Optimal Income Taxation

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GOALS OF THESE LECTURES

1) Take a look at actual taxes and transfers in the U.S.

2) Understand the core optimal income tax model: linear and nonlinear taxes in the Saez (2001) framework.
   General method, intuitive, sufficient statistics.

3) Introduce the mechanism design approach of Mirrlees (1971).
   Incentive compatibility, optimal control.
   With and without income effects.

4) Extensions: Migration and rent-seeking

5) Should commodity taxes be used in addition to income taxes?
   Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem
Songs have been written about taxes...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0zaebtU-CA
Songs have been written about taxes... I

One, two, three, four

Let me tell you how it will be

There’s one for you, nineteen for me

’Cause I’m the taxman

Yeah, I’m the taxman

Should five per cent appear too small?

Be thankful I don’t take it all

’Cause I’m the taxman

Yeah, I’m the taxman

I’ll tax the street

(If you try to sit, sit)
Songs have been written about taxes. II

I’ll tax your seat

(If you get too cold, cold)

I’ll tax the heat

(If you take a walk, walk)

I’ll tax your feet

Taxman!

’Cause I’m the taxman

Yeah, I’m the taxman

Don’t ask me what I want it for

(Ha, ha, Mr. Wilson)

If you don’t want to pay some more
Songs have been written about taxes.. III

(Ha, ha, Mr. Heath)

’Cause I’m the taxman

Yeah, I’m the taxman

Now my advice for those who die

Declare the pennies on your eyes

Yeah, I’m the taxman (yeah, I’m the taxman)

And you’re working for no one but me (taxman!)
If you find it hard.. you’re not alone..!

“The hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.”

— Albert Einstein
TAXATION AND REDISTRIBUTION

**Key question:** Should government reduce inequality using taxes and transfers?

1) Governments use **taxes** to raise revenue

2) This revenue funds **transfer** programs:

a) Universal Transfers: Education, Health Care (only 65+ in the US), Retirement and Disability

b) Means-tested Transfers: In-kind (e.g., public housing, nutrition, Medicaid in the US) and cash

Modern governments raise large fraction of GDP in taxes (30-45%) and spend significant fraction of GDP on transfers

This lecture follows Piketty and Saez ’13 handbook chapter
GOAL: TAKE A LOOK AT ACTUAL TAX SYSTEM

Sometimes you are an optimal tax theorist and don’t know the actual top tax rates... is it bad?

_Einstein was once asked how many feet are in a mile. Einstein’s reply was ‘I don’t know, why should I fill my brain with facts I can find in two minutes in any standard reference book?’_

However.. you need to know institutional details not for the sake of the numbers, but because they help us understand why things are as they are, what’s important and what not. It’s not boring. It’s crucial.

You should not try to capture all institutional details in your models. But unless you know them, you cannot argue they are second-order. (Sometimes the devil is in the detail, sometimes not).

The tax system reflects (in addition to all economic forces:)

i) social judgements made by people and policy makers and

ii) lobbying, political economy, interest groups.

Understand the implicit social judgements behind the tax system.

Question them! Which constraints are truly “irremovable”? 
Means-tested Transfers in the US, 1960-2019

FACTS ON US TAXES AND TRANSFERS

References: Comprehensive description in Gruber undergrad textbook (taxes/transfers) and Slemrod-Bakija (taxes)

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/

A) Taxes: (1) individual income tax (fed+state), (2) payroll taxes on earnings (fed, funds Social Security+Medicare), (3) corporate income tax (fed+state), (4) sales taxes (state)+excise taxes (state+fed), (5) property taxes (state)

B) Means-tested Transfers: (1) refundable tax credits (fed), (2) in-kind transfers (fed+state): Medicaid, public housing, nutrition (SNAP), education (3) cash welfare: TANF for single parents (fed+state), SSI for old/disabled (fed)
FEDERAL US INCOME TAX

US income tax assessed on annual family income (not individual) [most other OECD countries have shifted to individual assessment]

Sum all cash income sources from family members (both from labor and capital income sources) = called Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)

Main exclusions: fringe benefits (health insurance, pension contributions and returns), imputed rent of homeowners, undistributed corporate profits, interest from state+local bonds, unrealized capital gains

⇒ AGI base is only 70% of factor national income (earned by some factor at some point).
Taxable income = AGI - personal exemptions - deduction

personal exemptions = Used to be $4K * # family members (in 2016/17). Removed in TCJA 2018.

deduction is max of standard deduction or itemized deductions

Standard deduction is a fixed amount depending on family structure ($25K for couple, $12.5K for single in 2021 (it basically doubled when personal exemption abolished))

Itemized deductions: (a) state and local taxes paid (only up to $10K since 2018), (b) mortgage interest payments, (c) charitable giving, various small other items

[about 10% of AGI lost through itemized deductions, called tax expenditures]

In 2018+, only 10% of tax filers itemize (30% before 2018)
FEDERAL US INCOME TAX: TAX BRACKETS

Tax $T(z)$ is piecewise linear and continuous function of taxable income $z$ with constant marginal tax rates (MTR) $T'(z)$ by brackets

In 2018+, 7 brackets with MTR 10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, 37% (top bracket for $z$ above $600K$), indexed on price inflation

Lower preferential rates (up to a max of 20%) apply to dividends (since 2003) and realized capital gains [in part to offset double taxation of corporate profits]

20% of business profits are exempt since 2018

Tax rates change frequently over time. Top MTRs have declined drastically since 1960s (as in many OECD countries)
T(z) is continuous in z

slope 37%
slope 12%
slope 10%

T(z) Individual Income Tax
Marginal Income Tax

\( T'(z) \) is a step function

- 10%
- 12%
- 37%

Taxable income \( z \)
Historically, a 70 percent marginal tax rate is not unusual

The top marginal income tax rates from 1913 to 2018

1981
Reagan took office

SOURCE: TAX POLICY CENTER
In practice...
## 2018 US Personal Income Tax Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Married Filing Jointly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Up to $9,525</td>
<td>Up to $19,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>$9,526 to $38,700</td>
<td>$19,051 to $77,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22%</td>
<td>$38,701 to $82,500</td>
<td>$77,401 to $165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24%</td>
<td>$82,501 to $157,500</td>
<td>$165,001 to $315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32%</td>
<td>$157,501 to $200,000</td>
<td>$315,001 to $400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$200,001 to $500,000</td>
<td>$400,001 to $600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37%</td>
<td>over $500,000</td>
<td>over $600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alternative minimum tax (AMT) is a parallel tax system (quasi flat tax at 28%) with fewer deductions: actual tax = $\max(T(z), AMT)$ (hits < 1% of taxpayers in 2018+)

Tax credits: Additional reduction in taxes

1. Non refundable (cannot reduce taxes below zero): foreign tax credit, child care expenses, education credits, energy credits

2. Refundable (can reduce taxes below zero, i.e., be net transfers): EITC (earned income tax credit, up to $3.5K, $5.7K, $6.5K for working families with 1, 2, 3+ kids), Child Tax Credit ($2K per kid, partly refundable)

2021: CTC expanded to $3K per kid and fully refundable.

Refundable credits have become the largest means-tested cash transfer in the US
The Phase-In and Phaseout of the EITC

Credit Amount by Marital Status and Number of Children

- Three or More Children
- Two Children
- One Child
- No Children

Earnings

Credit Amount

FIGURE 1
Child Tax Credit, Single Parent
For one child, tax year 2020

Credit for children under age 17  Credit for other dependents

Adjusted gross income

Notes: Assumes all income comes from earnings, and child meets all tests to be a CTC-qualifying dependent. Credit for married parents begins to phase out at $400,000 of income. Only citizen children qualify for the $2,000 CTC for children under 17. Noncitizens under age 17 who meet the dependency tests of eligibility can qualify for the credit for dependents over age 17.
FIGURE 1
Child Tax Credit, Single Parent
For one child, tax year 2021

Notes: Assumes all income comes from earnings, and child meets all tests to be a CTC-qualifying dependent. $3,000 and $3,600 credits are fully refundable; prior law limited refunds to $1,400 out of the maximum $2,000 credit. Credit for married parents first phases out at $150,000 of income until credit reaches pre-2021 level; begins second phase out at $400,000 of income. Only citizen children qualify for the $3,000 and $3,600 credits for children under 18. Noncitizens under age 18 who meet the dependency tests of eligibility can qualify other dependent credit.
Basic Income vs. Means-tested transfer: Mankiw quiz

Consider an economy in which average income is $50,000 but with much income inequality. To provide a social safety net, two possible policies are proposed.

A. A universal transfer of $10,000 to every person, financed by a 20-percent flat tax on all incomes.

B. A means-tested transfer of $10,000. The full amount goes to someone without any income. The transfer is then phased out: You lose 20 cents of it for every dollar of income you earn. These transfers are financed by a tax of 20 percent on income above $50,000.

Which would you prefer?
Basic Income vs. Means-tested transfer

Basic income definition: all people receive an unconditional sum of money (every year) regardless of how much they earn

This is the $R$ of the linear tax system $c = (1 - \tau) \cdot z + R$

Or the $-T(0) > 0$ of the nonlinear tax system $c = z - T(z)$

Basic income for everybody + higher taxes to fund it is **economically equivalent** to means-tested transfer Pro basic income: less stigmatizing than means-tested transfer

Cons: basic income requires higher “nominal” taxes (that are then rebated back)

Pros: Much more widely accepted. Countries provide “in-kind” basic income in the form of universal health care (not the US), public education, and child allowances
Basic income vs. Means-tested transfer

Budget: \( c = (1-\tau) z + R \)

**Basic income:** give \( R \) to all, Tax all earnings \( z \) at MTR \( \tau \)

**Means-tested transfer:** give \( R \) to people with \( z=0 \), give \( R-\tau z \) to people with \( z \) in \((0,z^*)\), Tax earnings \( z \) at MTR \( \tau \) but only above \( z^* \)
FEDERAL US INCOME TAX: TAX FILING

Taxes on year $t$ earnings are withheld on paychecks during year $t$ (pay-as-you-earn) (Why?)

