@article {168041,
	title = {{\textquotedblleft}Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence,{\textquotedblright} },
	journal = { American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
	volume = {2},
	number = {1},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {149-164},
	abstract = {This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary the tournament prizestructure and the information available about participants{\textquoteright} skill at the task of solving mazes. The number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given. This result is strongest when we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others solved in a pre-tournament round. Some participants reported that they solved more mazes than they actually solved, and this misreporting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes.},
	url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.2.1.149},
	author = {Richard B. Freeman and Alexander Gelber}
}
