Cost pass-through to higher ethanol blends at the pump: Evidence from Minnesota gas station data

Jing Li a, *, James H. Stock b

a MIT Sloan School, USA
b Department of Economics and Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, The National Bureau of Economic Research, USA

ABSTRACT

We examine the pass-through of wholesale prices to retail prices in the market for E85, which contains 51%–83% ethanol, and in the much larger market for E10, which contains 10% ethanol. We use a panel dataset consisting of monthly observations from 2007 to March 2015 on wholesale and retail prices for 274 Minnesota gas stations that sell both E10 and E85. Consistent with prior research, the cumulative pass-through coefficient for E10 is 1.00 after one month. In contrast, the E85 market is sparse, and although pass-through increased over time, we estimate it to be only 0.53 statewide from 2012 to 2015. Pass-through is higher at stations with more local E85 competitors. In the Twin Cities, which has a high density of E85 stations, pass-through is nearly complete, but outside the Twin Cities slightly less than half the wholesale discount of E85, relative to E10, is passed on to the consumer.

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1. Introduction

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 set ambitious goals for blending renewable fuels into the U.S. surface transportation fuel supply. The regulatory structure for achieving these goals is the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The RFS effectively provides a revenue-neutral tax on fuels with low renewable content and a subsidy to fuels with high renewable content, which operates through the market for tradable RFS compliance certificates, RINs (Renewable Identification Numbers).

For the past decade, the main renewable fuel in the United States has been ethanol made from corn, and the dominant fuel blend sold at retail today is E10, which is 10% ethanol. Selling more ethanol into the fuel supply than provided through E10 requires sales of higher blends. Although there have been attempts to sell E15, the main higher blend available is E85, which is between 51% and 83% ethanol and can be used only by flex fuel vehicles. Because E85 has lower energy content than E10 and thus requires more frequent refueling, boosting sales of E85 requires providing a price incentive to flex fuel vehicle owners to buy E85. This price incentive is provided by the RIN subsidy, assuming it is passed through to the consumer in the form of lower prices in the E85 market.

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lijing@mit.edu (J. Li).

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This paper studies the pass-through of wholesale prices and RIN values to pump prices in the retail market for E85. This paper complements work on consumer demand for biofuels and in particular E85, notably Anderson (2012), who estimates demand elasticities for E85 in Minnesota, Salvo and Huse (2013), who study consumer choices between gasoline and ethanol in Brazil, and Pouliot and Babcock (2017), who use daily station-level data from a large retailer to estimate E85 demand. All three authors conclude that most consumers would only purchase E85 if it were substantially discounted relative to regular gasoline. These papers point to the importance of end-consumer prices to the success of the RFS. This paper provides evidence on the efficacy of the RFS system in providing those price incentives to consumers.

The retail market is the final of three steps in the gasoline supply chain. With considerable simplification, in the first (upstream) step, importers and refiners sell bulk refined petroleum fuels on exchanges and at the bulk wholesale level. That petroleum blendstock is then transported to a regional distribution terminal, typically via pipeline. Separately, ethanol is produced then transported to the terminal, typically by rail. In the second (midstream) step, these two fuels are blended at the terminal, sold to retailers, and pumped into tanker trucks for delivery to the gas station. At the third (downstream) step, the retailer sells the fuel to the end consumer at the gas station.

The wholesale price considered in this paper is the price for blended fuel charged to the tanker truck operator. This price is called the “rack price” because it is the price charged at the facility within the terminal, the truck rack, at which the blended fuel is pumped into the tanker. The gas station owner then charges the public the retail (pump) price. As explained in the next section, if the entire RIN subsidy to E85 is fully passed through from bulk wholesale (exchange) prices to rack prices for blended fuels, and if rack prices for blended fuels are fully passed through to retail prices, then the consumer receives the full RIN subsidy.

Our core data are monthly station-level observations on E10 and E85 prices at stations that offer both fuels, along with estimated wholesale E85 and E10 prices by station. The retail E85 prices were collected by the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The retail E10 prices are from Oil Price Information Service (OPIS), matched to the E85 stations at the month-station level. We also use OPIS rack prices for E10 and E85; by matching stations to racks, we estimate the wholesale prices for E10 and E85 paid by a given station in a given month. Because we know the locations of the E85 stations, we can also compute regional station density measures, for example the number of competing E85 stations within a 10-min drive. Our full dataset spans January 2007 to March 2015, which includes the period of high ethanol RIN prices beginning in January 2013.

We have three main findings. First, consistent with a large literature on E10 pricing, we find complete pass-through in the E10 market. As discussed below, we split the sample at the expiration of the Volumetric Ethanol Tax Credit (VEETC) on December 31, 2011. Using our sample of stations for which we observe both E85 and E10 prices, we estimate a cumulative pass-through coefficient for E10 of 1.03 using data from January 2007-December 2011, and of 0.98 using data from January 2012-March 2015.

Second, we find only partial pass-through to the E85 retail price of the E85 wholesale price, controlling for the E10 wholesale price, that is, of the E85-E10 wholesale spread to the E85-E10 retail spread. This pass-through increased over the sample period from 0.347 (SE = 0.023) in 2007-December 2011 to 0.525 (SE = 0.053) in January 2012-March 2015.\(^1\)

Third, there is considerable heterogeneity in E85 pass-through rates. Much of this variation is explained by observable factors. In particular, we find that pass-through is higher if there are more local stations that sell E85. Moreover, the entry of a nearby station into the E85 market reduces the markup\(^2\) on E85 charged by an E85 retailer. We also examine whether there is variation in pass-through or markups associated with whether the retailer is affiliated with an entity that is obligated under the RFS to retire RINs with the EPA. We find no meaningful association with obligation status, consistent with the profit-maximizing incentives for marketing E85 being the same at the station level whether or not the station is affiliated with an obligated party.

Taken together, these results are consistent with the E10 market being highly competitive, but the E85 market being comprised of local markets in which participants frequently have considerable market power. Having more local E85 stations increases competition and is associated with higher pass-through. In the Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul) metro area, an area of relatively high E85 station density, we find essentially complete pass-through of the E85-E10 rack price discount to retail prices. Outside the Twin Cities, slightly less than half the E85-E10 wholesale price discount is passed along to consumers.

Returning to the RIN subsidy, we estimate that in the Twin Cities, nearly all of the RIN subsidy for E85 is passed through the full supply chain and is received by the retail consumer. Outside the Twin Cities, however, we estimate that roughly three-fourths of the RIN value is passed through at the rack, and slightly less than half of that is passed through to retail prices. Statewide, we estimate that 0.35 (SE = 0.05) of the RIN subsidy passes through the full supply chain to retail E85 prices.

In a companion paper, Pouliot et al. (2017) use daily data on rack prices of blended fuel and upstream bulk wholesale prices at 283 terminals in 63 cities (including most of the terminals used in this paper) to estimate pass-through at the rack. Our finding here of incomplete pass-through at some racks is consistent with their finding of heterogeneity of pass-through of RIN subsidies to rack prices for higher ethanol blends.

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\(^1\) As discussed in Section 4, our break at the end of 2011 aligns with the expiration of the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit, and statistical tests find a break at this date.

