On the Causes and Consequences of Cultural Variation:

Perspectives from Economic History and Development Economics

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The starting point

- **Culture:** Values, beliefs, knowledge that is transmitted between people and/or across generations.
- Evidence that culture exists and varies significantly across societies.
- 'WEIRD' societies are not typical.

Roadmap

Summary of research that attempts to make progress on the following questions:

1. Where do cultural differences come from?
   - Longer-term determinants?
   - Shorter-run determinants?
2. Does cross-cultural variation matter for well-being?
3. Is a recognition of culture important for policy?

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   - Shorter-run determinants?
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3. Is a recognition of culture important for policy?

Cultural differences across societies

- In 1996, ultimatum game was implemented (by Joseph Henrich) among the Machiguenga, slash-and-burn horticulturalists living in the Peruvian Amazon.
- "Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon," **American Economic Review**, 2000.



Cultural differences across societies

Henrich et al. (2005)



Where do differences come from? The Lamalera

Africa's slave trades

Nunn (2008); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)



Table 1. The Method of Enslavement of Koelle's Informants

Manner of Enslavement	Percentage
Taken in a war	24.3%
Kidnapped or seized	40.3%
Sold/tricked by a relative, friend, etc.	19.4%
Through a judicial process	16.0%

Notes: The data are from Sigismund Koelle's Linguistic Inventory. The sample consists of 144 informants interviewed by Koelle for which their means of enslavement is known.

Data sources

Shipping records

- Know ports of embarkation and estimates of total numbers shipped
  - e.g., data from 34,584 voyages during the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

Ethnicity data

- Atlantic slave trade.
  - 53 samples, 80,656 slaves, 229 ethnicities
- Indian Ocean slave trade.
  - 6 samples, 21,048 slaves, 80 ethnicities
- Saharan slave trade.
  - 2 samples, 5,385 slaves, 23 ethnicities
- Red Sea slave trade.
  - 2 samples, 67 slaves, 32 ethnicities

Table: Slave Ethnicity Data: Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1450–1799

Region	Years	Num. Ethnic.	Num. Obs.	Record Type
Valencia, Spain	1482–1516	77	2,675	Crown Records
Puebla, Mexico	1540-1556	14	115	Notarial Records
Dominican Republic	1547–1591	26	22	Records of Sale
Peru	1548–1560	16	202	Records of Sale
Mexico	1549	12	80	Plantation Accounts
Peru	1560–1650	30	6,754	Notarial Records
Lima, Peru	1583–1589	15	288	Baptism Records
Colombia	1589–1607	9	19	Various Records
Mexico	1600–1699	28	102	Records of Sale
Dominican Republic	1610–1696	33	55	Government Records
Chile	1615	6	141	Sales Records
Lima, Peru	1630–1702	33	411	Parish Records
Peru (Rural)	1632	25	307	Parish Records
Lima, Peru	1640–1680	33	936	Marriage Records
Colombia	1635–1695	6	17	Slave Inventories
Guyane (French Guiana)	1690	12	69	Plantation Records
Colombia	1716–1725	33	59	Government Records
French Louisiana	1717–1769	23	223	Notarial Records
Dominican Republic	1717–1827	11	15	Government Records
South Carolina	1732–1775	35	681	Runaway Notices
Colombia	1738–1778	11	100	Various Records
Spanish Louisiana	1770–1803	79	6,615	Notarial Records
St. Dominique (Haiti)	1771–1791	25	5,413	Sugar Plantations
Bahia, Brazil	1775–1815	14	581	Slave Lists
St. Dominique (Haiti)	1778–1791	36	1,280	Coffee Plantations
Guadeloupe	1788	8	45	Newspaper Reports
St. Dominique (Haiti)	1788–1790	21	1,297	Fugitive Slave Lists
Cuba	1791–1840	59	3,093	Slave Registers
St. Dominique (Haiti)	1796–1797	56	5,632	Plantation Inventories

Table: Slave Ethnicity Data: Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1800–1900

