THE SECOND ANALOGY

NO NON SEQUITUR, BUT DOES KANT PROVE TOO MUCH?

There is a tendency to regard the *Critique of Pure Reason* as if it were one of those sublime “wonders of nature” that struck the eighteenth-century traveller with such awe – a volcanic island perhaps, rising in impressive perfection above a featureless surrounding ocean. The *Critique* on this view is distinguished by two (related) qualities: first, its isolation – its isolation from the work of Kant’s contemporaries, but its isolation, too, from Kant’s own, earlier writings – and, second, its self-sufficiency. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, those who admire it from this perspective believe, is a work of remarkable completeness and coherence. One may well quarrel with its premises – of what work of philosophy is that not true? – but what distinguishes Kant is how clearly he articulates what those premises are and how masterfully he ensures that the conclusions that he draws are consistent with them.

I should say that I think that this account is not wholly wrong, but it is misleading, I think, in one important way. It represents the *Critique* as a work that is essentially finished, without inner tensions. This is, of course, the image that Kant himself was eager to project. Yet what we know of the history of Kant’s thought following the *Critique*'s first publication calls this public image into question. Kant followed up the *Critique* with an expository work, the *Prolegomena*, a heavily revised second edition, and, finally, the strangely named and never completed *Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics*. In all of these writings Kant takes up issues to be found in the original 1781 edition in ways that appear, on the surface, to be intriguingly different from their treatment there. Kant’s official
story that these are only different ways of presenting the same, critical doctrine seems, to say the least, questionable.

In this paper, I am going to try to do three things. First, I am going to present an account of the Second Analogy that is very much in the traditional spirit. That is to say, I shall attempt to show that the argument’s conclusions are arrived at cogently, given its premises. In so doing, I will provide a rejoinder to the most celebrated line of objection to the Second Analogy, that associated with Strawson and, before him, Schopenhauer. My interpretation shows that the Strawson/Schopenhauer objection is misguided, I believe. But it is equally at odds, for reasons that I shall explain, with what seems to have become the Kantians’ most popular line of reply to Strawson/Schopenhauer, a line which was originated by Gerd Buchdahl. Finally – and this is the most speculative part of the paper – I shall suggest that Kant’s strategy of argument itself entails difficulties, but that these are different from the ones most familiarly discussed in the literature. If these difficulties are as I take them to be, and if Kant himself was at least partially aware of them, then they may help to explain some of the – to me, to be frank, very puzzling – ideas that appear to be at work in the *Opus Postumum*.

I

{1} The question from which Kant starts in the Analogies is: how, admitting that appearances are not things in themselves, can we make *sense* of the distinction between the way things are and the way that they present themselves?
Immediately I unfold the transcendental meaning of my concepts of an object, I realise that the house is not a thing in itself but only an appearance, that is, a representation, the transcendental object of which is unknown. What then am I to understand by the question how the manifold may be connected in the appearance itself, which is yet nothing in itself? (B235-36)

Grant, in other words, the doctrine of transcendental idealism – that what we think of as mind-independent objects are not *Dinge an sich* but appearances (*Erscheinungen*) – and we still, Kant is saying, need to make sense of the distinction between the way that things are and the way that they appear to be – between apparent appearances, if you like, and objective ones.

Now the reason that this problem arises is because our world appears to be a world of objects. Admitting the truth of transcendental idealism (if we do) does not alter that fact. For this fact to be possible (for us to *have* that kind of experience of objects) we must be able, Kant claims, to move from the way that things are given, as he says, in *apprehension*, to the way that they are objectively. {2} Objects are correlative to the subjective order of apprehension and what it is to be an object is to sanction such a transition from subjective to objective connection:

That which lies in the successive apprehension is here viewed as representation, while the appearance which is given to me, notwithstanding that it is nothing but the sum of these representation, is viewed as their object; and my concept, which I derive from the representations of apprehension, has to agree with it... Appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can be represented as an
object distinct from them only if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from
every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of
the manifold. The object is *that* in the appearance which contains the condition of this
necessary rule of apprehension. (B236)

We are, in other words, talking about two kinds of representation. One of which is frankly
subjective. The other goes beyond that to represent those “representations of apprehension” as
objects: that is, as sets of representations connected according to rules.

