Introduction

Over the past 30 years, economic activity has become less volatile in most G-7 countries. In the United States, for example, the standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP averaged over four quarters was one-third less during 1984 to 2002 than it was during 1960 to 1983. This decline in volatility is widespread across sectors within the United States and is also found in the other G-7 economies, although the timing and details differ from one country to the next. Interestingly, despite these changes and increasing international economic integration, output fluctuations have not become more correlated or synchronized across countries.

Much has been written about the possible causes of this “great moderation.” In this paper, we review existing evidence and present some new evidence on these causes. Our main focus is on the hypothesis that the great moderation is a happy byproduct of improved monetary policy. For the United States (on which the most data are available and the most has been written), monetary policy is generally thought to have been too accommodative during the 1960s and 1970s (DeLong 1997, Romer and Romer 2002, Sargent 1999); this changed in 1979, and for the 1980s and 1990s the Fed showed a commitment to maintaining low inflation.
If improved monetary policy tamed inflation, does it not stand to reason that it also produced the great moderation? Not necessarily. The role for monetary policy in the great moderation is summarized in Figure 1, which plots the standard deviation of a measure economic activity against the standard deviation of the rate of inflation. The actual values of these standard deviations depend on the structure of the economy, the shocks experienced by the economy, and the monetary policy followed by the Fed. Different rules produce different values for these standard deviations, and the best that the policymaker can do, given the structure of the economy, is to reach the “frontier” represented by the solid line in Figure 1. The points B, C, and D are achieved by three different policies on the frontier; none dominates the others, in the sense that none has both lower inflation and output volatility than the others. Point A is within the frontier. If A represents the policy of the 1960s and 1970s, inflation volatility could be reduced by moving to any
point to its left, for example, to B, C, or D. Whether this shift also reduces output volatility depends on the details of the policy and on the workings of the economy. If the shift is to B, output volatility drops considerably; if it is to C, output volatility falls slightly; but if it is to D, output becomes more volatile. At this level of abstraction, improved monetary policy that reduces inflation variability might also reduce output variability, then again it might not. This all assumes that the frontier has stayed fixed, but if shocks to the economy are smaller, or if the private sector becomes better at smoothing shocks, then the frontier shifts toward the origin and the policy that led to C would now lead to E: It would appear that the improved policy led to lower output volatility, but most of the volatility reduction is the result of smaller macroeconomic shocks or structural changes in the economy.

The empirical results in this paper suggest that improved monetary policy accounted for only a small fraction of the reduction in the variance of output growth from the pre-1984 period to the post-1984 period in the United States, and that the bulk of the great moderation arose from shifts in the frontier; in terms of Figure 1, we think that the path “A-C-E” provides the most plausible description of the improved macroeconomic performance of the past two decades. This argument requires estimating how the post-1984 economy would have evolved had the monetary policy of the 1970s been in place, and to answer this question we use four different modern econometric models, ranging from a backward-looking vector autoregression to a forward-looking nine-equation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Remarkably, these different models lead to the same conclusion: Although improved monetary policy played a key role in getting inflation under control, it played, at best, a modest role in the great moderation. This conclusion is reinforced by the international evidence.

This leaves an important question: Why did the frontier shift in, and is this shift likely to be permanent or temporary? We conclude that part of the inward shift could be permanent, but the empirical evidence suggests that much—half or more—of the great moderation could be temporary, the result of smaller macroeconomic shocks, in particular
smaller common international shocks. Were these common international shocks to become again as large as they were in the 1970s, volatility would increase throughout the G-7 and the G-7 business cycles would become more synchronized.

Before turning to the evidence, we make a few general comments about the analysis. Although we discuss aspects of changes in the business cycle for all the G-7 economies, because of data limitations and space constraints, our discussion focuses primarily on the United States. Our interest is on changes in the business cycle; changes in time series properties at very high frequencies can be the consequence of changes in survey methods or other features not directly germane to business cycle analysis, and structural economic changes that affect long-term growth rates, while certainly important, bear only indirectly on short-term macroeconomic management. We therefore take Hall's (2002) advice and use transformations of the data that focus on fluctuations at business cycle frequencies. For real series, we examine four-quarter growth rates; for GDP, this is $100\ln(\text{GDP}_t/\text{GDP}_{t-4})$. Longer growth rates, while also of interest, reduce the number of non-overlapping observations. The models and analysis specific to the United States uses real GDP, but for cross-country comparisons we use real GDP per capita.

**Changes in the business cycle in the G-7, 1960-2002**

The business cycle has changed in important ways over the past four decades: Output fluctuations have moderated, GDP growth is easier to forecast, and shocks to GDP are more persistent. Curiously, one thing that has not changed is the degree of synchronization of business cycles among the G-7.

**Widespread but varied reductions in output volatility**

Perhaps the most striking change in the business cycle over the past three decades has been the dramatic decline in the volatility of GDP growth in most G-7 economies. In the United States, this “great moderation,” first documented by Kim and Nelson 1999 and
Chart 1
Four-Quarter Growth Rates of GDP per Capita
McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000, is well characterized as a sharp reduction in the variance of GDP growth in the mid-1980s; using different econometric techniques and working independently, both Kim and Nelson 1999 and McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000 estimate a break date of 1984.

This decline in cyclical volatility has occurred not just in the United States but, to varying degrees, in the other G-7 economies as well. Chart 1 plots the four-quarter growth rate of GDP for the G-7 economies over the past four decades. As is summarized in Table 1, the standard deviation of four-quarter GDP for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States over the period 1984-2002 is less than three-fourths what it had been during the earlier period, 1960-1983. Indeed, the variance of four-quarter GDP growth in these six countries fell by 50 percent to 80 percent.

The estimates in Table 1 use the 1984 date of the volatility shift in the United States, but this date or the single-break model might not be appropriate for other countries. In addition, the standard deviations in Table 1 might confound changes in the trend growth rate of output in these countries with changes in business cycle fluctuations. In fact, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan grew much more rapidly in the 1960s, when postwar reconstruction was still under way, than in the past two decades, and the standard deviations reported in Table 1 in principal contain the two effects of changing cyclical fluctuations and decadal changes in the mean growth rate. It is therefore desirable to obtain alternative estimates of the time path of volatility, which do not rely on a single break date and are robust to movements in the long-term growth rate of output.

Accordingly, Chart 2 plots estimates of the instantaneous standard deviation of four-quarter GDP growth in these economies. These estimates are based on an autoregressive model with time-varying coefficients that allow for a long-run GDP growth rate that varies over time. These estimated volatility paths show a broadly similar pattern as Table 1, although some details differ. The estimates for Canada in
Chart 2 shows a large decline in volatility, but this decline occurs in the early 1990s, not the mid-1980s. The estimates for France suggest that there has been little change in volatility over most of the past 30 years. The volatility decline for Germany is very large and, according to the Chart 2 estimates, is nearly a straight-line decrease. The volatility decline in Italy and the UK preceded that in the United States, while in Japan volatility is estimated to have fallen in the 1970s but then increased again in the late 1990s. In short, while there is clear statistical evidence of a reduction in volatility in (at least) Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States, the particulars of magnitude and timing differ substantially from one country to the next.

