Volunteer Spies, Volunteer Bureaucrats
Neighborhood Governance in Indonesia and Around the World

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Abstract

In many developing countries, auxiliaries of the formal civil service are organized at the level of a handful of households to carry out administrative tasks. This institutional form is especially common in, but not limited to, Pacific Asia, where it is a legacy of Japanese colonialism. Neighborhood governance of this kind is a top-down project designed to direct organizational life to state purposes. When effective, these systems provide cheap labor to the state, supplementing small civil services and security forces with organized volunteers. These systems originated in periods of non-democratic rule, but in a number of countries, have continued to function long after democratization. It is not clear, however, why residents choose to provide this labor in a democratic context. With evidence from Indonesia, I find evidence suggesting that the effectiveness of the neighborhood governance system depends on residents' incentives to participate, and that these are related to individual characteristics, including age, and community characteristics like residential mobility. I then outline designs for testing the effects of these characteristics on participation in neighborhood governance, and the effects of neighborhood leadership density on political participation and disaster recovery.

Introduction

In many parts of the world, auxiliaries of the formal civil service facilitate governance at the level of the neighborhood, alley, or hamlet. Often acting without pay, these state agents operate within their own neighborhoods, signing documents, confirming eligibility for government programs, enforcing rules and laws, organizing their communities for collective action, and keeping watch at night. Auxiliaries of this kind are common in the developing world, originating during periods of single-party rule or foreign occupation. But how did these organizations—volunteer bureaucracies, as I will show them to be—come about? And under what circumstances are they successful?

This paper proceeds in three parts. In the first, I analyze the characteristics of these very-local auxiliaries as they actuate around the world, showing that they have their origins in undemocratic projects, and persist over time in part because of the problems the solve for government leaders. In the second part, I use a case study of the neighborhood governance system in Indonesia to understand how these dynamics operate in a single country over time. I then turn to the puzzle of participation in the auxiliary system, looking at the incentive structure

for volunteer bureaucrats in present-day Indonesia to derive hypotheses about the circumstances in which neighborhood-level governance structures are more and less effective.

Volunteer Bureaucracies and Persistence in Southeast Asia

At the end of the Second World War, Japanese occupiers across Pacific Asia left behind a governance structure that set clusters of a few households as the smallest level of government. During their colonial rule Northeast Asia and the brief period of rule in Indonesia, Japanese rulers developed formal systems in which persons would be chosen from within neighborhoods to carry out government-assigned tasks within their neighborhoods. By the end of the war, these tiny neighborhood subdivisions had become base units for mobilization, civil defense, and law enforcement in Japan, Taiwan, China, Korea, and Indonesia. In each of these countries today, some version of this system remains in place. In Indonesia has the system not only stayed organizationally almost identical to what it was in 1945, but also expanded in scope—Japanese occupiers had put it in place on Java; post-independence leaders exported it to the rest of the Indonesian archipelago.

Why did an institution created by Japanese occupiers during a three-year occupation turn out to be so sticky? And why in Indonesia did this institution change so little? China, Korea, and Taiwan experienced decades of Japanese rule, yet in these places, neighborhood governance looks very different from its wartime form. In Japan itself, neighborhood organizations have only minimal relevance to governance today. Of all the places where it was imposed, it is in Indonesia where a wartime system that incorporated unpaid laborers into the state apparatus has persisted intact—through three regime transitions. By considering a case in which neighborhood governance through very-local volunteers has been so important, despite foreign origins and a comparatively brief period of foreign imposition, this paper will shed light on an important mode of persistence, in which an institution repeatedly provides a solution to state leaders' problems. Yet such a state-centered explanation of institutional persistence does not provide insight into the much more fundamental question of why volunteer bureaucracies have volunteers at all. The later sections of this paper build on fieldwork in Indonesia to generate hypotheses about why (and where) people serve as volunteer bureaucrats.

Government institutions that operate at levels below the city have only recently become subjects of study in political science. A new strain of work on neighborhood associations, much of it focused on Latin America, is optimistic about the possibilities for accountability that very-

local organization might hold (Avritzer 2011). This literature would be well-complemented with work on those countries in which very-local administration has long been part of the public administration system. Many countries—not just those that have experienced Japanese colonial rule—have used a system of neighborhood governance at some point in their history, but few comparative studies have been undertaken to assess what is common about them. One of these, Benjamin Read's study of neighborhood institutions in Taiwan and China characterizes well the smallness, and to Western observers, the strangeness—and the semi-formality—of governance at the neighborhood level:

> "These institutions constitute ornate extensions of officialdom fused into the structure and governance of the smallest of urban territorial units, which, depending on one's perspective, could appear unsettling, amusing, helpful, wasteful, or simply the normal condition of things" (Read 2012, 8)

That study ties the success of neighborhood-level institutions in Pacific Asia to long historical traditions, even as it recognizes the tremendous usefulness of the neighborhood governance institution to modern states. In that framework, Indonesia stands out as a country with *no* historical tradition of neighborhood governance.

Robert Pekkanen's work on Japanese neighborhood associations—successors to the wartime institution established in Indonesia—has documented their transformation into ordinary civic associations with a marginal role in governance (2014). This has not happened in Indonesia, where the neighborhood system remains the linchpin of local administration. Understanding why this is and what consequences this has had for Indonesia is especially important for scholars interested in more formally integrating neighborhood associations as they exist in places like Brazil, where the push has come from the bottom up.

My work on neighborhood institutions addresses two areas of inquiry. The first draws on earlier work looking at residentially-based state organizations in different parts of the world. This focuses on the ways neighborhood institutions interact with civil administration and local communities. Neighborhood institutions form a two-way transmission belt connecting citizens to the state and enabling the state to reach quickly and cheaply into the neighborhood; the ways in which neighborhood institutions blend state administration and neighborly life shape the ways the state can actuate within a community.

The second area of inquiry concerns exactly this—the ways in which state administration is shaped by the use of very-local institutions. This is the focus of my current work in Indonesia. More broadly, analysis of the individual incentives underlying participation in a neighborhood governance institution may provide systematic predictions about the way these institutions—and thus local administration—will function in different kinds of communities.

This project draws on Paul Pierson's (2004) idea of "sticky" institutions, as well as Mahoney and Thelen's (2009) work on gradual institutional change. It also is informed by Joel Migdal's work complicating the division between state and society. Also informing this project is Lily Tsai's (2007) work on informal accountability and Gretchen Helmke's and Steve Levitsky's (2004) work on informal institutions. Levitsky and Way's (2012) concept of state scope is part of my understanding of the problems very local institutions might help solve. Benjamin Olken's (2010) work on how local institutions shape service delivery in Indonesia provides compelling evidence that small variations in very-local institutional patterns affect service delivery in Indonesia.. Finally, Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucrats informs much of my thinking on the job and incentive structure of both public-facing formal civil servants and the volunteer bureaucrats at the heart of this project.

This is a mixed-methods project. It uses interviews conducted in Jakarta, Medan, and Banda Aceh, Indonesia from May to July 2014 and January 2015. It also incorporates data from a semi-annual survey of Indonesia's village-level governments. I have collected data on election returns and am working to scrape voter lists that can be used alongside the election data to measure turnout. This will allow me to estimate the magnitude of neighborhood institutions' impact on voter turnout. During future fieldwork in Indonesia, I will be able to collect information on how often local authorities use neighborhood leaders to muster citizens for corvée labor, a practice that was once common. Through interviews with neighborhood leaders, civil society organizers, politicians, and civil servants, I am in the process of painting a comprehensive portrait of the motivations behind participation, the consequences of neighborhood institutions for other organizations, the role neighborhood institutions play in elections, and the degree to which civil servants depend on neighborhood institutions.