Income tax return filed in January-April 15, year $t+1$ [filers use either software or tax preparers, huge private industry]

Most tax filers get a tax refund as withholdings $>\text{net taxes owed}$

Payers (employers, banks, etc.) send income information to IRS (US Tax administration) (3rd party reporting)

Third party reporting + withholding at source is key for successful enforcement
MAIN MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS

1) **Traditional transfers:** managed by welfare agencies, paid on monthly basis, high stigma and take-up costs ⇒ low take-up rates

Main programs: Medicaid (health insurance for low incomes), Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, former food stamps), public housing, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF, traditional welfare), Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (aged+disabled)

2) **Refundable income tax credits:** managed by tax administration, paid as an annual lumpsum in year $t+1$, low stigma and take-up cost ⇒ high take-up rates

Main programs: EITC and Child Tax Credit [large expansion since the 1990s] for low income working families with children

→ move has been from “support the very poor” to “support working low-income.”
BOTTOM LINE ON ACTUAL TAXES/TRANSFERS

1) Based on current income, family situation, and disability (retirement) status ⇒ Strong link with current ability to pay

2) Some allowances made to reward / encourage certain behaviors: charitable giving, home ownership, savings, energy conservation, and more recently work (refundable tax credits such as EITC)

Do you think this is the role of the tax system?

3) Provisions pile up overtime making tax/transfer system more and more complex until significant simplifying reform happens (such as US Tax Reform Act of 1986, or TCJA 2018)

Motto: any vested interest you create will be impossible to remove.
KEY CONCEPTS FOR TAXES/TRANSFERS

1) Transfer benefit with zero earnings $- T(0)$ [sometimes called demogrant or lumpsum grant] Fancy word: Universal Basic Income (UBI)

2) Marginal tax rate (or phasing-out rate) $T'(z)$: individual keeps $1 - T'(z)$ for an additional $1$ of earnings (intensive labor supply response)

3) Participation tax rate $\tau_p = [T(z) - T(0)] / z$: individual keeps fraction $1 - \tau_p$ of earnings when moving from zero earnings to earnings $z$ (extensive labor supply response):

$$z - T(z) = -T(0) + z - [T(z) - T(0)] = -T(0) + z \cdot (1 - \tau_p)$$

4) Break-even earnings point $z^*$: point at which $T(z^*) = 0$
If line is steeper is that more or less redistribution?

What is perfect redistribution? What is no redistribution?
\[ c = z - T(z) \]

\[ \tau_p = \text{participation tax rate} \]

\[ (1 - \tau_p)z \]
US Tax/Transfer System, single parent with 2 children, 2009

Gross Earnings (with employer payroll taxes)

Disposable earnings

Welfare:
TANF+SNAP

Tax credits:
EITC+CTC

Earnings after Fed+SSA taxes

45 Degree Line

Source: Federal Govt
Source: Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez (2012)
OPTIMAL TAXATION: SIMPLE MODEL WITH NO BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES

Utility $u(c)$ strictly increasing and concave

Same for everybody where $c$ is after tax income.

Income is $z$ and is fixed for each individual, $c = z - T(z)$ where $T(z)$ is tax on $z$. $z$ has density distribution $h(z)$

Government maximizes Utilitarian objective:

$$\int_{0}^{\infty} u(z - T(z)) h(z) dz$$

subject to budget constraint $\int T(z) h(z) dz \geq E$ (multiplier $\lambda$)
SIMPLE MODEL WITH NO BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES

Form lagrangian: \( L = [u(z - T(z)) + \lambda \cdot T(z)] \cdot h(z) \)

First order condition (FOC) in \( T(z) \):

\[
0 = \frac{\partial L}{\partial T(z)} = [-u'(z - T(z)) + \lambda] \cdot h(z) \Rightarrow u'(z - T(z)) = \lambda
\]

\( \Rightarrow z - T(z) = \) constant for all \( z \).

\( \Rightarrow c = \bar{z} - E \) where \( \bar{z} = \int zh(z)dz \) average income.

100% marginal tax rate. Perfect equalization of after-tax income.

Utilitarianism with decreasing marginal utility leads to perfect egalitarianism [Edgeworth, 1897]
Utilitarianism and Redistribution

Utility

Consumption $c_1 + c_2$

$u(c_1 + c_2)$

$u(c_1) + u(c_2)$

$\frac{c_1 + c_2}{2}$

Consumption $c$

$u(c)$
Optimal Tax/Transfer Systems

- $z - T(z)$
- $-T(0)$
- No taxes/transfers
- Optimal tax system with no behavioral responses: 100% redistribution

Diagram showing after-tax income and transfer income.
ISSUES WITH SIMPLE MODEL

1) **No behavioral responses:** Obvious missing piece: 100% redistribution would destroy incentives to work and thus the assumption that $z$ is exogenous is unrealistic

⇒ Optimal income tax theory incorporates behavioral responses (Mirrlees RESstud ’71): **equity-efficiency trade-off**

2) **Issue with Utilitarianism:** Even absent behavioral responses, many people would object to 100% redistribution [perceived as confiscatory]

⇒ Citizens’ views on fairness impose **bounds** on redistribution.

The issue is in part the restricted nature of social preferences that can be captured by most social welfare functions.

We will discuss preferences for redistribution in another lecture! For now we remain agnostic about the “$g_i$.”
MIRRLEES OPTIMAL INCOME TAX MODEL

We will solve the Mirrleesian model later. For now, let’s look at the spirit of optimal tax evolution.

1) Standard labor supply model: Individual maximizes $u(c, l)$ subject to $c = wl - T(wl)$ where $c$ consumption, $l$ labor supply, $w$ wage rate, $T(\cdot)$ nonlinear income tax ⇒ taxes affect labor supply

2) Individuals differ in ability $w$, private information $w$ distributed with density $f(w)$.

3) Govt social welfare maximization: Govt maximizes

$$SWF = \int G(u(c, l)) f(w) dw$$

($G(\cdot) \uparrow$ concave) subject to

(a) budget constraint $\int T(wl) f(w) dw \geq E$ (multiplier $\lambda$)

(b) individuals’ labor supply $l$ depends on $T(\cdot)$
MIRRLEES MODEL RESULTS

Optimal income tax trades-off redistribution and efficiency (as tax based on $w$ only not feasible)

$\Rightarrow T(.) < 0$ at bottom (transfer) and $T(.) > 0$ further up (tax) [full integration of taxes/transfers]

MIRRLEES formulas complex, only a couple fairly general results:

1) $0 \leq T'(.) \leq 1, \ T'(.) \geq 0$ is non-trivial (rules out EITC) [Seade '77]

2) Marginal tax rate $T'(.)$ should be zero at the top (if skill distribution bounded) [Sadka '76-Seade '77]

3) If everybody works and lowest $wl > 0, \ T'(.) = 0$ at bottom
HISTORY: BEYOND MIRRLEES

MIRRLEES ’71 had a huge impact on information economics: models with asymmetric information in contract theory

Discrete 2-type version of Mirrlees model developed by Stiglitz JpubE ’82 with individual FOC replaced by Incentive Compatibility constraint [high type should not mimic low type]

Till late 1990s, Mirrlees results not closely connected to empirical tax studies and little impact on tax policy recommendations

Since late 1990s, Diamond AER’98, Piketty ’97, Saez ReStud ’01 have connected Mirrlees model to practical tax policy / empirical tax studies

[new approach summarized in Diamond-Saez JEP’11 and Piketty-Saez Handbook’13]
INTENSIVE LABOR SUPPLY CONCEPTS

\[
\max_{c,z} u(c, z) \quad \text{subject to} \quad c = z \cdot (1 - \tau) + R
\]

Imagine a linearized budget constraint: \( R \) is virtual income (why virtual?) and \( \tau \) marginal tax rate.

FOC in \( c, z \Rightarrow (1 - \tau)u_c + u_z = 0 \Rightarrow \) Marshallian labor supply 
\( z = z(1 - \tau, R) \)

Uncompensated elasticity 
\[
\varepsilon^u = \frac{(1 - \tau)}{z} \frac{\partial z}{\partial (1 - \tau)}
\]

Income effects 
\[
\eta = (1 - \tau) \frac{\partial z}{\partial R} \leq 0
\]
INTENSIVE LABOR SUPPLY CONCEPTS (II)

Substitution effects: Hicksian labor supply: $z^c(1 - \tau, u)$ minimizes cost needed to reach $u$ given slope $1 - \tau$ ⇒

- Compensated elasticity $\epsilon^c = \frac{(1 - \tau)}{z} \frac{\partial z^c}{\partial (1 - \tau)} > 0$

- Slutsky equation $\frac{\partial z}{\partial (1 - \tau)} = \frac{\partial z^c}{\partial (1 - \tau)} + z \frac{\partial z}{\partial R} \Rightarrow \epsilon^u = \epsilon^c + \eta$
Labor Supply Theory

$c = (1-t)z + R$

Marshallian Labor Supply $z(1-\tau,R)$

Indifference Curves

Slope $= 1-\tau$

Consumption $c$

Earnings supply $z$

$c =$ consumption

$R$

0
Labor Supply Theory

c = consumption

Slope = 1 - \tau

Hicksian Labor Supply
zc(1-\tau,u)

utility \ u

earnings supply z
Labor Supply Income Effect

\[ \eta = (1-t) \frac{\partial z}{\partial R} \leq 0 \]

Graph showing the relationship between earnings \( z(1-\tau, R) \) and \( z(1-\tau, R+\Delta R) \) with the income effect \( \eta \) being non-positive.