{3} Three sorts of question arise about this distinction between the subjective order of
apprehension and the world of objects in time to which this subjective order is referred:

(1) Why do we need to go beyond the subjective order and refer it to an objective world.

(2) What makes it possible that we *can* carry out such a referral?

(3) Can we derive any general truths from it about the necessary structure of experience?

I shall deal with each of these questions below, but, for the present, let me offer, on Kant’s
behalf, three quick answers:

(1) We need to go beyond the subjective order, Kant believes, because the subjective
order alone cannot show us that something endures or alters (*sich verändert*) in the sense of
being a continuing thing which changes its state: there is only the evanescent displacement of
one state by another.
It is possible to go beyond the subjective order because our perception involves imagination – our perceptions become perceptions of an object only when the subjective series are set in time by the imagination in a nonarbitrary way, according to a rule.

What such a rule will turn out to be specifically we cannot say in advance of our experience, but it must be sufficient to allow our experience to meet the most general characteristics of time determination. Thus those rules that constitute our concepts of objects will themselves be subject to higher-order rules (synthetic a priori principles), namely, rules which state the condition which must be met for appearances to be integrated into the modes of temporal experience. Because the particular rules which we apply in imagination must give us knowledge of a world with these three modes of time relation (duration, succession, coexistence) they are constrained. If we can express that constraint in terms of a rule itself we shall have a principle of the sort Kant requires. As Kant says:

The three modes of time are duration, succession, and coexistence. There will, therefore, be three rules of all relations of appearances in time, and these rules will be prior to all experience, and indeed make it possible. (B219)

II

Returning now to the three questions, let me answer them in a little more detail:

Why do we need to go beyond the subjective order and refer it to an objective world?
Kant’s claim is that there is something that the subjective order of apprehension lacks which makes the transition to an objective order necessary. What might it be? There are, I think, two ways in which we might take this, depending on what we mean by Kant’s phrase “the subjective sequence in our apprehension”. On one view, this subjective sequence is the world as we normally view it, a world of objects and events, but a world that is subjective in the sense that its apparent order lacks any objective guarantee.

This is the way in which Kant is often read. Yet to interpret him in this way, I submit, misses the point of the argument. It begs the question against Kant’s opponents, for the idea that we need to make the transition from the subjective order in this sense to an order with an objective guarantee is just what any Humean, for example, would deny. The Humean does not deny that the world seems to be an orderly sequence of events taking place against a background of relatively permanent objects: it is simply that our belief that things are this way (and that they will continue to be so) lacks any form of guarantee. In other words, the Humean denies our entitlement (and also our need) to move from the subjective order in this sense to a more objective one.

In fact, the contrast between subjective and objective at stake in the Analogies is a quite different one. Kant’s claim is that we need to go beyond the subjective order of apprehension – what this amounts to we shall leave open for the moment – even to achieve an awareness of the world as a world of objects and events, never mind whether that awareness is “merely subjective” or whether it is underpinned by some objective guarantee.
Kant claims that, if we are to see objects as enduring (as we certainly do) we require some correlate for our subjective representations:

Only through the permanent does existence in different parts of the time-series acquire a magnitude which can be entitled duration. For in bare succession existence is always vanishing and recommencing, and never has the least magnitude. Without the permanent there is therefore no time-relation. (B226)

Because time itself is not an object of perception it is only because, by synthetic means, we locate items in time that we can perceive them as abiding objects. Similarly, Kant says, we can have perceptions of events (as, again, we undeniably do) only if we have some rule which renders the subjective synthesis of apprehension objective:

I render my subjective synthesis of apprehension objective only by reference to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in their succession, that is, as they happen, are determined by the preceding state. The experience of something as happening is itself possible only on this assumption. (B240)

So the argument looks like this:

(1) We experience the world as made up of objects and events (although not necessarily with any guarantee as to their objectivity).
(2) The subjective order of apprehension fails to provide the content necessary for (1).

