With the recent wave of democratization across Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, scholars have begun to explore how democratic changes affect women. Like other analyses of gender and the state (Brush 2003; Eisenstein 1988; MacKinnon 1989; Orloff 1996; Pateman 1988), these studies examine how states create and govern gender relations among their citizens through institutions, laws, and legal discourses (Jaquette and Wolchick 1998; Stephen 1997; Waylen 1994, 2000). Importantly, they extend previous gendered state literature by asking what happens to the political institutionalization of gender when a state is transformed by democratic transition.

There are strong theoretical reasons to anticipate that democratic transitions will create more gender equitable states. First, democratic transitions provide women (and men) with new opportunities for political participation. Second, new participatory opportunities typically coincide with the negotiation and implementation of new state institutions and policies. Applying the framework to four test cases, we conclude that women’s movements are most effective at targeting democratizing states when transitions are complete, when women’s movements develop cohesive coalitions, when the ideology behind the transition (rather than the ideology of the winning regime) aligns easily with feminist frames, and when women’s past activism legitimates present-day feminist demands. These findings challenge current conceptualizations of how democratic transitions affect gender in state institutions and provide a comparative framework for evaluating variation across additional cases.
This provides activists with an extremely rare opportunity to participate in the construction of a new state apparatus. Third, because many democratization movements are populated by women’s mobilizations (Jaquette 1994), and because feminist movements often grow out of other types of women’s mobilizing (Kaplan 1992; Molyneux 1985; Shayne 2004), we would expect feminist activism to be especially high during such transitional moments.

Paradoxically, however, most scholars conclude that democratization has done little to improve women’s political influence within the state, even when women were active in the transition process. With democratization in Eastern Europe, for example, women’s political participation dropped precipitously, maternity leave policies were curtailed, women’s legislative quotas were dismantled, funding for childcare centers decreased, and abortion rights were threatened (Einhorn 1993; Haney 1994; Roman 2001; Watson 1993). Similarly, in the developing world, democratization brought a reassertion of traditional gender expectations (Jaquette 1994; Rai 1996), waning women’s mobilizations (Craske 1998), and, in many nations, declines in women’s parliamentary representation and formal political power (Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999; Fisher 1993; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Waylen 1994).

We concur that democratization often fails to improve gender equity within states, yet scholarly emphasis on democracy’s failure within cases obscures the fact that gendered outcomes of democratic transitions may be quite variable across cases. This paucity of systematic cross-national comparisons leaves open the question of whether and why some democratic transitions result in more “women-friendly” states than others. Are there particular configurations of transitional contexts and social mobilizations that are especially likely to create feminist changes? Or, conversely, are the democratic ideals upon which new state institutions are modeled imbued with patriarchal ideologies and organizational structures that generate consistently masculine state outcomes, regardless of variation in mobilization characteristics or transition processes?

Using insights from existing case studies, we develop in this article a theoretically-grounded comparative framework for evaluating gendered variation across democratizing states. Because states do not typically adopt feminist changes without pressure from organized groups of women (Gelb and Hart 1999; Gordon 1994; Lyclama a Nijehol, Vargas, and Wieringa 1998; Seidman 1999), we place women’s movements at the center of our framework, and we use social movement theory to conceptualize the relationship between the framework’s explanatory factors (elaborated below). We then apply the framework to four states in transition that have witnessed quite divergent outcomes: South Africa, Argentina, Ghana, and El Salvador. We conclude that the combined presence of four specific characteristics—a complete transition, a cohesive coalition within the women’s movement, a transitional ideology that aligns easily with feminist frames, and a legacy of women’s activism that legitimates present-day feminist demands—creates an especially positive context within which women’s mobilizations can effectively target democratizing states. These findings, generated from cross-national comparison, extend current case-based conceptualizations of how democratic transitions affect the gendered state. They also question existing understandings of the importance of left party ideologies, “gender-bending” activism, and international influences.

This article forwards sociological understandings of gender, democratization, and mobilization in three ways. First, by identifying and explaining cross-national variation in the gendered outcomes of democratization, we challenge and extend the existing case-based scholarship that generally suggests democratization has failed women. Second, we offer a comparative framework through which a deeper understanding of the gendered processes of democratization can be developed, especially with extension to additional cases. And finally, our conjunctural explanation of why some women’s movements are more successful than others, given the shared context of democratization, provides new ways for thinking about divergent mobilization outcomes.

BUILDING A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENDERED STATE

Drawing from existing literature, we first construct a comparative framework that helps capture and explain gender variation across
democratic transitions. The conception of states as inherently masculine structures is at the foundation of our framework (Brush 2003; Orloff 1996; Parpart and Staudt 1989; Waylen 1998). Undergirding this is the assumption that states will not typically adopt feminist changes without pressure from organized groups of women (Gelb and Hart 1999; Gordon 1994; Lyclama a Nijehol et al. 1998; Seidman 1999). We identify four political factors that are often cited as critical for understanding the presence and effectiveness of women’s movements in new democracies: (1) the democratic transition itself, (2) the legacy of previous women’s mobilizations, (3) the actions and ideologies of political parties, and (4) international influences. We expect that these factors, working in conjunction with one another, will shape the political openings and ideologies that accompany democratization, and thus the political context within which women’s movements must operate. These are certainly not the only factors affecting women’s mobilizations, but when analyzed together, we believe this parsimonious set of political factors allows scholars to capture many of the relevant historical and political processes within a case, while still allowing for systematic comparisons across cases.

1 Democratic transitions are defined narrowly as the moment when a nation holds its first multiparty elections, in which all political parties participate freely and fairly, after a period of rule by unelected or corruptly elected persons (see Bratton and van de Walle 1997). We acknowledge that the establishment of formal electoral competition does not imply a corresponding redistribution of power among citizens such that there is a true “rule by the people.” We use the terms democratic transition and democratization interchangeably throughout the article.

2 We consider “feminist” state changes to be transformations in policies, practices, or institutions that improve women’s access to resources and decision-making positions. Our focus on women’s mobilizations distinguishes our framework from the comparative work of Waylen (2007), who concludes that electoral systems and political institutions, not mobilizations, are most critical for explaining gendered variation across cases.

3 We limit our framework to political factors. Many studies argue that the neo-liberal economic policies accompanying democratization also account for women’s disappointing political gains. An analysis of how variation in the degree of a state’s neo-liberal immersion affects gendered outcomes would be welcome, but it is beyond the scope of this project.

4 So-called “mainstream” studies of democratization demonstrate that transition types have legacies for new democracies (Huntington 1991; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992). However, they focus almost exclusively on elite political actors and offer little consensus on how to categorize transitions (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1997; Welsh 1994). This leaves them poorly equipped to evaluate gendered outcomes. Waylen (2007) applies a gender lens to transitions, concluding that “pacted” transitions are ideal for women’s organizations because they give women more time to mobilize.

Of course, women’s movements also have agency, and their successes are determined in part by how they frame and pursue movement goals. We therefore examine the strategies and frames of women’s movements during moments of democratic transitions. Strategies are the actions a movement uses to present its goals to an intended audience (e.g., lobbying or protests) and frames are the descriptive structures a movement uses to articulate its goals (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986).

