

The Legal Academy's Ideological Uniformity

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ABSTRACT

We study the ideological balance of the legal academy and compare it with the ideology of the legal profession more broadly. To do so, we match professors listed in the Association of American Law Schools' *Directory of Law Teachers* and lawyers listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory to a measure of political ideology based on political donations. We find that 15 percent of law professors, compared with 35 percent of lawyers, are conservative. This may not simply be due to differences in their backgrounds: the legal academy is still 11 percentage points more liberal than the legal profession after controlling for several relevant individual characteristics. We argue that law professors' ideological uniformity marginalizes them but that it may not be possible to improve the ideological balance of the legal academy without sacrificing other values.

1. INTRODUCTION

In November 2016, Jeff Sessions was nominated to be the attorney general of the United States. Sessions was a highly controversial figure at the time of his nomination: he had a reputation for being extremely conservative, and many on the left viewed him as holding deeply troubling, racist views (Nakashima and Horwitz 2016; Zapotosky, Horwitz, and Nakashima 2017). Before the Senate voted, over 10 percent of all law professors in the United States posted a widely circulated open letter opposing Sessions's nomination, stating that they believed he "will not fairly enforce our nation's laws and promote justice and equality in the United States" (Aaron et al. 2017). However, the law professors' letter was quickly dismissed by many conservative lawmakers, public ob-

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servers, and journalists precisely because it was written by law professors (see, for example, Huffman 2017; Presser 2017). A spokeswoman for Sessions rejected the letter as “business as usual for the same far-left academics who trot out letters opposing just about any conservative or Republican who’s nominated to a key position by a Republican president” (Johnson 2017). One Republican member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Lindsey Graham, even joked, “We’re about to get an answer to the age-old question: Can you get confirmed attorney general of the United States over the objection of 1,400 law professors? I don’t know what the betting line is in Vegas, but I like your chances” (C-SPAN 2017). This statement was met with laughter from the audience. Sessions was ultimately confirmed.

Was it accurate to characterize the signatories of the letter, and the legal academy more generally, as uniformly liberal? In fairness to those who dismissed the letter, five prior studies of the ideologies of law professors find that at least 75 percent of law professors are liberal (Merritt 1998; Cardiff and Klein 2005; McGinnis, Schwartz, and Tisdell 2005; Lindgren 2016; Phillips 2016). Although these studies bring evidence to this debate, they all examine limited samples of law professors. Moreover, even if a large majority of law professors are liberal, so too are lawyers, particularly graduates of elite law schools (hereafter, elite lawyers) (Bonica, Chilton, and Sen 2016). It thus may be the case that law professors are not ideologically out of step with the legal profession. Instead, the political ideology of the legal academy could simply reflect the political ideology of the population from which it is drawn. If so, this would suggest a more liberal slant in the legal community more generally, but not the legal academy specifically. If not, this would suggest that any number of mechanisms are at work to limit the representation of conservatives in the legal academy.

In this article, we study the ideological balance of the legal academy and compare it with the ideological balance of the legal profession. To do so, we match 10,040 law professors listed in the 2012 *Directory of Law Teachers* from the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) to a comprehensive database of political ideology that is based on political donations—the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME; Bonica 2016). We also match lawyers listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory to their political donations. Through this approach, we are able to improve on past work in three ways. First, whereas other studies used limited samples of law professors (for example, professors from top law schools), we use all law professors listed in the 2012 AALS *Di-*

rectory of *Law Teachers* who have made political donations. Second, our measure of political ideology—the Campaign Finance score (CFscore)—places individuals on an ideological spectrum, which offers richer information on individuals’ political leanings than using a discrete measure of ideology (for example, donations to a political party), as in previous studies. Third, we use data on the ideologies of both law professors and lawyers and are therefore able to conduct the first comparison of the ideology of the legal academy with that of the legal profession.

Using this new data set, we find that approximately 15 percent of law professors are conservative compared with 35 percent of lawyers. Law professors also hold more ideologically extreme views than lawyers: only 32 percent of law professors, compared with 67 percent of lawyers, are either moderately liberal or moderately conservative. And even though law professors have backgrounds similar to those of elite lawyers, and elite lawyers are more liberal than lawyers overall, individual characteristics do not fully explain the 20-percentage-point gap. After estimating a series of regressions, we find that the legal academy is still 11 percentage points more liberal than the legal profession after controlling for several relevant individual characteristics. In short, we find that law professors are more liberal than elite lawyers even after controlling for relevant shared characteristics. This means that there may be sorting into the legal academy or discrimination on the basis of ideology; however, we cannot adjudicate between these and other possible mechanisms (see generally Phillips 2016).

This ideological uniformity in the legal academy has potentially broad implications. As the law professors’ letter opposing Sessions illustrates, the legal academy’s ideological homogeneity can limit its political credibility. In fact, matching the signatories of the letter to our sample of law professor ideology, we find that only 4 percent of the signatories appearing in our data are conservative.¹ Thus, the commentators and politicians who dismissed the letter as reflecting the views of liberals were not wrong in their assumptions. Moreover, the decision to speak out against Sessions was not a rare act of advocacy. Numerous law professors file briefs before state and federal courts, and many others weigh in on important policy issues. These activities might be undermined by the professoriate’s

1. Note that we were able to match 754 of the signatories to their political donations—the law professors whom we were unable to match could have made no donations, switched law schools between 2012 and 2016, or not been a professor by 2012.

ideological homogeneity. To the extent that is true, the introduction of more ideological diversity may strengthen the legal academy's influence.

However, reducing the ideological uniformity of the legal academy may have drawbacks. Most notably, adopting ideological hiring preferences—like promoting the hiring of conservative faculty—could negatively affect other hiring prerogatives, including the goal of achieving a gender balance and the priority of hiring underrepresented minorities. By using information on the gender of law professors and an AALS list of 1,417 minority law professors, we assess ideological differences by gender and minority status. We find that male law professors are roughly two times more likely to be conservative than female law professors and that nonminority law professors are roughly one and a half times more likely to be conservative than minority law professors. This provides at least some suggestive evidence that a trade-off between ideological balance and diversity-oriented hiring prerogatives likely exists.