So:

(3) It is necessary to supplement the subjective order of apprehension in order to move to the objective order of events.

What in the former interpretation was the starting-point is, on this interpretation, the achievement. The starting point, the subjective order of apprehension, is not the world as we take it to be, a world of objects and events, but something else: the world as it is given to us.

Now when we ask the question: why do we need to go beyond the subjective order of apprehension? the answer is obvious. We cannot “rest content” with the subjective order of apprehension because such a reduced form of experience would be so thin that it would lack the minimum characteristics that anyone could be said to intelligibly undergo. In particular, it would lack (even apparently) the sorts of temporal characteristics which any Humean sceptic would concede that we at least think that our experience has; specifically, we could not even think that we had perceptions of (abiding) objects or perceptions of events.

On this interpretation, then, talk about the subjective order of apprehension does not refer to a phenomenologically available process, something of which one could become aware, but simply to one element in a total process of synthesis which, as a matter of fact, always takes place completely, and must do so if we are even going to seem to have perception of a unified world of objects and events. Talk about the subjective synthesis of apprehension is an abstraction to which no consciousness could correspond.
But there is an obvious difficulty with this interpretation. Kant does indeed say a good deal about the nature of apprehension – about its time-order in particular. What entitles him to do so?

He says, for example, (B234) that “the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive.” He then gives an example: “For instance, the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive. The question then arises, whether the manifold of the house is also in itself successive. This, however is what no one will grant.” (B235)

When we see a house we do not see it as a succession of house-parts which we then are aware of connecting into a house. Nevertheless, this is what Kant asserts is happening. How can he do so unless he has some privileged access to the component parts of the synthesising process?

This objection is supported by some textual evidence, admittedly not drawn from the Critique itself. In the Prolegomena Kant quite explicitly distinguishes between perceiving and judging. The former does not seem to depend on the latter:

The senses represent to us the course of the planets as now progressive, now retrogressive; and herein is neither falsehood or truth, because as long as we hold this to be nothing but appearance we do not judge of the objective character of their motion. (Prolegomena, p.38)
It seems that Kant is conceding here that we could perceive things without judging that we perceive them objectively. This would be a subjective kind of awareness [(experience in a weak sense, rather than Kant's own strong, knowledge-presupposing sense of experience – “Experience is an empirical knowledge, that is a knowledge which determines an object through perceptions” B218, my emphasis)] with no objective commitment entailed.

Is Kant simply unclear – or is there a compromise interpretation? Kant writes at B242-43:

We have representations in us, and can become conscious of them. But however far this consciousness may extend, and however careful and accurate it may be, they still remain mere representations, that is, inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time... In the synthesis of appearances the manifold of representation is always successive. Now no object is hereby represented, since through this succession there is a relation to the preceding state, from which the representation follows in conformity with a rule, something represents itself as an event, as something that happens; that is to say I have perceptual knowledge of an object to which I ascribe a certain determinate position in time – a position which, in view of the preceding state, cannot be otherwise assigned. (B242-43)

Here is the possibility of a compromise. We may be conscious of representations, on this reading, without them having to be representations of objects. They are “inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time”. What they are not is representations of events in a world of objects. It is only when we combine representations according to rules that they amount to “knowledge of an object to which I ascribe a certain determinate position in time”. So this concession does not undermine the force of Kant’s potential case against the Humean.
It is not open to the Humean to say that he concedes only the subjective series of representations. In fact, he concedes much more: that we are aware of the world as if it were a world of abiding objects and temporally determinate events. And it is this, Kant’s claim is, that the subjective order of apprehension lacks.

