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Earnings inequality in urban China has grown rapidly the past two decades. During the same period, the composition of the urban labor force has been dramatically altered by three large-scale structural changes: (1) the expansion of tertiary education; (2) the decline of state sector employment; and (3) a surge in rural-to-urban migration. In this article, I examine how these institutional and demographic shifts have shaped the recent upswing in earnings inequality. Based on data from two nationally representative surveys, I use variance function regressions to decompose the growth in earnings inequality from 1996 to 2010 into four components: changes in between-group earnings gaps, changes in within-group earnings variation, and two types of composition effects (distribution effect and allocation effect). I also employ counterfactual simulations to evaluate the utility of different explanations. Results show that nearly half of the growth in earnings inequality during this period is due to increases in returns to education, and that the other half can be attributed to compositional changes in the labor force. The composition effects stem chiefly from the expansion of tertiary education and the shrinkage of state sector employment.

Since its beginning in 1978, China’s market-oriented reform has brought not only unprecedented economic growth but also a tremendous increase in economic inequality. In 1980, the Gini coefficient for family income in China was around 0.3 (UNU-WIDER 2008), but now it has reached the alarming level of 0.55 (Xie and Zhou 2014), a magnitude that places China among the most unequal societies in the world. While it is widely recognized that economic inequality in China is marked by a large rural-urban gap in industrial development (Knight and Song 1999; Sicular et al. 2007; Yang and Zhou 1999), recent...
survey data indicate that inequality within urban areas has also widened considerably over the past two decades (Jansen and Wu 2012; Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013). As shown in figure 1, the Gini coefficient for individual earnings climbed from 0.40 in 1996 to 0.49 in 2010. The pace of this growth is striking when we consider that it took 27 years for the corresponding measure in the United States to increase by the same proportion: from 0.33 in 1979 to 0.41 in 2006 (McCall and Percheski 2010).

What are the sources of the rising inequality in urban China? How has the change in aggregate inequality been driven by changes in individual and contextual determinants of earnings? Previous research has discussed three major mechanisms: (1) widening regional disparities (e.g., Hauser and Xie 2005); (2) increasing returns to education (e.g., Jansen and Wu 2012; Zhao and Zhou 2002); and (3) growing residual inequality (e.g., Hauser and Xie 2005; Meng, Shen, and Xue 2013). Few studies, however, have explicitly examined the role of changing labor-force structure in the evolution of earnings inequality in China. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the composition of the urban labor force has been dramatically altered by three large-scale structural changes: (1) the expansion of tertiary education; (2) the decline of state sector employment; and (3) a surge in rural-to-urban migration. This article investigates whether, to what extent, and in what ways these institutional and demographic shifts have shaped the recent upswing of earnings inequality in urban China.

Figure 1. Earnings inequality among working population in urban China, 1996–2010

Note: Data are from the 1996 survey of “Life History and Social Changes in Contemporary China” (LHSCCC) and five waves of the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) from 2003 to 2010. Assuming the log-normality of earnings distribution, the Gini coefficients were calculated using the parametric formula \( G = 2\Phi\left(\sqrt{V/2}\right) - 1 \), where \( V \) is the variance of log earnings and \( \Phi \) is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution (see Allison 1978, 874).
To accomplish this goal, I capitalize on variance function regressions (Western and Bloome 2009) to decompose the change in earnings inequality from 1996 to 2010 into four components: changes in between-group earnings gaps, changes in within-group earnings variation, and two types of composition effects. I also use counterfactual simulations to adjudicate between the competing explanations for the rise of inequality. Results show that nearly half of the growth in earnings inequality during this period is due to increases in returns to education, and that the other half can be attributed to compositional changes in the labor force. The composition effects result chiefly from changes in educational distribution and in sectoral structure, which have in turn been driven by the expansion of tertiary education and the shrinkage of state sector employment.

Although focusing on the context of urban China, the present study sheds light on the evolution of earnings inequality both in other developing countries and in other post-socialist states. On the one hand, a sizable body of research—in both sociology and economics—has investigated the linkage between educational distribution and aggregate inequality in earnings (Jacobs 1985; Knight and Sabot 1983; Lam and Levison 1992; Nielsen and Alderson 1997). It might be supposed that an expansion in college education would necessarily reduce the level of inequality in a developing country. However, researchers have concurred that an increase in the supply of highly educated workers can actually drive up aggregate inequality through a more dispersed educational distribution, unless this effect is offset by a drop in returns to education. My analyses lend empirical support to this proposition by showing a substantial contribution of college expansion to the rise of inequality in urban China. On the other hand, like China, the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have also downsized their state sectors through various forms of privatization, a process that has also been related to observed increases in economic inequality. For example, based on cross-national comparisons, Bandelj and Mahutga (2010) report a positive effect of the degree of privatization on the level of income inequality in CEE. By analyzing trends from micro-level data, the present study not only demonstrates this link in China, but, as we will see, also measures the impact of state sector downsizing on earnings inequality over the past decade and a half.

Existing Explanations

In the course of China’s post-socialist transition, the rise of earnings inequality has been propelled by a wide array of social, economic, and demographic processes. Here, I review three mechanisms that have been extensively discussed in the literature: widening regional disparities, increasing returns to education, and growing residual inequality.

Widening Regional Disparities

Economic inequality in China has long been characterized by its vast regional disparities. Back in the Mao era, different regions already varied greatly in their pace
of industrialization (Kanbur and Zhang 2005). During earlier years of the market-oriented reform, regional inequality slightly narrowed; yet, it widened again over the 1990s, due mainly to a persistent gap in growth rates between the coastal and the inland provinces (Wan 2007). In fact, at the outset of the economic reform, a number of coastal cities (known as Special Economic Zones) were granted preferential policies, such as tax breaks and duty exemptions, to attract both domestic and foreign investments. Thanks to these policies, coastal provinces such as Guangdong immediately enjoyed rapid growth in both foreign direct investments (FDI) and exports. These initial benefits, combined with economies of scale, soon translated into cumulative advantages (Démurger et al. 2002; Golley 2002). The coastal provinces, as a result, sustained higher growth rates than the inland provinces for a long time, leading to an ever-increasing coastal-inland divide. Inequality in economic development caused differentiation in personal earnings. As Xie and Hannum (1996) have shown, by 1988 the most influential predictor of earned income in urban China was not individual attributes but rather regional indicators. In a follow-up study, Hauser and Xie (2005) report that the influence of regional differences on earnings determination increased from 1988 to 1995. While more recent trends remain unclear, there is strong evidence that regional disparities persisted, if not widened, into the 2000s. Using the 1 percent population sample survey of 2005, Zhang and Wu (2010) find that 41 percent of the total variation in earnings can be explained by between-county differences.

