%0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %X

What is so special about banks that their demise often triggers government intervention? In this paper we show that, even ignoring interconnectedness issues, the failure of a bank causes a larger welfare loss than the failure of other institutions. The reason is that agents in need of liquidity tend to concentrate their holdings in banks. Thus, a shock to banks disproportionately affects the agents who need liquidity the most, reducing aggregate demand and the level of economic activity. The optimal fiscal response to such a shock is to help people, not banks, and the size of this response should be larger if a bank, rather than a similarly-sized nonfinancial firm, fails.     

%G eng %0 Generic %D Working Paper %T More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts %A Oliver Hart %A Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka %X

Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on “contracts as reference points”. Including a contingency of the form, “The buyer will require a good in event E”, has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be strictly superior to a contingent contract.

%G eng %0 Generic %D Forthcoming %T Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles (Revised Nov. 2022) %A David Frydlinger %A Oliver Hart %X Transactions of any complexity between buyers and sellers are supported by long-term contracts and these contracts are inevitably incomplete. We propose an approach for overcoming contractual incompleteness based on the idea that most people are inclined to follow widely accepted social norms, such as being fair-minded and acting with integrity. We suggest that this tendency can be reinforced if these social norms are incorporated into a formal contract in the form of guiding principles. We develop a model in which guiding principles reduce shading behavior and discuss cases where the approach has been successfully applied in practice. %B Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. Forthcoming %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Forthcoming in %D Forthcoming %T Private Sanctions %A Oliver Hart %A David Thesmar %A Luigi Zingales %B Forthcoming in %G eng %U https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/epolic/eiad041/7462771?utm_source=advanceaccess&utm_campaign=economicpolicy&utm_medium=email %0 Journal Article %D 2022 %T The New Corporate Governance %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %V 1 %P 195-216 %8 2022 %G eng %U https://businesslawreview.uchicago.edu/2022/10/31/the-new-corporate-governance/ %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Published in Journal of Political Economy, December 2022 %D 2022 %T Exit vs. Voice %A Eleonora Broccardo %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B Published in Journal of Political Economy, December 2022 %G eng %U https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/720516 %0 Magazine Article %D 2020 %T An Innovative Way to Prevent Adversarial Supplier Relationships %A David Frydlinger %A Oliver Hart %A Kate Vitasek %B Harvard Business Review %V October 8 %G eng %U https://hbr.org/2020/10/an-innovative-way-to-prevent-adversarial-supplier-relationships?ab=hero-subleft-3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization %D 2020 %T Continuing Contracts %A Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka %A Oliver Hart %X

 

Parties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example.  Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point.  A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or long-term contract.  However, fair bargaining makes adjusting to outside options difficult and may cause inefficient outcomes.  An implicit promise of a long-term relationship, as in employment, can improve matters. 

 

%B Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization %V 36 %P 284-313 %G eng %U https://academic.oup.com/jleo/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewz022/5717393?guestAccessKey=3064583f-6d17-4d84-ba35-dd789f2c81a5 %N 2 %0 Magazine Article %D 2019 %T A New Approach to Contracts %A David Frydlinger %A Oliver Hart %A Kate Vitasek %B Harvard Business Review %V Sept-Oct %G eng %U https://hbr.org/2019/09/a-new-approach-to-contracts %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting %D 2017 %T Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %X What is the appropriate objective function for a firm? We analyze this question for the case where shareholders are prosocial and externalities are not perfectly separable from production decisions. We argue that maximization of shareholder welfare is not the same as maximization of market value. We propose that company and asset managers should pursue policies consistent with the preferences of their investors. Voting by shareholders on corporate policy is one way to achieve this. %B Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting %V 2 %P 247-274 %G eng %N 2 %0 Magazine Article %D 2017 %T Serving Shareholders Doesn't Mean Putting Profit Above All Else %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B Harvard Business Review “This article was first published on HBR.org” %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2017 %T Incomplete Contracts and Control %A Oliver Hart %B American Economic Review %V 107 %P 1731-1752 %G eng %N 7 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of the European Economic Association %D 2015 %T How Do Informal Agreements and Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points? %A Ernst Fehr %A Oliver Hart %A Christian Zehnder %X

The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority and delegation. Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation or revision. Here we show that the central behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust to such considerations. Our data reveal that informal agreements can mitigate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility but they do not fully resolve the problem of misaligned reference points. Our experiments also show that contract revision is a more nuanced process than the previous literature has recognized. We find, for example, that it is sometimes better for parties to write a simple (rigid) contract and then revise it ex post if needed, rather than to anticipate and include future contingencies in a (flexible) contract from the outset.

