

# ONLINE APPENDIX – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

## for “Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution”

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### OA.1 Additional Tables and Figures

TABLE OA1: DETAILED PERCEIVED TRANSITION PROBABILITIES

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q2 (2)	Q1 to Q3 (3)	Q1 to Q4 (4)	Q1 to Q5 (5)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (6)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (7)	Obs. (8)
<b><i>All Countries</i></b>								
All	34.04	22.64	21.82	11.21	10.29	0.43	0.31	6,880
Left	37.55	23.00	20.27	10.06	9.12	0.35	0.23	2,276
Right	32.25	22.67	22.91	11.70	10.47	0.46	0.32	2,206
<b><i>US</i></b>								
All	32.16	21.83	22.32	11.98	11.72	0.46	0.34	2,170
Left	37.37	21.67	19.33	11.10	10.53	0.35	0.25	577
Right	29.45	21.96	24.14	12.49	11.96	0.53	0.38	652
<b><i>UK</i></b>								
All	37.77	22.25	19.39	10.62	9.97	0.37	0.27	1,290
Left	42.88	23.20	16.85	8.63	8.44	0.23	0.14	406
Right	36.20	22.00	19.71	11.52	10.57	0.41	0.26	304
<b><i>France</i></b>								
All	35.26	23.60	21.51	10.53	9.10	0.42	0.29	1,297
Left	38.36	23.07	20.48	9.56	8.54	0.40	0.26	451
Right	32.70	23.76	22.59	11.47	9.47	0.46	0.31	501
<b><i>Italy</i></b>								
All	33.61	23.13	21.87	11.25	10.14	0.40	0.29	1,242
Left	34.77	23.54	21.80	10.51	9.38	0.34	0.25	554
Right	33.55	22.85	22.13	11.18	10.29	0.41	0.31	402
<b><i>Sweden</i></b>								
All	32.00	23.10	24.52	11.16	9.21	0.47	0.33	881
Left	34.51	24.22	23.66	9.95	7.66	0.43	0.27	288
Right	31.88	22.79	24.79	11.31	9.24	0.45	0.29	347

Notes: The table reports mobility perceptions. Respondents are split according to their self-reported political affiliation. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from “Very liberal (1)” to “Very conservative (5).” “All” refers to the average across all respondents. Left-wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Right-wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” Column  $j$  for  $j = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$  shows the perceived probability of a child from from the bottom quintile to move to quintile  $j$ . Columns 6 (respectively, 7) shows the proportion of respondents who believe that the chance of moving from the first to the fourth (respectively, to the fifth) quintile is “fairly low,” “fairly high,” or “high.” Column 8 reports the number of observations for each row.

TABLE OA2: THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF EFFORT

	Panel A: Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional on Effort					Panel B: % Difference Between Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional and Unconditional on Effort				
	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)
Q1 to Q5	12.47	12.54	11.39	10.86	12.57	0.06 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.25 (0.00)	0.07 (0.00)	0.36 (0.00)
Q1 to Q4	14.83	15.20	15.03	14.22	17.96	0.24 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.61 (0.00)
Q1 to Q3	29.33	26.38	29.39	27.61	31.82	0.31 (0.00)	0.36 (0.00)	0.37 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.30 (0.00)
Q1 to Q2	21.14	22.09	20.91	22.53	19.72	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.58)	-0.11 (0.00)	-0.03 (0.27)	-0.15 (0.00)
Q1 to Q1	22.23	23.79	23.28	24.78	17.93	-0.31 (0.00)	-0.37 (0.00)	-0.34 (0.00)	-0.26 (0.00)	-0.44 (0.00)
Obs.	1,735	900	908	872	656	1,735	900	908	872	656

Notes: The five rows of Panel A of the table report the average perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult if that child “works very hard,” i.e., based on our survey question that asks respondents to think conditional on individual hard work. The five rows of Panel B of the table report the percent change in the perceived probability of a child born in a family from the bottom quintile to be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult conditional on effort relative to the unconditional case. P-values in parentheses.

TABLE OA3: HETEROGENEITY IN PERCEPTIONS: PARTIAL EFFECTS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)
Male	2.090*** (0.741)	-1.034 (0.669)	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.048*** (0.014)
Young	1.858** (0.769)	-0.387 (0.693)	0.073*** (0.016)	0.095*** (0.014)
Has Children	-2.328*** (0.776)	1.749** (0.700)	0.027* (0.016)	0.049*** (0.014)
Rich	1.694* (0.966)	-0.661 (0.871)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.032* (0.018)
College	4.843*** (0.780)	-4.444*** (0.704)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.058*** (0.014)
Right	-2.468*** (0.789)	0.960 (0.711)	0.080*** (0.016)	0.041*** (0.015)
Moved up	-1.890** (0.767)	0.861 (0.692)	0.021 (0.016)	0.011 (0.014)
Immigrant	-1.819* (1.028)	1.249 (0.927)	0.044** (0.021)	0.049** (0.019)
Obs.	4,290	4,290	4,290	4,290
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	34.17	20.97	0.38	0.27

Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 (respectively, column 2) is the perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the bottom quintile (respectively, in the fourth or fifth quintile) when adult. The dependent variables in columns 3 and 4 are defined as in Table OA1. Regressors are indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, right-wing political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. “Mean Dep. Var” is the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA4: THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF TALENT

	Panel A: Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional on Talent					Panel B: % Difference Between Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional and Unconditional on Talent				
	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)
Q1 to Q5	14.03	9.59	11.83	12.25	10.70	0.20 (0.00)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.30 (0.00)	0.21 (0.05)	0.16 (0.31)
Q1 to Q4	14.59	13.37	15.06	13.77	14.49	0.22 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.22 (0.00)	0.30 (0.00)
Q1 to Q3	26.96	26.84	30.83	27.82	32.02	0.21 (0.00)	0.38 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.27 (0.00)	0.31 (0.00)
Q1 to Q2	21.08	22.74	20.58	22.91	21.58	-0.03 (0.96)	0.02 (0.35)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.61)	-0.07 (0.14)
Q1 to Q1	23.34	27.45	21.70	23.25	21.22	-0.27 (0.00)	-0.27 (0.00)	-0.38 (0.00)	-0.31 (0.00)	-0.34 (0.00)
Obs.	435	390	389	370	225	435	390	389	370	225

Notes: The five rows of Panel A of the table report the average perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult if that child is very talented, i.e., based on our survey question that asks respondents to think conditional on individual talent. The five rows of Panel B of the table report the percent change in the perceived probability of a child born in a family from the bottom quintile to be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult conditional on talent relative to the unconditional case. P-values in parentheses.

TABLE OA5: HETEROGENEITY IN PERCEPTIONS CONDITIONAL ON EFFORT: PARTIAL EFFECTS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)	Diff Q1 to Q1 (5)	Diff Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (6)
Male	1.800** (0.863)	-1.215 (0.861)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.037* (0.020)	0.894 (0.805)	-0.661 (0.692)
Young	1.999** (0.890)	2.358*** (0.888)	0.060*** (0.020)	0.098*** (0.021)	1.608* (0.830)	1.716** (0.714)
Has Children	-0.307 (0.899)	0.610 (0.896)	0.031 (0.020)	0.074*** (0.021)	1.790** (0.838)	-0.972 (0.721)
Rich	1.344 (1.127)	0.532 (1.124)	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.358 (1.051)	0.660 (0.904)
College	-0.816 (0.905)	-2.584*** (0.903)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.076*** (0.021)	-5.422*** (0.844)	2.146*** (0.726)
Right	-3.496*** (0.913)	2.785*** (0.911)	0.057*** (0.020)	0.069*** (0.021)	-0.625 (0.852)	1.981*** (0.733)
Moved up	-1.601* (0.890)	1.188 (0.888)	0.023 (0.020)	0.014 (0.021)	0.779 (0.830)	-0.382 (0.714)
Immigrant	-0.918 (1.197)	0.684 (1.193)	0.028 (0.027)	0.066** (0.028)	1.146 (1.116)	-0.138 (0.960)
Obs.	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	23.48	25.19	0.66	0.51	-10.24	3.83

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are defined as in Table OA3 but conditional on effort. The dependent variable in column 5 (respectively, 6) is the difference between the perceived probability conditional on effort and the unconditional probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the bottom quintile (respectively, in the fourth or fifth quintile) when adult. Regressors are defined as in Table OA3. “Mean Dep. Var” is the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA6: HETEROGENEITY IN PERCEPTIONS CONDITIONAL ON TALENT: PARTIAL EFFECTS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)	Diff Q1 to Q1 (5)	Diff Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (6)
Male	2.793*** (1.039)	-2.440** (1.015)	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.068*** (0.024)	-1.081 (0.946)	-0.622 (0.862)
Young	3.253*** (1.085)	-0.576 (1.060)	0.044* (0.024)	0.056** (0.025)	-0.758 (0.988)	1.372 (0.900)
Has Children	-1.741 (1.103)	1.106 (1.078)	0.031 (0.024)	0.019 (0.025)	0.932 (1.005)	-0.708 (0.916)
Rich	0.441 (1.349)	-1.797 (1.318)	0.027 (0.030)	0.032 (0.031)	-1.120 (1.228)	-0.531 (1.119)
College	2.560** (1.103)	-3.169*** (1.078)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.087*** (0.025)	-2.501** (1.004)	0.903 (0.915)
Right	-2.957*** (1.112)	3.483*** (1.086)	0.072*** (0.025)	0.085*** (0.026)	-1.144 (1.012)	2.262** (0.922)
Moved up	-1.174 (1.080)	-0.363 (1.055)	-0.011 (0.024)	0.001 (0.025)	-0.163 (0.983)	-0.126 (0.896)
Immigrant	-2.703* (1.443)	3.571** (1.410)	0.069** (0.032)	0.075** (0.033)	-1.282 (1.313)	1.859 (1.197)
Obs.	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	23.53	26.18	0.66	0.52	-11.31	5.78