III

(2) *What makes it possible that we can carry out such a referral?*

Imagination is what connects what we receive:

All empirical knowledge involves the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination.

This synthesis is always successive, that is, the representations in it are always subsequent upon one another. (B246)

We have a subjective order of representations. But the fact that we have perceived them in this way is not sufficient to show that they are this way objectively. This is a crucial point whose meaning needs explaining. Is Kant saying that when we perceive things subjectively in the order A,B,C,D it is possible that they are (objectively) D,C,B,A? In that case our subjective order would be contradicted by the objective one. One hopes that this is not Kant’s claim – for the empiricist will, surely, just deny it. How could we come to perceive the world in the wrong order?
Fortunately there is a better suggestion, one which brings me to the heart of my argument. It is this. When we have this subjective order of apprehension the problem is not that our perception is potentially mistaken – that the order might be wrong. It is, rather, that our perception is under-determined. Although the subjective order of perception is veridical, as far as it goes, it still leaves open is whether the representations ABCD are successive or simultaneous. Now simultaneity, it follows from Kant’s claim regarding the nature of the subjective order of apprehension, is not something that is directly perceived. We only construct things to be simultaneous. Yet it is just this that gives us the difference between objects and events: objects are simultaneous (although the perception of them is successive) while events are both successive and are perceived successively.

{7} Thus:

(1) If the successive subjective apprehension ABCD is a perception of an event, X, then the fact that X is an event entails that the way in which we *did* perceive ABCD was the way in which we *had* to. In this case, then, it is not just that ABCD is the correct order of apprehension (how could it be otherwise?) but that, relative to the event X, ABCD is warranted as necessary.

(2) On the other hand, if ABCD were to be a perception of an object, O, then, since O is an abiding object, this would entail that we *could have* perceived the representations that go to make up O in a way other than that in which we did.

To summarize: the perception ABCD is a perception of X only if ABCD is a necessary sequence, and it is a perception of O *only if* ABCD is *not* a necessary sequence. But what
enables us to tell whether ABCD is a necessary sequence or not? This is the important point: nothing in the sequence itself.

If it is the case that experience requires us to decide whether what we are perceiving are abiding objects or events, then our apprehension is insufficient to provide us with a determinate experience. Yet we do see the world as a world of objects and of events. So there must be some way to make that distinction. We have a case of what one might call (with apologies to Quine) “the underdetermination of experience by data”. What to do? Might we not, in imagination, apply any old combinatory principle to fill the gap?

Not so, Kant believes. For experience is determinate. There must, therefore, be some other source of order for our perceptions which, as it were, breaks the deadlock. It isn’t as if I am aware that I have any option in how I construct experience: so, if imagination plays a role in my perception of objects, it isn’t that what is added to what is given is in any way arbitrary. If I say: there is a chair (rather than some sinuous flow of outlines?) I must have derived from the character of the perceptions themselves that they were abiding – I must have got from a sequential perception of chair-parts to the experience of a chair. But that (importantly) could not be by induction or direct experience – I could not know that things that are opaque and retain shape are more likely to be parts of chairs and tables, while things that are translucent or reflective are likely to be the rushing water in streams or waterfalls. We need a rule prior to experience. As Kant says {8}:

Understanding is required for all experience and for its possibility. Its primary contribution does not consist in making the representation of objects distinct, but in making the representation of an object possible at all. (B244)
IV

(3) Can we derive any general truths about the necessary structure of experience?

What kind of constraint are such rules of the understanding under? They must be sufficient to establish duration, succession, coexistence. This issues in three sorts of constraints that the perception of objects must meet – constraints which can themselves be expressed as rules. These higher rules are, Kant says, regulative rather than constitutive. They are necessary conditions of determinate knowledge of objects – we couldn’t have such knowledge unless the conditions that those rules represent were satisfied – but not sufficient conditions for the determination of the particular objects themselves.