To the extent that regional gaps have widened during the period under investigation, this article aims to identify how much of the observed rise in earnings inequality is attributable to increased regional gaps. To accomplish this goal, I base my counterfactual analyses on multiple regressions that control for educational attainment and other individual attributes. This procedure helps eliminate the influence of potentially confounding factors, such as increasing returns to education, a process that would exacerbate regional inequality if human capital were distributed unevenly across regions.

**Increasing Returns to Education**

The growth in earnings inequality may also be explained by increasing returns to education. For earlier years of China’s economic reform, returns to schooling have been found to be extremely low, which has been attributed largely to the absence of markets (Peng 1992; Walder 1990; Whyte and Parish 1985; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhao and Zhou 2002). Nonetheless, the gradual expansion of markets has led theorists to predict an increase in the importance of human capital in the long term (Cao and Nee 2000; Nee 1989, 1991, 1996). This prediction has been widely supported by subsequent empirical studies (Bian and Logan 1996; Hauser and Xie 2005; Wu and Xie 2003; Zhou 2000). For instance, Hauser and Xie (2005) find that net returns to schooling in urban China almost doubled from 1988 to 1995. Jansen and Wu (2012) also demonstrate a steady increase in returns to schooling over the reform period: “one additional year of schooling translated into a 2 percent net increase in income in 1978, 3.5 percent in 1985, 4.5 percent in 1990, 5.5 percent in 1995, 6.6 percent in 2000, and
7.7 percent in 2005.” However, in 1999, the Chinese government launched a college expansion project that has significantly raised college enrollments over the following years. As a result, the supply of college-educated workers has increased rapidly, which may have slowed the growth in returns to education (Meng, Shen, and Xue 2013).

How would an increase in returns to education influence the size of earnings inequality? Xie and Hannum (1996) show that, holding constant the marginal distribution of human capital, an increase in returns to schooling generally drives up total inequality. Thus, I expect the rise of inequality during the study period to be driven partly by an increase in returns to education, although the size of this increase since the early 2000s may have been moderated by an expanding supply of college-educated workers. As with changing regional gaps, the impact of changing returns to education will be assessed by counterfactual analyses.

**Growing Residual Inequality**

Beyond changes in observed determinants of earnings, another explanation for the rise of earnings inequality is growing residual variation. Labor economists studying inequality in the United States have found that the rise of wage inequality in the 1970s and 1980s was due primarily to an increased residual variance of earnings after individual-level predictors such as schooling, experience, and demographic attributes are factored in (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993).

This finding has been closely linked to the theory of “skill-biased technological change” (henceforth SBTC), which posits that the growth in residual inequality is mainly a result of rising returns to unobserved skills among workers with the same observed characteristics (Acemoglu 2002). Similarly, the rise of earnings inequality in urban China from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s has also been related to an increase in residual variation (Hauser and Xie 2005).

While traditional regression-based analyses assume homoscedasticity and thus regard residual variance as uniform among all individuals, recent research on inequality has begun to address heterogeneity in residual variance across population subgroups (Lemieux 2006; Western and Bloome 2009). When this heterogeneity is taken into account, the change in total residual inequality over a time period consists of two components: one represents changes in residual inequality among people in the same observed groups, and the other represents the effect of changing group proportions. Indeed, Lemieux (2006) challenges the SBTC explanation by showing that the growth of residual inequality in the United States during the 1990s was propelled mainly by changes in the proportion of workers in different experience-education cells rather than by changes in within-cell variation. In this study, I also separate out these two drivers of residual inequality by modeling sectoral differences in residual variation in China. Specifically, I consider changes in within-sector variation as essential changes in residual inequality, and use allocation effect to denote the impact on residual inequality of changes in sectoral composition. For example, if inequality is greater in the private sector than in the state sector, a shift in the workforce from the state sector to the private sector can amplify the level of overall inequality through an allocation effect.
A Missing Link: Composition Effects

Among the above explanations, widening regional disparities and increasing returns to education can be construed as changing earnings gaps between population subgroups (in these cases, based on region and education), whereas growing residual inequality reflects increases in within-group variation. If the composition of the labor force is fixed, all sources of change in overall inequality can be subsumed under these two categories. Nonetheless, when group proportions are time-varying, trends in aggregate inequality may also be driven by composition effects. In fact, since the mid-1990s, the composition of the labor force in urban China has been dramatically reshaped by three large-scale socio-economic changes: (1) the expansion of tertiary education; (2) the decline of state sector employment; and (3) a surge in rural-to-urban migration (for more details, see figure S1 in the supplementary material online). Below, I discuss how these compositional shifts may have contributed to the rise of earnings inequality during the past two decades.

Expansion of Tertiary Education

In 1999, as noted above, the Chinese government instituted a college expansion policy that has significantly enlarged the pool of college-educated workers over the ensuing years. The purpose of this policy was twofold. First, it was aimed to increase the supply of skilled labor for sustaining China’s rapid economic growth. Second, the extension of schooling for the youth was designed as a strategy to alleviate the pressure of re-employment for those being laid off during the reform of state-owned enterprises (see the next subsection). Coupled with cohort replacement, the expansion of higher education has, since 2003, substantially changed the educational distribution among the urban workforce. In 2003, those who had finished at least a three-year college constituted only 9.1 percent of the urban population (aged 6+); but by 2010, this portion had more than doubled, to 21.5 percent (see figure S1).

What is the implication of such a compositional shift for earnings inequality? Before the college expansion, the educational distribution among urban workers was highly concentrated at the levels of junior and senior high school, suggesting a relatively homogeneous labor force in terms of observed skills. However, as more youths were provided the opportunity of obtaining a college degree, cohort replacement has resulted in a more dispersed educational distribution, which, everything else being equal, should have inflated earnings inequality in the aggregate. Thus, we would expect that the rise of earnings inequality in urban China can be attributed partly to changes in educational distribution.

