Repeated Games

Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG. It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2015;116 :481-499. its_the_thought_that_counts.pdf
Fudenberg D, Ishii Y, Kominers SD. Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags. Journal of Economic Theory. 2014;150 :487-514. delayed_response_strategies.pdf
Fudenberg D, Dreber A, Rand DG. Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World. American Economic Review. 2012;102 :720-749. PDF slow_to_anger_online_appendix.pdf
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory. 2011;146 :1664-1683. PDF
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2011;146 :1733-1769. PDF
Fudenberg D, Olszewski W. Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;(72) :86-99. PDF
Fudenberg D. The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007;132 :461-73. PDF
Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M. Tit-for-tat or Win-stay, Lose-shift?. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2007;247 :574-80. PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Takahashi S. Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players Are Patient. Games and Economic Behavior. 2007;61 :27-49. PDF
Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M. Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2005;102 :10797-10800. PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maskin E. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information. Econometrica. 1994;62 :997-1039.
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994;62 :103-35.
Fudenberg D. Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships. In: Laffont JJ Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press ; 1993.
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;54 :26-47.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;53 :428-38.
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Maskin E. Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players. Review of Economic Studies. 1990;57 :555-573.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990;51 :194-206.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games. American Economic Review. 1990;80 :274-9.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information. Econometrica. 1986;54 :533-554.