

Web Appendix for
COMMERCIAL IMPERIALISM? POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND
TRADE DURING THE COLD WAR

DANIEL BERGER

New York University

WILLIAM EASTERLY

New York University, NBER

NATHAN NUNN

Harvard University, NBER, BREAD

SHANKER SATYANATH

New York University

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1. Introduction

This appendix accompanies “Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War” by Daniel Berger, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn and Shanker Satyanath. Section 2 provides further details of the data used in the paper, as well as their sources. Section 3 reports additional tables and figures that were discussed in the body of the paper, but not reported there explicitly.

2. Data and Their Sources

Data on trade flows are taken from two different sources. When we examine the total value of annual bilateral trade across all industries, we use trade data from the Correlates of War Trade Dataset (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins, 2008), which reports aggregate bilateral trade flows (measured in millions of nominal US dollars) annually between 1870 and 2006. For the post WWII period, the data are originally from the International Monetary Fund’s *Direction of Trade Statistics*. Exploiting the fact that all transactions are potentially recorded by both the importing and exporting countries, Barbieri *et al.* impute missing flows by using the importer’s statistics if data from the exporter’s accounts are missing. Full details are provided in Barbieri *et al.* (2008) and Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009). In particular see table 1 of Barbieri *et al.* (2009).

When we examine trade flows at the industry level, we use data from Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, and Ma’s (2004) World Trade Flows, 1962–2000 database, which reports bilateral trade flows at the SITC revision 2 industry-level. The data are originally from the United Nations’ Comtrade Database. Unlike the aggregate COW trade data, the industry-level Comtrade data only begin in 1962. Therefore, our industry-level sample only includes 1962 to 1989.

Data on real per capita income and aggregate GDP are from Maddison (2003). The figures are given in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.

The controls for leadership turnover and leadership tenure are from Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2004). Our democracy-autocracy indicator variable is taken from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Data on whether countries were GATT participants are from Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers (2007).

Data used to construct the indicator for the existence of a sanction against US exports to a foreign country are from Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg (2009). The indicators for the threat

of force, display of force or use of force in disputes with the US are from Maoz (2005). Measures of countries' real exchange rate, inflation, and the government's share of GDP are from the Penn World Tables 6.3.

Information on country voting patterns in the UN General Assembly are from Gartzke (2006).

Data on the value of economic aid, military aid, food aid, and Export-Import Bank loans from the U.S. are taken from the USAID's *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations* annual report, also known simply as the "Green Book". See USAID (2006) for further details.

Our sample includes all countries except the former Soviet Union and the United States. Countries that split or merge between 1947 and 1989 require special consideration. We have chosen to consider the newly split or merged countries as separate entities from their constituent parts. For example, in 1971 Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan. We treat Pakistan prior to 1970 as a separate country to Pakistan after 1970, which no longer included land that became Bangladesh. We call Pakistan up until 1970 Unified Pakistan and assign it the iso code BGD_PAK in our data set. In 1970, Unified Pakistan is no longer in our data set, and two new countries, Bangladesh (BGD) and Pakistan (PAK) emerge.

In total, there are four instances like this in our data set: (1) East and West Germany, (2) North and South Vietnam, (3) Pakistan and Bangladesh, and (4) Northern and Southern Yemen. For each, we summarize in table A1 our precise definition of the countries and their codings. For each, we following the same logic as outline in the example of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The iso codes reported in the table correspond to the iso codes in our dataset.

The construction of the panel of CIA and KGB interventions across countries between 1947 and 1989 is documented in separate documentation files that accompany the dataset. The full dataset and complete documentation is provided in a zipped file available on the authors web pages. In addition to a Stata version of the dataset, the zip file also includes a an excel spreadsheet that reports the origin of the information for each observation with a CIA or KGB intervention (see *Intervention_Table.xls*) and a pdf file that reports the full reference of the sources cited (*Intervention_References.pdf*). We also provide a general description of each CIA intervention episode in the dataset (*Summary_of_Interventions.pdf*).

Table A1: Country iso codes for the partitioned countries in the sample.

Year	Germany			Vietnam			Bangladesh & Pakistan			Yemen		
	West Germany	East Germany	United Germany	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	Unified Vietnam	Unified	Bangladesh	Pakistan	South Yemen	North Yemen	Unified Yemen
1945			DEU									
1946			DEU									
1947			DEU				BGD_PAK					
1948			DEU				BGD_PAK					
1949	DFR	DDR					BGD_PAK					
1950	DFR	DDR					BGD_PAK					
1951	DFR	DDR					BGD_PAK					
1952	DFR	DDR					BGD_PAK					
1953	DFR	DDR					BGD_PAK					
1954	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1955	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1956	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1957	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1958	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1959	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1960	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1961	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK					
1962	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK				YAR	
1963	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK				YAR	
1964	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK				YAR	
1965	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK				YAR	
1966	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK				YAR	
1967	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK			YMD	YAR	
1968	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK			YMD	YAR	
1969	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK			YMD	YAR	
1970	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN		BGD_PAK			YMD	YAR	
1971	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN			BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1972	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN			BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1973	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN			BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1974	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN			BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1975	DFR	DDR		VDR	VTN			BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1976	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1977	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1978	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1979	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1980	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1981	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1982	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1983	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1984	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1985	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1986	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1987	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1988	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1989	DFR	DDR				VNM		BGD	PAK	YMD	YAR	
1990			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1991			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1992			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1993			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1994			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1995			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1996			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1997			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1998			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
1999			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM
2000			DEU			VNM		BGD	PAK			YEM

3. Additional Tables and Figures

Details of the Coding of Interventions in Chile

The relationship between the history of CIA involvement in Chile and the coding of our variable $US\ influence_{t,c}$ is summarized in table A2. During the 1964 Chilean elections, the CIA provided covert funding and support for the Christian Democratic Party candidate Eduardo Frei Montalvo. Eduardo Frei won the presidential election in 1964, and continued to receive CIA support while he was in power. In the 1970 election, Salvador Allende, a candidate of a coalition of leftist parties, was elected, and remained in power until the CIA orchestrated coup of 1973. After the coup, Augusto Pinochet took power and was backed by the CIA.

Since our variable $US\ influence_{t,c}$ equals one in all periods in which a leader is installed or supported by the CIA, the variable equals one from 1964 to 1970 when Eduardo Frei was in power. It equals zero in 1971 and 1972, the years when Salvador Allende was in office. It then equals one from 1973 to 1988, the years when Augusto Pinochet, who was installed and supported by the CIA, was in power.

Table A2: An example: The history of successful CIA interventions in Chile.

isocode	year	US influence	Key Historical Events
...	
CHL	1963	0	
CHL	1964	1	Election; CIA propoganda, funding, etc; Frei wins
CHL	1965	1	Continued support for right wing groups, etc.
CHL	1966	1	...
CHL	1967	1	...
CHL	1968	1	...
CHL	1969	1	...
CHL	1970	1	Salvador Allende wins election
CHL	1971	0	
CHL	1972	0	
CHL	1973	1	CIA planned coup; head of military, Pinochet takes power
CHL	1974	1	...
CHL	1975	1	...
CHL	1976	1	...
CHL	1977	1	...
CHL	1978	1	...
CHL	1979	1	...
CHL	1980	1	...
CHL	1981	1	...
CHL	1982	1	...
CHL	1983	1	...
CHL	1984	1	...
CHL	1985	1	...
CHL	1986	1	...
CHL	1987	1	...
CHL	1988	1	Plebiscite, democratic elections; Pinochet steps down
CHL	1989	0	
...	