Shrinkage of State Sector Employment

As with other post-socialist countries, one central aspect of China’s economic transition has been the decline of state sector employment. Although the economic reform in urban China started as early as 1984, it was concentrated in the goods market during its first decade. In the early 1990s, the vast majority of
urban workers were still employed in state-owned enterprises (henceforth SOE), the prototypical work unit in pre-reform urban China. By 1994, however, most of the SOEs had excessive employment and nearly half were incurring losses, severely hindering China’s economic development (Cao, Qian, and Weingast 2003). To remedy this problem, the Chinese government has, since 1995, been reforming and downsizing state-owned enterprises under the policy of “grasp the large and let go the small.” On the one hand, the central government began to merge and restructure large SOEs, thereby consolidating its control over certain strategically vital industries, such as power generation, telecommunications, and raw materials. On the other hand, at the local level, small SOEs were largely privatized, and workers in medium-sized SOEs were massively laid off. As a result, since the mid-1990s, tens of millions of former SOE employees have been pushed into the private sector. Among new entrants to the labor market, the share of state sector employment has also dwindled. The rise in aggregate inequality has caused a steady decline in state sector employment: in 1996, 64 percent of the urban workers were employed in the state sector, but by 2010 this figure had reduced to 27 percent (see figure S1).

It is widely acknowledged that SOE reform has been successful in vitalizing China’s market economy. At the same time, however, the massive transfer of workers from the state sector to the private sector may have exacerbated the country’s earnings distribution. Before the reform, the majority of urban workers were employed by the state with a centrally planned wage system, which imposed a highly compressed earnings distribution. Earnings variation within the state sector was driven primarily by differences in bonus income, which depended heavily on the profitability of particular work units (Wu 2002; Xie and Wu 2008). Overall, earnings inequality was substantially lower in the state sector than in the private sector, partly because observed and unobserved skills were less rewarded by the state, and partly because the paychecks of state employees were less sensitive to the ebb and flow of the market. This pattern, in fact, has been fairly stable over time. Today’s SOEs in China continue to benefit from sheltered markets, implicit government subsidies, and politically favored bank loans. By shielding the SOEs from market competition, these institutional protections have sustained a relatively low dispersion of earnings across the state sector. Meanwhile, the downsizing of SOEs has pushed tens of millions of workers into the private sector, where their heterogeneity in ability and skills is more likely to translate into different rates of pay. Therefore, given that earnings inequality is lower in the state sector than in the private sector, we would expect that the massive transfer of workers from the state sector to the private sector has contributed to the rise in aggregate inequality.

**Rural-to-Urban Migration**

In the pre-reform era, rural-urban migration in China was severely restricted by the Chinese household registration system, that is, *hukou*, a state institution established to limit population mobility. Since 1978, the market reform has moderately eased the restriction on temporary migration, but without a
corresponding relaxation of the hukou system. This has resulted in a “floating population” of urban dwellers with rural hukou status (Wu and Treiman 2004). The size of this floating population was relatively small, if not negligible, until the early 1990s. Since then, China’s economic growth has been increasingly propelled by export-oriented manufacturing sectors and government-sponsored infrastructure projects, which have significantly raised the demand for young and low-skilled workers in many urban centers. The surge of demand for cheap labor has attracted wave after wave of young and poorly educated migrants from the rural inland. As a result, the volume of rural migrants residing in urban centers has increased tremendously over the past two decades. According to Meng, Shen, and Xue (2013), the number of rural-urban migrant workers was about 39 million in 1997, but by 2009 the size had increased to 145 million, constituting more than a quarter of the urban labor force.

Despite their growing contribution to the economic boom in urban areas, it remains extremely difficult for these rural migrants to acquire a local hukou in the cities where they work. As noted by Chan and Buckingham (2008), in such large cities as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, which are the major destinations of recent waves of rural-urban migrants, the entry requirements for obtaining a local hukou are highly prohibitive and clearly beyond the reach of most migrant workers. The lack of local hukou status is perhaps the greatest disadvantage for this ever-increasing floating population, because hukou status was and still is a very strong institutional constraint that shapes one’s social and economic well-being in urban China (Treiman 2012; Wu and Treiman 2004, 2007). Not only is local hukou status a prerequisite for such social welfare benefits as health care and unemployment insurance, but migrant workers without a local hukou also suffer from a range of unfair treatments in the workplace, such as wage arrears and denial of payments.

Given the persistent power of hukou in shaping one’s economic well-being, how has the recent upsurge in rural-to-urban migration affected earnings inequality in urban China? Meng and Zhang (2001) have shown that in the 1990s, migrant workers without an urban hukou were subject to a wage penalty in the urban labor market. It is unclear, however, whether such a wage gap narrowed or widened into the 2000s, and whether the wage gap necessarily translated into an earnings gap between the two groups (given that migrant workers typically work longer hours and more days than local urban workers). Nonetheless, to the extent that an earnings gap exists across the hukou axis, the surge in rural-to-urban migration should have subjected a larger share of the workforce to an earnings penalty, thereby aggravating the level of overall inequality.

Methods

$R^2$-Based Methods

In this study, I use the variance of log earnings to gauge the size of earnings inequality. The variance measure is particularly useful for studying trends in inequality because it can be easily decomposed into between-group and within-group components.
using ANOVA (see Mouw and Kalleberg 2010). The ratio of the between-group component to the total variance provides an intuitive measure for the between-group contribution to total inequality, a measure that is equivalent to the \( R^2 \) in a linear regression of log earnings on group dummies. To examine temporal trends in the size of between-group contribution, one may simply track changes in this ratio over time. For example, Kim and Sakamoto (2008) used the time series of occupation \( R^2 \) to assess the relative importance of between-occupation and within-occupation inequality in explaining the rise of wage inequality in the United States. Moreover, in a regression model that controls for additional covariates, we can evaluate the net contribution of a particular set of variables using incremental or partial \( R^2 \)s (see Kim and Sakamoto 2008; Meng, Shen, and Xue 2013). As a preliminary analysis, I also use partial \( R^2 \) to detect temporal variations in the importance of different earnings determinants.

This approach, however, is prone to conflate changes in population composition with real changes in between-group disparities and within-group variation. To see this, consider a hypothetical population consisting of only two groups: college graduates and high school graduates. Assume that the average gap in log earnings between the two groups is fixed, and that the within-group variation among college graduates is greater than that among high school graduates. Now imagine an education expansion that enlarges the share of college graduates from 10 to 50 percent. In this case, earnings inequality will increase, via neither increased returns to education nor increased within-group inequality, but via a change in population composition. Specifically, the impacts of this compositional shift are twofold. On the one hand, given an earnings premium for college graduates, a more balanced distribution of the two groups will automatically inflate the overall variance. On the other hand, given that within-group inequality is higher among college graduates than among high school graduates, an increased share of the former will also raise the level of total inequality. The \( R^2 \) measure, however, may drift in either direction without a clear interpretation.

