

# Inequalities in the Times of a Pandemic

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
## Covid has exacerbated existing inequalities

- ... across income groups, sectors, regions, gender, and children from different backgrounds.
- Policy responses proposed are medium and longer-term actions, not short-run mitigation strategies.


# Evolution of income inequalities

- **Stronger negative impact on lower-income households**
  - pre-tax & transfer income Gini increased by 3.6% Spring 2020 in the EU (27);
- **Substantial support from governments** propped incomes up in the short run.
  - disposable income Gini decreased by 0.7%;
- **Yet, regressive direct impact of the pandemic likely to persist** and require longer-term action. Channels:
  - Job loss, longer-term unemployment, scarring.
  - Business destruction
  - Accelerated digitization and automation favoring higher-paid jobs.


# Evolution of household income per capita and real GDP from 2007-Q1 to 2020-Q3 in OECD countries



# Loss of income from employment between 2019-Q2 and 2020-Q2 in the EU, by income



# Loss of income from employment between 2019-Q2 and 2020-Q2 before and after government compensation



## Remote work opportunities as a vector of inequalities

- Potential for remote work is lower at the bottom of income distribution.
  - (US, 2020) 37% on average; 45.5% of high-income / 18.4% of low-income worked remotely;
  - (EU, 2018) 74% of high-income / 3% of low-income could work remotely;
- Heterogeneous effects on productivity of working from home, driven by sectoral composition and worse home working conditions of lower-income households.
- If shift to remote work more long-lasting, could also widen inequalities; and affect different regions differently.

## Unemployment across the income distribution

- Lower-income workers are more likely to be in essential positions (+), yet also less likely to be able to work remotely (-).
- On balance: unemployment shocks have been worse for low-income workers.
  - (UK, 2/20-3/20) 12% decrease in employment for low earners, 5% for high earners;
  - (US, 1/20-4/20) 37% decrease in employment for low earners, 14% for high earners;
- Quicker recovery of employment towards the top of the income distribution but towards the bottom.
- Possible long-lasting effects on labor market inequalities


## Digital divide

- Unequal potential for using technology to cope with the pandemic across the income distribution and across regions. Disparities in access to
  - High-speed internet connection
  - Sufficient and appropriate computer/hardware/software equipment for all households members
- Resulting inequalities in access to online learning, maintaining social life, online services, etc.

## Sectoral and Regional Inequalities

- Sectoral inequalities have been driven by disparities in the ability to
  - **Stay open during lockdowns**
  - **Substitute online for in-person activity**
  - **Provide critical services** during the pandemic.
  - U.S: small business revenues decreased by 57% in leisure and hospitality sectors and by 26% in retail and transportation (of goods and people) sectors from January to March 2020.
  - VC investments increased by 39% in health-related sectors over the world in the first half 2020. IT companies surged as well.
- Poorest regions had higher Covid-19 mortality (due to, among others: infrastructure, quality of air and spaces, ability to socially distance, sectoral composition and unequal potential for remote work).
- A long-lasting shift towards remote work could reshape regions in perhaps unpredictable ways (“zoom towns”?).

# Share of jobs that can potentially be performed remotely, in cities, towns and rural areas in Europe, 2018




# Inequalities across gender

Women experienced..

- **.. more work from home, conditional on remaining employed**
  - Occupations are more amenable to remote work.
  - Increased need for childcare due to school and kindergarten closures.
- **.. stronger reduction in work hours and increase in unemployment**
  - The *shecession* (*she-recession*) of 2020 – unlike previous crises when men's employment was hit harder.
  - Higher share of women had part-time or alternative work contracts pre-Covid-19, which are less stable
  - Women quit their jobs or significantly reduced their work hours due to the increased need for childcare.
- **... increased childcare responsibilities**
  - Mothers absorbed more of additional childcare (& overall housework).
  - (UK): Women added 30.3 additional hours of childcare per week, men added 19.4. men.

## Difference between women's and men's unemployment increases, US recessions from 1948 to 2020



Women's unemployment (at peak) had risen 2.9 pp more than men's.

# Inequalities in education

- **Time spent learning and learning delays**
  - Significantly less time on school work during school closures.
  - Considerable heterogeneity by family income. Learning delays more pronounced for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
- **Unequal technical and resource constraints**
  - Starkly different technical capacities for digital instruction across schools in different countries and across households.
  - In England, 1 in 10 students in primary school and 1 in 7 students in secondary school relied only on a cell phone or had no digital device to access school materials online.

## Change in Math Lessons Completed in the U.S., Relative to January 2020, by income group



# A Policy Matrix: Intervening at several stages

		At what stage of the economy does policy intervene?		
		pre-production stage	production stage	post-production stage
Which income segment do we care about?	bottom incomes	primary education and early-childhood programs; vocational training	minimum wage; apprenticeships; reduced social security contributions by firms; in-work benefits	social transfers (housing, family, child benefits); guaranteed minimum income
	middle class	public higher education; adult retraining programs	cluster policies; SME support programs; EU Structural and Investment Funds; occupational licensing; on-the-job training; collective bargaining & work councils; EU trade policies	unemployment insurance; pensions
	top incomes	inheritance & estate taxes	R&D tax credits; EU competition policies	top income tax rates; wealth taxes

Rodrik and Stantcheva (2020). Traditional welfare states rely on 1st and 3rd column; assumes everyone who wants a “good job” can find one. Secular trends (globalization, technological change) + Covid-19 challenged this.