Total interventions over time

Figure A1 shows the total number of successful CIA interventions among all countries in each year between 1947 and 1989. In other words, the figure reports the number of countries for which $US\ influence_{t,c} = 1$ in each year.



Figure A1: Total number of countries experiencing a successful CIA intervention in each year.

Counterfactuals

To provide the reader with a better sense of the estimated magnitudes of the CIA intervention estimates, we undertake a number of counterfactual exercises. For intervened countries, we ask how different imports from the US would have been absent any CIA interventions. This is done as follows. First, recall that γ_1 and γ_2 are coefficients for the one- and two-year lags of the dependent variables, and β is the coefficient for *US influence*. Counterfactual measures are denoted by an over-line. Counterfactual imports from the US had no interventions taken place, $\overline{\ln m_{t,c}^{US}}$, are equal to:

$$\overline{\ln m_{t,c}^{US}} = \ln m_{t,c}^{US} - \beta \text{US influence} - \gamma_1 (\ln m_{t-1,c}^{US} - \overline{\ln m_{t-1,c}^{US}}) - \gamma_2 (\ln m_{t-2,c}^{US} - \overline{\ln m_{t-2,c}^{US}}) \quad (1)$$

The first term subtracted from $\ln m_{t,c}^{US}$ is the adjustment for the direct effect of an intervention in period t on imports from the US in the same period. The second term adjusts for the persistent effect of an intervention in period $t - 1$ on imports in period t . This works through the impact that lagged trade has on current trade. The third term is the adjustment for the effect of intervention in period $t - 2$ on trade in period t .

The calculations are made recursively beginning in 1947, the first period of the sample. For these observations the last two terms of (1) are equal to zero. Calculations are then performed for 1948, which uses the counterfactual trade flows from 1947. In 1948, the second term in (1) is non-zero, while the third term is zero. The 1949 calculation uses the counterfactual trade flows from 1947 and 1948. The procedure is continued until the final year, 1989.

Figure A2 reports, for Chile, the actual and counterfactual value of log imports from the US in each year. The calculations use the estimates from column 1 of table 2 in the paper. The horizontal axis measures time and the vertical axis reports the natural log of Chilean imports from the US (measured in millions of nominal US dollars). From the figure it is clear that following the CIA interventions, which began in 1964, counterfactual and actual imports diverged significantly. By 1988, the final period of the intervention episode, actual imports from the US totaled 1.0 billion US dollars, while the counterfactual value of imports is estimated to be only 574 million US dollars, just over half of the actual value.

Figure A3 quantifies the impact of CIA interventions from the US perspective. It shows actual total exports from the US by year, and calculated counterfactual total exports based on our estimates from column 1 of table 2 in the paper. Counterfactual total US exports are calculated as




Figure A2: Actual and counterfactual imports for Chile.

follows. For each intervened country, we first calculate its counterfactual imports from the US. We then construct a counterfactual measure of total US exports to all countries by aggregating each country’s counterfactual imports from the US. As shown by figure A3, although CIA interventions had a large impact on trade flows from the perspective of intervened countries, the impact of interventions on US total exports was not particularly large. As an example, in 1965, at the height of CIA activity, US exports totaled 25.1 billion dollars. According to the counterfactual calculations, without any covert CIA activities, total US exports would have been 22.8 billion dollars.

One concern with this counterfactual is our implicit assumption that the intervention-induced increase in US exports to the intervened country did not result in a reduction of US exports to nearby countries. In other words, if interventions simply cause a divergence of exports from neighboring countries, then our counterfactual would be inaccurate.¹

We examine this possibility by constructing a measure of US influence that captures these potential spillovers. We first identify, for each country, all countries that share a border with

¹We are grateful to a referee for point this out.




Figure A3: Actual and counterfactual aggregate exports for the US.

the country. We then calculate the proportion of each country's neighbors that are experiencing a CIA intervention in a given year. We then include this variable in our estimating equations. The coefficient for neighbors' interventions provides an estimate of whether CIA interventions in neighboring countries affected imports from the US.

The estimates are reported in table A3. As shown in columns 1–4, there is no evidence that neighbors' interventions affect a country's imports from the US. The estimated coefficient for the spillover variable is insignificant in all specifications. Columns 5 and 6 show that neighbors interventions also do not affect total imports into a country. Also, of interest is the fact that the estimated impacts of *US influence* remain robust to controlling for potential spillovers.

Table A3: Testing for an effect of neighbors' interventions on imports from the US.

	ln share of imports from US		ln imports from the US		ln imports from the world	
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>US influence</i>	0.108*** (0.039)	0.170** (0.069)	0.129*** (0.044)	0.179** (0.075)	0.021 (0.018)	0.001 (0.028)
<i>US influence of neighbors</i>	-0.076 (0.055)	-0.053 (0.086)	-0.029 (0.087)	0.035 (0.141)	0.060 (0.065)	0.098 (0.103)
Observations	3,951	2,507	3,951	2,507	4,181	2,737

Notes : The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator variable. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Causality: The Selection of Interventions

Table A4 reports estimation results of an additional test for the selection of interventions described in section 4 of the paper. The tests consider the endogeneity of the onset of interventions. We first disaggregate our baseline variable $US\ influence_{t,c}$ into onset years (the first year of a CIA intervention) and all other years. We then estimate equation (7), looking specifically at the effect of onset years, while controlling for indicator variables that capture the lead and lag years. The specification includes all control variables, as well as a control for all other intervention years. The specification provides a test of whether the effects of interventions are first felt in exactly the same year as the beginning of the interventions. Table A4 reports specifications that control for indicators for between 2 to 5 years of leads and lags of the onset variable. The table also reports estimates for the full sample and for the subsample of autocracies. In all eight specifications, the intervention onset variable is positive and statistically significant, and we continue to find larger effects among the subsample of autocracies. Further, we find no statistically significant effect on the share of imports from the US in the years before or after the onset of the interventions. We estimate a statistically insignificant coefficient for all 52 pre- and post-indicator variables. CIA interventions begin to have effects in exactly their first year, not earlier and not later. All regressions also include a control for all other intervention years (i.e., non-onset intervention years). The coefficient for this variable is always positive and statistically significant.

Estimates of the determinants of interventions are reported in table A5. The odd numbered columns report estimates for the full sample and the even numbered columns report estimates for the subsample of autocracies. The specifications control for the change in US imports or US import share over the previous five years, the log share of US imports in each of the previous two years, and the log of US imports in the previous two years. As we report in section 4 of the paper, the estimates in table A5 show that pre-existing changes in trade with the US are uncorrelated with the probability of a country experiencing a CIA intervention.