Neighborhood Governance (around the world)

Neighborhood governance systems are not limited to countries that experienced Japanese occupation. A number of Latin American countries, as well as the Soviet Union, have at one time

or another used a national system of neighborhood organizations. With their very-local scope, these institutions bear a surface resemblance to participatory institutions that have recently gained favor as tools for accountability. The institutions discussed in this section, however, are all state-developed administrative tools; they are closer to government bureaucracies than to social movements, and they are grassroots only in the sense that they operate at a very local level. Although the systems in place in different countries differ in a number of ways, most of them have similar tasks and are motivated by similar impulses. In this section, I cover the common characteristics of those systems, the countries that adopt them, and the ideologies that justify them or led to their creation. The cases discussed are those in which a central state built an auxiliary administrative apparatus that operates on a very local level with personnel drawn from the communities in which they operate. I argue that across countries, neighborhood governance is imposed from the top down by a leadership that wishes to have a hand in directing community life at its most local level.

What is an institution of neighborhood governance?

The neighborhood governance project begins with maps. State officials divide cities and villages into very small territorial units, and the people living within those units choose (or have chosen for them) a leader and, usually, designated assistants. In Indonesia, the boundaries of an RT (the lowest level of its neighborhood system) are drawn to incorporate 30 – 50 households in a city, or a cluster of houses in a rural hamlet (BPS 2011; Tjondronegoro 1984). In Singapore, each member of a Resident Committee is normally responsible for one apartment building (Ling 2009). In Cuba, "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution" are organized along block lines to maintain a system of "revolutionary collective vigilance" (Fagen 1969, 69). In wartime Japan, the entire country was divided into ten-household units (Pekkanen 2014). In the USSR, Community Self-Help Organizations mobilized city blocks for work (Friedgut 1979, 244). In present-day Hanoi, "Resident Groups" comprise 25 – 30 households who elect a group head (Koh 2006, 48). In Peru under military rule, squatter communities elected residents to become partners of local officials in the distribution of aid and facilities (Castells 1983, 193). In Sandinista Nicaragua, Neighborhood Base Committees guided community activities and ran a night watch (LaRamée & Pokaloff 1997). The table below establishes the cases I consider in this

section—cases where state auxiliaries operated at a very local level.[1] It should be noted no country that has established a system to govern neighborhoods was a democracy at the time it established the system.

Table 1: Neighborhood Governance around the World
(Names most commonly used in sources)

Country	Organization Name	Democracy at adoption?
China	Resident Committee	No
Cuba	*Comité para la Defesa de la Revolución*	No
Indonesia	*Tonarigumi / Rukun Tetangga*	No / No
Japan	*Tonarigumi / chonaikai*	No / Yes
Korea	*Banjang*	No
Nicaragua	*Comité de Base Sandinista*	No
Peru	*Comité Vecinal*	No
Singapore	Residents' Committee	No
Taiwan	*Linzhang*	No
USSR	Residence Committee	No
Vietnam	*Tô dân phô*	No

The state creates these systems, and never the other way around. In a few countries, most importantly, Japan, the state was incorporating an established practice into a nationwide system. These institutions function at the grassroots and are characterized (of necessity) by high levels of informality in their behaviors and procedures. Thus governing the neighborhood (with these

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[1] Two cases not in the table that may be appropriate to include are Tanzania, where the CCM party attempts to organize at the 10-household level, and the lowest rung of Malaysia's UMNO (see Levitsky and Way 2012). Currently, these cases are excluded because it is not clear whether a party organization operating at this level is the same as the more administrative organizations covered in the included cases. Singapore straddles this party-administration boundary line, and Indonesia's GOLKAR was closely entwined with the neighborhood governance system there. In these cases, though, the balance of their work is state administration, so they are included.

kinds of institutions) creates an informal state. Collapsing autonomy and de-formalizing the state has a number of consequences.

In some countries, neighborhood governance institutions run in parallel with a political party or other encompassing organization. This is the case in single-party states like Cuba, Vietnam, wartime Japan, Sandinista Nicaragua, military-ruled Peru, and the USSR. In others, they are the lowest rung in the state's administrative hierarchy. This is the case in contemporary Japan, Indonesia, China, Taiwan, and Singapore. In another kind of case, a ruling party is itself organized at this level (this is the case in Tanzania and Malaysia); whether these cases should be included is something I leave to another version of this paper. Regardless of the administrative status, governments in these states developed parallel organizations that took the neighborhood as their base unit (Stepan 1978). The act of creating tiny administrative units, structuring other state organizations around these units, and bounding those communities has led non-state organizations to set the neighborhood as their base unit. In Indonesia, a number of nationalist groups, as well as a major Islamic organization, have developed territorial structures that include chapters organized on a territorial basis following the neighborhood governance boundaries. A number of other groups—a mass organization for women and a youth organization—operate with state sponsorship on the same territorial basis. This is a mirror of the process by which organizations in the United States developed the federated structure of the polity, as described by Skocpol, Ganz and Munson (2000)—here, the neighborhood governance system and its ancillary organizations take the shape they do because state actors built them that way.

Governing the neighborhood

Neighborhood governance makes the neighborhood legible to the state (Scott 1998) and provides the infrastructure for mobilizing what the state finds within the neighborhood. Almost all institutions of neighborhood governance use the institution to maintain some kind of residency record. Typical among them, Peru's Neighbor Committees maintained the record of block residents' ages, marital status, employment, and income (Stepan 1978, 171 n. 28). In many countries, this has become part of the process of establishing title to land. More or less detailed versions of the residency record are maintained by neighborhood governance institutions in every one of the cases mentioned in this paper. Although residency records are the most common task assigned to the neighborhood government, the institution typically has a wider responsibility to mobilize the community.

Neighborhood governance institutions raise money and labor for public services and public projects. The practice of making a collection for neighborhood expenses, including some public services, is very common. Dues collection, scaled for income, was prevalent from the beginning of neighborhood governance in wartime Japan (Kasza 1995, 96). Collections for specific services like trash collection and mosquito fogging, again scaled for income, are carried out today in Indonesia (Interview 6/13/2014; Yoshihara & Diwanto 2001, 160). Dues, along with labor, are often used for neighborhood "self-help" projects, which is in these systems a near-universal way of describing residents working together to build something on behalf of the state. Responding to a land invasion in Lima, then-President General Alvarado invited the landless community to form a "self-help community supported by the government." He established Neighbor Committees to carry this out (Castells 1983, 192). A high official in Nicaragua's Sandinista party reported in 1985 that the goal of that country's neighborhood base committees was to create "a gigantic community movement whereby the community organizes itself to solve its own problems . . . with the aid of the government and not the government with the aid of the community" (LaRamée & Pokaloff 1997, 160). An Indonesian community activist explained the job of the neighborhood organization as to "Construct plans and carry out development by building up the aspirations and pure self-reliance of the community" (Munthe 2013). Friedgut explains that in the USSR, many projects completed with community labor happened because "Unless citizens turn out for labor, work would simply not be done, or at least not without great delay," (1979, 279). Neighborhood self-help often meant serving national development goals. Kurasawa shows that the Japanese-imposed residential governance system on Java during the occupation was the backbone of a corvée labor system that served Japanese war effort (1988); Sullivan notes that the practice of turning out a community's population on a Sunday for some government work continued well into the 1990s (Kurasawa 2009; Sullivan 1992).

One reason to encourage community self-help, and to mobilize neighborhood labor, is to save money. Describing a community effort to winterize a school, one Russian principal reported that the work was accomplished "'without outlay of money'" (Friedgut 1979, 273). Soviet neighborhood officials routinely calculated the money saved by employing community labor in place of professionals. States mobilize community labor because it is cheap—when it can be mobilized. The third section of this paper considers in more detail the circumstances under which these organizations are more or less able to mobilize their communities.

Neighborhood governance institutions have been very effective tools in large-scale public health campaigns. Cuban vaccination drives relied on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Fagen 1969). Close proximity makes these institutions effective for monitoring compliance in otherwise private health matters, which is why China's Residence Committee is to maintain a list of the birth control method each woman in the community is using, and has the responsibility to report unauthorized pregnancies (Read 2012, 62).