However, the rules which make the perception of objects possible – the rules of the understanding which, in some sense, are the object (“The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension” (B236)) – are sufficient conditions for the appearance in question.

This point can be illustrated from the argument of the Second Analogy. The argument’s premise is that events are perceptions of representations which are ascribed a necessary sequence (as opposed to abiding objects where the perceived sequence of representations is arbitrary). {9} The question that arises is: how can a sequence justifiably be seen as necessary? The answer is: that sequence is necessary only if the subjective sequence of apprehensions has been synthesised in such a way that each step in the objective order of
perceptions fits into an explanatory framework of rules such that each state of affairs is entailed by the antecedent state of reality (that is, the disposition of objects and the laws governing them). In other words, it has to be synthesised into a sequence of causes and effects.

{10} Kant expresses the first step in the argument as follows:

When, therefore, I perceive that something happens, this representation first of all contains the consciousness that there is something preceding, because only by reference to what precedes does the appearance acquire its time-relation, namely, that of existing after a preceding time in which it itself was not. But it can acquire this determinate position in this relation of time only in so far as something is presupposed in the preceding state upon which it follows invariably, that is, in accordance with a rule. (B243)

Because I have a perception of a transition as an event I perceive that two states are in a sequential relation and (this is the important point) that this sequence is an objective sequence. For this there must be some antecedent condition which is sufficient to allow us to derive the event:

... if the state which precedes is posited, this determinate event follows inevitably and necessarily. The situation, then, is this: there is an order in our representations in which the present, so far as it has come to be, refers us to some preceding state as a correlate of the event which is given; and though this correlate is, indeed, indeterminate, it nonetheless stands in a determining relation to the event as its
consequence, connecting the event in necessary relation to itself in the time-series.

(B243-44)

{11} Let me, then, summarise:

(1) To perceive something as an event I must render my objective synthesis of apprehension active

(2) To do this means to ascribe to it a necessary time-order – a place in the determinate order of the world.

(3) A time-order is necessary only if there is some antecedent state from which the event in question can be derived according to a necessary rule.

(4) But this (being derivable according to a necessary rule) is just what it means to be the effect of a cause.

(5) Thus, given an event, we can infer the existence of a cause although we cannot, just from that event, determine what the cause is.

It is worth clarifying the place of necessity in this account, for it can be confusing. All rules, says Kant, have what he calls the “form of necessity”: that is, they take the form (roughly) “Given A, then, necessarily B”. What is necessary, too, is that we have some such rules, sufficient to determine experience as composed of objects and events. But what is contingent,
Kant maintains, is just what particular rules those will turn out to be. It is for this reason that
the causal principle is regulative, not constitutive.

The existence of adequate causal laws is thus *coeval* with our having experience – the rules
which make experience possible amount to rules of causal connection {12}:

> If... my perception is to contain certain knowledge of an event, of something as
> actually happening, it must be an empirical judgement in which we think the sequence
> as determined; that is, it presupposes another appearance in time, upon which it
> follows necessarily, according to a rule... Thus the relation of appearances (as possible
> perceptions) according to which the subsequent, that which happens, is, as to its
> existence, necessarily determined in time by something preceding in conformity with
> a rule – in other words the relation of cause to effect – is the condition of the objective
> validity of our empirical judgements in respect of the series of perceptions, and so of
> their empirical truth; that is to say it is the condition of experience. (B247)

This is what Kant means when he describes the understanding not simply as the law-giver of
nature but as being the source for the applicability of the principle of sufficient reason to
experience – the principle that everything is governed by some antecedent conditions. Were
that not the case, we would not be able to move from the possibility of an experience to its
actuality: that is, the knowledge of an appearance with a determinate position in time. That
we *can* establish such a determinate position in time is possible only because we have a rule
by which our subjective succession of apprehension can be ordered:
The principle of sufficient reason is thus the ground of possible experience, that is, of objective knowledge of appearances in respect of their relation in the order of time.