Region	Years	Num. Ethnic.	Num. Obs.	Record Type
American Louisiana	1804–1820	62	223	Notarial Records
Salvador, Brazil	1808–1842	6	456	Records of Manumission
Trinidad	1813	100	12,460	Slave Registers
St. Lucia	1815	62	2,333	Slave Registers
Bahia, Brazil	1816–1850	27	2,666	Slave Lists
St. Kitts	1817	48	2,887	Slave Registers
Senegal	1818	17	80	Captured Slave Ship
Berbice (Guyana)	1819	66	1,127	Slave Registers
Salvador, Brazil	1819–1836	12	871	Manumission Certificates
Salvador, Brazil	1820–1835	11	1,106	Probate Records
Sierra Leone	1821–1824	68	605	Child Registers
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	1826–1837	31	772	Prison Records
Anguilla	1827	7	51	Slave Registers
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	1830–1852	190	2,921	Free Africans' Records
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	1833–1849	35	476	Death Certificates
Salvador, Brazil	1835	13	275	Court Records
Salvador, Brazil	1838–1848	7	202	Slave Registers
St. Louis/Goree, Senegal	1843–1848	21	189	Emancipated Slaves
Bakel, Senegal	1846	16	73	Sales Records
d'Agoué, Benin	1846–1885	11	70	Church Records
Sierra Leone	1848	132	12,425	Linguistic and British Census
Salvador, Brazil	1851–1884	8	363	Records of Manumission
Salvador, Brazil	1852–1888	7	269	Slave Registers
Cape Verde	1856	32	314	Slave Census
Kikoneh Island, Sierra Leone	1896–1897	11	185	Fugitive Slave Records
Total			**80,656**	

No	Name of Slave	No	Name of Master	Sect	Residence	Age	sex	Tribe	DATE Remarks
1.	Rajiki		Ismael bin Nur	B.	Chak Chak	20	f	Nyassa	24/4/74
2.	Rajiki		Jafferji Karimji	B.	do	16	"	Mgindo	" "
3.	Zafran		Phirbhoy Jiwanji	B	Tanjiba	30	"	Miao	29/4/74
4.	Bahali		do	"	do	15	"	"	" "
5.	Singora		do	"	do	18	m	Makonda	" "
6	Zafran				See Criminal Case No 26 of 1874 do	19	f	Miao	12/6/74
7	Fabir				do	16	"	Nyassa	" "
8	Amina		v. a. case No 2 of 1874 Mrs. Daphne		do	25	"	Mkwa	" "
9	Mahopashira		do		do	20	m	" "	" "
10	Euli		do		do	25	"	" "	" "
11	Bilal		do		do	25	"	" "	" "
12	Nivali		do		do	25	f	" "	" "
13	Amaholela		do		do	25	"	" "	" "
14	Msimo		Dira bin Japher *		do	12	f	Mzalia	18/6/74
15	Rahema		* These slaves had belonged		do	30	"	Msanga	" "
16	Ungumu Yangu		to the above Khoja, and		do	30	"	mchania	" "
17	Majuma		on his decease last year		do	20	"	Nyassa	" "
18	Peoa		were inherited by his grand-son		do	15	"	Mzalia	" "
19	Mapema		Ramathan bin Saif.		do	16	"	" "	" "
20	Myakazi		a suriana		do		"	Nyassa	" "

203

This Surey were slave of the late Salemina freed slave of this Consulate who died on the 27th April 1896

Deed of Freedom of Surey Mzaramo
No. 4414

(بنو تعالي)

الي كافة من يراه وبعد فان هذه * سوري المزراجير
كانت مملوكة والان صارت حرة مالاحد عليها التعرض ولالها *
سبيل تملك خادم اوخادمه *

حرر في الفضل من ١٣١٣ (سنة)
١٦ ١٩

Dated at Zanzibar
the 30th April 1896

Basil S. Cave
H.M. Consul
for H. M's. Agent & Consul General,
Zanzibar.

H.B.M. CONSULATE ZANZIBAR.


Atlantic Slave Exports
0
1 - 50,000
50,001 - 100,000
10,0001 - 1,000,000
1,000,001 - 4,000,000


Indian Slave Exports
0
1 - 1,000
1,001 - 50,000
50,001 - 100,000
100,001 - 1,000,000

Estimated effects on trust

	Trust of relatives	Trust of neighbors	Trust of local council	Intra-group trust	Inter-group trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln (1+exports/area)	-0.133***	-0.159***	-0.111***	-0.144***	-0.097***
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	20,062	20,027	19,733	19,952	19,765
Number of ethnicity clusters	185	185	185	185	185
Number of district clusters	1,257	1,257	1,283	1,257	1,255
R-squared	0.13	0.16	0.20	0.14	0.11

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the ethnicity and district levels. The individual controls are for age, age squared, a gender indicator variable, 5 living conditions fixed effects, 10 education fixed effects, 18 religion fixed effects, 25 occupation fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respondent lives in an urban location. The district controls include ethnic fractionalization in the district and the share of the district's population that is the same ethnicity as the respondent. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.

But...