Notes: Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are defined as in Table OA3 but conditional on talent. The dependent variable in column 5 (respectively, 6) is the difference between the perceived probability conditional on talent and the unconditional probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the bottom quintile (respectively, in the fourth or fifth quintile) when adult. Regressors are defined as in Table OA3. “Mean Dep. Var” is the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA7: COMMUTING ZONE CHARACTERISTICS AND MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: PARTIAL EFFECTS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)
Racial Segregation	-0.075** (0.037)	0.035 (0.035)	0.089** (0.044)	0.080** (0.038)
Income Segregation	0.076** (0.036)	-0.046 (0.035)	-0.068* (0.039)	-0.077* (0.041)
Social Capital Index	0.050 (0.037)	-0.060* (0.033)	-0.092*** (0.032)	-0.075** (0.037)
Gini	-0.025 (0.035)	0.052 (0.036)	-0.041 (0.038)	0.038 (0.037)
Manufacturing Share	-0.010 (0.027)	0.039 (0.028)	-0.034 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.031)
College Grad Rate	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.029)	0.014 (0.031)
Obs.	1,635	1,635	1,635	1,635

Notes: “Racial Segregation” is a Multi-group Theil Index calculated at the census-tract level over four groups (White alone, Black alone, Hispanic, and Other) and aggregated at the commuting zone level, “Income Segregation” is measured by a weighted average of two-group Theil indices, as in Reardon (2011), at the commuting zone level, “Social Capital Index” is the social capital index from Rupasingha and Goetz (2008) at the commuting zone-level, “Gini” is the commuting zone-level Gini coefficient, “Manufacturing Share” is the share of employed persons 16 and older working in manufacturing from the 2000 census at the commuting zone-level, “College Grad Rate” is the residual from a regression of graduation rate (the share of undergraduate students that complete their degree in 150% of normal time) on household income per capita in 2000, aggregated at the commuting zone level. The regressors are from Chetty et al. (2014). Please refer to Chetty et al. (2014) for a detailed explanation of the construction of the commuting zone-level regressors. All regressions control for survey wave fixed effects and include all covariates in Table OA3. The dependent variables are defined as in Table OA3. All variables normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the estimation sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the commuting zone level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA8: MINORITIES, IMMIGRANTS, AND REDISTRIBUTIVE PREFERENCES

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
Racial Segregation × Right	-0.091** (0.045)	0.037 (0.047)	-0.020 (0.050)	0.015 (0.056)	0.026 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.050)	-0.010 (0.084)	0.247** (0.114)	0.097 (0.062)
Frac. Black × Right	0.130*** (0.047)	0.064 (0.042)	-0.005 (0.051)	0.073 (0.055)	0.027 (0.038)	0.082* (0.042)	0.045 (0.088)	-0.034 (0.096)	-0.105** (0.053)
Frac. Foreign Born × Right	0.039 (0.052)	-0.004 (0.044)	0.037 (0.064)	0.009 (0.054)	-0.074** (0.031)	0.073* (0.039)	0.027 (0.068)	-0.026 (0.082)	0.058 (0.047)
Racial Segregation × Left	0.055 (0.052)	-0.005 (0.053)	0.132*** (0.046)	0.053 (0.046)	0.077 (0.074)	0.120* (0.066)	0.000 (0.093)	0.050 (0.061)	0.044 (0.045)
Frac. Black × Left	-0.065 (0.050)	0.022 (0.060)	-0.057 (0.058)	0.013 (0.047)	-0.030 (0.060)	-0.025 (0.067)	-0.073 (0.113)	0.084 (0.069)	-0.014 (0.052)
Frac. Foreign Born × Left	-0.073* (0.038)	-0.060 (0.058)	-0.093** (0.040)	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.115* (0.059)	-0.026 (0.046)	0.010 (0.073)	0.020 (0.056)	-0.018 (0.046)
Obs.	1655	1655	1655	1655	1655	1655	811	811	1655

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on commuting zone characteristics interacted with dummies for political affiliation. Interaction of commuting zone characteristics and “Moderate” is not reported. “Racial Segregation” is a Multi-group Theil Index calculated at the census-tract level over four groups (White alone, Black alone, Hispanic, and Other) and aggregated at the commuting zone level, “Frac. Black” is defined as the number of people in a commuting zone who are black divided by the commuting zone population, “Frac. Foreign Born” is the number of foreign born inhabitants divided by total commuting zone population. The regressors are from Chetty et al. (2014). Please refer to Chetty et al. (2014) for a detailed explanation of the construction of the commuting zone-level regressors. All regressions control for survey wave fixed effects and include all covariates in Table 3. The dependent variables are defined as in Table 3. Commuting zone-level variables are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the estimation sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the commuting zone level. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$