Table A4: Controlling for leads and lags of the onset of interventions.

	ln share of imports from the US							
	5-years pre and post		4-years pre and post		3-years pre and post		2-years pre and post	
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pre-US onset indicator variables:								
Period $t-5$	0.004 (0.058)	0.013 (0.082)						
Period $t-4$	-0.033 (0.056)	-0.082 (0.087)	-0.039 (0.050)	-0.092 (0.077)				
Period $t-3$	0.023 (0.066)	0.025 (0.091)	0.026 (0.062)	0.016 (0.086)	0.047 (0.060)	0.054 (0.082)		
Period $t-2$	0.027 (0.061)	-0.002 (0.081)	0.019 (0.058)	-0.013 (0.081)	0.021 (0.060)	0.002 (0.083)	0.049 (0.067)	0.033 (0.088)
Period $t-1$	0.104 (0.115)	0.151 (0.119)	0.090 (0.108)	0.123 (0.111)	0.095 (0.110)	0.140 (0.114)	0.096 (0.111)	0.141 (0.113)
<i>US onset</i>	0.173** (0.083)	0.328*** (0.114)	0.175** (0.076)	0.314*** (0.111)	0.182** (0.076)	0.326*** (0.111)	0.181** (0.075)	0.329*** (0.107)
<i>Other intervention years</i>	0.096** (0.041)	0.159** (0.077)	0.095** (0.039)	0.154** (0.073)	0.096** (0.037)	0.145** (0.070)	0.091** (0.037)	0.144** (0.068)
Post-US onset indicator variables:								
Period $t+1$	-0.176 (0.175)	-0.308 (0.319)	-0.181 (0.176)	-0.315 (0.321)	-0.132 (0.168)	-0.296 (0.322)	-0.134 (0.167)	-0.293 (0.321)
Period $t+2$	-0.006 (0.042)	-0.010 (0.079)	-0.012 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.079)	-0.003 (0.039)	-0.002 (0.074)	-0.008 (0.039)	0.001 (0.072)
Period $t+3$	0.006 (0.051)	-0.099 (0.081)	0.029 (0.054)	-0.048 (0.094)	0.037 (0.051)	-0.029 (0.084)		
Period $t+4$	-0.049 (0.042)	-0.097 (0.073)	-0.043 (0.044)	-0.111 (0.075)				
Period $t+5$	0.081 (0.063)	0.140 (0.107)						
Observations	3,719	2,349	3,831	2,423	3,889	2,465	3,941	2,503

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participants, a democracy indicator variable, and an indicator for intervention years that are not onset years. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A5: Do trade flows predict CIA interventions?

	Dependent variable: <i>US influence</i>							
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Five year change in ln share of imports from the US ($t-6$ to $t-1$)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)						
Five year change in ln US imports ($t-6$ to $t-1$)			-0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)				
ln share of imports from the US ($t-1$)					-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)		
ln share of imports from the US ($t-2$)					0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)		
ln US imports ($t-1$)							0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)
ln US imports ($t-2$)							-0.002 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)
Observations	3,461	2,186	3,461	2,186	3,968	2,524	3,968	2,524

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator variable. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis

Table A6 reports the estimates showing the robustness of our results to alternative specifications. Columns 1 and 6 report estimates from a specification with lagged dependent variables, but no fixed effects, while columns 2 and 7 report estimates with fixed effects but no lags of the dependent variable. Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 246) suggest that these two alternatives give bounds on the treatment effect, since the lagged dependent variable specification estimates a treatment effect that is too small if the true model is fixed effects, while fixed effect specification estimates a treatment effect that is too large if the true model is the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, the fact that both estimates are positive and statistically significant is reassuring. Columns 3, 4, 8 and 9 report fixed effects estimates that also control for linear and non-linear country-specific time trends. Finally, columns 5 and 10 report estimates using the Bruno estimator (see Bruno, 2005*a,b*).

Our baseline estimating equations are derived from a log-linearization of the theoretically derived gravity model. One consequence of the log-linearization is that zero trade observations are dropped from the sample. Although, the number of observations dropped for this reason is very small (only 306 of 4,170 potential observations), we check that our omission of these observations is not significantly affecting our results. We pursue two strategies to assess the importance of the omission of zero trade flows from our analysis. The first is to re-estimate equation (7) with the share of imports from the US, rather than the log share of imports from the US, as the dependent variable. The second is to use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Because PPML does not use a log-linearized estimating equation, all observations are used, even ones with zero trade.

Estimates are reported in table A7. The estimates from columns 1 and 2 report estimates where the dependent variable is the share of imports from the US, rather than the log share. The point estimates are similar in magnitude to our baseline estimates, once one accounts for the difference in the dependent variables. The means of the dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 are 0.181 and 0.156, respectively. Therefore, for a country with a mean US import share, an intervention increases the share of US imports by 6.6 and 10.9 percent, respectively. These figure are broadly similar to the magnitudes of our baseline estimates.

Columns 3–6 report Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimates for specifications examin-

Table A6: Robustness and sensitivity of the estimated effects of US interventions on the US import share.

	Full sample				Autocracies only					
	LDV only (1)	FEs only (2)	FEs with country- specific time trends (3)	Bruno Estimator (4)	LDV only (6)	FEs only (7)	FEs with country- specific time trends (8)	Bruno Estimator (9)	Bruno Estimator (10)	
<i>US influence</i>	0.069*** (0.018)	0.282*** (0.109)	0.163** (0.081)	0.161** (0.080)	0.109*** (0.024)	0.385** (0.188)	0.272* (0.157)	0.270* (0.156)	0.155** (0.066)	
Lag(s) of the dependent variable	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	
Country fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Year fixed effects	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Linear country-spec. time trends	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	
Nonlinear country-spec. time trends	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	
Observations	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	2,507	2,507	2,507	2,507	2,595	

Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (7). The dependent variable is the share of imports from the US. The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include a Soviet intervention control, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator variable for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US and a democracy indicator. Columns 1 and 6 include two lags of the dependent variable. When the Bruno estimator is used, in columns 5 and 10, a single lag of the dependent variable is used (this also explains the larger sample size). Columns 2-4 and 7-9 do not include any lags of the dependent variable. Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. Columns 1-4 and 6-9 report Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 40. Columns 5 and 10 report bootstrapped standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

ing imports from the US and imports from the world. The estimates show that the alternative specification yields results that are similar to the baseline estimates, although the estimated magnitudes, which are directly comparable to our baseline estimates, are noticeably larger.

Table A7: Alternative estimates that include zero trade flows.

	OLS Estimates		Poisson Estimates			
	Share of imports from the US		Imports from the US		Imports from the world	
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>US influence</i>	0.012*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.326*** (0.035)	0.535*** (0.077)	-0.007 (0.023)	0.071 (0.053)
Observations	4,179	2,735	4,269	2,821	4,271	2,823

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Estimates using alternative intervention measures are reported in table A8. Specifically, we disaggregate our baseline *US influence* variable into two variables. One variable captures periods of US influence that stem from CIA interventions in which the intervention episode began with a CIA induced regime change. This is the variable reported in the first row of the table: *Influence (install and support)*. The second variable equals one in periods of US influence where the CIA intervention episode began with the CIA supporting an existing leader – typically helping them to maintain power – rather than installing a new regime. This is the second variable reported in the table: *US Influence (start supporting)*.

The estimates show that CIA interventions that install a new regime, rather than support an existing regime, have a much larger effect on imports from the US. The coefficients for *US Influence (install and support)* are all positive and highly significant, while the coefficients for *US Influence (start supporting)* are much smaller in magnitude (and negative in one specification) and insignificant. These findings are consistent with the US having greater influence over regimes that were installed with the help of the CIA.

In the paper, we report estimates of the effect of CIA interventions on country imports by

Table A8: The effects of narrow US interventions on imports.

	ln share of imports from US				ln imports from the US			
	Full sample		Autocracies		Full sample		Autocracies	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence (install and support)</i>	0.147*** (0.057)	0.153*** (0.058)	0.265*** (0.091)	0.266*** (0.091)	0.185*** (0.063)	0.191*** (0.063)	0.313*** (0.098)	0.309*** (0.097)
<i>US influence (start supporting)</i>		0.046 (0.030)		0.008 (0.063)		0.047 (0.038)		-0.042 (0.080)
Observations	3,951	3,951	2,507	2,507	3,951	3,951	2,507	2,507

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator variable. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

examining bilateral imports. Using the same logic, one can also examine the effect of CIA interventions on country exports by examining bilateral exports. The estimating equation is:

$$\ln x_{t,c,m} = \alpha_t + \alpha_{c,m} + \beta_1 US\ influence_{t,c} + \beta_2 US\ influence_{t,c} \times I_m^{US} + \sum_{n=1}^N \gamma_n \ln x_{t-n,c,m} + \mathbf{X}_{t,c}\mathbf{\Gamma} + \mathbf{X}_{t,m}\mathbf{\Omega} + \varepsilon_{t,c,m} \quad (2)$$

where m indexes importing countries.