\(^2\) Markup is defined as the difference between a retailer’s posted price, which consumers face, and wholesale cost.
The most closely related paper in the literature is the independent and contemporaneous work by Lade and Bushnell (2016), who use panel data on E85 retail prices at 450 gas stations in Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota between 2013 and 2016 to estimate pass-through of the RIN subsidy to retail E85 prices. Their dataset and ours have several differences. Lade and Bushnell’s (2016) data has the advantage of being weekly. Their data covers more states and heavily represents urban areas, whereas our dataset has mainly rural stations. The dataset here has the advantage of having wholesale rack prices by station: Lade and Bushnell instead use upstream bulk wholesale prices, which prevents them from distinguishing pass-through at the retail outlet from pass-through at the rack, whereas our data allow estimation of pass-through at the retail level directly. In addition, our data include retail and rack prices for E10, which allows us to control for broader price swings in fuel markets by focusing on the E85–E10 spread at the retail and rack level. The longer span here allows examining stages of market development, but our data end earlier than Lade and Bushnell’s (2016) so has fewer observations in the period of high RIN prices. Despite these differences, the two sets of empirical results are consistent. Lade and Bushnell (2016) find nearly complete pass-through of RIN prices to retail, which is what we find when we restrict attention to the Twin Cities to be comparable to their heavily urban sample. Our results outside the Twin Cities highlight the heterogeneity of pass-through and its dependence on the amount of local competition.

This paper also contributes to literatures on RIN price pass-through at other stages of the fuel supply chain, on gasoline pricing, and on the RFS more generally. Burkholder (2015), Burkhardt (2016), and Knittel et al. (2017) examine the pass-through of RIN prices to the prices of obligated fuels in the bulk or exchange-traded wholesale market; their main finding is that there is essentially complete RIN pass-through at the bulk wholesale market. Relative to these papers, and to Pouliot et al. (2017), we study the pass-through of wholesale E85 (rack) prices and the wholesale E85–E10 spread to retail E85 prices.

This paper also contributes to a large literature on gasoline pricing more generally, see for example Borenstein et al. (1997), Borenstein and Shepard (2002), Bachmeier and Griffin (2003), Lewis (2011), and Owyang and Vermann (2014). These papers generally find complete pass-through of regular gasoline (now E10) over the course of 4–8 weeks, although price decreases are found to pass through more slowly than price increases. Stolper (2016) studies data on regular gasoline from Spain and finds complete pass-through on average, but also finds considerable heterogeneity in station-level pass-through coefficients, as we do for Minnesota E85 stations. Coglianese et al. (2016) find anticipatory behavior of E10 stations before tax increases, and in Section 5.3 we also find anticipatory behavior of E85 stations in advance of the entry of a nearby competitor. Anderson (2012), Corts (2010), Liu and Greene (2013), and Liao and Pouliot (2015) use the Minnesota Department of Commerce E85 dataset (which also includes station sales volumes) to estimate the willingness to pay for E85, but none of these examined pass-through. Relative to this large literature, our main contribution is to examine E85 pricing behavior; the only other paper to do so with station level data is Lade and Bushnell (2016).

This paper also contributes to the economic literature on the RFS. See Lade et al. (2015) for a discussion of RFS policy surprises and RIN prices, see Stock (2015) for an overview of the economics of the RFS, and see Irwin (2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015) for insightful real-time commentaries on RFS economic issues. Finally, although the VEETC is not the focus of our paper, accounting for changes in the E85 market at its expiration plays an important role in our empirical analysis, and our findings in this regard are consistent with the more complete study of the expiration of the VEETC by Bielen et al. (2016).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more details on the RFS and the RIN mechanism and summarizes the empirical methods. Section 3 describes the panel dataset. Section 4 examines the time series properties of the panel data, aggregated to Minnesota state-wide averages, and discusses the break that occurred with the expiration of the VEETC. Empirical results using the panel dataset are presented in Section 5. Section 6 interprets the results and discusses broader implications, including for RIN pass-through down the entire supply chain.

2. The RFS system and empirical methods

2.1. The RFS and RINS

Under the RFS, a gallon of renewable fuel blended into the surface transportation fuel supply generates a RIN. Conventional fuels, such as corn ethanol, generate a D6 RIN; advanced renewable fuels, such as cane ethanol, generate a D5 RIN; and biomass-based diesel (BBD) generates a D4 RIN. Under the RFS, refiners and importers (“obligated parties”) must turn in to the EPA (“retire”) a bundle of D4, D5, and D6 RINS for each gallon of petroleum fuel sold into the fuel supply. The composition of this RIN bundle is established annually by the EPA. For example, during 2013–2015, the period of high RIN prices, an obligated party must retire 0.0113 D4 RINS to meet the biomass-based diesel standard, 0.0162 D4 or D5 RINS to meet the Total Advanced standard, and 0.0974 D4, D5, or D6 RINS to meet the Total Renewable standard. By increasing the fractions of RINS in this RIN bundle, the EPA increases the fraction of the fuel supply comprised by renewable fuels.

Because RINS are tradeable and priced, the RIN system serves as a tax on fuels with high petroleum content and a subsidy for fuels with high renewable content. For the period during our sample with high RIN prices (January 2013 to March 2015), the prices of D4, D5, and D6 RINS were very close (D4 RINS were typically generated in excess of the BBD standard and used to fulfill the advanced and total renewable standard), so for illustrative purposes here we suppose these prices are the same. Based on the 2013 standard, a fuel with volumetric fraction \( \omega \) of ethanol generates \( \omega \) D6 RINS and incurs a RIN obligation of 3 We ignore cellulosic fuels because they were produced in negligible volumes during our data period.
0.0974(1-\omega) RINs. Assuming all RIN prices are the same and equal to the D6 RIN price, $P^D_{it}$, the net RIN subsidy is $[\omega - 0.0974(1-\omega)]P^D_{it}$. Fuel blended at the rate $\omega = 8.88\%$ incurs zero net tax or subsidy. If the RIN price is $1 and passed through to retail prices, E10 receives a very small net subsidy of $0.012/gallon. In contrast, for E85 that contains 83% ethanol, the subsidy is $0.813/gallon, greater than the E10 subsidy by $0.801/gallon.

The incidence of the RIN subsidy depends on the elasticities of supply and demand for the biofuel. Fig. 1 (which is Fig. 4 in Knittel et al. (2017)) illustrates two different cases: biodiesel and corn ethanol. At current blending ratios, biomass-based diesel is well below any operational blend wall and can be blended smoothly into the diesel supply, so a gallon of biodiesel receives the same market price as petroleum diesel. However, biodiesel is more expensive to produce, so under perfect competition the RIN subsidy accrues to the producer. For corn ethanol, the supply curve is effectively flat in the narrow region at and just above the blend wall, but the demand curve drops steeply because flex fuel vehicle owners require an incentive to purchase ethanol as E85. In this case, under perfect competition the subsidy passes through entirely to the consumer. This basic reasoning motivates focusing on pass-through of RIN prices to retail E85 prices.

The specifics of the RFS RIN system determine where and how RIN pass-through can be measured. The obligation on petroleum fuels occurs upstream, when it is sold by a refiner or importer. No further obligation is incurred on the petroleum fuel from the point of sale at the upstream exchange through sale to the consumer. In contrast, the RIN is generated when a renewable fuel is produced, but remains attached to a biofuel electronically throughout its upstream supply chain: a purchaser of bulk ethanol on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange purchases the physical fuel (“wet” gallons) and the attached RIN. The RIN is detached, and can be sold separately from the physical fuel, when the renewable fuel is blended into the U.S. surface fuel supply at the rack. Thus, under complete pass-through, the price of blended fuel at the rack should equal the bulk wholesale (exchange) prices of the fuels in proportion to the blend, minus the price of the fraction of a D6 RIN generated upon blending the ethanol, plus a markup.

Because the blended fuel purchased at the rack does not come with a RIN, the RIN value no longer enters the price calculus of the retailer who pays the rack price for blended fuel. Pass-through at retail therefore does not involve RIN prices and simply entails the pass-through of rack prices to retail prices.

2.2. Empirical methods

Our panel data analysis focuses on three related specifications. In all, the retailer is treated as setting retail prices, taking wholesale prices as given and determined for reasons other than local supply and demand conditions. This assumption accords with wholesale prices largely being driven by national and international considerations (oil prices, corn prices, pipeline tariffs, etc.) and the retailer’s markup being determined by local considerations.