In addition to mobilizing the community, the neighborhood governance institution is usually intended to foster cooperation and harmony among residents. In wartime Japan, Interior Ministry literature explained that the ten-household group "has as its purpose the harmonious relations of all members of the neighborhood association," (Braibanti 1948, 153). In its current iteration, Indonesia's neighborhood system goes by the name "Harmonious Neighborhood," and municipal adjustments to the national regulations usually explain that changes are "to better orient society towards democratization and harmony of neighbors and peoples" (Office of the Governor, 2001). In Singapore, where racial tension is perhaps the foremost concern of the ruling People's Action Party, "Resident Communities embark on a wide range of social activities and projects to get residents of diverse backgrounds and interests to interact and feel a part of the community" (Ling 2009, 182).

Finally, neighborhood governance systems are often tasked with orienting daily habits towards regime goals. Cuba's "revolutionary collective vigilance," (Fagen 1969, 69) post-independence Indonesia's "republic-mindedness," (Kurasawa 2009, 62) and wartime Japan's "eradication of selfishness for complete devotion to the nation" (Kasza 1995, 165) are each examples of the change of mind that institutions of neighborhood governance have been asked to bring about among ordinary people.

For the leaders of the states that implement these systems, they are invaluable instruments for gathering information, turning it into policy, and implementing state directives. Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore's longtime Prime Minister, described his country's Resident Committee system as the state's "nerve system," describing the process of collecting information from them and responding to it as "the signals having been processed in the brain, signals are sent out in response to make changes and adjustments necessary for effective living" (Ling 2009, 182). This is a less directed version of Lenin's "transmission belts" which by running "from the vanguard to the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working people" were to

enable the efficient dictatorship of the proletariat (Lenin 1920, 3). Japan's wartime neighborhood system was described by its creators as "instrument through which the directions of the authorities are communicated to the people and the voice of the people is communicated to the authorities" (Braibanti 1948, 153). Yet these organizations do more than provide a channel for communication—this section showed that institutions of neighborhood governance regularly mobilize citizens for labor on behalf of the state. That they successfully do this, at least some of the time, suggests that state auxiliaries operating at the very-local level bring selective incentives to bear in service of state goals. Whether these selective incentives grow out of the small group size (Olson 1965), out of reputational concerns of people in the neighborhood (Wilson 1973), or from a specific configuration of punishments and rewards (Oliver 1980), an approach that takes an interest in the costs and benefits of participation in the neighborhood administration offers a promising route to predicting where neighborhood institutions will be more or less effective. Systems to govern the neighborhood are intended to increase both the potency and the responsiveness of the state.

Volunteer Bureaucracy: civil administration or civil society organization?

Many governments maintain the legal contention that the institution used to govern neighborhoods is *not* part of the actual state administration. Calling it a "social movement," a "neighborhood association," or a "community organization," the state in every case draws a distinction between administration and the neighborhood governance institution.

The Indonesian government calls its neighborhood government system a "social organization" and insists that it is "helping local government." A fascinating quote from a manual giving regulations for Indonesia's neighborhood system shows how the state conceives of these organizations—bridging the state society divide, bringing people in line with the state, and supporting state goals, all without officially being part of the state:

> [The neighborhood system is] a social organization recognized and protected by
> the state but not an arm of Local Government, . . . obligated to realize the
> integration of Society and State. . . . helping local government within the
> framework of mutual aid, assisting and implementing development and building
> harmony between individual residents (*Biro Pemerintahan DKI Jakarta* 1981).

From this it is clear that in Indonesia, the organization involved in administering neighborhoods has a special relationship with the state, has the mission to bridge the divide between state and

society, and is to help the local government do its part in pursuing development goals—something set by the central government—all while preserving order within the neighborhood. The legal contention that these organizations are *not* part of the state administration is often taken for granted. Koh writes that in Hanoi, "The resident cluster sometimes had been misunderstood as a level of administrative authority, but it is not, because it does not have independent state authority that is usually marked by the use of official stamps in documents" (2006, 46). Although it is clear that institutions of neighborhood governance have some role in carrying out state goals, it is worth considering whether they might fit into some other organizational category. If the neighborhood bureaucracy is not part of the state, as Indonesian and Vietnamese authorities insist, then perhaps it belongs to civil society

Larry Diamond writes that "Civil society is the realm of organized life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (1999, 221); the institutions of neighborhood governance do not fit this definition very well. Although they are bound by a legal order and by set rules, and may in fact be partially self-supporting (they often survive regime changes, which suggests they are not totally dependent on the state), they are not autonomous from the state. Rather, they exist because of state action (Kasza 1995), and for much of their history have been mandatory. Sullivan describes the how Indonesian neighborhood officials helped keep people associated with communism out of neighborhoods after 1965, and the ways neighborhood officials play a leading role in effectively excluding certain people from community life (Sullivan 1992). Such a record of exclusion makes it hard to call the base units of neighborhood governance "open." On almost every count, neighborhood governance institutions fail the civil society test. But not everyone agrees.

Authors looking at neighborhood government in democratized countries have been sympathetic to the claim that the institutions are part of civil society. Literature on Japan, and to a lesser extent, Indonesia, has taken to calling these systems "Neighborhood Associations" (Pekkanen et al 2014, Yoshihara & Diwanto 2001). In Japan, certainly, it is a reasonable claim. The organizations are voluntary, such citizens who do not wish to interact with the neighborhood association can avoid having to do so. Further, "although NHAs do engage in active cooperation with local governments, they are primarily local organizations of citizens meant to serve local needs" (Pekkanen et al 2014, 6). Pekkanen and his coauthors see the current state of Japan's

neighborhood associations as proof that "civil society can be structured by the state, flourish through state promotion, and contribute to social capital" (*ibid*, 2). The fact that the organization was structured by the state and flourishes now because it has always enjoyed a special relationship with the state is problematic for most conceptions of the civil sphere. If autonomy remains an important condition for civil society, Japan's neighborhood associations are at best a liminal case.

Perhaps it does not make sense to accept governments' contentions that the neighborhood government is not part of the state administration. After all, in Japan, even before the neighborhood association was standardized into the wartime ten-household group (*tonarigumi*), "the division of roles between the NHAs and the local municipal authorities was unclear" (Pekkanen et al 2014, 16). Certainly, there was no question about the place of these groups once the war began. During the war, the household groups were mandatory and essential to central control:

> Without the *tonarigumi* [ten-household group], the national government in its civil-administrative functions (as distinct from its police functions) extended its tentacles only as far as the city, town, and village level. With the [ten-household group] the government reached into the lives of every citizen. (Braibanti 1948, 139)

Yet the specifically local character of these organizations, the way they reach into the smallest corners of society, makes the distinction hard. Drawing the boundary is even more difficult when this structure is the basis for myriad government administrative tasks. "We have a saying that all tasks of local administration are also tasks of the CDR," Fagen quotes a local official as saying (1969, 93). Neighborhood government is without a doubt involved in administration; what is less clear is whether it is the state bureaucracy or something else.

In Indonesia, the link between the "helping" organization and the state bureaucracy is one where the civil bureaucracy depends on this helper for nearly all of its functions. A civil servant in Jakarta's Menteng Dalam ward told me that when people arrived at his desk with welfare applications signed by their neighborhood leaders, he approved them on the spot because he had no way of determining eligibility beyond the presence of the signatures (Interview 6/12/2014). One neighborhood leader put it simply, "It's not the *lurah* who knows the people; it's the RTs,"

that is, the appointed chief of the ward does not know anyone, but the neighborhood leaders do (Interview 6/14/2014).