- \( 0 \) on the vertical axis represents the earnings \( z \).
- \( R \) and \( R+\Delta R \) on the horizontal axis represent income levels.
- The graph illustrates the decrease in earnings due to income taxation and potential labor supply effects.
Labor Supply Substitution Effect

\[ \frac{\partial c}{\partial \tau} > 0 \]

\[ c(z_{1-\tau}, u) \]

\[ c(z_{1-\tau+d\tau}, u) \]

\[ \varepsilon^c = \frac{(1-\tau)}{z} \frac{\partial z^c}{\partial (1-\tau)} > 0 \]
Uncompensated Labor Supply Effect

Slutsky equation: \( \varepsilon^u = \varepsilon^c + \eta \)

- income effect: \( \eta \leq 0 \)
- substitution effect: \( \varepsilon^c > 0 \)
Labor Supply Effects of Taxes and Transfers

Taxes and transfers change the slope $1 - T'(z)$ of the budget constraint and net disposable income $z - T(z)$ (relative to the no tax situation where $c = z$)

Positive MTR $T'(z) > 0$ reduces labor supply through substitution effects

Net transfer ($T(z) < 0$) reduces labor supply through income effects

Net tax ($T(z) > 0$) increases labor supply through income effects
Effect of Tax on Labor Supply

\[ c = z - T(z) \]

\[ \text{slope} = 1 - T'(z) \]

- \( T(z) < 0: \) income effect \( z \downarrow \)
- \( T'(z) > 0: \) substitution effect \( z \downarrow \)
- \( T(z) > 0: \) income effect \( z \uparrow \)
- \( T'(z) > 0: \) substitution effect \( z \downarrow \)
WELFARE EFFECT OF SMALL TAX REFORM

Indirect utility: \( V(1 - \tau, R) = \max_z u((1 - \tau)z + R, z) \) where \( R \) is virtual income intercept

Small tax reform: \( d\tau \) and \( dR \):

\[
dV = u_c \cdot [-zd\tau + dR] + dz \cdot [(1 - \tau)u_c + u_z] = u_c \cdot [-zd\tau + dR]
\]

Envelope theorem: no effect of \( dz \) on \( V \) because \( z \) is already chosen to maximize utility \( ((1 - \tau)u_c + u_z = 0) \)

\([-zd\tau + dR]\) is the mechanical change in disposable income due to tax reform

Welfare impact of a small tax reform is given by \( u_c \) times the money metric mechanical change in tax
WELFARE EFFECT OF SMALL TAX REFORM (II)

!! Remains true of any nonlinear tax system $T(z)$

Just need to look at $dT(z)$, mechanical change in taxes, or $dT_i$ for agent $i$.

$dV_i = \text{Welfare impact is } -u_c dT(z_i)$.  

When is the welfare impact not just the mechanical change in disposable income?

**Envelope Theorem:** For a constrained problem

$$V(\theta) = \max_x F(x, \theta) \text{ s.t. } c \geq G(x, \theta)$$

$$V'(\theta) = \frac{\partial F}{\partial \theta}(x^*(\theta), \theta) - \lambda^*(\theta) \frac{\partial G}{\partial \theta}(x^*(\theta), \theta)$$
Welfarism = social welfare based solely on individual utilities

Any other social objective will lead to Pareto dominated outcomes in some circumstances (Kaplow and Shavell JPE’01) Why?

Most widely used welfarist SWF:

1) Utilitarian: $SWF = \int_i u^i$

2) Rawlsian (also called Maxi-Min): $SWF = \min_i u^i$

3) $SWF = \int_i G(u^i)$ with $G(.) \uparrow$ and concave, e.g., $G(u) = u^{1-\gamma}/(1-\gamma)$ (Utilitarian is $\gamma = 0$, Rawlsian is $\gamma = \infty$)

4) General Pareto weights: $SWF = \int_i \mu_i \cdot u^i$ with $\mu_i \geq 0$ exogenously given
SOCIAL MARGINAL WELFARE WEIGHTS

Key sufficient statistics in optimal tax formulas are Social Marginal Welfare Weights for each individual:

Social Marginal Welfare Weight on individual $i$ is $g_i = G'(u^i)u^i_c/\lambda$ ($\lambda$ multiplier of govt budget constraint) measures $\$\$ value for govt of giving $1$ extra to person $i$

No income effects $\Rightarrow \int g_i = 1$: giving $1$ to all costs $1$ (population has measure 1) and increase SWF (in $\$$ terms) by $\int g_i$

$g_i$ typically depend on tax system (endogenous variable)

Utilitarian case: $g_i$ decreases with $z_i$ due to decreasing marginal utility of consumption

Rawlsian case: $g_i$ concentrated on most disadvantaged (typically those with $z_i = 0$)
Social Marginal Welfare Weights

- Utilitarian weights
- Libertarian = equal weights
- Rawlsian weights

pre-tax income $z$

$g$
Social Marginal Welfare Weights

- **Rawlsian weights**
- **Utilitarian weights**
- **Libertarian=equal weights**

The diagram shows the relationship between pre-tax income and social marginal welfare weights, with different curves representing the three perspectives mentioned.
OPTIMAL LINEAR TAX RATE: INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM

Disposable income (consumption): \( c = (1 - \tau) \cdot z + R \) with \( \tau \) linear tax rate and \( R \) demogrant funded by taxes \( \tau Z \) with \( Z \) aggregate earnings

Population of size one (continuum) with heterogeneous preferences \( u^i(c, z) \) [differences in earnings ability are built in utility function]

Individual \( i \) chooses \( z \) to maximize \( u^i((1 - \tau) \cdot z + R, z) \) labor supply choices \( z^i(1 - \tau, R) \) aggregate to economy wide earnings \( Z(1 - \tau) = \int_i z^i \) (are a function of the net-of-tax-rate).

Tax Revenue \( R(\tau) = \tau \cdot Z(1 - \tau) \) is inversely U-shaped with \( \tau \): \( R(\tau = 0) = 0 \) (no taxes) and \( R(\tau = 1) = 0 \) (nobody works): called the Laffer Curve
Laffer Curve

\[ R = \tau \cdot Z(1 - \tau) \]

\[ \tau^* = \frac{1}{1 + e} \text{ with } e = \frac{1 - \tau}{Z} \cdot \frac{dz}{d(1 - \tau)} \]
OPTIMAL LINEAR TAX RATES: PLAN

Let’s look at:

1) The optimal linear tax formula (on all income $z \in [0, \infty)$).

2) The revenue-maximizing rate (special case).

3) The top revenue-maximizing tax rate (nests previous case if top bracket starts at $z = 0$).
Government chooses $\tau$ to maximize
\[ \int_i G[u^i((1 - \tau)z^i + \tau Z(1 - \tau), z^i)] \]

Govt FOC (using the envelope theorem as $z^i$ maximizes $u^i$):
\[ 0 = \int_i G'(u^i)u^i_c \cdot \left[ -z^i + Z - \tau \frac{dZ}{d(1 - \tau)} \right], \]
\[ 0 = \int_i G'(u^i)u^i_c \cdot \left[ (Z - z^i) - \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} eZ \right], \]

First term $(Z - z^i)$ is mechanical redistributive effect of $d\tau$, second term is efficiency cost due to behavioral response of $Z$

\[ \Rightarrow \text{we obtain the following optimal linear income tax formula} \]
\[ \tau = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + e} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g} = \frac{\int g_i \cdot z_i}{Z \cdot \int g_i}, \quad g_i = G'(u^i)u^i_c \]
OPTIMAL LINEAR TAX RATE: FORMULA

\[ \tau = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + e} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g} = \frac{\int g_i \cdot z_i}{Z \cdot \int g_i}, \quad g_i = G'(u^i)u^i_c \]

0 ≤ \bar{g} < 1 if \( g_i \) is decreasing with \( z_i \) (social marginal welfare weights fall with \( z_i \)).

\( \bar{g} \) low when (a) inequality is high, (b) \( g_i \) \( \downarrow \) sharply with \( z^i \)

Formula captures the equity-efficiency trade-off robustly (\( \tau \downarrow \bar{g}, \tau \downarrow e \))

Rawlsian case: \( g_i \equiv 0 \) for all \( z_i > 0 \) so \( \bar{g} = 0 \) and \( \tau = 1/(1 + e) \)

Rawlsian optimum = top of Laffer curve if \( \min_i u^i \) agent earns \( z_i = 0 \).
Laffer Curve

\[ R = \tau \cdot Z(1 - \tau) \]

\[ \tau^* = \frac{1}{1 + e} \text{ with } e = \frac{1 - \tau}{Z} \cdot \frac{dZ}{d(1 - \tau)} \]
OPTIMAL TOP INCOME TAX RATE (SAEZ ’01)

Consider constant MTR $\tau$ above fixed $z^*$. Goal is to derive optimal $\tau$

Assume w.l.o.g there is a continuum of measure one of individuals above $z^*$

Let $z(1 - \tau)$ be their average income [depends on net-of-tax rate $1 - \tau$], with
elasticity $e = [(1 - \tau)/z] \cdot dz/d(1 - \tau)$

! Careful, what is $e$?