This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss prior research on the topic. In Section 3 we introduce the data. In Section 4 we study the ideologies of law professors overall, by expertise, and by law school. In Section 5 we study the ideological balance between the legal academy and the legal profession. In Section 6 we discuss the limitations of the research and conclude by explaining the trade-offs associated with increasing ideological diversity.

2. BACKGROUND

Political ideology affects legal decision-making. For example, political ideology affects the voting of Supreme Court justices (Segal and Spaeth 2002), influences the voting patterns of heterogeneous circuit court panels (Miles and Sunstein 2006), and even predicts the conclusions that law professors reach in their research (Chilton and Posner 2015). In fact, the relationship between ideology and legal decision-making is thought to be so strong and persistent that it is now widely believed to be one of the most influential factors in legal decisions (see, for example, Martin et al. 2004; Ruger et al. 2004).

The relationship between ideology and legal decision-making has given rise to concerns over the ideological balance in the legal academy and, in particular, the implications stemming from an underrepresentation of conservatives. The strong link between ideology and legal

decision-making implies that law professors, who are charged with training future generations of lawyers and who exercise influence over politics and policy, should not be overwhelmingly from one side of the political spectrum. Concerns about the ideological imbalance of the legal academy have recently drawn attention from both academics and politicians. For example, a group of law professors petitioned the AALS to promote more ideological diversity in the legal academy (Barnett 2017), and bills have been introduced into two state legislatures—Iowa and North Carolina—that would require public universities to promote ideological diversity in faculty hiring (Schmidt 2017).

The belief that law professors are predominantly liberal not only is based on anecdotal evidence but also has been documented in a number of empirical studies. At least five studies investigate the political ideologies of law professors.² Table 1 summarizes the ideologies of law professors estimated in each study. Although these studies use different samples and methods for identifying political ideology, all five find that between 75 percent and 86 percent of law professors are liberal.

That said, even if 86 percent of law professors are liberal, it does not mean that they are necessarily ideologically out of step with the legal profession. Instead, the handful of prior efforts to study the ideologies of American lawyers all find that lawyers are also a very liberal group (Muller 2013; Roeder 2014). Bonica, Chilton, and Sen (2016) find that 68 percent of lawyers who made political donations gave more money to Democrats than Republicans. And this ideological tilt is even more extreme among elite lawyers, with liberals making up 76 percent of graduates of elite law schools (the so-called top 14) (Bonica, Chilton, and Sen 2016).

This observation motivates several of the empirical analyses that follow. In particular, law professors may be more liberal than the general public, but they might be comparable to the population of elite lawyers—the population from which they are drawn. Although we cannot confirm or rule out mechanisms, observing no ideological differences between the

2. See Phillips (2016) for a summary of this research. In addition to these five studies, two others indirectly examine the ideologies of law professors. First, Chilton and Posner (2015) examine the relationship between political ideology and the political leanings of legal scholarship using a sample of 156 law professors from the top 14 law schools. They find that 75 professors were net donors to Democrats, 24 professors were net donors to Republicans, and 57 professors made no donations. Second, Bonica, Chilton, and Sen (2016) examine the political ideologies of lawyers in the Martindale-Hubbell directory and find that lawyers who identify as law professors are more liberal than other lawyers.

Table 1. Studies of the Ideologies of Law Professors

Study	Sample	N	Measure	Findings
Merritt (1998)	Entry-level hires from 1986 to 1991	832	Self-reported survey of political beliefs	75% Liberal, 10% conservative
Cardiff and Klein (2005)	Nonrandom set of California law schools	254	Voter registration records	80% Democrats, 20% Republicans
McGinnis, Schwartz, and Tisdell (2005)	Rank of assistant, associate, or full professor as of the 2001–2 school year at the top 21 law schools	1,215	Political donations from 1992 to 2002	81% Democrats, 15% Republicans
Lindgren (2016)	Law faculty at the top 100 law schools in 1997	710	Party identification	80% Democrats, 13% Republicans
Phillips (2016)	Full-time tenure-track faculty for the 2011–12 school year at the top 16 law schools	1,011	Campaign donations, voter registration records, organizational affiliations, résumés, and scholarship	86% Liberal, 14% conservative or libertarian

legal profession and the legal academy would alleviate concerns of an ideological bias against conservatives in the hiring process (see generally Phillips 2016). On the other hand, observing ideological differences between the legal profession and the legal academy would motivate future study about why the pattern exists, such as whether conservatives are less likely to pursue an academic career or law schools being less inclined to hire conservatives.

3. DATA

In this section, we introduce the data that we used to identify law professors and the data on political ideology. We also describe how we matched the data and two checks we conducted to test the reliability of the measure of ideology.

3.1. Association of American Law Schools Directory

We obtained the names of all law professors recorded in the 2012 AALS *Directory of Law Teachers*.³ The AALS directory contains multiple tables of law professors' identities. We utilize the table of law teachers by subject for our list of law professors. This means we intentionally exclude anyone who is not listed as teaching at least one subject (for example, directors of alumni relations, heads of student services). This yields 10,040 law professors. The directory further identifies the law school where the professor is employed and each subject that he or she teaches. There are a total of 104 subjects,⁴ and the average professor teaches 3.9 subjects.

3.2. Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections

We use data on political ideology from DIME (Bonica 2016). This database was introduced in Bonica (2014) and contains information on the universe of political donations disclosed to the Federal Election Commission and state election agencies. This includes donations made from 1979 to 2016 in local, state, and federal elections by individuals and organi-

3. Several studies rely on Association of American Law Schools (AALS) data (for example, White 1994; Olivas 1994; Eisenberg and Wells 2000; Harrison 2006). We rely on the 2012 AALS directory because it was the most recent version in pdf form when we began data collection for this project.

4. We exclude subjects taught by fewer than 10 law professors.

zations. In total, DIME contains over 250 million donations made from over 20 million donors.⁵

The database provides a measure of ideology known as the CFscore. The CFscores are calculated by first placing candidates on a unidimensional ideological scale on the basis of their share of common donors. Individual donors are then placed on the same scale on the basis of the weighted share of the donations given to candidates. The scale is normalized such that it has an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 with respect to the population of US donors.⁶ For instance, Bernie Sanders has a CFscore of -1.89 , Barack Obama has a CFscore of -1.16 , Mitt Romney has a CFscore of $.90$, and Donald Trump has a CFscore of 1.29 .