**FOUR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES**

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS. When explaining the failure of democratization to create more women-friendly states, scholars employing case studies focus on the historically-specific characteristics of particular transitions, but they seldom make statements about how transitions and their gendered effects might be more broadly patterned. We highlight two characteristics of transitions that we believe are regularly implicated in the process of negotiating and institutionalizing gender within new state structures. First, we examine the “completeness” of a democratic transition by investigating whether and to what extent the old regime maintains power, and whether constitutions, laws, and institutions are opened to change. We reason that women’s movements will achieve more feminist states when the democratic transition presents concrete opportunities for renegotiating state structures and widespread public interest in rethinking predemocratic political ideologies.
Second, using Snow and Benford’s (1992) concept of a master frame, we investigate how democratic transitions introduce new ideologies that women’s movements can then mobilize toward their own goals. Social-movement participants purposively frame their actions in ways they hope will attract adherents and help achieve movement goals (Benford and Snow 2000). These collective action frames are generally specific to a movement, but when they become so broad in scope as to influence the actions and orientations of many movements, they are referred to as a master frame. In democratic transitions, a number of movements and organizations coalesce into one push for democratization, and a master frame emerges. Following Noonan (1995), we reason that women’s movements will achieve more feminist gains in states where these master frames are both broadly accepted by the public and easily aligned with feminist demands.

Women’s pretransition mobilization. The literature on gender and democratization documents the crucial role that women’s mobilizations play in bringing about many transitions (Britton 2005; Jaquette 1994; Seidman 1999; Shayne 2004). We argue that the timing, strategies, and frames of these pretransition mobilizations help explain variation in the successes of later women’s movements as they target new democratic states. Some scholars suggest that women’s posttransition movements benefit from women’s pretransition activism, because these earlier movements provide a strong base of experienced activists from whom to draw affiliates, as well as established network ties to internal and international collaborators (Noonan 1995; Shayne 2004). Moreover, women whose pretransition activism “bent gender,” or broke with traditional understandings of the feminine (e.g., guerrilla combatants or political organizers), are thought particularly likely to launch strong feminist movements under new democratic regimes (Kampwirth 2004; Shayne 2004).

Yet the strategies and frames used prior to transitions can also constrain the success of later movements. In Latin America, women protesters often strategically incorporated authoritarian regimes’ gendered discourse of women as pious, self-sacrificing mothers into the framing of their own claims against the state. This left authoritarian regimes in the uncomfortable position of justifying the repression of grieving mothers to local and international audiences (Alvarez 1990; Okeke-Ihejiirika and Franceschet 2002; Ray and Korteweg 1999). With democratization, however, new political players on both the left and the right used women’s own framing of innate gender differences to encourage women’s return to the home (Chinchilla 1994; Fisher 1993; Friedman 1998). Scholars therefore concluded that it was difficult for women’s movements to convert past feminine frames into new feminist discourses.

In still other cases, women’s pretransition mobilization was stifled by authoritarian governments, and the patterns of female exclusion carried over into new democratic regimes. In many African cases, authoritarian governments dictated the activities of women’s organizations using coercion and control over resources (Geisler 1995; Tripp 2000; Waylen 1996), and in Eastern Europe, the Communist Party’s iron-handed control over political organizing stifled women’s pretransition mobilizations (Einhorn 1993). These predemocratic legacies of exclusion left new democracies adept at co-opting women’s activism and left women poorly organized at the critical moment of transition.

Political parties. Social movements often lose influence under democratization (Friedman 2000; Nelson and Chowdhury 1994) because political parties, not movements, control access to democratic states (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Understanding the variable effectiveness of women’s movements in new democracies therefore requires understanding movements’ relationships with political parties. Some scholars argue that, when women’s pretransition activism takes place in collaboration

5 Examples of feminine movements include motherhood-based human-rights groups (Fisher 1990; Stephen 1997) and housewife movements protesting rising prices and shrinking social services (Neuhouser 1998). Feminine movements do little to challenge traditional patriarchal society, but some argue they can and do overlap and develop into “feminist” ideologies (Molyneux 1985; Stephen 1997). Little is written about which movements evolve, which languish, and whether this broadening of movement goals results in gendered changes within the state apparatus.
with broader liberation movements, women can then use these ties to make effective claims on party power (Britton 2002; Hassim 2006; Luciak 2001). By contrast, numerous analyses document how women’s mobilizations are co-opted by political parties after a transition (Alvarez 1999; Manuh 1993; Okeke-Ihejirika and Franceschet 2002; Tsikata 1989). Gender-specific goals are often subsumed to a party’s “mainstream” agenda, and women’s branches of political parties are generally too weak and poorly funded to exert real party influence (Friedman 2000; Geisler 1995; Luciak 2001). In response, many women’s movements declare autonomy from parties to pursue their own agendas and collaborate with a wide range of political interests, even though autonomy limits their access to the state (Alvarez 1999; Jaquette 1994; Tripp 2000; Waylen 1994).

Political party ideologies also contribute to the dynamics of women’s mobilizations. In general, leftist parties are most likely to express a commitment to reducing gender inequalities, and socialist parties in particular often articulate feminist goals of ending women’s double work day and encouraging female political and economic participation (Caul 1999; Chinchilla 1990). Although ideological commitments to feminism are not often carried out in practice (Urdang 1995), some argue that the stated ideals may allow women to make more effective claims on party power (Chinchilla 1990). Others find that leftist ideologies do result in real gains for women’s political power (Waylen 2007).

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES. The literature on gender and democratization argues that a strong international and transregional feminist movement positively supports women’s activism in new democracies (Britton 2002; Hassim 2003; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Nelson and Chowdhury 1994; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Seidman 1999). Global summits call attention to women’s shared interests, and when governments sign on to United Nations agreements, local women’s movements have a legal basis on which to claim equality. International feminist organizations often provide material resources to local women’s movements, as well as ideological ties to broader feminist concerns.

Yet a few scholars warn against overly rosy depictions. Heavy reliance on international nongovernmental organizations raises the concern that women’s organizations will channel their actions toward what agencies will fund rather than toward what is needed locally (Barrig 1994; Caldeira 1998). Furthermore, the institutionalization of movements into organizations may create divisions between the professional women running the organizations and the grassroots women whose needs are represented (Caldeira 1998; Richards 2004).

WOMEN’S DEMOCRATIC MOBILIZATIONS

As conceptualized within our framework, women’s democratic movements are the mechanism by which states may become more gender equitable. Women’s movements are constrained by the four factors discussed above, but their effectiveness in targeting new democratic states is also determined by which strategies and frames they choose to employ. Our review of the literature suggests that women’s movements’ strategies are relatively consistent across cases. For example, movements often articulate women’s demands by preparing platforms (Britton 2005; Hassim 2002; Saint Germaine 1997) and then pushing political parties and state officials to adopt these platforms through lobbying, protests, and media campaigns (Geisler 1995; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Steady 2006; Tibbetts 1994). Women’s movements also seek out and support female candidates for public office and launch campaigns to increase voter turnout and other forms of political participation among women (Saint Germaine 1997; Tripp 2001).

