

# Presidential Patronage and Bureaucratic Development\*

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## Abstract

Presidential patronage occupies a central role in accounts of administrative capacity, state development, and party politics. Yet existing scholarship lacks systematic evidence about presidential administrations and bureaucratic composition in the United States. We address this omission using new individual-level data on the personnel who occupied more than 145,000 positions in the Department of Interior between 1849 and 1905. We document changes in turnover rates across time, presidential administrations, and agencies. Using panel data on the allocation of bureaucratic personnel, we also establish a link between electoral politics and the disbursement of bureaucratic appointments. Finally, we show that civil service reform significantly attenuated the connection between electoral politics and allocation of patronage. Our findings document the role of presidential parties in staffing the federal bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, provide evidence of potential mechanisms through which patronage operated, and suggest how agency characteristics and institutional reforms contributed to the weakening of presidential patronage.

*Note to readers:* This is an extremely rough draft of our ideas and empirics. We are grateful for suggestions!

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The spoils system was a—perhaps *the*—distinctive characteristic of nineteenth-century American politics. The system linked presidents to their parties, connected national parties to state and local party organizations, and provided Congress with informal means of influence over the executive branch (James 2000; Johnson and Libecap 1994; Skowronek 1982). The president stood at the center of this system. Wielding the appointment power, presidents selected copartisan supporters to serve in executive branch positions (James 2000; Johnson and Libecap 1994; Skocpol 1992; Skowronek 1982; White 1954). Through this process, as Carpenter (2001, 40) has argued, “agencies were partisan reflections of the presidential administration in power.” Controversy over patronage was associated with the first impeachment of an American president, the assassination of another president, and persistent calls for reform. The replacement of the spoils system with the merit system was among the most “wrenching and controversial changes” (Carpenter 2001, 5) that had “transformed” the civil service by the turn of the twentieth century (Hoogenboom 1959, 313).

In this paper, we study how presidential politics affected the composition of the federal workforce during the patronage era. Previous research characterizes the patronage system based on snapshots of personnel turnover (e.g., Carpenter 2001; Hoogenboom 1959) and the removal of individuals from Senate-confirmed positions (e.g., James 2006). Yet it is not clear from existing scholarship how turnover rates varied across time or to whom executive branch positions were awarded. Because nineteenth-century patronage was “a quintessentially distributive phenomenon” (Skocpol 1992, 83), understanding the allocation of executive branch positions provides insight into the mechanisms through which the patronage system operated.

We contribute new evidence about the politics of patronage and its decline in the United States. We draw from original data we compiled on employment patterns in the Department of the Interior from its inception in 1849 to 1905, comprising approximately 145,000 position-years. We present three primary findings. First, we document changes across time in personnel size and stability: as overall employment increased across the nineteenth century, turnover rates

decreased. Personnel turnover was higher, however, following changes in presidential administrations, particularly following changes in presidential partisanship.

Second, we establish a robust link between electoral politics and executive branch appointments. Using a panel design with presidential election results and the allocation of executive branch positions across states, we find that a state's electoral support for the presidential administration significantly increased the hiring rates of state residents. Voting for the winning presidential candidate in the electoral college was associated with approximately a ten percent increase in bureaucratic positions. States that provided electoral support to the president are especially advantaged in hiring patterns during periods of divided government. We also find some evidence for the role of congressional politics, as membership on relevant committees is also associated with hiring increases for state residents.

Third, we show that civil service reform severed the relationship between presidential election returns and the allocation of bureaucratic positions. Following the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, state voting patterns had no association with the allocation of executive branch positions to its residents.

Collectively, our findings have several implications for scholarship on bureaucratic politics and interbranch relations. They suggest that the presidency's formal appointment power, rather than informal deference to congressional copartisans, was the mechanism through which the spoils of office were distributed. To the extent that control over personnel was associated with policy administration in the executive branch, our results indicate that the president was the relevant principal for executive branch officials. Consistent with the argument advanced by Whittington and Carpenter (2003), our results also suggest the president's role in accounts of American political development. Finally, our results contribute new evidence about the consequences of civil service reform. Not only might merit protections increase bureaucratic expertise (Gailmard and Patty 2007) and job performance (Lewis 2007), but they may also alter the relationship between electoral politics and the composition of government.

## The Patronage Era

The first century of American government was administered largely by the major political parties. Patronage was central to these arrangements (e.g., Carpenter 2001; Skowronek 1982; Skocpol 1992). According to Skocpol (1992, 75), for instance, “from the Jackson era through the end of the century, parties . . . controlled much of the staffing and functioning of public administration in the United States.” The defects of the spoils system generated calls for reform toward the end of the nineteenth century and precipitated fundamental change in the nature of the administration state (Carpenter 2001; Skowronek 1982).

As head of the executive branch and the agent of their parties, presidents had central roles in the patronage system. According to Johnson and Libecap (1994, 104), for instance, “the President was the key figure in the allocation of patronage,” and this position enabled presidents to wield “broad control over administrative affairs” (Mashaw 2012, 293). This responsibility consumed their official duties. As Bryce (1995 [1888], vol I, 61) remarked, Abraham Lincoln confronted “a rising tide of office-seekers” while James Garfield “was engaged almost incessantly in questions of patronage.” Changes in presidential administrations were thus accompanied by the rotation of party members through executive departments (Carpenter 2001). Based on this state of affairs, Skowronek (1992, 52) characterized the presidency of 1832 to 1900 as a “partisan presidency” in which presidents mostly distributed patronage to party factions to preserve the national coalition.

Comparatively little is known, however, about the organization of the federal bureaucracy during the patronage era. Perhaps even more importantly, less is known about the personnel who worked in the bureaucracy and how patronage considerations were associated with their employment. This omission is striking, as we lack systematic evidence about the role of presidents and Congress in dispensing patronage, the mechanisms through which patronage was awarded, and how the transition to civil service was associated with changes in the selection of personnel. While the institutionalization of adjoining branches of government—namely, Congress (e.g.,

Polsby 1968)—is reasonably well-studied, analogous evidence for the institutional development of the American bureaucracy has yet to be provided.