To offer a slightly simplified illustration of how the donors' scores are constructed, consider two examples. First, if an individual's only donation is to Barack Obama, her CFscore would be -1.16 . This is because her CFscore would simply be Barack Obama's CFscore. Second, if an individual made two-thirds of her lifetime donations to Bernie Sanders and one-third of her lifetime donations to Barack Obama, her CFscore would be -1.65 . This is because her CFscore would be calculated as two-thirds Bernie Sanders's CFscore of -1.89 and one-third Barack Obama's CFscore of -1.16 ($(-1.89 \times \frac{2}{3}) + (-1.16 \times \frac{1}{3})$).

3.3. Matching

We use the professor's name, the law school where he or she works, and the law school's location to match to DIME. In addition to the data on law professors' identities, we obtained data on the identities of lawyers from the Martindale-Hubbell directory. To match these data to DIME, we use the lawyer's name, employer, and the state of residence from the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers (for information on the matching process, see Bonica and Sen 2015). Using this process, we find that the donation rate for law professors is 64 percent. To put this in perspective, Chilton and Posner (2015) hand match professors from top 14 law schools to their donations and find a donation rate of 63 percent. This donation rate is higher than that for Americans in general (roughly 5 percent) and for lawyers in the Martindale-Hubbell directory (41 percent).

5. We use version 3 of the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections, which at the time of writing is not publicly available.

6. This measure has been extensively validated (Bonica 2014; Bonica and Sen 2015) and used in political science and legal research (for example, Thomsen 2014; Chilton and Posner 2015; Wood and Spencer 2016).

3.4. Robustness of Campaign Finance Scores

We investigate two concerns about why CFscores may not accurately capture the ideological makeup of the legal academy. One concern about using political donations as a measure of ideology for law professors is that professors may donate to candidates for reasons other than shared ideologies. This may happen, for example, if a professor makes donations to former classmates who run for office with whom they do not share ideological views. To assess this concern, we exploit the fact that donations to state and local candidates are more likely to be orthogonal to ideology because law professors are less likely to know federal and presidential candidates.⁷ We therefore test whether donations to state and local candidates are similar to donations to federal and presidential candidates, and we find no evidence that the findings are sensitive to the type of donations used to construct the CFscore (see Figure A1).

Another concern with using CFscores is that they may lead to different classifications than more traditional measures of ideology like political party. For instance, a law professor who donates more to conservative candidates but makes one large donation to a liberal candidate may have a moderately liberal CFscore. If this happens systematically, differences in our results and prior research could be driven by the measure of ideology rather than actual differences in the ideological distribution. We therefore examine the breakdown of professors' ideology using a coarser measure of ideology—whether a law professor gave solely to Republican candidates, solely to Democratic candidates, or to both Republicans and Democrats. We find no evidence that CFscores overstate the liberal tilt of the legal academy (see Figure A2).

4. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY

In this section, we assess several patterns of law professor ideologies, including variation by area of expertise and across law schools. We begin by exploring the overall distribution of law professors' ideologies.

7. Of course, there are exceptions. For example, professors at the University of Chicago may have donated to Barack Obama because of personal relationships even if Obama's ideology was substantially different from their own.




Figure 1. Ideologies of donating law professors

4.1. Ideologies of Law Professors Overall

Figure 1 displays the distribution of the CFscores for the 6,441 law professors who made donations (prominent politicians' CFscores are marked for reference). The distribution is roughly bimodal, following the two-party ideological divide in American politics. The average CFscore of donating professors is -0.86 , which is liberal, but less liberal than Barack Obama (-1.16).

Using a cutoff for conservative of 0 (which reflects the average ideology of Americans), 15 percent of law professors are conservative. If we define moderately conservative as between 0 and 1, 54 percent of conservative professors are moderately conservative. If we define moderately liberal as between -1 and 0, 27 percent of liberal professors are moderately liberal. We use these definitions of moderately conservative and liberal throughout.

4.2. Ideologies of Law Professors by Subject

Next we examine whether the ideologies of law professors vary according to the subjects they teach. One might expect political ideology to stem

from, or perhaps serve to motivate, law professors' research and teaching activities.

We examine this possible relationship by assessing how the ideologies of law professors vary according to the subjects they teach, as listed in the AALS directory.⁸ Figure 2 plots the average and median ideologies of law professors in each of the subject areas. The teaching areas are sorted by the average CFscore of professors in the subject area from most liberal (feminist legal theory) to most conservative (military law). Some of the subjects that have a reputation for being the most liberal are taught by, on average, the most liberal professors. For example, subjects taught by the most liberal professors on average (in terms of average CFscore) are feminist legal theory, poverty law, women and the law, critical race theory, immigration law, disability law, welfare law, and human rights law. Similarly, subjects with the reputation of being conservative are taught by some of the most conservative professors on average, including military law, estate planning, oil and gas rights, securities regulation, admiralty, sports law, equity, and law and accounting.

To investigate the forces driving the differences, we also assess the distribution of CFscores by subject area.⁹ We find that a key difference between the ideologies of law professors by subject is not a noticeable shift from liberal professors to moderately liberal professors but the presence, if any, of conservative professors in the field. In particular, there are few conservative professors teaching the subjects that are most liberal on average; by contrast, subjects that are more conservative on average are taught by a majority of liberal professors but at least some conservative professors. Thus, the mere presence of some conservatives is sufficient to differentiate average ideological differences among law professors between subject areas.

4.3. Ideologies of Law Professors by Law School

We anticipate some of the greatest variation in the ideologies of law professors to be across law schools. Law schools have different ideological cultures, with differences in the ideologies of alumni comporting with the

8. Subject area refers to the subject matter taught, which could differ from research and writing areas. Although we believe that scholars generally tend to teach in areas related to their research areas, we know this is not always true. In addition, professors may have multiple teaching areas listed. We include each professor in each subject area for which he or she is listed.

9. As discussed in Section 5, Figure 8 plots the ideological distributions of professors for coarse areas of expertise.




Figure 2. Average ideologies of donating law professors by subject area

popular reputations of the programs (Bonica, Chilton, and Sen 2016). For instance, alumni of the University of California, Berkeley, are some of the most liberal lawyers, while graduates of Brigham Young University and the University of Wyoming are some of the most conservative.