- **How do we know that these estimates are causal?**
- It's possible that places with lower levels of trust historically selected into the slave trade:

$$Trust \Rightarrow Slave\ \ Trade$$

Solution

- **Instrumental variable**: historical distance of an ethnic group from the coast.

$$\textit{Distance from Coast} \Rightarrow \textit{Slave Trade} \Rightarrow \textit{Trust}$$

- Requirements of an instrument:
  1. Affects historical exposure to the slave trade.
  2. Does not affect trust through any other channel.

- The big question: is requirement # 2 satisfied?

A ‘falsification’ test

$$\textit{Distance from Coast} \Rightarrow \textit{Trust}$$

- If distance from the coast only affects trust because of the slave trade, then
  1. Within Africa, we should see a relationship.
  2. Outside of Africa, there should be no relationship.

Distance from the coast and trust

	Trust of local government council			
	Afrobarometer sample		Asiabarometer sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance from the coast	0.00039***	0.00031***	-0.00001	0.00001
	(0.00009)	(0.00008)	(0.00010)	(0.00009)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of observations	19,913	19,913	5,409	5,409
Number of clusters	185	185	62	62
R-squared	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.22

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual. The dependent variable in the Asiabarometer sample is the respondent's answer to the question: "How much do you trust your local government?". The categories for the answers are the same in the Asiabarometer as in the Afrobarometer. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnicity level in the Afrobarometer regressions and at the location (city) level in the Asiabarometer and the WVS samples. The individual controls are for age, age squared, a gender indicator, education fixed effects, and religion fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.

Distance from the coast and trust

	Inter-group trust				
	Afrobarometer sample		WVS non-Africa sample		WVS Nigeria
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Distance from the coast	0.00039***	0.00037***	-0.00020	-0.00019	0.00054***
	(0.00013)	(0.00012)	(0.00014)	(0.00012)	(0.00010)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	n/a
Individual controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	19,970	19,970	10,308	10,308	974
Number of clusters	185	185	107	107	16
R-squared	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.06

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual. The dependent variable in the WVS sample is the respondent's answer to the question: "How much do you trust <nationality> people in general?". The categories for the respondent's answers are: "not at all", "not very much", "neither trust nor distrust", "a little", and "completely". The responses take on the values 0, 1, 1.5, 2, and 3. Standard errors are clustered at the ethnicity level in the Afrobarometer regressions and at the location (city) level in the Asiabarometer and the WVS samples. The individual controls are for age, age squared, a gender indicator, an indicator for living in an urban location, and occupation fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.

But...

- **How do we know this has anything to do with culture?**
- The relationship between the slave trade and trust could work through:
  1. Internal beliefs, values, and norms (culture)
     - e.g., heuristics or gut-feelings about how much one should trust others.
  2. The external environment
     - e.g., institutions that affect the trustworthiness of others.

Making Progress on Channels

1. The slave trade may have affected the trustworthiness of the local government.
   - Examine trust in the local government.
   - Control for each respondent's view of the performance of their local government.

2. The slave trade may have affected the trustworthiness of others.
   - Examine trust of those from other ethnic groups.
   - Control for the impact of the slave trade on the ancestors of other ethnic groups in the same location.

3. Most generally, the slave trade could have affected anything external to the individual.
   - Examine the average number of slaves historically taken from the environment/location where the individual lives today.

	Trust of local council		Inter-group trust		
			Within town	Within district	Within province
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnicity-based slave export measure (baseline measure)	-0.072***	-0.070***	-0.102***	-0.120***	-0.098***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Average slave export measure among other ethnicities in the same location			-0.037	-0.063**	-0.091***
			(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Council trustworthiness fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Five public goods fixed effects	No	Yes	No	No	No
Colonial population density	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity-level colonial controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	12,827	12,203	9,673	12,513	15,999
Number of clusters	146 / 1,172	145 / 1,130	147 / 725	147 / 737	147 / 1,127
R-squared	0.37	0.37	0.12	0.12	0.12

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the ethnicity-based ethnicity level and at the location-based ethnicity level. `Average slave export measure among other ethnicities in the same location' is the average slave export measure of respondents in the Afrobarometer survey living in the same village, district or region as the respondent. The 'Five public goods fixed effects' are for the existence of the following public goods in the respondent's town/village: school, health clinic, sewage, piped water, and electricity. See table 3 for a description of the baseline controls, the ethnnicity-level colonial controls, and the colonial population density variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Making Progress on Channels

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3. Most generally, the slave trade could have affected anything external to the individual.
   - Examine the average number of slaves historically taken from the environment/location where the individual lives today.


