

Appendix D1

Description of the variables

This table describes the variables collected for the 175 countries in our study which are used in Appendix D and were not previously defined in Table 2 of the paper. .

Variable	Description
<i>1) Corruption measures</i>	
Kaufmann corruption index (2003-2005)	The average score of the Kaufmann corruption index between 2003 and 2005. The indicator is constructed using an unobserved components methodology. The estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. The range of the score is from -2.5 to +2.5, with a higher score indicating better government effectiveness.. <i>Source: Kaufmann et al (2008).</i> www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data
Transparency International corruption index (2003-2007)	The average score of the Transparency International corruption perception index between 2003 and 2007. The index provides a measure of the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist in the public and political sectors. The index focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. It is based on assessments by experts and opinion surveys. The index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). <i>Source: www.transparency.org.</i>
Heritage Foundation corruption index (2003-2007)	The average score of the Heritage Foundation corruption index between 2003 and 2007. The index is based on quantitative data that assess the perception of corruption in the business environment, including levels of governmental, legal, judicial and administrative corruption. The index is based on the Transparency International corruption index but supplemented with quantitative information from other sources. The scale of the index is from 0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating less corruption. <i>Source: www.heritage.org.</i>
GCR corruption index (2003-2007)	The average score of the Global Competitiveness Report corruption index between 2003 and 2007. The index is based on survey measures that include questions about the business costs of corruption. The scale of the index is from 0 to 7, where higher numbers mean less corruption. <i>Source: International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Services. www.prsgroup.com.</i>
Firms that pay bribes (%)	The percentage of firms that report “paying bribes to get things done” from the World Banks’ Enterprise Surveys carried out between 2002 and 2007. The surveys collect information on firm characteristics, business perceptions, and indicators of the quality of the business environment. <i>Source: www.enterprisesurveys.org.</i>
<i>2) Other variables and controls</i>	
Fuel exports	Percentage of mineral fuels in manufacturing exports in 2000. <i>Source: Treisman (2007), originally taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.</i>
Protestant population	The percentage of Protestant population in the country in 1980. <i>Source: La Porta et al (1999), based on CIA World Factbook.</i>
Catholic population	The percentage of Catholic population in the country in 1980. <i>Source: La Porta et al (1999), based on CIA World Factbook.</i>
Muslim population	The percentage of Muslim population in the country in 1980. <i>Source: La Porta et al (1999), based on CIA World Factbook</i>
Continent dummies	Dummy variables that identify the geographical continent of each country. Countries are classified in one of the six different continents provided by standard geographic classifications. The continents are: Africa, America, Europe, Asia, Oceania, and Antarctica. The dummy variable is equal to 1 if the country is located in that particular continent and zero otherwise. <i>Source: Authors classification based on data by www.wikipedia.com.</i>