One might expect the reputations to extend to the professors at the law schools. To investigate differences in ideology by law school, Figure 3 shows the percentages of liberal, moderately liberal, moderately conservative, and conservative law professors at the top 50 ranked law schools,




Figure 2. Continued

and Figure 4 plots the average and median CFscore for professors at each law school. In Figure 4, the programs are sorted by the average CFscore for professors from the most liberal (Florida A&M University) to the most conservative (George Mason University). We find that universities with liberal reputations, such as the University of California, Berkeley, have on average the most liberal professors and that universities with conservative reputations, such as George Mason University and Brigham Young University, have on average the most conservative professors. Figures 3 and 4 also make clear that a large majority of law schools have average faculties that lean to the left of center. Figure 4 shows that the av-




Figure 3. Ideologies of donating law professors at the top 50 law schools

erage professor is more conservative than the average American at fewer than 10 law schools.

As with subject areas, we also examine whether these differences by law school are driven by the absence of conservative professors and/or by

more moderately liberal professors.¹⁰ We find that differences in ideology appear to be driven by the presence of conservatives at several programs rather than a shift of liberals in the moderate direction. For example, consider the law schools at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University, which we find to have more conservative faculties than similarly ranked programs such as the law schools at the University of Michigan and the University of Pennsylvania. Liberal professors at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University ideologically resemble the professors at similarly ranked institutions; however, these two programs differ in that they have relatively more conservative professors.

4.4. Ideologies of Law Professors by Law School Ranking

Next, we explore the relationship between ideology and law school rank. Figure 5 shows a binned scatterplot of the relationship between the average ideology of professors at a law school and law school rank.¹¹ Figure 5 shows a clear negative relationship between the average CFscore for professors and law schools' prestige; that is, the more prestigious the program (the closer its rank is to 1), the more liberal (negative) the average professor is at the law school. To assess the relationship more formally, we fit a linear regression line onto the scatterplot: the slope of the plotted line indicates that law schools ranked 30 spots higher are associated with a .04 shift in CFscore to the left ($p < .01$).

The difference in the average ideology of professors by law school could be driven by two channels. First, polarization could be different at higher-ranked schools (that is, liberal professors at top schools could be more liberal, or conservatives at top law schools could be more moderate). Second, there could be relatively fewer conservatives present at higher-ranked law schools.

Figure 6 explores the extent to which these channels explain the relationship between average ideology and rank. Figure 6A explores polarization. We divide law professors at each law school into liberals and conservatives and then plot the average ideology of the liberal or conservative professors against the law school's rank. We find no evidence that differences in polarization are driving the relationship between ideology and rank. Figure 6B explores the presence of conservatives by plotting

10. As discussed in Section 5, Figure 9 plots the ideological distribution of the professors at the top 14 law schools.

11. Since our AALS data are from 2012, we use 2012 *U.S. News and World Report* law school rankings.




Figure 4. Average ideologies of donating law professors by law school




Figure 4. Continued




Figure 5. Average ideologies of donating law professors by law school rank

the relationship between rank and the proportion of conservative professors at a law school. The negative relationship suggests that higher-ranked law schools have a lower share of conservative professors. Law schools ranked 30 spots higher are associated with a 2-percentage-point drop in conservative professors ($p < .01$). In sum, we find evidence that the relationship between professors' ideology and a law school's rank is driven by the presence of fewer conservative professors at higher-ranked schools rather than a shift of liberal or conservative law professors in a more liberal direction.

4.5. Ideologies of Law Professors by Their Alma Mater Law School

In Section 5, we address whether the ideologies of law professors differ from those of lawyers. Here we give some context on the importance of this question by presenting descriptive statistics in Table 2 for law professors by which law schools they attended.¹² Harvard ranks first in market share, with 12 percent of professors having attended its law school. Only Yale Law School has a market share close to Harvard's (9 percent). Each of the other law schools account for less than half of Yale's market share. Roughly a third of legal academic positions are held by graduates of the

12. This analysis is of professors for whom we were able to identify the law school attended from the biography section of the 2012 *AALS Directory of Law Teachers*.




Figure 6. Polarization (A) and the presence of conservatives (B) by law school rank

five top law schools, and roughly half (51 percent) of academic positions are held by graduates of the top 14 law schools.

Table 2 also shows how the ideologies of law professors vary by law school attended. Eighteen percent of law professors from schools not in

Table 2. Donating Law Professors by Law School Attended

	Market Share	Mean Campaign Finance Score	Proportion Conservative
Harvard University	12	-.98	10
Yale University	9	-.95	11
Columbia University	4	-.94	11
University of Michigan	4	-.88	15
University of Chicago	3	-.72	21
New York University	3	-1.06	9
Georgetown University	3	-1.01	9
Stanford University	3	-.95	13
University of California, Berkeley	2	-1.02	10
University of Virginia	2	-.83	15
University of Pennsylvania	2	-.87	13
Northwestern University	2	-1.04	11
Duke University	1	-.64	22
Cornell University	1	-.84	19
All others	49	-.76	18

the top 14 are conservative, compared with 12 percent of law professors from top-14 law schools (not shown). Among professors from the top 14 law schools, there are noticeable differences in the average ideologies and the proportion of conservatives between law schools. Law professors who attended New York University are the most liberal in terms of both average ideology and the proportion of conservatives, and law professors who attended Duke and the University of Chicago are the most conservative. These differences highlight the importance of controlling for where law professors went to law school in assessing ideological differences between the legal academy and the legal profession.

5. COMPARING THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Section 4 documents a leftward tendency among law professors, one that becomes more pronounced at the most prestigious law schools. However, a key question concerns context. How do law professors compare with other lawyers, including alumni of their law schools or lawyers in their areas of expertise? On the one hand, the ideologies of law professors may simply correspond closely to those of other similar lawyers. On the other hand, a large gap between the ideologies of law professors and those of similar lawyers would indeed suggest that law professors are ideologi-

cally out of step with the profession. In this section, we study whether the legal academy is ideologically out of step with the legal profession by examining how the ideologies of law professors compare with those of a number of relevant groups.

5.1. Ideologies of Law Professors and Lawyers

First, we assess how the ideologies of law professors compare with those of lawyers generally.¹³ Figure 7A plots the ideological distributions of law professors and of lawyers. Law professors are significantly more liberal on average than lawyers overall (CFscore of $-.84$ compared with $-.31$; $p < .01$).

