Iris Bohnet,, & Kübler, D. (2005).
Compensating the cooperators: is sorting in the prisoner’s dilemma possible? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
56, 61–76.
Publisher's VersionAbstractChoice between different versions of a game may provide a means of sorting. We experimentally investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the cost of unilateral cooperation is lower than in the status quo version separates (conditional) cooperators from money maximizers. After the auction, significantly more subjects cooperate in the modified {PD} than in the status quo {PD}, whereas there is no difference between cooperation rates if the two versions of the game were assigned to participants. However, sorting is incomplete and cooperation deteriorates over time.
Iris Bohnet,, Harmgart, H., (ucl), S. H., & Tyran, J. - R. (2005).
Learning Trust.
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
3 322–329.
Publisher's VersionAbstractWe examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers' trading history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers' trading history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard. ({JEL}: C72, C91, L14)
Iris Bohnet,. (2005).
Status Anxiety - Harvard Business Review.
Publisher's VersionAbstractLike it or not, concerns about status pervade our negotiations. Most of us are less likely to accept a job offer, even one that would be a substantial improvement on our current job, if it is worse than an offer made to a peer. Even when hammering out seemingly dry, factual purchasing terms, we take time to look around and see how others in our shoes are doing. The desire to achieve better outcomes than others–from friends to coworkers to competitors–can cause you to leave real money on the table. This article introduces you to the basics of status concerns, shows you when status issues are likely to crop up during negotiation, and teaches you how to use status concerns to improve your negotiated outcomes.