Appendix D2

Cross-sectional determinants of disclosure and enforcement

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the full sample of countries. The dependent variable are shown in the first row. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 2 of the paper or in Appendix D1. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Requirements and public availability		Form content disclosure indices				Enforcement	
	<i>Dependent variable is:</i> Disclosure required	Publicly available	Values available to congress	Sources available to congress	Values publicly available	Sources publicly available	Strength of registrar	Strength of checking unit
<i>Panel B: Controlling for legal origins</i>								
Log GNI percapita 2006	-0.0043 [0.0393]	0.0147 [0.0338]	-0.0538 ^a [0.0194]	-0.0184 [0.0222]	-0.0189 [0.0124]	0.0242 [0.0215]	-0.0677 ^b [0.0286]	-0.0482 ^b [0.0207]
Democracy (1950-2006)	0.0211 [0.0143]	-0.0031 [0.0166]	0.0067 [0.0082]	0.0027 [0.0097]	-0.0039 [0.0077]	-0.0046 [0.0106]	-0.0024 [0.0127]	-0.0046 [0.0121]
FH press freedom	0.0040 [0.0030]	0.0064 ^b [0.0025]	0.0029 ^c [0.0016]	0.0051 ^a [0.0017]	0.0017 [0.0011]	0.0035 ^b [0.0014]	0.0049 ^b [0.0020]	0.0026 [0.0017]
Fuel exports	-0.0011 [0.0018]	-0.0012 [0.0010]	0.0001 [0.0008]	0.0004 [0.0008]	-0.0006 ^c [0.0004]	-0.0006 [0.0006]	0.0010 [0.0013]	0.0008 [0.0010]
French civil law dummy	0.0183 [0.0994]	-0.0977 [0.0869]	-0.0653 [0.0485]	-0.1159 ^b [0.0514]	-0.0313 [0.0335]	-0.0915 ^c [0.0492]	0.0121 [0.0760]	0.0182 [0.0553]
German civil law dummy	0.0383 [0.1078]	0.1605 [0.1364]	0.0024 [0.0820]	-0.0856 [0.0822]	0.1259 [0.0797]	0.0160 [0.0977]	0.1058 [0.1060]	0.0000 [0.0832]
Scandinavian law dummy	-0.8360 ^a [0.2428]	0.1544 [0.1212]	-0.3442 ^a [0.0720]	-0.6258 ^a [0.0984]	-0.0659 [0.0777]	-0.0175 [0.1114]	-0.2980 ^b [0.1213]	-0.3094 ^a [0.0828]
Africa dummy	-0.2862 ^b [0.1375]	-0.4029 ^a [0.1400]	-0.2091 ^b [0.0857]	-0.2685 ^a [0.1014]	-0.1561 ^b [0.0659]	-0.1905 ^b [0.0899]	-0.2113 ^c [0.1167]	-0.2909 ^a [0.0999]
America dummy	0.0393 [0.0767]	-0.3336 ^b [0.1324]	0.1603 ^b [0.0635]	0.0334 [0.0647]	-0.0829 [0.0641]	-0.1534 ^c [0.0912]	0.1237 [0.0937]	-0.0127 [0.0886]
Asia dummy	-0.2009 ^b [0.0975]	-0.1571 [0.1316]	-0.0777 [0.0813]	-0.1815 ^b [0.0817]	-0.0435 [0.0626]	-0.1183 [0.0791]	-0.1024 [0.0919]	-0.2001 ^b [0.0811]
Oceania dummy	-0.2970 [0.2332]	-0.2663 [0.2554]	-0.3713 ^a [0.0719]	-0.0853 [0.2530]	-0.1740 ^a [0.0583]	0.0216 [0.2232]	-0.1294 [0.1423]	-0.0437 [0.1368]
Constant	0.9814 ^b [0.4194]	0.8019 ^b [0.3612]	0.9032 ^a [0.2199]	0.9160 ^a [0.2495]	0.4386 ^a [0.1589]	0.3264 [0.2304]	1.1636 ^a [0.3387]	0.8852 ^a [0.2620]
Observations	125	125	121	121	125	125	125	125
R-squared	0.35	0.46	0.40	0.45	0.28	0.40	0.23	0.21
Continent dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

Appendix D3

Outcome measures and first principal components of content disclosure indices, controlling for income and democracy (Full sample of 175 countries)

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the full sample of countries. Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column). The regressions also control for log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of population)
Values available to congress first principal component	-0.1131 ^a [0.0274]	-0.0432 ^a [0.0131]	-0.0357 [0.0383]	-0.0423 [0.0413]	0.9427 ^b [0.3891]
Sources available to congress first principal component	-0.6509 ^b [0.2613]	-0.1165 [0.1343]	-0.6784 ^b [0.3272]	0.0712 [0.3348]	12.1724 ^a [3.6439]
Values publicly available first principal component	-0.0530 [0.0449]	-0.0126 [0.0166]	-0.1340 ^b [0.0538]	0.1596 ^b [0.0631]	2.1004 ^a [0.6762]
Sources publicly available first principal component	0.6468 ^b [0.2899]	0.4647 ^a [0.1558]	-1.1826 ^a [0.3773]	1.2182 ^a [0.3267]	15.0947 ^a [4.0772]

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

Appendix D4: Outcome measures and disclosure indices, controlling for income and democracy (Subsample of countries with high democracy score)