There are several additional substantive findings. First, there are relatively fewer conservative law professors than conservative lawyers.¹⁴ Second, differences at the tails of the distribution suggest that law professors hold more extreme political views than lawyers. Compared with the 61 percent of liberal lawyers who are moderately liberal (CFscores between -1 and 0), 27 percent of liberal law professors are moderately liberal; compared with the 76 percent of conservative lawyers who are moderately conservative (CFscores between 0 and 1), 54 percent of conservative law professors are moderately conservative. Both these differences in averages are statistically significant ($p < .01$).¹⁵

13. For an overview of the ideological leanings of the professional bar, see Bonica, Chilton, and Sen (2016). We note that law professors tend to donate at higher rates than do lawyers—64 percent compared with 41 percent. This means that law professors are more likely to be selected into our data than are lawyers. Possible problems associated with selection bias in the bar as a whole are discussed in Bonica, Chilton, and Sen (2016), which shows that there is no reason to think that differences in contribution rates would be correlated with ideology in a way that would bias any inferences about these populations.

14. See Bonica, Chilton, and Sen (2016) for a comparison of lawyers with other similarly educated professionals that shows that lawyers are more liberal than accountants, workers in the finance industry, and doctors but more conservative overall than journalists and workers in the high-tech sector.

15. In this paper, we at times test the differences in averages between groups. We have also statistically compared distributions via a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the statistical significance of the primary results holds under the test as well (which means that we can rule out the null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same underlying population). Even though the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has the advantage of making no assumptions about the underlying distribution of the data (unlike the t -test for differences in averages), in our setting we view the tests largely as alternatives. For simplicity, we therefore report results of only the widely used t -test.




Figure 7. Comparisons of ideologies: *A*, lawyers; *B*, lawyers from top-14 law schools; *C*, lawyers at top-100 law firms; *D*, federal clerks; *E*, federal judges; *F*, other academics.






Figure 7. *Continued*

5.2. Ideologies of Law Professors, Elite Lawyers, and Other Academics

Law professors are among the most elite of lawyers and tend to have prestigious educational and professional backgrounds (Presser 2016). For example, many law professors are alumni of the top-ranked law schools, have served as Supreme Court or court of appeals law clerks, and/or have doctoral degrees. To provide a better comparison set, we therefore compare law professors with three subsets of lawyers: alumni of top-14 law schools and lawyers at the 100 largest law firms by number of attorneys (Biglaw), federal law clerks, and federal judges. We also provide a comparison to one other relevant group: academics in all fields.

5.2.1. Comparison with Top-14 Alumni and Big-Firm Lawyers. Figures 7B and 7C plot the ideologies of alumni from top-14 law schools and Biglaw lawyers against the ideologies of law professors.¹⁶ The average CFscore for alumni from top-14 law schools is $-.55$ and is $-.42$ for Biglaw lawyers (compared with $-.86$ for law professors). In addition, 25 percent of alumni from top-14 law schools and 30 percent of lawyers from Biglaw are conservative (compared with 15 percent of law professors). In short, alumni from top-14 law schools and Biglaw lawyers are more liberal than lawyers overall, but law professors are more liberal still. All of these differences are statistically significant ($p < .01$).

5.2.2. Comparison with Law Clerks. Next we examine how the ideologies of law professors compare with the ideologies of lawyers who have served as judicial law clerks. Legal clerkships are highly prestigious 1- to 2-year positions in which recent law school alumni work closely with judges, serving as research and writing assistants (for more information on the ideologies of law clerks, see Bonica et al. 2017). For our purposes, clerkships—in particular Supreme Court and, to a lesser extent, federal lower-court clerkships—can serve as stepping stones into a career in legal academia.

We disaggregate our analysis by examining federal district clerks and federal court of appeals clerks and US Supreme Court clerks. We use data on district and court of appeals clerks from 1996 to 2004 from Katz and Stafford (2010) and data on Supreme Court clerks from 1960 to 2009 from the Supreme Court Information Office.¹⁷ Figure 7D plots the ideol-

16. We determine whether a lawyer worked for Biglaw using his or her entry in the Martindale-Hubbell directory.

17. Note that this means that our analysis compares law clerks from the past with law professors in 2012; this could mean overlap in terms of individuals who were law clerks then but are now professors.

ologies of law professors against those of law clerks. Liberal law professors resemble liberal law clerks. The average CFscore for the 72 percent of Supreme Court clerks who donated is $-.49$, and the average CFscore for the 40 percent of district and court of appeals clerks who donated is $-.63$ (compared with $-.86$ for law professors).¹⁸ However, a key difference between law clerks and law professors is the much larger density of conservative law clerks compared with conservative law professors: 24 percent of district and court of appeals clerks are conservative, and 30 percent of US Supreme Court clerks are conservative (compared with 15 percent for law professors). These differences are statistically significant ($p < .01$).

5.2.3. Comparison with Federal Judges. The third elite peer group we examine are federal judges. Transitioning from a career as a federal judge into a career in the academy is unusual;¹⁹ for that reason, our goal here is to provide a comparison with a parallel career path similar in prestige, job security, and pay to a career in the legal academy (Posner 2016). In addition, note that a key difference between federal judges and law professors is that judges are, explicitly, political appointees. For that reason, we would expect to see a divergence between the ideologies of law professors and judges, with judges more closely following contemporary ideological cleavages between Democrats and Republicans.

For this analysis, we draw on data from Bonica and Sen (2017), which provides CFscores for federal district and court of appeals judges. Note that federal judges cannot donate once they are appointed to the bench, so here we observe only donations made before their appointment. Figure 7E plots the ideologies of law professors against those of federal district court and court of appeals judges. Judges differ substantially from law professors. Judges at both tiers of the federal judiciary are more conservative than law professors. In particular, the average CFscore of district court judges is $-.07$, and the average CFscore of court of appeals judges is $.05$ ($-.86$ for law professors); 45 percent of district court judges and 52 percent of court of appeals judges are conservative (15 percent of law professors are conservative). These differences are statistically significant ($p < .01$).

18. The ideological difference between Supreme Court clerks and district and court of appeals clerks is statistically significant ($p < .01$).