But the patronage system was not only vital for party organization and maintenance. It also had consequences for the execution of public policy by the federal government. In evaluations of contemporary American government, scholars recognize that hiring allies for executive branch positions increases bureaucratic responsiveness to the principal's (president's) preferences (e.g., Berry and Gersen 2017; Gordon 2011; Moe 1985). Politicization thus provides advantages to presidents by ensuring that bureaucratic outputs are more consistent with their preferences. The patronage system likely held similar benefits for presidents and parties. According to Carpenter (2001, 42), for example, “[w]hether in the postal service, in customs collection, in land allocation, in patent administration, or in agricultural research, politicians aligned with the president could rest assured that federal programs were being implemented according to their party’s view. . . . Republican bureaucrats rewarded Republican loyalists, and Democrat-filled agencies did likewise for reliably Democratic states and localities.” Thus, understanding the nature of the patronage system and the mechanisms through which it operated can provide insight into the character and quality of policy implementation in the nineteenth-century United States.

## **Presidents and the Distribution of Patronage**

We study how presidential politics was reflected in the composition of the federal bureaucracy. We argue that by virtue of the appointment (and removal) powers, patterns of bureaucratic appointments corresponded to presidents’ political goals. These goals centered primarily around electoral and partisan considerations. As agents of their parties, presidents had incentives to reward loyal party members and to satisfy the demands of party leaders. Party bosses were known to be vocal about their dissatisfaction with presidents whose allocation of patronage was unsatisfactory; for example, just several months into his term, party leaders accused Rutherford B. Hayes of “a lack of devotion to the interests of his party” Stoddard (1889, 77) for disallowing

congressional copartisans to dictate appointments in their home districts. Presidents also desired to enhance their electoral standing (and, by extension, their party's). By delivering patronage positions to localities most critical for the president's re-election, presidents can increase their chances of renomination and re-election, and further their party's electoral efforts (see, e.g., James 2000, 2006).

While it is difficult to cleanly separate the relative influences of presidents' partisan and electoral incentives, this account we propose provides a decidedly president-centric pattern of patronage distribution. While this characterization contrasts with research that emphasizes Congress's role in dispensing patronage (e.g., Kernell and McDonald 1999), it is consistent with a variety of accounts that emphasize how appointment power established presidential control of patronage. Bryce (1995 [1888], vol I, 61), for instance, noted that "the president's patronage is, in the hands of a skilful intriguer, an engine of far-spreading potency. By it he can oblige a vast number of persons, can bind their interests to his own, can fill important places with the men of his choice." Similarly, Whittington and Carpenter (2003, 500) argued that presidents' ultimate authority over patronage helped to compensate for some of their institutional weaknesses. Moreover, our account is consistent with the claim from James (2006, 59) that "patronage discipline [was] systematically applied to service the electoral welfare of the president's party," though his argument focuses specifically on the postbellum era which he distinguishes from earlier periods. James (2000, 27) further notes, though, that presidential control over patronage extended well into the 1930s and was used strategically by presidents to advance their policy agendas. However, presidential influence over patronage could have varied across time and executive branch position, as White (1954) notes that presidents regularly cleared and/or named appointments to key positions as early as the antebellum period.

Accounts about the character of the patronage system, however, have generally not been received systematic empirical scrutiny. To date, for instance, most evidence about employment in the nineteenth-century executive branch relies on cross-sectional comparisons and/or highly

aggregated data. For example, Carpenter (2001, 41) describes the replacement of 40,000 postmasters appointed by Republican presidents during Cleveland's administrations with Democratic appointees, and likewise during the Harrison administration. Carpenter (2001, chapter 6) also examines the distribution of employees across counties in the Department of Agriculture in 1905. Neither comparison allows us to infer whether these patterns reflect patronage as opposed to some other mechanism, or would have been observed in other contexts with different political configurations. Other work describes turnover rates or personnel characteristics in individual units of the executive branch, usually at highly aggregated levels and at single snapshots in time (Fowler 1943; Hoogenboom 1959, 1961; White 1958). Several studies examine the distribution of post offices (Rogowski 2015, 2016) and postal routes (Kernell and McDonald 1999) across states and counties, but while they note the implications the data for patronage they do not directly evaluate how patronage positions were dispensed or to whom. In perhaps the most extensive investigation of patterns of patronage, James (2006) reports evidence from Senate-confirmed presidential appointments between 1829 and 1917. Yet the data exclude positions that did not require Senate confirmation and do not provide information about the mechanism through which patronage may have been extended. Thus the available evidence provides an incomplete portrait of the nature and operation of the patronage system in nineteenth-century executive branch politics.

We contribute to this literature by performing the most comprehensive empirical investigation to date of executive branch personnel in the nineteenth century. We evaluate claims about the nature of the patronage system by describing rates of personnel turnover across various classes of employees and bureaucratic units. We further investigate the mechanisms that structured the allocation of executive branch positions. Finally, we examine how changes to the personnel system affected executive branch personnel.

Though our focus is on the nineteenth-century United States, we contribute to scholarship on patronage and bureaucracies across a range of other contexts. For example, Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso (2020) study the effect of political connections on public sector employment in con-

temporary Brazil and report evidence of patronage allocated through local parties. In this work, campaign donors and candidates for office were significantly more likely to receive government employment when their party wins control of local government, particularly for positions without competitive examination requirements. Studying Ghana, Brierly (2021) shows that bureaucrats are more likely to hire copartisans to serve in low-skilled positions but rely on meritocratic criteria for high-skilled positions. And in Indonesia, Pierskalla and Sacks (2020) show that increased party competition leads to higher rates of election-year patronage hiring. Each of these studies documents the role of political connections and electoral competition on governmental employment. Our research contributes to this research by studying the relationship between presidential politics on executive branch personnel in the historical United States.

## **Civil Service and the Decline of Presidential Patronage**

Textbook accounts of bureaucratic development emphasize the importance of the Pendleton Act. Passed in 1883, the Act insulated a share of executive branch positions from patronage considerations.<sup>1</sup> The Act created the Civil Service Commission, which made determinations about which positions were subject to civil service protections. The Commission was also responsible for designing and implementing competitive examinations for appointments to those positions. According to Theriault (2003, 52), “[t]hese exams replaced loyalty with merit as the medium of exchange in securing political appointments.” The Act also classified positions based in Washington, D.C. and in certain post offices and customs houses. Finally, the Act permitted the president to extend protections to positions not originally designated by the Act.