A related aspect of the great moderation is that, at least in the United States, expansions have grown longer and recessions shorter; the 120-month U.S. expansion of the 1990s is the longest in the 140 years covered by the NBER chronology, the 92-monthly expansion of the 1980s is the third-longest, and the two post-1984 recessions were both short, only eight months. These changes have a straightforward

### Table 1
**Changes in Volatility of Four-Quarter Growth of Real GDP Per Capita in the G-7, 1960-1983 and 1984-2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard deviation, 1960-1983</th>
<th>Standard deviation, 1984-2002</th>
<th>std. dev. 84-02 std. dev. 60-83</th>
<th>variance 84-02 variance 60-83</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: Entries in the first two columns are the standard deviations of the four-quarter growth in GDP over the indicated time periods. The third column contains the ratio of standard deviation in the second column to that in the first; the final column presents the square of this ratio, which is the ratio of the variances of four-quarter GDP growth in the two periods. Data sources are given in the Data Appendix.*
Chart 2
Estimated Instantaneous Standard Deviation of 4-Quarter Growth of GDP per Capita

A. Canada

B. France

C. Germany

D. Italy

E. Japan

F. United Kingdom

G. United States

Source: Stock and Watson 2003
interpretation. If the long-term growth rate of output is constant and its variance decreases, then (all else equal) periods of negative growth become fewer and farther apart. Because recessions are periods of negative growth, a moderation in output volatility with no change in the mean growth rate implies, in this mechanical sense, shorter recessions and longer expansions.4

GDP growth is more forecastable and persistent

The innovations in GDP growth in the G-7 have also become smaller in the post-1984 period, and in this sense GDP growth has become easier to forecast using simple time series models. Table 2 summarizes some results for simulated forecasts of quarterly GDP growth using univariate time series models. The first pair of columns reports the standard error of the regression for autoregressions with four lags; this one-quarter-ahead standard error fell in all seven countries, in several cases by more than one-third. These autoregressions could not have been used for forecasting because they were estimated using data beyond the forecast period. A better way to simulate real-time forecasting is to estimate a different autoregression at each date, where the estimates are based on a moving window of data that would have been available at the date the forecast is made. The root mean squared error of the resulting pseudo out-of-sample forecasts produced this using an eight-year window is summarized in the third and fourth column. The forecast root mean squared errors are somewhat larger than the standard error of the regressions in the first two columns over the post-1984 sample in part because the autoregressions in the third and fourth columns were estimated using fewer observations. As in the first two columns, however, the root mean squared forecast errors are substantially less post-1984 than pre-1984.5

Table 2 also reports a measure of the change in the persistence of a shock to GDP growth, specifically the sum of the autoregressive coefficients; the inverse of one minus this sum is the cumulative effect of a GDP forecast error on the long-term forecast of GDP, so an increase in this sum implies an increase in the persistence of a univariate innovation
in GDP. In Canada, France, the UK, and, to a lesser extent, Italy and the United States, the sum of the autoregressive coefficients increased from the first period to the second.

**Sectoral volatility has decreased**

Is the reduction in volatility evident in GDP growth widespread throughout the U.S. economy, or is it limited to certain sectors or series? This question is addressed in Table 3 for 22 major U.S. series consisting of the main NIPA aggregates and selected other macroeconomic time series. As can be seen in Table 3, the volatility of 21 of these 22 series fell in the post-1984 period. This said, the decline in the standard deviation is not uniform across series. The standard deviation of nondurables consumption fell by more than it did for

**Table 2**

*Autoregressive Models of Quarterly GDP Growth: Measures of Forecast Errors and Sum of Autoregressive Coefficients*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard error of the regression ($\hat{\sigma}_ε$)</th>
<th>Pseudo one-step ahead forecast root mean squared error</th>
<th>Sum of $\alpha$ coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60-83      84-02</td>
<td>69-83 84-02</td>
<td>60-83 84-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.82       2.27</td>
<td>4.09 2.78</td>
<td>0.00 0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.95       1.79</td>
<td>2.73 2.12</td>
<td>-0.36 0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.42       3.39</td>
<td>4.89 3.97</td>
<td>0.04 -0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.03       2.16</td>
<td>5.16 2.47</td>
<td>0.02 0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4.08       3.79</td>
<td>4.65 4.31</td>
<td>0.38 0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4.81       1.84</td>
<td>6.40 2.41</td>
<td>0.03 0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.98       1.96</td>
<td>4.92 2.27</td>
<td>0.30 0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Estimates in the first two and final two columns were computed using quarterly detrended GDP growth, where the trend growth is modeled as an unobserved random walk with a small innovation variance; for details, see Stock and Watson 2003. The pseudo out-of-sample forecast errors reported in the third and fourth column were computed by estimating a new autoregression for each forecast date using quarterly GDP growth (not detrended) and a moving window of eight years of data, which ends one quarter before the quarter being forecasted; the entry is the square root of the average squared forecast error over the indicated periods.
services or durables consumption. Similarly, the volatility of nondurable goods production fell by more than the volatility of the production of durable goods or services. Among the measures of real activity, the largest relative decline in volatility occurred in the cyclically sensitive housing sector, in which the post-1984 standard deviation is approximately one-half its pre-1984 value. Even though the share of residential investment is fairly small, because its variance is so large the reduction in volatility “explains,” in an accounting sense, a substantial fraction of the variance reduction in GDP growth; we shall return to this fact below. The volatility of inflation also fell sharply, as did, to a lesser extent, the volatility of short-term interest rates. Interestingly, however, the volatility of long-term interest rates increased in this period, another fact to which we return below.

The final two columns of Table 3 report a measure of the co-movement of the series with the business cycle—specifically, the correlation between the row series and the four-quarter growth rate of GDP. In the face of the widespread reductions in volatility, the striking result of the final two columns is that this cyclical correlation is virtually unchanged for all the real series.

International synchronization has not increased

Over the past four decades, world economies have become increasingly linked by trade and financial markets. This increasing interdependence suggests that national business cycles might have become more synchronized. Interestingly, however, this turns out not to have been the case. Table 4 presents contemporaneous correlations between the four-quarter GDP growth rates in the G-7 countries in the pre- and post-1984 periods. Some of the correlations have increased, such as those between France and Italy and between Canada and the UK, but others have decreased, such as those between the UK and France and between the United States and Japan. One general pattern in Table 4 is that the correlations between the Japanese GDP growth and the rest of the G-7 have decreased. On average, however, these correlations have remained essentially
### Table 3
Changes in Volatility and Cyclical Correlations of Major Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>Standard deviation 1960-2002</th>
<th>Ratio of standard deviations, 84-02 to 60-83</th>
<th>Correlation with 4-quarter GDP growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumption</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>durables</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nondurables</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investment (total)</td>
<td>10.41</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed investment – total</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonresidential</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residential</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆inventory investment/GDP</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exports</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imports</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government spending</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goods (total)</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nondurable goods</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>durable goods</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structures</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonagricultural employment</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price inflation (GDP deflator)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-day T-bill rate</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-year T-bond rate</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: NIPA series are expressed in four-quarter growth rates (percent at an annual rate), except for the change in inventory investment, which is the annual difference of the quarterly change in inventories as a fraction of GDP. Inflation is the four-quarter change in the annual percentage inflation rate, and interest rates are in four-quarter changes. The first column reports the standard deviation of the row series over the full period, 1960-2002. The second column reports the ratio of the standard deviations for the post- and pre-1984 subperiods; a ratio less than one means that volatility has moderated. The final two columns report the contemporaneous correlation between the row series and the four-quarter growth rate of GDP.
unchanged: The average cross-country correlation in Table 4 was 0.41 in the first period and 0.36 in the second; excluding Japan, the average was 0.43 in the first period and 0.44 in the second.

The failure to find an increase in synchronization has stimulated considerable recent research. This general finding is robust to the subsamples used to estimate the correlations, whether the correlations account for lagged effects, and the statistical method used to compute these correlations. It is also consistent with cross-country regressions that try to explain volatility using measures of openness and/or financial integration and, generally speaking, find no relation or an unstable relation, at least for developed economies (e.g., Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz 2001; and Buch, Doepke, and Pierdzioch 2003).

Table 4
International Correlations of Four-Quarter GDP Growth Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1960-1983</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td><strong>1984-2002</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Improved monetary policy and the great moderation

Did improved monetary policy cause the great moderation? We investigate this possibility by first documenting the quantitative evidence on changes in monetary policy and laying out the arguments suggesting that, at least in theory, these changes could have reduced output volatility. To quantify this effect, we enlist three econometric models of the U.S. economy, plus one of the euro zone, which range from a purely backward-looking VAR to a nine-equation rational expectations system. These models all estimate the contribution of improved monetary policy to the volatility slowdown to be small.