Estimates of equation (2) are reported in table A9. Column 1 reports estimates for the full sample and column 2 reports estimates of the restricted sample of exporters that are autocracies. The estimates show that, consistent with the findings from the country-year regressions, CIA interventions did not have an effect on exports to any country, including the US.

Table A9: Effect of CIA interventions on exports using the full sample of bilateral country-pairs.

	Dep var: ln bilateral exports	
	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)
<i>US influence</i>	0.008 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.022)
<i>US influence</i> × <i>US importer</i>	0.060 (0.064)	0.077 (0.091)
Observations	175,473	84,597

Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variable is the natural log of exports from country c to country m in year t . All regressions include year fixed effects, country-pair fixed effects, three lags of the dependent variable, a Soviet intervention control (and the same interactions as for the CIA intervention variable), ln importer per capita income, ln exporter per capita income, ln importer total income, ln exporter total income, an indicator for importer leader turnover, an indicator for exporter leader turnover, importer current leader tenure, exporter current leader tenure, indicator variable for the importer being a GATT participant, indicator variable for the exporter being a GATT participant, an indicator if the importer has a preferential trade agreement with the US, an indicator if the exporter has a preferential trade agreement with the US, an importer democracy indicator, and an exporter democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Heterogeneous effects

Table A10 reports estimates that test for heterogeneous effects of successful CIA interventions by decade over the sample period. We do this by interacting $US\ influence_{t,c}$ with indicator variables for each decade of the sample. We find no evidence of differential impacts over time. Table A11 reports estimates that allow for a differential impact by geography, distinguishing between countries in the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe. Overall, we find no evidence of a robust differential impact of CIA interventions by geography. The one exception is for Asia when the dependent variable is the natural log of US imports. For this case there is an additional positive effect for Asian countries that is significant at the 10% level.

Table A10: Testing for heterogeneous effects by decade.

	ln share of imports from the US: ln (Imports from US / Imports from world)				ln imports from the US			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence</i>	0.098*** (0.042)	0.110*** (0.039)	0.109*** (0.039)	0.104*** (0.039)	0.121*** (0.050)	0.132*** (0.045)	0.132*** (0.045)	0.125*** (0.042)
Interaction terms:								
<i>US influence</i> x 1940s/1950s indicator	0.034 (0.036)				0.033 (0.038)			
<i>US influence</i> x 1960s indicator		-0.015 (0.027)				-0.016 (0.036)		
<i>US influence</i> x 1970s indicator			-0.010 (0.022)				-0.014 (0.028)	
<i>US influence</i> x 1980s indicator				0.006 (0.040)				0.013 (0.052)
R-squared	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
Observations	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT membership, and six regime type fixed effects. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 40. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A12 tests for differential impacts of CIA interventions across observations with different levels of trade openness. The table reports our baseline estimates allowing for a differential impact based on a country's trade-to-GDP ratio (imports+exports/GDP). In the odd numbered columns, we use data from the COW Trade Database and income data from Maddison (2003) to construct the trade openness measure. In the even numbered columns, as a robustness check, we use the pre-constructed trade openness from the PWT 6.1. Because this variable is only available from

Table A11: Testing for heterogeneous effects by continent.

	ln share of imports from the US: ln (Imports from US / Imports from world)				ln imports from the US			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence</i>	0.118*** (0.041)	0.056* (0.033)	0.102** (0.041)	0.151** (0.066)	0.151*** (0.045)	0.070* (0.042)	0.126*** (0.045)	0.165** (0.074)
Interaction terms:								
<i>US influence</i> x Africa indicator	-0.082 (0.124)				-0.146 (0.155)			
<i>US influence</i> x Asia indicator		0.154 (0.097)				0.179* (0.107)		
<i>US influence</i> x Europe indicator			0.049 (0.060)				0.026 (0.080)	
<i>US influence</i> x Americas indicator				-0.100 (0.073)				-0.082 (0.087)
R-squared	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
Observations	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951	3,951

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 40. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

1950, these specification have fewer observations.

The interaction between $US\ influence_{t,c}$ and trade openness is statistically insignificant on all specifications. There is no evidence of a differential effect of interventions depending on the initial openness of the country. This finding is important, since an alternative explanation for the differential effect of interventions on autocracies and democracies is that since autocracies trade less, the effects of interventions may have been greater for autocracies because of the lower initial level of trade openness. The results of Table A12 do not provide support for the notion that CIA interventions had a larger impact on countries that are less open.

We also consider heterogeneity of effects across industries. In the paper we examine differential effects based on the US and foreign country's RCA. For the interested reader, we also report estimates of the effects of CIA interventions on imports for each SITC 2-digit SITC industry. In practice, we estimate equation (4) separately for US imports in each industry. Table A13 reports, for each regression, the estimated coefficient and standard error for $US\ influence$, as well as the number of observations. The estimates for each industry are ordered, from lowest to highest, based on the magnitude of the coefficient estimate.

Table A12: Testing for heterogeneous effects by trade openness.

	ln share of imports from the US: ln (Imports from US / Imports from world)				ln imports from the US			
	Full sample		Autocracies		Full sample		Autocracies	
	Baseline data	PWT data	Baseline data	PWT data	Baseline data	PWT data	Baseline data	PWT data
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence</i>	0.103** (0.043)	0.132** (0.061)	0.164** (0.073)	0.265** (0.109)	0.158*** (0.059)	0.147* (0.076)	0.221** (0.091)	0.306** (0.125)
<i>US influence</i> x (Trade/GDP)	0.016 (0.098)	0.000 (0.001)	0.030 (0.135)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.172 (0.202)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.208 (0.279)	-0.002 (0.002)
Observations	3,951	3,623	2,507	2,246	3,951	3,623	2,507	2,246

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, a democracy indicator, and the trade-to-GDP ratio. The trade-to-GDP ratio used in the odd numbered columns is constructed from the trade and GDP data used in the baseline regressions. The even numbered columns uses the trade-to-GDP ratio (openc) from the PWT 6.1. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 40. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A13: Impacts of CIA interventions on imports from the US, by 2-digit SITC industry.

