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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
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FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
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HARVARD.EDU
Drew Fudenberg
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Repeated Games
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2015
Dreber A, Fudenberg D, Rand DG
.
It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games
. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2015;116 :481-499.
its_the_thought_that_counts.pdf
2014
Fudenberg D, Ishii Y, Kominers SD
.
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
. Journal of Economic Theory. 2014;150 :487-514.
delayed_response_strategies.pdf
2012
Fudenberg D, Dreber A, Rand DG
.
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
. American Economic Review. 2012;102 :720-749.
PDF
slow_to_anger_online_appendix.pdf
2011
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y
.
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
. Journal of Economic Theory. 2011;146 :1664-1683.
PDF
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y
.
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games
. Journal of Economic Theory. 2011;146 :1733-1769.
PDF
Fudenberg D, Olszewski W
.
Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal
. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;(72) :86-99.
PDF
2007
Fudenberg D
.
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games
. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007;132 :461-73.
PDF
Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M
.
Tit-for-tat or Win-stay, Lose-shift?
. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2007;247 :574-80.
PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Takahashi S
.
Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players Are Patient
. Games and Economic Behavior. 2007;61 :27-49.
PDF
2005
Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M
.
Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection
. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2005;102 :10797-10800.
PDF
1994
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maskin E
.
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
. Econometrica. 1994;62 :997-1039.
Fudenberg D, Levine DK
.
Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
. Journal of Economic Theory. 1994;62 :103-35.
1993
Fudenberg D
.
Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships
. In:
Laffont JJ
Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press ; 1993.
1991
Fudenberg D, Levine DK
.
An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information
. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;54 :26-47.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E
.
On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games
. Journal of Economic Theory. 1991;53 :428-38.
1990
Fudenberg D, Kreps DM, Maskin E
.
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players
. Review of Economic Studies. 1990;57 :555-573.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E
.
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games
. Journal of Economic Theory. 1990;51 :194-206.
Fudenberg D, Maskin E
.
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
. American Economic Review. 1990;80 :274-9.
1986
Fudenberg D, Maskin E
.
Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
. Econometrica. 1986;54 :533-554.
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Book
(4)
Book Chapter
(5)
Conference Paper
(1)
Conference Proceedings
(1)
Journal Article
(110)
Publication Topics
Bargaining, Contracting, Renegotiating, and Mechanism Design
(11)
Decision Theory
(2)
Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics
(15)
Evolution, Learning, and other Non-Equilibrium Adjustment Processes
(32)
Foundations and Mathematics of Game Theory
(19)
Macroeconomics
(1)
Repeated Games
(19)
Reputation Effects
(5)
Theoretical Industrial Organization
(20)
Recent Publications
Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Models: A Lyapunov Approach
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility
It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics
Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion
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