Note that $e$ is a mix of income and substitution effects (see Saez ’01)
OPTIMAL TOP INCOME TAX RATE: STANDARD OPTIMIZATION (I)

Government chooses $\tau$ to maximize

$$
\int_{i: z_i < z^*} G[u^i(z^i - T(z^i) + \tau[z - z^*] + \tilde{R}, z^i)] + \int_{i: z_i \geq z^*} G[u^i((1 - \tau)z^i + \tau[z - z^*] + \tilde{R}, z^i)]
$$

Note: $\tilde{R}$ is revenue other than from the top bracket/other transfers. The tax rate below $z^*$ and $\tilde{R}$ can be anything; we are not optimizing on that here.

Govt FOC (using the envelope theorem as $z^i$ maximizes $u^i$ for all agents):

$$
0 = -\int_{i: z_i \geq z^*} G'(u^i)u^i_c \cdot [z^i - z^*] + \int_{i} G'(u^i)u^i_c \cdot \left[z - z^*\right] - \tau \frac{d[z - z^*]}{d(1 - \tau)} ,
$$

(note that the direct tax change $d\tau$ only affects top earners, but the revenue goes to everyone equally).
OPTIMAL TOP INCOME TAX RATE: STANDARD OPTIMIZATION (II)

\[
0 = - \int_{i: z_i \geq z^*} G'(u^i) u^i_c \cdot [z^i - z^*] + \int_i G'(u^i) u^i_c \cdot [z - z^*] - \tau \frac{d[z - z^*]}{d(1 - \tau)},
\]

Define \( a = \frac{z}{z - z^*} \) to be the Pareto tail parameter.

\[
0 = - \int_{i: z_i \geq z^*} G'(u^i) u^i_c [z^i - z^*] + \int_i G'(u^i) u^i_c \cdot \left[ (z - z^*) - \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} ae(z - z^*) \right],
\]

\( \Rightarrow \) we obtain the following optimal top linear income tax formula

\[
\tau = \frac{1 - \tilde{g}}{1 - \tilde{g} + a \cdot e} \quad \text{with} \quad \tilde{g} = \frac{\int_{i: z_i \geq z^*} g_i \cdot [z^i - z^*]}{[z - z^*] \cdot \int g_i}, \quad g_i = G'(u^i) u^i_c
\]
Optimal Top Income Tax Rate (Mirrlees ’71 model)

Disposable Income
\[ c = z - T(z) \]

Market income \( z \)

Top bracket:
Slope 1-\( \tau \)

Reform:
Slope 1-\( \tau - d\tau \)

Source: Diamond and Saez JEP'11
Optimal Top Income Tax Rate (Mirylees ’71 model)

Disposable Income
\[ c = z - T(z) \]

Market income \( z \)

Optimal Top Income Tax Rate (Mirrlees ’71 model)

Mechanical tax increase:
\[ d\tau [z - z^*] \]

Behavioral Response tax loss:
\[ \tau dz = - d\tau e z \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} \]

Source: Diamond and Saez JEP'11
Consider small $d\tau > 0$ reform above $z^*$. 

1) **Mechanical increase** in tax revenue:

$$dM = [z - z^*]d\tau$$

2) **Welfare effect:**

$$dW = -\bar{g}dM = -\bar{g}[z - z^*]d\tau$$

where $\bar{g}$ is the social marginal welfare weight for top earners

3) **Behavioral response** reduces tax revenue:

$$dB = \tau \cdot dz = -\tau \frac{dz}{d(1-\tau)}d\tau = -\frac{\tau}{1-\tau} \cdot \frac{1}{z} \frac{dz}{d(1-\tau)} \cdot zd\tau$$

$$\Rightarrow dB = -\frac{\tau}{1-\tau} \cdot e \cdot zd\tau$$
OPTIMAL TOP INCOME TAX RATE

\[ dM + dW + dB = d\tau \left[ (1 - \bar{g})[z - z^*] - e\frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} z \right] \]

Optimal \( \tau \) such that \( dM + dW + dB = 0 \) \( \Rightarrow \)

\[ \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau} = \frac{(1 - \bar{g})[z - z^*]}{e \cdot z} \]

\[ \tau = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + a \cdot e} \quad \text{with} \quad a = \frac{z}{z - z^*} \]

Optimal \( \tau \downarrow \bar{g} \) [redistributive tastes]

Optimal \( \tau \downarrow \) with \( e \) [efficiency]

Optimal \( \tau \downarrow a \) [thinness of top tail]
OPTIMAL LINEAR RATES: RECAP

1) The optimal linear tax formula (on all income $z \in [0, \infty)$):

$$\tau^* = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + e} \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{g} = \frac{\int g_i \cdot z_i}{Z \cdot \int g_i}, \quad g_i = G'(u^i)u^i_c$$

2) The revenue-maximizing rate (special case if $\bar{g} = 0$, i.e., if $g_i = 0$ for all $z_i \neq 0$).

$$\tau^R = \frac{1}{1 + e}$$

3) The optimal top tax rate (equal to $\tau^*$ if $z^* = 0$).

$$\tau^{top} = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + a \cdot e} \quad \text{with} \quad a = \frac{z}{z - z^*}$$

4) Top revenue maximizing rate, special case of $\tau^{top}$ if $\bar{g} = 0$:

$$\tau^{top,R} = \frac{1}{1 + a \cdot e}$$
 Pause for a bit: did we say anything about underlying characteristics of people?

Note how general the formula is!

Sufficient statistics, observables only.
EMPIRICALLY: OPTIMAL TOP INCOME TAX RATE

Empirically: \( a = \frac{z}{z - z^*} \) very stable above \( z^* = 400K \)

Pareto distribution \( 1 - F(z) = (k/z)^\alpha, \ f(z) = \alpha \cdot k^\alpha / z^{1+\alpha} \), with \( \alpha \) Pareto parameter

\[
z(z^*) = \frac{\int_{z^*}^\infty s f(s) ds}{\int_{z^*}^\infty f(s) ds} = \frac{\int_{z^*}^\infty s^{-\alpha} ds}{\int_{z^*}^\infty s^{-\alpha-1} ds} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} \cdot z^*
\]

\( \alpha = z / (z - z^*) = a \) measures thinness of top tail of the distribution

Empirically \( a \in (1.5, 3) \), US has \( a = 1.5 \), Denmark has \( a = 3 \)

\[
\tau = \frac{1 - \bar{g}}{1 - \bar{g} + a \cdot e}
\]

Only difficult parameter to estimate is \( e \); very difficult parameter to set is \( \bar{g} \).
\[
y_m/(y_m - y^*) \text{ with } y_m = E(y|y > y^*)
\]
\[
\alpha_Y = y^* h_Y(y^*)/(1 - H_Y(y^*))
\]
\[
\frac{rk_m}{rk_m - rk^*} \text{ with } rk_m = E(rk | rk > rk^*)
\]

\[
\alpha_K = rk^* h_K(rk^*) / (1 - H_K(rk^*))
\]
EMPIRICALLY: TOP TAX REVENUE MAXIMIZING TAX RATE

What about $\bar{g}$? In the end, $\bar{g}$ reflects the value that society puts on marginal consumption of high-income people $\Rightarrow$ we cannot give “the right” answer.

If utilitarian criterion with $u_c \to 0$ when $c \to \infty$ $\Rightarrow$ $\bar{g} \to 0$ when $z^* \to \infty$

If Rawlsian criterion (max utility of worst-off person) $\Rightarrow$ $\bar{g} = 0$ for any $z^* > \min(z)$

If other (”high incomes deserving of their income” or “libertarian”) $\to$ ?

$\bar{g} = 0$ $\Rightarrow$ Tax Revenue Maximizing Rate $\tau = 1/(1 + a \cdot e)$ (upper bound on top tax rate for any given elasticity & distribution)

Example: $a = 2$ and $e = 0.25$ $\Rightarrow$ $\tau = 2/3 = 66.7\%$

Laffer linear rate is a special case with $z^* = 0$, $z^m/z^* = \infty = a/(a - 1)$ and hence $a = 1$, $\tau = 1/(1 + e)$
GENERAL NON-LINEAR INCOME TAX $T(z)$

(1) Lumpsum grant given to everybody equal to $-T(0)$

(2) Marginal tax rate schedule $T'(z)$ describing how (a) lump-sum grant is taxed away, (b) how tax liability increases with income.

Let $H(z)$ be the income CDF [population normalized to 1] and $h(z)$ its density [endogenous to $T(.)$]

Let $g(z)$ be the social marginal value of consumption for taxpayers with income $z$ in terms of public funds [formally $g(z) = G'(u) \cdot u_c / \lambda$]: no income effects $\Rightarrow \int g(z)h(z)dz = 1$

Redistribution valued $\Rightarrow g(z)$ decreases with $z$

Let $G(z)$ the average social marginal value of $c$ for taxpayers with income above $z$ [$G(z) = \int_z^\infty g(s)h(s)ds/(1 - H(z))$]
Disposable Income
\[ c = z - T(z) \]

Pre-tax income \( z \)

Mechanical tax increase: \( d \tau dz \ [1-H(z)] \)

Social welfare effect: \( -d \tau dz \ [1-H(z)] G(z) \)

Behavioral response:
\[ \delta z = - \frac{d \tau e^z}{(1-T'(z))} \]

\( \rightarrow \) Tax loss:
\[ T'(z) \delta z h(z) dz = -h(z) e^z T'(z)/(1-T'(z)) dzd\tau \]
GENERAL NON-LINEAR INCOME TAX

Assume away income effects \( \varepsilon^c = \varepsilon^u = e \) [Diamond AER’98 shows this is the key theoretical simplification]

Consider small reform: increase \( T' \) by \( d\tau \) in small band \( z \) and \( z + dz \)

Mechanical effect \( dM = dzd\tau [1 - H(z)] \)

Welfare effect \( dW = -dzd\tau [1 - H(z)] G(z) \)

Behavioral effect: substitution effect \( \delta z \) inside small band \( [z, z + dz] \):
\[
dB = h(z)dz \cdot T' \cdot \delta z = -h(z)dz \cdot T' \cdot d\tau \cdot z \cdot e(z) / (1 - T')
\]

Optimum \( dM + dW + dB = 0 \)
GENERAL NON-LINEAR INCOME TAX: NOTE ON THE “VIRTUAL DENSITY”

We implicitly made an assumption above (as in Saez (2001)).