SITC 2 digit	Industry description	Coef	SE	Obs
22	Oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels	-0.459	(0.377)	1,145
42	Fixed vegetable oils and fats	-0.350**	(0.143)	1,851
28	Metalliferous ores and metal scrap	-0.197	(0.182)	1,122
24	Wood, lumber and cork	-0.112	(0.148)	1,340
34	Gas, natural and manufactured	-0.069	(0.298)	601
85	Footwear	-0.043	(0.180)	1,276
61	Leather, leather manufactures nes and dressed fur skins	-0.039	(0.149)	1,394
21	Hides, skins and fur skins, undressed	-0.012	(0.219)	932
84	Clothing	-0.009	(0.134)	1,926
68	Non ferrous metals	-0.003	(0.121)	1,861
32	Coal, coke and briquettes	-0.002	(0.200)	962
11	Beverages	0.013	(0.109)	1,508
41	Animal oils and fats	0.053	(0.150)	1,383
27	Crude fertilizers and crude minerals, nes	0.079	(0.108)	1,819
71	Machinery, other than electric	0.085	(0.071)	2,365
75	Office machines and automatic data processing equipment	0.088	(0.069)	2,234
04	Cereals and cereal preparations	0.090	(0.089)	2,455
26	Textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste	0.097	(0.080)	2,134
03	Fish and fish preparations	0.107	(0.130)	1,253
59	Chemical materials and products, nes	0.113*	(0.059)	2,328
52	Crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and gas	0.118	(0.099)	1,991
23	Crude rubber including synthetic and reclaimed	0.121	(0.077)	1,488
65	Textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles, etc.	0.122	(0.074)	2,286
77	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances nes	0.138*	(0.081)	2,319
89	Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes	0.139**	(0.070)	2,264
88	Photographic apparatus, optical goods, watches	0.144***	(0.054)	2,111
66	Non metallic mineral manufactures, nes	0.146**	(0.072)	2,109
29	Crude animal and vegetable materials, nes	0.147**	(0.071)	1,859
82	Furniture	0.159	(0.131)	1,881
62	Rubber manufactures, nes	0.166**	(0.081)	2,151
69	Manufactures of metal, nes	0.169***	(0.060)	2,297
87	Professional, scientific and controlling instruments	0.171**	(0.076)	2,393
55	Perfume materials, and toilet and cleansing products	0.171***	(0.046)	2,009
72	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances	0.175***	(0.053)	2,528
73	Transport equipment	0.176	(0.107)	1,864
12	Tobacco and tobacco manufactures	0.176*	(0.095)	2,098
63	Wood and cork manufactures excluding furniture	0.176*	(0.100)	1,572
74	General industrial machinery, equipment and parts	0.180***	(0.064)	2,442
64	Paper, paperboard and manufactures thereof	0.182***	(0.063)	2,097
83	Travel goods, handbags and similar articles	0.190	(0.130)	1,328
25	Pulp and paper	0.192*	(0.104)	1,255
53	Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials	0.192***	(0.055)	1,948
67	Iron and steel	0.199**	(0.098)	2,109
56	Fertilizers, manufactured	0.201	(0.127)	1,377
08	Feed stuff for animals excluding unmilled cereals	0.201*	(0.116)	1,515
51	Chemical elements and compounds	0.226***	(0.084)	1,950
58	Artificial resins and plastic materials, etc.	0.230**	(0.097)	1,967
54	Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	0.243***	(0.071)	2,276
78	Road vehicles	0.246***	(0.083)	2,425
57	Explosives and pyrotechnic products	0.251	(0.241)	1,125
05	Fruit and vegetables	0.253***	(0.076)	1,922
81	Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures	0.265***	(0.099)	1,738
33	Petroleum and petroleum products	0.271***	(0.076)	2,213
01	Meat and meat preparations	0.286	(0.182)	1,429
43	Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed	0.287*	(0.149)	1,229
00	Live animals	0.306***	(0.118)	1,247
76	Telecommunications and sound recording apparatus	0.314***	(0.096)	2,353
06	Sugar, sugar preparations and honey	0.317**	(0.141)	1,485
07	Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and manufactures thereof	0.321**	(0.144)	1,364
02	Dairy products and eggs	0.364***	(0.113)	1,794
09	Miscellaneous food preparations	0.377***	(0.130)	2,050
79	Other transport equipment	0.458***	(0.156)	2,296
95	Firearms of war and ammunition	0.507	(0.317)	624

Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (4), with the sample restricted to a given 2-digit SITC industry. Each row of the table reports the coefficient and standard error from one regression, as well as the number of observations in the regression. Standard errors are Newey-West standard errors with a maximum lag of 40.

Testing Alternative Explanations

Tables A14 and A15 reports the RCA measure for the US for two years in our sample, 1962 and 1989, for each 2-digit SITC industry.

Table A14: US revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in 1962.

Low RCA industries			High RCA Industries		
US RCA in 1962	sitc2	Industry description	US RCA in 1962	sitc2	Industry description
0.043	11	Beverages	0.909	81	Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures
0.065	07	Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and manufactures thereof	0.910	88	Photographic apparatus, optical goods, watches
0.083	03	Fish and fish preparations	1.003	43	Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed
0.101	06	Sugar, sugar preparations and honey	1.137	42	Fixed vegetable oils and fats
0.108	85	Footwear	1.155	62	Rubber manufactures, nes
0.146	00	Live animals	1.203	52	Crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and gas
0.227	91	Scrap and waste	1.207	69	Manufactures of metal, nes
0.308	33	Petroleum and petroleum products	1.263	54	Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
0.314	63	Wood and cork manufactures excluding furniture	1.294	55	Perfume materials, and toilet and cleansing products
0.377	01	Meat and meat preparations	1.335	57	Explosives and pyrotechnic products
0.386	84	Clothing	1.343	76	Telecommunications and sound recording apparatus
0.415	24	Wood, lumber and cork	1.373	77	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances nes
0.442	34	Gas, natural and manufactured	1.547	78	Road vehicles
0.456	65	Textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles, etc.	1.555	51	Chemical elements and compounds
0.468	02	Dairy products and eggs	1.562	09	Miscellaneous food preparations
0.469	68	Non ferrous metals	1.598	89	Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes
0.471	29	Crude animal and vegetable materials, nes	1.626	22	Oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels
0.503	64	Paper, paperboard and manufactures thereof	1.650	72	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances
0.510	28	Metalliferous ores and metal scrap	1.654	35	Machinery, except electrical
0.538	66	Non metallic mineral manufactures, nes	1.669	74	General industrial machinery, equipment and parts
0.545	67	Iron and steel	1.685	58	Artificial resins and plastic materials, etc.
0.559	83	Travel goods, handbags and similar articles	1.701	75	Office machines and automatic data process. equip.
0.579	05	Fruit and vegetables	1.788	71	Machinery, other than electric
0.619	25	Pulp and paper	1.877	12	Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
0.645	21	Hides, skins and fur skins, undressed	1.927	04	Cereals and cereal preparations
0.723	27	Crude fertilizers and crude minerals, nes	1.976	41	Animal oils and fats
0.736	82	Furniture	1.977	73	Transport equipment
0.740	61	Leather, leather manuf. Nes, and dressed fur skins	2.058	59	Chemical materials and products, nes
0.740	23	Crude rubber including synthetic and reclaimed	2.207	87	Professional, scientific and controlling instruments
0.778	26	Textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste	2.240	32	Coal, coke and briquettes
0.800	08	Feed stuff for animals excluding unmilled cereals	2.435	79	Other transport equipment
0.819	53	Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials	3.133	95	Firearms of war and ammunition
0.836	56	Fertilizers, manufactured			

Table A16 shows that, as reported in the paper, estimates of the paper's equation (8) are very similar when the natural log of imports from the US, rather than the natural log of the share of imports, is used as the dependent variable. The results from table A16 can be compared to table 4 in the paper. In all of the specifications in table A16 the US RCA interaction is negative, and in all but two it is statistically significant.

Table A17 reports an additional test of the political ideology channel, which is discussed in

Table A15: US revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in 1989.