TABLE OA9: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

	Trust Govt. (1)	Govt. Tools (2)	Government Intervention (3)	Lowering Taxes Better (4)	Unequal Opp. Problem (5)	Negative View of Government (6)	Obs. (7)
<b><i>All Countries</i></b>							
All	0.19	0.72	5.32	0.36	0.87	0.63	4,448
Left	0.21	0.79	5.79	0.20	0.94	0.49	1,442
Right	0.19	0.64	4.81	0.57	0.81	0.80	1,422
<b><i>US</i></b>							
All	0.23	0.75	4.95	0.32	0.83	0.59	1,731
Left	0.30	0.85	5.61	0.14	0.92	0.39	464
Right	0.17	0.63	4.10	0.56	0.74	0.78	517
<b><i>UK</i></b>							
All	0.17	0.82	5.50	0.24	0.85	0.50	759
Left	0.09	0.89	5.91	0.11	0.93	0.40	257
Right	0.37	0.75	5.02	0.44	0.75	0.65	167
<b><i>France</i></b>							
All	0.06	0.48	5.42	0.51	0.89	0.85	769
Left	0.08	0.53	5.61	0.32	0.94	0.75	249
Right	0.06	0.48	5.22	0.66	0.84	0.91	307
<b><i>Italy</i></b>							
All	0.08	0.73	5.92	0.44	0.94	0.71	735
Left	0.10	0.76	6.00	0.33	0.96	0.60	335
Right	0.05	0.69	5.76	0.61	0.92	0.84	238
<b><i>Sweden</i></b>							
All	0.50	0.81	5.28	0.29	0.91	0.53	454
Left	0.59	0.90	5.96	0.07	0.99	0.23	137
Right	0.46	0.78	4.70	0.53	0.84	0.74	193

Notes: The table reports respondents' views on the government. *Trust Govt.* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that she can trust the government to do what is right "Most of the time" or "Always", *Govt. Tools* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families the government has the ability and the tools to do "Some" or "A lot", *Government Intervention* is the respondent's support, on a scale from 1 to 7, for government intervention to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal, *Lowering Taxes Better* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that "lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth" would do more to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal than "raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations to expand programs for the poor", *Unequal Opp. Problem* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that if children from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal opportunities in life this is "A problem" or "A serious problem" or "A very serious problem", *Negative View of Government* is defined as in Figure 7 of the paper. Political affiliations "Left" and "Right" are defined as in Table OA1.

TABLE OA10: VIEWS ON TAXES AND PUBLIC SPENDING

	Tax Rate Top 1 (1)	Tax Rate Next 9 (2)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (3)	Share Taxes Top 1 (4)	Share Taxes Bottom 50 (5)	Support Estate Tax (6)	Budget Opportunities (7)	Budget Safety Net (8)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (9)	Obs. 1-5 (10)	Obs. 6-9 (11)
<b>All Countries</b>											
All	37.58	25.75	10.09	0.23	0.11	0.30	37.29	13.93	3.74	3,564	4,447
Left	40.49	27.13	8.83	0.24	0.10	0.41	39.17	15.17	4.10	1,193	1,442
Right	36.11	26.07	11.96	0.21	0.13	0.18	35.74	12.75	3.41	1,163	1,422
<b>US</b>											
All	25.22	14.78	7.86	0.35	0.07	0.35	32.73	13.51	3.61	851	1,731
Left	28.10	15.19	5.96	0.39	0.05	0.51	35.22	15.03	4.08	216	464
Right	22.49	14.52	10.05	0.31	0.08	0.20	29.08	11.86	3.09	261	517
<b>UK</b>											
All	37.15	23.06	6.50	0.28	0.10	0.32	41.30	13.36	3.90	758	758
Left	39.97	23.21	5.67	0.31	0.08	0.44	42.12	14.45	4.20	256	257
Right	34.65	22.89	6.89	0.26	0.10	0.26	41.52	12.19	3.67	167	167
<b>France</b>											
All	43.71	29.41	8.51	0.18	0.12	0.22	38.59	13.37	3.66	769	769
Left	47.07	30.98	6.92	0.19	0.09	0.31	39.95	14.81	3.97	249	249
Right	42.70	28.60	9.59	0.17	0.13	0.18	37.09	12.31	3.42	307	307
<b>Italy</b>											
All	37.75	26.35	10.37	0.19	0.14	0.23	38.99	15.70	3.96	732	735
Left	38.66	27.66	9.04	0.19	0.12	0.31	40.15	15.55	4.11	335	335
Right	34.74	25.26	11.44	0.17	0.15	0.14	38.33	15.37	3.84	235	238
<b>Sweden</b>											
All	50.81	43.61	22.50	0.11	0.17	0.28	43.03	14.52	3.76	454	454
Left	53.49	44.99	22.23	0.11	0.17	0.49	43.26	16.67	4.19	137	137
Right	46.99	41.39	23.32	0.10	0.17	0.16	43.25	13.07	3.53	193	193

