@workingpaper {683125,
	title = {Can gender and race dynamics in performance appraisals be disrupted? The case of anchoring},
	year = {Working Paper},
	abstract = {
	Performance reviews in firms are common but controversial. Managers{\textquoteright} subjective appraisals of their employees{\textquoteright} performance and employees{\textquoteright} self-evaluations might be affected by demographic characteristics. As self-evaluations are typically shared with managers before they rate employees, social influence via anchoring may also contribute to gender or race differences in performance ratings. Analyzing the data of a multi-national financial services firm, we find gender and intersectionality gaps in self-ratings as well as race and intersectionality gaps in manager ratings, leading to female employees of color being assigned the lowest final ratings. We evaluate a mechanism that could disrupt these dynamics: a quasi-exogenous shock leading to self-evaluations not being shared with managers before they appraised employees. This intervention induced {\textquotedblleft}de-anchoring,{\textquotedblright} leading to lower average manager ratings. However, it did not change overall gender or race dynamics as managers imposed their own gender and race effects (independent of self-evaluations), and also had access to previous years{\textquoteright} ratings for most employees. To exclude potential anchors from the past, we focus on employees with no history in the firm during their first year of employment. Among these newcomers, employees who traditionally have given themselves the lowest self-ratings{\textemdash}women of color{\textemdash}benefitted most from the intervention. The intervention did not, however, close the manager-induced race gap overall. These race dynamics were particularly pronounced in the US, negatively affecting Black, Asian and Latinx employees. Counterfactual simulations suggest that 22-28\% of Black employees{\textquoteright} manager ratings would have to be increased for this race gap to disappear. \&nbsp;

},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Oliver P. Hauser and Ariella Kristal}
}
@article {632425,
	title = {Informational inequity aversion and performance},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
	volume = {159},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {181-191},
	abstract = {In labor markets, some individuals have, or believe to have, less data on the determinants of success than others, e.g., due to differential access to technology or role models. We provide experimental evidence on when and how informational differences translate into performance differences. In a laboratory tournament setting, we varied the degree to which individuals were informed about the effort-reward relationship, and whether their competitor received the same or a different amount of information. We find performance is adversely affected only by worse relative, but not absolute, informedness. This suggests that inequity aversion applies not only to outcomes but also to information that helps achieve them, and stresses the importance of inequality in initial information conditions for performance-dependent outcomes.},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300368?dgcid=coauthor},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Farzad Saidi}
}
@article {632418,
	title = {Descriptive Norms and Gender Diversity: Reactance from Men},
	journal = {Journal of Behavioral Public Administration},
	volume = {2},
	number = {1},
	year = {2019},
	abstract = {Descriptive norms provide social information on others{\textquoteright} typical behaviors and have been shown to lead to prescriptive outcomes by {\textquotedblleft}nudging{\textquotedblright} individuals towards norm compliance in numerous settings. This paper examines whether descriptive norms lead to prescriptive outcomes in the gender domain. We examine whether such social information can influence the gender distribution of candidates selected by employers in a hiring context.\&nbsp; We conduct a series of laboratory experiments where {\textquoteleft}employers{\textquoteright} decide how many male and female {\textquoteleft}employees{\textquoteright} they want to hire for male- and female-typed tasks and examine whether employers are more likely to hire more of one gender when informed that others have done so as well. In this set-up descriptive norms do not have prescriptive effects. In fact, descriptive norms do not affect female employers{\textquoteright} hiring decisions at all and lead to norm reactance and backlash from male employers when informed that others have hired more women.},
	url = {http://journal-bpa.org/index.php/jbpa/article/view/51},
	author = {Maliheh Paryavi and Iris Bohnet, and Alexandra van Geen}
}
@inbook {360546,
	title = {Improving Outcomes in the Trust Game: The Games People Choose in Oman, the United States, and Vietnam},
	booktitle = {Trust in Social Dilemmas},
	year = {2017},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	address = {Oxford},