19. We do note that there are instances in which law professors transitioned into appointments on federal courts. Karen Nelson Moore (Sixth Circuit), Richard Posner (Seventh Circuit), and Guido Calabresi (Second Circuit) are just a few examples. There are also instances in which federal judges resign and enter academia—for example, Michael McConnell (Tenth Circuit), Deanell Reece Tacha (Tenth Circuit), and David Levi (Eastern District of California).

5.2.4. Comparison with Other Academics. As a final comparison group, we use other academics (namely, all professors at universities other than law professors). We obtain this information from DIME, which contains a contributor's employer and profession for a subset of donors. We use this information to identify 322,434 academics. Figure 7F plots the ideologies of law professors against those of other academics. The average CFscore for other academics is $-.92$ (compared with $-.86$ for law professors). The difference in averages is statistically significant ($p < .01$). Examining the data more closely suggests that there is no difference between the two groups in terms of the presence of conservatives: both sets of faculty have very few conservatives. For nonlaw professors, around 16 percent are conservative (15 percent of law professors are conservative). However, it does seem to be the case that nonlaw liberal academics are more extreme than liberal law professors: 19 percent of liberal nonlaw professors are moderately liberal, but 27 percent of liberal law professors are moderately liberal. This difference is statistically significant ($p < .01$).

5.3. Ideologies of Law Professors and Lawyers Compared by Subject or Practice Area

The above investigations into ideological differences between law professors and lawyers have the potential to obscure possible ideological sorting by area of expertise. We would expect ideological differences between law professors and lawyers to narrow when we condition on area of expertise. To assess the extent to which ideological sorting by subject or practice area could explain the ideological gap, we leverage additional information from the Martindale-Hubbell directory, which reports the practice areas of lawyers. We note that the practice areas in the Martindale-Hubbell directory do not perfectly correspond to the subject areas listed in the AALS directory; we therefore manually coded the practice areas into coarse areas of expertise. We then coded the AALS teaching fields into the same areas of expertise.²⁰ A list of the coarse areas of expertise for law professors' teaching subjects and lawyers' practice areas is provided in Table A1.

Figure 8 assesses the extent to which the ideological distributions of law professors and lawyers differ across areas of expertise, sorted by the difference between the median ideology of law professors and lawyers in

20. Lawyers in the Martindale-Hubbell directory can specify multiple practice areas. We operationalized our coding of area of expertise by including all lawyers listed for each practice area.




Figure 8. Ideologies of donating law professors and lawyers by subject area

the area (for example, the difference between the median law professor and median lawyer practicing trade law is greater than the difference in other fields). In almost every area of expertise, there are comparatively fewer conservative law professors than lawyers. An extreme example of

this is family law, in which the majority of law professors lean to the left. For practicing lawyers, however, the ideological distribution of family lawyers is much more bimodal, with a larger proportion of conservative lawyers. In summary, law professors typically lean to the left even compared with lawyers in the same area of expertise. Thus, differences in ideology by subject-matter expertise does not fully explain the ideological gap between law professors and lawyers.

5.4. Ideologies of Law Professors and Law School Alumni

Law schools have different cultures, which may in turn relate to the ideologies of both students and professors. For example, it might be possible that a legal education exerts an independent causal effect on ideology, with the teaching and mentoring from more liberal professors leading to a more liberal alumni body (and the analogous result for conservative professors). Although we do not attempt to isolate any mechanisms, a number of reasons could explain an ideological relationship between professors at a law school and its alumni.

We assess the overall relationship between the ideologies of professors and alumni of a law school by regressing the average ideology of professors on the average ideology of alumni from a law school. We find a strong positive relationship between the ideologies of professors and alumni. A 1-unit increase in the average CFscore for professors at a law school is associated with a .58 increase in the average CFscore for graduates ($p < .01$).

Above we observed that differences in the average ideology of law professors at a law school are driven mainly by the presence of conservative professors at the law school rather than a shift in the ideology of liberal law professors. To assess whether the same pattern is at play in the relationship of the average ideologies of professors and graduates at law schools, Figure 9 presents the ideological distributions of law professors and their schools' alumni for each of the top 14 law schools. The law school distributions are sorted by the difference between the median ideology of law professors and alumni; for example, the median graduate of Yale more closely resembles the median law professor at Yale than the median law professor at the other schools.

There are a number of notable features of Figure 9. First, for each law school, the median law professor is more liberal than the median graduate. Although we report only the top 14 law schools for brevity, only at seven law schools is the median law professor more conservative than




Figure 9. Ideologies of donating law professors and alumni

the median graduate.²¹ In other words, the median law professor is only more conservative than the median graduate in roughly one of every 20 law schools.

Second, in law schools with the most conservative alumni, the graduates tend to be the most dissimilar to law professors. For instance, the six law schools with the largest professor-graduate gap have some of the

21. The seven schools are Southern University Law Center (.02), Regent University (.09), the University of Memphis (.18), Loyola University New Orleans (.24), Chapman University (.56), Pepperdine University (.70), and George Mason University (1.57).

most conservative alumni. For law schools with a conservative median graduate, the median law professor's CFscore is on average .98 more liberal than the median graduate. Contrast this with the law schools with a liberal median graduate, where the median law professor's CFscore is .55 more liberal than the median graduate. We investigate the relationship between alumni ideologies and the ideological professor-graduate gap more formally by regressing the difference between the median graduate's ideology and the median professor's ideology on the median alumni ideology. A larger difference between median graduate's ideology and median professor's ideology indicates that law professors are more liberal than alumni, for example, a small negative CFscore for lawyers (moderately liberal) minus a larger negative CFscore for professors (very liberal). A positive relationship would imply that law professors become more and more liberal relative to alumni as the alumni become more conservative. We find a strong positive relationship: as alumni get more conservative, the gap between professors and alumni increases. A 1-unit increase in the median CFscore of alumni is associated with a .46 increase in the ideological gap ($p < .01$). In sum, law professors are the most out of step with the profession in law schools that have relatively more conservative alumni.

5.5. Regression Analysis

We have seen that the ideologies of law professors and lawyers vary across a number of dimensions, including law school affiliation and area of expertise. Above we considered the relationship of law professors' and lawyers' ideologies along different dimensions in isolation. In this section, we assess the extent that law professors differ from comparable lawyers. In particular, we estimate the specification in equation (1) on the combined sample of the ideologies of law professors and lawyers:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta p_i + \delta_l + \zeta_e + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where y is either an indicator for whether individual i is a conservative (CFscore > 0) or individual i 's CFscore and p_i is an indicator for whether individual i is a professor.