In the first specification, the retail price of E10 at station $i$ in month $t$, $R^E_{iit}$, or the E85 retail price $R^E_{iit}$, is expressed as a distributed lag of the respective wholesale price, $W^E_{iit}$ or $W^E_{iit}$, along with control variables $X_{it}$:

$$R^E_{iit} = \alpha_i + \beta^E (L) W^E_{iit} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it},$$

(1)

where $L$ is the lag operator. Here and below we use generic notation for station-level fixed effects $\alpha_i$, for the coefficients $\delta$ on the control variables, and for the error term $u_{it}$. In our base specification, the control variables are eleven monthly dummies to allow for potential seasonal variation in markups (seasonals are discussed in Section 3.2). The sum of the distributed lag coefficients, $\beta^E (1)$, is the cumulative pass-through of wholesale costs to retail costs for that fuel.

Fig. 1. RIN price determination in terms of market fundamentals.
Source: Knittel et al. (2017).
Because fuel prices move together, and because the RIN subsidy from blending ethanol for E85 is much larger than the
subsidy for blending ethanol into E10, we decompose the E85 wholesale price as the sum of the E10 wholesale price and
the difference between the E85 and E10 wholesale prices. The E10 component of the E85 wholesale price is driven by demand
and supply in the oil and gasoline markets. The E85-E10 spread component is driven by factors that determine the price of ethanol
and, most importantly for this study, by fluctuations in RIN prices. This logic leads us to the regression specification,
\[\hat{P}_{it}^{E85} = \alpha + \beta^{E10}\hat{P}_{it}^{E10} + \gamma^{E85}\left(\hat{P}_{it}^{E85} - \hat{P}_{it}^{E10}\right) + \delta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{2}\]
where \(\beta^{E10}(L)\) is the pass-through distributed lag of the E10 wholesale price to the E85 retail price, and \(\gamma(L)\) is the pass-
through distributed lag on the E85-E10 wholesale spread, and \(\beta^{E10}(1)\) and \(\gamma(1)\) are the respective cumulative pass-
through. If these two costs are treated similarly in retail pricing, then \(\beta^{E10}(L) = \gamma(L)\), and if cumulative pass-through is
complete, then \(\beta^{E10}(1) = \gamma(1) = 1\).

If the distributed lags \(\beta^{E10}(L)\) in (11) and \(\beta^{E10}(L)\) in (2) are equal, then subtracting (11) from (2) yields,
\[\hat{P}_{it}^{E85} - \hat{P}_{it}^{E10} = \alpha + \gamma(L)\left(\hat{P}_{it}^{E85} - \hat{P}_{it}^{E10}\right) + \delta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{3}\]

This specification has the intuitive interpretation of measuring the pass-through of the E85-E10 wholesale spread to the
retail E85-E10 spread. In the context of the RIN subsidy, with perfect pass-through, a D6 RIN price of $1 would reduce the E85-
E10 wholesale spread by the difference in their fractional ethanol content times $1, which in turn would reduce the retail E85-
E10 spread by this amount. Although our primary specification for analyzing pass-through to retail E85 is (2), in cases in
which we have few observations we use the additional restrictions of (3).

3. The Minnesota gas station data

3.1. Dataset sources and construction

Our dataset consists of observations on retail prices of E10 and E85, wholesale prices of E10 and E85, RIN prices, and
demographic data. The unit of observation is a retail gasoline station in Minnesota; all price observations are monthly aver-
egages of daily data. The full data span runs from January 2007 to March 2015.\(^4\) All prices are nominal.

We use three subsets of our full dataset.

The MN E10 dataset consists of 231,257 monthly observations on retail and wholesale prices of E10 at 3104 Minnesota gas
stations. Most of these stations do not sell E85.

The MN E85 dataset consists of 15,970 monthly observations on retail and wholesale prices of E85 at 398 Minnesota gas
stations.

The MN E85-E10 dataset is comprised of stations for which there are data on both E10 and E85 prices, both wholesale and
retail. This dataset is constructed by merging the Minnesota E10 and Minnesota E85 datasets at the station-month level. The
data set is further restricted by dropping the smallest stations, which we define to be stations that either sell less than
300 gallons of E85 per month (averaged over months of nonzero volumes), or that report fewer than 8 months of E85 prices.
There are also some stations in the MNDOC dataset that report selling E85 but are not in the OPIS database, so E10 prices for
those stations are not available; these stations were also dropped. With these exclusions, the MN E85-E10 dataset consists of
9983 monthly observations on E85 and E10 prices at 247 stations that sell both fuels.

These datasets were assembled from multiple sources in four steps.

First, E85 retail price data were obtained from the Minnesota Department of Commerce (MNDOC), which maintains a
monthly survey of retail E85 stations in Minnesota. Stations report volume-weighted prices obtained from monthly sales
quantities and revenues; retail prices include all taxes. Earlier vintages of this dataset have been used by Anderson (2012) and
by Liu and Greene (2013) and are further described there. The data used in this study has two advantages over previous
vintages. First, it contains observations during the period of high RIN prices after January 2013, which permits analyzing RIN
price pass-through to retail prices. Second, our dataset includes the station street address and brand. This permits matching
E85 price data with E10 price data at the station level and also permits accurate estimation of E85 and E10 wholesale costs at
the station level. During 2007-March 2015, 398 stations appear in the MNDOC E85 data.

Second, we obtained from OPIS data on the 3104 Minnesota gas stations in the OPIS database. These data consist of station
addresses, monthly E10 retail prices, and the OPIS estimate of the wholesale price paid by each station for E10. The OPIS
estimate of the wholesale price depends on whether the station is branded or unbranded. For branded stations, OPIS esti-
mates the wholesale price by the rack price for that brand at the closest rack at which the brand is available. For unbranded
stations, the OPIS estimate is the average unbranded rack price at the closest rack. In both cases, OPIS estimates transportation
costs to provide a delivered E10 wholesale price.

\(^4\) Though our dataset begins in January 2005, the data on E85 prices are sparse prior to 2007, so the analysis in this paper begins in January 2007.
Third, OPIS could not provide an estimated E85 wholesale price at the station level, so we constructed our own estimate. To do so, we obtained monthly OPIS price data on neat (pure) petroleum gasoline (E0), on neat ethanol (E100), and on all ethanol blends available for wholesale purchase at twelve racks in Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa, including all seven racks in Minnesota. The non-Minnesota racks were selected to ensure matching the Minnesota retailer with the closest rack even if it is outside the state. The wholesale blends for which we have prices are E10, E60, E65, E70, E75, E80, and E85, however many racks do not have prices on all the higher blends. Discussions with managers in the industry indicated that rack E85 contains 83% ethanol, rack E80 contains 78% ethanol, etc., so that all the E60 — E85 rack blends can be sold at retail as E85. Our algorithm for estimating the station-level E85 wholesale price is a modified version of the OPIS algorithm used to estimate the E10 wholesale price. The modification addresses two key features of E85: first, the ethanol content of retail E85 varies seasonally so that the blended fuel meets Reid Vapor Pressure standards. The seasonal blend also varies over the period of our sample as environmental standards changed. The seasonal blend percentage was determined for each month in our sample using American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM, multiple) Standard Specifications. For the period of our data, the blending rate ranges from 74% (sold at the rack as E75) during winter months to 83% (sold at the rack as E85) during summer months. Given the seasonal blend, we used the following algorithm for estimating the station wholesale price. For a branded station, we use the wholesale price at the closest rack selling that brand at the seasonal blend. If a price for that seasonal blend is not available, then we use the next-highest blend. We refer to the wholesale blend ratio thus determined (e.g. 78% if the wholesale price is for E80) as the month-station blend ratio. For unbranded stations, we use the same algorithm, except that the station is assumed to purchase at the OPIS low price for unbranded blends, using the same seasonal blending and purchasing hierarchy.