### Variance Function Regressions and Decomposing Trends in Inequality

My analytical focus is to disentangle different sources of the observed rise in earnings inequality, thus adjudicating between the competing explanations discussed in the preceding sections. To achieve this goal, I decompose the change in the variance of log earnings based on variance function regressions (Western and Bloome 2009), a technique that allows both the mean and the variance of log earnings to depend on a set of explanatory variables.

To sketch this approach, let us denote by \( Y_t \) the dependent variable, log earnings, at time \( t \). Meanwhile, denote by \( X_t \) and \( Z_t \) two sets of independent variables that predict the mean and variance of log earnings, respectively. We then jointly estimate the conditional mean and the conditional variance of log earnings as linear functions of \( X_t \) and log-linear functions of \( Z_t \), yielding two fitted models:

\[
\hat{E}(Y_t|X_t) = \hat{\beta}_t X_t, \quad \hat{\text{Var}}(Y_t|Z_t) = \exp(\hat{\lambda}_t Z_t),
\]
where $\hat{\beta}_t$ and $\hat{\lambda}_t$ represent estimated coefficients of $X_t$ and $Z_t$. As a result, the fitted total variance of log earnings can be written as

$$\hat{V}_t = \text{Var} \left[ \hat{E}(Y_t|X_t) \right] + \hat{E} \left[ \text{Var}(Y_t|Z_t) \right] = \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_t X_t \right) + \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_t Z_t \right) \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

This equation can be seen as a parametric analog of ANOVA, with the first component corresponding to between-group inequality and the second component within-group inequality. Accordingly, the change in total inequality from time $t$ to another time point $t'$ ($t < t'$) can be written as

$$\hat{V}_{t'} - \hat{V}_t = \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_t X_t \right) - \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_{t'} X_{t'} \right) + \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_t Z_t \right) \right] - \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{t'} Z_{t'} \right) \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where the first contrast, $\text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_t X_t \right) - \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_{t'} X_{t'} \right)$, measures the change in between-group inequality, and the second contrast, $\hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_t Z_t \right) \right] - \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{t'} Z_{t'} \right) \right]$, measures the change in within-group inequality. These two parts can be further decomposed to separate the effects of changing coefficients ($\beta$ and $\lambda$) from those of changing distributions of $X$ and $Z$. Specifically, equation (2) can be expanded as

$$\hat{V}_{t'} - \hat{V}_t = \hat{\delta}_B + \hat{\delta}_D + \hat{\delta}_W + \hat{\delta}_A,$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

with

$$\hat{\delta}_B = \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_t X_t \right) - \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_{t'} X_{t'} \right)$$

$$\hat{\delta}_D = \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_t X_t \right) - \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_{t'} X_{t'} \right)$$

$$\hat{\delta}_W = \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_t Z_t \right) \right] - \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{t'} Z_{t'} \right) \right]$$

$$\hat{\delta}_A = \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_t Z_t \right) \right] - \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{t'} Z_{t'} \right) \right].$$
In this decomposition, the first term, $\delta_B$, measures the change in between-group earnings gaps. For example, if region is the only predictor of earnings, then $\delta_B$ represents the impact of widening (if $\delta_B > 0$) or narrowing (if $\delta_B < 0$) regional gaps on total inequality. The second term, $\delta_D$, gauges the change in between-group inequality due to changes in population composition. Recent research on the US labor market has revealed a polarization of the occupational structure, that is, growing employment in both high- and low-paying occupations and hollowing out of the middle (Massey and Hirst 1998; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010). Such compositional changes would drive up overall inequality even if between-occupation differences in average earnings were fixed. For this reason, I refer to $\delta_D$ as distribution effect. Clearly, changes in between-group gaps ($\delta_B$) and the distribution effect ($\delta_D$) together constitute the total change in between-group inequality ($\delta_B + \delta_D$). The third term, $\delta_W$, characterizes the change in within-group variation among people with the same observed characteristics. In the economics literature, this component is intimately connected with the theory of SBTC, which stresses the role of increasing returns to skills (often unobserved) in the growth of residual inequality. The last term, $\delta_A$, identifies the change in within-group inequality due to changes in population composition. As discussed in the preceding section, the massive transfer of workers from the state sector to the private sector in urban China may have raised overall inequality as a result of unequal residual variations between the two sectors—even if the amounts of within-sector inequality stayed unchanged over time. Hence, I term $\delta_A$ allocation effect. The separation of the allocation effect from $\delta_W$ enables us to distinguish the impacts of compositional shifts in the labor force from more inherent changes in residual inequality. The structure of this four-component decomposition is shown concisely in table 1.

Note that the above decomposition is not algebraically unique. In equation (3), the difference between $V_t'$ and $V_t$ is decomposed in a way that changes in coefficients happen first and changes in population composition come second. Reversing this order yields an alternative decomposition. Below, I use type I decomposition to mean equation (3) and call the alternative type II decomposition.

**Counterfactual Analysis**

Results from variance function regressions can be used to construct counterfactual levels of inequality, thus enabling us to assess the utility of competing

### Table 1. Four-Component Decomposition of the Change in Inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-compositional changes ($\delta_B + \delta_W$)</th>
<th>Changes in between-group/explained inequality ($\delta_B + \delta_W$)</th>
<th>Changes in within-group/residual inequality ($\delta_W + \delta_A$)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compositional changes ($\delta_D + \delta_A$)</td>
<td>Distribution effect ($\delta_D$)</td>
<td>Allocation effect ($\delta_A$)</td>
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explanations (Western and Bloome 2009). For example, to evaluate the effect of changing returns to education, we can calculate the following counterfactual:

\[
\hat{V}_{t'}^{\beta_{edu}} = \text{Var} \left( \hat{\beta}_{edu}^{t'} X_{edu}^{t'} + \hat{\beta}_{edu}^t X_{edu}^t \right) + \hat{E} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{edu}^{t'} Z_{edu}^{t'} \right) \right],
\]

(4)

where \(\beta_{edu}^{t'}\) denotes the coefficient (or a set of coefficients) for education, and \(\beta_{edu}^t\) denotes the coefficients for all other predictors. Equation (4) gauges the level of inequality that would have been observed at time \(t'\) had returns to education stayed at the level of time \(t\). Thus, the difference between \(\hat{V}_{t'}^{\beta_{edu}}\) and \(\hat{V}_{t'}^{\beta_{edu}}\) identifies the contribution of changing returns to education to the change in overall inequality from \(t\) to \(t'\).