%B Journal of the European Economic Association %V 13 %P 1-28 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of the European Economic Association %D 2015 %T Liquidity and Inefficient Investment %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %X

We study consumer liquidity in a general equilibrium model where the friction is the non-pledgeability of future income. Liquidity helps to overcome the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Consumers over-hoard liquidity and the resulting competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Fiscal policy following a large negative shock can increase ex ante welfare. If the government cannot commit, the ex post optimal fiscal policy will be too small from an ex ante perspective.

%B Journal of the European Economic Association %V 13 %P 737-769 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law and Economics %D 2014 %T Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine %A T. Christopher Borek %A Angelo Frattarelli %A Oliver Hart %X

Courts have articulated a number of legal tests to distinguish corporate transactions that have a legitimate business or economic purpose from those carried out largely, if not solely, for favorable tax treatment. We outline an approach to analyzing the economic substance of corporate transactions based on the property rights theory of the firm, and describe its application in two recent tax cases.

%B Journal of Law and Economics %V 57 %P 975-1000 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Games %D 2013 %T Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points %A Oliver Hart %X

We analyze noncontractible investments in a model with shading. A seller can make an
investment that affects a buyer’s value. The parties have outside options that depend on asset
ownership. When shading is not possible and there is no contract renegotiation, an optimum can
be achieved by giving the seller the right to make a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer. However, with
shading, such a contract creates deadweight losses. We show that an optimal contract will limit
the seller’s offers, and possibly create ex post inefficiency. Asset ownership can improve matters
even if revelation mechanisms are allowed.

%B Games %V 4 %P 437-456 %G eng %U http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/4/3/437 %N 3 %R 10.3390/g4030437 %0 Web Page %D 2013 %T Tax shelters and the theory of the firm %A T. Christopher Borek %A Angleo Frattarelli %A Oliver Hart %B VOX %G eng %U http://www.voxeu.org/article/tax-shelters-and-theory-firm %N July 2, 2013 %0 Journal Article %J American Law and Economics Review %D 2011 %T A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %X

We design a new capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFI) that are “too big to fail.” Our mechanism mimics the operation of margin accounts. To ensure LFIs do not default on systemically-relevant obligations, we require that they maintain a cushion of equity and junior long-term debt sufficiently great that the credit default swap price on the long-term debt stays below a threshold level. If the CDS price moves above the threshold, either LFIs issue equity to bring it down or the regulator intervenes. This mechanism ensures that LFIs are always solvent, while preserving some of the benefits of debt.

%B American Law and Economics Review %V 13 %P 453-490 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2011 %T Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's 'The Theory of the Firm' %A Oliver Hart %X

In this review, I describe how economists have moved beyond the firm as a black box to incorporate incentives, internal organization, and firm boundaries. I then turn to the way that the theory of the firm is treated in Daniel Spulber’s book The Theory of the Firm:  Microeconomics with Endogenous Entrepreneurs, Firms, Markets, and Organizations. Spulber’s goal is to explain why firms exist, how they are established, and what they contribute to the economy. To accomplish this, Spulber defines a firm to be a transaction institution whose objectives differ from those of its owners. For Spulber, this separation is the key difference between the firm and direct exchange between consumers. I raise questions about whether this is a useful basis for a theory of the firm. ( JEL D21)

%B Journal of Economic Literature %V 49 %P 101-113 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2011 %T Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence %A Oliver Hart %A Ernst Fehr %A Christian Zehnder %X

Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as ref- erence points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid con- tracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about out- comes within the contract.

%B American Economic Review %V 101 %P 493-525 %G eng %N 2 %0 Generic %D 2010 %T “Curbing Risk on Wall Street” %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B National Affairs %V 3 %P 20-34 %G eng %U http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20100317_HartZingales.pdf %N Spring %0 Newspaper Article %B Financial Times %D 2010 %T How to Make a Distressed Bank Raise Equity %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B Financial Times %8 2/08/2010 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2010 %T A Theory of Firm Scope %A Oliver Hart %A Bengt Holmstrom %X

The formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are resolved through bargaining. In reality, parties often simply exercise their decision rights. We develop a model, based on shading, in which the use of authority has a central role. We consider two firms deciding whether to adopt a common standard. Nonintegrated firms may fail to coordinate if one firm loses. An integrated firm can internalize the externality, but puts insufficient weight on employee benefits. We use our approach to understand why Cisco acquired StrataCom, a provider of new transmission technology. We also analyze delegation.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V CXXV %P 483-513 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2009 %T Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points %A Oliver Hart %X