	abstract = {This chapter shows how people in three culturally different contexts, Oman, the United States and Vietnam, deal with trust situations. We offer two trust-fostering mechanisms principals can choose from{\textemdash}a mitigation-based approach, decreasing the principal{\textquoteright}s cost of betrayal, and a prevention-based approach, increasing the agent{\textquoteright}s benefits of trustworthiness. We refer to the former as {\textquotedblleft}insurance{\textquotedblright} and to the latter as {\textquotedblleft}bonus.{\textquotedblright} We measure what choices principals make, how agents respond to them and how both parties{\textquoteright} behaviors compare to a situation where insurance or bonus was assigned by chance.\&nbsp; We find some differences among the studied countries; but overall, our results show strong similarities. About two-thirds of our principals prefer the safety of the insurance mechanism.\&nbsp; However, by insuring themselves, they make it less likely for their trust to be rewarded. The remaining one-third of our principals prefer sending a bonus, making themselves vulnerable to the agent. This vulnerability pays off by tripling the likelihood of trustworthiness compared to when insurance is chosen. Still, when a bonus is chosen, only about half of the agents reward trust. This fraction is not sufficient to make the principals whole.\&nbsp; In terms of expected payoffs principals would be better off with insurance.},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Benedikt Herrmann and Maliheh Paryavi and Anh Tran and Richard Zeckhauser}
}
@book {405861,
	title = {What Works: Gender Equality by Design},
	year = {2016},
	publisher = {Harvard University Press},
	organization = {Harvard University Press},
	abstract = {


What Works
Gender Equality by Design
Iris Bohnet



\&nbsp;




Gender equality is a moral and a business imperative. But unconscious bias holds us back, and de-biasing people{\textquoteright}s minds has proven to be difficult and expensive. Diversity training programs have had limited success, and individual effort alone often invites backlash. Behavioral design offers a new solution. By de-biasing organizations instead of individuals, we can make smart changes that have big impacts. Presenting research-based solutions, Iris Bohnet hands us the tools we need to move the needle in classrooms and boardrooms, in hiring and promotion, benefiting businesses, governments, and the lives of millions.

What Works is built on new insights into the human mind. It draws on data collected by companies, universities, and governments in Australia, India, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia, and other countries, often in randomized controlled trials. It points out dozens of evidence-based interventions that could be adopted right now and demonstrates how research is addressing gender bias, improving lives and performance. What Works shows what more can be done{\textemdash}often at shockingly low cost and surprisingly high speed.

Product Details
HARDCOVER$26.95 {\textbullet} {\textsterling}19.95 {\textbullet} {\texteuro}24.50ISBN 9780674089037Publication: March 2016400 pages


Related Subjects

BUSINESS \&amp; ECONOMICS: Organizational Behavior
BUSINESS \&amp; ECONOMICS: Economics: Theory
PSYCHOLOGY: Industrial \&amp; Organizational Psychology
SOCIAL SCIENCE: Gender Studies








About This Book
About the Authors
Reviews
Table of Contents


},
	url = {http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674089037},
	author = {Iris Bohnet,}
}
@article {173701,
	title = {When Performance Trumps Gender Bias. Joint Versus Separate Evaluation},
	journal = {Management Science},
	volume = {62},
	number = {5},
	year = {2016},
	month = {May 2016},
	pages = {1225-1234},
	abstract = {We examine a new intervention to overcome gender biases in hiring, promotion, and job assignments: an {\textquotedblleft}evaluation nudge,{\textquotedblright} in which people are evaluated jointly rather than separately regarding their future performance. Evaluators are more likely to focus on individual performance in joint than in separate evaluation and on group stereotypes in separate than in joint evaluation, making joint evaluation the money-maximizing evaluation procedure. Our findings are compatible with a behavioral model of information processing and with the System 1/System 2 distinction in behavioral decision research where people have two distinct modes of thinking that are activated under certain conditions.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2186},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Alexandra van Geen and Max H. Bazerman}
}
@inbook {218816,
	title = {The Elasticity of Trust: How to Promote Trust in the Arab Middle East and in the United States},
	booktitle = {Restoring Trust in Organizations and Leaders: Enduring Challenges and Emerging Answers},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	address = {Oxford},
	abstract = {To trust is to risk. When we lend someone money, we make ourselves vulnerable, hoping that the borrower will reward our trust and return the money at a later stage, possibly with interest or a reciprocal favor added. Generally, people are more willing to engage in a risky activity, such as buying a stock or starting a business, the greater the expected returns from the activity. This chapter examines whether willingness to trust follows the same logic, that is, whether it responds to changes in the expected value of trusting, much like willingness to take risk responds to changes in the expected value of risk taking in three countries of the Arab Middle East, namely, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and in the United States. The chapter shows that trust is promoted very differently in the Middle East than in the United States.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756087.001.0001},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Benedikt Herrmann and Mohamad Al-Issis and Andrea Robbett and Khalid Al-Yahya and Richard Zeckhauser}