Legend
Current location of respondent
Afrobarometer countries
Historic ethnic boundaries

The importance of location vs. ancestry

	Trust of relatives	Trust of neighbors	Trust of local council	Intra-group trust	Inter-group trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ethnicity-based slave export measure (baseline measure)	-0.155***	-0.182***	-0.100***	-0.169***	-0.090***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.030)
Location-based slave export measure	-0.058***	-0.041**	-0.068***	-0.039*	-0.047**
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Colonial population density	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity-level colonial controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	15,999	15,972	15,221	15,931	15,773
Number of clusters	146 / 269	146 / 269	145 / 272	146 / 269	146 / 269
R-squared	0.13	0.16	0.20	0.16	0.12

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the ethnicity-based ethnicity level and at the location-based ethnicity level. 'Ethnicity-based slave export measure' is our baseline measure of slave exports used throughout the paper; it is the log of the number of slaves taken from an individual's ethnic group (normalized by land area). 'Location-based slave export measure' is our alternative measure of slave exports, which is the log of the number of slaves taken from the location where an individual is currently living (normalized by land area). See table 3 for a description of the baseline controls, the ethnnicity-level colonial controls, and the colonial population density variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

The role of women around the world

Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013, 2017)



Source: International Labor Organization (2010a).

The role of women around the world

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

Boserup: Traditional agricultural technologies

Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013, 2017)

Empirical Findings

Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013, 2017)

Ancestral plough use is associated with:

- Lower female labor force participation.
- Less female representation in government.
- Less female firm ownership.
- More male-biased sex ratios.

This is true whether one looks across:

- Countries.
- Districts within countries.
- Ethnic groups within districts.
- Children of immigrants living in the United States and Europe.

Do strong states make ‘good’ citizens?

Lowes et al. (2017)



King Mbop Mabinc maKyeen (1939–69) (photograph by Eliot Elisofon, 1947, Eliot Elisofon Photographic Archives 22923-P5, #10, National Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution)

The Kuba Kingdom



The Kuba realm: General orientation

States and (norms of) rule following

Lowes et al. (2017)



The experimental setting: RAG

Lowes et al. (2017)



State formation and rule following: RAG (N=499)



Are the Kuba exceptional? RAG



Measuring rule following using the UG (with theft)





Are the Kuba exceptional? UG with theft



Long-run determinants

- Trust (& related prosocial traits)
  - Slave trade: Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
  - Colonial indirect rule: Blouin (2015)
  - Habsburg state: Becker et al. (2016)
  - DRC rubber concessions: Lowes and Montero (2016)
  - Missions: Valencia Caceido and Voth (in progress)
- Gender norms:
  - The plough: Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
  - Communism: Campa and Serafinelli (2015)
  - Animal herding: Becker (2017)
- Collectivism/individualism
  - Wet rice: Talhelm et al. (2014)

Roadmap

Summary of research that attempts to make progress on the following questions:

1. **Where do cultural differences come from?**
   - Longer-term determinants?
   - **Shorter-run determinants?**
2. Does cross-cultural variation matter for well-being?
3. Is a recognition of culture important for policy?

Short-run determinants (some examples)

Adverse economic shocks:

- People who experience a recession during their early adult life have stronger preferences for redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014).

Shared experiences:

- Participation in 4th-of-July festivities as a child causes one to be more patriotic, more likely to vote, and more likely to vote republican (Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2011).
- Within Africa, national soccer victories cause greater national identity, weaker ethnic identity, and less conflict (Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante, 2018).

The 4th of July

Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011)

The 4th of July

Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011)

Socialization, values, and political preference

Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011)

Table 5. Childhood Fourth of July: Long-Term Effects on Voting Behavior, λ_{child}

Dependent Variable	Turnout			Voted for the Republican Candidate			Voted for the Democratic Candidate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rain-free July 4, childhood	0.0088***	0.0078***	0.0084***	0.0085**	0.0071*	0.0098**	0.0004	0.0009	-0.0014
	(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0031)	(0.0039)	(0.0037)	(0.0040)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0039)
Rain-free July 2, childhood			-0.0001			0.0013			-0.0013
			(0.0026)			(0.0035)			(0.0040)
Rain-free July 3, childhood			-0.0000			-0.0040			0.0045
			(0.0027)			(0.0045)			(0.0035)
Rain-free July 5, childhood			0.0024			-0.0003			0.0028
			(0.0030)			(0.0047)			(0.0039)
Rain-free July 6, childhood			-0.0027			-0.0003			-0.0029
			(0.0029)			(0.0043)			(0.0045)
Dependent variable mean	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.347	0.347	0.347	0.371	0.372	0.371
State time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Covariates	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	12,919	12,765	12,919	12,175	12,038	12,175	12,175	12,038	12,175
R-squared	0.10	0.19	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.10	0.09	0.19	0.10
ANES Elections Sample	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
P-value on joint placebos			0.867			0.625			0.932