Since the tax system is nonlinear, as the agent changes their income, their marginal tax rate changes too. This is a second-round, but not a second-order effect (we should not neglect it).

\[ dz = -ez \frac{d\tau + dT'(z)}{1 - T'(z)} \Rightarrow dz = -ez \frac{d\tau}{1 - T'(z) + ezT''(z)} \]

What we have done is to implicitly replace the actual density \( h^*(z) \) of income by the virtual density \( h(z) \) that would apply at \( z \) if the tax schedule were locally linear and tangent to \( T() \) at \( z \). They are related through

\[ \frac{h(z)}{(1 - T'(z))} = \frac{h^*(z)}{1 - T'(z) + ezT''(z)} \]

There is little loss in doing this since the actual income distribution is endogenous to \( T \). It’s a way to get rid of the deformation component induced by the nonlinear tax schedule. But you will see some papers that keep the term in \( T''(z) \) around.
GENERAL NON-LINEAR INCOME TAX

\[ T'(z) = \frac{1 - G(z)}{1 - G(z) + \alpha(z) \cdot e(z)} \]

1) \( T'(z) \) decreases with \( e(z) \) (elasticity efficiency effects)

2) \( T'(z) \) decreases with \( \alpha(z) = (zh(z))/(1 - H(z)) \) (local Pareto parameter)

3) \( T'(z) \) decreases with \( G(z) \) (redistributive tastes)

Asymptotics: \( G(z) \to \bar{g}, \alpha(z) \to a, e(z) \to e \Rightarrow \) Recover top rate formula
\[ \tau = (1 - \bar{g})/(1 - \bar{g} + a \cdot e) \]
Empirical Pareto Coefficient

$z^* = \text{Adjusted Gross Income (current 2005$) }$

$a = \frac{zm}{zm - z^*}$ with $zm = E(z|z > z^*)$

$\alpha = \frac{z^* h(z^*)}{1 - H(z^*)}$

Source: Diamond and Saez JEP'11
Negative Marginal Tax Rates Never Optimal

Suppose $T' < 0$ in band $[z, z + dz]$

Increase $T'$ by $d\tau > 0$ in band $[z, z + dz]$: $dM + dW > 0$ and $dB > 0$ because $T'(z) < 0$

⇒ Desirable reform

⇒ $T'(z) < 0$ cannot be optimal

EITC schemes are not desirable in Mirrlees ’71 model
EXTENSIONS AND LIMITATIONS

1) Model includes only intensive earnings response. Extensive earnings responses [entrepreneurship decisions, migration decisions] ⇒ Formulas can be modified

2) Model does not include fiscal externalities: part of the response to $d\tau$ comes from income shifting which affects other taxes ⇒ Formulas can be modified

3) Model does not include classical externalities: (a) charitable contributions, (b) positive spillovers (trickle down) [top earners underpaid], (c) negative spillovers [top earners overpaid]

Classical general equilibrium effects on prices are NOT externalities and do not affect formulas [Diamond-Mirrlees AER ’71, Saez JpubE ’04]
EXTENSION 1: MIGRATION EFFECTS

Tax rates can affect migration (evidence on this in future lectures).

Migration issues may be particularly important at the top end (brain drain), and for highly-paid, non-attached people.

Some theory papers (Mirrlees ’82, Lehmann-Simula QJE’14, Kleven-Landais-Munoz-Stantcheva JEP’20).

Technical difficulties:

(1) Fully nonlinear income tax requires keeping track of incomes of foreigners and of those who migrate out + of intensive margin choices.

(2) How to weigh foreigners vs. domestic people’s welfare? Typically; only weigh those inside jurisdiction (whether foreign or not). Requires only keeping track of income levels and welfare weights at income levels.

(3) Coordination across countries/regions/states or competition?
Imagine two regions, $A$ and $B$. Consider non-linear tax, but (i) uncoordinated tax policy (ignore other countries’/states’ welfare) in region/country $A$; and (ii) earnings $y_i^A$ are fixed, conditional on residence. (Symmetric for region B).

$P^A(c|y^A)$ is number of residents earning $y^A$ when disposable income is $c$, with $c = y^A - T(y^A)$.

Consider small tax reform $dT^A(y)$ for those earning $y$.

Prelim important elements:

(1) What is migration responding to? Marginal taxes? No! Why not?

(2) What is the direct utility impact of someone moving country due to tax changes? Why? (counterintuitive, and not true for general location choices).
ELASTICITY OF MIGRATION TO TAXES

Mechanical effect net of welfare is:
\[ M(y) + W(y) = (1 - g^A(y))P^A(c|y)dT^A(y). \]

Why? Where is utility effect of changing country induced by taxes?

Migration responds to average taxes (or total taxes, since income fixed).

\[ \eta^A(y) = \frac{\partial P^A(c|y)}{\partial c} \frac{y - T^A(y)}{P^A(c|y)} \]

Fiscal cost of raising taxes by \( dT^A(y) \) is: \( B(y) = -\frac{T^A(y)}{y - T(y)} \cdot P^A(c|y) \cdot \eta^A(y) \)

Optimal tax is where \( M + W + B = 0 \):

\[ \frac{T^A(y)}{y - T(y)} = \frac{1}{\eta^A(y)} \cdot (1 - g^A(y)) \]

What determines the elasticity \( \eta^A(y) \)?
MIGRATION EFFECTS IN THE STANDARD MODEL

\( \eta_A(y) \) depends on size of jurisdiction: large for cities, zero worldwide \( \Rightarrow (1) \)
Redistribution easier in large jurisdictions, (2) Tax coordination across countries increases ability to redistribute (big issue currently in EU with preferential regimes for foreigners), (3) visa system, cost of migration, ...

How about top revenue maximizing rate when there is migration? (Brewer-Saez-Shepard ’10):

Easier because it’s a linear tax, conditional on being in the top bracket.

\[
\tau = \frac{1}{1 + a \cdot e + \bar{\eta}^A}
\]

where \( \bar{\eta}^A \) is the elasticity of top earners to disposable income (includes all effects).
Imagine now a central tax authority setting taxes in regions A and B. See derivations in Kleven, Munoz, Landais, and Stantcheva (2020).

Simplify: (1) Linear taxes $\tau^A$ and $\tau^B$.

(2) Only behavioral responses are mobility responses.

(2) No direct spillovers from foreign immigration on behavior of domestic agents or on local economy.

$y^A$ and $y^B$ denote aggregate incomes in the two regions; Behavioral responses mean: $y^A = y^A(1 - \tau^A, 1 - \tau^B)$ and $y^B = y^B(1 - \tau^A, 1 - \tau^B)$

$\eta^A = \frac{dy^A(1 - \tau^A)}{y^A(1 - \tau^A)}$: elasticity of migration (or income!) in region A to $(1 - \tau^A)$;

$\eta_A^B \frac{dy^B(1 - \tau^A)}{y^B(1 - \tau^A)}$ cross-elasticity.

$g^A = \frac{\sum_{i \in A} g_i y_i^A}{\sum_i g_i y_i^A}$ is average, income-weighted value to the social planner of transferring one unit of income to people in region A.
Income tax revenue rebated lump-sum. Consumption of agent $i$ in region $A$:

$$c_i^A = y_i^A(1 - \tau^A) + \tau^A y_i^A + \tau^B y_i^B$$

Consider change $d\tau^A$.

Reduces each agent’s income by $d\tau^A y_i^A$ which is valued at $-g_i y_i^A d\tau^A$.

Total welfare effect:

$$- \sum_i g_i y_i^A d\tau^A$$

Mechanical revenue effect:

$$- \sum_i y_i^A d\tau^A$$

Behavioral effect:

$$- \sum_i g_i \left( \frac{\tau^A dy_i^A}{d(1-\tau^A)} + \frac{\tau^B dy_i^B}{d(1-\tau^A)} \right) d\tau^A$$

Why are we ignoring utility impact of moving?

Set three effects to zero and obtain optimal coordinated tax with mobility.
Relative to uncoordinated policy: internalize spillovers from one region to other (here: only fiscal externality). Makes taxes higher in both regions, all else equal (no “beggar-thy-neighbor”).

Illustrates that it may be valuable to differentiate tax policy across regions/countries (coordination does NOT mean UNIFORM policies): based on \( g^A \) and \( y^A \).

Degree of progressivity and tax “diversity” are limited by mobility.

Elasticities smaller if (1) jurisdiction larger; (3) more tax coordination; (3) mobility lower due to non-tax factors (including amenities, more on that later).