Civil service reform had far-reaching implications that extended beyond the hiring practices for individual positions. According to Van Riper (1958, 111-112), for instance, the Act “laid the foundation for the development of that technical expertise so crucial to the operation of the mod-

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<sup>1</sup>For extended discussion of the Pendleton Act, its origins, and provisions, see, e.g., Hoogenboom (1961, chapter 13) and Van Riper (1958, chapter 5).



ern state.” As an act of Congress, Van Riper (1958, 113) wrote, it was a monumental accomplishment as “[t]he first positive reform legislation with long-range implications, upon which the American electorate and its representatives could agree after the issue of slavery was settled.” Skowronek (1982, 67) went further, arguing that the Pendleton Act “amounted to nothing less than [a] recasting of the foundations of national institutional power.” The reasons for these claims lay largely in the severing of politics from executive branch appointments. Before 1883, Hoogenboom (1959, 301) wrote, “the spoils system largely prevailed, with politicians dictating appointments.” But with the adoption of Pendleton, civil service reform led to “political neutrality in the distribution of public office” (Van Riper 1958, 111).

Despite the importance of the Pendleton Act in accounts of the demise of the spoils system, relatively little evidence provides systematic support for claims about its impact. Yet some cross-sectional comparisons are suggestive. For example, Hoogenboom (1959) noted the varied occupational backgrounds of individuals who worked in the Treasurer’s Office in 1867. Because their diverse backgrounds were mostly unassociated with the substantive work performed in the Treasurer’s Office, he concluded that they “could anticipate early dismissal” (Hoogenboom 1959, 301). The clear implication was that these short-term positions were granted for partisan purposes rather than skill or expertise. Two decades after passage of the Pendleton Act, by comparison, Carpenter (2001, chapter 6) analyzed the geographic distribution of positions in the Department of Agriculture across counties, and found relatively little evidence that political connections were associated with the number of positions. Based on these findings, Carpenter (2001, 198) concluded that the Department had “solidified the scientific outlook” in its hiring practices. Reflecting on successive presidents’ use of the Pendleton Act to extend the positions covered by civil service protections, Gailmard and Patty (2013, 104) argue that the Act “simultaneously lightened the burdens of the president in terms of congressional demands for patronage and enlarged the direct scope of presidential control of the federal services.” While recent work evaluates whether the nature of bureaucratic selection affects personnel performance in the contemporary era (Lewis

2007), however, we lack larger scale evidence about whether and how the Pendleton Act affected executive branch patronage.

We test the hypothesis that presidential control over patronage weakened following the Pendleton Act. The accounts above lead us to expect that the association between presidential politics and bureaucratic positions attenuated after the Pendleton Act. However, it is not clear that the Pendleton Act had the kind of immediate transformation some accounts suggest. For example, only eleven percent of federal workforce was under civil service protections in 1883; and those this increased to 46 percent by 1900 (Hoogenboom 1959, 303), its provisions applied gradually rather than suddenly. Because of this, “agencies hired applicants based on ‘presidential recommendations,’ congressional advice, and geographic apportionment for decades after the Pendleton Act” Carpenter (2001, 47). Gailmard and Patty (2013, 98) present a relatively circumspect conclusion about the effects of the Pendleton Act, arguing that “the act did little to abrogate direct responsiveness of federal employment to presidential election outcomes.” And investigating a context quite different from the Gilded Age U.S., Dahlström and Holmgren (2019) shows that partisan politics can continue to shape the composition of agency personnel even in systems that are intended to insulate bureaucratic expertise from political control. These accounts suggest that the Pendleton Act may have little if any effect on materially altering the relationship between state electoral politics and executive branch positions. Arbitrating between the competing hypotheses discussed in previous research is an important task for characterizing the effect of civil service reform on executive branch personnel.

## **Data**

We evaluate the politics of personnel using data we collected from the *Official Register of the United States*. The *Official Register* was published biennially beginning in 1817 and contained the names of all civilian and military personnel working in the federal government at the time


of publication. Entries included each individual's place of birth and residence at the time of appointment, the location of their government employment, title, and salary.

We collected these data for the Department of Interior from its beginning 1849 to 1905. The Department of Interior was created on the last day of the 30th Congress and consolidated the Patent Office, the Indian Affairs Office, and the military pension offices from other departments. Its jurisdiction was later expanded to include managing federal public and mental health facilities, regulating territorial governance, surveying the west, and administering the census. During the period under study, the bureaus and agencies housed in Interior included the Pension Office, General Land Office, Patent Office, Geological Survey, Bureau of Education, Census, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Public Buildings. Given its wide range of responsibilities across domestic issues, Interior earned the moniker "The Department of Everything Else." While the Department of Interior was but a single Cabinet-level department, the breadth of issues addressed by Interior suggests the ability to generalize across a range of domains. Moreover, the entities housed within it varied in their political character. For instance, while the Pension Office appeared to be suffused with politics (Skocpol 1992), the Patent Office was regarded as fair and impartial due to the technical complexity of its subject matter and the training of its examiners (Gailmard and Patty 2013; Gordon 2016; Usselman and John 2006).

Figure 1 displays the aggregate growth in the Department of Interior for the first seven decades of its history. Between 1849 and 1905, the Department grew by a factor of 20, from 504 employees to more than 10,000. Using the number of pages in the *Official Register* as a rough guide, growth in the Department of Interior was similar to growth in the Departments of War and the Navy. The number of pages dedicated to personnel listings was about seven times larger for each of these departments in 1905 relative to 1849. In comparison, Interior grew at a much greater rate compared to the State and Treasury departments, for whom 1.25-2 times as many pages appeared in the 1905 *Official Register* compared to 1849.

Figure 2 shows how employment patterns varied across units within the Department of In-

**Figure 1:** Department of Interior Employees, 1849–1905




terior. The steepest increase in personnel occurred with the Office of Indian Affairs. Between 1875 and 1881, its number of employees nearly tripled, and then doubled again by 1901. Staffing in Pension Office increased sharply during the 1880s and more than doubled over the course of the decade before plateauing for the remaining period in our time series. This increase coincided with the rise in Civil War pension recipients (Skocpol 1992). Personnel increases occurred more gradually and incrementally in the Land and Patent Offices and the U.S. Geological Survey. The number of personnel in the Office of Education was consistently low since its creation. As one might expect, the number of personnel in the Census Office was highly variable, peaking in years corresponding to the decennial Census and falling in the intervening years. Notably, however, its personnel increased substantially for each successive census administration in this time period.

### **Employment and Turnover, 1849–1905**

Using the data described above, we evaluate patterns of personnel turnover within the Department of Interior. Turnout rates are a key component of claims about the nature of patronage.