To assess the impact of a compositional shift, we can reweight the observed data at time \(t'\) to make the marginal distribution of the corresponding variable identical to that at time \(t\) (see Lemieux 2006). For instance, to gauge the effect of college expansion, we can fix the marginal distribution of educational attainment at time \(t\) by appropriately down-weighting college graduates and up-weighting others in the sample at time \(t'\), that is,

\[
\hat{V}_{t'}^{\pi_{edu}^t} = \text{Var}_{\pi_{edu}^t} \left( \hat{\beta}_{edu}^{t'} X_{edu}^{t'} \right) + \hat{E}_{\pi_{edu}^t} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{edu}^{t'} Z_{edu}^{t'} \right) \right],
\]

(5)

where \(\pi_{edu}^t\) denotes the educational distribution at time \(t\), and its appearance as subscript means that corresponding weights are used to calculate the variance and the expectation. The composition effect of changing educational distribution is thus identified by the difference between \(\hat{V}_{t'}^{\pi_{edu}^t}\) and \(\hat{V}_{t'}^{\pi_{edu}^t}\):

\[
\hat{V}_{t'}^{\pi_{edu}^t} - \hat{V}_{t'}^{\pi_{edu}^t} = \text{Var}_{\pi_{edu}^t} \left( \hat{\beta}_{edu}^{t'} X_{edu}^{t'} \right) - \text{Var}_{\pi_{edu}^t} \left( \hat{\beta}_{edu}^{t'} X_{edu}^{t'} \right) + \hat{E}_{\pi_{edu}^t} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{edu}^{t'} Z_{edu}^{t'} \right) \right] - \hat{E}_{\pi_{edu}^t} \left[ \exp \left( \hat{\lambda}_{edu}^{t'} Z_{edu}^{t'} \right) \right].
\]

The above expression reveals that the composition effect consists of two parts, representing changes in between-group and within-group inequalities. Hence, the first part corresponds to the distribution effect, and the second part corresponds to the allocation effect.

While the above illustrations are for the variable of education, the same techniques can be employed to gauge the effects of changes in other determinants of earnings. Table 2 shows how the competing explanations discussed earlier will be examined by counterfactual analysis. For example, I will assess the allocation effect of state sector shrinkage by reweighting the 2010 data such that the sectoral composition equals that in 1996. However, since the educational
distribution may systematically differ across sectors, the reweighting method is unable to manipulate the marginal distribution of one variable without changing that of the other. Therefore, in the following analysis, I also examine the combined effects of changing educational and sectoral compositions by fixing their joint distributions at the 1996 level.

Data

I use data from two nationally representative sample surveys: the 1996 survey of “Life History and Social Changes in Contemporary China” (henceforth LHSCCC 1996) and the 2010 wave of the Chinese General Social Survey (henceforth CGSS 2010). Although these two surveys have different names, their data are highly comparable for my trend analysis. First, both surveys used a multi-stage stratified sampling design under which one adult was randomly selected from each sampled household (Li and Wang 2012; Treiman and Walder 1998). Second, in both surveys, the fieldwork was implemented by the same organization—the Department of Sociology at Renmin University of China. Moreover, the two surveys adopted the same rule to demarcate urban and rural populations—namely, whether the sampled household belonged to a neighborhood committee (urban) or a village committee (rural)—which ensures that the two urban samples are consistent in their coverage.

While CGSS 2010 collected data from all 31 provinces of mainland China, the sampling frame of LHSCCC 1996 did not include Tibet. To maintain the comparability of labor markets over time, I excluded Tibet from the CGSS 2010 data as well (step 1: \( N_{1996} = 3,087, N_{2010} = 7,081 \)). Since Tibet represents only 0.2 percent of the Chinese population (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011), its exclusion is unlikely to weaken the representativeness of the data. To assess earnings inequality among the economically active population, I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competing explanations</th>
<th>Parameters to be fixed at the 1996 level</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widening regional disparities</td>
<td>( \beta_{\text{region}} )</td>
<td>Changes in between-group gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing returns to education</td>
<td>( \beta_{\text{edu}} )</td>
<td>Changes in between-group gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing residual inequality</td>
<td>( \lambda )</td>
<td>Changes in within-group variation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of tertiary education</td>
<td>( \pi_{\text{edu}} )</td>
<td>Distribution effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrinkage of state sector employment</td>
<td>( \pi_{\text{sector}} )</td>
<td>Allocation effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-to-urban migration</td>
<td>( \pi_{\text{hukou}} )</td>
<td>Distribution effect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( \pi_{\text{edu}}, \pi_{\text{sector}}, \) and \( \pi_{\text{hukou}} \) denote the population distribution respectively by educational attainment, by sector of employment, and by hukou status. In this article, hukou status is used to distinguish between permanent urban residents and rural-urban migrants in urban China.
further restricted both samples to those who were between ages 20 and 69 and gainfully employed with annual earnings greater than 100,1996 Yuan (step 2: \( N_{1996} = 2,024, N_{2010} = 3,050 \)). After eliminating a small number of respondents with missing covariates, we have 2,019 individual workers from LHSCCC 1996 and 3,040 from CGSS 2010.

The dependent variable, earnings, refers to the total amount of earned income, including wages and salaries, bonuses, and profits from private businesses. Earnings in 1996 are inflation-adjusted to 2010 Yuan based on official CPI rates (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). To adjudicate between the competing explanations for the rise of inequality, I use the following explanatory variables: province, level of education, sector of employment, and hukou status. To better identify composition effects, I treat education as a categorical variable containing six levels of educational attainment: (1) no schooling; (2) elementary school; (3) junior high school; (4) senior high school or vocational high school; (5) vocational college; and (6) four-year college or above. While most previous studies treated sector of employment as a state-market dichotomy, I adopt a tripartite typology of sector: (1) state sector, which includes government agencies, public organizations, and state-owned enterprises; (2) private sector, which includes domestic private enterprises, foreign-invested firms, joint ventures, as well as collective enterprises and institutions; and (3) self-employment. Hukou status is coded as a binary variable (non-agricultural versus agricultural) in order to identify rural-urban migrants. The regression model for the mean of log earnings also includes sex, age, age squared, and party membership as covariates.

Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics. The first two columns show the population share of different subgroups in 1996 and 2010. With regard to sex, age, and party membership, the group proportions are fairly similar across the two years, although the workforce appears slightly older in 2010. The share of workers holding a rural hukou increased sharply, from 12 percent in 1996 to 27 percent in 2010, reflecting the sheer scale of rural-to-urban migration. Thanks to college expansion, the proportion of workers who had a college degree (either vocational or regular) more than doubled. Moreover, state sector employment declined dramatically: in 1996, 59 percent of the workers were employed in the state sector, but by 2010 this portion had been reduced to 27 percent.

