Research

Working Paper

Road transport is a major source of both greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution. Large vehicles cause disproportionate damages. Research and policy prioritize improving vehicle quality rather than changing driver behavior, even though driving techniques substantially affect fuel consumption and emissions. I conducted a field experiment in Karnataka, India, randomly assigning public sector bus drivers to two interventions: a training program on safe and fuel efficient driving, and a financial incentives scheme for achieving fuel efficiency targets. The training program increased fuel efficiency in the short term for four months and had no effect thereafter. The incentives scheme increased fuel efficiency for a twelve month period. I find no evidence of any complementarities between training and incentives. Training increased fuel efficiency by a marginally significant 0.0186 kilometers per liter for four months, which saved 0.19\% of baseline fuel consumption over twelve months, and had a cost-effectiveness of 3.12. Incentives increased fuel efficiency by a statistically significant 0.0168 kilometers per liter for twelve months, which saved 0.35\% of baseline fuel consumption, and had a cost-effectiveness of 4.22. Along with the high return on investment from fuel savings, the interventions generated positive externalities from reduced vehicle emissions. 

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In Preparation
Harish, Santosh, and Janhavi Nilekani. In Preparation. “Evaluating Potential Particulate Matter Control Policies for Indian Industrial Plants”. Abstract

Using survey data of 1000 small and medium Indian industrial plants, we empirically estimate the aggregate abatement and costs from several potential particulate matter pollution control policies. We create a static model that treats each firm as a compliant risk-neutral cost-minimizing agent that selects abatement technologies and operating practices in order to minimize expected abatement costs, subject to regulatory constraints. We estimate aggregate outcomes under a variety of potential policies.

2015
Greenstone, Michael, Janhavi Nilekani, Rohini Pande, Nicholas Ryan, Anant Sudarshan, and Anish Sugathan. 2015. “Lower Pollution, Longer Lives: Life Expectancy Gains if India Reduced Particulate Matter Pollution.” Economic and Political Weekly 50 (8): 40-46. Publisher's Version Abstract
India's population is exposed to dangerously high levels of air pollution. Using a combination of ground-level in situ measurements and satellite-based remote sensing data, this paper estimates that 660 million people, over half of India's population, live in areas that exceed the Indian National Ambient Air Quality Standard for fine particulate pollution. Reducing pollution in these areas to achieve the standard would, we estimate, increase life expectancy for these Indians by 3.2 years on average for a total of 2.1 billion life years. We outline directions for environmental policy to start achieving these gains. 
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2013
Dunning, Thad, and Janhavi Nilekani. 2013. “Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils.” American Political Science Review 107 (1): 35-56. Publisher's Version Abstract
Ethnic quotas are often expected to induce distribution of material benefits to members of disadvantaged groups. Yet, the presence of an ethnic quota does not imply that political mobilization takes place along ethnic lines: Cross-cutting affiliations within multi-ethnic party organizations may lessen the tendency of politicians to target benefits to particular ethnic groups. In this article, we evaluate the impact of quotas for the presidencies of village councils in India, a subject of considerable recent research. Drawing on fine-grained information from surveys of voters, council members, presidents, and bureaucrats and using a natural experiment to isolate the effects of quotas in the states of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Bihar, we find weak distributive effects of quotas for marginalized castes and tribes, but suggestive evidence of the importance of partisanship. We then use survey experiments to compare the influence of party and caste on voting preferences and expectations of benefit receipt. Our results suggest that especially when politicians have dynamic political incentives to allocate benefits along party lines, cross-cutting partisan ties can blunt the distributive impact of ethnic quotas.
The paper,  background materials and online appendix are available from Professor Thad Dunning's website.