(B246)

V

This concludes my account of the argument of the Second Analogy. It is now time to place it in contrast with P.F. Strawson’s celebrated (to some, notorious) criticism of the same argument. In fact, Strawson’s criticism is very simply conveyed. He argues as follows. Take a subjective sequence of perceptions – call it A,B,C,D. Now that sequence, if it is objective, is necessary, in the sense that – relative to the objective order of events – it could not be otherwise. Yet causation requires something more. It requires not just that A,B,C,D is an objective sequence; it requires that there is a necessary connection between A,B,C and D such that, given the covering laws and initial conditions, B follows from A, C from B, and so on. But that is not licensed, says Strawson, by the sheer fact that the order A,B,C,D is necessary, given the objectivity of the sequence; it is this move that constitutes the famous “non sequitur of numbing grossness”.

Given what I have said so far, it is now easy to see where I think that Strawson goes wrong. It is not the case that we start from a series of events and are then faced with the question: are those events objective? What we are given is the subjective order of apprehension, and what this amounts to is neither a sequence of events nor a background of abiding objects. That subjective order is only an ingredient in our experience and is not something that we can be aware of self-sufficiently. What is phenomenologically present, in fact, is a world of events
taking place against a background of objects. Now the claim is that we could have got to that world only if a set of rules had been applied to the given material (that is, that it should have been brought under concepts). The constraint upon those rules is that they must be such as to allow us to order what is given to us into a seamless and coherent reality.

It is just this that allows Kant to make his claim about causality. Causality, he says, is the ability to relate one event to another according to rules. We can be sure that we are in possession of such rules because, without them, we would not be able to form the subjective order of apprehension into objects and events. So the sceptic’s doubt – that we might have a world of objects and events, but no causal laws to support that world – can be answered. Without the rules that amount to causality, we would not even have the world of objects and events.

This is a quite different reply to Strawson from that made by Gerd Buchdahl. For Buchdahl, Strawson’s mistake is to think that Kant is arguing that we are, necessarily, in possession of causal laws. So Strawson’s failure to find a satisfactory argument in Kant for such laws is by no means surprising. According to Buchdahl, the most that Kant aspires to is to argue that we necessarily seek to apply the causal principle: not that there is any a priori reason for us to expect to be able to do so successfully. Yet that is just what Kant is arguing, on my view. On my understanding of the argument, Kant’s claim is that, unless we were in possession of some sufficient set of rules for determining appearances – that is, in effect, of causal laws – we should not have the everyday experience that both realist and sceptic agree that we have.
I come now to the final part of my discussion. It seems to me that there are two obvious lines of criticism to make of Kant. The first would be to challenge his premise: his claim that the subjective order of apprehension is deficient vis-à-vis the experience of the world of objects and events that we, unquestionably, have. The second, however, is rather different. I have argued that Kant’s argument is that in order to meet that deficiency – in order to convert the subjective order of apprehension into objects and events – it is necessary that we are in possession of a system of rules to apply to what is given to us.

On the face of it, this is a very happy result for Kant. On the one hand, it allows him to argue that the proposition “There are some true causal principles sufficient to establish a world of objects and events” is true *a priori*. On the other hand, it seems to do justice to what seems to most of us to be an obvious truth: that we have to discover the way that the world is (and the ways in which it is connected) by empirical enquiry. Yet if we return to look over the argument we can see that this separation threatens to come apart.