Low RCA industries			High RCA Industries		
US RCA in 1989	site2	Industry description	US RCA in 1989	site2	Industry description
0.059	94	Scrap and waste	0.929	27	Crude fertilizers and crude minerals, nes
0.095	85	Footwear	0.930	78	Road vehicles
0.122	07	Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and manufactures thereof	0.937	55	Perfume materials, and toilet and cleansing products
0.124	83	Travel goods, handbags and similar articles	0.944	57	Explosives and pyrotechnic products
0.144	34	Gas, natural and manufactured	0.947	73	Transport equipment
0.154	33	Petroleum and petroleum products	1.013	54	Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
0.159	84	Clothing	1.078	26	Textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste
0.231	02	Dairy products and eggs	1.079	28	Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
0.284	11	Beverages	1.083	89	Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes
0.300	06	Sugar, sugar preparations and honey	1.187	72	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances
0.338	67	Iron and steel	1.192	09	Miscellaneous food preparations
0.399	43	Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed	1.227	58	Artificial resins and plastic materials, etc.
0.400	65	Textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles, etc.	1.279	51	Chemical elements and compounds
0.450	35	Machinery, except electrical	1.309	56	Fertilizers, manufactured
0.500	82	Furniture	1.397	77	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances nes
0.510	66	Non metallic mineral manufactures, nes	1.398	95	Firearms of war and ammunition
0.516	61	skins	1.400	52	Crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and gas
0.531	81	Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures	1.424	74	General industrial machinery, equipment and parts
0.563	00	Live animals	1.521	24	Wood, lumber and cork
0.573	63	Wood and cork manufactures excluding furniture	1.550	08	Feed stuff for animals excluding unmilled cereals
0.593	68	Non ferrous metals	1.800	59	Chemical materials and products, nes
0.625	42	Fixed vegetable oils and fats	1.825	25	Pulp and paper
0.633	76	Telecommunications and sound recording apparatus	1.894	32	Coal, coke and briquettes
0.658	29	Crude animal and vegetable materials, nes	1.982	75	Office machines and automatic data process. equip.
0.659	23	Crude rubber including synthetic and reclaimed	2.014	71	Machinery, other than electric
0.671	03	Fish and fish preparations	2.103	21	Hides, skins and fur skins, undressed
0.711	64	Paper, paperboard and manufactures thereof	2.388	79	Other transport equipment
0.825	05	Fruit and vegetables	2.548	87	Professional, scientific and controlling instruments
0.831	88	Photographic apparatus, optical goods, watches	2.827	04	Cereals and cereal preparations
0.849	62	Rubber manufactures, nes	2.934	12	Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
0.868	53	Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials	3.067	41	Animal oils and fats
0.902	01	Meat and meat preparations	3.293	22	Oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels
0.914	69	Manufactures of metal, nes			

section 6B of the paper. We re-estimate equation (10) from the paper, but restrict the sample of exporters to be: (i) NATO members, (ii) OECD members, (iii) Western European countries (or the US), or (iii) countries that are large exporters, measured as countries with above mean world exports in 1969.² This strategy examines the effect of voting similarity among an arguably more homogenous (and comparable) group of exporting countries. We continue to find a robust, positive, and statistically significant differential impact of CIA interventions on imports from the US. For non-US countries, in all specifications, we find estimates that are very close to zero. To see the effect for the typical non-US country first note that the mean of *US alignment of exporter* ($V_{t,e}^{US}$ in equation (10)) is 0.71. Therefore, the effect of interventions for a country with a measure of US vote similarity that is at the mean is $\beta_1 + 0.71 \times \beta_4$, where β_1 and β_4 are defined in equation (10) in

²Results are very similar using alternative definitions of large exporters.

Table A16: Testing the trade costs explanation using revealed comparative advantage. The dependent variable is ln US imports.

	Developing country market RCA													
	World market RCA						Autocracies only							
	Full sample		Autocracies only		Full sample		Autocracies only		Full sample		Autocracies only			
2-digit industries	3-digit industries	4-digit industries	2-digit industries	3-digit industries	4-digit industries	2-digit industries	3-digit industries	4-digit industries	2-digit industries	3-digit industries	4-digit industries	2-digit industries	3-digit industries	4-digit industries
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>US influence</i>	0.0840** (0.033)	0.108*** (0.032)	0.099*** (0.033)	0.241*** (0.058)	0.252*** (0.056)	0.237*** (0.059)	0.085** (0.033)	0.111*** (0.032)	0.097*** (0.033)	0.240*** (0.058)	0.251*** (0.056)	0.240*** (0.058)	0.251*** (0.056)	0.224*** (0.059)
<i>US influence</i> × <i>US RCA</i>	-0.115* (0.065)	-0.217*** (0.070)	-0.105 (0.068)	-0.336*** (0.086)	-0.456*** (0.100)	-0.345*** (0.100)	-0.163* (0.084)	-0.220*** (0.064)	-0.089 (0.069)	-0.427*** (0.112)	-0.394*** (0.090)	-0.427*** (0.112)	-0.394*** (0.090)	-0.213** (0.102)
<i>US RCA</i>	0.873*** (0.094)	1.744*** (0.095)	1.475*** (0.079)	0.980*** (0.156)	1.671*** (0.158)	1.623*** (0.164)	1.087*** (0.123)	1.495*** (0.102)	0.985*** (0.195)	1.192*** (0.201)	1.374*** (0.155)	1.192*** (0.201)	1.374*** (0.155)	0.811*** (0.266)
Observations	92,705	222,118	335,731	49,293	102,525	131,837	92,705	222,118	335,731	49,293	102,525	49,293	102,525	131,837

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t in a 2, 3 or 4-digit SITC industry i , where t ranges from 1962 to 1989. The dependent variable is the natural log of imports from the US. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, four lags of the dependent variable, importer RCA, importer RCA interacted with *US influence*, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country-year level in brackets. ***, **, * and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A17: Testing the political ideology channel, with a restricted set of exporters.

	Dependent variable: ln bilateral imports							
	NATO exporters		OECD exporters		W. Europe & US exporters		Larger exporters	
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
<i>US influence</i>	-0.134 (0.114)	0.085 (0.143)	0.030 (0.084)	0.305*** (0.109)	0.005 (0.076)	0.259*** (0.097)	0.005 (0.059)	0.017 (0.080)
<i>US influence × US exporter</i>	0.104** (0.051)	0.171* (0.094)	0.125** (0.051)	0.205** (0.099)	0.120** (0.051)	0.186* (0.098)	0.144*** (0.051)	0.223** (0.097)
<i>US influence × US alignment of exporter, γ^{US}</i>	0.172 (0.121)	-0.082 (0.153)	0.000 (0.090)	-0.325*** (0.119)	0.028 (0.082)	-0.263** (0.106)	-0.001 (0.065)	-0.069 (0.089)
Observations	34,774	21,576	50,647	30,931	47,615	29,449	78,007	46,061

Notes: The unit of observation is a country-pair in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variable is the natural log of imports into country c from country e in year t . All regressions include year fixed effects, country-pair fixed effects, three lags of the dependent variable, a Soviet intervention control (and the same interactions as for the CIA intervention variable), ln importer per capita income, ln exporter per capita income, ln importer total income, an indicator for importer leader turnover, an indicator for exporter leader turnover, importer current leader tenure, exporter current leader tenure, indicator variable for the importer being a GATT participant, indicator variable for the exporter being a GATT participant, an indicator if the importer has a preferential trade agreement with the US, an indicator if the exporter has a preferential trade agreement with the US, an importer democracy indicator, and an exporter democracy indicator. Columns 1 and 2 restrict the sample to exporting countries that were NATO members, columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to exporters that were original OECD members, columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to exporters from Western Europe or the United States, and columns 7 and 8 restrict the sample to large exporters, defined as those that had the above mean level of world exports in 1969. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

the paper. The estimates from column 1 suggest that the effect is $-0.134 + 0.71 \times 0.172 = -0.012$, which is very close to zero. Even for specifications in which β_1 and β_4 are statistically significant, the estimated impact for a country with mean US vote similarity is close to zero. For example, according to the estimates from column 5 the estimated impact is $0.296 + 0.71 \times -0.318 = 0.070$, which is also close to zero.