Notes: The table reports respondents' views on taxes and public spending. Political affiliations "Left" and "Right" are defined as in Table OA1. *Tax Rate Top 1*, *Tax Rate Next 9*, *Tax Rate Bottom 50* are the respondent's chosen income tax rates for the Top 1% of the income distribution, the next 9%, and the bottom 50%, respectively. *Share Taxes Top 1* and *Share Taxes Bottom 50* convert the tax rates chosen by respondents into shares of tax revenue paid by each group. *Support Estate Tax* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is in favor of the estate tax (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "do not support at all" and 5 means "strongly support"). *Budget Opportunities* and *Budget Safety net* are the share of the budget the respondent believes should be allocated to education and health, and to safety net policies, respectively. *Support Equality Opp. Policies* is the respondent's support, on a scale from 1 to 5, for policies to improve equality of opportunity. Columns 10 and 11 report the number of observations for each row, for the outcomes in columns 1-5 and 6-9, respectively.

TABLE OA11: VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT AND POLICY PREFERENCES, LEFT VERSUS RIGHT

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Budget Safety Net (5)	Tax Rate Top 1 (6)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (7)
Lowering taxes better × Left-Wing	-1.907*** (0.703)	-0.198*** (0.030)	-0.607*** (0.065)	-0.399*** (0.090)	-0.987** (0.482)	-7.202*** (1.183)	3.550*** (0.676)
Govt. Tools × Left-Wing	0.347 (0.691)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.430*** (0.064)	0.810*** (0.088)	0.752 (0.474)	2.107* (1.162)	-1.528** (0.664)
Trust Govt. × Left-Wing	0.912 (0.700)	0.058* (0.030)	0.004 (0.065)	-0.032 (0.089)	-0.086 (0.480)	-1.418 (1.249)	0.704 (0.714)
Lowering taxes better × Right-Wing	-0.642 (0.569)	-0.130*** (0.024)	-0.517*** (0.053)	-0.623*** (0.072)	-2.170*** (0.390)	-7.614*** (0.982)	1.171** (0.562)
Govt. Tools × Right-Wing	3.034*** (0.598)	0.055** (0.025)	0.580*** (0.056)	1.075*** (0.076)	1.074*** (0.410)	0.798 (1.032)	-0.179 (0.590)
Trust Govt. × Right-Wing	1.339* (0.741)	0.073** (0.032)	0.010 (0.069)	0.022 (0.094)	0.230 (0.508)	-1.686 (1.285)	1.800** (0.735)
Observations	4284	4283	4284	4284	4284	3436	3436

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Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on respondents’ views of government interacted with dummies for the respondent’s self-reported political affiliation. “Left-Wing” and “Right-Wing” respondents are defined as in Table OA1. The coefficients on the interactions between views of government and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has “Moderate” views on economic issue are not reported in the table. *Lowering Taxes Better* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent thinks that “lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth” is better than “raising taxes [...] to expand programs for the poor” to improve mobility. *Govt. Tools* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent thinks that the government has the ability and the tools to do “some” or “a lot” to improve mobility. *Trust Govt.* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent says that the government can be trusted to do what is right “most of the time” or “always”. The dependent variables are defined as in Table 3 of the paper. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3 of the paper. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA12: CORRELATION BETWEEN VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT, POLICY PREFERENCES, AND PESSIMISM

	Government Cannot Do Much	Unequal Opp. Not Serious Problem	Lowering Taxes Better	Low Spending Opp.	Optimistic
Government Cannot Do Much	-	-	-	-	-
Unequal Opp. Not Serious Problem	0.207 (0.013)***	-	-	-	-
Lowering Taxes Better	0.156 (0.014)***	0.25 (0.015)***	-	-	-
Low Spending Opp.	0.146 (0.015)***	0.139 (0.017)***	0.093 (0.016)***	-	-
Optimistic	0.029 (0.015)**	0.123 (0.017)***	0.093 (0.016)***	0.071 (0.015)***	-

Notes: Each coefficient in the table refers to a regression of the variable in the column on the variable in the row and a constant, controlling for country and survey fixed effects. The number of observations is 4,440 for all regressions. *Government Cannot Do Much* is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent says that the government cannot do much or can do nothing to equalize opportunities. *Unequal Opp. Not Serious Problem* is a binary variable equal to one if unequal opportunities are not perceived to be a serious problem. *Lowering Taxes Better* is defined as in Table OA11. *Low Spending Opp.* is a binary variable equal to one if the share of budget allocated by the respondent to education and health policies is below the 20th percentile in the variable distribution. *Optimistic* is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent believes that the chances of moving from the bottom to the top quintile are neither “close to zero” nor “low”. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA13: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: US