Quantitative evidence of changes in monetary policy

The past 30 years have seen great changes in the institutions and practice of monetary policy. At the Federal Reserve, the monetary policy of the 1960s and 1970s, now widely seen as having permitted the great inflation of the late 1970s, was replaced by a commitment to low inflation made credible by the twin recessions of 1979-82. At the Bank of England, years of political management of monetary policy gradually yielded to increasing independence, an explicit inflation target, and eventually formal independence from the Treasury. In continental Europe, political agreement on the Maastricht criterion for inflation led to sweeping changes in monetary policy, culminating with inflation range targeting by the European Central Bank (ECB). Now, throughout the G-7, inflation is quiescent and is at or near postwar lows.7

One way to see whether these qualitative changes are reflected in quantitative measures of monetary policy is to estimate rules of the form suggested by Taylor 1993 using historical data from different episodes. Taylor-type rules relate changes in the short-term interest rate $R_t$ (in the United States, the fed funds rate) to deviations of inflation from target and the size of the output gap:

$$R_t = r^* + \pi^* + g_\pi (\bar{\pi}_t - \pi^*) + g_y (y_t - y'_t),$$  

(1)

James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson
where \( r^* \) is the long-term equilibrium real interest rate (at an annual rate), \( \bar{\pi}_t \) is the rate of inflation averaged over four quarters (also expressed at an annual rate), \( \pi^* \) is the target rate of inflation, \( y_t^f \) is the logarithm of GDP in quarter \( t \), \( y_t^p \) is the logarithm of potential GDP (so that \( y_t - y_t^p \) is the output gap), and \( g_\pi \) and \( g_y \) are coefficients that govern the response of interest rates to deviations of inflation from target and to deviations of output from potential. Taylor 1993 originally suggested the coefficients \( g_\pi = 1.5 \) and \( g_y = 0.5 \), so that the central bank responds to a one percentage point increase in the rate of inflation sustained for four quarters by increasing the short rate by 150 basis points.8

Table 5 collects estimates of historical Taylor-type rules estimated using U.S. data by Judd and Rudebusch 1998; Taylor 1999; and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000. According to these estimates, before 1979 the key coefficient on inflation, \( g_\pi \), was less than one; that is, an increase in the rate of inflation was met by a smaller increase in the short rate and thus an effective reduction in the real rate, potentially leading to an unstable spiral in which increases in the rate of inflation led to expansion by the Fed. In contrast, the post-1979 estimates have inflation coefficients greater than one (and close to Taylor’s recommended value of 1.5), indicating a reduction in the real rate in response to an increase in the rate of inflation. In short, these estimates provide a concise quantitative summary of the qualitative history of Fed policy.9

In theory, improved monetary policy could account for the
great moderation

At the risk of oversimplification, the main theoretical arguments that improved monetary policy produced the great moderation can be put into three groups: arguments involving unstable equilibria, indeterminate or multiple equilibria, and anchored inflationary expectations.

Unstable equilibria. As Taylor 1993, 1999 emphasized, if the Taylor rule coefficient on inflation is less than one, then the economy can become unstable, in the sense that a surprise increase in the rate of inflation results
in insufficient tightening. Technically speaking, in many economic models, especially those with a limited role for rational expectations, an insufficiently aggressive monetary policy can result in an explosive root in the difference equation describing the model’s dynamics. This explosive root results in time paths for output and inflation that are unstable, so that inflation can, and eventually will, depart arbitrarily far from its target value, and output can deviate arbitrarily far from potential. Over an infinite horizon, this implies inflation and output gap paths that have an infinite variance. Of course, we would not observe an infinite variance in a finite time period; instead, the infinite variance result should be taken as suggesting that over horizons of interest, for example 20 years of a policy regime (1960-1979, for example), the variances of inflation, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judd and Rudebusch (1998)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor (1999)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000)</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries are the indicated authors’ estimates of the Taylor rule coefficients in (1), estimated using historical data for the United States; standard errors are in parentheses. The authors used different specifications to obtain these estimates. Judd and Rudebusch 1998 estimated a dynamic Taylor rule over the periods 1970:1-1978:1, 1979:3-1987:2, and 1987:3-1997:4, with lagged values of the output gap and interest rates, and use the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) model for potential output; their reported results include standard errors for their estimates of $g_\pi$ but not of $g_y$. Taylor 1999 estimated (1) over the periods 1960:1-1979:4 and 1987:1-1997:3 using as an estimate of potential output the Hodrick-Prescott low frequency trend of log GDP; he did not report standard errors adjusted for the serial correlation in the error term. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s 2000 dynamic Taylor rule replaces inflation and the output gap in (1) with their forecasted value one quarter hence. They estimated the resulting rule by generalized method of moments over the periods 1960:1-1979:2 and 1979:3-1996:4, using the CBO output gap and the one-quarter (not four-quarter) rate of inflation.

*Estimates are based on a combined sample of 1979:3-1996:4.
the output gap could be very large. In contrast, in these models a more responsive policy with an inflation coefficient greater than one and a sufficiently large coefficient on the output gap produces stable roots and stationary paths for inflation and the output gap, suggesting that over the 20 years of a policy regime we would observe smaller variances of inflation and the output gap. Judd and Rudebusch 1998 provide a clear illustration of the link between Taylor rule coefficients and unstable equilibria using a backward-looking model, the Rudebusch-Svensson 1999 model—one of the models we examine below.

**Indeterminate (multiple) equilibria.** A more arcane implication of insufficiently aggressive monetary policy is that, at least in some models, there can be multiple equilibria. Rational expectations play a key role in these models, and the multiple equilibria arise because of self-fulfilling expectations: Expecting an inflationary boom makes it happen because individuals in the economy correctly understand that the Fed will respond too passively to an inflationary shock. Prices can jump for reasons unrelated to economic fundamentals, and once they do, the increase gets built into expectations and, hence, into future inflation: These are models with “sunspot” equilibria. For a simple model with this feature, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000.

Unlike the problem of explosive roots, in these models the sunspot equilibria are stable; the problem, from the point of economic performance, is that some of the equilibria have large “sunspot” changes in expectations that lead to high variances of inflation and output gaps. If, however, the inflation and output gap policy responses are known to be sufficiently aggressive, then individuals recognize that the central bank will not accommodate an inflation shock, thereby eliminating these high-volatility sunspot equilibria.

**Anchored inflationary expectations.** A related argument emphasizes the role of credibility of the central bank. Before 1979, the reasoning goes, policymakers had no credible commitment to low inflation; as DeLong 1997 argues, the preconceptions of policymaker, and indeed the institutional relation between the Fed and elected politicians,
resulted in a bias toward expansionary policy. Establishing anti-inflation credibility took the recessions of 1979-82 and a clear commitment to low inflation. DeLong 1997, Sargent 1999, and Romer and Romer 2002 tell parts of this story differently, but a common theme is that the Fed slowly learned about the dangers of inflation and about the pitfalls of trying to exploit a short-run Phillips curve; having gone through this process, the Fed now commits to lower inflation through implicit inflation targeting. Even without an explicit inflation target, according to this line of reasoning, this credible commitment anchors long-term inflationary expectations. On a technical level, having a credible commitment to control inflation is important for anchoring long-term inflationary expectations (see, for example, Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano 2003).

According to this argument, once long-run inflation expectations are anchored, monetary policy is free to be an effective tool for stabilizing output. Macroeconomic shocks today might be as large as they were in the 1970s, but with inflationary expectations pinned down, the Fed can respond to shocks more nimbly and effectively, thereby dampening output fluctuations.