We find that women’s movements often vary across two characteristics. First, some have been successful at building coalitions across classes, races, ethnicities, and political affiliations (Britton 2005; Saint Germaine 1997). Others, though, struggle with problems of cohesion, particularly when pretransition movement leaders, who are often from a higher class and better educated than most activists, assume paid positions within new state offices or political parties, leaving the women who remain in the community-based movements feeling isolated (Geisler 1995; Richards 2004; Waylen 1994). Second, as we highlight in the following cases, transition movements vary in how they frame
their demands for women’s inclusion in the state. We anticipate that variations along these two characteristics can be explained in large part by how the four factors discussed above both constrain and expand political openings and ideologies available to women’s movements with democratization.

**Assessing Outcomes**

If a state is to become more feminist, its institutional foundations must explicitly take into account, and work to remedy, women’s subordination in the larger society. To evaluate whether a state has become more “women-friendly” with democratization, we examine changes in institutional foundations, including the new democratic state’s constitutions, laws passed since democratization, the formal organizational structures established to address gender inequalities, and the system for placing individuals into power.

In addition, if women are to have recourse within their state, they must be able to gain representation within the state apparatus, and they must successfully access political decision makers from outside formal channels. We therefore evaluate women’s representation within state structures, especially parliaments.\(^6\) We also investigate a state’s receptivity to women’s movements by identifying the demands that women’s groups make of a state, and whether and how states respond to their desired policy changes.

We acknowledge that these analyses do not capture the entire myriad of ways in which states are gendered, but other research suggests that, if these foundational gendered changes are institutionalized with democratization, they will persist and have positive influences on other aspects of the state apparatus, as well as the society in which it operates (Molyneux 2000; Schmitter 1998; Stacey 1983).

**Applying the Framework: A Comparative Analysis of Four Cases**

To test the utility of our framework, we examine four countries: South Africa, Argentina, Ghana, and El Salvador. We chose these cases because they clearly demonstrate successes and failures in improving gender equity within the state, and because they differ from one another according to the framework factors identified above. This allows us to explain outcomes by drawing on similarities across varied contexts. Our initial selection of these cases was based primarily on rates of women’s legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. We created tables ranking nations by their percentage of female parliamentarians in 1995 and 2005. Most nations in Africa and Latin America showed incremental gains over this time period, but Ghana fell from 17th to 30th out of 40 African nations, while El Salvador fell from 9th to 16th out of 21 Latin American nations. By contrast, South Africa and Argentina represent new democracies that have recently become regional leaders in placing women into formal political office. We then explored the outcomes of these cases to determine if higher women’s legislative representation was indicative of the political institutionalization of a more gender equitable state. This was the case for Argentina and South Africa, but not for Ghana or El Salvador.

In the following country reviews, our goal is not to provide detailed case studies, but rather to pull out specific factors highlighted by the framework. In doing so, we hope to determine which combination of factors generated more successful outcomes for South Africa and Argentina, as compared with Ghana and El Salvador. We recognize that using only four cases will not result in definitive answers regarding feminist state outcomes and democratization more broadly. However, our findings challenge current conceptualizations of how democratic transitions affect gender issues in state policies, institutions, and personnel, and we hope our comparative framework will provide a tool with which the gendered processes of democ-

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\(^6\) Women’s representation within the state does not always signify an increasingly women-friendly state apparatus, as not all women legislators promote feminist concerns. However, studies suggest that increasing women’s legislative representation correlates with the development of more justly gendered policies and has a contagion effect such that women improve their representation in other areas, such as labor unions and local government structures (Britton 2002; Jones 1997; Waylen 2000).
ratization can continue to be explored across additional cases.\footnote{The data in our analyses are primarily secondary sources, although the authors also conducted in-depth interviews with women and feminist activists in Ghana and El Salvador between 1997 and 2004.}

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**Democratic transition.** Centuries of racist practices and politics preceded the 1948 implementation of apartheid and the formal political exclusion of non-whites from the South African state (Britton 2005; Seidman 1993). A powerful movement, united under the master frame of liberation and equality for all, developed to counter these racial injustices. By 1990, the white minority government was left without international legitimacy and unable to control movement protests within its own borders. It ended apartheid and invited major opposition groups to negotiate a new state apparatus. The subsequent two rounds of protracted negotiations included only the major government and opposition parties; other segments of civil society were not well represented (Hassim 2002). In 1994, free democratic elections brought the African National Congress (ANC)—a leading player in the liberation movement—into power. The creation of a new constitution began under their tenure and was enforced in 1997.

The South African democratic transition ended the rule of the previous regime, formally dismantled the predemocratic system of political power, and included all major parties in the negotiations to construct the new state apparatus. Because South African democracy was predicated on expanding political, social, and economic rights to non-whites, much of the rhetoric surrounding democratic negotiations emphasized racial equality.

**Women’s pretransition mobilizations.** South African women of all races were actively involved in the pretransition liberation movement. This activism took place within locally-based groups, such as labor unions and neighborhood associations, and outside national borders, where the ANC operated in exile (Hassim 2006; Meer 2005; Seidman 1993). South African women’s struggles to unite women of different races and classes, as well as to unite local and exiled activist communities, resulted in early discussions of how to articulate solidarity among diverse groups of women (Hassim 2006). Although attempts to unite diverse women pretransition were unsuccessful, the idea of coalition building among women developed early on. Ultimately, even though a small group of feminists arose pretransition, especially among women in exile, all liberation organizations continued to promote political liberation over women’s liberation (Hassim 2006; Seidman 1993).

**Political parties.** With transition, political parties initially placed low importance on women’s rights and representation, but pressure exerted from women within the parties forced change. In particular, women within the ANC argued that the party should seek both a non-racist and a non-sexist democracy (Britton 2002; Hassim 2002). They demanded and won a commitment from the ANC to ensure that 30 percent of winnable positions on the party’s electoral ballots were filled by women. Other parties have followed the ANC’s lead by increasing support for female parliamentarians running for elections.

**International influences.** The South African women’s movement was strongly influenced by the international community. Under apartheid, women exiled in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola witnessed how women’s rights were subverted in those countries’ transitions to independence (Britton 2002; Geisler 2000; McEwan 2000). Upon returning to South Africa, they used the lessons learned in exile to keep women’s issues on the South African negotiating table during democratization. In addition, international donors provided women’s nongovernmental organizations in South Africa with no-strings-attached funding to help them fight both racist and sexist policies before and during the transition (Britton 2006). Also during the transition, antiapartheid activists from the Netherlands initiated discussions between hundreds of South African women about how gender could be incorporated into the new state (Seidman 1993). Unfortunately, after the transition, many international organizations moved their funds to other areas of the world,
and members of women’s organizations had to compete with each other for financial support. International donors also began to attach conditions for the use of the posttransition funds (Britton 2006).

Women’s Democratic Mobilizations. When women were completely excluded from the first round of multiparty negotiations in 1992, the South African women’s movement was quickly prodded into political action (Hassim 2002). Drawing on the democratic master frame of liberation and equality for all, more than 70 ideologically-diverse organizations came together to form the Women’s National Coalition (WNC), arguing that equality should extend to women. Their main goals were to (1) gain women’s inclusion in the multiparty negotiations and (2) create a Women’s Charter of Equality to be added to the constitution. Despite difficulties maintaining cohesion across the diverse organizations, the coalition succeeded in gaining women’s representation in the first round of negotiations. When women were again marginalized during the second round of negotiations, WNC women wrote open letters to political leaders, staged protests, and ultimately stormed the negotiations and halted discussions until the issue of women’s representation was addressed (McEwan 2000; Seidman 1999). In the end, the WNC gained one seat for every political team of two people within the multiparty negotiations, thus increasing their representation to 50 percent. They further demanded that the WNC’s own Gender Advisory Committee be part of the technical teams involved in constructing the new constitution, and they succeeded in adding their Women’s Charter to the constitution. The new constitution now emphasizes feminist concerns about gendered violence and women’s specific needs in relation to legal status, health, work, and access to resources (Hassim 2002; Meer 2005), and these laws supersede customary laws.