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
<b>A. Unconditional Beliefs</b>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.036* (0.020)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.045*** (0.012)	0.018 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.028)	0.000 (0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.005 (0.014)	0.021 (0.035)	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.177	0.183	0.154	0.727	0.406	0.030	0.948	0.824	0.422
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.069** (0.033)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.055*** (0.020)	0.086* (0.051)	0.020 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.001)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.060* (0.033)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.020)	0.044 (0.049)	-0.004 (0.044)	0.002 (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.006	0.065	0.313	0.436	0.099	0.047	0.551	0.699	0.105
Observations	1656	1656	1656	1656	1656	1656	812	812	1656
<b>B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort</b>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.046* (0.025)	0.001 (0.001)	0.005* (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.048*** (0.016)	0.009 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.075** (0.029)	0.001 (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.041** (0.019)	-0.018 (0.042)	0.085** (0.038)	-0.000 (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.453	0.661	0.288	0.635	0.436	0.768	0.634	0.038	0.882
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.076** (0.038)	-0.003** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.039 (0.024)	0.048 (0.048)	0.014 (0.043)	-0.000 (0.001)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.004 (0.039)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.025)	0.046 (0.054)	0.115** (0.048)	0.000 (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.141	0.096	0.513	0.527	0.251	0.327	0.977	0.115	0.802
Observations	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	812	812	1242

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent’s self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.S.. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from “Very liberal (1)” to “Very conservative (5).” Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has “Moderate” views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in the main Appendix. “p-value diff” is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country, and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA14: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: UK

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
<i>A. Unconditional Beliefs</i>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.041* (0.024)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.021 (0.018)	0.078** (0.038)	-0.032** (0.015)	0.001 (0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.020 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.022)	0.017 (0.046)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.003*** (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.573	0.010	0.002	0.000	0.026	0.397	0.309	0.818	0.005
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.059 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.067** (0.029)	-0.009 (0.062)	0.053** (0.024)	-0.002 (0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.043 (0.049)	0.000 (0.002)	0.004 (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.040 (0.079)	0.007 (0.031)	0.004* (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.099	0.425	0.029	0.064	0.036	0.070	0.759	0.231	0.020
Observations	729	728	729	729	729	729	728	728	729
<i>B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort</i>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.035 (0.036)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.009* (0.005)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.022 (0.031)	-0.027 (0.061)	0.006 (0.024)	0.002 (0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	-0.020 (0.061)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.065 (0.052)	0.072 (0.103)	0.002 (0.040)	-0.006** (0.003)
p-value diff.	0.830	0.940	0.256	0.309	0.091	0.476	0.406	0.940	0.011
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	0.015 (0.057)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.052 (0.048)	0.011 (0.098)	0.049 (0.038)	-0.004* (0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.093 (0.070)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.010)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.080 (0.059)	-0.084 (0.120)	0.065 (0.046)	0.005 (0.003)
p-value diff.	0.384	0.146	0.045	0.227	0.198	0.080	0.535	0.794	0.019
Observations	352	351	352	352	352	352	352	352	352

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent’s self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.K.. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from “Very liberal (1)” to “Very conservative (5).” Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has “Moderate” views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in the main Appendix. “p-value diff” is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA15: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: FRANCE

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
<i>A. Unconditional Beliefs</i>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.006** (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.015 (0.017)	0.097* (0.050)	-0.043** (0.021)	-0.001 (0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	-0.008 (0.024)	0.000 (0.001)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)	0.020 (0.016)	0.049 (0.046)	-0.023 (0.019)	0.000 (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.973	0.575	0.630	0.243	0.388	0.827	0.477	0.497	0.576
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.053 (0.048)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.038 (0.031)	-0.127 (0.092)	0.112*** (0.038)	0.005* (0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.082* (0.042)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.041 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.081)	0.039 (0.034)	-0.001 (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.644	0.099	0.510	0.199	0.849	0.934	0.302	0.152	0.076
Observations	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739
<i>B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort</i>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.057 (0.036)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)	0.002 (0.001)	0.012 (0.025)	0.175** (0.070)	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.022 (0.038)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.026 (0.025)	0.111 (0.073)	-0.009 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.130	0.490	0.657	0.074	0.930	0.699	0.529	0.992	0.704
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.139* (0.082)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.016 (0.056)	-0.349** (0.162)	0.098 (0.066)	-0.001 (0.004)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.023 (0.066)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.142 (0.130)	0.047 (0.053)	-0.001 (0.003)
p-value diff.	0.268	0.902	0.651	0.346	0.812	0.290	0.319	0.545	0.987
Observations	366	366	366	366	366	366	366	366	366

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent’s self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from France. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from “Very liberal (1)” to “Very conservative (5).” Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has “Moderate” views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in the main Appendix. “p-value diff” is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA16: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: ITALY

