%0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2016 %T Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Models: A Lyapunov Approach %A Ellison, G %A D Fudenberg %A Imhof, LA %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 161 %P 1-36 %G eng %U http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053115001866 %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 2015 %T Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility %A D Fudenberg %A Iijima, R %A Strzalecki, T %B Econometrica %V 83 %P 2371-2409 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization %D 2015 %T It's the Thought That Counts: The Role of Intentions in Noisy Repeated Games %A Dreber, A %A D Fudenberg %A DG Rand %B Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization %V 116 %P 481-499 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Scandinavian Journal of Economics %D 2015 %T Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics %A D Fudenberg %B Scandinavian Journal of Economics %V 117 %P 771-800 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Theoretical Economics %D 2015 %T Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium %A D Fudenberg %A Kamada, Y %B Theoretical Economics %V 10 %P 775-806 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 2015 %T Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion %A Drew Fudenberg %A Strzalecki, T %B Econometrica %V 83 %P 651-691 %G eng %N 2 %0 Conference Proceedings %B Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %D 2014 %T

Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Peysakhovich, A %B Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %C Stanford, CA %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %D 2014 %T

Learning with Recency Bias

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %V 111 %P 10826-10829 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %D 2014 %T Who Cooperates in Repeated Games: The Role of Altruism, Inequity Aversion, and Demographics %A Dreber, A %A D Fudenberg %A David G. Rand %B Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization %V 98 %P 41-55 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Psychology %D 2014 %T

An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Zacharias Maniadis %B Journal of Economic Psychology %V 41 %P 55-67 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Dynamics and Games %D 2014 %T

Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Dynamics and Games %V 1 %P 45-56 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2014 %T

Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Yuhta Ishii %A Scott Duke Kominers %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 150 %P 487-514 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Bulletin of Mathematical Biology %D 2012 %T

Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Lorens A. Imhof %B Bulletin of Mathematical Biology %V 74 %P 399-421 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Microeconomics %D 2012 %T

On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Zacharias Maniadis %B American Economic Journal: Microeconomics %V 2 %P 131-145 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2012 %T

Subgame Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Philippe Aghion %A Richard Holden %A Takashi Kunimoto %A Olivier Tercieux %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 127 %P 1843-1881 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 2012 %T

Timing and Self-Control

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Econometrica %V 80 %P 1-42 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization %D 2012 %T

Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization %V 81 %P 606-612 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2012 %T

Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Anna Dreber %A David G. Rand %B American Economic Review %V 102 %P 720-749 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2011 %T

The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Yuichi Yamamoto %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 146 %P 1664-1683 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2011 %T

Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Yuichi Yamamoto %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 146 %P 1733-1769 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Microeconomics %D 2011 %T

Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs

%A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B American Economic Journal: Microeconomics %V 3 %P 34-68 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2011 %T

Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Wojciech Olszewski %B Games and Economic Behavior %P 86-99 %G eng %N 72 %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2011 %T

Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Satoru Takahashi %B Games and Economic Behavior %P 100-120 %G eng %N 71 %0 Journal Article %J The American Naturalist %D 2011 %T

Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

%A Drew Fudenberg %A Marco Archetti %A Francisco U'beda %A Jerry Green %A Naomi E. Pierce %A Douglas W. Yu %B The American Naturalist %V 177 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 2010 %T Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown %A Drew Fudenberg %A Yuichi Yamamoto %B Econometrica %P 1673-1710 %G eng %N 78 %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2010 %T Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents %A Drew Fudenberg %A R. M. Anderson %A Glenn Ellison %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 69 %P 2-23 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Public Economics %D 2010 %T Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation %A Drew Fudenberg %A Parag Pathak %B Journal of Public Economics %V 94 %P 78-86 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2009 %T Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %P 2354-2371 %G eng %N 144 %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2009 %T Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation %A Drew Fudenberg %A David G. Rand %A Anna Dreber %A Tore Ellingsen %A Martin A. Nowak %B Science %P 1272-1275 %G eng %N 325 %0 Journal Article %J Annual Review of Economics %D 2009 %T Learning and Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Annual Review of Economics %P 385-420 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2009 %T Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %A Lorens A. Imhof %B Games and Economic Behavior %P 98-114 %G eng %N 66 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2009 %T Repeated Games with Frequent Signals %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %P 233-265 %G eng %N 124 %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 2008 %T Erratum to "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information" %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Eric Maskin %B Econometrica %G eng %0 Book Section %B A Long Run Collaboration on Long-Run Relationships %D 2008 %T Introduction %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B A Long Run Collaboration on Long-Run Relationships %I World Scientific Publishing Company %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2008 %T Winners Don't Punish %A Drew Fudenberg %A Anna Dreber %A David Rand %A Martin Nowak %B Nature %V 452 %P 348-351 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2008 %T Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations %A Drew Fudenberg %A Lorens Imhof %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 140 %P 229-245 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2008 %T When Is Reputation Bad? %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jeff Ely %A David K. Levine %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 63 %P 498-526 %G eng %0 Book %D 2008 %T A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %I World Scientific Publishing Company %G eng %U http://www.worldscibooks.com/economics/6880.html %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Dynamics %D 2007 %T Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Review of Economic Dynamics %V 10 %P 173-192 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2007 %T The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games %A Drew Fudenberg %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 132 %P 461-73 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Theoretical Biology %D 2007 %T Tit-for-tat or Win-stay, Lose-shift? %A Drew Fudenberg %A Lorens Imhof %A Martin Nowak %B Journal of Theoretical Biology %V 247 %P 574-80 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Artifical Intelligence %D 2007 %T An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Artifical Intelligence %V 171 %P 378-381 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2007 %T Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players Are Patient %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Satoru Takahashi %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 61 %P 27-49 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Theoretical Economics %D 2007 %T Interim Correlated Rationalizability %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %A Stephen Morris %B Theoretical Economics %V 2 %P 15-40 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Theoretical Economics %D 2007 %T Completion of the Proof of Proposition 4 in "Interim Correlated Rationalizability" %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %A Stephen Morris %B Theoretical Economics %V 2 %P 15-40 %G eng %0 Book Section %B Economics and Information Systems, Volume 1 %D 2007 %T Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition %A Drew Fudenberg %A J. Miguel Villas-Boas %B Economics and Information Systems, Volume 1 %I Elsevier Science %C Oxford %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2007 %T Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions %A Drew Fudenberg %A Markus Mobius %A Adam Szeidl %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 133 %P 550-567 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Theoretical Population Biology %D 2006 %T Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutations %A Drew Fudenberg %A Lorens Imhof %A Martin Nowak %A Christine Taylor %B Theoretical Population Biology %V 70 %P 352-63 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2006 %T A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B American Economic Review %V 96 %P 1449-1476 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2006 %T Advancing Beyond “Advances in Behavioral Economics" %A Drew Fudenberg %B Journal of Economic Literature %V 44 %P 694-711 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Theoretical Economics %D 2006 %T Topologies on Types %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %A Stephen Morris %B Theoretical Economics %V 1 %P 275-309 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2006 %T Superstition and Rational Learning %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B American Economic Review %V 96 %P 630-651 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2006 %T Imitation Processes with Small Mutations %A Drew Fudenberg %A Lorens Imhof %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 131 %P 251-262 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Bulletin of Mathematical Biology %D 2005 %T Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations %A Drew Fudenberg %A Martin Nowak %A Akira Sasaki %A Christine Taylor %B Bulletin of Mathematical Biology %V 66 %P 1621-44 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J The Latin American Journal of Economics %D 2005 %T Learning and Belief Based Trade %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B The Latin American Journal of Economics %V 42 %P 199-297 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %D 2005 %T Evolutionary Cycles of Cooperation and Defection %A Drew Fudenberg %A Lorens Imhof %A Martin Nowak %B Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences %V 102 %P 10797-10800 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Nature %D 2004 %T Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations %A Drew Fudenberg %A Martin Nowak %A Akira Sasaki %A Christine Taylor %B Nature %V 428 %P 646-650 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2004 %T Word of Mouth Learning %A Drew Fudenberg %A Abhijit Banerjee %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 46 %P 1-22 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 2004 %T Learning to Play Bayesian Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %A David K. Levine %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 46 %P 282-303 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of the European Economics Association %D 2004 %T Competing Auctions %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %A Markus Mobius %B Journal of the European Economics Association %V 2 %P 30-66 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2003 %T Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 118 %P 1249-1278 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2002 %T Subjective Uncertainty about Behavior Strategies: A Correction %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 104 %P 473-8 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Industrial Economics %D 2000 %T Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Journal of Industrial Economics %V 48 %P 373-90 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 2000 %T Customer Poaching and Brand Switching %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 31 %P 634-57 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 2000 %T The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades of Computer Software %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 31 %P 253-72 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 2000 %T Learning Purified Equilibria %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 90 %P 84-115 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1999 %T Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 89 %P 165-85 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 1999 %T An Easier Way to Calibrate %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 29 %P 131-7 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 1999 %T Conditional Universal Consistency %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 29 %P 104-30 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J European Economic Review %D 1998 %T Learning in Games: Where Do We Stand %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B European Economic