}
@inbook {218811,
	title = {Trust, Distrust and Bargaining},
	booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	address = {Oxford},
	abstract = {
This article compares the framing of trusting actions and the role of extending trust versus the lack of distrust in achieving exchange efficiencies. It uses experiments to investigate empirically the impact of the presumption of trust. It also reports new evidence comparing behavior in the distrust game (DTG) and the trust game (TG). The data indicates that the parties to a negotiation should build trust incrementally as healthy skepticism signals merely a lack of trust and not a betrayal signaled by loss of trust. In the experiments, the default of full trust increased efficiency and inequality, with trustors much worse off than trustees, and much worse off than they would have been if they had withdrawn all trust. Trust building is important for the parties to be able to share information on issues and underlying interests.
},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199730858.013.0013},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Stephan Meier}
}
@newspaperarticle {173726,
	title = {Gender Equality: A Nudge in the Right Direction},
	journal = {The Financial Times},
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {It is not always easy to make what is seen to be the right choice {\textendash} choosing an apple over a bar of chocolate, or paying money into a savings account rather than buying a new pair of shoes {\textendash} but there might be a solution, and it may only take a nudge.},
	url = {http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/59d7d2f6-d6a7-11df-98a9-00144feabdc0.html$\#$axzz34pkXtS00},
	author = {Iris Bohnet,}
}
@article {173721,
	title = {"Trust and the Reference Points for Trustworthiness in Gulf and Western Countries."},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
	volume = {CXXV},
	number = {2},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {811-828},
	abstract = {Why is private investment so low in Gulf compared to Western countries? We investigate cross-regional differences in trust and reference points for trustworthiness as possible factors. Experiments controlling for cross-regional differences in institutions and beliefs about trustworthiness reveal that Gulf citizens pay much more than Westerners to avoid trusting, and hardly respond when returns to trusting change. These differences can be explained by subjects{\textquoteright} gain/loss utility relative to their region{\textquoteright}s reference point for trustworthiness. The relation-based production of trust in the Gulf induces higher levels of trustworthiness, albeit within groups, than the rule-based interactions prevalent in the West.},
	url = {http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/125/2/811.short},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Benedikt Herrmann and Richard Zeckhauser}
}
@inbook {218831,
	title = {Experiments},
	booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {639-665},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	address = {Oxford},
	abstract = {Analytical sociology is a strategy for understanding the social world. It is concerned with explaining important social facts such as network structures, patterns of residential segregation, typical beliefs, cultural tastes, and common ways of acting. It explains such facts by detailing in clear and precise ways the mechanisms through which the social facts were brought about. Making sense of the relationship between micro and macro thus is one of the central concerns of analytical sociology. The approach is a contemporary incarnation of Robert K. Merton{\textquoteright}s notion of middle-range theory and presents a vision of sociological theory as a tool-box of semi-general theories each of which is adequate for explaining certain types of phenomena. The Handbook brings together some of the most prominent sociologists in the world. Some of the chapters focus on action and interaction as the cogs and wheels of social processes, while others consider the dynamic social processes that these actions and interactions bring about.},
	url = {http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199215362.do},
	author = {Iris Bohnet,},
	editor = {Peter Bearman and Peter Hedstr{\"o}m}
}
@article {218821,
	title = {Exploring gendered behavior in the field with experiments: Why public goods are provided by women in a Nairobi slum},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization },
	volume = {70},
	number = {1},
	year = {2009},
	pages = { 1-9},