Unfortunately, the WNC’s strength waned after the first multiparty elections in 1994 (Meer 2005; Walsh 2006). Having achieved its two primary goals, the WNC needed to reevaluate its purpose. Meanwhile, all members of the WNC executive committee were voted into parliament and thus had to resign from the coalition, as dictated by WNC rules. The simultaneous achievement of goals and loss of leadership in 1994 contributed to the WNC’s fragmentation (Hassim 2002; Seidman 2003).

Gendered State Outcomes. Due in part to women’s activism, South Africans not only instituted a proportional representation system (Britton 2002) and constructed one of the most gender-equitable constitutions in the world (Walsh 2006), but by 1998, they had also created a number of state institutions to monitor gender equity (Seidman 2003). The Office on the Status of Women, located within the Office of the President, evaluates the activities of the government, including hiring and maternity leave practices. Within each ministry, a gender desk examines all policies to ensure gender equity is appropriately addressed. The South African Commission on Gender Equality was created to oversee all these activities and to address concerns for gendered justice within civil society.

Women’s political representation has been consistently high in the three national elections since transition (Britton 2002; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007), reaching 28.3 percent in 1994, 29.8 percent in 1999, and 32.8 percent in 2004. Initially, these high numbers were due to strong wins by the ANC, but other parties also increased their female representation in the later elections due to a contagion effect. Parties may have also received encouragement from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional organization that asked all its member states to reach 30 percent legislative representation for women by 2005.

The institutionalization of gender equality in state institutions, combined with women’s increased legislative representation, resulted in major legislative victories for women (Hames 2006; Walsh 2006). During the five years following transition, a series of acts were passed that, among other things, addressed sexual harassment in the workplace, provided extensive maternal and family responsibility leave, promoted affirmative action for women in hiring, gave women greater access to abortion, required financial support from absent parents, criminalized domestic violence, and provided free health care to pregnant women and children up to age 6.
ARGENTINA

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. In 1976, a military coup took power in Argentina and, in what has since been dubbed the “dirty war,” tortured, killed, or “disappeared” an estimated 30,000 “insurgents.” By 1983, the state’s corrupt use of international funds, poor economic planning, continued human rights violations, and defeat in a conflict with Great Britain over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands left the ruling junta thoroughly discredited. The Argentine public called for an end to authoritarianism, and in response, the junta reinstated the 1853 Argentine constitution, allowed civilian elections, and peace-fully handed over political power to the winners, placing few demands on new political actors. Ten years later, a special assembly updated the constitution. Often considered a “transition by collapse,” the return to democracy in Argentina was ultimately swift, complete, and carried out under a widely-accepted master frame of anti-authoritarianism.

WOMEN’S PRETRANSITION MOBILIZATIONS. Both feminine and feminist groups were involved in the 1983 transition to democracy in Argentina (Feijoo with Nari 1994), but the feminine groups were by far the most influential. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, or the Madres, publicly protested the disappearance of their children by military force, and the Housewife Organizations protested the injustice of the rising cost of living and unemployment. Both groups were avowedly nonpartisan and campaigned for government accountability and ethics. Both groups were also criticized for reifying women’s traditional, subordinate feminine roles, although Feijoo (with Nari 1994) notes that these women actually transgressed traditional understandings of the feminine as weak and submissive, transforming “motherhood” into a source of power. By contrast, feminist organizations initially focused more on personal issues and cultural transformations than politics (Feijoo with Nari 1994). Yet, toward the end of the dirty war, most feminist groups publicly called for peace and justice, and some began lobbying political parties to include women’s issues in their platforms when democratization returned.

POLITICAL PARTIES. Historically, Argentina has been dominated by two political parties: the Partido Justicialista (PJ), derived from the Peronist populist movements, and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), a more liberal middle-class political party (Waylen 2000). Neither party prioritizes gender in its organization or its mission, and internal party offices are largely held by men (Partido Justicialista de la República Argentina 2007; Unión Cívica Radical Comité Nacional 2007). However, with the transition, women from both parties aligned with each other and with the Argentine women’s movement to promote a national quota law requiring that women make up at least 30 percent of electoral candidates (Gray 2003).

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES. Western feminism influenced the early feminist formations in Argentina, and international conferences provided new opportunities for Argentines to engage with feminist issues. The adoption of CEDAW (the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) encouraged the creation of new women’s offices and provided the language for feminist constitutional reforms (discussed below). Yet the international community has not played a large financial role in Argentine women’s organizations, with less than half receiving foreign funding, and many eschewing international financial assistance because of its tendency to dictate local agendas (Borland 2004a and personal correspondence).

WOMEN’S DEMOCRATIC MOBILIZATIONS. Although no women’s group had a strong influence on the immediate terms of the rapid democratic transition (Waylen 2000), both the Madres and the feminists aggressively engaged the newly democratic state. The Madres wanted answers about their disappeared children and punishment for those found guilty of torture. The feminists pursued a broader agenda, seeking changes in divorce laws, child custody laws, the availability of contraceptives, and an electoral quota to increase women’s representation. Argentine feminists also pursued issues of abortion rights to an unusual degree for Latin America, in large part because the Catholic Church, which aligned with the violent military junta during the dirty war, had been affiliated...
with “authoritarianism” (Borland 2004b). The feminists adopted two available frames when making their claims. First, because the new state promoted democratic and neo-liberal reforms as necessary for becoming “modern,” feminists argued that gendered justice was necessary for a “modern” state as well (Waylen 2000, see also Towns 2004). Likewise, because the Madres had equated “feminine” politics with ethics, justice, and decentralized power, feminists referred to masculine styles of aggressive, hierarchical politics as “authoritarian,” a style repudiated by the Argentine public (Borland 2004a).

Women’s mobilizations in Argentina have historically formed powerful cross-class coalitions, beginning with populism in the 1950s. Since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, Argentine women from all types of women’s organizations—left, right, religious, secular, feminist, human rights, and economic needs—have met regularly for a National Encounter to debate “women’s interests” and plan collaborative work (Borland 2004a). Organizations like the Union of Housewives (SACRA) were formed with the explicit intention of creating cross-class coalitions, given that women’s unfair share of household labor was thought to be an issue with which women from many walks of life could identify (Fisher 1993). Argentine women legislators have also collaborated exceptionally well across party lines to forward women’s issues (Gray 2003).