Quantitative evidence based on four macro models

To quantify the effect of improved monetary policy on output volatility, one needs to be able to estimate the counterfactual effect of changing a monetary policy rule, holding constant the structure of the economy. Performing this calculation requires an econometric model. We take a catholic perspective and consider four very different models: Rudebusch and Svensson’s 1999 three-equation backward-looking model of the United States (RS); Stock and Watson’s 2002 three-equation structural VAR (SVAR); Smets and Wouters’ 2003b rational expectations dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the United States (SW-US) with nine endogenous variables, and Smets and Wouters’ 2003a similar nine-equation model of the euro zone (SW-EU).
The particulars of these calculations are rather involved and are reported in the Technical Appendix to this paper (available at the authors’ Web sites). Here, we highlight the most important points. In general terms, each of the four base models applies to the post-1984 data, using a post-1984 policy rule. The monetary policy rules in these models are versions of Taylor rules, but their exact specifications differ. In each case, the post-1984 Taylor rule coefficients are nonaccommodative and are broadly similar to the estimates reported for post-1979 rules in Table 6. The models were then solved to estimate the variance of four-quarter GDP growth and the mean and variance of inflation. In all the models, because the monetary rule was sufficiently responsive, equilibria were stable and determinate in the base case.10

Next, the post-1984 policy rule was replaced with a pre-1979 policy rule, while the other model parameters were left unchanged. For the RS model, this resulted in an explosive root. To compare the results of this model to the 1961-79 data, we followed Judd and Rudebusch 1998 and simulated a 19-year sample of data from the model, where the shocks were the actual shocks from 1984 to 2002; this is a model-based simulation of how the United States economy would have evolved had the parameters and specific history of shocks been what they were in 1984-2002 but policy followed the pre-1979 rule (which, in the RS model, has an inflation response coefficient of 0.63). (For comparability, the analogous 19-year sample variance was used for the RS model in the base case as well.) Because the SVAR specifies a unit root in inflation, the same 19-year simulation approach was used for the SVAR. In the SW-US and SW-EU models, following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000 we selected a pre-1979 policy that is accommodative but remains just inside the determinate region. Thus, the SW-US and SW-EU models have unique equilibria under our pre-1979 policy, even though the inflation response is somewhat less than one (determinacy is a property not just of the rule but of the fully solved model). All this resulted in two estimates of the variance of four-quarter GDP growth for each model: the base case estimate of the post-1984 variance and the counterfactual estimate of what this variance would have been had
the monetary authorities conducted pre-1979 policy but all else, including shock magnitudes, was as it was post-1984.

The results are summarized in Table 6. For two of the models (RS and SW-EU), the standard deviation of four-quarter output growth increases slightly in the “accommodative monetary policy” counterfactual scenario, while for the other two (SVAR and SW-US), the standard deviation of output falls slightly under the counterfactual scenario. The very small increase in output volatility in the RS model might seem particularly surprising because the RS model has an explosive root in the counterfactual scenario. Simulation of that model reveals, however, that the explosive root results in unstable behavior at very low frequencies—explosive Kondratieff cycles, in a sense—that eventually result in large deviations of output from potential. At the business cycle frequency that is relevant for the great moderation, however, this explosive behavior simply is not evident over a two-decade time frame.

With these results in hand, we can estimate the fraction of the change in variance that is explained by improved monetary policy in each model; the results are reported in the final column of Table 6. The SW/EU model estimates that 26 percent of the reduction in variance pre-1984 to post-1984 is a result of improved monetary policy; the RS model estimates this fraction to be 7 percent; and the SVAR and SW-US estimate it to be slightly negative, so that, all else equal, the more responsive post-1984 policy is estimated to have increased output volatility slightly. Among the models fit to United States data, the largest estimated fraction of the change in variance due to monetary policy is 7 percent.

The model calculations also produced means and variances of inflation under the counterfactual scenario using pre-1979 policy. In each model, the policy regime switch is estimated to have had a large effect on inflation: Had the pre-1979 policy been in place, the same shocks would have produced high levels and/or variances of the rate of inflation, so that in each model the mean squared error of inflation minus, say, a target of 2.5 percent, would have been much greater than was actually observed in the post-1984 period. In the RS and SVAR
models, the level of inflation does not come down under the counterfactual scenario and exceeds 7 percent at the end of the sample in both models. In the SW-EU model, the variance of inflation increases substantially (by a factor of four) under the counterfactual scenario. (The inflation target in SW/US follows a random walk, making it difficult to compare with the other models.) The details are summarized in the Technical Appendix.

In summary, this diverse collection of models all suggest that improved monetary policy brought inflation under control, but accounts for only a fraction—among the models fit to United States data, less than 10 percent—of the reduction in output volatility.

### Table 6
The Effect of Improved Monetary Policy on Output Volatility in Four Econometric Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard deviations</th>
<th></th>
<th>Percent of variance reduction explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base model</td>
<td>Base + pre-1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>monetary policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudebusch-Svensson</td>
<td>1.67(^a)</td>
<td>1.74(^a)</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock-Watson SVAR</td>
<td>1.67(^a)</td>
<td>1.63(^a)</td>
<td>−4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smets-Wouters/US</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>−10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smets-Wouters/EU</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Historical values:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984-02</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961-79</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The base model specifications reflect the actual shocks and monetary policy in the United States post-1984, and the resulting solved model standard deviations of output growth are reported in the first column. The second column reports the solved model standard deviations with pre-1979 monetary policy, computed by replacing the post-1984 Taylor rule coefficients in each model with pre-1979 coefficients. The final row reports the actual sample standard deviations over the post-1984 and pre-1979 samples. The final column reports an estimate of the fraction of the actual reduction in the variance of output explained by the model, for example, the first entry in the final column is \((1.74^2 - 1.67^2) / (2.48^2 - 1.67^2) = .07\), expressed in percentage terms.

\(^a\)Based on 19-year simulation using 1984–2002 estimated shocks.
Revisiting the arguments that improved monetary policy is the cause of the great moderation

Unstable equilibria. Insufficiently responsive policy rules produce explosive roots, but the calculations in Table 7 suggest that the unstable equilibria are reflected in volatility at longer horizons than the business cycle frequencies of interest here. This is not to say that overly accommodative monetary policy is acceptable or desirable, it is simply to say that, over a 20-year period, a more responsive policy does not produce a substantial moderation in the cyclical volatility of output growth.

A variant of the “unstable equilibrium” story is that inflation was countered by stop-go monetary policies, in which periods of inaction and creeping inflation triggered a sharp recession induced by monetary policy. Because the policy rules in our four econometric models are linear, strictly speaking the simulations do not address the stop-go hypothesis. Two pieces of empirical evidence, however, cast doubt on this stop-go view. First, the moderation in GDP growth is evident even if recessions are excluded from the pre-1979 data. The standard deviation of U.S. four-quarter GDP growth from 1960:1 to 1978:4 is 2.49; excluding 1973:1-1975:4 (a period that contained the 16-month 1973-75 recession), this standard deviation was 2.05; but during the 1984-2002 period, this standard deviation was 1.67. Evidently the pre-1979 volatility was present not just in the “stop” periods but in the “go” periods as well. More to the point, the simulations in Table 7 need the linear Taylor rule to be an adequate approximation to historical policy; ought it instead contain nonlinear terms, such as a threshold once inflation reaches a certain level? To find out, we estimated a variety of nonlinear extensions of dynamic Taylor rules but found scant evidence of nonlinearities, such as threshold effects, that match descriptions of stop-go policies. Even if there were a nonlinear, stop-go policy prior to 1979, as a statistical matter the nonlinear policy seems to be well approximated by the linear Taylor-type rules summarized in Table 7.
Indeterminate (multiple) equilibria. Because the Taylor rule in the SW-US and SW-EU models was chosen to be just within the determinate region, multiple equilibria remain a possibility that is unaddressed in the computations. The question of whether the U.S. economy was, in fact, in a sunspot equilibrium—an equilibrium in which pricing “mistakes” (more precisely, nonfundamental movements in prices) get built into expectations, which, in turn, feed into monetary policy—is unresolved in the literature. Today, sunspot equilibria remain a theoretical construct, as once were the ether and the neutrino in physics. We hope that future empirical work will ascertain whether sunspot equilibria do indeed exist (like the neutrino) or whether they do not (like the ether).