In addition, we used these data to compute a splash-blend wholesale price for retail E85, which we use in Section 3 as an alternative cost estimate. The splash-blend price is computed by assuming that the retailer purchases E10 and E100 at the rack, then blends them in the tanker truck to create the seasonal E85 blend. For example, if the seasonal maximum is 83%, the blend is 81.1% E100 and 18.9% E10. We use the price of E100 with a RIN attached (during the pre-2013 period, when RIN prices were negligible, we ignore the distinction between E100 with and without the RIN), and assume that the retailer detaches and sells the RIN; thus the splash-blend wholesale cost is net of the RIN subsidy. For the subset of stations that report a retail E85 price, the correlation between our estimated wholesale price and the splash-blend price is 0.907.

Fourth, we use RIN prices from OPIS and Bloomberg. Using the station-level blending ratio corresponding to the wholesale price, we computed the net RIN subsidy to station-level retail E85, compared with E10, that is, the RIN contribution to the E85-E10 retail spread.

### 3.2. Plots and summary statistics

Fig. 2 presents time series plots of quantiles of markups and spreads computed from the monthly data, January 2007–March 2015, for the 247 stations in the E85-E10 dataset. Table 1(a) provides summary statistics for the panel datasets (the E10 dataset for E10 and the E85 dataset for E85) and for the E85-E10 dataset.

Several features of the data are noteworthy. First, E85 almost always sells at retail for a discount relative to E10 on a dollar per gallon basis (Fig. 2c), consistent with E85 having lower energy content than E10. On average, this discount is $0.51, although there is substantial variation in this discount over time and across stations.

Second, the variation over time and across stations of the markup is substantially greater for E85 than for E10: the standard deviation of the E85 markup is three times the standard deviation of the E10 markup.

Third, as is well known, the E10 retail and wholesale prices exhibit seasonality. Table 1(b) reports a test for the significance of monthly dummy variables using the statewide average time series, in a regression also containing year dummies (Newey-West standard errors). The markups also have seasonal movements, as do the markup spreads. One driver of the seasonals in gasoline prices is the shift from winter to summer blendstocks, and the seasonal in E10, which has high BOB content, is much larger than the seasonal in wholesale E85, which has a smaller BOB content; it is thus unsurprising that there is seasonal variation in the retail E85-E10 spread. In principal seasonal fluctuations in E85 demand (perhaps due to cold-start considerations) could lead to a seasonal in the E85-E10 markup spread, and that seasonal is large ($0.205) but imprecisely estimated.

Fourth, there are two time periods with multiple missing observations in the E85-E10 dataset, in 2008 and in late 2012. These missing observations relate to lapses in the MNDOT data collection system, not based on the values of any of the variables, so we treat them as missing at random.

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5 The Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) is a measure of how evaporative a liquid is. Evaporative fuel emissions contribute to ozone so fuel RVP limits vary seasonally. Initially, blending ethanol to E0 increases the RVP, but after approximately 10 — 15% ethanol, the RVP declines (Andersen et al., 2010). E10 has a waiver that permits year-round E10 sales but other ethanol blends do not, so the E85 blending ratio must be sufficient to ensure that the blended fuel meets the local and seasonal E0 RVP limit. See Bracmort (2017).

6 As a check, we applied this algorithm (without the higher blend hierarchy) to estimate E10 wholesale prices; the correlation between the station-level E10 wholesale price from our algorithm and the OPIS estimate of the station-level E10 wholesale price over the full dataset is 0.997. Our wholesale cost estimates are FOB the rack, not delivered. Because distance to the rack is fixed for a given station, however, transportation costs should largely be absorbed by station fixed effects in our panel data regressions.
4. Aggregate time series data and the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit

We start by examining the aggregate monthly time series data formed by averaging the prices in the MN E85-E10 dataset. These data are plotted in Fig. 3. The timing of this increase coincides with the end of the federal VEETC on December 31, 2011. The VEETC was a subsidy provided for blending ethanol into motor fuel. During our data sample, this tax credit was $0.51 per gallon of ethanol through 2009, then $0.45 per gallon through 2011. Bielen et al. (2016) undertake an event study of the behavior of prices before and after the VEETC expiration; they estimate that, at the close of the program, approximately two-thirds of the subsidy was accruing to ethanol producers, approximately one-third was accruing to blenders, and very little of the subsidy was accruing to consumers. Table 2 reports changes in the row series around the VEETC expiration, from December 2011 to January 2012, both with and without seasonal adjustment, using the regression method in Table 1(b). The data in Table 2 are consistent with Bielen et al.’s (2016) conclusion that very little of the VEETC subsidy was passed along to the consumer, at least at the end of the program. In December 2011, the seasonal E85 ethanol content was 74%, so the full value of the VEETC for E85, minus its value for E10, was \((0.74-0.1) \times 0.45 = 29\text{¢}\). From December 2011 to January 2012, however, the seasonally adjusted retail E10 price rose by 2.2¢ and the retail E85 price rose by 6.6¢, for an increase in the E85-E10 spread of only 4.4¢, consistent with only 4.4¢ of the 29¢ subsidy having been passed on to consumers.

In these data, the main effect of the VEETC expiration was to decrease the wholesale price of E85 by 25.0¢, and to increase the E85-E10 markup spread by 24.2¢. If the retailer received the tax credit, this is consistent with the retailer’s markup, net of the VEETC, being left roughly unchanged by the VEETC expiration. If so, then the VEETC subsidy was largely accruing upstream, to the biorefiner or potentially the farmer. The blender eligible to receive the VEETC can be the terminal operator or the retailer depending on how the blending is done (splash blending or rack blending unit) and on ownership or contracting for the delivery truck, see University of Illinois (2007, p. 157). Even if only some of the retailers received the VEETC, the mean markup as measured here would change with the VEETC expiration.

Fig. 2. The Minnesota E10-E85 data from January 2007 to March 2015: Quantiles of markups and markup spread. Units are $/gallon.
The E85-E10 dataset consists of observations on stations which (i) have at least eight months in which retail and wholesale prices of E10 and E85 are observed, and (ii) have monthly E85 sales averaging at least 300 gallons. The test for seasonality in part (b) is computed using the monthly time series (1), through by estimating separate station-level regressions, where we adjust (deconvolute) the pass-through estimates for change the intercept in pass-through regressions relating wholesale and retail prices.

The VEETC subsidy was a fixed dollar per gallon subsidy, so the direct effect of the expiration of the VEETC would be to change the intercept in pass-through regressions relating wholesale and retail prices.

### Pass-through estimates using time series data

Table 3 reports regressions examining the dynamic relation between retail and wholesale E85-E10 spreads. The full-sample regressions (columns (1) and (2)) test for a break in one or more of the regression coefficients (including the intercept) at an unknown date. The remaining regressions estimate aggregate pass-through rates for the two samples before and after the VEETC expiration date of Dec. 31, 2011. The pass-through rates in Table 3 and in subsequent tables are cumulative over the indicated number of months.

The results in Table 3 suggest four main points, which inform the panel data specifications in the next two sections.

First, consistent with the visual evidence in Fig. 3 and the discussion of the VEETC expiration above, the sup-Wald test for a break using the full sample indicates a break in the spread regressions, with the break date estimated to be January 2012. In addition to the shift in the mean E85 markup evident in Fig. 3b, the pass-through coefficients change between the two periods: in the 2007–2011 period, pass-through is only 0.42 after one month, but this increases to 0.72 in the 2012–2015 period. In both periods, pass-through is incomplete, however.