Professional bureaucrats in the Indonesian civil service use the neighborhood government as gatekeepers and auxiliaries. For a person to approach the civil service with a request, they must first pass that request through a neighborhood official. Once the neighborhood official has approved the request, the request will be fulfilled by the civil service. Thus the neighborhood government officials act as gatekeepers—they screen citizens' requests—and as auxiliaries. When the civil servant approves the request, it is often the neighborhood official who carries it out. In the USSR, the neighborhood officials fulfilled a similar function; acting as the "first filter" who "relieves the load on the administrative department" (Friedgut 1979, 183).

Neighborhood officials in many places (but not all) work without pay, constituting an organized force of volunteers integrated into the administrative bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, this volunteer bureaucracy sometimes has problems with professionalism. Neighborhood officials exercise a lot of power over certain things. Sometimes they abuse it. The city of Jakarta, concerned by the ways some neighborhood officials use their position to make money from those who live and work in their communities, has considered replacing elected senior neighborhood committee leaders with appointees (Setiawati 2014). At the same time, volunteers embedded in their home communities sometimes have strong incentives to serve the community at the expense of the state goals they nominally pursue. Braibanti (1948) describes how the heads of Japanese *tonarigumi*, charged with enforcing the wartime rationing regime, more often became the center of attempts to circumvent the rationing. Extending the powers of state administration to this most-local level makes possible corruption at the smallest scale. It also makes it less clear who acts on behalf of the state, and introduces the range of community motives to what would otherwise be administrative actions motivated by state goals.

In countries where there is a neighborhood governance system, a great deal of law enforcement (and punishment) is carried out by bodies other than the police. In the USSR, *druzhiny* volunteer militias drew some of their members from residence groups (Friedgut 1979, 258 – 9). Often, the neighborhood government is required to form a night watch. These put violence in the hands of state-authorized non-professionals, muddying the question of who is and who is not a legitimate wielder of violence. As with state administration, this boundary confusion

can introduce a host of community- and individually-based incentives to coercive actions that bear some degree of state imprimatur through the neighborhood bureaucrats' official status.

Confusion over the place of neighborhood governance institutions begins with state rhetoric. According to the governments that implement them, systems of neighborhood governance are social organizations, auxiliaries, movements—but never part of civil administration. This confusion makes it unclear which tasks are state tasks, and which are to be done by the community. It also leads to ambiguity over who can act on behalf of the state and introduces mixed incentives to the execution and enforcement of state policies.

State Construction

The previous section asked whether the neighborhood governance institutions in place around the world were part of civil administration or civil society. It concluded that they are fundamentally of the civil administration, but that their small size and role in mobilization ensure that they take on characteristics determined by their local context. In this section, I show that the lack of boundaries between state and society described above is deliberate. Neighborhood governance institutions are the work of national leaders who wish to direct what elsewhere would be a private or otherwise autonomous social sphere by expanding the zone of relations that can exist within the social sphere.

In most cases, the creation of a neighborhood governance system constrains, to a greater or lesser degree, the ability of people to participate in non-governmental forms of associational life. As Read describes it, the neighborhood system "channels community energies in ways that undercut nonstate alternatives even as it also can empower citizens" (2012, 20). One of the most important ways they do this is by taking people's time. Ling believes that the demands placed on busy Singaporean apartment-dwellers by Resident Community activities "May have prevented or at least constrained the growth of alternative movements at the grassroots like civil society organizations," adding that through this institution, the ruling People's Action Party "effectively maintained its hold on civic activities in neighborhoods" (2009, 187). Already short on time, the events put on by the Resident Community become the one outlet for many Singaporeans, fulfilling the mission of a party that has consistently worked to prevent the growth of non-state organizational life (Kadir 2004).

In some cases, the activities of the neighborhood organization are fairly onerous. In these examples, it becomes apparent that time diversion can be an acknowledged goal in adopting

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neighborhood governance systems. Well into the 1990s, "duty work" activities organized by Indonesian neighborhood leaders in cooperation with city government meant that large portions of the adult population spent their days off doing road construction (Yoshihara & Diwanto 2001; Kurasawa 2009). Friedgut describes how Lenin viewed the Soviet mass organizations as a tool to direct the people's energy toward state goals: "'Our aim is to ensure that every toiler, having completed his eight hours' task in production, shall perform state duty without pay.'" (1979, 279). What time is available to the working adult is (deliberately) taken up by state-organized activities. Writing on Soviet organizational life, Roeder explains that these "policies used the instrumentalities of involvement themselves (e.g., popular militia, comrades' courts) to check the expanding popular involvement with heightened emphasis on social control, discipline, and homogeneity in the population" (1989, 873). In each of these countries, the mobilizational aspects of neighborhood government are intended, at the moment of their adoption, to head off the formation of autonomous organizations.

To justify the entry of the state into the associational sphere, the state engages in an "appropriation of the discourse of community" (Read 2012, 51). Indonesia provides one of the clearest examples. There, the neighborhood organization and its projects are justified through reference to a traditional Javanese value, *gotong royong*, often translated as "mutual assistance." This is "a form of institutionalized spontaneous cooperation containing elements of voluntary reciprocity between members of a village" but also "largely a state-constructed concept" used to justify mobilizing the community to "fulfill incidental village/ward needs" (Yoshihara & Diwanto 2001, 151). In the name of a particular conception of community, state officials use neighborhood governance institutions to mobilize the population for labor on behalf of the state.

Where neighborhood governance systems exist, they have come about through deliberate state action. This action seeks to direct organizational life to state purposes by creating a government-controlled organizational sphere that operates at a very local level. These organizations serve twin purposes of mobilizing labor for the state and filling time that might otherwise be used for participation in more autonomous organizations. The creation and use of this institution is often joined with a discourse of community that conflates service to the community with participation in activities sponsored by the neighborhood governance organization. Although neighborhood governance comes from a state project, the volunteer bureaucrats who carry it out have complicated incentives—as members of the communities they

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regulate, their actions will be shaped by state mandates and the particular contours of the community in which they both live and work. Institutions that govern neighborhoods through volunteer bureaucrats are characterized by informality, resulting in unclear boundaries between state and private action. A closer look at how one of these institutions has developed over time and operates today will illustrate how these general patterns operate.

Neighborhood governance in Indonesia

Indonesia's institution of neighborhood governance was created by Japanese occupiers on the island of Java in 1942 (Kurasawa 1988). They took the form of 10 – 20-household units whose leaders were in theory elected but in practice chosen by government officials from among the residents. Called *tonarigumi*, they were identical in name and structure with the wartime system of neighborhood governance in Japan and occupied Taiwan. Unlike in Japan and Taiwan, the wartime *tonarigumi* were not a variation on a pre-existing theme in local governance. In Java, and across Indonesia, there had been no tradition of governance at the neighborhood level. Thus the *tonarigumi* system of neighborhood governance was one of the few specifically Japanese contributions to Indonesian governance; much of the Dutch colonial administrative structure remained intact through occupation and independence (Kanahele 1967). Sullivan, an anthropologist who studied neighborhoods in the city of Yogyakarta, believes it to be a coincidence that "the wholesale installation of the Japanese system worked" (1992, 145). It was not. Rather, neighborhood governance persisted in Indonesia as a result of the effort by Japanese and Indonesian leaders to legitimize the institution, the fact that this institution was "present at the creation" of the independent Indonesian state, and the usefulness of the institution to post-independence leaders (who endeavored to keep it in place and expand its reach).

Despite the fact that neighborhood governance was an import made in Japan, Japanese occupiers carefully cast their new institution as if it were in fact *Javanese*. From day one, propaganda officials emphasized the *tonarigumi*'s relationship with the Javanese value of "mutual assistance." Nationalist leaders in the Indonesian client government worked hard to associate Japanese administrative decisions with the path toward an independent Indonesia (Friend 2003), and the ten-household group was one of the institutions they worked hardest to promote. Indonesian officials in Jakarta convened Muslim leaders who issued a letter explaining that the *tonarigumi* system followed Quranic principles (Kurasawa 1988, 284 – 285). The functions of the Javanese *tonarigumi* and the *tonarigumi* in Japan were nearly identical,

comprising civil defense, information distribution, delivery of service to the government and production assistance, and the promotion of mutual aid. Of course, they also incorporated an obligation to protect the community from espionage and criminals (287). This extended beyond simply preventing inappropriate activities or improper persons from entering the community, and included an admonishment that the heads of the *tonarigumi* were responsible for ensuring the moral uprightness of their communities.