	abstract = {Women, and particularly women in all-female groups, appear to be especially adept at providing public goods in developing countries. We use a one-shot Public Goods game to explore the effect of sex and a group{\textquoteright}s sex composition on the voluntary provision of public goods in a Nairobi slum. Sex heterogeneity hurts the voluntary provision of public goods because women{\textemdash}but not men{\textemdash}contribute less in mixed-sex than same-sex groups. Women contribute as much as men in same-sex groups. This result is driven by women{\textquoteright}s pessimism and men{\textquoteright}s optimism about others{\textquoteright} contributions in mixed-sex groups rather than by gendered social preferences.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.12.006},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Fiona Greig}
}
@inbook {218836,
	title = {The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences.},
	booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences. },
	year = {2009},
	pages = {179-180},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	address = {Oxford},
	abstract = {Few areas have witnessed the type of growth we have seen in the affective sciences in the past decades. Across psychology, philosophy, economics, and neuroscience, there has been an explosion of interest in the topic of emotion and affect.},
	url = {http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780198569633.do},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Stephan Meier},
	editor = {David Sander and Klaus R. Scherer}
}
@article {218851,
	title = {Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {98},
	number = {1},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {294-310},
	abstract = {Due to betrayal aversion, people take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. Individuals in six countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States) confronted a binary-choice trust game or a risky decision offering the same payoffs and probabilities. Risk acceptance was calibrated by asking individuals their "minimum acceptable probability" (MAP) for securing the high payoff that would make them willing to accept the risky rather than the sure payoff. People{\textquoteright}s MAPs are generally higher when another person, rather than nature, determines the outcome. This indicates betrayal aversion.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.294},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Fiona Greig and Benedikt Herrmann and Richard Zeckhauser}
}
@article {218856,
	title = {Special Section: Gender in Negotiation Introduction},
	journal = {Negotiation Journal},
	volume = {24},
	number = {4},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {389{\textendash}392},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00193.x},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Hannah Riley Bowles}
}
@article {218861,
	title = {Is There Reciprocity In A Reciprocal-exchange Economy? Evidence Of Gendered Norms From A Slum In Nairobi, Kenya},
	journal = {Economic Inquiry},
	volume = {46},
	number = {1},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {77-83},
	abstract = {Norms of reciprocity help enforce cooperative agreements in bilateral sequential exchange. We examine the norms that apply in a reciprocal-exchange economy. In our one-shot investment game in a Nairobi slum, people adhered to the norm of {\textquotedblleft}balanced reciprocity,{\textquotedblright} which obligates quid-pro-quo returns for any level of trust. The norm is gendered, with people more likely to comply when confronted with women rather than men, and differs from {\textquotedblleft}conditional reciprocity,{\textquotedblright} prevalent in developed countries, according to which greater trust is rewarded with proportionally larger returns. Balanced reciprocity produces less trust and trustworthiness and smaller gains from trade than conditional reciprocity. (JEL C72, C91)},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00081.x},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Fiona Greig}
}
@inbook {218846,
	title = {Trust in experiments.},
	booktitle = {The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics},
	year = {2008},
	publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
	organization = {Palgrave Macmillan},
	edition = {2nd Edition},
	address = {Basingstoke},
	abstract = {Trust is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another person{\textquoteright}s actions, based on beliefs about that person{\textquoteright}s trustworthiness. This article focuses on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness between two people, a trustor and a trustee, as measured in laboratory experiments. A trustee behaves trustworthily if he voluntarily refrains from taking advantage of the trustor{\textquoteright}s vulnerability. Trust applies to all transactions where the outcome is partly under the control of another person and not fully contractible. The article discusses measurement issues, the motives for and influences on trust and trustworthiness (incentives, repetition and demographic variables) and questions of external validity.},
	url = {http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_T000241\&edition=current\&q=iris\%20bohnet\&topicid=\&result_number=1},
	author = {Iris Bohnet,},
	editor = {Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume}
}
@article {218871,
	title = {Institutions and Trust: Implications for Preferences, Beliefs and Behavior},
	journal = {Rationality and Society},
	volume = {19},