What if we are constrained to have uniform policies?
EXTENSION 2: FISCAL EXTERNALITIES REAL VS. TAX AVOIDANCE RESPONSES

Behavioral response to income tax comes not only from reduced labor supply but also shifts to other forms of income or activities: (untaxed fringe benefits, deferred compensation, shift to corporate income tax base, shift toward tax favored capital gains, etc.)

Real responses vs. tax avoidance responses is critical for 2 reasons:

1) Govt can control tax avoidance through other tools: closing loopholes, broadening the tax base ⇒ Elasticity e is endogenous to tax system design (Slemrod)

2) Most tax avoidance responses create “fiscal externalities” in the sense that tax revenue increases at other time periods or in other tax bases (Saez-Slemrod-Giertz JEL’ 12)
REAL VS. AVOIDANCE RESPONSES THEORY

Fraction $s$ of response $dz$ to $d\tau$ due to avoidance (fraction $1 - s$ is real) and “shifted income” $s \cdot dz$ is taxed at rate $t \leq \tau$

$\Rightarrow$ Tax revenue maximizing rate is (Saez, Slemrod, Giertz ’12)

$$\tau = \frac{1 + a \cdot t \cdot s \cdot e}{1 + a \cdot e}$$

1) $t = 0 \Rightarrow \tau = 1/(1 + a \cdot e)$ (tax avoidance response vs. real response response is irrelevant, Feldstein ’99)

2) $t > 0 \Rightarrow \tau > 1/(1 + a \cdot e)$ because of “fiscal externality”

3) Fully optimal policy: $t = \tau$ and $\tau = 1/[1 + a \cdot (1 - s)e]$ with $(1 - s)e$ real elasticity (avoidance response $s \cdot e$ irrelevant) $\Rightarrow$ (a) broaden the base/close loopholes, (b) then $\uparrow$ top rates
EXTENSION 3: RENT SEEKING EFFECTS

Pay may not be equal to the marginal economic product for top income earners. Why? Overpaid or underpaid?


Actual output is $y$, but individual only receives share $\eta$ of actual output. To increase either productive effort or rent-seeking, effort is required.

$$u^i(c, \eta, y) = c - h_i(y) - k_i(\eta)$$

Define bargained earnings: $b = (\eta - 1)y$.

Average bargaining is $E(b)$, extracted equally from everyone else (good assumption?) Means $E(b)$ can be perfectly canceled by $-T(0)$. 
RENT SEEKING ELASTICITIES

Given tax, individual maximizes:

\[ u^i(c, y, \eta) = \eta \cdot y - T(\eta \cdot y) - h_i(y) - k_i(\eta) \]

What will \( y_i \) and \( \eta_i \) depend on?

Average reported income, productive income and bargained earnings in the top bracket:

\[ z(1 - \tau), \quad y(1 - \tau), \quad \eta(1 - \tau) \]

Total compensation elasticity \( e \): 
\[ e = \frac{1 - \tau}{y} \frac{dz}{d(1 - \tau)} \]

(what is it driven by?)

Real labor supply elasticity \( e_y \): 
\[ e_y = \frac{1 - \tau}{y} \frac{dy}{d(1 - \tau)} \geq 0. \]

Thus the bargaining elasticity component \( e_b \) with 
\[ e_b = \frac{1 - \tau}{z} \left( \frac{db}{d(1 - \tau)} \right) = s \cdot e \]

\[ s = \frac{db/d(1 - \tau)}{dz/d(1 - \tau)} \]

\( s \) and \( e_b \) positive if \( \eta > 1 \).
Suppose rent-seeking only at the top, $E(b) = qb(1 - \tau)$ where $q$ fraction of top earners.

Government maximizes tax revenues from top bracket earners:

$$T = \tau[y(1 - \tau) + b(1 - \tau) - z^*]q - E(b)$$

Why does $E(b)$ enter?

$$\tau^* = \frac{1 + a \cdot e_b}{1 + a \cdot e} = 1 - \frac{a(y/z)e_y}{1 + a \cdot e}$$

How does $\tau^*$ change with $e$, $e_y$, and $e_b$? When is $\tau^* = 1$ optimal?

Trickle up vs trickle down: what happens to $\tau^*$ when top earners are overpaid? Underpaid?

How would you measure $e_b$ (even $b$ itself?)
MIRRLEES MODEL

The difference to before: we need to specify the structural primitives.

Key simplification is the lack of income effects (Diamond, 1998). We look into income effects next time.

Individual utility: $c - v(l)$, $l$ is labor supply.

Skill $n$ is exogenously given, equal to marginal productivity. Earnings are $z = nl$.

Density is $f(n)$ and CDF $F(n)$ on $[0, \infty)$.

Entry into contract theory/mechanism design here: The government does not observe skill. Tax is based on income $z$, $T(z)$.

What happens if we had a tax $T(n)$ available?

Why did we not talk about this in the earlier derivations? Did we ignore the incentive compatibility constraints?
Elasticity of labor to taxes

Recall we derive elasticities on the linearized budget set. If marginal tax rate is $\tau$, labor supply is: $l = l(n(1 - \tau))$. Why the $n(1 - \tau)$? Why only $n(1 - \tau)$?

FOC of the agent for labor supply:

$$n(1 - \tau) = v'(l)$$

Totally differentiate this (key thing: skill is fixed!)

$$d(n(1 - \tau)) = v''(l)dl$$

$$\Rightarrow e = \frac{dl}{d(n(1 - tau))} \frac{(1 - \tau)n}{l} = \frac{(1 - \tau)n}{lv''(l)} = \frac{v'(l)}{lv''(l)}$$

Is this compensated? uncompensated?
We want to max social welfare and have exogenous revenue requirement (non transfer-related $E$).

We imagine a direct revelation mechanism. Every agent comes to government, reports a type $n'$. We assign allocations as a function of the report. $c(n'), z(n'), u(n')$. Why are we not assigning labor $l(n')$?

What are the constraints in this problem?

Feasibility (net resources sum to zero): $\int_n c_n f(n) dn \geq n l_n f(n) dn - E$.

Incentive compatibility:
Direct Revelation Mechanism and Incentive Compatibility

We want to max social welfare and have exogenous revenue requirement (non transfer-related $E$).

We imagine a direct revelation mechanism. Every agent comes to government, reports a type $n'$. We assign allocations as a function of the report. $c(n'), z(n'), u(n')$. Why are we not assigning labor $l(n')$?

What are the constraints in this problem?

Feasibility (net resources sum to zero): $\int_n c_n f(n) dn \geq nl_n f(n) dn - E$.

Incentive compatibility:

$$c(n) - v \left( \frac{z(n)}{n} \right) \geq c(n') - v \left( \frac{z(n')}{n} \right) \forall n, n'$$

That’s a lot of constraints!
Envelop Theorem and First order Approach

Replace the infinity of constraints with agents’ first-order condition. If we take derivative of utility wrt type $n$ at truth-telling

$$
\frac{du_n}{dn} = \left( c'(n) - \frac{z'(n)}{n} \nu' \left( \frac{z(n)}{n} \right) \right) \frac{dn'}{dn} + \frac{z(n)}{n^2} \nu' \left( \frac{z(n)}{n} \right)
$$

What if report is optimally chosen?

Envelope condition:

$$
\frac{du_n}{dn} = \frac{l_n \nu'(l_n)}{n}
$$

Will replace infinity of constraints.

Is necessary, but what about sufficiency?
Full Optimization Program

\[
\max_{c_n,u_n,z_n} \int_n G(u_n) f(n) dn \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \int_n c_n f(n) dn \leq \int_n n l_n f(n) dn - E
\]

and \ s.t. \ \frac{du_n}{dn} = \frac{ln v'(l_n)}{n}

State variable: \ u_n.

Control variables: \ l_n, \ with \ c_n = u_n + v(l_n).

Why am I suddenly saying \ l_n \ is a control?

Use optimal control.
Hamiltonian and Optimal Control

The Hamiltonian is:

\[ H = \left[ G(u_n) + p \cdot (nl_n - u_n - v(l_n)) \right] f(n) + \phi(n) \cdot \frac{lnv'(l_n)}{n} \]

\( p \): multiplier on the resource constraint.

\( \phi(n) \): multiplier on the envelope condition ("costate"). Depends on \( n! \)

FOCs:

\[ \frac{\partial H}{\partial l_n} = p \cdot [n - v'(l_n)] f(n) + \frac{\phi(n)}{n} \cdot [v'(l_n) + lnv''(l_n)] = 0 \]

\[ \frac{\partial H}{\partial u_n} = [G'(u_n) - p] f(n) = -\frac{d\phi(n)}{dn} \]

Transversality: \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \phi(n) = 0 \) and \( \phi(0) = 0 \).
Rearranging the FOCs

Take the integral of the FOC wrt $u_n$ to solve for $\phi(n)$:

$$-\phi(n) = \int_{n}^{\infty} \left[ p - G'(u_m) \right] f(m) \, dm$$

Integrate this same FOC over the full space, using transversality conditions:

$$p = \int_{0}^{\infty} G'(u_n) f(m) \, dm$$

What does this say?

How can we make the tax rate appear? Use the agent’s FOC.

$$n - \sqrt'(l_n) = nT'(z_n)$$
Obtaining the Optimal Tax Formula

Recall that $e = \frac{(1 - T'(z_n))n}{l \nu''(l)}$

Rearranging the last term in the FOC for $l_n$:

$$\left[\nu'(l_n) + l_n \nu''(l_n)\right]/n = \left[1 - T'(z_n)\right][1 + 1/e]$$

Let $g_m \equiv G'(u_m)/p$ be the marginal social welfare weight on type $m$.