The next two columns present the group-specific means of log earnings. Overall, we see a substantial increase in earnings for both men and women, both party members and non-members, and all age groups. However, on average, earnings growth seems larger for permanent urban dwellers and more educated workers than for rural-urban migrants and less educated workers. The last two columns demonstrate the group-specific levels of inequality, measured by the variance of log earnings. We find that the rise of earnings inequality is greater among party members and permanent urban dwellers than among non-members and rural-urban migrants. Moreover, for both years, earnings dispersion is much lower in the state sector than in the private sector, and the self-employed exhibit the highest within-group inequality.
To gauge the influence of a given set of variables on earnings inequality, past research has often relied on $R^2$ or partial $R^2$ from multiple regressions of log earnings. As discussed earlier, this approach is not well suited for studying trends in inequality, because it is prone to conflate changes in population composition with inherent changes in between-group gaps and within-group variation. For a given time point, though, it can provide a snapshot of the structure of earnings inequality. In figure 2, the bar plots show the net contributions of province, education, sector of employment, and hukou status to the overall inequality, measured by the corresponding partial $R^2$'s. First, we find that province is the most...
influential factor shaping earnings inequality in urban China: in both years, nearly 15 percent of the variation in log earnings can be explained by interprovincial disparities, even after covariates such as sex, age, and education are controlled for. Second, we see a sharp increase in the importance of education: the partial $R^2$ grew from 4.7 percent in 1996 to 12.3 percent in 2010. Finally, sector of employment accounts for roughly 3 percent of total inequality at both time points, and the explanatory power of hukou status is negligible for both years.

The above results highlight the significance of region and education in maintaining earnings inequality in urban China. Nonetheless, they do not reveal the sources of the growth in inequality. For example, the rise in the partial $R^2$ of education could stem either from real increases in returns to education or from changes in educational composition (i.e., distribution effect). I now turn to results from variance function regressions, which provide a basis for both decomposition and counterfactual analyses.

**Variance Function Regressions and Decomposition of the Rise in Inequality**

Table 4 reports the results from variance function regressions. The first two columns present the effects of different predictors on the mean of log earnings.
Table 4. Regression Results for Mean and Variance Functions in 1996 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>Mean regression</th>
<th>Variance regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>8.690***</td>
<td>9.135***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.222***</td>
<td>−0.307***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age$^2$/100</td>
<td>−0.025**</td>
<td>−0.089***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>0.075*</td>
<td>0.155***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural hukou</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>−0.600***</td>
<td>−0.743***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>−0.152***</td>
<td>−0.486***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>−0.068*</td>
<td>−0.252***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high school or vocational high school (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational college</td>
<td>0.079†</td>
<td>0.315***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-year college or above</td>
<td>0.264***</td>
<td>0.608***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector of employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State sector (reference group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>−0.112**</td>
<td>−0.127***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment</td>
<td>−0.358***</td>
<td>0.183***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $R^2$</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The mean models also control for province dummies, for which the coefficient estimates are not reported here. The mean and variance models were jointly fitted via maximum likelihood estimation (Western and Bloome 2009). *** $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$ † $p < .1$ (two-tailed tests).
First, for both years, we see an earnings penalty for females, a premium for party members, and a quadratic effect of age, which are all consistent with previous research on earnings determination in urban China (e.g., Xie and Hannum 1996). However, we find that the effect of rural *hukou* is not significantly different from zero in either 1996 or 2010, indicating that there may not be an earnings penalty for rural-urban migrants when covariates, such as education and sector, are factored in. Meanwhile, we see a sharp rise in economic returns to a college degree (either vocational or regular) over this period: in 1996, a worker with a four-year college education was expected to earn 30 percent ($e^{0.264} - 1$) more than a worker with only a high school diploma; by 2010, this gap had widened to 84 percent ($e^{0.608} - 1$).\(^4\) In addition, for both years, we observe an earnings premium for workers in the state sector compared with employees in the private sector. The self-employed seem to have improved their position enormously: in 1996, they earned markedly less than the other two groups, but by 2010 they had become the most advantaged group, earning about 20 percent ($e^{0.183} - 1$) more than state sector workers.

My earlier argument presumes that residual inequality is substantially lower in the state sector than in the private sector. To model sectoral differences in residual inequality, I use sector dummies as predictors in the variance regressions.\(^5\) As shown in the last two columns, estimated residual variation is much smaller in the state sector than in the private sector, and the self-employed are the most unequal group. This pattern holds true in both years, although to a lesser extent in 2010 than in 1996. This heterogeneity in residual variance underlies my hypothesis that the decline of state sector employment has raised the level of overall inequality through an allocation effect.

Based on the coefficient estimates in table 4, I decompose the change in inequality from 1996 to 2010 into the four components expressed by equation (3). The bar plots in figure 3 show the results from both type I and type II decompositions. We find that changes in between-group earnings gaps account for 34–46 percent of the total growth in earnings inequality, depending on the way the decomposition is performed. Distribution effect (i.e., change in between-group inequality through compositional shifts) explains 22–34 percent of the total growth, whereas allocation effect (i.e., change in within-group inequality through compositional shifts) contributes 21–37 percent. Taking them as a whole, we conclude that more than half of the rise in inequality over this period is attributable to compositional shifts in individual and contextual characteristics. By contrast, the contribution of $\delta_w$ ranges from −5–12 percent, suggesting that changes in within-group dispersion have a very small, if any, impact on the change in earnings inequality over this period.

**Counterfactual Analyses: Evaluation of Competing Mechanisms**

I now assess the utility of different explanations through counterfactual analyses. In table 5, the first column presents the variances of log earnings adjusted for changes in between-group gaps (i.e., $\beta$) and in within-group variation (i.e., $\lambda$), and the second column shows the counterfactual change from 1996 to 2010.
when between-group/within-group effects are fixed at the 1996 level. The third column reports the percentage of the total change explained, that is, other things being equal, how much of the total rise in inequality would have disappeared had the corresponding between-group/within-group effects stayed unchanged during this period. First, fixing the coefficients of province dummies yields an adjusted variance.