**Gendered State Outcomes.** Under the military regime, women were largely excluded from positions of political power, and the democratic transition of 1983 did little to improve women’s representation. Women consistently won less than 4 percent of new deputy positions in the elections of the 1980s (Waylen 2000). In 1991, under pressure from Argentine women’s organizations and female activists within the political parties, the Argentine congress passed the first national quota law in the Western Hemisphere. It stipulated that at least 30 percent of all candidates for national political office must be women, and that women be placed in “winnable” positions on closed party lists. Nevertheless, the numbers of women in congress reached only 13.2 percent in the 1993 elections, due to parties’ loose interpretations of what constitutes a “winnable” position. Importantly, the quota law also applied to candidates for a constitutional assembly, which was charged in 1993 with updating the Argentine constitution. Women made up 26 percent of the assembly members. Some were feminists and many organized across party lines on issues relevant to women (Jones 1996; Waylen 2000). They inserted language into the constitution that strengthened the quota laws, made CEDAW compliance a constitutional imperative, and successfully fought a clause that would have made abortion illegal under any circumstance (Waylen 2000). The strengthened quota laws, among other factors, increased women’s legislative representation dramatically—women’s representation rose to 25.3 percent in 1995 and to 35 percent in 2005. Moreover, some scholars suggest that the quota law is having a contagion effect, as unions and provincial elections are also adopting these procedures (Waylen 2000).

In addition to increasing their personnel in the new democratic state, Argentine women also gained new women’s machinery in the state apparatus. In 1991, President Menem created the National Council of Women to ensure the implementation of CEDAW in Argentina. Established by presidential decree, this body initially had a large budget and a feminist-sympathizing leader. It has played a critical role in monitoring parties for adherence to the quota laws and brings charges against parties that are not in compliance. The Council does not, however, have ministerial status (Gray 2003), and when the Council’s leader campaigned against Menem’s attempt to insert stricter abortion clauses into the constitution, she was forced to resign, was replaced by a new pro-life party woman, and the Council’s budget was reduced (Waylen 2000). The proportional representation system, the exemplary quota laws, and the new women’s machinery are all positive steps toward feminist change in the Argentine state, but the hyper-presidentialism of the system can, at times, leave women and their institutions vulnerable.

**Ghana**

**Democratic Transition.** In 1981, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings overthrew a democratically elected president and, with his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), initiated
an 11-year left-wing dictatorship in Ghana. In the early 1990s, however, international donor agencies placed external pressure on Rawlings to democratize his government, while local Ghanaian organizations protested for multiparty elections and free association by appealing to Ghanaians’ political pride. Ghana was the first country to gain independence in sub-Saharan Africa, and Ghanaians wanted to uphold their nation as an exemplary model for political competition, thus making “political pride” an effective master frame. Rawlings eventually succumbed to this pressure and agreed to multiparty elections in 1992. With his new National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, he won both the 1992 and 1996 elections. The 1992 elections were controversial (Lyons 1999), but because all parties could theoretically participate, most Ghanaians refer to them as the moment of transition. The 1996 elections were deemed fairer and oppositional parties accepted the results.

Ghana’s transition to democracy was slow and relatively peaceful but initially left remnants of the previous authoritarian regime in place. The constitution was drafted by a Consultative Assembly prior to the transition, drawing from previous constitutions and a report from a “Committee of Experts” appointed by the PNDC (Kumado 1993). Women were not central to the process, and their political status was not discussed by political or civic actors.

WOMEN’S PRETRANSITION MOBILIZATION. In 1982, Rawlings created the 31st December Women’s Movement (DWM) with the ostensible purpose of encouraging women’s political involvement in the state. In reality, the DWM co-opted women into PNDC rule using financial incentives (Gyimah-Boadi 1994; Tsikata 1989). The PNDC state intimidated citizens who addressed politics and targeted market women as enemies of the state (Manuh 1993), leaving women fearful of politics and largely unmobilized with the transition to democracy.

POLITICAL PARTIES. Political parties did not prioritize women’s rights in their transition-era agendas. Women’s political activities were still co-opted by the DWM. Rawlings’s leftists political party, the NDC, has been the only one to state in its manifesto, beginning in 1999, that affirmative action will be used to ensure women’s representation in executive positions (Allah-Mensah 2007). Their party structure, though, has not mirrored that commitment.

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES. Prior to Rawlings’s dictatorship, the Ghanaian government established an independent council, the National Council on Women in Development (NCWD), to assess the economic and social status of Ghanaian women, as well as to participate in international meetings like the United Nations Decade for Women (1975 to 1985). However, Rawlings and members of the DWM took over the NCWD in 1987 (Manuh 1993), curtailing Ghanaian women’s participation in international conferences and campaigns. Not until after the transition, when members of autonomous women’s organizations began to participate in international conferences like Beijing-95, did international influences begin to significantly impact Ghanaian women’s mobilization.

Similarly, after the democratization process, funding opportunities increased for women (Fallon 2008). In the beginning, due to the distrust instilled through the PNDC, and later the NDC, access to funding was contentious and women’s organizations saw one another as competitors. Beginning in 1999, donor agencies attempted to bring civil society organizations together by forming coalitions. Although international funding remained competitive, coalitions formed and women’s distrust of one another dissipated.

Women’s democratic mobilizations. Immediately after the transition, many Ghanaian women’s organizations continued to fear the government and the DWM, and thus chose to remain focused on economic, rather than political, issues (Fallon 2003). However, in the late 1990s, because President Rawlings was constitutionally required to step down in 2000, women’s organizations began to challenge the government more openly. Women’s mobilization in this period focused on calling for government action to end a brutal three-year string of serial killings against women. They formed a coalition called NETRIGHT, which was quickly followed by other coalitions. The serial killings, the development of women’s coalitions, participation in Beijing, access to increased donor
funds, and the end of (P)NDC rule resulted in a Ghanaian women’s movement that began to place demands on the government, and it succeeded in getting a domestic violence bill passed (Fallon 2008). However, as the domestic violence bill was the primary goal, and the state created hurdles that the women’s movement had to negotiate, other gendered concerns did not materialize.

Gendered state outcomes. Under Rawlings’s authoritarian regime, women held just 1 of 16 cabinet positions, and 1 of 29 state ministry positions in 1985. By 1990, those numbers had dropped to zero (Brown, Gharthey, and Ekumah 1996). Even within the local-level district assemblies, which Rawlings permitted in 1988, only 9.1 percent were women (Pepera 1993).

Women’s representation improved little with transition. After the 1992 elections, women held only 3 of 24 council of state positions and 3 of 19 cabinet ministries, and these numbers remain similarly low today. Women won 8 percent of the legislative seats in 1992, and this increased only incrementally over the following elections: 9 percent in 1996, 10 percent in 2000, and 11 percent in 2004. Women’s district assembly representation also remains low at 12 percent.

Gains in feminist legislation since democratization have also been slow. In 1993, rape was more broadly defined as a criminal act, and jail time for rapists increased significantly. In 1994, legislation was passed to make Trokosi (a ritual servitude of girl children) and Female Genital Cutting illegal. Also in 1994, a criminal statute prohibiting wife beating was passed, yet some ambiguity remained since British common law, established during colonization, allowed for domestic abuse. Not until 2007, after years of protracted struggle between women’s organizations and the government, was a domestic violence bill passed to override common law. Women’s rights and political participation within the state improved only minimally with the onset of democratization, but women have gained more ground recently as the Ghanaian women’s movement has strengthened. Nonetheless, only domestic violence issues have been highlighted and attempts to transform political structures have not come to the fore.