**Figure 2:** Employment within the Department of Interior, 1849–1905



If patronage resulted in the replacement of incumbent officeholders with new officeholders following changes in presidential administrations, we would expect to observe several patterns. First, we would expect to observe greater turnover between presidential administrations than we do within presidential administrations. Since we have biennial data, this leads us to hypothesize that we observe greater turnover in, for example, 1853 and 1857 (the first years of the Pierce and Buchanan presidencies) than we observe in 1855 and 1859 (the third years of the same administrations). Second, we would expect to observe greater turnover in years following a change in presidential party compared to other years.

We examine the evidence for these hypotheses by calculating biennial turnover rates. Specifically, we calculate the percentage of individuals in year  $t-2$  who were also employed in year  $t$ , and subtract this quantity from 1. This follows calculations of personnel stability used in other contexts (e.g., Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). Using this calculation, larger values indicate years in which the composition of current personnel is increasingly different from the previous year in the data. For instance, if 20 percent of the individuals employed in 1873 were also employed in

1875, the turnover rate for 1875 will have been 80 percent—indicating that a large share of individuals that were previously employed were no longer employed. We identify individuals across years by matching their first and last names and the states in which they were born.

Figure 3 displays the turnover rates for the years in our data. Since turnover rates are calculated based on employment in the previous biennium, the first year for which a rate can be calculated is 1851. The shaded regions correspond to different presidential administrations and are placed to distinguish between turnover rates on either side of a presidential transition. For example, the turnover rate was approximately 45 percent in 1851 (during the third year of the Taylor/Fillmore presidency) but was approximately 77 percent in 1853 (the first year of the Pierce presidency).

Several patterns are clear from Figure 3. First, overall, turnover rates appear fairly high. Biennial turnover rates exceeded 30 percent in every year in the data and were often higher than 50 percent.<sup>2</sup> Second, turnover rates and their variation reduced across time. In the early years in the period, turnover could exceed 80 percent in one year and then drop by 30 percentage points in the next. By the end of the time period, turnover rates more regularly hovered around 40 percent and generally (though not always) fluctuated by ten percentage points or fewer from one biennium to the next.


Third, we find little systematic evidence that turnover rates were substantially higher following changes in presidential administrations than within administrations. The average turnover rate was 52 percent following changes in administrations and 51 percent following midterm election years. Turnover rates following presidential elections were modestly higher (54 percent) when they produced a change in partisan control of the White House. We want to be appropriately circumspect in our interpretations of these patterns given the small sample of years in our data ( $n = 28$ ). Nevertheless, our data suggest that personnel changes were rather constant

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<sup>2</sup>For context, the annual turnover rate for federal employment in 2019 (16.5 percent; see <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.t16.htm>) extrapolated to a biennium is approximately 30 percent.

across the nineteenth century but did not appear to spike dramatically during transitions between presidential administrations.


**Figure 3:** Employment Turnover in the Department of Interior, 1851–1905



As Figure 4 shows, however, we do find more marked differences in turnover rates when comparing employees of different wage levels. To avoid making fine-grained comparisons in earnings across time, we instead distinguish employees with fixed salaries to those whose earnings were pegged to daily, weekly, or monthly work. This distinction roughly classifies individuals from clerical and administrative work from individuals who worked in the trades, on police forces, or as teachers. Interestingly, the figure shows that the declining turnover rates shown about are driven by reduced turnover among individuals working in salaried positions, among whom turnover reduced steadily from the 1860s to the turn of the twentieth century. Among non-salaried personnel, however, turnover rates remained consistently high—generally above 50 percent—across most of the time period. To the extent that wage structure reflects differences in skill, these results are broadly consistent with research in other contexts on bureaucratic structure and personnel turnover and shows that high-skilled bureaucrats enjoy greater employment

stability (Iyer and Mani 2012). At the aggregate level, they also show evidence of increasing institutionalization among clerical and administrative personnel across time.

**Figure 4:** Turnover by Employee Compensation, 1849–1905



The data above provide some evidence about variation in turnover rates across positions and time in the Department of Interior. They suggest that Department personnel tended to serve for relatively short periods of time and that the Department experienced substantial turnover quite frequently. By the beginning of the patronage era, however, turnover had reduced dramatically, particularly among individuals who exercised discretion in policy-making capacities. Overall, our results provide evidence about the institutional development of the Department of Interior throughout the nineteenth century.

## Presidential Patronage and Executive Branch Employment

We use the data described above to study the relationship between presidential politics and executive branch employment. We model the allocation of bureaucratic positions as a kind of dis-



tributive good, as patronage was “a quintessentially distributive phenomenon ... [and] the meat and potatoes of nineteenth-century politics” (Skocpol 1992, 83). To do so, we recorded information from the *Official Register* on the state of residence at the time of appointment for the Interior Department personnel in our data. These details were recorded beginning in 1851.

Figure 5 below shows the number of positions awarded to residents of each state between 1851 and 1905. The data reveal considerable variation in state appointments both between states and across time. As the varying ranges of the *y*-axes indicates, the largest number of positions was allocated to residents of western states. This reflects the Department’s role in expanding the reach of the federal government through the American west. Even among states in the east, employment rates changed across time and not in a consistent way. For example, the allocation of positions to residents of Southern states tended to decline substantially with the Civil War and remained low for several decades afterward (see, e.g., Arkansas, Florida, and Texas). In other states, employment numbers steadily increased over time before declining near the end of the nineteenth century (see, e.g., New Hampshire and New York). And in still others, the number of positions fluctuated with some regularity (see, e.g., Iowa and Michigan). We use this state-level variation in employment patterns to examine how presidential politics is reflected in administrative governance.