Second, the dynamic regressions indicate that lagged dynamics are significant both statistically and economically, with cumulative pass-through increasing from contemporaneous to one month, with a small and statistically insignificant increase after two months. This is consistent with the time scale of pass-through found in other studies of retail gasoline pricing.

Third, although the fuel prices have large seasonal components, the pass-through coefficients are insensitive (within a single standard error) to whether seasonals are included or excluded from the regressions.

Because of the strong institutional and statistical evidence of a break not just in the mean markup and markup spreads, but also in the pass-through coefficients at the time of expiration of the VEETC, henceforth we conduct the empirical analysis separately for the two samples before and after the VEETC expiration date.

### 5. Panel data analysis of rack-to-retail pass-through

We now turn to estimates of wholesale cost pass-through to retail E10 and E85 prices using the MN E85-E10 panel dataset. We begin with estimates of average pass-through across stations, that is, the distributed lags \( \beta(L) \) and \( \gamma(L) \) in specifications (1)–(3), estimated by panel data regression with station fixed effects. We then estimate station-level heterogeneity in pass-through by estimating separate station-level regressions, where we adjust (deconvolute) the pass-through estimates for
estimation error. Finally, we use panel data regressions with interactions to examine whether pass-through varies with local competition and with whether the station sells branded or unbranded gasoline.

This section describes and summarizes the empirical results; interpretation of the results is deferred to Section 6.

5.1. Pass-through regressions

Table 4 presents OLS estimates of pass-through for the two periods, before and after the VEETC expiration, estimated using the MN E85-E10 dataset. The regressions in Table 4 are all of the form of a retail price or spread regressed on the current value and one lag of one or more wholesale prices or spreads. The reported coefficients are cumulative pass-through coefficients. Because all prices are in nominal dollars, a coefficient of 1.00 indicates complete pass-through of the relevant wholesale cost to the retail price. Consistent with the aggregate time series results, our base specifications include a contemporaneous term and a single lag. The regressions include month (seasonal) and station fixed effects. To allow for spatially correlated demand disturbances, standard errors are clustered at the county level.
The Supplemental Appendix tables report additional specifications and sensitivity checks. Appendix Table I includes an additional monthly lag, and Appendix Table II excludes the seasonal dummies. In Appendix Table III, the regressions involving...
only E10 are estimated using the full MN E10 dataset and the regressions involving only E85 are estimated using the MN E85 dataset. Appendix Table IV includes year effects. Appendix Table VI provides alternative standard errors for Table 4 computed using two-way clustering (county and time). Additionally, some of the appendix tables include regressions estimated over the full sample period (not split in January 2012).

Four aspects of the results in Table 4 and Appendix Tables I–IV are noteworthy.

First, for E10, pass-through is complete in both samples (regressions (1)–(2)), and roughly 80–90% of E10 wholesale costs are passed through in the current month. Cumulative retail E10 pass-through is estimated to be 1.03 after one month in the pre-2012 sample (regression (1)) and 0.98 in the post-2012 sample (regression (2)). The large number of station-level observations result in very small standard errors, even with clustering at the county level, so these estimates are statistically different from one; however, we interpret them as economically the same as one and consistent with complete pass-through.

Second, pass-through dynamics for E85 are different from those for E10 (regressions (3)–(6)). Cumulative pass-through is estimated to be large, 0.947 in the pre-2012 period (regression (3)) and 0.953 in the post-2012 period (regression (4)) after one month, but in both periods is statistically different from one. In addition, pass-through is slower for E85 than for E10, with current-month pass-through of 69% in the pre-2012 period and 64% in the post-2012 period.

Third, decomposing the wholesale price of E85 into the E10 component and the E85-E10 wholesale spread — that is, estimating specification (2) — reveals that pass-through is very different for these two components, and moreover that the pass-through coefficients on both components changed over the two periods. Before 2012, 91.6% (SE = 0.8 pp) of the E10 cost was passed through to E85 but only 34.7% (SE = 2.3 pp) of the E85-E10 wholesale spread was passed through. After 2012, there was complete pass-through of E10 costs (one-month cumulative pass-through of 1.010, SE = 0.016) to E85, and pass-through of the wholesale spread rose to 0.525 (SE = 0.053). In the second period, because the cumulative pass-through of E10 wholesale prices to E85 retail prices is statistically insignificantly different from one, we can impose this unit coefficient and estimate pass-through using the spread specification (3), which (not surprisingly) gives a similar pass-through estimate of 0.501 (SE = 0.049). These results are robust to removing the seasonal dummies, to including an additional monthly lag, and to including year effects.

Fourth, these results are robust to including an additional monthly lag (Appendix Table I), but the pass-through coefficient is smaller if one ignores lagged effects and estimates only a contemporaneous pass-through regression. The results are also robust to dropping the seasonals (Appendix Table II). Because specification (1) only involves one fuel, it can be estimated using the full MN E10 or MN E85 datasets, depending on the fuel, and the results are robust to using these larger datasets (Appendix Table III); this robustness suggests that the merged MN E85-E10 dataset does not introduce sample selection bias.

 estimation error is plausibly independent of g(1), the Gaussian-Gaussian deconvolution formula can be used to estimate $g(1)$ as $g(1) = E(g(1) | \hat{g}(1))$. We use $\hat{g}(1)$ as our estimator of the station-level pass-through coefficient.

5.2. Heterogeneity in station-level pass-through

We next estimate station-level E85 pass-through coefficients for stations for the two time periods, where estimates are restricted to stations with at least 18 monthly observations in a given time period; this restricts the sample to 145 stations in the first period and 94 in the second. To reduce the number of parameters, the pass-through coefficients are estimated using the spread — spread specification (3) with no control variables and with the current and a single lagged value of the wholesale spread, for a total of three coefficients. The station-level cumulative pass-through coefficients $g(1)$ are estimated from the station-level time series, so HAC standard errors are used (Newey-West with 3 lags).

Because of the small number of time series observations per station, the coefficient estimates have substantial sampling error. We therefore estimate the station-level pass-through coefficient using a Gaussian-Gaussian decomposition. Specifically, write the OLS estimator of the cumulative pass-through coefficient for station $i$ as $\hat{\gamma}(1) = \gamma(1) + (\hat{\gamma}(1) - \gamma(1)) = \gamma(1) + e_i$, where $\gamma(1)$ is the unknown station-level pass-through coefficient and $e_i$ is OLS estimation error. The OLS estimation error is plausibly independent of $\gamma(1)$ and, using the large-sample approximation, is approximately normally distributed, where var($e_i$) is estimated by the Newey-West variance. With the additional assumption that $\gamma(1)$ is normally distributed across stations, the Gaussian-Gaussian deconvolution formula can be used to estimate $\gamma(1)$ as $\hat{\gamma}(1) = E(\gamma(1) | \hat{\gamma}(1))$. Specifically, let var[$\gamma(1)$] = $\sigma^2$ and let var[$\hat{\gamma}(1) | \gamma(1)$] = $\sigma_2^2$. Then $\hat{\gamma}(1) = w_0 \gamma(1) + (1 - w_0) \hat{\gamma}(1)$, where $w_0 = \hat{\gamma}_i^2 / (\hat{\gamma}_i^2 + \sigma_2^2)$, where $\hat{\gamma}_i(1)$ is the sample average of the $\gamma(1)$’s, $\hat{\gamma}_i$ is the Newey-West estimator of $\gamma(1)$, and $\sigma_2^2$ is an estimator of $\sigma^2$. In unreported results, we modeled $\gamma(1)$ as a mixture of Gaussian distributions, with no appreciable change in the results. For additional discussion of deconvolution and a recent application to income dynamics see Gu and Koenker (2017).
Fig. 4 presents a histogram of estimated E85-E10 spread pass-through coefficients for the two periods. The mean of this distribution is 0.38, with standard deviation 0.19, in the first period, and is 0.56, with standard deviation 0.21, in the second. These mean values are close to the coefficients (average treatment effects) of 0.35 and 0.53 from the panel data regressions (5) and (6) in Table 4 and are consistent with the increase in pass-through from the first to the second period found in the fixed effects regressions.