The goal of the regression analysis is to compare the ideologies of law professors with those of the population from which they are drawn. Because law professors differ from lawyers generally along a number of important dimensions, we include two sets of control variables. First, because law professors are not drawn evenly from the graduates of all law

Table 3. Ideological Gap between Donating Law Professors and Similar Lawyers

	Conservative			CFscore		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Professor	-.20** (.01)	-.18** (.01)	-.11** (.01)	-.55** (.02)	-.50** (.02)	-.35** (.02)
Mean of the dependent variable	.35	.35	.35	-.32	-.32	-.32
Area-of-expertise fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Law school fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note. Standard errors, clustered by law school attended, are in parentheses. Results are for the difference in donating by conservative law professors and similar conservative lawyers and the average difference in the campaign finance scores (CFscores) of donating law professors and similar lawyers. $N = 366,519$.

** $p < .01$.

schools (Presser 2016), it is appropriate to control for the law school that the professors attended. We thus include law school fixed effects δ_i .²² Second, because ideology varies by area of expertise, it is important to control for area of expertise. After all, the ideological gap between law professors and lawyers may be driven largely by a different representation of lawyers by area of expertise resulting from more lawyers in more conservative areas relative to law professors (for example, law schools have to teach everything). Therefore, we include area-of-expertise fixed effects ζ_e .

The main coefficient of interest is β . When the outcome is whether an individual is conservative, β estimates the percentage-point gap between conservatives in the legal academy and similar conservative lawyers. When an individual’s CFscore is the outcome, β estimates the average difference in ideology between law professors and similar lawyers.

Table 3 reports the results for whether an individual is a conservative and for an individual’s CFscore. Column 3 suggests that there are fewer conservative law professors than similar lawyers, and the difference is 11 percentage points. It is worth noting that where one attended law school explains 7 percentage points of the difference in conservatives between professors and lawyers (comparing the point estimates in columns 2 and

22. It is worth noting that above we compared law professors at a law school with the alumni of the school, but here the law school fixed effects are for the law school that professors attended. The latter is necessary here to give the appropriate comparison between law professors and the population from which they are drawn.

3). The point estimate of -0.35 in column 6 suggests that professors are on average more liberal than lawyers who are similar to them in terms of law school and area of expertise by an amount only slightly smaller than the difference between Elizabeth Warren (-1.57) and Barack Obama (-1.16).

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this article, we formally assessed the ideological balance of the legal academy against that of the relevant legal profession. To do so, we matched 10,040 law professors listed in the 2012 AALS *Directory of Law Teachers* to DIME, a comprehensive database of political ideology that is based on political donations. We found that 15 percent of law professors, compared with 35 percent of lawyers, are conservative. After controlling for several individual characteristics, the legal academy is still 11 percentage points more liberal than the legal profession. Using a continuous measure of political ideology, we found evidence that the liberal tilt of the legal academy is primarily the result of the relative scarcity of conservatives as opposed to a more leftward shift in liberal faculty.

Our study has several limitations that are important to note. First, we are able to observe the ideology of only the 64 percent of law professors in the 2012 AALS directory who made political donations. It is possible that conservatives and liberals donate at different rates and that, as a result, using political donations as a measure of ideology captures the representation of only donating professors and does not adequately reflect the representation of conservatives who do not donate. Second, political donations may not perfectly capture the true ideologies of all law professors. An individual who donates to Democrats, for example, might still have conservative ideological views, while an individual who donates to Republicans might hold liberal views (Bonica 2017). Third, the motivations for donating might differ between law professors and lawyers, which could bias the inferences stemming from the use of donations as a measure of ideology.

With those caveats in mind, we still find a persistent ideological gap between the legal academy and the legal profession. At least two causal explanations could account for this pattern. A first is ideological sorting: conservative lawyers might be less likely to pursue an academic career. Some evidence is consistent with that explanation: Fisman et al. (2015) reports the results of a survey experiment on the distributional prefer-

ences of Yale law students and finds that law students pursuing academic or nonprofit positions exhibit stronger preferences for redistribution and are less likely to be conservative. The pattern could thus be explained by conservatives choosing to pursue other opportunities because of their preferences.²³ A second explanation is ideological discrimination against conservatives. A handful of papers raise the possibility that hiring committees in law schools implicitly or explicitly discriminate against conservative candidates. Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive.²⁴ Moreover, sorting and discrimination could interact. For instance, ideological sorting may occur because of real or perceived discrimination in the academy. These and other narratives could thus create the observed empirical patterns. We leave the question of what causes conservatives to be underrepresented in the legal academy for future research.

Regardless of the reason why conservatives are underrepresented, the ideological uniformity of the legal academy has important implications. Law professors frequently weigh in on important political, policy, and legal issues—including delivering oral arguments, testifying before lawmakers, writing op-eds, and lobbying. However, the relative scarcity of conservatives could limit the legal academy's influence. As of this writing in 2017, conservatives control over two-thirds of the state governorships and state legislative assemblies; at the federal level, conservatives control all three branches of government. In terms of public opinion, roughly 35 percent of Americans in 2014 identified as conservative compared with roughly 24 percent who identified as liberal (the rest are moderate) (Saad 2016). These realities put the legal academy out of step not only with lawyers but also with political decision makers and the general public. This raises the possibility that the intellectual and public contributions of the legal academy could be dismissed as partisan.

One solution would be to increase ideological diversity in law school hiring. Although increasing the ideological diversity in the legal academy could serve to increase its influence among decision makers and members of the public, a concern with hiring on the basis of ideology more broadly, and of promoting the hiring of conservative law professors specifically, is that there could be spillover effects that negatively affect

23. Conservatives could also pursue other opportunities—like being appointed judges—because of the relative scarcity of conservatives among elite lawyers.