Underlying Mechanisms

We now detail the results of the procedure discussed in section 7A of the paper. Using South Korea's input-output (I-O) tables for 2000, we measure, for each industry, the proportion of an industry's production that is purchased by the government. The industries are originally classified into 413 industries according to South Korea's I-O classification. The industries with the highest shares are reported in table A18.

We link each of the industries to an SITC 2-digit industry and aggregate to create shares measured at the SITC 2-digit level. With this measure, we then re-estimate the industry level regressions – equation (8) from the paper, but without the RCA interactions – separately for industries with above and with below median shares of government purchases. The estimation results are reported in table A19. Columns 1–4 report the estimates for the industries with above median government purchase shares, and columns 5–8 report estimates for the below median share industries. We report specifications with both the natural log of the US import share and the natural log of US imports as dependent variables and specifications with both the full sample of countries and the sample of autocracies. The results show a greater effect of CIA interventions in the industries in which the government is a more active consumer, based on our constructed measure. The estimates for the low government industries sample are typically about half the magnitude of the high government industry estimates.

We also construct a second measure of government purchases in each industry. This is the share of *imports* that are purchased by the government, rather than the share of *domestic sales* purchased by the government. The industries with the greatest share of imports purchased by the government are reported in table A20. Estimation results using the alternative measure are reported in table A21. Using the alternative measure yields very similar results. In industries with a higher share of government purchase of imports, the estimated impact of CIA interventions on US imports is around twice the magnitude as for industries with a lower share.

We now report the estimates discussed in section 7B of the paper that test for tariffs and FDI as alternative mechanisms underlying the effect of CIA interventions on US imports.

To examine the FDI mechanism, we use data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and test whether interventions were followed by increases in US FDI in the intervened country.

The estimates, using a number of different measures of outward US FDI, are reported in table A22. Although five of the six specifications report a positive coefficient for US interventions, none of the coefficients is statistically significant.

In table A23, we report estimates of our baseline estimating equation (7), controlling for each of the three measures of outward FDI. The coefficient for $US\ influence_{t,c}$ remains positive and statistically significant even after controlling for measures of FDI. As well, the estimated coefficients remain similar in magnitude.

Overall, the estimates from tables A22 and A23 provide little support for the notion that CIA interventions result in a subsequent increase in US FDI. There is also no evidence that US FDI accounts for any of the estimated effect of CIA interventions on US imports.

It is possible that the estimated unimportance of FDI may be explained by the imprecision in the BEA's FDI data. The BEA only conducts a comprehensive census every five years. In the years between these benchmark years, smaller surveys are conducted sampling only a fraction of the total population. These smaller surveys, together with trends between the benchmark years, are used to estimate figures for the full sample. Because our identification relies strongly on year-to-year variation, the imprecision of the FDI data may result in estimates that are biased towards zero. Without better data, we are unable to reject this explanation for the insignificant FDI results.

Table A24 reports estimates that examine whether changing tariffs explain part of the increase in US imports following CIA interventions. We test whether interventions had a greater impact on US imports after a revision to the intervened-country's tariff schedule. We check for this by constructing a variable that equals one for intervention years that follow a change in the tariff structure that occurred during the intervention episode, where an intervention episode is defined as continuous years of intervention.

In columns 1 and 4 of table A24, we first estimate whether US interventions affected the probability of a change in the tariff structure.³ The estimates provide no evidence for this. The remaining columns in the table report estimates of our baseline estimating equations with the new post-tariff change intervention variable. The estimates show no evidence that within intervention episodes, the periods after a tariff change experienced a greater increase in US imports. In none

³We estimate a linear probability model. Logit and Probit models provide qualitatively identical estimates.

of the specifications is the post-tariff change intervention variable positive.

Table A25 reports the full results from our two strategies undertaken to examine the timing of the effects of CIA interventions. These are discussed in section 7C of the paper.

The first strategy disaggregates *US influence* into three parts. The first is an indicator variable that equals one in the first year of an intervention episode, *US influence (onset year)*. The second is an indicator for the last year of the episode, *US influence (offset year)*. The third is an indicator for interventions in the years between the onset and offset years, *US influence (intermediate year)*. We then include the three variables in the estimating equations rather than *US influence*. The estimates, which are reported in the odd numbered columns of table A25, show that interventions, even in their first year, have large effects. In other words, US influence immediately causes an increased purchase of US products. Moreover, the effect of the interventions does not appear to change over the tenure of the intervention episode. In all four specifications, standard *F*-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the three intervention variables are equal.

The second strategy we employ allows the effect of *US influence* to differ depending on the number of previous consecutive intervention years experienced by the country. This tests explicitly whether, during an intervention episode, a year of intervention begins to have a stronger or weaker impact on trade over time. In practice, we interact *US influence* with how many years into the intervention episode period t is, and with this measure squared (this allows the differential effect to be non-linear). The results, reported in the even numbered columns of table A25, provide no evidence of a differential effect of an intervention depending on the number of previous intervention years.

Table A18: South Korean government purchases by industry.

Industry code	Industry description	Total purchases	Share of purchases by government
292	Aircraft and parts	1,883,121	33.00%
245	Misc. Machinery and equipment of special purpose	2,841,776	15.95%
135	Printing	3,490,317	9.75%
290	Ship repairing and ship parts	1,432,490	7.99%
134	Publishing	1,970,672	6.69%
137	Coal briquettes	31,351	5.13%
143	Light oil	9,616,189	4.05%
130	Stationery paper and office paper	427,867	4.01%
288	Steel ships	497,812	3.94%
141	Jet oil	1,461,073	3.92%
296	Metal furniture	232,011	3.89%
177	Misc. Rubber products	373,248	3.75%
136	Publishing and reproduction of recorded media	203,278	3.63%
303	Models and decorations	475,999	3.62%
272	Electric household fans	103,206	3.23%
275	Medical instruments and supplies	623,142	3.20%
17	Other Inedible crops	117,394	3.05%
161	Medicaments	8,179,915	2.99%
160	Pesticides and other agricultural chemicals	1,257,428	2.62%
140	Gasoline	3,737,202	2.45%
293	Motorcycles and parts	192,900	2.43%
168	Explosives and fireworks products	243,279	2.21%
299	Sporting and athletic goods	284,689	2.21%
123	Other wooden products	214,411	2.20%
277	Measuring and analytical instruments	2,554,009	2.10%
105	Textile wearing apparels	894,109	2.09%
304	Misc. Manufacturing products	532,697	2.01%
295	Wood furniture	715,011	1.91%
133	Newspapers	2,258,836	1.82%
226	Internal combustion engines and turbines	2,481,148	1.68%
142	Kerosene	2,144,468	1.57%
278	Cinematograph cameras and projectors	301,989	1.51%
152	Industrial gases	862,064	1.48%
144	Heavy oil	6,835,148	1.48%
16	Seeds and seedlings	247,346	1.42%
252	Electric lamps and electric lighting fixtures	2,023,989	1.38%
147	Misc. Petroleum refinery products	771,153	1.33%
300	Musical instruments	120,732	1.23%
224	Household metallic utensils	216,282	1.22%
232	Heating apparatus and cooking appliances	98,153	1.20%
297	Other furniture	825,329	1.18%

Notes: Data are from the South Korean 2000 Input Output tables. The first column reports the total value of purchases in the Korean economy for the industry listed, measured in millions of won. The second column reports the share of the domestic sales purchased by the South Korean government.

Table A19: Effect of CIA interventions on US imports in industries with high and low government purchase shares.

