@article {bohnet_trust_2003,
	title = {Trust, Risk and Betrayal},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
	volume = {55},
	number = {4},
	year = {2003},
	month = {oct},
	pages = {467{\textendash}484},
	publisher = {Social Science Research Network},
	type = {{SSRN} Scholarly Paper},
	address = {Rochester, {NY}},
	abstract = {Using experiments, we examine whether the decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction is equivalent to taking a risky bet, or if a trust decision entails an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal. We compare a binary-choice Trust game with a structurally identical, binary-choice Risky Dictator game with good or bad outcomes. We elicit individuals{\textquoteright} minimum acceptable probabilities (MAPs) of getting the good outcome such that they would prefer the chance to the sure payoff. First movers state higher {MAPs} in the Trust game than in situations where nature determines the outcome.},
	keywords = {Advocacy and persuasion, conflict management, econometric theory, economics, ethics, law and legal Institutions, leadership, political philosophy},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.004},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Richard J. Zeckhauser}
}