Leadership positions within the *tonarigumi* became important springboards for young Indonesians. Although there is today little connection between service in the neighborhood governance system and a government career, during the occupation, the neighborhood governance system was the starting point for younger Indonesians being socialized into politics. Because the principal qualification for the position was literacy (Kurasawa 1988, 290) in a period when most of village officialdom was old and uneducated (Vickers 2005), this was the first taste of civil administration for the first generation of Indonesians literate in the *Indonesian* language (prior generations of administrations had learned Dutch) (Kanahele 1967). By 1945, the position included training (Kurasawa 1988, 291). The system of neighborhood governance thus became an institution associated (in the minds of many notables-to-be) with modern administration, the formation of a nation called Indonesia, and the end of domination by the Dutch and its allies in the petty nobility (Benda 1957). Neighborhood government was a young, modern way of doing things.

Kurasawa concludes that the *tonarigumi* had "dual functions, … as the grassroots unit to assist government administration, and secondly as the lowest unit to help in [neighborhood] activities" (293). The neighborhood governance system carried out administrative and security functions, cheaply, but also engaged in the ground-level work of mass mobilization. Sukarno, leader of the Indonesian client government—and first president of an independent Indonesia— believed that these functions would be essential to the country's future: in a 1944 speech he declaimed that the duties of the *tonarigumi* were to "help the government prosecute the war and to build up a new society" (Kurasawa 1988, 293). The soon-to-be-born country depended on these.

Indonesia, Liberated

The early post-occupation period coincided with Indonesia's war of independence against returning Dutch forces. This was a time when the forces of organized crime and those of law and

order tended to blend together (Cribb 1991). In different regions, the new state contended with foreign invasion, local separatism, and Islamist violence (Vickers 2005). State leaders cast about for whatever was at hand to craft communities of law and order, and to build up the state. In Central Java, local military commanders saw the *tonarigumi* as tools to inculcate "Republic mindedness" and mobilize people for the fight against the Dutch. Here, the system remained in place with no change in name, procedures, or structure (62). As in the occupation period, this institution directed community life, serving as a tool to help establish buy-in to the new state. It was also a tool for controlling territory in conditions of shifting lines and military infiltration (Cribb 1991).

In the post-independence period, the *tonarigumi* system was renamed *Rukun Tetangga*, the system for "neighborhood harmony," and became a voluntary one that not all communities needed to adopt. Where it diminished after the war, it was quickly brought back during the mid-1950s. In Jakarta the system was re-established in 1954. By 1960, 80 percent of residential Jakarta had established these neighborhood committees, following a decision by the city's local military commander (who acted as a kind of deputy governor) to use the committees to encourage residents in the "basic principles" (Kurasawa 2009).

Outside Java, where the system had never been put in place, laws putting it in place passed in 1965; implementation was not complete until 1974 (DPR 1965; DPR 1974). This first law coincided with the apex of Sukarno's "Guided Democracy," a shift to partial (but by 1965, increasingly complete) authoritarian rule (Friend 2003). The re-creation of the occupation-era institution of neighborhood governance was an attempt to reassert social control—one carried out with input from the military.

Just as the military saw the neighborhood committee as a tool for controlled mobilization and ideological education, so too did the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI). Borrowing the language of legitimation used by Japanese occupiers and the national government, the PKI established "*Gotong Royong* [Mutual Aid] Service Sections" that operated at the neighborhood committee level and attempted to place members and sympathizers in neighborhood leadership positions. In Yogyakarta special district in Central Java, about half of neighborhood committee leaders were communists by 1965 (Yoshihara & Diwanto 2001, 63).

From Suharto's New Order to the Present Day

The first and only major restructuring of the neighborhood committees came in 1966, as General Suharto's New Order government consolidated power. It was at this point that the neighborhood committees were given control of the household registration system. Kurasawa (2009, 64) explains that registration served to identify communists and control their movements. To this day, neighborhood committees provide job-seeking residents with "certificates of good behavior," remnants of a tool used to deny services to communists (*ibid*, 64). Sullivan (1992) describes in some detail the power of neighborhood leaders to exclude residents from activities of the neighborhood, and links this to the suppression of the communist party in 1965.

Over the course of the New Order government, neighborhood organizations became an important tool for ruling GOLKAR ("functional groups") party mobilization (Reeve 1985; Yoshihara & Diwanto 2001). It was during this period that the neighborhood governance institution became the nexus of functional organizations for women and youth, and developed a role in electoral administration (which they retain to this day).

In the early 1980s, a wave of crime led the government to deputize neighborhood committees as agents of public safety. Concurrent with a brutal campaign in which military intelligence executed tattooed men by night and left their bodies in public places (Barker 2001; 2006), the neighborhood committees were told to organize security for their neighborhoods and build gates at neighborhood entrances. This effort deputized as law-enforcers the millions of people involved in neighborhood committees (BPS 2011).

Since the 1983 *siskamling* ("environmental security system") law, neighborhood committees have formally had the task of tracking movements in and out of neighborhoods (Barker 2001). Movement control in Indonesia involves registering who lives where and ensuring that the right people are accessing benefits, as in many parts of the world, but also in keeping a record of who was physically present but non-resident. This is a strong signal not to engage in subversive activities. It is also a rule rarely enforced on the rich, nearly impossible in areas with many young people, and similarly difficult where many residents come to the city from elsewhere (Interview 6/15/2014). Urbanization, increasing mobility, and new housing practices are making it difficult for volunteer bureaucrats to keep tabs on the neighborhood.

Indonesian leaders have repeatedly seen neighborhood governance institutions as key tools in responding to threats, from the Allied Forces during the Second World War, the Dutch during

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the war of independence, separatist and Islamist fighters in the post-independence period (and in Aceh until recently), to Communists in the 1960s and criminals in the 1980s. Repeated decisions by leaders are an important part of the explanation for the continued existence—and expansion—of an institution with no indigenous predecessor established during a brief occupation.

In the years since Suharto's fall, local government in Indonesia has been dramatically overhauled at the sub-provincial level. Decentralization made sub-provincial units the primary level of local governance and administration, but left the regulations on neighborhood governance largely intact (Smoke 2007, *Jakarta Post* 2002). What criticisms of neighborhood governance did emerge during the early-2000s *reformasi* era tended to focus on deficiencies in the system, rather than advocating its replacement.

Neighborhood Governance in Present-day Indonesia

Communities in Indonesia use a one- or two-tiered system of neighborhood governance. On the island of Java, were neighborhood governance began during the Japanese occupation, nearly all communities use two tiers. Outside of Java, where neighborhood governance began only after independence, the practice of a two-tier neighborhood administrative system is less common. In areas that use the two-tier system, like Jakarta, a lower-level neighborhood leader, called an RT, heads an association whose members supervise 30 – 50 households, while RWs, the upper-level leaders, supervise three to 15 lower-level RTs. Both tiers are elected in tiny single-member districts and serve three-year terms; voting for these positions is normally done on a per-household rather than per-elector basis.