5.3. Variation of pass-through with local competition and obligation under the RFS

The histograms in Fig. 4 show considerable heterogeneity in station-level pass-through. We now investigate the extent to which this variation can be explained by the degree of local competition or by whether the station is affiliated with an obligated party under the RFS.

The motivation for examining the number of local competitors is that, under perfect competition, pass-through should be one. If there is limited local competition, then gas stations can exercise local market power, and if so pass-through will in general be different from one.

The variation of pass-through with local competition is estimated using panel data regressions of the retail E85-E10 spread on distributed lags of the wholesale E85-E10 spread and the interactions of the wholesale spread with one of two measures of the number of local competitors. The three measures of local competition are (i) the number of gas stations selling E85 within 0–3 and 3–10 mile annuli around the station, (ii) the number of gas stations selling E85 within 0–3 and 3–10-min driving time from the station, and (iii) whether the station is located in the Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul metro area, specifically Hennepin and Ramsey counties). The Twin Cities has the highest density of E85 stations in our dataset and is considered to be one of the most mature E85 markets in the nation. As in Table 4, all regressions include station fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. We focus on the second period, which is when there is greater average pass-through.
The results are summarized in Table 5. In all cases, more local competition is associated with higher pass-through. In each specification the interactions are jointly statistically significant, and the results are robust to including seasonals or not. The effect of local competitors is greatest if they are nearby, but remains positive and statistically significant if they are more distant. For example, having an E85 competitor within a 3-min drive is associated with a pass-through coefficient that is higher by 0.055 (SE = 0.23, regressions (2)).

The most striking results are when the stations are separated by being in the Twin Cities or not (regressions (3) and (6)), with stations in the Twin Cities having pass-through coefficients 0.31 greater than stations outside the Twin Cities. In the regression without seasonals, pass-through for Twin Cities stations is nearly complete, with a coefficient of 0.930 (SE = 0.003); the corresponding estimate with seasonals is 0.780 (SE = 0.022).

Because obligated parties need to procure RINs, one possibility is that stations affiliated with obligated parties act more aggressively to detach the D6 RINs needed by their parent companies, and as part of that effort pass through more of the RIN value. We can examine this proposition because the OPIS dataset includes the brand of the gas station, and using public information we determined whether the station is affiliated with an obligated party. We find, however, that there is no statistically significant difference in pass-through rates between obligated-affiliated and non-obligated-affiliated stations (Appendix Fig. 1 and Appendix Table VIII). Another measure of pricing aggressiveness is the difference between the E85 markup and the E10 markup at a station (the markup spread), with a lower markup spread indicating more aggressive E85 pricing. In the high-RIN period starting January 2013, this markup spread was essentially the same in obligated-affiliated and non-obligated-affiliated stations, being lower in obligated-affiliated stations by only 0.037 (SE = 0.038). These results find no evidence of difference in pricing behavior between stations affiliated with obligated parties, and those not.

The lack of effect of obligation on pricing behavior is consistent with stations facing the same profit maximizing incentives. If a station has local E85 market power, it is in its financial interest to price accordingly, but if it is in a competitive local E85 market as in the Twin Cities, it will price competitively and pass through its marginal cost. This incentive for station-level profit maximization is the same whether or not the station is affiliated with an obligated party.
5.4. Effect of entry

The regressions in Table 5 establish that pass-through is greater if there are more local competitors in the E85 market, but because the decision to sell E85 is endogenous, those regressions do not establish a formal causal link. Our dataset allows us to examine the effect of entry of a local competitor, however, so here we exploit these entry events to estimate the effect of competition on markups and pass-through. We define an E85 entry event as an increase in the number of E85 stations within a circle of a given radius, compared to the previous month. In most cases, this entry event corresponds to a new station entering the MN DOC database. In some cases, stations appear to sell E85 either seasonally (not offering E85 in the winter) or have an extended period of E85 sales, then an extended period of no sales, then a period of sales.8 We consider separately the effect just periods of random data reporting lapses, our estimated effects of entry would be attenuated because of classical errors-in-variables bias.

Table 6A summarizes the dynamic effect of entry on markups, estimated for entry defined over circles of radii 3, 4, and 5 miles. The dependent variable is the E85 markup; the regressors are dummy variables indicating the months prior to entry \(t-1\), etc., the month of entry, and months after entry \(t+1\), etc.). The change in markup reported in the table is the difference between the average coefficient for the four months after entry, minus the average for the four months before entry. The regressions have station fixed effects, so the coefficients have a differences-in-differences interpretation (before vs. after, stations with entry at a given date vs. those without).

The estimates in Table 6A are consistent with substantial and statistically significant effects of entry on average markups: in the first period, an entry within four miles is estimated to decrease the markup by \(-13.5\,\text{¢} (SE = 2.5)\). The point estimates of

8 Because stations are required to report prices and volumes if they received state funding for their E85 investment, it is plausible that most of these periods of no report sales actually represent zero sales rather than simply a lapse in reporting. To the extent that some of our identified entry events are in fact just periods of random data reporting lapses, our estimated effects of entry would be attenuated because of classical errors-in-variables bias.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of entry events</td>
<td>≤3 mile</td>
<td>≤4 mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry, (t+4)</td>
<td>0.0759</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry, (t+3)</td>
<td>0.0700</td>
<td>0.0975</td>
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<td>Entry, (t+2)</td>
<td>0.0661</td>
<td>0.0571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entry, (t+1)</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry, (t)</td>
<td>(0.0379)</td>
<td>(0.0284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in markup spread</td>
<td>(0.0368)</td>
<td>(0.0272)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Fixed effects regression estimates of the effect of entry on cumulative pass-through

| Change in pass-through: \(\Delta \gamma(1)\) | (0.0405) | (0.0355) | (0.0319) | (0.0101) | (0.00996) |

Monthly seasonals? | No | No | No | No | No |

Notes: All results are for the E85-E10 dataset. The number of entry events in the dataset within the specified rings is given in the fourth header row. In panel A, entries are coefficients on the indicated month before \(+\) or after \(\pm\) entry, in fixed effects panel data regressions with the E85-E10 markup spread as the dependent variable. The change in the markup is the average of the coefficients on \(\gamma\) for \(1-4\) months after the entry, minus the average of the coefficients for \(1-4\) months before entry. In panel B, the dependent variable is the E85-E10 retail spread and the regressors are the current and first lag of the E85-E10 wholesale spread, the wholesale spread interacted with a dummy indicating the twelve months before an entry event, and the wholesale spread indicating the twelve months after an entry event; these regressions also include station fixed effects. The reported change in pass-through is the difference between the before- and after-cumulative pass-through coefficients. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the station level. See the notes to Table 4.
the effect of entry are similar in the two periods, although there are few entry events in the second period so the standard errors are large. (Results for a 3-mile radius in the second period are omitted because there are only 4 of these entry events, and there are only 12 within a 4 mile radius.) The dynamics of the markup response is similar across all estimates in Table 6A, with the markup beginning to decline in the month prior to entry and the largest decline occurring in the month of entry and the month after entry. The anticipatory decline is consistent with the ability of a retail operator to observe the construction associated with an existing local E10 station adding the ability to sell E85 by installing a blender pump or, possibly, upgrading its tanks.