El Salvador

Democratic transition. In 1980, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) formed to overthrow the elite-sponsored, military-dominated Salvadoran state. Although the FMLN leadership espoused a socialist ideology, most participants in their rebel army mobilized around ideologies of human rights and social justice rather than specific understandings of class conflict (Viterna 2006). During the ensuing civil war, the Salvadoran state responded to external pressures to democratize by drafting a new constitution in 1983, and by holding elections for a civilian president in 1984 and 1989. However, the military continued to control the state and commit human rights abuses, and the FMLN continued its militant assaults, until the United Nations brokered peace accords in 1992. These accords reestablished civilian control over the military and gave the FMLN status as a political party, but they left the 1983 constitution intact. The accords focused primarily on bringing peace and full political participation to the nation, leaving to the side many of the social justice issues that initially mobilized participants in the 1970s and 1980s. The democratic master frame that evolved was directly related to achieving and maintaining peace.

The 1994 elections were the first in which all political players, including the FMLN, participated, and therefore mark the moment of transition. Since the transition, the FMLN has become a powerful opposition party, but the ARENA party, which is closely tied to the former authoritarian government, has won all post-transition presidential elections and continues to receive support from large segments of the Salvadoran population. El Salvador’s negotiated transition brought peace and instituted formal democracy, but it left the prewar economic and political power base largely intact.

Women’s pretransition mobilizations. Salvadoran women’s activism increased exponentially in the 1970s, both in mixed-gender revolutionary organizations and in women-specific groups, such as motherhood and teachers organizations. Women also became extensively involved in the FMLN, comprising nearly one-third of the approximately 13,000 guerrillas and an estimated 80 percent of their civilian
supporters (Luciak 2001; Vázquez, Ibáñez, and Murguialday 1996). Although many women continued to perform traditionally “feminine” duties in the guerrilla camps, such as cooking and nursing, many others assumed more “masculine” duties, such as political education, intelligence, and combat (Montgomery 1995; Reif 1986; Ueltzen 1993). During the civil war, women’s organizations within the FMLN were largely concerned with mobilizing other women, soliciting funds abroad, and helping guerrillas with women-specific issues such as pregnancy (Silber and Viterna 2008). They accepted the socialist logic that class, not gender, was the central problem, and that women’s equality would come naturally with a socialist revolution.

**Political Parties.** Women’s posttransition gains in political parties have been disappointing. The ARENA platform largely espouses traditional female values (Cansino 2001), and the ARENA government has been consistently poor at integrating women into the presidential cabinet, although they did nominate a female vice-presidential candidate in the 2004 elections. Within the FMLN, women militants fought to establish a Women’s Secretariat and to secure a quota system in which at least 35 percent of all electoral candidates would be women. The quota system has not yet reached its 35 percent minimum level of office-holders, though, and the women’s division within the party structure has not yet been formally institutionalized, nor does it receive a regular budget (Luciak 2001). The women’s movement felt particularly abandoned by the FMLN in 1998, when a large majority of the party’s legislative representatives voted in favor of a constitutional amendment making abortion illegal, even when the life of the mother is at stake, and despite the women’s movement’s push to stop the passage of the amendment.  

**International Influences.** During the war, many women leaders in the FMLN were exiled, and their exposure to feminist ideas while living abroad made them increasingly aware of gender discrimination within the FMLN upon their return. Shortly after the peace accords, international financial support helped women’s organizations gain autonomy from the FMLN, and international conferences encouraged women’s feminist formation and collaboration (Silber and Viterna 2008). For example, during the sixth Feminist Encounter of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1992, Nicaraguan feminists cautioned Salvadoran women not to let the FMLN sideline their feminist struggles as theirs had been. Salvadoran women responded by forming a coalition called “Women ’94” (discussed below). Likewise, after the Fourth World Conference of the Woman in Beijing in 1995, women’s organizations pushed the Salvadoran government to create the Salvadoran Institute for Women’s Development (ISDEMU) and helped ISDEMU identify 10 areas where government policy could promote gender equality.

**Women’s Democratic Mobilizations.** After democratization, women’s groups that had formed under the FMLN separated from the party and evolved into self-supporting, feminist, nongovernmental organizations, while the women themselves often remained both party militants and members of feminist organizations. The women’s movement often framed its claims for political inclusion by arguing that women had proven their ability to be effective participants in all aspects of the revolutionary movement, and therefore women deserved an equal role in the democracy they had helped to create. In 1994, multiple women’s groups formed a coalition with the explicit goal of incorporating women into formal politics. Calling themselves “Women ’94,” they wrote a platform addressing women’s rights, publicized it, and succeeded in getting all party candidates to agree to its adoption. They also sought exceptional women who supported the platform to run for office, and they initiated a voter registration drive because an estimated 75 percent of unregistered voters were women (Saint Germaine 1997). Women’s coalition work continued for the 1997 elections but has since declined. This decline is in part due to frustrations that officials

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8 Prior to this amendment, abortion in El Salvador was legal if a doctor agreed that it was necessary for reasons of health.

9 The women-specific organizations in El Salvador, such as motherhood-based groups, largely declined or disbanded.
quickly forgot about the women’s platform after being elected, and in part due to continuing political divisions between feminist organizations, some of which carry over from divisions between wartime FMLN factions. These divisions have been amplified by the need to compete for increasingly scarce international funding (Silber and Viterna 2008).

Gendered state outcomes. Women gained only two additional legislative seats with the 1994 elections, or 10.7 percent of the total parliament. The 1997 elections saw an increase to 15.5 percent, but that number dropped to 9.5 and 10.7 percent in the 2000 and 2003 elections, respectively. The 2006 elections again saw an increase to 16.7 percent, but it remains to be seen whether this increase will be maintained over time. Of the 262 mayors in El Salvador, only 16 (6.1 percent) are women (COMURES n.d.). This is a decrease from 12.2 percent in 1994 (Cansino 2001). Although the FMLN has a quota, the women’s movement’s efforts to secure a quota at the national level have consistently failed.

Legislative policies have also been slow to change. The women’s movement wrote and pursued to implementation a family code that deals specifically with intrafamiliar violence and a new penal code that condemns sexual assault and workplace discrimination against women. Yet efforts to promote reproductive freedom, judicial reforms, and enforcement of existing laws have been largely unsuccessful. Likewise, under ARENA, ISDEMU’s focus has shifted almost exclusively to work against rape and domestic violence, leaving behind other issues such as women’s workplace rights and reproductive rights (Garcia Corral and Quintana 2000).

Summarizing the cases: Feminist Gains or Masculine Retrenchment?

As called for in our framework, we evaluated four new democratic states’ gendered changes by examining their constitutions, institutions, and women’s representation, as well as their receptivity to women’s demands. In South Africa and Argentina, feminist changes have occurred. New constitutions explicitly address issues of women’s subordination through the enforcement of gender quotas and the creation of institutions that effectively pursue just gendered practices. Women’s access to formal positions of political power is increasing, as demonstrated by their rapidly growing presence in national parliaments. And women’s civil society organizations are effectively using political power outside of conventional channels to win concessions from the state, even on highly controversial issues such as electoral quotas and reproductive rights.