## Empirical Strategy


We leverage the panel nature of the data described in Figure 5 to estimate the degree to which bureaucratic appointments were responsive to a state’s political alignment with the presidential administration. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$\ln(\text{patents} + 1)_{it} = \beta_0 + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta_1 \text{Electoral support}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is the number of appointments filled by residents of state  $i$  in year  $t$ . Because the distribution of this variable is right-skewed, we use the natural log of the number of positions (plus one). The main explanatory variable characterizes a state’s electoral support for the current presidential administration. We use two measures to study this relationship. In the first, we use the share of a state’s popular votes cast for the incumbent president. For example, for the year 1855, we use the proportion of votes cast in the state for the Democratic presidential nominee (Franklin Pierce) in the 1852 election. In the second, we use an indicator for whether the current president received (a majority of) the state’s votes in the Electoral College. To continue the example from 1855, states whose electors supported the losing candidate, Winfield Scott, are coded as zeroes (Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Vermont) while the states that supported Pierce (all others) are coded as ones. These two measures provide complementary strategies for evaluating the relationship between a state’s support for the president and the bureaucratic positions distributed to its residents. While the former characterizes greater variation in a state’s political relationship with the presidential administration, popular vote totals were not reported for all states and years in the time frame under study. It is also unclear whether the allocation of (logged) bureaucratic positions would be expected to be linear in the state’s support for the president. The binary indicator thus allows us to address issues of missing data while relaxing assumptions about functional form.

Given the specification above, the coefficient for  $\beta_1$  is the key parameter of interest. If the distribution of bureaucratic personnel to states is responsive to states’ support for the presidential

**Figure 5: Bureaucratic Appointments by State, 1851–1905**



Figures show the biennial number of bureaucratic appointments to residents of each state.

administration, we expect to observe a positive coefficient estimate for  $\beta_1$ . We include state fixed effects ( $\alpha_i$ ) to control for observed and unobserved time-invariant attributes that may affect the allocation of positions across states. For instance, states may vary on average in the number of positions they receive based on their political histories, geographic locations, and physical features. We also include time fixed effects ( $\delta_t$ ) to account for secular trends in bureaucratic personnel across time. As we describe below, we also estimate additional models that control for state population and include state-specific time trends. Finally,  $\beta_0$  is a constant term and  $\epsilon_{it}$  is a random error term, which we cluster on state.

Using equation (1), the coefficient of interest is identified with within-state variation in a state's political alignment with the current presidential administration. Within-state changes in the values of this variable are driven by two sources of variation. In the first, state preferences change, in which a state that did not formerly vote for a presidential candidate then did so when the winning candidate sought re-election. For instance, in the 1868 election, New York supported Horatio Seymour over Ulysses Grant, but then supported Grant's re-election bid in 1872. Analogous logic applies to a state's changing partisanship, such that the state begins supporting Republican or Democratic candidates when it used to support candidates from the other party. For example, Pennsylvania supported primarily Democratic presidential candidates in the antebellum period before voting consistently Republican after the war. In the second, the partisan identity of the presidential administration changes, inducing changes in a state's alignment with the party of the presidential administration currently in office. There were six such changes (out of the 14 elections held) during the period under study.

As we describe below, we also estimate additional models that include state-specific linear and quadratic trends. The key identifying assumption (i.e., parallel trends) in our analysis is that absent changes in support for the current president, the allocation of bureaucratic appointments in states that supported the current presidential administration would have followed the same trends as those in states that did not support the current presidential administration. These addi-

tional specifications reduce our reliance on the parallel trends assumption and help address the possibility that changes in a state’s political alignment with the president is correlated with other trends in a state’s representation in the federal bureaucracy.

## Results

Table 1 reports the results of the regression models described above. Column (1) displays the results of a bivariate regression of patents on the president’s popular vote share, along with state and year fixed effects. The coefficient estimate for  $\beta_1$  is positive and statistically significant, indicating that states received increased numbers of bureaucratic appointments as they supported the current presidential administration at higher rates. The magnitude of the estimate indicates that a ten percentage point increase in support for the presidential administration is associated with a eight percent increase in bureaucratic positions awarded to residents of that state. Columns (2) through (4) report similar patterns from other model specifications. In column (2), we control for state population (linearly interpolated for intercensal years). Column (3) includes state-specific linear trends and column (4) includes state-specific quadratic trends. We obtain positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for the president’s popular vote share across each model. These results provide evidence of a link between the president’s geographic bases of electoral support and the representation of those regions in the executive branch.

Columns (5) through (8) report the results from models using the indicator for whether the president received a state’s electoral votes. The findings are substantively similar. In each model, the coefficient for the president’s electoral success is positive and statistically significant. Exponentiating the coefficients, states that supported the president in the Electoral College are estimated to receive 17 to 19 percent more bureaucratic positions relative to states that did not support the president.

The results reported above are robust to several additional analyses. First, we studied whether

**Table 1: State Electoral Support and Bureaucratic Appointments**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	log(1 + number of positions)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presidential vote share	0.775* (0.173)	0.767* (0.168)	0.698* (0.153)	0.614* (0.118)				
President won state					0.178* (0.048)	0.176* (0.048)	0.152* (0.045)	0.154* (0.035)
log(1 + population)		-0.044 (0.142)	0.166 (0.245)	1.458* (0.430)		-0.065 (0.137)	0.196 (0.246)	1.658* (0.419)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State trends			Linear	Quadratic			Linear	Quadratic
Observations	981	981	981	981	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

our findings related to presidential electoral support were concentrated among electorally vulnerable states or states where the president performed exceptionally well. The distinction has implications for evaluating the connection between state political parties and federal jobs. If competitive states were disproportionate recipients of federal positions, this suggests the positions may be used to repay parties or individuals for their support. Yet if positions were concentrated among residents of states the president won handily, this suggest that they may have been used to repay party bosses for providing for the president’s nomination. We evaluated these possibilities, following Kriner and Reeves (2015) by creating indicators to distinguish *Core* and *Swing* states. *Core* states supported the president with at least 55 percent of the popular vote while *Swing* states awarded the president between 45 and 55 percent of the vote. Hostile states who opposed the president at greater levels are the omitted category. Thus, the coefficients for *Core* and *Swing* states characterize the increased number of positions allocated relative to states in which the

president fared poorly. The results are shown in Table A.1. We find that both *Core* and *Swing* states benefited, relative to hostile states, from their alignment with the president. However, the magnitude is consistently larger for *Core* states. The most conservative estimates from model (5) suggest that core states receive 29 percent more bureaucratic positions than hostile states while swing states receive 15 percent more positions than hostile states.