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
<b>A. Unconditional Beliefs</b>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.027 (0.024)	0.002** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	0.016 (0.021)	0.095** (0.044)	-0.049** (0.025)	0.001 (0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.050* (0.029)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.038 (0.025)	0.102* (0.053)	-0.048 (0.030)	0.000 (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.533	0.350	0.646	0.042	0.364	0.096	0.926	0.975	0.662
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.113*** (0.040)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.034)	-0.172** (0.073)	0.101** (0.040)	-0.003 (0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.045 (0.045)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	0.040 (0.039)	-0.027 (0.083)	0.072 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.261	0.376	0.752	0.840	0.054	0.392	0.191	0.639	0.398
Observations	721	721	721	721	721	721	718	718	721
<b>B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort</b>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.012 (0.038)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)	0.024 (0.032)	0.128* (0.065)	-0.028 (0.035)	-0.000 (0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.008 (0.047)	0.000 (0.002)	0.007 (0.004)	0.010 (0.006)	0.003 (0.002)	0.022 (0.040)	0.123 (0.082)	-0.044 (0.044)	0.001 (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.937	0.587	0.581	0.602	0.727	0.961	0.969	0.777	0.717
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.117 (0.075)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.063)	-0.426*** (0.130)	0.268*** (0.069)	-0.003 (0.003)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.181** (0.072)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.112* (0.061)	-0.166 (0.125)	0.055 (0.066)	0.001 (0.003)
p-value diff.	0.541	0.740	0.419	0.305	0.039	0.223	0.151	0.026	0.446
Observations	358	358	358	358	358	358	357	357	358

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent’s self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from Italy. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from “Very liberal (1)” to “Very conservative (5).” Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has “Moderate” views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in the main Appendix. “p-value diff” is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



TABLE OA17: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: SWEDEN

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
<i>A. Unconditional Beliefs</i>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.022 (0.037)	0.001 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.000 (0.005)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.066)	-0.047 (0.042)	0.000 (0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.048 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.008 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.053)	-0.004 (0.034)	0.000 (0.001)
p-value diff.	0.591	0.394	0.615	0.810	0.180	0.882	0.747	0.430	0.834
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.131** (0.056)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.037)	-0.023 (0.100)	-0.024 (0.064)	-0.003 (0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.085* (0.051)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.033)	0.024 (0.091)	0.067 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.548	0.118	0.719	0.651	0.241	0.972	0.730	0.294	0.571
Observations	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
<i>B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort</i>									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.044 (0.057)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.044 (0.034)	-0.119 (0.103)	0.128** (0.059)	-0.002 (0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.041 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.048 (0.032)	-0.094 (0.097)	-0.057 (0.056)	-0.004** (0.002)
p-value diff.	0.287	0.275	0.988	0.086	0.968	0.052	0.859	0.026	0.549
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.029 (0.141)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.084)	-0.136 (0.254)	-0.003 (0.147)	0.004 (0.005)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.134 (0.087)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.007 (0.007)	0.012 (0.010)	0.001 (0.003)	0.029 (0.052)	0.196 (0.157)	0.002 (0.091)	0.008** (0.003)
p-value diff.	0.525	0.413	0.079	0.497	0.688	0.786	0.263	0.976	0.589
Observations	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent’s self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from Sweden. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from “Very liberal (1)” to “Very conservative (5).” Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has “Moderate” views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in the main Appendix. “p-value diff” is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA18: PERSISTENCE OF TREATMENT EFFECTS ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS – LEFT-WING RESPONDENTS

	First Survey All Respondents (1)	First Survey Who Took Follow Up (2)	Follow up Respondents (3)
<i>Q1 to Q1</i>			
Treated	8.532*** (1.806)	9.544** (3.691)	7.841** (3.625)
<i>Q1 to Q2</i>			
Treated	-1.386 (0.854)	-0.264 (1.883)	-1.340 (2.014)
<i>Q1 to Q3</i>			
Treated	-4.404*** (0.863)	-5.666*** (1.946)	-6.252*** (2.015)
<i>Q1 to Q4</i>			
Treated	-2.348*** (0.635)	-2.679** (1.214)	-1.790 (1.331)
<i>Q1 to Q5</i>			
Treated	-0.394 (1.058)	-0.936 (2.506)	1.541 (1.951)
<i>Q1 to Q4 (Qual.)</i>			
Treated	-0.197*** (0.058)	-0.210* (0.125)	-0.315** (0.131)
<i>Q1 to Q5 (Qual.)</i>			
Treated	-0.169** (0.066)	-0.217 (0.136)	-0.233* (0.135)
Obs.	916	214	214