Table 7
The Effect of Sectoral Composition on the Variance of Four-Quarter GDP Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral shares:</th>
<th>Estimated variances</th>
<th>Counterfactual variance</th>
<th>Effect of changing sectoral shares on variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sectoral variances:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60-83</td>
<td>84-96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14.78</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Let \( \sigma^2(i,j) \) denote the variance of annual GDP growth, computed from the sectoral data (10 sectors) for period \( i \) with share weights being their average values from period \( j \), where \( i, j = 1 \) corresponds to 1960-83, and \( i, j = 2 \) corresponds to 1984-96. The variance \( \sigma^2(1,1) \) is estimated using the approximation that the annual growth rate of GDP is approximately the share-weighted average of the annual growth rates of the 10 individual sectors, so \( \sigma^2(1,j) = \text{var}(\omega_{1,10}\Delta X_{10,t} + \ldots + \omega_{1,10}\Delta X_{10,t}) \), where \( \omega_{1,10} \) is the average share of sector 10 in the first period, \( \Delta X_{10,t} \) is the annual growth rate of sector 10 in year \( t \), and the variance is computed over period \( j \). The first column reports \( \sigma^2(1,1) \), the second column reports \( \sigma^2(2,2) \), and the third column reports \( \sigma^2(2,1) \). The fourth column reports \( 1/2 \left[ (\sigma^2(2,2) - \sigma^2(1,1)) - (\sigma^2(2,1) - \sigma^2(1,2)) \right] \), which (algebra reveals) is an estimate of the reduction in the variance due to the change in the weights, evaluated at the average of the sectoral covariance matrices in the two periods. The final column is the second column, expressed as a percentage of the total variance reduction, \( \sigma^2(2,2) - \sigma^2(1,1) \).
In any event, there are reasons to be skeptical that sunspot equilibria can provide a satisfactory resolution of the international evidence on the volatility reduction. Of the G-7 central banks, the Bundesbank has the longest history of a credible commitment to inflation reduction, yet the standard deviation of four-quarter growth of German GDP fell by almost half from the pre- to post-1984 periods; this change in variance was not sharp, as it might be if the economy emerged from a sunspot equilibrium, but (as is evident in Chart 2) followed a linear trend decline. Similarly, in the UK, the decline in volatility began around 1980, before the decline in the United States and well before the drive of the Bank of England toward inflation targeting and institutional independence. France presents a different picture, in which monetary policy underwent many changes. Yet, despite these changes output volatility is nearly unaffected at business cycle frequencies. Had sunspot equilibria been present under previous French monetary policy, presumably France too would have experienced excessive output variability in an earlier period.

Anchored inflationary expectations. This argument is not addressed by the model-based computations reported above. In our four models, the Fed’s long-term inflation target is taken as known, as is its policy rule, and the Fed is implicitly modeled as being fully credible. Still, two pieces of empirical evidence are relevant.

The first piece of evidence concerns the implication of this argument for the short-run tradeoff between inflation and output or, expressed in terms of the unemployment rate, the slope of the short-run Phillips curve. The premise is that anchored inflationary expectations mean that the Fed can affect output growth without affecting inflation. This implies that the short-run Phillips curve has become flatter or, more precisely, the sacrifice ratio (the reduction in output required for a given reduction in inflation) has increased. There has been an ongoing debate about whether the short-run Phillips curve has become flatter or, alternatively, whether the NAIRU has simply shifted. Our research on this topic points to the latter (e.g., Staiger, Stock and Watson 2001), and does not suggest an increase in the sacrifice ratio.
Second, whether inflationary expectations have, in fact, become anchored is difficult to assess directly, but what evidence there is suggests that if they have, this is a quite recent phenomenon, at least in the United States. As is evident in Table 3, the variance of the long-term interest rate increased post-1984 even though the variance in the short-term rate fell (also see Watson 1999). Kozicki and Tinsley 2001 investigated the sources of the variability of long rates from 1980 to 1991 and concluded that the most plausible explanation for this volatility was that this movement reflected movements in long-term expected inflation; this conclusion was also reached by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2003. Moreover, survey forecasts of long-term inflation, summarized in Chart 3, indicate that professional forecasts of long-term inflation moved substantially over most of the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{12} Admittedly, inflationary expectations may finally have become anchored in the past three or four years, but with such a short span it is hard to test this empirically. In any event, it appears that over the longer period since the mid-1980s, inflationary expectations

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart3}
\caption{Long-Term Inflation Forecasts in the United States, 1983-2003}
\end{figure}

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
have been moving substantially, and the timing of this story thus is at odds with the sharp reduction in volatility in the mid-1980s.

**Discussion and summary.** We conclude this discussion of the effects of the change in monetary policy with two additional remarks. First, our analysis of the effects of the change in monetary policy has focused on the usual mid-term notion of monetary policy—that is, the use of the short-term interest rate as a tool for achieving inflation and/or output stabilization goals over the medium term. But central banks have other responsibilities that arguably belong in a broader definition of monetary policy. For example, an important function of central banks is short-term crisis management, such as providing liquidity or taking other actions in response to rapidly developing financial crisis. It is possible that the reduced volatility of output is, in part, a result of better crisis management by the monetary authorities. This channel is not addressed by conventional models of monetary policy transmission, including the four used here.

Second, our empirical results do not imply that monetary policy has no effect on output growth, nor do they imply that a poor monetary policy—one that was worse, in some sense, than that of the 1970—could not have increased the volatility of output post-1984. Instead, what our results say is that the particular policy change of interest, from the policy of the 1970s to that post-1984, had the major impact of bringing inflation under control but happened not to have a large effect on the cyclical volatility of output.

**Permanent shifts in the frontier?**

One group of explanations for the great moderation is that the structure of the economy has undergone permanent changes. These include the hypothesis that the moderation is a consequence of the increasing share of the services in the economy; the hypothesis that new inventory management methods have smoothed production and thus aggregate output; and the hypothesis that financial innovation
and deregulation has relaxed liquidity constraints and allowed consumers and businesses better to smooth shocks to their incomes.

*The sectoral shifts hypothesis*

While cyclically sensitive sectors such as durable manufacturing once constituted a large share of the G-7 economies, those shares have fallen and the share of the cyclically quiescent services sector has risen. As pointed out by Burns 1960 and Moore and Zarnowitz 1986, all else equal, this shift should reduce the cyclical volatility of aggregate production growth.

Whether this is an important contribution to the great moderation depends on the relative variances of the various sectors, the magnitude of the sectoral shifts, and whether the correlations among the sectors have changed. To assess this effect, we performed a simple experiment. Suppose that during the post-1984 period the sectoral shares in, say, the U.S. economy were the same as had been on average in the pre-1984 period, but the growth rates of the various sectors took on their actual post-1984 values, what would the variance of U.S. GDP growth have been? If it is close to the actual variance of GDP growth in the pre-1984 period, then we can conclude that the sectoral shift was a key cause of the moderation of output volatility in the United States. On the other hand, if this counterfactual variance is close to the actual post-1984 variance, then we can conclude that the sectoral shift was unimportant compared with the changes in the sectoral variances themselves.