	number = {1},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {99-135},
	abstract = {Institutions matter - but how? This article employs experiments to examine whether institutions only affect trust and trustworthiness behavior by changing constraints and thereby the beliefs people hold about others{\textquoteright} behavior, as commonly assumed in a rational choice framework, or also by influencing preferences. In a within-subject design, we confront people with an anonymous one-shot trust game, a one-shot game with pre-play communication, post-play communication and a post-play punishment option and a finitely repeated game. Institutions increasing the cost of betrayal as compared to an anonymous one-shot game affect people{\textquoteright}s beliefs and enhance their willingness to trust and be trustworthy. However, all settings that offer tighter institutional constraints compared to the anonymous one-shot game decrease intrinsically motivated trust. They do not influence trustworthiness. Thus, institutions may also affect preferences. The {\textquoteleft}crowding-out{\textquoteright} of intrinsic trust is of concern as it has been found to be associated with economic performance and democracy.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463107075110 },
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Yael Baytelman}
}
@article {218866,
	title = {Status and distrust: The relevance of inequality and betrayal aversion},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
	volume = {28},
	number = {2},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {197{\textendash}213},
	abstract = {Trust involves a willingness to accept vulnerability, comprised of the risk of being worse off than by not trusting, the risk of being worse off than the trusted party (disadvantageous inequality), and the risk of being betrayed by the trusted party. We examine how people{\textquoteright}s status, focusing on sex, race, age and religion, affects their willingness to accept these three risks. We experimentally measure people{\textquoteright}s willingness to accept risk in a decision problem, a risky dictator game, and a trust game, and compare responses across games. Groups typically considered having lower status in the US {\textendash} women, minorities, young adults and non-Protestants {\textendash} are averse to disadvantageous inequality while higher status groups {\textendash} men, Caucasians, middle-aged people and Protestants {\textendash} dislike being betrayed.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2006.06.003},
	author = {Kessely Hong and Iris Bohnet,}
}
@booklet {bohnet_how_2006,
	title = {How Much Should You Trust? - Harvard Business Review},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {Much is made of the necessity for trust in productive negotiations. But, the authors contend, people who take trust for granted at the start of a negotiation will be much worse off than if they strive to build trust incrementally and naturally over the course of a relationship. How do you go about building a relationship you can trust? The authors offer guidelines for setting ground rules, creating contingent agreements, assessing whether the degree of trust between partners is justified, and adjusting that assessment as needed.},
	url = {https://hbr.org/product/how-much-should-you-trust/N0603C-PDF-ENG},
	author = {Iris Bohnet,}
}
@article {ashraf_decomposing_2006,
	title = {Decomposing trust and trustworthiness},
	journal = {Experimental Economics},
	volume = {9},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {193{\textendash}208},
	abstract = {What motivates people to trust and be trustworthy? Is trust solely {\textquotedblleft}calculative,{\textquotedblright} based on the expectation of trustworthiness, and trustworthiness only reciprocity? Employing a within-subject design, we run investment and dictator game experiments in Russia, South Africa and the United States. Additionally, we measured risk preferences and expectations of return. Expectations of return account for most of the variance in trust, but unconditional kindness also matters. Variance in trustworthiness is mainly accounted for by unconditional kindness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively small role. There exists some heterogeneity in motivation but people behave surprisingly similarly in the three countries studied.},
	keywords = {Cross-cultural experiments, Economic Theory, Methodology and the History of Economic Thought, Microeconomics, Operations Research/Decision Theory, Public Finance \& Economics, Reciprocity, Social preferences, Trust},
	issn = {1386-4157, 1573-6938},
	doi = {10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4},
	url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4},
	author = {Nava Ashraf and Iris Bohnet, and Piankov, Nikita}
}
@article {bohnet_compensating_2005,
	title = {Compensating the cooperators: is sorting in the prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma possible?},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
	volume = {56},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {61{\textendash}76},