Second, we also studied how our results are sensitive to two particular classes of bureaucratic employees: field agents and clerks. We omitted field agents and focused on individuals who worked in positions based in Washington, D.C. Most field agents served in the West and these positions may have been more likely to be filled by individuals living in those regions. As Carpenter (2001, 42-43) wrote, “[f]ield appointments in federal agencies were controlled by party notables and civic elites with strong ties to local interests. . . . This practice [dots] and was nowhere better entrenched than in the Interior Department.” We also omitted individuals who worked as Clerks.<sup>3</sup> White (1954, 398) noted that the power to appoint inferior officers such as clerks was typically exercised by departments rather than by the president and reported that clerkships were typically apportioned to each state beginning in 1853. Therefore, we excluded appointments to these positions. In both analyses, we continue to find strong evidence for the role of presidential politics. In fact, when omitting field officers and, alternatively, clerks, the results show that state electoral performance is an even stronger predictor of a state’s representation in the federal bureaucracy. (These results are shown in Table A.2 and A.3, respectively.)

Third, we estimated additional models that disaggregated Department employment across its main constituent units. Using the offices of Public Buildings, the Census, Education, the Indian Commissioner, Indian Affairs, General Land, Patent, Pension, Rail, the Secretary, and the Territories, we used the office-state-year as the unit of analysis. In this specification,  $\beta_3$  is estimated using within-office variation in a state’s employment as a function of the state’s changing alignment with the presidential administration. These results are reported in Table ?? and are

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<sup>3</sup>This includes individuals with the following titles: Clerk, Assistant Clerk, Temporary Clerk, and Issue Clerk.

consistent with those above.

## Presidents, Congress, and Patronage

While the models in Table 1 provide relatively strong and consistent evidence of a link between electoral politics and bureaucratic appointments, the models are specified relatively sparsely. Perhaps most importantly, they omit covariates for factors within Congress that may also contribute to bureaucratic appointments and could confound the relationship between the president's electoral standing and the distribution of bureaucratic positions. We perform two additional sets of analyses. In first, we account for characteristics of Congress that may serve as potential confounders; in the second, we evaluate the evidence for interpreting the results shown above as a consequence of *presidential* rather than *congressional* politics.

We estimate a series of models that account for other factors within Congress that could be associated with a state's representation in bureaucratic positions. We include two measures to account for the partisanship of a state's House delegation. We calculated the share of each state's House seats that was affiliated with the chamber majority party. Larger values of *Share majority party* indicate that a state's House delegation was more strongly aligned with the party that controlled the chamber. Similarly, we calculated the share of each state's House delegation that was a member of the president's party, where larger values of *Share president's party* indicate that a greater proportion of the state's legislators were copartisans of the president. Both, either, or neither of these factors may be associated with the representation of a state's residents in the bureaucracy. We account for ideological alignment based on the ideological distance between the median legislator in the state's delegation and the floor median. *Delegation distance from median* accounts for the possibility that patronage is allocated based on the ideological alignment between representatives from a state and the pivotal member of Congress. Finally, we account for committee membership with an indicator for whether a state had at least one member serving



on a committee relevant for the Department of Interior.<sup>4</sup> If committee membership is associated with greater patronage, we expect the coefficient for *Relevant committee* to be positive.

Table 2 shows the results. The first three columns show results for the continuous measure of presidential vote share and the last three columns show results for the binary measure of Electoral College support. Two main findings emerge. First, even when accounting for congressional characteristics, we continue to find evidence of a link between presidential politics and executive branch positions. The coefficients for both measures of presidential electoral support are positive and statistically significant, and they are similar in magnitude to the substantive results in Table 1. A ten percentage point increase in electoral support for the president is estimated to increase a state's appointments to the bureaucracy by five to eight percent. Likewise, supporting the president in the Electoral College increases a state's bureaucratic appointments by 12 to 15 percent.

Second, we find rather limited evidence that powerful or well-positioned state delegations in Congress receive larger shares of bureaucratic positions. We find no evidence that states with greater representation in the House majority party receive increased bureaucratic representation. In fact, the coefficients for *Share majority party* are consistently negative and sometimes statistically significant. However, the coefficients for *Share president's party* are consistently positive, and are statistically significant in the models that use the Electoral College-based measure of state presidential support. Not only do states with increased shares of representatives in the House majority party do not receive increased numbers of bureaucratic positions, but they may do so instead based on their alignment with the president's party. We find no evidence, however, that ideological distance from the floor median is associated with a state's bureaucratic positions, nor do we find that membership on relevant committees is associated with the distribution of executive branch personnel. On the whole, therefore, Table 2 reinforces the interpretation of our

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<sup>4</sup>We considered the following committees as having relevance for the Department: Expenditures, Interior Department; Indian Affairs; District of Columbia; Territories; Pensions; Patents; Ways and Means; and Census. Overall, 77 percent of state-year observations had at least one member serving on one or more of these committees.

findings as reflecting the nature of presidential politics and provides little evidence that legislative characteristics are associated with the bureaucratic positions awarded to a state's residents.

**Table 2:** Interbranch Relations, State Electoral Support, and Bureaucratic Appointments

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	log(1 + number of positions)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Presidential vote share	0.739* (0.163)	0.677* (0.185)	0.530* (0.156)			
President won state				0.140* (0.051)	0.124* (0.051)	0.115* (0.037)
log(1 + population)	-0.060 (0.144)	0.046 (0.248)	1.446* (0.428)	-0.072 (0.137)	0.081 (0.250)	1.622* (0.404)
Share majority party	-0.197* (0.075)	-0.190* (0.076)	-0.046 (0.067)	-0.138 (0.071)	-0.144 (0.072)	-0.021 (0.065)
Share president's party	0.093 (0.055)	0.085 (0.045)	0.053 (0.044)	0.134* (0.062)	0.125* (0.046)	0.081* (0.038)
Delegation distance from median	-0.091 (0.128)	-0.047 (0.109)	-0.048 (0.102)	0.017 (0.124)	0.052 (0.105)	-0.002 (0.099)
Relevant committee	-0.010 (0.053)	0.016 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.034)	-0.0003 (0.046)	0.033 (0.035)	0.017 (0.032)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State trends		Linear	Quadratic		Linear	Quadratic
Observations	980	980	980	1,007	1,007	1,007

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

## Agency Characteristics and Presidential Patronage

Because the Department of Interior was organized into separate agencies, bureaus, offices, and other units, we explore how the patterns documented in Table 1 varied across them. For the purposes of this analysis, we focus on the four largest units (by employment) within the Department: the General Land Office ( $n=13,947$ ), Office of Indian Affairs (57,169), Patent Office (10,680), and Pension Office (26,163). Altogether, these four offices comprised approximately 70 percent of Department positions during the period under study.