	High government purchase industries				Low government purchase industries			
	ln US import share		ln US imports		ln US import share		ln US imports	
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence</i>	0.052** (0.023)	0.102** (0.046)	0.080** (0.033)	0.187*** (0.060)	0.026 (0.023)	0.053 (0.044)	0.039 (0.032)	0.156*** (0.057)
Observations	52,669	29,962	52,669	29,962	44,550	23,160	44,550	23,160

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t in a 2-digit SITC industry i , where t ranges from 1962 to 1989. Columns 1-4 include industries with more than the median share of sales that were purchased by the government in South Korea in 2000. Columns 5-10 include the industries with less than the median share. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, four lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country-year level in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A20: South Korean government imports by industry.

Industry code	Industry description	Total imports	Share of imports purchased by government
292	Aircraft and parts	1,687,673	49.95%
245	Misc. Machinery and equipment of special purpose	3,972,974	10.24%
293	Motorcycles and parts	71,047	9.83%
134	Publishing	454,914	7.01%
152	Industrial gases	14,312	6.98%
289	Other ships	45,401	6.02%
140	Gasoline	191,059	5.35%
296	Metal furniture	38,249	3.89%
111	Cordage, rope, and fishing nets	35,481	3.75%
143	Light oil	355,982	3.70%
130	Stationery paper and office paper	31,680	3.64%
168	Explosives and fireworks products	10,784	3.62%
275	Medical instruments and supplies	1,175,696	3.13%
281	Passenger automobiles	327,755	3.03%
161	Medicaments	1,255,220	2.95%
284	Motor vehicles with special equipment	97,824	2.59%
267	Radio and television broadcasting and wireless communications	2,014,445	2.45%
141	Jet oil	843,964	2.43%
304	Misc. Manufacturing products	232,135	2.21%
17	Other Inedible crops	115,514	2.16%
226	Internal combustion engines and turbines	914,868	2.07%
303	Models and decorations	156,210	2.01%
290	Ship repairing and ship parts	154,223	1.93%
142	Kerosene	488,827	1.77%
135	Printing	141,742	1.71%
109	Textile products	298,539	1.68%
300	Musical instruments	119,561	1.65%
269	Office machines and devices	454,201	1.64%
215	Metal products for construction	18,721	1.45%
252	Electric lamps and electric lighting fixtures	420,589	1.41%
136	Publishing and reproduction of recorded media	112,334	1.39%
16	Seeds and seedlings	117,208	1.39%
159	Fertilizers	225,474	1.33%
191	Abrasives	64,402	1.32%
268	Computer and peripheral equipment	6,736,961	1.22%
173	Industrial plastic products	471,165	1.22%
133	Newspapers	10,229	1.21%
232	Heating apparatus and cooking appliances	37,478	1.20%
277	Measuring and analytical instruments	4,800,457	1.15%
169	Recording media for electronic equipments	274,621	1.15%
153	Basic inorganic chemicals	1,342,904	1.13%

Notes: Data are from the South Korean 2000 Import Input Output tables. The first column reports the total value of imports in the Korean economy for the industry listed, measured in millions of won. The second column reports the share of the imports purchased by the South Korean government.

Table A21: Effect of CIA interventions on US imports in industries with high and low government import shares.

	High government import industries				Low government import industries			
	ln US import share		ln US imports		ln US import share		ln US imports	
	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies	Full sample	Autocracies
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence</i>	0.049** (0.023)	0.103** (0.047)	0.082** (0.033)	0.195*** (0.060)	0.028 (0.023)	0.051 (0.044)	0.038 (0.032)	0.147** (0.057)
Observations	51,947	29,433	51,947	29,433	45,272	23,689	45,272	23,689

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t in a 2-digit SITC industry i , where t ranges from 1962 to 1989. Columns 1-4 include industries with more than the median share of imports purchased by the government in South Korea in 2000. Columns 5-10 include the industries with less than the median share. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, four lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered at the country-year level in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A22: CIA interventions and US outward FDI.

	Full sample			Autocracies only		
	ln (1 + Number of foreign affiliates)	ln (1+ Foreign affiliate sales)	ln (1 + Foreign affiliate employment)	ln (1 + Number of foreign affiliates)	ln (1+ Foreign affiliate sales)	ln (1 + Foreign affiliate employment)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>US influence</i>	-0.016 (0.055)	0.075 (0.128)	0.014 (0.037)	-0.052 (0.090)	-0.002 (0.185)	0.038 (0.066)
Observations	2,490	2,490	2,490	1,704	1,704	1,704

Notes: The unit of observation is a an autocratic country c , in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variables are measures of US FDI. Each is measured as the natural log of one plus its value. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A23: The effect of CIA interventions, controlling for US outward FDI.

	Dependent variable: ln Share of imports from the US					
	Full sample			Autocracies only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>US influence</i>	0.176*** (0.064)	0.175*** (0.064)	0.174*** (0.064)	0.267** (0.109)	0.267** (0.109)	0.265** (0.109)
ln (1 + Number of foreign affiliates)	0.007 (0.009)			0.000 (0.016)		
ln (1 + Foreign affiliate sales)		0.003 (0.004)			0.002 (0.007)	
ln (1 + Foreign affiliate employment)			0.007 (0.007)			0.017 (0.022)
Observations	2,673	2,673	2,673	1,810	1,810	1,810

Notes: The unit of observation is a an autocratic country c , in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. The dependent variable is the natural log of the share of imports that are from the US. The FDI variables are measured as the natural log of one plus their value. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A24: Interventions, tariff changes, and US imports.

	Full sample			Autocracies only		
	Tariff change indicator	ln imports from US	ln US import share	Tariff change indicator	ln imports from US	ln US import share
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>US influence</i>	0.021 (0.033)	0.204*** (0.070)	0.163*** (0.055)	-0.001 (0.034)	0.261*** (0.100)	0.223*** (0.077)
<i>US influence × Post tariff change</i>		-0.080 (0.054)	-0.069* (0.040)		-0.096 (0.084)	-0.066 (0.064)
Observations	2,692	3,679	3,679	1,663	2,276	2,276

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator variable for a preferential trade agreement with the US, and a democracy indicator. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table A25: Timing and the effects of US interventions.

	ln share of imports from the US				ln imports from the US			
	Full sample		Autocracies		Full sample		Autocracies	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>US influence (onset year)</i>	0.187** (0.079)		0.343*** (0.116)		0.170* (0.100)		0.313** (0.159)	
<i>US influence (intermediate year)</i>	0.099** (0.039)		0.160** (0.070)		0.124*** (0.044)		0.169** (0.076)	
<i>US influence (offset year)</i>	0.168*** (0.054)		0.213** (0.089)		0.177*** (0.068)		0.252** (0.099)	
<i>US influence</i>		0.130*** (0.043)		0.166** (0.067)		0.142*** (0.054)		0.183** (0.081)
<i>US influence × intervention year</i>		-0.004 (0.004)		0.000 (0.007)		-0.003 (0.006)		-0.001 (0.009)
<i>US influence × intervention year²</i>		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
F-test for equality of coeff (p-value)	0.16		0.18		0.61		0.43	
Observations	3,951	3,951	2,507	2,507	3,951	3,951	2,507	2,507

Notes: The unit of observation is a country c in year t , where t ranges from 1947 to 1989. All regressions include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, a Soviet intervention control, two lags of the dependent variable, ln per capita income, ln total income, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure, an indicator variable for GATT participation, an indicator for a preferential trade agreement with the US and a democracy indicator variable. Coefficients are reported with Newey-West standard errors in brackets. The odd numbered columns also report the p-value from the F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the three US influence variables are equal. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

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