	abstract = {Choice between different versions of a game may provide a means of sorting. We experimentally investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma game in which the cost of unilateral cooperation is lower than in the status quo version separates (conditional) cooperators from money maximizers. After the auction, significantly more subjects cooperate in the modified {PD} than in the status quo {PD}, whereas there is no difference between cooperation rates if the two versions of the game were assigned to participants. However, sorting is incomplete and cooperation deteriorates over time.},
	keywords = {Auctions, Conditional cooperation, Experiments, Prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma game, sorting},
	issn = {0167-2681},
	doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2003.04.002},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268103002026},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and K{\"u}bler, Dorothea}
}
@article {bohnet_learning_2005,
	title = {Learning Trust},
	journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
	volume = {3},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {322{\textendash}329},
	abstract = {We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers{\textquoteright} trading history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers{\textquoteright} trading history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard. ({JEL}: C72, C91, L14)},
	issn = {1542-4774},
	doi = {10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.322},
	url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.322/abstract},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Harmgart, Heike and (ucl), Steffen Huck and Tyran, Jean-Robert}
}
@booklet {bohnet_status_2005,
	title = {Status Anxiety - Harvard Business Review},
	year = {2005},
	abstract = {Like it or not, concerns about status pervade our negotiations. Most of us are less likely to accept a job offer, even one that would be a substantial improvement on our current job, if it is worse than an offer made to a peer. Even when hammering out seemingly dry, factual purchasing terms, we take time to look around and see how others in our shoes are doing. The desire to achieve better outcomes than others{\textendash}from friends to coworkers to competitors{\textendash}can cause you to leave real money on the table. This article introduces you to the basics of status concerns, shows you when status issues are likely to crop up during negotiation, and teaches you how to use status concerns to improve your negotiated outcomes.},
	url = {https://hbr.org/product/status-anxiety/an/N0511B-HCB-ENG},
	author = {Iris Bohnet,}
}
@article {bohnet_repetition_2004,
	title = {Repetition and Reputation: Implications for Trust and Trustworthiness When Institutions Change},
	journal = {The American Economic Review},
	volume = {94},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {362{\textendash}366},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592911},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Huck, Steffen}
}
@article {bohnet_social_2004,
	title = {Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining},
	journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
	volume = {106},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {495{\textendash}510},
	abstract = {Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer-specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is \$30{\textemdash}ex ante it was either \$15 or \$30{\textemdash}affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people{\textquoteright}s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.},
	keywords = {asymmetric information, C91, Experimental bargaining, social comparisons, ultimatum game},
	issn = {1467-9442},
	doi = {10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00376.x},
	url = {http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00376.x/abstract},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Richard Zeckhauser}
}
@article {bohnet_trust_2003,
	title = {Trust, Risk and Betrayal},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
	volume = {55},
	number = {4},
	year = {2003},
	month = {oct},
	pages = {467{\textendash}484},
	publisher = {Social Science Research Network},
	type = {{SSRN} Scholarly Paper},
	address = {Rochester, {NY}},
	abstract = {Using experiments, we examine whether the decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction is equivalent to taking a risky bet, or if a trust decision entails an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal. We compare a binary-choice Trust game with a structurally identical, binary-choice Risky Dictator game with good or bad outcomes. We elicit individuals{\textquoteright} minimum acceptable probabilities (MAPs) of getting the good outcome such that they would prefer the chance to the sure payoff. First movers state higher {MAPs} in the Trust game than in situations where nature determines the outcome.},
	keywords = {Advocacy and persuasion, conflict management, econometric theory, economics, ethics, law and legal Institutions, leadership, political philosophy},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.004},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Richard J. Zeckhauser}
}
@article {bohnet_more_2000,
	title = {More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding},
	journal = {The American Political Science Review},
	volume = {95},
	number = {1},
	year = {2000},
	pages = {131-144 },