We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under condi- tions of value and cost uncertainty. A contract fixing price works well in normal times because there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is unusually high or low, one party will deviate from the contract and hold up the other party, causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that allocating asset ownership and indexing contracts can reduce the incentives to engage in hold-up. In contrast to much of the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty, rather than noncontractible investments.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 124 %P 267-300 %G eng %N 1 %0 Generic %D 2009 %T To Regulate Finance, Try the Market %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B Foreign Policy %8 03 March 2009 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Accounting Research %D 2009 %T Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Accounting Research %V 47 %P 437-445 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of the European Economic Association %D 2009 %T Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation %A Oliver Hart %A Ernst Fehr %A Christian Zehnder %X

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a “fundamental transformation” (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before. (JEL: C91, D03, D23)

%B Journal of the European Economic Association %V 7 %P 561-572 %G eng %N 2-3 %0 Generic %D 2009 %T How the Tricks that Crashed Wall Street Can Save the World %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B Foreign Policy %8 12/03/2009 %G eng %U http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/03/how_the_tricks_that_crashed_wall_street_can_save_the_world %0 Journal Article %J Economica %D 2008 %T

Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm

%A Oliver Hart %B Economica %V 75 %P 404-411 %G eng %N 299 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2008 %T Contracts as Reference Points %A Oliver Hart %A John Moore %X

We argue that a contract provides a reference point for a trading relationship: more precisely, for parties’ feelings of entitlement. A party’s ex post performance depends on whether he gets what he is entitled to relative to outcomes permitted by the contract. A party who is shortchanged shades on performance. A flexible contract allows parties to adjust their outcomes to uncertainty but causes ineffi- cient shading. Our analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible investments and elucidates why “employment” contracts, which fix wages in advance and allow the employer to choose the task, can be optimal.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V CXXIII %P 1-48 %G eng %N 1 %0 Newspaper Article %B Wall Street Journal %D 2008 %T Economists Have Abandoned Principle %A Oliver Hart %A Luigi Zingales %B Wall Street Journal %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2008 %T Debt Enforcement Around the World %A Oliver Hart %A Simeon Djankov %A Caralee McLiesh %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforce- ment will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. This measure is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development. Several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and avail- ability of floating charge finance, influence efficiency.

%B Journal of Political Economy %V 116 %P 1105-1149 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2007 %T Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts %A Oliver Hart %A John Moore %B American Economic Review %V 97 %P 182-186 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2005 %T On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Journal of Political Economy %V 113 %P 675-702 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Economic Journal %D 2003 %T Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships %A Oliver Hart %B Economic Journal %V 113 %P C69-C76 %G eng %N 486 %0 Journal Article %J University of Pennsylvania Law Review %D 2001 %T Norms and the Theory of the Firm %A Oliver Hart %B University of Pennsylvania Law Review %G eng %0 Unpublished Work %D 2001 %T Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control %A Oliver Hart %A Lucian Bebchuck %X

This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyze and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on acquisition offers. We first show how proxy fights unaccompanied by an acquisition offer suffer from substantial shortcomings that limit the use of such contests in practice. We then argue that combining voting with acquisition offers is superior not only to proxy fights alone but also to takeover bids alone. Finally, we show that, when acquisition offers are in the form of cash or the acquirer’s existing securities, voting shareholders can infer from the pre-vote market trading which outcome would be best in light of all the available public information. Our analysis has implications for the ongoing debates in the US over poison pills and in Europe over the new EEC directive on takeovers.

%8 October 2001 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2001 %T Financial Contracting %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Economic Literature %V 34 %P 1079-1100 %G eng %N 4 %0 Book Section %B Governance, Equity and Global Markets %D 1999 %T