All regressions include county, cohort, age and survey-year fixed effects. *Rain-free July 4* is the number of Fourth of Julys without rain during the respondent's childhood (ages 4-18). *Turnout* is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent voted in the latest presidential election. *Voted for the Republican Candidate* is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent voted for the Republican party in the latest presidential election, and zero otherwise. *Voted for the Democratic Candidate* is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent voted for the Democratic party in the presidential election, and zero otherwise. Individual covariates are race, education, income, gender, and marriage status. The OLS estimates the average long-term effect. The average respondent age in the sample is 39. All regressions use panel A (childhood weather). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** 1% , ** 5% , * 10% significance level.

Roadmap

Summary of research that attempts to make progress on the following questions:

1. Where do cultural differences come from?
   - Longer-term determinants?
   - Shorter-run determinants?
2. **Does cross-cultural variation matter for well-being?**
3. Is a recognition of culture important for policy?

Childhood stunting in India

Jayachandran and Pande (2017)

Childhood stunting in India and Africa

Jayachandran and Pande (2017)



Food cultures and malnutrition in India

Atkin (2016)

Other recent studies within economics

- **Trust** is associated with lower income (Algan and Cahuc, 2010).
- **Individualism** was associated with lower incomes before approx. 1500 but higher incomes today (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017).
- **Cousin marriage** is associated with autocracy and corruption (Schulz, 2018; Akhbari et al, 2018).
- **Matrilineal kinship** is associated with more marital conflict but better health of children (Lowes, 2018).
- **Segmentary lineage organization** is associated with conflict and civil war (Moscona, Nunn, and Robinson, 2018).

Roadmap

Summary of research that attempts to make progress on the following questions:

1. Where do cultural differences come from?
   - Longer-term determinants?
   - Shorter-run determinants?
2. Does cross-cultural variation matter for well-being?
3. **Is a recognition of culture important for policy?**

HEALTH 27 SEPTEMBER 2014

Guinea residents 'refusing' Ebola treatment

Residents say people frightened to go to clinics because of conspiracy theories that they will be killed by doctors.

EPIDEMIC

'Fear and Distrust': Red Cross Workers Come Under Attack as Ebola Spreads in Congo

While volunteering to combat the deadly virus in the Democratic Republic of Congo, three Red Cross volunteers were violently attacked.

Olivia Messer10.04.18 12:41 PM ET

Colonial medical campaigns



Colonial medical campaigns

Lowes and Montero (2018)

- Villagers were required (often at gun point) to submit to physical exams.
- Early treatment was *atoxyl*, an arsenic-based drug.
  - Caused (at least partial) blindness in 20% of those treated.



Blood test refusals rates: By country

Lowes and Montero (2018)



Cameroon



Congo



Gabon



Chad

Success of World Bank development projects

Lowes and Montero (2018)



(a) Health Projects, No controls



(c) Non-health Projects, No controls

Medical distrust in a WEIRD society

Alsan and Wanamaker (2018)



Figure: Gap in the black vs. white mortality rate (ages 55-64). Blue = men; red = women.

Medical distrust and the Tuskegee experiment

Alsan and Wanamaker (2018)



Implications for policy?

Alsan, Garrick, and Graziani (2018)



Coupon for Free Men's Health Screening

- See a doctor about a free health screening and receive $50
- Receive **free** health screening for:
  1. Diabetes
  2. Cholesterol
  3. Height and Weight (Body Mass Index)
  4. Blood Pressure

Clinic Address:
(See Map on back)

Clinic Hours:
11am-5pm
Saturdays **only** (List dates here)

Subject ID_____

The current racial composition of doctors

Alsan, Garrick, and Graziani (2018)



The intervention

Alsan, Garrick, and Graziani (2018)





Empirical findings

Alsan, Garrick, and Graziani (2018)



Blood Pressure (58% → 82%)



BMI (52% → 76%)



Diabetes (43% → 63%)



Cholesterol (35% → 62%)

Conclusion

Have provided a summary of research that attempts to make progress on the following questions:

1. Where do cultural differences come from?
   - Longer-term determinants?
   - Shorter-run determinants?
2. Does cross-cultural variation matter for well-being?
3. Is a recognition of culture important for policy?

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