Then, the FOC for $l_n$ becomes:

$$\frac{T'(z_n)}{1 - T'(z_n)} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{e}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{\int_n^\infty (1 - g_m) dF(m)}{nf(n)}\right)$$

This is the Diamond (1998) formula.

What is different from the previously derived formula à la Saez (2001)?
Let’s go from types to observable income

How do we go from type distribution to income distribution?

Under linearized tax schedule, earnings are a function $z_n = nl(n(1 - \tau))$.

How do earnings vary with type?

$$\frac{dz_n}{dn} = l + (1 - \tau)n\frac{dl}{d(m(1 - \tau))} = l_n \cdot (1 + e)$$

(intuition?)

Let $h(z)$ be the density of earnings, with CDF $H(z)$. The following relation must hold:

$$h(z_n)dz_n = f(n)dn$$

$$f(n) = h(z_n)l_n(1 + e) \Rightarrow ng(n) = z_nh(z_n)(1 + e)$$

Let’s substitute income distributions for type distributions in the formula.
Optimal Tax Formula with No Income Effects

\[
\frac{T'(z_n)}{1 - T'(z_n)} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{e(z_n)}\right) \left(\frac{\int_n^{\infty} (1 - g_m) dF(m)}{nf(n)}\right) \quad \text{(primitives)}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{e(z_n)} \left(\frac{1 - H(z_n)}{z_n h(z_n)}\right) \cdot (1 - G(z_n)) \quad \text{(incomes)}
\]

where:

\[
G(z_n) = \frac{\int_n^{\infty} g_m dF(m)}{1 - F(n)} = \frac{\int_{z_n}^{\infty} g_m dH(z_m)}{1 - H(z_n)}
\]

is the average marginal social welfare weight on individuals with income above \(z_n\) (change of variables to income distributions in last equality).

Rearrange, use definition of Pareto parameter \(\alpha(z) = (zh(z)) / (1 - H(z))\) to get same formula as before:

\[
T'(z) = \frac{1 - G(z)}{1 - G(z) + \alpha(z) \cdot e(z)}
\]
Recap:

“Mechanism design approach” requires you to specify *primitives* (utility function, uni-dimensional heterogeneity) as done in Mirrlees (1971).

“Sufficient stats approach” captures arbitrary heterogeneity conditional on $z$ as long as well-behaved elasticities.

Yield same formula if can make the link between types and income distributions.

\[
\frac{T'(z_n)}{1 - T'(z_n)} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{e(z_n)}\right) \left(\frac{\int_1^\infty (1 - g_m) dF(m)}{nf(n)}\right) \quad \text{(primitives)}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{e(z_n)} \left(\frac{1 - H(z_n)}{z_n h(z_n)}\right) \cdot (1 - G(z_n)) \quad \text{(incomes)}
\]
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS

$H(z)$ [and also $G(z)$] endogenous to $T(.)$. Calibration method (Saez Restud ’01):

Specify utility function (e.g. constant elasticity):

$$u(c, z) = c - \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{e}} \cdot \left(\frac{z}{n}\right)^{1+\frac{1}{e}}$$

Individual FOC $\Rightarrow z = n^{1+e}(1 - T')^e$

Calibrate the exogenous skill distribution $F(n)$ so that, using actual $T'(.)$, you recover empirical $H(z)$

Use Mirrlees ’71 tax formula (expressed in terms of $F(n)$) to obtain the optimal tax rate schedule $T'$. 
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS

\[
\frac{T'(z(n))}{1 - T'(z(n))} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{e}\right) \left(\frac{1}{nf(n)}\right) \int_n^\infty \left[1 - \frac{G'(u(m))}{\lambda}\right] f(m) \, dm,
\]

Iterative Fixed Point method: start with \(T'_0\), compute \(z^0(n)\) using individual FOC, get \(T^0(0)\) using govt budget, compute \(u^0(n)\), get \(\lambda\) using \(\lambda = \int G'(u)f\), use formula to estimate \(T'_1\), iterate till convergence

Fast and effective method (Brewer-Saez-Shepard '10)
NUMERICAL SIMULATION RESULTS

\[ T'(z) = \frac{1 - G(z)}{1 - G(z) + \alpha(z) \cdot e(z)} \]

Take utility function with \( e \) constant

2) \( \alpha(z) = (zh(z))/(1 - H(z)) \) is inversely U-shaped empirically

3) \( 1 - G(z) \) increases with \( z \) from 0 to 1 (\( \bar{g} = 0 \))

⇒ Numerical optimal \( T'(z) \) is U-shaped with \( z \): reverse of the general results \( T' = 0 \) at top and bottom [Diamond AER’98 gives theoretical conditions to get U-shape]
FIGURE 5 – Optimal Tax Simulations

Utilitarian Criterion, Utility type I

Marginal Tax Rate

\( \zeta = 0.25 \)

\( \zeta = 0.5 \)

Wage Income \( z \)

$0 \quad $100,000 \quad $200,000 \quad $300,000

Utilitarian Criterion, Utility type II

Marginal Tax Rate

\( \zeta = 0.25 \)

\( \zeta = 0.5 \)

Wage Income \( z \)

$0 \quad $100,000 \quad $200,000 \quad $300,000

Rawlsian Criterion, Utility type I

Marginal Tax Rate

\( \zeta = 0.25 \)

\( \zeta = 0.5 \)

Wage Income \( z \)

$0 \quad $100,000 \quad $200,000 \quad $300,000

Rawlsian Criterion, Utility type II

Marginal Tax Rate

\( \zeta = 0.25 \)

\( \zeta = 0.5 \)

Wage Income \( z \)

$0 \quad $100,000 \quad $200,000 \quad $300,000

Source: Saez (2001), p. 224
Consider effect of small reform where marginal tax rates increased by \(d\tau\) in \([z^*, z^* + dz^*]\).

What are the effects on tax receipts?

Mechanical effect net of welfare loss, \(M\):

Every tax payer with income \(z\) above \(z^*\) pays additional \(d\tau dz^*\), valued at \((1 - g(z))d\tau dz^*\).

\[
M = d\tau dz^* \int_{z^*}^{\infty} (1 - g(z)) h(z) dz
\]
The diagram illustrates the relationship between before-tax income $z$ and after-tax income $z - T(z)$, with two schedules: before reform and after reform.

- The **Before reform schedule** is represented by a solid line.
- The **After reform schedule** is represented by a dotted line.

**Key Elements**:

- **Slope $1 - \tau$:**
  - $z^*$
  - $z^* + dz^*$
  - **Substitution effect**

- **Income effect**

The diagram shows the effect of a change in tax rate $d\tau$ on the after-tax income. The slope of the before reform schedule is $1 - \tau$, and the slope of the after reform schedule is $1 - \tau - d\tau$.
BEHAVIORAL EFFECT PART 1: SUBSTITUTION

In \([z^*, z^* + dz^*]\), income changes by \(dz\).

Marginal tax rate changes \textit{directly} by \(d\tau\), but also additionally \textit{indirectly} by \(dT'(z) = T''(z)dz\). Why? When is this not the case?

\[
dz = -\varepsilon^c(z)z^* \frac{d\tau + dT'(z)}{1 - T'(z)} \Rightarrow dz = -\varepsilon^c(z)z^* \frac{d\tau}{1 - T'(z) + \varepsilon^c(z)z^* T''(z)}
\]

Define the \textit{virtual density}: density that would occur at \(z\) if tax schedule replaced by linearized tax schedule. What is the linearized schedule \((\tau, R)\) such that income is \((1 - \tau)z + R)\?

\[
\frac{h^*(z)}{1 - T'(z)} = \frac{h(z)}{1 - T'(z) + \varepsilon^c(z)z^* T''(z)}
\]
Overall elasticity/substitution effect is then:

\[ E = -\varepsilon(z)z^* \frac{T'(z)}{1 - T'(z)} h^*(z^*) d\tau dz^* \]

Can derive expression without taking into account endogenous (indirect) change in marginal tax rates if use the virtual density instead of true one.
Taxpayers with income above \( z^* \) pay \(-dR = d\tau dz^*\) additional taxes. Their change in income is:

\[
dz = -\varepsilon_c(z)z \frac{T'' dz}{1 - T'} - \eta \frac{d\tau dz^*}{1 - T'(z)} \Rightarrow dz = -\eta \frac{d\tau dz^*}{1 - T'(z) + z\varepsilon_c(z)T''(z)}
\]

Why?

Total income effect response:

\[
I = d\tau dz^* \int_{z^*}^{\infty} -\eta(z) \frac{T'(z)}{1 - T'(z)} h^*(z) dz
\]

At the optimum: \( M + E + I = 0 \).
PUTTING THE EFFECTS TOGETHER

\[
\frac{T'(z)}{1 - T'(z)} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_c(z)} \left( \frac{1 - H(z^*)}{z^* h^*(z^*)} \right)
\]

\[
\times \left[ \int_{z^*}^{\infty} (1 - g(z)) \frac{h(z)}{1 - H(z^*)} \, dz + \int_{z^*}^{\infty} -\eta \frac{T'(z)}{1 - T'(z)} \frac{h^*(z)}{1 - H(z^*)} \, dz \right]
\]


Change of variable from \( z \) to \( n \)?