Review %V 42 %P 631-9 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 1998 %T Trade-Ins, Upgrades, and Buy-Backs %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 29 %P 235-58 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1998 %T When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Wolfgang Pesendorfer %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 79 %P 46-71 %G eng %0 Book %D 1998 %T The Theory of Learning in Games %A Drew Fudenberg %I MIT Press %C Cambridge, MA %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1997 %T Measuring Player's Losses in Experimental Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 112 %P 479-506 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1996 %T Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A M. Celentani %A W. Pessendorfer %B Econometrica %V 64 %P 691-701 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, %D 1995 %T Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, %V 19 %P 1065-89 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1995 %T Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learning %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 110 %P 93-126 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1995 %T A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Journal of Political Economy %V 103 %P 75-93 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 1995 %T Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria %A Drew Fudenberg %A David M. Kreps %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 8 %P 20-55 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1994 %T The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Eric Maskin %B Econometrica %V 62 %P 997-1039 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1994 %T Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 62 %P 103-35 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Games and Economic Behavior %D 1993 %T Learning Mixed Equilibria %A Drew Fudenberg %A David M. Kreps %B Games and Economic Behavior %V 5 %P 320-67 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1993 %T Rules of Thumb for Social Learning %A Drew Fudenberg %A Glenn Ellison %B Journal of Political Economy %V 101 %P 612-43 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1993 %T Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Econometrica %V 61 %P 547-74 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1993 %T Self-Confirming Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Econometrica %V 61 %P 523-46 %G eng %0 Book Section %B Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress %D 1993 %T Commitment and Cooperation in Long-Term Relationships %A Drew Fudenberg %E J. J. Laffont %B Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress %I Cambridge University Press %C Cambridge, UK and New York %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1992 %T Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks %A Drew Fudenberg %A C. Harris %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 57 %P 420-41 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1992 %T Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Review of Economic Studies %V 59 %P 561-81 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1991 %T An Approximate Folk Theorem for Games with Imperfect Private Information %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 54 %P 26-47 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1991 %T Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 53 %P 236-60 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1991 %T On the Dispensability of Public Randomizations in Discounted Repeated Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eric Maskin %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 53 %P 428-38 %G eng %0 Book %D 1991 %T Game Theory %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %I MIT Press %C Cambridge, MA %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1990 %T Rational Play with Payoff Uncertainty %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eddie Dekel %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 52 %P 243-67 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1990 %T Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Econometrica %V 58 %P 1279-1320 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1990 %T Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players %A Drew Fudenberg %A David M. Kreps %A Eric Maskin %B Review of Economic Studies %V 57 %P 555-573 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1990 %T Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eric Maskin %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 51 %P 194-206 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1990 %T Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships %A Drew Fudenberg %A Bengt Holmstrom %A Paul Milgrom %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 51 %P 1-32 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 1990 %T Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eric Maskin %B American Economic Review %V 80 %P 274-9 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1989 %T Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A P. Diamond %B Journal of Political Economy %V 97 %P 606-19 %G eng %0 Book Section %B Handbook of Industrial Organization %D 1989 %T Game Theory for Industrial Organization: Introduction and Overview %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %E D. Schmalansee %E R. Willig %B Handbook of Industrial Organization %I North Holland %C Amsterdam, New York %P Ch. 5 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1989 %T Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Econometrica %V 57 %P 759-778 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1989 %T An Example of Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium %A Drew Fudenberg %A P. Diamond %B Journal of Political Economy %V 97 %P 606-19 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1988 %T Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria of Dynamic Games with Many Players %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 44 %P 1-18 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1988 %T On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements %A Drew Fudenberg %A David M. Kreps %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 44 %P 354-80 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1987 %T Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents %A Drew Fudenberg %A David M. Kreps %B Review of Economic Studies %V 54 %P 541-568 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 1987 %T Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Uses of Game Theory in Industrial Organization %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B American Economic Review %V 77 %P 176-83 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1987 %T Incomplete-Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Jean Tirole %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 52 %P 37-50 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 1986 %T A Signal-Jamming Model of Predation %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 17 %P 366-76 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1986 %T A Theory of Exit in Duopoly %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Econometrica %V 54 %P 943-60 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1986 %T Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information %A Drew Fudenberg %A Eric Maskin %B Econometrica %V 54 %P 533-554 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1986 %T Limit Games and Limit Equilibria %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 38 %P 261-79 %G eng %0 Book %D 1986 %T Dynamic Models of Oligopoly %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %I Harwood Academic Publishers %G eng %0 Book Section %B Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining %D 1985 %T Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A Jean Tirole %E A. Roth %B Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining %I Cambridge University Press %C Cambridge, UK and New York %P 73-98 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1985 %T Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Review of Economic Studies %V 52 %P 383-402 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 1984 %T The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B American Economic Review %V 74 %P 361-6 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1983 %T Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Review of Economic Studies %V 50 %P 221-247 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Bell Journal of Economics %D 1983 %T Learning by Doing and Market Performance %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Bell Journal of Economics %V 14 %P 522-30 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1983 %T Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter Mobility %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 31 %P 227-50 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1983 %T Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 31 %P 251-268 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J European Economic Review %D 1983 %T Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Co­mpetition in Patent Races %A Drew Fudenberg %A Jean Tirole %A R. Gilbert %A J. Stiglitz %B European Economic Review %V 22 %P 3-31 %G eng %0 Conference Paper %B NBER Conference on Trade Unions %D 1983 %T Negotiations, Strikes, and Wage Settlements %A Drew Fudenberg %A David K. Levine %A P. Ruud %B NBER Conference on Trade Unions %I NBER %8 May %G eng