By contrast, the Salvadoran and Ghanaian states remained highly masculine with democratic transition. Neither state constitution was revised to actively promote gender equality, no national-level quotas promote women’s participation, and the new women’s offices, dominated by the unfeminist political aspirations of the parties in power, do not effectively address issues of gendered justice. Women’s mobilizations in these two nations have had relatively few successes gaining state responses to their demands. They have been most successful at generating state actions for issues like domestic violence, where new regulations minimally impact what happens in private homes. In Ghana, even this was contentious. They have had much less success (or opportunity, in the case of Ghana) forwarding issues in which the state is more likely to have influence, such as reproductive rights and gender-specific protections within paid employment.

Discussion

Building from the existing literature, we argue that an analysis of four theoretical factors—the context of the transition, women’s pretransition mobilizations, political parties, and international influences—should allow scholars to explain a great deal of variation in the gendered outcomes of new democratic states. We do not expect one factor to generate feminist change on its own; rather, it is how these factors combine and jointly influence women’s mobilizations that matters. We expect this influence to take two forms: creating new political openings for affecting state institutions and policies, and constructing new political ideologies within which movements can frame feminist goals. In the remaining pages, we explore the effects of these factors in our four test cases, looking first at the individual factors, and then discussing their interrelated effects.
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. Gendered changes in the state apparatus are more likely to occur with democratic transition if the transition is welcomed by the large majority of the nation, and if it results in a relatively “complete” structural transformation of political power. Scholars often emphasize that “who wins” may be important for women’s political gains. We focus on party ideology below, but here we suggest that a new regime’s political ideology is less relevant than the complete dismissal of the old regime’s political institutions and ideologies.

In Ghana, the democratic transition transformed Rawlings from a dictator to a president, but it did not remove him or his regime from power. His PNDC tightly controlled the process of writing a new constitution and setting up new government institutions, limiting opportunities to change the state apparatus. In El Salvador, the ruling ARENA party, closely tied to the previous authoritarian regime, maintained extensive support within segments of the Salvadoran population. A democratic constitution had been written, and nominally democratic institutions established, well before democratization was actually achieved. Salvadoran feminists were mobilized and targeting the state at the moment of transition, but this mobilization did not result in foundational changes in the state structure, in large part because there was no formal opportunity to recreate state institutions.

Contrast this situation with South Africa and Argentina, where the large majority of the populace welcomed the transition, and the outgoing regime lost legitimacy among its citizenry and within the larger international community. As a result, most citizens embraced the opportunity to write new constitutions and rethink existing institutions. In addition, the outgoing regime had relatively little control over the construction of the new state, although this is truer of Argentina than of South Africa. Consequently, women in these nations found new political openings in which to participate in the construction of a new state apparatus.

Also of importance, transitions created new master frames that could constrain the effectiveness of women’s movement-specific frames. In South Africa and Argentina, these master frames were relatively easy to align with feminist ideologies. In South Africa, the stratification of society by the physical attribute of race had been broadly delegitimized, so women framed issues of gender equality as ending the stratification of society by the physical attribute of sex, and therefore a central component of overall efforts to purge the old ways. Similarly, in Argentina, women appropriated the anti-authoritarian and modernity discourse used by public actors during the transition to argue for women’s active participation within political institutions. The inclusion of women in politics, as ethical, non-hierarchical political players, was framed as a necessary step toward leaving behind the old authoritarian ways.

By comparison, women’s movements in Ghana and El Salvador had a much more difficult time molding new transitional ideologies into feminist frames. In Ghana, there was no autonomous women’s movement at the moment of transition, so there was no opportunity to utilize the transitional frame relating to political pride. In El Salvador, women were mobilized at the moment of transition, but they did not use the transitional ideology of peace to forward their goals, perhaps because women’s earlier participation in the rebel army would make attempts to appropriate the language of “peace” difficult. Clearly, the ideology of these particular democratic transitions, when combined with women’s earlier mobilization strategies, provided little inspiration for developing feminist frames that would resonate well with state actors and the larger society.

PRETRANSITION WOMEN’S MOBILIZATIONS. All of our cases demonstrate that the strategies and frames used by women’s posttransition movements were, to a large extent, shaped by women’s earlier mobilization patterns. Prior to the transition, South Africans had attempted to unite women (working within mixed-gender organizations) across racial and class divisions, and these coalition efforts continued with democratization. South African women also appeared to bring their confrontational pretransition strategies into the posttransition context when they stormed and halted the negotiation process, forcefully demanding their inclusion and creating a critical turning point for women’s gains with democratization. Posttransition women’s movements adopted much of the rhetoric from the earlier movement as well, tying questions of gender equality to earlier struggles for racial equality.
In Argentina, a feminist movement that did not target the state until late in the pretransition period was slow to begin placing demands on the new democratic regime. When women did begin to actively pursue feminist goals, they overcame their slow start by drawing on their previous coalition experience to unite women across class differences. They also strategically framed their posttransition demands by appropriating the language of the Madres, a pretransition movement that was much more visible and widely respected than their own had been. When feminists promoted the inclusion of women in state politics as “anti-authoritarian,” the example of the Madres—who were widely respected for promoting ethics and accountability in government—provided powerful symbolic support for their claims. Thus, the pretransition strategies of the Argentine Madres, who eschew the label “feminist” and have been criticized by feminists for reinforcing traditional notions of femininity, may paradoxically have helped feminist movements. The feminists’ anti-authoritarian frame was resonant in large part because the Madres had given “feminine” politics a distinct and valued place in public perception.

In El Salvador, women’s most visible form of pretransition mobilization was as revolutionaries in mixed-gender, mostly-masculine organizations like guerrilla camps. Such militant strategies were difficult to transform into peacetime actions. Nevertheless, Salvadoran women’s posttransition mobilization frames relied heavily on pretransition actions. They argued that just as women were needed and capable members of the revolutionary movement, so were they needed and capable members of democratic institutions. Especially within the FMLN party, women activists stressed that women had earned political equality through their previous actions.

Salvadoran frames were not as successful as those used in the previous two cases because, rather than challenging the masculine structure of the state, they sought women’s inclusion within the masculine structures. Salvadoran women’s earlier “gender bending” roles suggested that women were capable, but not necessarily needed, political actors. This contrasts with Argentinean feminists’ use of the Madres’s “feminine” mobilizing to legitimate their claims that women brought something unique and important to anti-authoritarian politics.

Participation in gender-bending roles may develop specific women’s political skills, as argued elsewhere, but ideologically speaking, these past roles do not appear to generate feminist frames that resonate with a broader society. Interestingly, the four nations in Latin America with high levels of women’s militant guerrilla participation in the recent past (Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua) are also the four nations that have seen the largest relative decline in regional rankings of women’s legislative representation between 1995 and 2005.

Finally, in Ghana, a poorly organized pretransition women’s movement that was subject to state co-optation provided few strategies or frames from which later women’s movements could draw.