Most of the work done by these two tiers of neighborhood leaders is paperwork. This paperwork begins with residential registration: among the many pieces of paperwork for which RT and RW signatures are required are identity cards, which serve as proof of residence. But the neighborhood leader's role in paperwork goes far beyond identity cards—nearly any paper-based interaction a person in Indonesia could have with a government entity involves paperwork that passes through the RT and the RW. Family ID cards, residency records, birth and death records, registrations of both marriage and of never having been married, land records, property deeds, and letters in support of an application for title to land, applications for government financial assistance, permission to operate a business in a home, requests to be hooked into the power grid, proof of tax payment—all of these and more require the signature of a neighborhood leader. For people who live in areas with two levels of neighborhood leaders, both must sign before a

request can be processed by the city government. Voting, too, involves the neighborhood leaders at registration, during turnout drives, and on election day itself. This system means that all kinds of administrative decisions lie in the hands of unpaid (elected) volunteers, rather than professional civil servants.

In situations like the one described by a civil servant in Jakarta's Menteng Atas ward, where an office of 13 civil servants administers a region of the city with 32,000 residents (and 147 RTs, the lower-tier neighborhood leaders), the civil servants must rely on the neighborhood leaders' decisions—"we need them," the civil servant explained, echoing the words of a neighborhood leader in another part of the city: "It's not the chief civil servant in the district who knows the people; it's the RTs" (Interview 6/12/2014; Interview 7/15/2014). Without the neighborhood system to screen requests and certify information, it would be very difficult for the Indonesian civil service to do its work—at least in its current form. With functioning neighborhood governance systems, the Indonesian state can administer more with fewer professional civil servants. At the same time, the civil service's dependence on neighborhood leaders likely means that in places where the neighborhood system is not working well, the civil service is less able to do its job.

In addition to paperwork, the job of neighborhood leader comes with responsibilities to lead organizations in the neighborhood and mobilize the neighborhood for "duty work," a monthly work assignment from the chief civil servant in the area. The organizations with which the neighborhood leader is connected are many and comprehensive: there is a women's organization, a youth organization, a monthly health clinic for young children, a group for elderly residents, a revolving credit vehicle, and often, a Quran study group that is technically not part of neighborhood association business but often coterminous with the neighborhood leadership. These associations come in addition to the association formed from the neighborhood leadership. Links between these national organizations are not quite as tied to the neighborhood governance as they used to be—it is now appropriate for the head of the women's organization to be someone other than the wife of the neighborhood leader (Yoshihara and Diwanto 2001). For the lower-tier leaders, this is the RT, his treasurer, and his secretary. For the upper-tier RW, this is the body of RTs, an assistant RW, and four or more "section heads" with different areas of responsibility. The neighborhood leader anchors a plethora of organizations built by the state around the neighborhood unit.

All of this work weighs heavily on the neighborhood leaders' time, and it is easy to imagine a situation where even a dedicated neighborhood leader is unable to keep up with the flood of paperwork and meetings that go along with the unpaid job. Just as the civil servants relied on neighborhood leaders to make the neighborhood legible, the size of the neighborhood led by an RT or RW likely places constraints on their ability to carry out their assigned duties. Lipsky, in *Street-level Bureaucracy* (1977), describes how large caseloads limit bureaucrats' ability to develop personal relationships with those they interact with. In Indonesia's volunteer bureaucracy, it is often knowledge from personal relationships that underpins decision-making by the neighborhood bureaucrats. Where caseloads are high, that is, where there are more households per neighborhood leader, the administrative work of the volunteer bureaucrat is greater. Simply measuring the number of households served by a single neighborhood leader at the lowest tier likely provides a useful barometer of how effective administration and, perhaps, public goods provision are in a neighborhood. As a tool for understanding local administration, within-city and within-regency variation in neighborhood leaders per household are highly salient. The number of households served by a neighborhood leader varies a great deal across Indonesia, and in future work I will study why neighborhood leader density varies at the cross-regional level (see figure below). Notably, the average numbers of households served by neighborhood leaders in the outer islands is often smaller than the number served by neighborhood leaders on Java. This may reflect greater rurality outside of Java, a legacy of Javanization and transmigration programs during Suharto's New Order government (Interview 7/5/2014), greater government support, or a number of other possible alternatives.

Households per Volunteer Bureaucrat
By Subdistrict or Village, PODES 2011

Households per Volunteer Bureaucrat
National Mean = 66 (in Red)

Share of Subdistricts / Villages

The previous section addressed the many tasks neighborhood governance institutions perform in Indonesia, and suggested that they do so quite cheaply relative to what it would cost to employ civil servants for the same tasks. One answer to the question of why the institution of neighborhood governance persists—and has been chosen repeatedly by leaders in Indonesia—is precisely that: the neighborhood governance system is a cheap solution to all sorts of public administration problems. But this actor-centered, functionalist answer (Pierson 2004, 107) is more useful in explaining why Indonesian leaders never got rid of the system than why it was first adopted or, even more interestingly, why it continues to work. Dwelling on the importance of cheap labor to the story raises a tricky question: why are people choosing to become neighborhood leaders?

Explaining Participation

Simply identifying that the neighborhood governance system in Indonesia provides a great deal of free labor to the state provides a possible reason for why state leaders have turned to it repeatedly in their state-building project. It does not explain what, when we consider the tasks assigned to the neighborhood bureaucracy, might motivate people to participate in it. Benjamin Read, in his look at neighborhood governance in Taiwan and China concluded that the motivations of service in these organizations were similar to motivations of people volunteering in any other sort of organization, though he notes that "service in official auxiliaries also has its own distinct appeals" (2012, 9). One "distinct appeal" might be opportunities to collect rents. In this section, I examine what motivates Indonesians to serve in their neighborhood governance system, and find that rent-seeking explanations have important, but limited, explanatory power. These explanations run up against the stark pettiness of the neighborhood leader's job. A more complete explanation of participation in neighborhood associations needs to incorporate learned norms of service, status-seeking, social ties within the community, and how easy it is to monitor neighbors.[2] This provides the basis for a series of predictions about neighborhood governance systems across Indonesia.

Why would an individual choose to spend two hours each weeknight taking paperwork for his or her neighbors? As an RW (upper-tier neighborhood leader) in Jakarta's Karet Kuningan

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[2] At times during Suharto's New Order government, the neighborhood association leadership positions appear to have come with some opportunities for advancement into the ruling GOLKAR party. This appears to have changed; future versions of this work will address the changing GOLKAR party and its connection to neighborhood governance.

ward described it, this work was "not enjoyable," yet he persisted in doing it (Interview 7/15/2014).

Although positions in the neighborhood governance system are unpaid, there are opportunities for neighborhood leaders to gain materially from their position. In some cases, they can make money by misusing or embezzling government funds. In Jakarta, but not elsewhere, neighborhood leaders are given "intensive operational money," about 28 dollars per month to defray expenses related to neighborhood activities. Every neighborhood leader interviewed about this money insisted that it was "not a salary." An RW in Jakarta's Karet Semanggi ward explained,

> Operational money, that comes in. We give a photocopy to the security early each morning so that people know. It is not a salary, it is operational money.

It is, however, worth noting that while the "operational money" has been handed out since 2007, accounting began in 2012. It is not a very large sum. In return for being on call to resolve disputes and coordinate responses to problems at any hour, and spending hours each night taking paperwork, a neighborhood leader treating the operational money as a salary would be getting a raw deal, even by Indonesian standards. The opportunity to extract money directly from the city government is one available only to neighborhood leaders in the city of Jakarta. Thus the most straightforward rent opportunity for neighborhood leaders is only available in a single province, and is small in absolute terms.

The small rents available to Jakarta neighborhood leaders interested in embezzling have not deterred people from seeking the position. An upper-tier neighborhood leader in Jakarta's Kenari ward explained that in his area there are never shortages of candidates because residents there believed the position *did* come with a salary. Kenari is a very poor area. Most of the houses had been built without plumbing, and, according to this neighborhood leader, residents came to him frequently to complain about how the ward government would not build new communal toilets (Interview 6/30/2014). Neighborhood association members in another part of that same ward lamented the "stupid people" who sought positions in the neighborhood association while lacking "community spirit." Unlike those people, these leaders explained, "We just care about the neighborhood" (Interview 7/1/2014). In this poor community, the possible cash incentives attached to the neighborhood governance system ensured a steady flow of candidates for

office—they also generated ill will from residents who suspected their neighbors of inappropriate motivations. These sentiments are little changed from those reported in 2002, when budgets were first allocated to neighborhood governance institutions. A woman identified as a housewife in a story published at the time seems to be source of the echoes I heard twelve years later: "I'm afraid the monthly allowance will tempt people, regardless their qualifications, including the uneducated and the unemployed, to compete for the posts" (*Jakarta Post* 2002).