**Table 5. Adjusted Variances for Changes in Between-Group Gaps and Within-Group Variation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Change from 1996 to 2010</th>
<th>Percentage of change explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fitted variance</td>
<td>0.839 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.304 (0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing changes in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional disparities (β_{region})</td>
<td>0.839 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.305 (0.041)</td>
<td>−0.2 (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to education (β_{edu})</td>
<td>0.701 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.167 (0.042)</td>
<td>45.2 (7.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All between-group gaps (β)</td>
<td>0.699 (0.030)</td>
<td>0.165 (0.038)</td>
<td>45.8 (7.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All within-group variation (λ)</td>
<td>0.853 (0.046)</td>
<td>0.319 (0.032)</td>
<td>−4.7 (16.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors (250 replications). Boldface numbers identify the main driving forces of the rise in inequality.
variance of 0.839, suggesting that changing interprovincial disparities accounts for none of the total growth in inequality. In contrast, by fixing the coefficients of educational attainment, we find that rising returns to education explains 45.2 percent of the total growth. The next row shows that had all between-group earnings gaps stayed at the 1996 level, 45.8 percent of the increased inequality would have disappeared. A comparison of the above two numbers indicates that changes in between-group gaps are driven almost entirely by increases in returns to education. Finally, by fixing the coefficients in the variance model ($\lambda$), we find that changes in within-sector earnings variation have virtually no influence on the rise of inequality over this period.

Table 6 shows the variances of log earnings adjusted for a range of compositional shifts and the corresponding contributions of distribution effects, allocation effects, and total composition effects. First, we find that the distribution effect of changing hukou composition is close to nil, which echoes the fact that rural hukou is not statistically significant in predicting log earnings. In other words, because there is no discernible gap in earnings between rural-urban migrants and permanent urban workers, changing hukou composition has little impact on the trends in earnings inequality. Second, the distribution effect of education, which results chiefly from the college expansion policy, accounts for 21.9 percent of the total change in inequality. That is, more than a fifth of the increased variation in log earnings can be attributed to a more dispersed educational distribution. Third, the allocation effect of changing sectoral composition also explains about one-fifth of the increased inequality. This finding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Adjusted Variances for Changes in Population Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Fitted variance</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitted variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing compositional changes in hukou status ($\pi_{hukou}$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing compositional changes in education ($\pi_{edu}$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing compositional changes in sector ($\pi_{sector}$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing compositional changes in education + sector ($\pi_{edu,sector}$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing compositional changes in all explanatory variables ($X, Z$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors (250 replications). Boldface numbers identify the main driving forces of the rise in inequality.
demonstrates the crucial role of state sector shrinkage: because within-sector variation is substantially lower in the state sector than in the private sector, the massive labor influx into the private sector has inflated earnings inequality in the aggregate.

Although we do not assume any effects of hukou and education on the variance of log earnings, both changing hukou composition and changing educational composition exhibit allocation effects as well. This is because the distributions of hukou and educational attainment are not independent of the distribution of sector of employment. Indeed, according to the 2010 data, rural-urban migrants are more likely to work in the private sector than permanent urban workers, and college-educated workers are more likely to work in the state sector than other educational groups. Therefore, a down-weighting of rural-urban migrants will lower the average within-group inequality, whereas a down-weighting of college-educated workers will heighten it. As a result, we observe a positive allocation effect of rural-urban migration and a negative allocation effect of changing educational composition. These allocation effects, however, should not be taken at face value because the compositional shifts of hukou and education may be closely intertwined with changes in sectoral structure. Hence, I proceed to examine the combined effects of different compositional shifts by fixing the joint distribution of the corresponding variables at the 1996 level. In particular, by fixing the joint distribution of education and sector, we find that 41.9 percent of the total increase in inequality results from compositional changes in education and sector of employment. This number, not surprisingly, roughly equals the sum of the distribution effect of changing educational composition and the allocation effect of changing sectoral composition. Finally, when the joint distribution of all observed characteristics (i.e., the data matrices X and Z) is fixed at the 1996 level, the increased variance from 1996 to 2010 drops from 0.304 to 0.137, suggesting that 54.9 percent of the total growth in inequality is due to compositional shifts in individual and contextual characteristics. Of these composition effects, about three-quarters (41.9/54.9 = 76.3 percent) come from changing educational and sectoral distributions.

In short, the counterfactual analyses show that the rise of earnings inequality from 1996 to 2010 is driven primarily by (1) increases in returns to education; (2) a more dispersed educational distribution; and (3) changes in sectoral structure. In particular, the composition effects of (2) and (3) stem from the policy of college expansion and the institutional downsizing of state-owned enterprises.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

Earnings inequality in urban China has grown sharply over the past two decades. To account for the rise of inequality in urban China, prior studies have offered three major explanations: widening regional gaps, increasing educational returns, and growing residual inequality. In this article, I examined how the recent upswing in earning inequality has been shaped by three large-scale structural changes: (1) college expansion; (2) state sector shrinkage; and
rural-to-urban migration. To adjudicate between existing explanations and these composition effects, I used variance function regressions to decompose and simulate the change in earnings inequality between 1996 and 2010. My results suggest that nearly half of the growth in earnings inequality during this period can be explained by increases in returns to education, and that the other half is attributable to compositional shifts in the labor force. The composition effects are due mainly to changes in educational and sectoral distributions, which in turn result from the expansion of tertiary education and the shrinkage of state sector employment.

Moreover, we find little effect of the upsurge in rural-urban migration on earnings inequality. In fact, my regression results show no significant difference in earnings between rural migrant workers and permanent urban workers once covariates, such as education and sector, are taken into account. This finding does not necessarily contradict earlier studies that demonstrate a wage penalty for rural migrant workers (Meng and Zhang 2001), because a wage penalty is not equivalent to a gap in total earnings—considering that rural migrants usually work longer hours and more days than local urban workers. In addition, it is worth noting that although rural-urban migration seems to have limited impact on earnings inequality in urban China, it may have a profound influence on economic inequality in China as a whole. Assuming that migrant workers earn more in urban areas than they would in their rural origins, an increasing volume of migrant workers can narrow the gap between these two otherwise segregated and unequal populations (i.e., urban and rural hukou holders), thereby reducing the level of nationwide inequality.

Methodologically, this study illustrates the utility of variance function regressions, a technique recently proposed by Western and Bloome (2009), for studying trends in inequality. By simultaneously modeling the mean and the variance of log earnings, this method allows the change in earnings inequality to be decomposed into four components: changes in between-group gaps ($\delta_B$), changes in within-group variation ($\delta_W$), distribution effect ($\delta_D$), and allocation effect ($\delta_A$). Different from $R^2$-based methods, this approach distinguishes the dynamics of inequality (i.e., analyzing the change in inequality) from the statics of inequality (i.e., analyzing the level of inequality). In a society, the principal factors that maintain the level of inequality do not always correspond to the major forces that drive the change in inequality. In fact, while geographic disparities remain the largest contributing factor to the level of inequality in China (Xie and Zhou 2014), we find that the rise of inequality in urban areas since the mid-1990s is not much driven by widening provincial disparities, but largely propelled by increasing returns to education and composition effects. An analysis of trends in $R^2$, however, would not disentangle composition effects from inherent changes in between-group gaps or within-group variation. For example, figure 2 has shown a tremendous growth in the partial $R^2$ of education, yet this growth does not necessarily stem from an increase in returns to education. Without a careful decomposition of the trend, we cannot separate the effect of changing returns to education from the effect of changing educational distribution. Similarly, without an explicit modeling of heteroscedasticity across employment sectors, we
would conflate real changes in within-sector inequality with shifts in sectoral composition.