Table 7 reports the results of this calculation for each of the G-7 economies, using comparable annual data. For example, the variance of the annual growth rate of U.S. GDP, estimated using the sectoral data, was 6.00 in the pre-1984 period and 3.76 post-1984; had the sectoral variances been the same as they were post-1984, but the weights were the same as their average values pre-1984, then the variance of U.S. GDP in the post-1984 period would have been 3.96. This is only slightly greater than the value computed with post-1984 weights, 3.76. Said differently, the shift to services reduced the variance of annual GDP
growth in the United States, but not by much, a finding consistent with Blanchard and Simon 2001 and Stock and Watson 2002. The final two columns in Table 7 provide an estimate of the variance reduction, both in variance units and as a percent of the pre-1984 variance, arising from the sectoral shifts. For France, Italy, and the United States, the estimated contribution of the sectoral shift is quite small, less than 10 percent. For the UK, the estimated contribution is somewhat larger in variance units, and although it appears very large as a percent of the total change in variance (63 percent), the absolute change is rather small using the 1984 break date of Table 7 (recall from Chart 2 that most of the decline in UK GDP volatility occurred after 1990). For Italy and Japan, the sectoral shift hypothesis goes in the wrong direction, tending to increase volatility as those economies shifted out of agriculture into manufacturing. Only for Germany does the sectoral shift hypothesis seem to explain a substantial amount of the volatility reduction, 24 percent of the large decline in the variance of GDP growth from 6.81 to 3.17.

Another difficulty for the sectoral shift hypothesis is that the sectoral changes have evolved gradually over the past four decades, but, aside from Germany’s long trend toward moderation, the volatility patterns in the G-7 are diverse and complex. This observation, plus the estimates in Table 7, suggestion that, outside of Germany, the sectoral shifts hypothesis cannot explain more than a small fraction of the volatility reduction, and even for Germany, three-fourths of the volatility reduction is not explained by sectoral shifts.

The inventories hypothesis

A novel explanation of the great moderation is that improved techniques for inventory management has allowed firms better to use inventories to smooth production in the face of unexpected shifts in sales. This hypothesis, proposed by McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000 and Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros 2002, has two key pieces of empirical support. First, at the quarterly level in the United States, the volatility of production has declined proportionately more than the volatility of sales, especially in the cyclically sensitive durables
manufacturing sector. Second, prior to 1984, changes in durable goods inventories were positively correlated with final sales, so that changes in inventories contributed to fluctuations in production. But after 1984 durable goods inventories became negatively correlated with final sales, thereby stabilizing production.

Several recent studies have taken a close look at the inventory management hypothesis, and it appears that the case for this hypothesis is not as strong as the initial evidence suggested. One set of concerns, based on calibrated theoretical models of inventories, is that improvements in inventory management technology will have, at most, a modest effect on the volatility of production (Maccini and Pagan 2003). Moreover, standard inventory models suggest that even in the absence of a change in inventory management methods, changes in the time series properties of firm-level sales can produce reductions in the volatility of production as large as those seen in the aggregate data (Ramey and Vine 2003). There is, in fact, evidence that the time series process of sales has changed over the past 20 years at the firm level, becoming more rather than less volatile (Comin and Mulani 2003), an observation consistent with the increased volatility of returns on individual stocks (Campbell and others 2001).

Other concerns relate to the aggregate time series evidence. If inventory management improves because of information technology, such as real-time use of scanner data to track sales, then all else equal the inventory-sales ratios should fall. However, inventory-sales ratios have fallen mainly for work-in-progress and raw materials inventories, not for the final good inventories that are used to smooth production; in fact, inventory-sales ratios have increased for finished goods inventories and for retail and wholesale trade inventories. Moreover, although the variance of production fell relative to the variance of sales at the quarterly level, this is not so at the longer horizons of business cycle interest: The standard deviation of four-quarter growth in both sales and production is 30 percent to 40 percent smaller post-1984 than pre-1984 across all production sectors, durables, nondurables, services, and structures (Stock and Watson 2002). This suggests that new inventory management methods might smooth
production at the horizon of weeks or months, but this smoothing effect disappears at business cycle frequencies.

Finally, it is difficult to square the inventory management hypothesis with the time series evidence in Chart 2. New technology generally diffuses gradually, yet the volatility reduction in the United States was sharp. Volatility began to moderate in the UK earlier than in the United States, but we know of no evidence that information technology was used for inventory management more aggressively early on in the UK than in the United States. And it is hard to see how improvements in inventory management can account both for the slow, consistent volatility moderation in Germany and for the constancy of GDP volatility in France. While improved inventory management methods have been important at the level of individual firms, this evidence, taken together, suggests that it has not been a major factor in the international tendency toward business cycle moderation.

The financial market deregulation hypothesis

Financial deregulation and new financial technologies have led to major changes in financial markets in the past three decades. For firms, these changes include new ways to hedge risks and improved access to financing. For individuals, these changes include the development of interest-bearing liquid assets, increasingly widespread shareholding, and easier access to credit in the form of credit card debt, mortgages, second mortgages, and mortgage refinancing (see for example McCarthy and Peach 2002). As Blanchard and Simon 2001 point out, these financial market developments let consumers better smooth shocks to their income, resulting in smoother streams of consumption at the individual level than would have been possible without these reforms. Aggregated to the macro level, this increased access of consumers to credit should result in smaller changes in consumption for a given shock to income and, because consumption accounts for two-thirds of GDP, a moderation of the fluctuations in GDP.
Although the net contribution of this change to the volatility moderation has proven difficult to quantify, some evidence suggests that these changes in financial markets might have played an important role in the great moderation, at least in the United States. One sector with large declines in volatility is residential housing. Chart 4 presents estimates of the instantaneous standard deviations of the four-quarter growth of the real value of private residential and nonresidential construction put in place. The residential measure shows a marked decline in volatility during the 1980s and 1990s; in contrast, the volatility of nonresidential construction has been essentially flat over the past three decades. One explanation for the decreased volatility in residential, but not nonresidential, construction is the increased ability of individuals to obtain nonthrift mortgage financing, including adjustable rate mortgages.\(^{14}\)

Other evidence, however, raises questions about the “financial market changes” hypothesis. Loosening of liquidity constraints should, all else equal, result in smoother consumption paths at the
individual level. It appears, however, that over the past 20 years individual-level consumption has become more rather than less volatile (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2003). This increased micro-level volatility of consumption might reflect the practical difficulty of using financial markets to smooth consumption, or it might simply be a consequence of greater volatility of individual income streams (see for example Moffitt and Gottschalk 2002); in any event, additional explaining is needed for this increase in micro-level consumption volatility to be consistent with the implications of the financial market changes hypothesis. A second challenge for the financial market changes hypothesis is that the timing of these changes, which have been ongoing and gradual over the past three decades in the United States, does not match the sharp decline in U.S. volatility in the mid-1980s evident in Chart 2. In short, although reductions in the volatility of housing construction suggest that mortgage market developments could have played a significant role in the great moderation, the problems of timing and the increased volatility of individual-level consumption suggest that there is more to the story of the great moderation than financial market developments.

**Temporary shifts in the frontier?**

Perhaps the international economy just experienced two decades of good luck in the form of smaller macroeconomic shocks. If so, then the current favorable tradeoff between output variability and inflation variability could worsen if macroeconomic shocks as large as those of the 1970s were to return.

*Estimates of the contribution of smaller shocks to the great moderation*

One way to see whether smaller shocks can account for the reduction in output volatility is to estimate what the standard deviation of output growth would have been under a counterfactual scenario in which monetary policy and economic structure is what it was post-1984, but the economy was subjected to shocks as large as those of
pre-1979. To estimate output volatility under this “big shock” counterfactual, we use two of the four models that we used earlier to compute the “accommodative monetary policy” counterfactuals in Table 6, the RS and SVAR models.16

The results are summarized in Table 8, which has the same format as Table 6. Under the counterfactual “big shock” scenario, in both the FS and SVAR models the standard deviation of four-quarter growth would have been much larger than its actual value post-1984, and approximately as large as pre-1979. Said differently, in the RS model, the decreased shock volatility more than explains the variance reduction from pre-1979 to post-1984, and in the SVAR the decreased shock volatility explains nearly all of the variance reduction. The variance reductions in the final columns of Tables 6 and 8 are not additive.
for a given model because these variances are not additive functions of the shocks and the monetary policy rules. Still, it is possible to conclude from Tables 6 and 8 that in the RS and SVAR models the output volatility increase arising from using pre-1979 shocks is much larger than the increase from using pre-1979 monetary policy.