24. For example, it is also possible that law professors are ideologically similar to comparable lawyers when they enter the academy but that differential trends in ideology endogenously emerge (for example, as a result of differing levels of compensation).

other hiring prerogatives. For example, law schools have made significant progress in recent decades toward increasing the number of minority and female law professors. To give some context, the 2012 AALS directory includes a list of minority professors, and the biographical information allows us to identify the gender of law professors. These data suggest that minorities and women account for 15 percent and 35 percent of law professors hired after 2002, up from 10 percent and 27 percent hired before 2002. But while 16 percent of law professors not on the AALS minority list are conservative, just 10 percent of law professors on the AALS minority list are conservative; similarly, 18 percent of male law professors are conservative, but just 9 percent of female law professors are conservative (both comparisons are statistically significant at $p < .01$).

The finding that minority and female law professors are, on average, more liberal than their white male counterparts is not surprising. What is perhaps surprising, however, is how few law professors, regardless of background, are conservative. We estimate that just 19 percent of white male law professors are conservative. To give some national-level context from the same time period, Republican nominee Mitt Romney won 62 percent of the white male vote in the 2012 US presidential election. Were we to assume that liberal and conservative graduates of elite law schools are of similar quality and apply for academic positions at similar rates during this period, it would suggest that hiring committees could expect to receive on the order of five applications from liberals for every conservative who applies. This ratio alone could present a logistical challenge to a school looking to recruit more conservative faculty. However, the challenge is compounded by relatively few traditionally underrepresented minorities being conservative. For instance, among recent graduates of elite law schools, our data suggest that 12 of every 100 are conservative, and, of those 12, nine are men and three are women. Prioritizing hiring from a group in which men outnumber women three to one without negatively affecting the gender balance of new hires would likely prove challenging. That said, we would like to emphasize that these analyses highlight potential trade-offs but do not conclusively demonstrate that such trade-offs would necessarily exist. After all, who a law school hires is intimately related to its rank, the preferences of its existing faculty, and the available pool of potential applicants.

APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES

Table A1. Groupings of Practice and Teaching Areas

Field	Attorneys' Practice Area	Law Professors' Teaching Area	
Administrative law	Election law	Administrative law	
	Government law	Government contracts	
	Legislative practice	Legislation	
	Nonprofits	Local government	
	Public law		
	Public utility law		
Antitrust	Utility law		
	Antitrust	Antitrust	
	Covenants not to compete		
	Mergers and acquisitions		
Bankruptcy	Unfair competition		
	Banking finance	Bankruptcy	
Commercial law	Bankruptcy	Agency and partnership	
	Business and corporate law	Business associations	
	Closely held corporations	Commercial law	
	Corporation law	Commercial paper	
	Corporations	Corporate finance	
	Franchise law	Financial institutions	
	Hospital law	Law and accounting	
	Joint ventures	Payment systems	
	Limited-liability-company partnerships	Securities regulation	
	Secured transactions		
	Constitutional law	Constitutional law	Constitutional law
		Americans with disabilities	Consumer law
	Consumer law	Birth trauma	Health-care law
		Collections	Insurance law
Consumer law		Products liability	
Health-insurance law		Remedies	
		Contracts	
Contracts	Breach of contract		
	Contract law and contracts		
Criminal law	Capital offenses	Criminal justice	
	Criminal offenses	Criminal law	
	Driver's license suspensions	Criminal procedure	
	Driving under the influence		
	Expungements		
	Extortion		
	Forgery		
	Fraud		
	Harassment		
	Hit and run		
	Money laundering		
	Parole and probation		
	Sexual abuse		
	Stalking		
	White-collar crime		
	Wire fraud		

Table A1. *continued*

Field	Attorneys' Practice Area	Law Professors' Teaching Area
Employment law	Labor employment	Disability law Employee benefit plans Employment discrimination Labor law Workers' compensation
Entertainment law	Entertainment law	Entertainment law Sports law
Environmental law	Agricultural law Energy Environmental law Transportation	Agricultural law Energy law Environmental law Natural resources Ocean resources Oil and gas rights Water rights
Evidence	Appeals Civil practice Civil trials Federal practice Litigation Postconviction remedies Trial practice Trials	Evidence Jurisprudence
Family law	Annulment Cohabitation agreements Conservatorships Custody Equitable distribution Family law Grandparents' custody Grandparents' visitation rights Parental rights Postnuptial agreements Visitation rights	Family law
Individual rights	Civil rights Collective bargaining Disabilities Education law Elder law Habeas corpus Search and seizure	Civil rights Critical legal studies Critical race theory Education law Elder law Feminist legal theory Human rights Juvenile law Poverty law Welfare law Women and the law
Intellectual property	Computer law Intellectual property Trade secrets	Computers and the law Intellectual property
International law	Immigration International law	Aviation and space law Comparative law International law

Table A1. *continued*

Field	Attorneys' Practice Area	Law Professors' Teaching Area
Legal profession	Professional liability Professional negligence	Clinical teaching Federal courts Judicial administration Law-office management Legal research and writing Professional responsibility
Military law	Defense law Military law	Military law National security law
Native American law	Native American law	Native American law
Procedure	Mediation	Alternative dispute resolution Appellate practice Civil procedure Legal drafting Legal method Trial advocacy
Property law	Boundary disputes Community association law Community property law Condemnation Condominium association law Condominium law Easements Estate settlements Leases and leasing Premises liability Property law Restraining orders Successions Wealth preservation	Community property Estate planning Estates and trusts Property
Tax law	Taxes	Corporate taxation Estate and gift tax Federal taxation State and local taxation Tax policy
Torts	Animal attacks Automobile liability Automobile negligence Civil liability Cumulative trauma Medical malpractice Medical malpractice defense Negligence Nursing-home negligence Personal injury Product defects Property damage Tort liability Torts Toxic torts Whiplash	Torts

Table A1. *continued*

Field	Attorneys' Practice Area	Law Professors' Teaching Area
Trade law	Admiralty/maritime law Aviation law Interstate support	Admiralty law Communications law Conflict of laws Immigration law International business transactions International organizations Regulated industries Trade regulation
Transactional law	Appellate practice Buy-sell agreements Construction law Estate planning Land use Mechanics' liens Name changes Powers of attorney Real estate Subrogation Surety law Transactions	Creditors' and debtors' rights Land-use planning Real estate transactions




Figure A1. Alternative measures of ideology by (A) donations and (B) ideologies of law professors.




Figure A2. Donations to (A) all candidates and (B) presidential candidates by political party.

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