Because of their role as (often literal) gatekeepers in Indonesian neighborhoods, neighborhood leaders can extract rents from people who wish to access their neighborhoods. The *Jakarta Post* reported on a group of RTs in a poor neighborhood of Jakarta who charged street sellers for permission to enter their neighborhood (Setiawati 2014). Schemes like these could provide an additional possible source of income for neighborhood leaders in places where there are people willing to pay for access to the neighborhood. Neighborhood leaders involved in such schemes would still run the risk of upsetting their neighbors—a serious cost in the densest areas.

Considering the kinds of documents that pass through the hands of neighborhood leaders, it might be possible for neighborhood leaders to simply charge a fee to residents asking for services. Remembering that neighborhood association leaders are elected, subject to the control of the local civil service, and live in the neighborhood with the people who elected them, extortion of this kind is likely costly, unless a neighborhood leader can be sure that the person he is demanding money from has no support in the neighborhood, no recourse to higher authorities, and no ability to impose costs on the leader. Such a situation could arise in a community experiencing an influx of outsiders, especially if the new residents are temporary or lack proper documentation.

One benefit of leading the neighborhood association is in what it does for relationships with neighbors. These relationships are both intrinsically and materially valuable. Serving as neighborhood leader provides many opportunities for a person to gain esteem, an important motivation for many costly actions (Wilson 1973). There are additional, and potentially large indirect material benefits. Helping neighbors get on the rolls of the benefits programs, organizing security and mosquito fogging, and mediating disputes all build up a store of goodwill toward the neighborhood leader, rooted in the understanding that he has done his part. In poor communities where webs of mutual obligation are critical to survival (Sullivan 1992), fostering these ties is one of the most important material reasons to become a neighborhood association leader. In

Kenari ward, one upper-level neighborhood leader noted that every one of the families in his area received aid from the Jakarta city programs (Interview 6/30/2014). This is without a doubt related to the concentration of poverty in that neighborhood. But as this section suggests, there are tangible benefits that flow to a neighborhood leader willing to stretch the eligibility criteria when his neighbors come asking for aid. When one's neighbors live ten feet away (as they do in tight-packed Kenari), getting along with them is important, and valuable.

For people with little money, the possibility of appropriating a small salary is a powerful incentive to participate—this is why there is no shortage of candidates in Kenari ward. Other sources of money potentially available to neighborhood association leaders—embezzlement of funds collected for neighborhood activities, demands of payment in return for carrying out basic services—are similarly low-yield and carry meaningful risks in the enmity of wronged neighbors. All of these benefits are small in absolute terms, and should be expected to shape association behavior in the poorest neighborhoods. Identifying these rents should not blind us to the fact that even the most feckless would-be neighborhood leader operates under constraints: he is still elected, and in many circumstances, it is costly to be believed untrustworthy by neighbors. As Sullivan wrote, "RT chiefs in Yogyakarta are moved by neighborly pressure to run their [community] in the community interest" (1992, 145). The degree to which opportunities to extract rents at this neighborhood level lead to rent-seeking behavior are conditioned by the costs leaders could incur in the process. These costs are both reputational and indirectly material, and their size depends on characteristics of the community. In particular, where there is strong mutual monitoring—something engendered by residential stability and higher densities—the costs of misconduct are likely quite high.

In interviews with neighborhood association personnel at both the upper (RW) and lower (RT) level, respondents explained that they participated because they wanted to serve the community. One RW described his work as RW as the kind of good work that will help the community and ensure his place in the afterlife:

> Really, I wanted to become RW only to care for the neighborhood. First to care (*peduli*) for the neighborhood; if the neighborhood doesn't have a leader, doesn't have someone to regulate (*mengatur*), then of course this village will become a mess (*ambrul adul*). First, as a person of the world (*duniawi*), as this I want to care for my neighborhood, my home village. But in my soul, I want to observe my religious obligations (*mau ibadah*). I am already old. In my old days I want to be

observant, maybe later I will close my eyes, I have done my charity towards the community, that's another. So there are two parts. The first part is my service to the neighborhood. The second is my private religious obligation.

In this RW's account, his work as the secretary and later, head, of the neighborhood association came from his belief that he ought to serve his community. His desire to serve relates both to the neediness of the neighborhood (a theme he revisited several times) and to a sense of obligation. He added, "What we do in the world that is good, later after God has taken us…we will be asked of our works (*perbuatan*) in the world—were they good or bad?" (Interview 6/30/2014). Serving as leader of the neighborhood association will help him answer that his works in the world were good.

Several things about this RW's testimony reflect characteristics that form an important type. He is retired, he is a man, he professes the same religion as most of the people in his neighborhood, he is wealthier than many people in his neighborhood (he has a toilet), and he has a strong sense of obligation to the neighborhood. Many, but not all, RWs and RTs interviewed fit this profile. His account stresses the need for leadership in the neighborhood and the fact that the neighborhood association seemed automatically the right way in which to carry out this service. Giving back means serving in the neighborhood association, rather than in some other group, like, in the case of his neighborhood, a separate "foundation formed by the community living in Kenari Ward," an organization that does, but is not where he chooses to serve.

The RW quoted above is only one of many RWs and RTs who described their service in terms of (Muslim) religious obligation. An RW in Karet Kuningan ward took the discussion of neighborhood association work to explain to me that "religious obligation is not only prayer," it also involves service. Non-Muslim neighborhood association leaders also described their activity in terms of giving back, although they did not use the word translated as "religious obligation" in this paper because the word has a more restricted meaning in Christian communities, and is sometimes shied away from for its connections to Islam.

The connection between the desire to give back and the *choice* to give back through participation in the neighborhood association appears deeply connected to the ideological project begun during the Japanese occupation, in which neighborhood governance institutions were linked to the traditional Javanese value of mutual assistance. The sense that participation in the neighborhood association constitutes an appropriate way to fulfill the Muslim religious

obligation of service is in turn related to the way traditional Javanese values have come to be articulated on Java as Muslim values (Geertz 1960). Because the conflation of mutual aid values and neighborhood organizations was an important part of Suharto-era rhetoric, older Indonesians, those with the longest exposure to the Suharto project, should be far more likely to understand the neighborhood associations as places to carry out their religious obligation, and to associate mutual aid with the neighborhood associations. This set of associated beliefs may be less common in younger people who spent less time being socialized under the Suharto regime. It is also a less likely package of beliefs outside of Java.

Some candidates for neighborhood leadership positions seek to affirm their status in the community, or are status-seeking, hoping that by serving in the neighborhood leadership they can hold higher status within the community. For some participants in the neighborhood association, their activities are in part a reflection of the status that comes with the job. Leaders of the neighborhood association are elected by tens or even hundreds of their neighbors, and both leading and participating give those who join an active role in the community that includes responsibilities widely acknowledged to be important. Two possible status motivations are likely at play. Some aspirants to the head of the neighborhood association see the position as a way to increase social status. Simply being the RT or RW comes, at least in their minds, with a measure of status that could not be attained otherwise. For other aspirants, the position of RW may be part of a broader effort to certify their status as leaders in the neighborhood. One RW described with pride how he had gotten money together from local factories to rebuild a bridge the government could not pay to fix (Interview 6/14/2014). For this longtime neighborhood association leader, his position as RW was the direct consequence of his stature in the community. Social climbers and those with a sense of *noblesse oblige* may be more likely to join their neighborhood associations.

