Publications by Type: Journal Article

2011
Fudenberg D, Olszewski W. Repeated Games with Asynchronous Monitoring of an Imperfect Signal. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;(72) :86-99. PDF
Fudenberg D, Takahashi S. Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;(71) :100-120. PDF
Fudenberg D, Archetti M, U'beda F, Green J, Pierce NE, Yu DW. Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms. The American Naturalist. 2011;177. PDF
2010
Fudenberg D, Yamamoto Y. Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown. Econometrica. 2010;(78) :1673-1710. PDF
Fudenberg D, Anderson RM, Ellison G. Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010;69 :2-23. PDF
Fudenberg D, Pathak P. Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation. Journal of Public Economics. 2010;94 :78-86. PDF
2009
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique. Journal of Economic Theory. 2009;(144) :2354-2371. PDF
Fudenberg D, Rand DG, Dreber A, Ellingsen T, Nowak MA. Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation. Science. 2009;(325) :1272-1275. PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Learning and Equilibrium. Annual Review of Economics. 2009;(1) :385-420. PDF
Fudenberg D, Ellison G, Imhof LA. Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics. Games and Economic Behavior. 2009;(66) :98-114. PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Repeated Games with Frequent Signals. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2009;(124) :233-265. PDF
2008
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Maskin E. Erratum to "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information". Econometrica. 2008. PDF
Fudenberg D, Dreber A, Rand D, Nowak M. Winners Don't Punish. Nature. 2008;452 :348-351. PDF
Fudenberg D, Imhof L. Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations. Journal of Economic Theory. 2008;140 :229-245. PDF
Fudenberg D, Ely J, Levine DK. When Is Reputation Bad?. Games and Economic Behavior. 2008;63 :498-526. PDF
2007
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring. Review of Economic Dynamics. 2007;10 :173-192. PDF
Fudenberg D. The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two-Player Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007;132 :461-73. PDF
Fudenberg D, Imhof L, Nowak M. Tit-for-tat or Win-stay, Lose-shift?. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2007;247 :574-80. PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK. An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning. Artifical Intelligence. 2007;171 :378-381. PDF
Fudenberg D, Levine DK, Takahashi S. Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players Are Patient. Games and Economic Behavior. 2007;61 :27-49. PDF

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