Previous scholarship generally recognizes the possibility for patronage considerations to dominate personnel decisions within each of these offices. According to White (1958, 223), for instance, “[d]espite the technical nature of the Patent Office operations, its overhead was politically appointed and politically responsible . . . political preference was the usual basis of choice.” Similar considerations may have dominated personnel decisions in the General Land Office, where Lanza (1990, 30) concluded that “[t]he most important criterion for holding office [in the land office] was loyalty to the administration in power.” Likewise, in the Pension Office, the Commissioner “hired mostly Republican clerks. . . the Pension Office remained a Republican political machine used to secure the veteran vote throughout the patronage era” (Eli 2015, 454). Yet not all accounts argue that political loyalties were the dominant or the only considerations that affected employment patterns. Referencing the Office of Indian Affairs, for instance, Rockwell (2010, 255) concluded that “Indian policy and administration were not disrupted by patronage . . . it is abundantly clear that personnel at all levels were routinely chosen for their knowledge and experience in local circumstances and for their familiarity with specific Indian situations.”

Lacking a fully comparative historical or theoretical account of Interior offices, we empirically distinguish the relationship between presidential politics and employment patterns across the four offices. We estimated separate regressions for each of them. The results are shown in Table 3, where we include state and year fixed effects, control for state population, and use both our Electoral College and popular vote based measures of state electoral support for the sitting

presidential administration. We find the most consistent evidence of presidential patronage for employment within the Pension Office and the General Land Office, for whom both measures are accompanied by statistically significant coefficients. Supporting the president in the Electoral College was associated with about a 17 percent increase in bureaucratic positions in both offices. While the coefficients for *President won state* are also positive for the Patent Office and the Office of Indian Affairs, they are both smaller in magnitude and neither is statistically significant.

Three of the four coefficients are positive and statistically significant when using the popular vote-based measure of state electoral support. A ten percentage point increase in support for the presidential administration is estimated to produce a six, eight, and five percent increase in positions for a state's residents in the Pension Office, Office of Indian Affairs, and General Land Office, respectively. While the coefficient estimate for the Patent Office is again positive, it is not statistically significant.

**Table 3:** State Electoral Support and Bureaucratic Appointments by Agency

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	log(1 + number of positions)							
	Patent Office		Pension Office		Indian Affairs		Land Office	
Popular vote share	0.269 (0.137)		0.581* (0.173)		0.780* (0.250)		0.484* (0.163)	
Incumbent won state		0.057 (0.032)		0.159* (0.042)		0.107 (0.069)		0.163* (0.037)
log(1 + population)	0.233 (0.179)	0.232 (0.168)	0.382 (0.206)	0.372 (0.207)	0.116 (0.191)	0.108 (0.184)	0.134 (0.131)	0.131 (0.129)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	797	815	941	973	811	832	917	947

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments to individuals born in each state.  
\*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

On the whole, our findings suggest that patronage was an important contributor to employment patterns in most of the major units in the Department of Interior. Across the General Land Office, Office of Indian Affairs, and the Pension Office, we found reasonably strong evidence that employment patterns for residents of a given state varied with that state's presidential election voting patterns. These findings are consistent with the use of presidential patronage to staff these Offices, though the magnitudes of the associations varied somewhat across offices and characterizations of state electoral support.

We found the weakest evidence for patronage in the Patent Office. While these patterns could reflect lack of statistical power, they could also be consistent with accounts that emphasize the technically complex nature of positions within the Patent Office. As Gordon (2016, 313) wrote, "The patent office was fair, respected, impartial, and not subject to bribes and corruption." Perhaps as a result, Congress "consistently deferred to the commissioner of patents due at least in part of the technical complexity of patent law" (Gailmard and Patty 2013, 612). These patterns of deference led Usselman and John (2006, 98) to conclude that the office "wielded an impressive degree of bureaucratic autonomy." We do not wish to push these conclusions too far, however, as our analysis does not distinguish various positions within the Patent Office, which could differ in the technical expertise required to performed the Office's core tasks.

## **Civil Service Reform and the Decline of Presidential Patronage**

In a final set of analyses, we study how civil service reform affected the relationship between state electoral support for the presidential administration and the allocation of bureaucratic positions. To do so, we estimate models similar to those reported above but we distinguish the period before the Pendleton Act was passed to the post-Pendleton period. Therefore, we estimated models for the 1851 to 1883 period in our data as well as for the 1885 to 1905 period. If civil service reform reduced the allocation of presidentially-based patronage, we would expect the coefficients for  $\beta_1$  to be larger in magnitude for the earlier period in the data.

Table 4 shows results for the popular vote based measure of presidential patronage. For the periods before and after the Act was passed, we estimated three models: the first contains the measures of state electoral support and state population in addition to state and year fixed effects. The second model includes state-specific linear time trends and the third includes state-specific quadratic time trends.

Prior to the passage of Pendleton, as the left three models show, state electoral support was a strong predictor of bureaucratic employment. The coefficients vary in magnitude across the three models, but they are all positive and statistically significant. A ten percentage point increase in state popular vote share is associated with a seven to eighteen percent increase in a state's bureaucratic appointments. As the right three models show, however, we find *no* evidence that presidential vote share was associated with bureaucratic appointments after the passage of Pendleton. The coefficients are all considerably smaller in magnitude, and two of them are essentially zero.

**Table 4:** Civil Service Reform and Presidential Patronage (popular vote measure)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	log(1 + number of positions)					
	Before Pendleton			After Pendleton		
Presidential vote share	1.622*	0.762*	0.641*	0.132	0.009	0.007
	(0.284)	(0.214)	(0.178)	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.079)
log(1+population	-0.051	1.044*	2.815*	0.405	0.131	-0.521
	(0.170)	(0.433)	(1.007)	(0.204)	(0.389)	(1.405)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
State trends		Linear	Quadratic		Linear	Quadratic
Observations	533	533	533	448	448	448

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

We find similar results when using the Electoral College measure of state support for the presidential administration, as Table 5 shows. Prior to the passage of the Pendleton Act, the models generally indicate that states that supported the president received an increase in bureaucratic positions of 12 to 33 percent. (However, we note that the coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from zero for the model that contains linear trends.) In the years following the passage of Pendleton, however, we find no evidence that a state's voting patterns were associated with its bureaucratic appointments. Each of the coefficients is smaller in magnitude and close to zero, and none are statistically significant.