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of population)
<i>Panel A: Disclosure indices</i>					
Disclosure required	-1.0730 ^a [0.3409]	-0.3341 ^b [0.1353]	0.0556 [0.4342]	-0.6982 [0.4397]	3.9018 [4.4237]
Publicly available	0.5028 ^b [0.2136]	0.2856 ^b [0.1080]	-0.6486 ^c [0.3319]	0.3746 [0.3210]	3.3523 [2.4536]
Values available to congress	-1.4307 ^b [0.5425]	-0.5058 ^b [0.2161]	-0.2685 [0.6781]	-1.2248 ^c [0.6544]	-1.0567 [5.4343]
Sources available to congress	-0.6194 [0.4952]	-0.0483 [0.1727]	-1.0590 ^b [0.5209]	-0.5091 [0.5132]	1.3254 [4.8952]
Values publicly available	0.0961 [0.5951]	0.1374 [0.2168]	-1.4280 ^c [0.7675]	0.7824 [0.6960]	8.0772 ^c [4.7238]
Sources publicly available	0.9207 ^b [0.3562]	0.4960 ^a [0.1543]	-1.5415 ^a [0.4550]	0.7321 ^c [0.4046]	5.0190 [3.9247]
Strength of registrar	-1.3713 ^a [0.3631]	-0.5733 ^a [0.1677]	0.0945 [0.5899]	-1.1749 ^b [0.4491]	3.1385 [4.8211]
Strength of checking unit	-1.5593 ^a [0.3489]	-0.6458 ^a [0.1955]	-0.4807 [0.5687]	-0.6716 [0.5364]	6.0457 [4.8020]

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

**Appendix D4: Outcome measures and disclosure indices, controlling for income and democracy
(Subsample of countries with high democracy score)**

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of population)
-------------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	-----------------------------	---

Panel B: First principal components of content disclosure indices

Values available to congress first principal component	-0.1841 ^a [0.0515]	-0.0638 ^a [0.0202]	-0.0109 [0.0703]	-0.1515 ^b [0.0621]	0.2183 [0.5565]
Sources available to congress first principal component	-0.9987 ^b [0.4693]	-0.1680 [0.1686]	-0.7399 [0.5177]	-0.6849 [0.5512]	2.4438 [4.9908]
Values publicly available first principal component	-0.0565 [0.0666]	-0.0074 [0.0200]	-0.1012 [0.0701]	0.0524 [0.0803]	0.9836 ^b [0.4506]
Sources publicly available first principal component	0.7779 ^b [0.3359]	0.4767 ^a [0.1579]	-1.3134 ^a [0.4551]	0.7716 ^c [0.4559]	4.8857 [3.8231]

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

**Appendix D5: Outcome measures and disclosure indices, including Treisman controls
(Full sample of 175 countries)**

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), fuel exports, freedom of the press, and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of pupulation)
<i>Panel A: Disclosure indices</i>					
Disclosure required	-0.4235 ^b [0.1946]	-0.1775 ^c [0.0963]	-0.3397 [0.2645]	-0.0964 [0.2557]	3.0366 [3.1275]
Publicly available	0.1673 [0.1965]	0.1158 [0.0883]	-0.5477 ^b [0.2695]	0.4154 ^c [0.2397]	1.7667 [2.8560]
Values available to congress	-1.0931 ^b [0.4302]	-0.4626 ^a [0.1699]	-0.4403 [0.4907]	-0.3958 [0.5657]	-0.0982 [5.1974]
Sources available to congress	-0.6831 ^c [0.3659]	-0.0499 [0.1614]	-0.8058 ^c [0.4239]	-0.0565 [0.5068]	4.7087 [4.0582]
Values publicly available	-0.1979 [0.4249]	-0.1510 [0.1691]	-0.9011 [0.5467]	0.9995 ^c [0.5647]	4.6290 [6.6168]
Sources publicly available	0.5353 [0.3542]	0.3058 ^b [0.1469]	-1.0115 ^b [0.4061]	0.7910 ^c [0.4071]	7.6078 ^c [4.3330]
Strength of registrar	-0.7120 ^a [0.2194]	-0.3401 ^a [0.0940]	-0.3587 [0.3535]	-0.2661 [0.3407]	0.1894 [3.7197]
Strength of checking unit	-0.9316 ^a [0.3539]	-0.3949 ^a [0.1281]	-0.3431 [0.4007]	-0.6634 ^c [0.3795]	2.6545 [4.6668]