The estimates in Table 8 are consistent with others in the literature on the great moderation. As discussed above, there has been an improvement in predictability, that is, a reduction in the one-step-ahead forecast error variance, which is approximately as large as the reduction in the variance of the series itself. In a univariate time series model, the variance of the series scales in direct proportion to the variance of the one-step-ahead forecast error, so in this sense essentially all of the reduction in the variance of four-quarter GDP growth is accounted for by a reduction in the forecast error variance. Other studies reaching this conclusion, using either univariate time series methods or reduced-form vector autoregressions, include Ahmed, Levin and Wilson 2001; Blanchard and Simon 2001; Sensier and van Dijk and others 2001; and Stock and Watson 2002. In addition, the proposition that the volatility reduction is the result of missing shocks is consistent with the sectoral evidence in Table 3, which shows an absence of change in business cycle correlations and the widespread volatility reductions across sectors and other real activity measures. The pattern in Table 3 is what one would expect to see if little changed on the real side of the economy, except that the standard deviations of all economic shocks fell by one-third.

What are the missing shocks?

The claim that shocks were smaller post-1984 than in the 1970s begs for some speculation about what the missing shocks were. One candidate is oil shocks—more specifically, fewer oil supply disruptions. Another is smaller productivity shocks—that is, unexpected (and, possibly, unrecognized) movements in productivity.
Oil shocks. Work by Hooker 1996 and Hamilton 1996, 2003 indicates that oil price fluctuations have had less impact on the U.S. economy in the 1980s and 1990s than they did in the 1970s. One possibility is that individuals and firms have adapted to oil price fluctuations. Hamilton 2003 provides a more nuanced interpretation, in which the oil price fluctuations that matter for macroeconomic stability are those that are associated with political upheaval and major supply disruptions, which, in turn, increase uncertainty in the minds of consumers and investors and, in some cases, induce rationing of petroleum products. Because all but one of the disruptions Hamilton 2003 identifies as important and exogenous occur before 1984, this interpretation also explains the recently small measured effect of oil prices on the economy. Both views—oil price effects having simply disappeared and oil price effects being only associated with supply disruptions—explain the historical data, but they have different implications in the sense that one of them leaves the door open for oil shocks, in the form of oil supply disruptions and turmoil in the Middle East, being potentially important in the future.

Productivity shocks. Both the pre- and post-1984 periods contained large, persistent changes in the trend growth rate of productivity. There are, however, reasons to think that these events, as well as the smaller productivity shocks that occurred, were smaller in the latter period than in the former.

There is no single universally accepted series of productivity shocks. One method of measuring productivity shocks, proposed by Gali 1999, is to identify productivity shocks in a structural VAR as the shocks that lead to permanent changes in labor productivity; identified thus, the standard deviation of Gali’s productivity shock series falls by 25 percent post-1984, relative to pre-1984. Moving away from model-based estimates, the most important productivity events in the two periods were not shocks to the level of productivity but persistent changes in its growth rate: The productivity slowdown of the early 1970s, and its resurgence in the mid-1990s. Aside from the obvious difference of sign, however, these two productivity events
have other salient features. The productivity slowdown was widespread, in large part associated with a fall in labor and total factor productivity growth in services (Nordhaus 2002), while its increase in the 1990s has been, to a considerable degree, concentrated in information technology sectors. The 1970s productivity slowdown was slow to be noticed, not just by the Fed (Orphanides 2001) but by economists more generally; indeed, research on why the productivity slowdown occurred continued well into the 1990s. In contrast, the productivity resurgence was expected by many; the surprise was not that it occurred, but rather that the expected revival, which workers saw all around them, was not evident in measured productivity (recall Solow’s famous quip about computers being everywhere except in the productivity statistics). Arguably, an unrecognized fall in productivity leads to less efficient allocations than a recognized increase. In this sense, productivity shocks in the sense of surprise changes, slowly recognized, could well have been larger pre- than post-1984.

Changes in international synchronization

It is initially surprising that, given the integration of the world economy, there has been no increase in synchronization in business cycles among the G-7 economies. Why is this, and is it reasonable to extrapolate current international business cycle correlations into the future?

In theory, it is unclear whether increased integration should result in more or less synchronized business cycles. On the one hand, a fall in demand in the United States will, all else equal, spill over to its trading partners as a drop in the demand for their exports: Demand shocks are exported through trade. Similarly, difficulties in one financial market could spill over into foreign financial markets through liquidity, wealth, or more general contagion effects. On the other hand, to the extent that trade induces specialization, then industry-specific shocks will be concentrated in a few economies and correlation could decrease. In addition, integrated financial markets facilitate international flows of capital to economies that have experienced productivity
shocks, potentially accentuating the effect of those shocks and decreasing international synchronization.\textsuperscript{18}

Given this theoretical ambiguity, empirical evidence is needed. Accordingly, it is useful to distinguish between economic shocks and their transmission. In an international context, shocks can be common to many countries (for example, an oil price shock or, possibly, a broad technology shock), or they can be country-specific shocks, which can be transmitted through trade linkages. To make this precise, consider a model with two countries; then this distinction between common and country-specific shocks is summarized in the equation,

\begin{equation}
\Delta y_{1,t} = a_1 \Delta y_{1,t-1} + b_1 \Delta y_{2,t-1} + \varepsilon_{1,t} + c_1 \eta_t,
\end{equation}

where $\Delta y_{1,t}$ is the quarterly growth of output in country 1, $\varepsilon_{1,t}$ is the country-specific shock for country 1, and $\eta_t$ is the common world shock. A similar equation would hold for country 2. In this stylized model, a world shock affects output growth in both countries directly, although the magnitude of that effect might differ; country-specific shocks affect their own country directly, but spill over to the other country because of international linkages. In this framework, cross-country correlations depend on the magnitudes of the various shocks and their effect on the economies.

Models like (2) have been estimated recently for G-7 data by Monfort and others\textsuperscript{2002}, Helbling and Bayoumi\textsuperscript{2003}, and Stock and Watson\textsuperscript{2003}. All three studies extend (2) to include an additional international shock and richer lagged effects, but otherwise differ in important details.\textsuperscript{19} Despite these differences, the studies reach similar conclusions. All find evidence of multiple international shocks, and in most countries these shocks explain a large fraction—in some cases, more than half—of the variance of output growth for individual economies. Moreover, during the past two decades common international shocks are estimated to have increased in importance as a determinant of output fluctuations, and the effect of the common international shocks on output growth have become more persistent.
These common international shocks have, however, become smaller in magnitude. So despite their increasing effect, on net the international correlations have remained constant. These findings complement those in the previous section and emphasize the importance of the reduction in the variance of the shocks—in this case, the common international shock.

Should we expect international synchronization to be in the future what it is today? According to these models, that depends on one’s view of future magnitudes of output shocks. One way to address this is to imagine that output shocks in the next decade were those of the 1970s, but that the transmission mechanism was that of the 1990s. Under this scenario, Stock and Watson 2003 estimate that the average correlation of output growth in the G-7 would rise by .15 from its value of the 1990s. Under this “big shock” scenario, business cycles would be both more volatile and more highly synchronized across the G-7.

Conclusions

In our view, the evidence on the great moderation suggests that the story summarized by the points A, C, and E in Figure 1 is the most plausible. In 1979, U.S. monetary policy shifted from an overly accommodative policy to one that was sufficiently responsive to inflation, resulting (in Sargent’s 1999 phrase) in the conquest of inflation. According to the econometric models we examined, however, this improved monetary policy can take credit for only a small fraction of the great moderation. Instead, most of the reduction in the variance of output at business cycle frequencies seems to be the result of a favorable inward shift of the frontier relating the output volatility and inflation volatility.