Table 6B reports estimates of changes in pass-through coefficients, estimated in fixed effects regressions of the retail E85-E10 spread on the current and first lagged values of the wholesale E85-E10 spread and that spread interacted with two indicators, one denoting the twelve months before the entry event and one denoting the twelve months commencing with the entry event. The Table 6B estimates are a triple-difference estimate of the change in E85 pass-through associated with an entry event. In both samples, the estimates for entries within 4 and within 5 miles are positive, and the magnitude of the coefficients is comparable to Table 5. Because of the few entry events, however, the estimation error in this triple difference estimate is large and none of these estimated differences in E85-E10 pass-through are statistically significant. Still, we take the results in Table 6B as weakly supportive of interpreting the more precise results in Table 5 as evidence that local competition increases pass-through.

5.5. Alternative purchasing assumptions

The analysis so far assumes that retailers purchase blended fuel at the rack. Under this assumption, the blended fuel already has the RIN detached so the retailer never touches a RIN. There are, however, two other purchasing and blending strategies used by some retailers. Under the first, examined in this subsection, a retailer purchases E10 and pure ethanol with a RIN at the rack (E100w) and “splash blends” the two fuels in the tanker truck. Under the second, examined in the next section, the retailer purchases fuel upstream of the rack and typically pays a price pegged to the bulk exchange at the origin of the pipeline and from the biorefiner. Both strategies change the RIN ownership chain, so the retailer ends up owning the RIN. As a result, both strategies have expression for the wholesale marginal cost that differ from each other and from the marginal cost for purchasers of blended fuels at the rack.9

For splash blending of fuels purchased at the rack, if the seasonal blend ratio is \( \omega \), then the retailer blends \( \tilde{\omega} = (\omega - .1)/.9 \) gallons of E100w with \( (1 - \omega) \) gallons of E10, and detaches and owns \( \tilde{\omega} \) D6 RINs. The retailer’s wet fuel cost is \( W_{it}^{E85,SB} = \tilde{\omega}W_{it}^{E100w} + (1 - \tilde{\omega})W_{it}^{E10} \). The full marginal wholesale cost for a splash blender (SB) subtracts off the value of the RIN detached and sold by the retailer, \( W_{it}^{E85,SB} - \delta P_{it}^{D6} \), where \( P_{it}^{D6} \) is the price of the D6 RIN. Because E10 is sold at the rack without a RIN, the E85-E10 wholesale spread is \( (W_{it}^{E85,SB} - W_{it}^{E10}) - \delta P_{it}^{D6} \), where the first term is the wet fuel spread between splash blended E85 and E10, and the second term is the value of the RIN sold by the retailer. With perfect competition, this marginal cost would be passed through to price, but under imperfect competition there could be incomplete pass-through and moreover the pass-through rates for the RIN price and the wet fuel spreads could be different. This leads to the pass-through regression for splash blending:

\[
R_{it}^{E85} - R_{it}^{E10} = \alpha_l + \gamma^{SB,fuel}(L)(W_{it}^{E85,SB} - W_{it}^{E10}) + \gamma^{SB,RIN}(L)R_{it}^{E85,SB} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it},
\]

where \( R_{it}^{E85,SB} = -\tilde{\omega}P_{it}^{D6} \) and \( \tilde{\omega} \) is determined by the seasonal E85 blending ratio. Under perfect competition, the cumulative pass-through coefficients on the wet fuel and RIN components are both one: \( \gamma^{SB,fuel}(1) = \gamma^{SB,RIN}(1) = 1 \).

Table 7 presents estimates of specification (4) for the full state, the Twin Cities, and outside the Twin Cities, where the rack price of E100w is used to compute the splash-blend wholesale price for E85. Statewide, the splash-blending pass-through rate for the wholesale splash-blending E85-E10 spread is .574 (SE = 0.064), the pass-through for the RIN component is less (0.393), and the restriction that the pass-through rates equal each other is rejected. In the Twin Cities, both the wet fuel and RIN pass-through rates are larger, 0.864 (SE = 0.044) and 0.792 (SE = 0.046), respectively, and are not statistically different from each other. Results without seasonals (Appendix Table VII) are very close to those with seasonals.

The splash-blending results in Table 7 are similar to the results in Tables 4 and 5, which assume purchase of blended fuels: the statewide blended fuel pass-through coefficient is 0.525, for splash blending it is 0.574; in the Twin Cities, the blended fuel pass-through coefficient is 0.930, and the splash-blended coefficient is 0.864. This result is not surprising: any retailer with the administrative infrastructure in place to sell RINs can seize the opportunity to arbitrage at the rack between purchasing blended fuel or splash-blending and retaining the RIN.

Retailers have other blending options too. Large chains have the ability to purchase fuel upstream of the rack and pay the terminal owner a service charge for handling the fuel; whether the fuel is delivered blended or splash blended, the retailer retains the RIN and pays an upstream, not rack, price for the fuel. If the upstream price is a bulk exchange price (plus...
6. Discussion and implications for RIN pass-through

These empirical results in Sections 4 and 5 lead us to four main conclusions.

First, the complete pass-through of E10 after one month is consistent with the Minnesota E10 retail market being highly competitive. This conclusion is consistent with results in the existing literature, which finds complete pass-through in the U.S. retail E10 market, with pass-through dynamics lasting 4–8 weeks.

Second, these results are consistent with imperfect competition in the retail E85 market, with stations having local market power. When there are more local competitors, that market power is reduced, and there is greater pass-through. The magnitude of this effect is substantial: according to the estimates in Table 5 regression (2), a station with 2 competitors within a 3-min drive and with 7 competitors within 10 min (both are the 90th percentile of these distributions) will pass through 22 percentage points more of the E85-E10 wholesale spread to its E85 retail customers than a station with no competitors within a 10 min drive.

Third, the weight of the evidence — the time series evidence in Table 3, the panel data estimates of specification (2), and the histograms in Fig. 4 — points to a change in the market structure around January 2012. Although we have highlighted the expiration of the VEETC as the event separating the two periods, the increasing pass-through coefficient could be unrelated to the VEETC expiration and could simply reflect maturing of the industry and an increase in consumer awareness of where E85 stations are, facilitated by state highway signage indicating E85 stations (Minnesota Department of Transportation (2006)). Alternatively, this change in pass-through could instead be associated with changing pricing dynamics in the high-RIN period starting in January 2013. Despite this evolution towards increasing pass-through, our estimates suggest that, on average, pass-through of the E85-E10 wholesale spread to E85 retail prices remained partial, with our preferred statewide pass-through estimate being 0.525 (SE = 0.053, Table 4(6)).

Implications for RIN pass-through. Because the net effect of a movement in RIN prices on E10 prices is negligible, both in theory and based on empirical evidence (Knittel et al. (2017)), the RIN subsidy to E85 operates through the E85-E10 wholesale

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Notes: The reported coefficients are the cumulative pass-through. The splash blend wholesale spread is the difference between the splash-blend wet-fuel wholesale price of E85 and the rack price of E10, where E85 is produced by splash blending E10 with E100 with a RIN at the appropriate seasonal blending rate. The splash blend RIN value is \( \omega \) where \( \omega = (1/(b^1 + 1)) \). All regressions have station fixed effects, with standard errors clustered as indicated. Results are for the E85-E10 dataset over the period 2012–2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional subset</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Splash blend wholesale E85-E10 spread, lag 0</td>
<td>0.238 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.376 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.217 (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splash blend wholesale E85-E10 spread, lag 1</td>
<td>0.574 (0.064)</td>
<td>0.864 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.537 (0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splash blend RIN value, lag 0</td>
<td>−0.353 (0.047)</td>
<td>−0.078 (0.018)</td>
<td>−0.382 (0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splash blend RIN value, lag 1</td>
<td>0.393 (0.048)</td>
<td>0.792 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.351 (0.045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the F statistic testing equality of cumulative coefficient on spread and RIN value:

- (p-value) | (0.0003) | (0.569) | (0.0007) |
- N          | 4288      | 441      | 3847      |
- Number of stations | 175      | 16      | 159      |
- Standard errors clustered at: county | Yes | Yes | Yes |
spread. The partial pass-through of the E85-E10 spread to E85 prices suggests that any RIN price subsidy passed through at the rack in the form of lower prices for blended fuels only partially passes through to the end retail customer. Our preferred overall estimate of 0.525 pass-through indicates that only half the RIN subsidy at the rack is passed through to lower retail E85 prices.