**Political Parties.** When parties with leftist or socialist ideologies win power, the new states are expected to be more women-friendly than their non-leftist counterparts. Yet our analysis suggests that ideology may not be the central explanatory factor of party support for gender equity. The NDC in Ghana is considered a leftist party, yet it stifled movements for women’s emancipation. On the other hand, the Peronist party in Argentina, which is not easily classified as left or right, has been instrumental in promoting women’s political participation. In El Salvador, the leftist FMLN did not win executive power, but it has a strong presence in the national legislature. This socialist organization, though, has often rebuffed calls by women’s movements to support feminist legislation. Nor do we see the feminist movements in these nations using leftist political ideologies when framing their demands for inclusion. Only in South Africa, where the strong ANC has been instrumental in increasing women’s access to the state, does party ideology play out as expected. However, the ANC’s move toward gender equality was in direct response to demands from mobilized women. Because these demands were historically consistent with women’s past activism, and because they resonated well with the broader democratic ideology, women were able to secure gender-egalitarian changes within the political party as well as the state. Our analysis therefore confirms that support from a strong political party is necessary for women’s movements to gain access to the state. However,
this support is determined more by the strategies and frames available to women’s movements in targeting a party, rather than a party’s political ideology.

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES. International influences may help or hurt women’s mobilizations depending on the type of support offered and whether it occurs before or after democratic transitions. Four primary patterns emerged. First, women’s ideological linkages with the international community enhance feminist transformations with democracy, especially when local women can frame transnational feminist goals as logical extensions of their past localized activism. In each nation, feminist activists were routinely engaged with organizations outside their national borders, and the process of sharing ideas across borders was viewed by the activists as a central and positive component of the struggle for re-gendering masculine states. Women’s participation in international conferences provided critical moments for learning about feminist strategies and successes in other nations, and for forming coalitions with other organizations within their own borders. In South Africa, Argentina, and El Salvador, women living in exile learned about feminist activism in nations with similar situations of political instability and change. Clearly, international ideological affiliations have strengthened women’s movements in democratizing states.

However, when ideological exchanges are buttressed with financial support, the role of the international community becomes more complex. Our second pattern finds that donor funding during pretransition liberation struggles improved women’s movement strategies. When clear injustices existed within authoritarian countries, and citizens were working toward political transformation through civil strife, donors were willing to provide high levels of funding with few strings attached. Such unregulated funding was necessary because liberation activities were often illegal and highly dangerous, making it impossible for activists to account for the use of funds to their international donors. Moreover, international funds were directed toward one specific aim—liberation. In particular, women in liberation movements in South Africa and El Salvador benefited from generous, unconstrained international funding.

Yet once liberation movements end and democratization is implemented, donor agencies often become detrimental to women’s mobilizing. Our third pattern demonstrates that the amount of international funds available to women’s organizations, particularly those involved in liberation struggles, diminishes with democratization, and that remaining donors begin to specify how their money can be used. Women’s organizations’ continued financial dependence on international donor agencies posttransition has been cited by activists in El Salvador, Ghana, and to a lesser extent South Africa, for constraining agendas and increasing competition between women’s groups. As a result, local innovation may be stifled and coalition work may become increasingly difficult.10

The fact that most Argentinean women’s organizations eschew international funding may help explain how they have continued their historical legacy of working in coalitions and developed innovative, locally-grounded ideas, such as the early promotion of women candidates through electoral quotas.

Finally, regional organizations may support women’s mobilizations. The South African Development Community (SADC) may have helped create women-friendly state changes in South Africa by encouraging all member states to place women in a minimum of 30 percent (now increased to 50 percent) of the seats in national legislatures. We believe it is no coincidence that the democratic countries within the SADC, including Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Seychelles, have some of the highest rates of women’s legislative representation in the world.

SUMMARY. These conclusions suggest that, of the four factors identified in the literature, it is the relationship between two of them—the context of the transition and women’s previous mobilizations—that best explains gendered state outcomes with democratization. The context of the transition determines which political open-

10 The one positive exception is Ghana, where donor agencies have only recently focused on coalition building. Although it is too early to fully understand the effects of this coalition work, initial analyses suggest that Ghanaian women may be gaining effectiveness in targeting the state as a result.
ings and frames are available to posttransition women’s movements, while the legacy of previous mobilizations constrains the ability of women’s movements to take advantage of those new openings and frames.

In South Africa and Argentina, democratic transitions were complete. Women’s movements therefore had formal political openings within which to negotiate more gender-equitable policies and institutions, and they generated strong coalitions in time to take advantage of these formal openings. Such effective and timely coalition building occurred, we argue, because earlier women’s movements had already experimented with coalition building—coalition building had become a “tool” that posttransition women’s movements could pull from their tactical repertoire. Likewise, the master frames accompanying the South African and Argentine transitions, “liberation” and “anti-authoritarianism,” easily aligned with feminist goals, especially because feminists could draw on women’s past activism to legitimate their claims. South African women could legitimately call for women’s liberation because they had spent decades fighting a battle for racial liberation. Argentinean feminists could legitimately argue that women’s politics is antithetical to authoritarianism because they strategically appropriated the symbol of the Madres as staunchly ethical, non-hierarchical political players. Appropriating these democratic master frames was key to the success of the women’s movements because the complete transition ensured that these frames would resonate well with key political actors and the general populace.

By contrast, transitions in Ghana and El Salvador were incomplete, and a lack of real openings for institutional change constrained women’s opportunities to influence the state. In El Salvador, women were mobilized at the moment of transition, and after participating in international conferences together, they initiated a strong women’s coalition to target the state. However, without concrete opportunities to reshape state institutions, and without past coalition-building experiences from which to draw, the coalition was routinely frustrated in achieving its goals. Old divisions between FMLN factions, class groups, and party lines soon reemerged. Salvadoran women did utilize their past revolutionary activism to frame their post-transition demands, but because these past actions were often militant, they did not align well with the master frame of “peace.” Meanwhile, in Ghana, strong women’s movements did not develop until nearly eight years after the transition, so women could neither draw on past movement strategies nor use democratic master frames to their benefit.

Political parties and international influences also play an important role in shaping the success of women’s movements under new democratic states, but our four cases suggest these influences are secondary to the interrelationship of democratic transitions and pretransition mobilization patterns. Political parties are a necessary vehicle for carrying women’s demands to the state, but we find that the type of vehicle (i.e., party ideology) matters less than how well the vehicle is driven by women’s mobilizations. In addition, international ideological exchanges are certainly beneficial, but whether feminist goals framed in the exterior resonate at the local level depends on how well local women situate these goals as logical extensions of their past activism and critical components of the overall democratic transition.

CONCLUSION

What happens to the political institutionalization of gender when a state is transformed by democratic transition? Most scholars conclude that democratization does little for women’s political rights and representation. We suggest that a more fruitful assessment of the relationship between democratization and women’s political power requires a systematic comparative analysis that documents variation across cases, and then helps scholars develop explanations for that variation. To this end, we have created a framework that allows for such systematic, cross-national comparisons.

By applying our framework to four test cases, we develop a conjunctural explanation for how democratization affects gender equity within states. Previous studies have established that strong women’s mobilizations are central for creating state-level changes. We extend these studies by arguing that women’s movements most effectively target new democracies when transitions are complete, when women’s movements develop cohesive coalitions, when the ideology behind the transition (rather than the
ideology of the winning regime) aligns easily with feminist frames, and when women’s past activism legitimates present-day feminist demands. We also raise doubts about existing conclusions in the literature, including the importance of left party ideology, international support, and a legacy of “gender-bending” activism. Finally, we develop a framework that we hope others will use to test and extend our proposed explanations for state variations, both by examining gendered state changes in additional cases of democratization, and by evaluating how other arenas connected to the state, such as civil society, the economy, education, and the family, may contribute to gendered outcomes with democratization.

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