Whether this inward shift is permanent or transitory is, of course, difficult to know. Some of the shift might be permanent, a result of improved ability of individuals and firms to smooth shocks because of innovation and deregulation in financial markets. There is, however, ample reason to suspect that much of the shift is the result of a period of unusually quiescent macroeconomic shocks, such as the absence of
major supply disruptions. Under this more cautious view, a re-emergence of shocks as large as those of the 1970s could lead to a substantial increase in cyclical volatility and to a reversal of the favorable shift in the frontier that we have enjoyed for the past 20 years.

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Data Appendix

Real GDP series were used for each of the G-7 countries for the sample period 1960:1–2002:4. In the cases of Canada, France, and Italy, series from two sources were spliced. The table below gives the data sources and sample periods for each data series used. Abbreviations used the source column are (DS) DataStream, (DRI) Global Insights (formerly Data Resources), and (E) for the OECD Analytic Data Base series from Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park 2002, generously provided to us by Jorgen Elmeskov via Brian Doyle and Jon Faust.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Series Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sample period</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>1960:1 1960:4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cngdp…d</td>
<td>Statistics Canada</td>
<td>1961:1 2002:4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>1960:1 2002:4</td>
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<td>itgdp…d</td>
<td>Istituto Nazionale Di Statistica</td>
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<td>1960:1 2002:4</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>gdpq</td>
<td>Dept. of Commerce</td>
<td>1960:1 2002:4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U.S. sectoral, NIPA, and other series used for Table 3 and Chart 4 were obtained from the Global Insight Basic Economics Database. The long-term inflation forecast data plotted in Chart 3 are the “combined” series from the Survey of Professional Forecasters Web site maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/). The international sectoral output data used to calculate Table 7 were obtained from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10-sector database.
Endnotes

1Taylor 1979 presents a graph like our Figure 1 with the frontier and point A estimated empirically.


3The estimates in Chart 2 are taken from Stock and Watson 2003. The instantaneous standard deviation is computed by first estimating a stochastic volatility autoregressive model with time varying parameters, specifically,

$$y_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{p} \alpha_j y_{t-j} + \sigma_t \epsilon_t,$$

where $y_t = \Delta \ln GDP_t$, $\alpha_j = \alpha_{j-1} + \eta_j$, $\ln \sigma_t^2 = \ln \sigma_{t-1}^2 + \zeta_t$, $\epsilon_t$, $\eta_1$, ..., $\eta_p$, are i.i.d. $N(0,1)$, and $\zeta_t$ is drawn from a mixture-of-normals distribution and is distributed independently of the other shocks. Next, the instantaneous variance of four-quarter GDP growth is computed as a function of the smoothed estimates of the time-varying parameters. For details, see Stock and Watson 2002, Appendix A, and Stock and Watson 2003.

4This reasoning assumes the long-term growth rate to be approximately constant. This is not a good assumption for Germany, Italy, and Japan, where the long-term mean growth rate fell substantially. In the presence of a constant variance, this fall would increase recession lengths and decrease expansion lengths. Accordingly, the implications of the great moderation for business cycle phase lengths for those countries require model-based calculations, such as those in Harding and Pagan 2002. See Blanchard and Simon 2001 for additional discussion.

5Repeating this exercise for forecasts of four-quarter GDP growth shows a similar reduction in pseudo out-of-sample forecast root mean squared errors. These calculations are based on the fully revised data, which were not available to real-time forecasts, so a real-time forecaster might not have realized the forecast improvements apparent in Table 2.

6See Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park 2002; Doyle and Faust 2002a, 2002b; Heathcote and Perri 2002; Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003; Monfort, Renne, and Vitale 2002; and Stock and Watson 2003. Some researchers have suggested the emergence of a euro zone business cycle (Artis, Koutelmis, and Osborn 1997; Artis and Zhang 1997, 1999; Carvalho and Harvey 2002; Helbling and Bayoumi 2003; Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park 2002; Del Negro and Otrok 2003; Luginbuhl and Koopman 2003; however, the time period available to assess this possibility is short, so it is difficult to draw clear statistical conclusions and we do not pursue this finding here.
For accounts of these institutional and policy changes in the United States, see DeLong 1997, Romer and Romer 2002, Sargent 1999; for an international perspective, see Bernanke and Mishkin 1992 and Bernanke and others 1999.

In practice, monetary policy necessarily involves discretion and considers many variables, not just the rate of inflation and the output gap; strictly, none of this is permitted under the Taylor rule (1). Moreover, the Taylor rule is difficult to implement in real time because of the large uncertainty about the level of potential output (e.g., Kohn 1999). Our immediate purpose is not, however, to dispense policy advice. Rather, it is to quantify the key broad features of monetary policy over the past 30 years, a job for which the Taylor rule provides a useful modeling simplification.

Other studies that find that U.S. monetary policy became more aggressive after 1979 include Boivin and Giannoni 2002, and Cogley and Sargent 2001, 2002. Interestingly, based on an analysis of real-time data, Orphanides 2001, 2002 suggests that this change might not reflect a shift in the preferences of the policymakers, who always intended to respond aggressively to inflation, but rather flaws in their estimates of potential GDP, which failed to detect the productivity slowdown of the early 1970s. Under Orphanides’ story, policymakers in the 1970s thought they were being more aggressive than they actually were. The large institutional shifts of the hard ERM period and the transition to monetary union, with their short sample periods, make it difficult to quantify shifts in policy in Europe, although Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1998 provide some evidence.

The RS and SVAR base models, including their base policy rules, were estimated using post-1984 data (we re-estimated the RS and SVAR models using the original specifications and data from 1984 to 2002). The SW-US and SW-EU base models were estimated by the original authors using a single full sample, in the U.S. case 1957-2002 and in the EU case 1980-1999; the original SW estimated policy rule coefficients are very close to the Taylor coefficients of 1.5 and 0.5 and thus reflect post-1984 policy.

The results are available in the Technical Appendix.

We thank Refet Gürkaynak, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson for bringing these data to our attention.

The data are annual growth rates, taken from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10-sector database. The 10 sectors are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, public utilities, retail and wholesale trade, transport and communication, finance and business services, other market services, and government services. The German data are for West Germany only.
Another explanation could be changes in the way these series are collected, which induce the changing volatilities observed in Chart 4; see Edge 2000 for a discussion of these data. However, the decline in volatility is evident in other measures of residential construction activity, including building permits, housing starts, and purchases of residential structures.

The only panel data set on individual-level consumption is the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics (PSID), which only records food consumption. Blundell and others 2003 make their inferences about overall consumption volatility by using econometric models of consumption to combine data from the PSID and from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a sequence of detailed cross-sectional surveys of consumption. Blundell and Preston 1998 report evidence for the UK of an increase in the variance of micro-level consumption.

Smets and Wouters 2003a, 2003b estimated their models over a single sample period, so for SW-US and SW-EU we do not have estimates of pre-1979 shock variances in those models. In addition, it is not clear how sensible it is to calibrate the SW-EU model to first-period U.S. shocks (how would Europe have responded to U.S. shocks?).

The extent of the decline in the standard deviation of productivity shocks, and perhaps even whether there was such a decline, depends on the measure of productivity shocks used. Measuring the volatility reduction using other measures of productivity shocks and reconciling the results merits further research.

For additional discussion, see Doyle and Faust 2002a and Heathcoate and Perri 2002.

Systems like (2) contain more shocks than observable variables; with seven countries and one common shock, there are eight shocks. Estimation of these systems requires factor model methods. Stock and Watson 2003 estimate a seven equation version of (2) with additional lag restrictions. Monfort, Renne, and Vitale 2002 model the international linkages as arising entirely from current and lagged effects of the common international shocks, while Helbling and Bayoumi 2003 make a similar assumption, but estimate the system using nonparametric methods.
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