's view everything is either true or false. And, in the end, it is unclear what good comes of mixing up objects and truth-values at all; unless some pressing reason can be given it appears only to compound vagueness with obscurity.

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