We examine RIN pass-through by two additional sets of regressions, in this case with RIN prices and upstream bulk wholesale cost spreads as regressors. These regressions examine the extent to which the subsidy for blending ethanol at the rack is passed on to posted rack prices, and then downstream to retail prices. The subsidy for blending ethanol into E10 is 0.1 times the D6 RIN price, and the subsidy for blending ethanol into E85 is the seasonal blend rate times the D6 RIN price. As before, we focus on the E85-E10 spread, which controls for fluctuations in oil prices and the fuels markets, and the net ethanol blending subsidy $RIN_{E85-E10}$ is the difference between the E85 and E10 blending subsidies. We estimate bulk wholesale costs using the Gulf CBOB price and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ethanol price (daily data from the Energy Information Administration and Bloomberg, respectively, aggregated to monthly), using the E10 and the seasonal E85 blending ratios. Our regressions have the form,

$$W_{it}^{E85} - W_{it}^{E10} = \alpha_1 + \gamma_{WB}(L)(B_{it}^{E85} - B_{it}^{E10}) + \theta_{WB}(L)RIN_{t}^{E85-E10} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it}$$

(5)

$$R_{it}^{E85} - R_{it}^{E10} = \alpha_2 + \gamma_{RB}(L)(B_{it}^{E85} - B_{it}^{E10}) + \theta_{RB}(L)RIN_{t}^{E85-E10} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it}$$

(6)

where $B_{it}^{E85}$ and $B_{it}^{E10}$ are the bulk wholesale costs of E85 and E10.

A key thing to note is that $B_{it}^{E10}$ is a price above the rack, so that the ethanol component includes a RIN; the RIN is detached upon blending at the rack. If there is complete pass-through at the rack, then $\gamma_{WB}(1) = \theta_{WB}(1) = 1$. If there is complete pass-through all the way down the supply chain, from bulk wholesale to retail, then $\gamma_{RB}(1) = \theta_{RB}(1) = 1$. If the cost of the wet fuels is passed on at the rack, but the RIN subsidy is only partially passed on, then $\gamma_{WB}(1) = 1$ but $\theta_{WB}(1) < 1$. Because the blended fuel does not have a RIN attached, there is no reason to think that the RIN price would affect the price at retail other than through the price of the blended fuel. In the notation of equation (3), the cumulative pass-through in the E85-E10 spread is $\gamma(1)$ from rack (blended) to retail. Thus, one would expect long-run RIN pass-through at retail to satisfy $\theta(1) = \gamma(1)/\theta(1)$. Said differently, a fraction $\theta(1)$ of the RIN value is passed along at the rack, and of that, a fraction $\gamma(1)$ is passed along at the pump; thus the consumer sees $\gamma(1)\theta(1)$ of the RIN value in the retail spread between E85 and E10.

Equation (6) has an additional interpretation. As discussed in Section 5.5, some retail chains occasionally purchase petroleum blendstock (E0) and E100w above the rack, then blend it at the rack, paying a user fee to the terminal operator. In this case, the retailer does not pay the rack price for fuel and retains and sells the RIN. If the price paid for the fuel above the rack is pegged to the bulk exchange prices, then Equation (6) is the relevant pass-through equation for retail chains that purchase fuel above the rack.

Table 8 presents results of estimation of regressions (5) and (6). The table separates the Twin Cities from the rest of Minnesota because of the large differences in pass-through and competition found between the two areas in Table 5; pooled results for the full state are presented in the final two columns. Results are only for the second period, which is the only relevant period with nontrivial D6 RIN prices.

The results in Table 8 are consistent with complete pass-through at the rack, with cumulative pass-through coefficients insignificantly different from 1 and insignificantly different from each other; these coefficients are imprecisely estimated because there is a single Twin Cities rack in our data and we use time series regression with HAC standard errors. In the Twin Cities, the RIN pass-through to retail is estimated to be 0.803 (SE = 0.049), consistent with the pass-through of blended rack to retail of 0.78 (Table 5(6)) and complete rack pass-through. These pass-through rates are estimated to be even higher without the seasonals (0.988, SE = 0.080, in Table 8(3)). Thus, the results for the Twin Cities are consistent with complete pass-through at the rack, complete or nearly complete pass-through at retail, and with the retail consumer seeing the full, or nearly full, RIN subsidy.

In contrast, outside the Twin Cities, pass-through is estimated to be less both at the rack and at retail: with seasonals, $\hat{\theta}_{WB}(1) = 0.743$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{WB}(1) = 0.311$. This latter estimate is consistent with the estimate of $\hat{\theta}_{RB}(1) = \hat{\gamma}_{WB}(1)\hat{\theta}_{WB}(1) = 0.466 \times 0.743 = 0.346$. Outside the Twin Cities, in our sample approximately three-fourths of the RIN value is passed on at the rack, and of that just under one-half is passed on at retail, so the consumer sees roughly one-third of the RIN value in the E85-E10 spread.11

The estimates of pass-through of RIN prices to the E85-E10 spread found here are greater than found in Knittel et al. (2017). Using weekly data on national average E85 prices, they estimated cumulative RIN pass-through to the E85-E10 retail spread of 0.23 after six weeks in their distributed lag specification that is closest to the distributed lag specifications used here. Their results used national average E85 prices, which includes markets that are less mature than in Minnesota. Our results indicate

11 These estimated pass-through findings at the rack are consistent with preliminary estimates in Pouliot et al. (2017).
lower pass-through in areas of lower competition, and we suspect this, or issues of data quality in the national time series, is the most likely reason for the national RIN pass-through being lower than the Minnesota RIN pass-through estimated here.

These estimates of RIN pass-through are also consistent with those in Lade and Bushnell (2016). As they point out, their data sample heavily represents urban centers (Minneapolis, Des Moines, and Chicago) where there is strong competition in E85. In contrast, our dataset contains many rural stations that have few if any local competitors. The results for our data, restricted to the Twin Cities, are consistent with their finding of complete pass-through.

Because we only have data for Minnesota, we cannot speak to pass-through rates in other states. That said, in the Twin Cities, where pass-through is essentially complete and where there is a competitive market, E85 sales per capita are roughly twice those outside the Twin Cities, where station density is lower and pass-through is less. Outside the Midwest, E85 station density is very low, and our results suggest that one would find low pass-through and low E85 sales in such cases.

**Broader implications.** The mechanism whereby the RFS incentivizes consumers to use more ethanol is the RIN subsidy. For this subsidy to be effective, it must reach the consumer in the form of lower prices for higher ethanol blends. The evidence presented here suggests that this occurs incompletely. Overall in our data, roughly half the rack discount of E85 off E10 — including that part of the discount due to the RIN subsidy — is passed along to the consumer, while half of the RIN subsidy that is passed through at the rack accrues to the station operator. Our results also suggest that greater E85-on-E85 competition increases RIN pass-through. The most obvious form for this increased competition is through increased station density, but other methods on which we do not have data, such as improved signage or internet posting of E85 prices could also matter. A specific implication of this analysis is that programs such as the $210 million USDA Biofuels Infrastructure Partnership in 2015 could substantially increase the fraction of the RIN subsidy passed along to the consumer and thus increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the RFS program. To do so, such subsidies should be targeted to promote E85-on-E85 retail competition through increasing station density; otherwise they will simply help the participating retailer establish a chain of local E85 monopolies.

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.08.003.

References