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

**Appendix D5: Outcome measures and disclosure indices, including Treisman controls
(Full sample of 175 countries)**

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), fuel exports, freedom of the press, and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of population)
<i>Panel B: First principal components of content disclosure indices</i>					
Values available to congress first principal component	-0.1103 ^b [0.0426]	-0.0481 ^a [0.0169]	-0.0113 [0.0466]	-0.0633 [0.0567]	0.2228 [0.5313]
Sources available to congress first principal component	-0.6935 ^b [0.3300]	-0.0999 [0.1509]	-0.6635 ^c [0.3691]	-0.2102 [0.4472]	6.1080 [4.2407]
Values publicly available first principal component	-0.0535 [0.0501]	-0.0285 ^c [0.0167]	-0.0569 [0.0587]	0.0745 [0.0656]	0.5210 [0.6747]
Sources publicly available first principal component	0.4401 [0.3354]	0.2850 ^c [0.1512]	-0.8927 ^b [0.4060]	0.7277 ^c [0.4222]	6.9218 [4.3570]
Robust standard errors in brackets					
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10.					

Appendix D6: Outcome measures and disclosure indices, including Treisman controls
(Subsample of countries with high democracy score)

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), fuel exports, freedom of the press, and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of population)
<i>Panel A: Disclosure indices</i>					
Disclosure required	-1.1793 ^a [0.3881]	-0.2552 [0.2102]	-0.4949 [0.4871]	-1.1204 ^b [0.4294]	4.0506 [5.0133]
Publicly available	0.5525 ^b [0.2339]	0.3238 ^a [0.0948]	-0.6052 [0.3713]	0.4168 [0.3607]	1.3282 [3.0036]
Values available to congress	-1.5194 ^b [0.6061]	-0.5154 ^b [0.2495]	-0.4819 [0.8367]	-1.0172 [0.7360]	-2.1961 [6.0944]
Sources available to congress	-0.8937 ^c [0.4839]	0.1022 [0.1979]	-1.2630 ^c [0.6887]	-0.4276 [0.6508]	0.7450 [5.8546]
Values publicly available	0.3963 [0.5666]	0.2260 [0.2052]	-1.1499 [0.8146]	1.1898 [0.7310]	4.9925 [6.4975]
Sources publicly available	0.8712 ^b [0.3882]	0.5427 ^a [0.1330]	-1.2578 ^b [0.5413]	0.9907 ^b [0.4589]	4.7380 [4.6712]
Strength of registrar	-1.5147 ^a [0.4303]	-0.4966 ^a [0.1685]	-0.1045 [0.6206]	-1.2796 ^b [0.4793]	2.5627 [5.1527]
Strength of checking unit	-1.9119 ^a [0.4373]	-0.5486 ^a [0.1958]	-0.3947 [0.5702]	-0.8598 [0.6169]	4.3714 [5.3272]
Robust standard errors in brackets					
Significance levels: (a) if p<0.01; (b) if p<0.05; (c.) if p<0.10.					

Appendix D6: Outcome measures and disclosure indices, including Treisman controls
(Subsample of countries with high democracy score)

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), fuel exports, freedom of the press, and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Government effectiveness index	Log cost of starting a business	Expropriation risk index	Participation in parliamentary elections (% of population)
-------------------------------	-----------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------	--

Panel B: First principal components of content disclosure indices

Values available to congress first principal component	-0.2122 ^a [0.0660]	-0.0618 ^b [0.0303]	0.0020 [0.0940]	-0.1947 ^b [0.0758]	0.0954 [0.6507]
Sources available to congress first principal component	-1.1854 ^b [0.4978]	0.0421 [0.2198]	-1.0491 [0.6343]	-0.9580 [0.6382]	-0.8175 [6.2487]
Values publicly available first principal component	-0.0003 [0.0627]	0.0061 [0.0199]	-0.0757 [0.0751]	0.0766 [0.0843]	0.6564 [0.6124]
Sources publicly available first principal component	0.8256 ^b [0.3515]	0.5456 ^a [0.1310]	-1.0902 ^b [0.5157]	0.8927 ^c [0.4849]	3.1642 [4.7217]