## Pillar 1. Inheritance, estate, and gifts taxation

- Can reduce persistence of wealth across generations.
- Unpopular taxes, partly due to misunderstandings of how they work and who actually bears them (Stantcheva, 2020).
- Move to a **beneficiary-based regime that is progressive in the cumulative amount received, regardless of timing and donor**
  - Tony Atkinson's proposal,  $\approx$  done in Ireland.
- Could allow for true progressivity, largely exempt the middle class, and address citizens' current concerns.

## Pillar 1. Education policy.

- Need better targeting of public investments towards disadvantaged areas, schools, and children.
- Level playing field by substituting for “missing family inputs.”
- Equalize access to digital resources and space for study (in school, as well as at home).
- Promising interventions pre- and during the pandemic:
  - Carlana and La Ferrara (2021) free individual tutoring online to disadvantaged students during lockdown; Hardt et al. (2020) remote peer mentoring at German university.
  - Pre-Covid example – program “Devoirs faits” (“Doing Homework”) in France, helps with homework under supervision of own school staff.
  - South Korea “Cyber Home Learning System,” US “Cognitive Tutor,” UK “Shireland Learning Gateway.”
- Facilitate transition into work: i) vocational and dual-track systems; ii) better guidance (info is lacking, causing mismatches).

## Pillar 1. Gender disparities.

- Child penalty already prevalent before Covid (Kleven et al., 2019)
- Mixed evidence on expanded maternal leave for mothers' earnings and labor force participation.
- Potentially promising evidence for “earmarked” parental leave on earnings and LFP.

## Pillar 2. Employer-focused active labor market policies.

- Active labor market policies have mixed records: skill training & certification, employment subsidies, public sector work programs, & assistance with job search and matching. Done through Public Employment Services (PES).
- **”Sectoral training programs”** in the U.S. have repeatedly been shown to be quite successful. E.g., Project Quest in San Antonio, TX; Per Scholars in the Bronx, NY; Madison Strategies Group in Tulsa, OK; or Wisconsin Regional training partnerships in Milwaukee, WI.
- Can serve as an inspiration: geared towards local employers’ needs, close cooperation with employers, including on curriculum design, specific training incl. soft skills, track people even post employment, run by community organizations or private agencies.

## Pillar 2. Business incentives focused on “good jobs.”

- Many business incentives today take the form of subsidies for physical investment and new technologies.
- Evidence suggests cost per job created is high, and may not be the most direct way of helping workers.
- Suggestions by Bartik (2020):
  - Incentives should focus only on areas that are distressed.
  - Policies need to center around sectors or firms that have high potential to actually create jobs.
  - Tax incentives should not be the only/main tool.
  - Rather, the focus should be on specific public services needed by firms, such as customized business services, zoning or infrastructure policies, local amenities, and skills training.

## Pillar 3. Exchange of information and tax cooperation

- **On capital.**

- Major improvements in international cooperation through the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI).
- Renewed opportunities to tax capital more efficiently and improve compliance.

- **On people.**

- People, like capital, can be internationally mobile, especially higher-income professionals with little location-specific human capital.
- Preferential tax regimes for foreigners – whereby foreigners coming to the country are given tax breaks for a few years – are widespread, but are “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies.

## Pillar 3. Reducing fiscal leakages by reducing avoidance and evasion.

- **Expanding third-party reporting.** Banks could act as third parties for private businesses and partnerships.
- **Leveraging Data Analytics to reduce non-compliance.** Predictive algorithms, machine learning, and AI. Make data available to & cooperate with researchers.
- **Giving resources to tax enforcement.** Tax administrations need investment in their technology infrastructure (software & hardware), advanced analytical capacities, and regular staff training.

## Pillar 3. Corporate and multinational taxation

- **Revenue potential & fairness concerns** (exacerbated by crises like financial crisis 2008, Covid-19).
- **Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)** initiative by the G-20 and the OECD has produced and pushed a set of recommendations to ensure a better taxation of multinationals.
- **Minimum taxes** (e.g., GILTI in the US or BEPS Pillar 2) can lead to a “race to the top”, if implemented (even unilaterally) by a large country or block of countries. See Clausing, Saez, and Zucman (2020).

## Surveys as a key tool for understanding citizens and designing policies.

- Large-scale surveys could become a continuously used, well-designed, and interactive policy tool.
- Key way for eliciting perceptions, knowledge, understanding, attitudes, and views.
- Deployed on a variety of issues by researchers, as exemplified by the studies of the **Social Economics Lab** at Harvard ([socialeconomicslab.org](http://socialeconomicslab.org)).
- For policy can be a tool for exploration, impact testing in real time, iterative feedback, evaluation.