Substantively, this study provides new insights into the way economic inequality can be shaped by rapid socio-structural changes. For example, standard economic theory predicts that ceteris paribus, an educational expansion will cause a decline in returns to schooling owing to increased market competition. By this logic, if educational expansion produces a composition effect that drives up earnings inequality, it may be offset or even outweighed by a drop in returns to education. This countervailing effect has been observed in both African and Latin American countries (Knight and Sabot 1983; World Bank 2011). My analyses, however, depict a different picture for China: returns to higher education have increased since the mid-1990s despite a growing supply of college-educated workers. As a result, these two forces have operated in the same direction toward a higher level of inequality. The impact of an educational expansion on inequality, therefore, may not always be predicted by a “partial equilibrium model”; instead, it can be shaped by an array of supply-side, demand-side, and non-market processes in a historical context.

While my analyses have broadly linked the growth in inequality to changes in earnings determinants, they are limited in revealing the complexity of micro-level processes. For example, although the observed increase in returns to education comports with the market transition theory, it is not necessarily due to market forces per se. First, if students with more (unobserved) family resources selectively obtained more education, the increase in estimated returns to education would reflect an increase in the compounded effects of schooling and family resources. Second, during the economic reform, state bureaucracies have increasingly emphasized educational credential in resource allocation, which may have also raised the observed returns to education. In fact, owing to state sponsorship, part-time adult colleges—which confer nearly a third of undergraduate diplomas in China—are much more likely to recruit mid-career cadres and state professionals than less privileged individuals (Lai forthcoming). If this effect had intensified over the study period, the observed increase in returns to college may have also been inflated.

The results of variance regressions show a markedly lower level of inequality in the state sector than in the private sector. This difference in residual inequality could also result from a wide range of sources. First, according to the human capital theory, residual inequality is often interpreted as reflecting the return to and the dispersion of unobserved skills. Compared with the state sector, the private sector is more directly exposed to market competition, under which variation in unmeasured skills is more likely to translate into different rates of pay. Also, workers in private firms may be more heterogeneous in unobserved skills than state sector employees (Wu and Xie 2003), which would lead to greater inequality in the private sector even if returns to unobserved skills were identical between the two sectors. Second, compared with the state sector, private firms may use more discriminatory practices in hiring and promotion, thus creating pay disparities even between workers with the same level of productivity. Third, as noted earlier, state-owned enterprises in China enjoy an array of
institutional protections—such as government-granted monopoly and politically favored bank loans—that help maintain a relatively low level of earnings dispersion among their employees. Finally, the difference in residual inequality between the two sectors could also stem from their differences in occupational and industrial structure. An assessment of these competing explanations, however, requires a large data set that includes comprehensive measures of skills and detailed occupational characteristics. I leave this challenge for future research. This study, though, highlights an important micro-macro nexus, that is, given that residual inequality is higher in the private sector than in the state sector, a decline in state sector employment will drive up earnings inequality in the aggregate.

Earnings inequality in urban China has been on a steady rise since the early 1980s (Jansen and Wu 2012). Although, the time span of my data does not allow an evaluation of the trends prior to 1996, previous research has shown that the growth in earnings inequality among urban workers up to the mid-1990s was propelled chiefly by widening regional gaps and increases in residual variation (Hauser and Xie 2005). Since then, however, the composition of the urban labor force has been significantly changed by college expansion, state sector downsizing, and a surge in rural-urban migration. By explicitly taking into account these institutional and demographic shifts, this article has demonstrated that the growth in earnings inequality over the past 15 years stems mainly from increased returns to education and composition effects. In light of these results, I believe that the rise of inequality in urban China has been driven by different forces during different stages of the economic reform. Understanding such stage-dependent dynamics of earnings inequality greatly enriches our knowledge about the multifaceted processes of economic transformation in post-socialist China.

Notes

1. In this step, the sample size dropped more substantially for CGSS 2010 than for LHSCCC 1996. This is due mainly to their differences in fieldwork implementation rather than a substantial decline in labor-force participation. According to data from the World Bank, the labor-force participation rate in China dropped by only 4 percentage points during this period, from 75 percent in 1996 to 71 percent in 2010.

2. In LHSCCC 1996, profits from private businesses were measured at the family level. Hence, I divided them by the number of working family members before treating them as a part of personal earnings.

3. Collective institutions and enterprises typically do not receive financial support from the central and local governments. Compared with state-owned organizations, they are less regulated by the state and closer to market forces. Therefore, they are classified into the private sector.

4. As both estimated coefficients are asymptotically normal and independent, it is easy to show that the z-score for their difference, \( \frac{\hat{\beta}_2 - \hat{\beta}_1}{\sqrt{\text{se}^2(\hat{\beta}_2) + \text{se}^2(\hat{\beta}_1)}} \), is highly significant.
5. Because there is no strong reason to assume differences in residual inequality across other social dimensions, sector of employment is used as the only predictor in the variance model.

6. Since the college expansion benefited primarily the younger cohorts, age and education are fairly correlated in the 2010 data. Therefore, the reweighting of the educational distribution inevitably altered the age structure, which may have biased the results. To alleviate this concern, I conducted auxiliary analyses by adjusting the conditional distribution of education given age (i.e., $\pi_{\text{edu}|\text{age}}$) such that the educational distribution resembles that in 1996 but the age distribution remains at the 2010 level. The results are substantively identical to those reported in table 6.

7. The same logic may be applied to speculate on the effects of interprovincial migration. Because of differences in pay and employment opportunities in manufacturing and service jobs, interprovincial migration in today’s China is characterized by the flow of unskilled/semiskilled workers from inland, less developed regions to coastal, more developed regions. Given that these low-end workers would earn even less in their places of origin, interprovincial migration may have a mitigating effect on the rise of nationwide inequality. Undoubtedly, further research is needed to test this conjecture.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material is available at Social Forces online, http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/.

About the Author

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