Notes: The coefficients and standard error in row  $j$  refer to a regression of the variable listed in row  $j$  on a dummy for being in the treatment group. Column 1 shows the first round effects on the full sample of respondents in the first round, while column 2 limits the sample to respondents who also took the follow up survey. Column 3 shows the second round effects. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3 of the paper. All dependent variables are defined as in Table 4 of the paper. The samples in all columns include only respondents who have views on economic issues that are “Liberal” or “Very liberal.” Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA19: PERSISTENCE OF TREATMENT EFFECTS ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS – RIGHT-WING RESPONDENTS


	First Survey All Respondents (1)	First Survey Who Took Follow Up (2)	Follow up Respondents (3)
<i>Q1 to Q1</i>			
Treated	9.763*** (1.555)	7.650** (2.990)	5.015* (2.838)
<i>Q1 to Q2</i>			
Treated	-1.544** (0.765)	-2.705* (1.474)	-0.291 (1.658)
<i>Q1 to Q3</i>			
Treated	-6.581*** (0.932)	-6.901*** (1.884)	-3.038* (1.769)
<i>Q1 to Q4</i>			
Treated	-1.932*** (0.597)	0.179 (1.170)	-1.851 (1.188)
<i>Q1 to Q5</i>			
Treated	0.294 (1.016)	1.778 (1.847)	0.165 (1.699)
<i>Q1 to Q4 (Qual.)</i>			
Treated	-0.309*** (0.056)	-0.149 (0.107)	-0.029 (0.110)
<i>Q1 to Q5 (Qual.)</i>			
Treated	-0.313*** (0.062)	-0.060 (0.128)	0.042 (0.126)
Obs.	1033	264	264

Notes: The coefficients and standard error in row  $j$  refer to a regression of the variable listed in row  $j$  on a dummy for being in the treatment group. Column 1 shows the first round effects on the full sample of respondents in the first round, while column 2 limits the sample to respondents who also took the follow up survey. Column 3 shows the second round effects. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3 of the paper. All dependent variables are defined as in Table 4 of the paper. The samples in all columns include only respondents who have views on economic issues that are “Conservative” or “Very conservative.” Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

FIGURE OA1: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS CONDITIONAL ON EFFORT

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile




20

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability *conditional on effort* of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See the main Appendix for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA2: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: U.S.

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile




Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.S.. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See the main Appendix for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA3: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: U.K.

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile




Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.K.. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See the main Appendix for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA4: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: FRANCE

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile




Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from France. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See the main Appendix for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA5: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: ITALY

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile




Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from Italy. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See the main Appendix for a definition of the groups.



FIGURE OA6: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: SWEDEN

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile



Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from Sweden. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See the main Appendix for a definition of the groups.

## OA.2 Data Sources for Population Statistics

- U.S.: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Income brackets (annual gross household income) are: less than \$20,000; \$20,000-\$40,000; \$40,000-\$70,000; more than \$70,000.
- U.K.: data on gender, age, and income is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from the Office of National Statistics. Income brackets (monthly net household income) are: less than £1,500; £1,500-£2,500; £2,500-£3,000; more than £3,000.
- France: data on gender, age, and income is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from INSEE. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-2,500; 2,500-3,000; more than 3,000.
- Italy: data on gender and age is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on income is from the Bank of Italy. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from ISTAT. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-2,450; 2,450-3,350; more than 3,350.
- Sweden: data on gender, age, and income is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from Statistics Sweden. Income brackets (monthly gross household income, in SEK) are: less than 33,000; 33,000-42,000; 42,000-58,000; more than 58,000.

## OA.3 Information on construction of the French transition matrix

Our methodology is inspired by Piraino (2007). We perform a two-stage regression based on two samples: a sample of sons who reported their fathers' socioeconomic characteristics and a sample of adult men ("pseudo fathers") whose age was consistent with that of the actual fathers. Once the samples are selected, the steps required for this empirical strategy are:

1. estimate an income equation from the older sample;
2. use the estimated coefficients to predict fathers' incomes on the basis of sons' reports;
3. construct a transition matrix based on these results.

### Sample selection:

- Sample of fathers: from the 1985 wave of the "Formation et Qualification professionnelle, INSEE" survey. They are men born between 1927 and 1947, who have at least one child and who have less than four older sister and brothers. We restrict the sample to individuals with positive income that are above half of the annual minimum wage and discard self-employed individuals because we do not have information on income from self-employment. The final sample has about 4500 fathers.
- Sample of sons: from the 2003 wave of the "Formation et Qualification professionnelle, INSEE" survey. They are born between 1963 and 1973, with fathers born between 1927 and 1947. We therefore measure income of the pseudo fathers when sons are 12-22. We further restrict the

sample to those individuals who report a basic set of their father’s demographic characteristics, have less than four older siblings, and, similarly to the fathers’ sample, have positive income, are above half of the annual minimum wage and are not self-employed. The final sample has 1279 sons.

**Variables to construct income of pseudo fathers:** educational level, occupation category, year of birth, indicator for whether father lived in Paris.

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