Recall with a linear tax:

\[
\frac{\dot{z}_n}{z_n} = \frac{1 + \varepsilon(u)}{n}.
\]


\[
\frac{\dot{z}_n}{z_n} = \frac{1 + \varepsilon(u)}{n} - \dot{z}_n \frac{T''(z_n)}{1 - T'(z_n)} \varepsilon_c z(n)
\]
Famous Atkinson-Stiglitz JpubE’ 76 shows that

\[
\max_{t, T(\cdot)} SWF = \max_{t=0, T(\cdot)} SWF
\]

(i.e, commodity taxes not useful) under two assumptions on utility functions \(u^h(c_1, \ldots, c_K, z)\)

1) Weak separability between \((c_1, \ldots, c_K)\) and \(z\) in utility

2) Homogeneity across individuals in the sub-utility of consumption \(\nu(c_1, \ldots, c_K)\) [does not vary with \(h\)]

\[
(1) \text{ and } (2): \quad u^h(c_1, \ldots, c_K, z) = U^h(\nu(c_1, \ldots, c_K), z)
\]

Original proof was based on optimum conditions, new straightforward proof by Laroque EL ’05, and Kaplow JpubE ’06.
ATKINSON-STIGLITZ THEOREM PROOF

Let \( V(y, p + t) = \max_c v(c_1, .., c_K) \text{ st } (p + t) \cdot c \leq y \) be the indirect utility of consumption \( c \) [common to all individuals]

Start with \((T(\cdot), t)\). Let \( c(t) \) be consumer choice.

Replace \((T(\cdot), t)\) with \((\bar{T}(\cdot), t = 0)\) where \( \bar{T}(z) \) such that
\( V(z - T(z), p + t) = V(z - \bar{T}(z), p) \Rightarrow \) Utility \( U^h(V, z) \) and labor supply choices \( z \) unchanged for all individuals.

Attaining \( V(z - \bar{T}(z), p) \) at price \( p \) costs at least \( z - \bar{T}(z) \). [Why? Suppose you could still purchase old bundle \( c(t) \) at new price \( p(t) \) and new income \( z - \bar{T}(z) \); then by definition of \( V(\cdot) \) you must be at least as well off, contradicting equality of utilities]. So \( p \cdot c(t) \geq z - \bar{T}(z) \).

Consumer also attains \( V(z - \bar{T}(z), p) = V(z - T(z), p + t) \) when choosing \( c(t) \Rightarrow z - \bar{T}(z) \leq p \cdot c(t) = z - T(z) - t \cdot c(t) \)

\( \Rightarrow \bar{T}(z) \geq T(z) + t \cdot c(t) \): the government collects more taxes with \((\bar{T}(\cdot), t = 0)\)
With separability and homogeneity, conditional on earnings $z$, consumption choices $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_K)$ do not provide any information on ability

$\Rightarrow$ Differentiated commodity taxes $t_1, \ldots, t_K$ create a tax distortion with no benefit $\Rightarrow$ Better to do all the redistribution with the individual income tax

Note: With weaker linear income taxation tool (Diamond-Mirrlees AER ‘71, Diamond JpubE ‘75), need $v(c_1, \ldots, c_K)$ homothetic (linear Engel curves, Deaton EMA ’81) to obtain no commodity tax result

[Unless Engel curves are linear, commodity taxation can be useful to “non-linearize” the tax system]
Generalization of Atkinson-Stiglitz to Heterogeneous Tastes – Saez (2002)

Can we generalize AS to case with heterogeneous consumption preferences?

Individuals indexed by $h$, utility $U(c, z)$ with $c = (c_1, \ldots, c_K)$.

Nonlinear income tax $T(z)$.

Pre-tax prices: $p$, post-tax price: $q = p + t$.

Budget constraint $q \cdot c \leq z - T(z)$.

Demands: $c^h(q, R, z)$, labor supply $z^h(q, T)$, indirect utility $v^h(q, R, z)$.

Suppose that $T(z)$ is optimally chosen at zero commodity taxation $p = q$ to max

$$W = \sum_h \alpha^h v^h(p, z^h - T(z^h), z^h) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_h T(z^h) \geq E$$

Marginal social welfare weight $g^h = \alpha^h v^h_R / \lambda$. 
Can commodity taxation improve welfare?

Imagine $dt_1$.

Mechanical revenue effect: $dM_1 = \sum_h c^h_1 dt_1 = C_1 dt_1$.

Welfare effect (envelope theorem): $dU_1 = -\sum_h g^h c^h_1 dt_1$.

Behavioral labor supply response: $dB_1 = -\sum_h T'(z^h) dz^h_{t_1}$ with $dz^h_{t_1} = dt_1 \frac{\partial z^h}{\partial q_1}$.

Why no behavioral response on revenue from changes in consumption?

If no commodity tax introduction can increase welfare, need $dW = dM_1 + dU_1 + dB_1 = 0$. 

Can commodity taxation improve welfare? (II)

Find a small income tax reform that “mimics” commodity tax change: 
\[ dT(z) = C_1(z) dt_1. \]

This reform has zero first order welfare impact, why? (Answer: the income tax is optimally set to start with, which means we cannot improve welfare with a variation in it).

Mechanical Revenue effect: 
\[ dM_T = \sum_h dT(z^h) = \sum_h C_1(z^h) dt_1 = C_1 dt_1 = dM_1 \] (why?)

Welfare effect: 
\[ dU_T = -\sum_h g^h C_1(z^h) dt_1 \]

Behavioral effect: 
\[ dB_T = -\sum_h T'(z^h) dz^h_T. \]

Subtract one from other (using that \( dW_T = dM_T + dU_T + dB_T = 0 \)).
Can commodity taxation improve welfare? (III)

\[
\frac{dW}{dt_1} = - \sum_h g^h [c^h_1 - C_1(z^h)] + \sum_h T'(z^h) \left[ \frac{dz^h}{dT(z^h)} \cdot \frac{dT(z^h)}{dt_1} - \frac{dz^h}{dt_1} \right]
\]

- Pure welfare effect is zero if conditional on \(z\), \(g^h\) and \(c^h\) are uncorrelated.

- What does this mean? Is this reasonable? (recall weights are "generalized" since \(\alpha^h\) depends on \(h\) directly).

- Young/old? medical expenses?

- Always satisfied in "standard AS" assumptions.
Behavioral Effects under Commodity and Income Taxation

Since $T'(z^h) \geq 0$ (remember), increasing $dt_1 > 0$ more efficient than equivalent income tax increase if labor supply increase from commodity tax change larger than that of income tax change.

When is this the case? Can show that:

$$E[ dz_{t_1}^h ] = -dt_1 \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{z_c^h}{1 + T''(z) z_c^h} \frac{dC_1}{dz} \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{z_R^h}{1 + T''(z) z_c^h} c_1^h \right] \right)$$

$$E[ dz_T^h ] = -dt_1 \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{z_c^h}{1 + T''(z) z_c^h} \frac{dC_1}{dz} \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{z_R^h}{1 + T''(z) z_c^h} C_1(z) \right] \right)$$

Need $E[ dz_{t_1}^h ] = E[ dz_T^h ]$ for no commodity taxation.
Assumptions needed for behavioral effects to be the same under Commodity and Income Taxation

**Assumption 2:** Conditional on \( z \), behavioral responses \( z^h_c \) and \( z^h_R \) independent of consumption patterns \( c^h_1 \) and \( \frac{dc^h_1}{dz} \).

Do you think this holds?

**Assumption 3:** For any income level, 

\[
E \left( \frac{dc^h_1}{dz} | z^h = z \right) = \frac{dC^1(z)}{dz}
\]

This is the key assumption. What does it say? Why is this not mechanically true?

\[
\frac{dC^1(z)}{dz} = \lim_{dz \to 0} \frac{E(c^h_1 | z^h = z + dz) - E(c^h_1 | z^h = z)}{dz}
\]

is cross-sectional variation in consumption of good 1 when income changes.

What is 

\[
E \left( \frac{dc^h_1}{dz} | z^h = z \right) ?
\]
Assumptions needed for behavioral effects to be the same under Commodity and Income Taxation

Imagine 2 groups:

Group A: \( z^h = z \). consume \( C_1(z) \) on average.

Group B: \( z^h = z - dz \). Consumes on average \( dc_1 = \frac{dC_1(z)}{dz} \) less of good 1.

Group A’: Individuals from group A who are forced to reduce their income to \( z - dz \). Reduce their consumption relative to group A by

\[
dc_1' = E \left( \frac{dc_1^h}{dz} \mid z^h = z \right) \, dz.
\]

Assumption 3 says: Group B = Group A’ for consumption of good 1.

Always true in AS since consumption only depends on after tax income with separability \( C_1(z) = c_1^h(z) \).

Why would Group A’ not have same consumption of good 1 as Group B?
WHEN ATKINSON-STIGLITZ ASSUMPTIONS FAIL

Thought experiment we just did was: force high earners to work less and earn only as much as low earners: if high earners consume more of good $k$ than low earners, taxing good $1$ is desirable.

1) High earners are “different” (since if left to chose, chose to work more. If they have a relatively higher/lower taste for good $1$ (independently of income), tax more/less good $1$. [indirect tagging] Cigarettes? Fancy wine? How would you see this empirically?

2) High earners now have more leisure. If Good $1$ positively related to leisure (consumption of $1$ increases when leisure increases keeping after-tax income constant), tax it! [tax on holiday trips, subsidy on work related expenses such as child care]

In general Atkison-Stiglitz assumption is a good starting place for most goods ⇒ Zero-rating on some goods under VAT for redistribution is inefficient and administratively burdensome [Mirrlees review]
REFERENCES


Laroque, G. “Indirect Taxation is Superfluous under Separability and Taste Homogeneity: A Simple Proof”, Economic Letters, Vol. 87, 2005, 141-144. (web)


Read it for historical reasons, it is not very easy to follow.