Not all neighborhoods suffer from a surfeit of candidacies. For many wealthier neighborhood association leaders, the time investment is deeply irksome. Rich people tend to avoid the job, though in general, neighborhood leaders tend to be wealthier than the average neighborhood resident. The problem of few willing candidates in wealthier areas has long been noted in the press (*Jakarta Post* 2001). When speaking with RTs and RWs in wealthier neighborhoods, a common story of their involvement begins with an invitation from neighbors to attend the association meeting. Having turned up for the first time in years, the less-than-willing

citizen finds that his name has now been put forward for RT or RW. There being no other candidates, he is stuck with the responsibility. This highlights two important differences at work in wealthier communities. First, it is common in wealthier neighborhoods for there to be a shortage of candidates for leadership positions in the neighborhood association. Second, social pressure plays an important role in ensuring the associations are adequately staffed. This social pressure should be understood as a very strong force in ensuring compliance, as has been well-documented in the large anthropological literature on Indonesian communities (beginning, but certainly not ending, with Geertz 1960; Sullivan 1992). The intensity of this social pressure will, however, be conditioned by the degree to which residents in a neighborhood can monitor one another.

Social pressure is an important part of why wealthier Indonesians participate in neighborhood associations. Where there are few candidates, social pressure can be brought to bear to induce someone to serve. It is harder to exert social pressure on people one does not know, and communities characterized by short-term residence are likely to be characterized by ineffective neighborhood institutions. In such places I expect residential registries to be incomplete and, in lower-income areas with high residential turnover, sale of access to the neighborhood to be especially common. The enervating consequences of short-term residence should be visible both in wealthier, newly developed apartment areas as well as in those neighborhoods that serve as collection points for newly arrived residents of Jakarta, though the signs of dysfunction likely differ in wealthier areas. One city ward illustrates this dynamic well. Menteng Atas, a mid-size ward in central Jakarta, contains a large area of slum housing where the RTs are largely unaware of who is present and who is not (Interview 6/15/2014). The ward also contains Taman Rasuna, a complex of nine residential towers almost 40 stories tall, two malls, a college, a luxury hotel, and the headquarters of a major Indonesian developer. The complex's apartments have one RW and several dozen RTs; the RW is notable in the ward office for having shown up exactly once in the past four years (the other neighborhood leaders attend monthly meetings with the ward chief). In the slums, high inflows and outflows of people make the residency record job of the RT very difficult. In the apartments, well-off residents with few ties to one another simply do not participate in the neighborhood system beyond the formality of electing neighborhood leaders.

In this section I have addressed the question of why so many Indonesians spend so much time doing administrative work for the state. Why do people join the volunteer bureaucracy when it is so costly to participate? The answers have implications for the effective functioning of the neighborhood governance system in different communities. For some neighborhood leaders, rents are a powerful incentive. But rents are only worthwhile for lower-income neighborhood leaders who have reason to think they can get away with rent-seeking. Whether rent-seeking behavior will impede the functioning of neighborhood institutions in a poor neighborhood depends on how stable residence is. Less stable, poorer communities are likely to have more neighborhood leaders who find rent-seeking worthwhile. For neighborhood leaders motivated by service, an important factor directing their service to the neighborhood system, rather than to some other service organization, is a set of norms taught during the Suharto era. Neighborhood leaders who connect their service to these norms are likely to be older than other neighborhood leaders. Some neighborhood leaders serve reluctantly, and may not be very active. This is likely to occur in wealthier areas. In general, wealthier areas are likely to suffer shortages of candidates for neighborhood office. This tendency is likely exacerbated where there are few ties between neighbors, as in high-end apartment blocks. The distribution of age, wealth, residential stability, and housing patterns in a community can plausibly affect how well a neighborhood governance system functions. By shaping neighborhood residents' incentives to participate in the neighborhood system, facilitating or complicating the tasks of neighborhood bureaucrats, and altering the costs of misconduct, each of these community characteristics shapes the ways volunteer bureaucrats bring the state to their communities.

Future Work: Measuring Variation and Consequences

In countries where neighborhood governance institutions are used, they tend to play a significant role in public administration and public goods provision. Indonesia is one of the best examples of the degree to which a neighborhood governance system can play a role in nearly all government-citizen interactions. It is likely that putting so much of public administration into the hands of volunteers has consequences for service delivery and public administration of many kinds. The work so far on neighborhood governance institutions has covered how they work in a few countries, but it has not attempted to tie them to policy outcomes, or to address on a large scale how local conditions might affect their operation. I am interested in both of these questions— how and why centralized neighborhood systems vary from place to place, and how variations in

the characteristics of the neighborhood system affect other things. The first approach takes the neighborhood association itself as a dependent variable, to study how local situations have transmuted it. The second uses it as an explanatory variable. Indonesia has a great deal of variation in how neighborhood institutions function, likely related to the very different contexts into which neighborhood governance systems have been embedded.

A neighborhood governance institution is likely to be shaped to a large degree by the neighborhood into which it is embedded. I have argued that within communities, neighborhood characteristics will explain much of the variation in how the neighborhood bureaucracy functions. This is separate from larger questions of variation across municipalities and regions. To understand how different neighborhood governance institutions are across Indonesia, and the degree to which that difference depends on local conditions, I plan to test whether certain local conditions—including those identified in the previous section—are associated with changes in the structure of neighborhood institutions. In this case, the neighborhood institution would be operationalized in terms of its density—the number of households per neighborhood leader, and in terms of its structure—the probability that a given area has a two-tier or one-tier neighborhood system. Using the Village Potential Statistics (PODES) study, a dataset collected periodically by the national statistical bureau, I have measures of the number of neighborhood leaders in a community, as well as some information about income and housing patterns. These would be used to test whether patterns I observed affecting people's willingness to participate in the neighborhood system operate nationwide.

Much of the work of the neighborhood system is in mobilizing people. One of the most important mobilization tasks assigned to neighborhood associations in Indonesia is that of organizing polling places and providing residents with the documentation needed to vote. As part of that process, neighborhood leaders distribute voting cards, post a list of registered voters, and place a stamp on each residence indicating how many registered voters live in that building. From the experimental literature in American politics, these are all likely to increase turnout. But the effectiveness of each of these turnout-increasing efforts will vary with the size of the task facing each neighborhood leader. Those who must serve a large number of residents, especially those who must do so without the assistance of an active neighborhood association, are likely not to do as much. I suspect that this should be manifest in lower turnout where there are more households per neighborhood leader. Turnout data will come from precinct-level lists of

registered voters, which I plan to scrape from a public database maintained by the Indonesian election commission. By comparing the number of votes cast to the number of people on the list, it will be possible to calculate turnout. I will then model turnout as a function of houses per neighborhood leader using the nationwide data on the number of neighborhood leaders as the main explanatory variable.

There is a growing literature on the relationship between organizational life and disaster recovery that connects stronger pre-disaster organizational life to more complete recovery after a disaster (Aldrich 2012). I have tried to test this theory using data from Aceh province before and after the 2005 Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami. I tried to model recovery in terms of percent change in small businesses operating in an area before and after the tsunami, predicted by density of neighborhood leaders *before* the tsunami, conditional on the severity of the tsunami in an administrative area. The hypothesis was that the decline in the number of businesses, conditional on tsunami severity, would be smaller in places with more neighborhood leaders per capita. Data limitations (many of the most-affected areas did not file their semi-annual report to the national statistical bureau) and the choice of a truly catastrophic disaster resulted in a null finding that I do not yet trust. It may be possible to repeat this procedure with a less catastrophic disaster, such as a volcanic eruption (there are many) or the annual flooding that occurs in Jakarta.

Variations on the institutional characteristics and the effects of neighborhood institutions across Indonesia can help illuminate how neighborhood governance institutions are altered by their local contexts and the degree to which institutional characteristics affect service delivery by neighborhood-level institutions.

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