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

Appendix D7: Corruption measures and disclosure indices, including Treisman controls
(Subsample of countries with high democracy score)

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), fuel exports, freedom of the press, and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Kaufmann corruption index	Transparency International corruption index	Heritage Foundation corruption index	GCR corruption index	Firms that pay bribes (%)
<i>Panel A: Disclosure indices</i>						
Disclosure required	-1.1865 ^a [0.4154]	-0.4273 ^c [0.2145]	-0.8771 ^c [0.5016]	-6.9731 [5.3530]	-0.6925 ^b [0.2776]	-23.1479 ^a [6.0676]
Publicly available	0.5643 ^b [0.2380]	0.2610 ^b [0.1269]	0.5323 [0.3210]	4.5861 [3.4921]	0.0643 [0.1818]	-16.5610 ^b [7.3539]
Values available to congress	-1.5101 ^b [0.6638]	-0.8105 ^a [0.2983]	-1.9325 ^b [0.7347]	-15.7269 ^b [7.8073]	-0.9523 ^b [0.4579]	-33.7367 [22.9327]
Sources available to congress	-0.8431 [0.5023]	-0.0497 [0.2389]	-0.1669 [0.5537]	0.8060 [5.8259]	-0.1793 [0.3390]	-33.1899 ^c [18.4506]
Values publicly available	0.4168 [0.5663]	-0.0466 [0.3100]	-0.3891 [0.7468]	-5.1029 [7.5524]	-0.4757 [0.3458]	-35.1410 [20.9351]
Sources publicly available	0.8806 ^b [0.3905]	0.4505 ^b [0.2034]	0.9529 ^c [0.5277]	7.5728 [5.8483]	0.2176 [0.2856]	-32.1727 ^b [14.5021]
Strength of registrar	-1.4748 ^a [0.4332]	-0.5019 ^b [0.2333]	-1.0923 ^c [0.5668]	-11.2640 ^c [5.6313]	-0.4890 [0.3180]	-24.8156 ^c [13.3803]
Strength of checking unit	-1.8910 ^a [0.4384]	-0.6533 ^b [0.2483]	-1.6374 ^a [0.5772]	-15.2761 ^b [5.9003]	-0.7350 ^b [0.3089]	-16.8204 [19.2511]

Robust standard errors in brackets

Significance levels: (a) if $p < 0.01$; (b) if $p < 0.05$; (c.) if $p < 0.10$.

Appendix D7: Corruption measures and disclosure indices, including Treisman controls
(Subsample of countries with high democracy score)

The table shows the results of OLS regressions using the subsample of countries with high democracy score (above the mean democracy score 1950-2006). Each cell in the table shows the coefficient and standard error of a regression of the dependent variable (shown in the first row) on the corresponding disclosure index (shown in the first column), log of GNI per capita (2006), democracy (1950-2006), fuel exports, freedom of the press, and a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable is:</i>	ICRG corruption index	Kaufmann corruption index	Transparency International corruption index	Heritage Foundation corruption index	GCR corruption index	Firms that pay bribes (%)
<i>Panel B: First principal components of content disclosure indices</i>						
Values available to congress First principal component	-0.2130 ^a [0.0713]	-0.0951 ^b [0.0362]	-0.2320 ^b [0.0882]	-2.1495 ^b [0.9004]	-0.1127 ^b [0.0449]	-3.7743 ^c [2.0228]
Sources available to congress First principal component	-1.0577 ^b [0.5187]	-0.1198 [0.2549]	-0.2200 [0.5774]	0.2842 [6.0490]	-0.2635 [0.3556]	-37.0148 ^b [16.7731]
Values publicly available First principal component	0.0007 [0.0611]	-0.0174 [0.0282]	-0.0602 [0.0733]	-0.6801 [0.7225]	-0.0566 [0.0355]	-3.6264 ^b [1.5213]
Sources publicly available First principal component	0.8434 ^b [0.3544]	0.4658 ^b [0.1891]	0.9322 ^c [0.5037]	8.5385 [5.5304]	0.2427 [0.2835]	-28.7331 ^b [12.2629]