Different Approaches to Bankruptcy

%A Oliver Hart %B Governance, Equity and Global Markets %7 Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics in Europe, June 21-21, 1999. %I Paris: La Docmentation Francaise, 2000. %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1999 %T Foundations of Incomplete Contracts %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Review of Economic Studies %V 66 %P 115-138 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J The Economic Journal %D 1999 %T Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," The Economic Journal %A Oliver Hart %B The Economic Journal %V 105 %P 678-689 %G eng %0 Unpublished Work %D 1998 %T Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership %A Oliver Hart %A John Moore %8 February 1998 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1998 %T Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 113 %P 1-41 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1997 %T The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons %A Oliver Hart %A A. Shleifer %A R. W. Vishny %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 112 %P 1126-1161 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings %D 1997 %T A New Bankruptcy Procedure That Uses Multiple Auctions %A Oliver Hart %A R. La Porta Drago %A F. Lopez-de-Silanes %A J. Moore %B European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings %V 41 %P 461-473 %G eng %N 3-5 %0 Journal Article %J Oxford Review of Economic Policy %D 1996 %T The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Oxford Review of Economic Policy %V 12 %P 53-69 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Rationality and Society %D 1996 %T An Economist's View of Authority %A Oliver Hart %B Rationality and Society %V 8 %P 371-386 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Insolvency Law and Practice %D 1995 %T Insolvency Reform in the U.K.: A Revised Proposal %A Oliver Hart %A P. Aghion %A J. Moore %B Insolvency Law and Practice %V 11 %P 4-11 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 1995 %T Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B American Economic Review %V 85 %P 567-585 %G eng %N 3 %0 Book %D 1995 %T Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure %A Oliver Hart %I Oxford University Press, USA %C New York %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Washington University Law Quarterly %D 1994 %T Improving Bankruptcy Procedure %A Oliver Hart %A P. Aghion %A J. Moore %B Washington University Law Quarterly %V 72 %P 849-872 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1994 %T A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 109 %P 841-879 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Insolvency Law & Practice %D 1993 %T A Proposal for Bankruptcy Reform in the U.K. %A Oliver Hart %A P. Aghion %A J. Moore %B Insolvency Law & Practice %V 9 %P 103-108 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J University of Toronto Law Journal %D 1993 %T An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty %A Oliver Hart %B University of Toronto Law Journal %V 43 %P 299-313 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law, Economics and Organization %D 1992 %T The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform %A Oliver Hart %A P. Aghion %A J. Moore %B Journal of Law, Economics and Organization %V 8 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics %D 1990 %T Is 'Bounded Rationality' an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions? %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1990 %T Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Journal of Political Economy %V 98 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Columbia Law Review %D 1989 %T An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm %A Oliver Hart %B Columbia Law Review %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1989 %T Bargaining and Strikes %A Oliver Hart %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V CIV %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Canadian Journal of Economics %D 1988 %T Capital Structure As a Control Mechanism in Corporations %A Oliver Hart %B Canadian Journal of Economics %V XXI %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1988 %T Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics %A Oliver Hart %A J. Tirole %B Review of Economic Studies %V LV %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1988 %T Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation %A Oliver Hart %A J. Moore %B Econometrica %V 56 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law, Economics and Organization %D 1988 %T Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Law, Economics and Organization %V 4 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics, %D 1988 %T One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Journal of Financial Economics, %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1986 %T The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Journal of Political Economy %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1986 %T Price Destabilizing Speculation %A Oliver Hart %A D. Kreps %B Journal of Political Economy %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Economic Journal %D 1985 %T Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results %A Oliver Hart %B Economic Journal %V 95 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1985 %T Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model %A Oliver Hart %B Review of Economic Studies %V LII %G eng %0 Journal Article %J International Economic Review %D 1985 %T Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot-Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry %A Oliver Hart %A R. Guesnerie %B International Economic Review %V 26 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Bell Journal of Economics %D 1983 %T The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme %A Oliver Hart %B Bell Journal of Economics %V 14 %P 366-382 %G eng %N Autumn %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1983 %T Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction %A Oliver Hart %B Review of Economic Studies %V 50 %P 1-35 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1983 %T Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 98 %P 123-156 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1983 %T An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Econometrica %P 7-46 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1983 %T Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %A E. Maskin %B Journal of Political Economy %V 91 %P 907-928 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1982 %T Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction %A Oliver Hart %B Review of Economic Studies %V 49 %P 313-314 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1982 %T A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features %A Oliver Hart %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 97 %P 109-138 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1981 %T The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Journal of Finance %V 36 %P 253-270 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings %D 1981 %T Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings %V 71 %P 301-307 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1980 %T Disclosure Laws and Take-Over Bids %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Journal of Finance %V 35 %P 323-334 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1980 %T Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 22 %P 279-312 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science %D 1980 %T Take-Over Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science %V 11 %P 42-64 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1979 %T On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies %A Oliver Hart %B Econometrica %V 47 %P 1057-1083 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1979 %T Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities %A Oliver Hart %B Review of Economic Studies %V 46 %P 1-30 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Econometrica %D 1979 %T A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies %A Oliver Hart %A S. Grossman %B Econometrica %V 47 %P 293-329 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1977 %T Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 16 %P 53-83 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1977 %T On the Profitability of Speculation %A Oliver Hart %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 91 %P 579-597 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1975 %T On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 11 %P 418-443 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Mathematical Economics %D 1975 %T A Proof of the Existence of Equilibrium without the Free Disposal Assumption %A Oliver Hart %A H.W. Kuhn %B Journal of Mathematical Economics %V 2 %P 335-343 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Theory %D 1974 %T On the Existence of Equilibrium in a Securities Model %A Oliver Hart %B Journal of Economic Theory %V 9 %P 293-311 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 1974 %T On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries %A Oliver Hart %A D.M. Jaffee %B Review of Economic Studies %V 41 %P 129-147 %G eng %N January