	publisher = {Social Science Research Network},
	type = {{SSRN} Scholarly Paper},
	address = {Rochester, {NY}},
	abstract = {Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law", it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. This paper studies a contractual relationship where the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation and find that economic incentives have a non-monotonic impact on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities. Trustworthiness is "crowded in" with weak and "crowded out" with medium enforcement. In a laboratory experiment we test our model{\textquoteright}s implications and find support for the crowding prediction. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly Communist countries.},
	keywords = {Bruno S. Frey, Iris Bohnet, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Steffen Huck, Trust and Crowding, {SSRN}},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117633},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Frey, Bruno S. and Huck, Steffen}
}
@article {bohnet_social_1999,
	title = {Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment},
	journal = {American Economic Review},
	volume = {89},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {335{\textendash}339},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.89.1.335},
	url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.89.1.335},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Frey, Bruno S.}
}
@article {bohnet_sound_1999,
	title = {The sound of silence in prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma and dictator games},
	journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
	volume = {38},
	year = {1999},
	month = {jan},
	pages = {43{\textendash}57},
	abstract = {Communication increases contributions to public goods. Our experimental results indicate that communication is not always required. Silent identification suffices to raise solidarity in prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma and dictator games. Increases in solidarity are not only due to expectations of reciprocity. While mutual identification induces individuals to converge to the social norm, the spread of the distribution of choices increases with one-way identification and with communication. As others are no longer faceless entities, one-way identification decreases social distance, inducing interaction-specific solutions. Communication allows more information to be transferred and, therefore, more scope for abandoning the norms.},
	keywords = {Anonymity, Communication, Dictator game, Fairness, Prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma},
	issn = {0167-2681},
	doi = {10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00121-8},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268198001218},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Frey, Bruno S.}
}
@article {oberholzer-gee_fairness_1997,
	title = {Fairness and Competence in Democratic Decisions},
	journal = {Public Choice},
	volume = {91},
	year = {1997},
	month = {apr},
	pages = {89{\textendash}105},
	abstract = {The price system is generally thought to be the epitome of efficiency. In some cases, however, lotteries are preferred to the market as a social decision-making system for reasons of fairness. As recent research has shown, neither procedure is always well accepted among the general population. We analyze the social acceptability of both mechanisms and apply our framework to the allocation of social burdens, namely the siting of nuclear waste facilities. Lotteries are only acceptable if they are applied to a set of efficient options. The market is accepted if the production of fairness precedes the use of prices.},
	issn = {0048-5829},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024204},
	author = {Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Iris Bohnet, and Frey, Bruno S.}
}
@article {bohnet_rent_1997,
	title = {Rent Leaving},
	journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics ({JITE}) / Zeitschrift f{\"u}r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft},
	volume = {153},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {711{\textendash}721},
	abstract = {
Economic rents are the driving force of market economies. Resource owners constantly look for opportunities to create and exploit economic rents which, however, in the dynamics of the market process dissipate as new entrants try to appropriate the profits. In equilibrium, economic rents are eliminated. Not so in different institutional settings. While rents in the market endogenously come and go, they are artificially created and sustained in political and bureaucratic decisionmaking. In analogy to individuals{\textquoteright} behaviour in the market, it is assumed that politicians, bureaucrats, pressure groups, voters and taxpayers strive for political rents. Rent seeking in the political arena may also increase an individual{\textquoteright}s income but in contrast to the market, is not socially beneficial. {\textquotedblleft}The term rent seeking is designed to describe behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus{\textquotedblright} (Buchanan 1980, 4).
},
	issn = {0932-4569},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40752027},
	author = {Iris Bohnet, and Frey, Bruno S.}
}