Let us consider Kant’s central claim: that a system of concepts – that is, of “rules of synthesis” – brings us from the subjective order of apprehension to the world of objects and events. What is the status of these concepts? Officially, of course, they are “empirical”. That is, although they have the form of necessity (as all concepts do) what they are is something that we have to discover from experience. Yet, on the other hand, empirical concepts are what makes experience possible. If we were not already applying them as “rules for the synthesis of the manifold” then we couldn’t observe and make discoveries about the world at all. So if the concepts that make objects possible are empirical, they are so in a strange and somewhat confusing sense.
One might think of them as a kind of “tacit knowledge”. Just as we apply, implicitly and unreflectively, a range of grammatical rules when we speak our language, so, on this view, we apply a range of perceptual rules to identify and order what is given to us through the senses. Yet, if that is so, then the sense in which such rules are really “empirical” starts to slip.

Certainly, they are not \textit{a priori} in the very particular sense in which Kant thinks that those quite special concepts, the categories, are \textit{a priori}. In the case of the categories, Kant believes that he has shown that all possible experience must employ just those concepts. In the case of the empirical concepts, however, it is not that the concepts that we employ are the only ones possible. Nevertheless, whichever empirical concepts we do employ must be sufficient to order what is given into a system of objects and events. Thus, although such concepts are not themselves \textit{a priori}, they are under an \textit{a priori} constraint.

But if the empirical concepts that generate the world of objects and events are not \textit{a priori} it is difficult to see how they are empirical either. They are, after all, concepts whose role it is to be applied to what is given as a means of ordering it; thus they cannot themselves, surely, be part of what is given. How, then, can they be thought of as being derived from – or as corresponding to, or as being revisable in the light of – experience? Yet without such features in what sense can concepts be said to be “empirical”?

In the end, the problem that it comes down to is this. If concepts are the means by which we order what is given then how can they themselves be part of what is given? Yet, unless they are part of what is given, how can they be said to be adequate to reality (or, indeed, \textit{inadequate} to it)? This, I am convinced, is a very deep difficulty, to which Kant has no easy answer. As far as the way that we experience the world goes, the empirical concepts that we
employ in identifying objects and events are not discovered or optional; we make no conscious effort to adopt or change them – they are too fundamental for that. When we do change our mind about the way that reality is, it is on the basis of observations that themselves already presuppose a framework of beliefs about objects and events.

How to resolve such a deep tension? One way, of course, is to weaken the claim made by the Analogies – to claim that its conclusion is not that we are necessarily in possession of a set of concepts sufficient to transform the subjective order of apprehension into a system of objects and events, but, simply, that we are necessarily disposed to try to develop such concepts – with no guarantee of success. This is, in effect, the Buchdahl strategy – although it has been followed by other distinguished commentators (not least, if I understand him correctly, Michael Friedmann). To put it rather crudely, this strategy suggests that we make the susceptibility of nature to a comprehensive framework of laws a matter of subjective commitment (in the manner of the regulative employment of the ideas of reason to be found in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason) rather than a matter of objective proof or “deduction” in the manner of the “Transcendental Analytic”.

One of the most striking features of the Opus Postumum, I think, is the way in which the first Critique’s carefully-constructed line between Transcendental Dialectic and Transcendental Analytic appears to be being called into question. On one reading, this seems to give support to the Buchdahl strategy. If the sharp distinction between reason and understanding is being blurred does that not show that Kant has wisely abandoned the attempt to derive substantive principles regarding the structure of reality from the mere conditions for the employment of concepts?
But this, I must say, seems to me to be the exact opposite of the way in which the texts point. Time and again, as I read it, Kant’s position in the Opus Postumum appears to be that we must be in possession – not, of course, consciously or theoretically – of an extensive grasp of the underlying nature of reality for experience of objects or events to be possible at all. In the Opus Postumum Kant’s claim is nothing less than that we have “a priori knowledge of the system of the moving forces of matter”. When he asks how this is possible Kant’s answer is unambiguous:

... not according to a synthetic, but to a merely analytic principle, namely, the rule of identity; since experience does not emerge immediately from an aggregate of perceptions (thus not empirically) but only as the consequence of a formal principle of the coordination of the manifold of empirical representations in a system, called experience. (Opus Postumum (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1993), p. 123)

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