@article {218871,
	title = {Institutions and Trust: Implications for Preferences, Beliefs and Behavior},
	journal = {Rationality and Society},
	volume = {19},
	number = {1},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {99-135},
	abstract = {Institutions matter - but how? This article employs experiments to examine whether institutions only affect trust and trustworthiness behavior by changing constraints and thereby the beliefs people hold about others{\textquoteright} behavior, as commonly assumed in a rational choice framework, or also by influencing preferences. In a within-subject design, we confront people with an anonymous one-shot trust game, a one-shot game with pre-play communication, post-play communication and a post-play punishment option and a finitely repeated game. Institutions increasing the cost of betrayal as compared to an anonymous one-shot game affect people{\textquoteright}s beliefs and enhance their willingness to trust and be trustworthy. However, all settings that offer tighter institutional constraints compared to the anonymous one-shot game decrease intrinsically motivated trust. They do not influence trustworthiness. Thus, institutions may also affect preferences. The {\textquoteleft}crowding-out{\textquoteright} of intrinsic trust is of concern as it has been found to be associated with economic performance and democracy.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463107075110 },
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Yael Baytelman}
}