**Table 5:** Civil Service Reform and Presidential Patronage (Electoral College measure)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
log(1 + number of positions)						
	Before Pendleton			After Pendleton		
President won state	0.284* (0.088)	0.111 (0.073)	0.148* (0.066)	0.028 (0.041)	0.008 (0.018)	0.018 (0.020)
log(1+population)	-0.095 (0.183)	1.231* (0.423)	2.690* (1.025)	0.379 (0.214)	0.066 (0.354)	-0.549 (1.406)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
State trends		Linear	Quadratic		Linear	Quadratic
Observations	548	548	548	460	460	460

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

The results in Tables 4 and pendleton1 provide new evidence about the potential consequences of the Pendleton Act. Across several characterizations of state voting patterns and model specifications, we find that the relationship between presidential politics and the allocation of bureaucratic positions significantly attenuated upon the passage of civil service reform in 1883. Moreover, the results of our models suggest that the relationship between voting patterns in pres-

idential elections and bureaucratic appointments was approximately *zero* following the adoption of Pendleton. We do not wish to overinterpret these findings, for several reasons. State and national politics likely differed on either side of the Pendleton Act and these differences could potentially confound our interpretation of the differences in coefficients. Moreover, changing relationships between presidential voting patterns and executive branch employment does not necessarily indicate that patronage was no longer a factor after the passage of Pendleton. Instead, it could have manifest in different ways; as its passage was made possible through the support of some party elites, upon its implementation a different set of political figures could have been more pivotal for allocating patronage. Finally, the Patronage Act applied initially to a relatively small set of executive branch employees. Though successive presidents extended its coverage to larger shares of employees, the results presented above provide rather coarse estimates of the effects of Pendleton upon its passage. Nevertheless, the findings are strongly suggestive of the effect of the Pendleton Act on presidential patronage and provide additional context for interpreting the findings in Table 1 as an indicator of the president's role in dispensing patronage appointments.

## **Conclusion**

We have sought to provide a systematic accounting of bureaucratic personnel during the nineteenth century. In doing so, we have focused on the Department of Interior, which stands out during this time period for its focus on domestic affairs. Using data on employment patterns in the Department between 1849 and 1905, we have investigated a series of claims about the spoils system, the president's role in administering it, and the consequences of civil service reform for its persistence. We contribute new descriptive evidence about the institutionalization of the federal bureaucracy across time and suggest how the president's role in administering patronage varied across time and bureaucratic units.

Our data and findings raise a number of questions for future research to address. First, future



work could more finely distinguish bureaucratic personnel by position and compensation level. This could provide better clearer evidence about how patronage varied across the bureaucratic hierarchy and across time. Second, our work does not evaluate the backgrounds of individual bureaucrats. Given opportunities to link personnel to Census data and other political-biographical data, this could shed new light on the characteristics of the individuals working in the federal government. Third, it remains to be seen how patterns of patronage for the Department of Interior compare to other cabinet-level departments. It would be instructive to compare these patterns to those for other units who vary in their responsibilities. Fourth, and finally, additional work would be useful for examining the consequences of patronage for other outcomes of interest. For instance, how does patronage generate tradeoffs with the quality of bureaucratic administration? Likewise, how does the allocation of patronage affect outcomes within the separation of powers? Many of the accounts described above suggest its utility for presidents in affecting legislative support for the president's policy agenda; this question, among many others, is ripe for future research. We seek to address these possibilities in our future work.

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## ***ONLINE APPENDIX***

Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses for  
*Presidential Patronage and Bureaucratic Development*

**Table A.1:** State Competitiveness, Electoral Support, and Bureaucratic Appointments

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	log(1 + number of positions)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Core state	0.334* (0.068)	0.333* (0.067)	0.360* (0.061)	0.306* (0.057)	0.254* (0.046)
Swing state	0.254* (0.050)	0.255* (0.050)	0.269* (0.049)	0.209* (0.046)	0.143* (0.042)
log(1 + population)		-0.082 (0.140)	-0.097 (0.139)	-0.009 (0.247)	1.427* (0.392)
Share majority party			-0.156* (0.075)	-0.161* (0.071)	-0.030 (0.065)
Share president's party			0.020 (0.035)	0.036 (0.032)	0.006 (0.037)
Delegation distance from median			-0.033 (0.124)	-0.011 (0.104)	-0.018 (0.098)
Relevant committee			-0.010 (0.054)	0.021 (0.038)	0.001 (0.033)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State trends				Linear	Quadratic
Observations	981	981	980	980	980

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

**Table A.2:** State Electoral Support and Bureaucratic Appointments (D.C. offices only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	log(1 + number of positions)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presidential vote share	0.395*	0.494*	0.643*	0.667*				
	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.145)	(0.117)				
President won state					0.119*	0.127*	0.165*	0.170*
					(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.034)
log(1 + population)		0.529*	0.407	0.295		0.516*	0.475	0.753
		(0.119)	(0.234)	(0.454)		(0.126)	(0.236)	(0.569)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State trends			Linear	Quadratic			Linear	Quadratic
Observations	954	954	954	954	993	993	993	993

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).

**Table A.3:** State Electoral Support and Bureaucratic Appointments (Non-clerks only)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	log(1 + number of positions)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Presidential vote share	0.833*	0.814*	0.729*	0.648*				
	(0.184)	(0.181)	(0.151)	(0.136)				
President won state					0.167*	0.164*	0.159*	0.167*
					(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.036)
log(1 + population)		-0.101	-0.141	1.086*		-0.132	-0.106	1.318*
		(0.166)	(0.267)	(0.409)		(0.163)	(0.270)	(0.430)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State trends			Linear	Quadratic			Linear	Quadratic
Observations	976	976	976	976	1,016	1,016	1,016	1,016

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments from each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).



**Table A.4:** State Electoral Support and Bureaucratic Appointments

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	log(1 + number of positions)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Popular vote share	0.462*	0.480*	0.451*	0.428*				
	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.076)				
Incumbent won state					0.102*	0.103*	0.093*	0.097*
					(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.016)
log(1 + population)		0.116	0.077	1.054*		0.084	0.058	1.232*
		(0.119)	(0.135)	(0.235)		(0.118)	(0.141)	(0.231)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State trends			Linear	Quadratic			Linear	Quadratic
Observations	5,428	5,428	5,428	5,428	5,572	5,572	5,572	5,572

*Note:* Entries are linear regression coefficients with standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logged (plus one) number of biennial appointments to individuals born in each state. \*p<0.05 (two-tailed test).