Research

Working Paper
Luna J. Constituency Service in Ghana. Working Paper.Abstract

Constituency service is an important duty for politicians. Numerous scholars argue that this duty is critical for reelection (Fiorina 1977, Fenno 1978). In the African context, constituency service is also important for both electoral and social reasons, but research on this topic primarily focuses on national legislators. Based on my fieldwork observations, I argue that citizens in sub–Saharan Africa often turn to local politicians for a variety of reasons. Drawing from a survey administered to 2809 Ghanaian cocoa farmers, I employ a non-parametric matching design to determine which factors drive these farmers to seek help from various local leaders. I find nuanced results across treatments spanning economic, political and demographic dimensions. The results of this research hold numerous implications for scholars and practitioners. 

luna_2015_constituencyservice.pdf
Luna J. Judicial Independence in an African State. Working Paper.Abstract

Judicial independence, that is, the ability for a court to decide cases free from political influence, is an important tenet of democratic governance. This topic, however, is understudied in the African context. Drawing on 540 Supreme Court of Ghana opinions issued between 1960–2005, which span authoritarian and democratic regimes, I apply methods of automated–text analysis to characterize cases covering Court jurisdiction, property, criminal and civil law. I find evidence that post-1992 Court cases on jurisdiction and civil law exhibit greater adherence to the Constitution of Ghana, plausibly indicating independence from external forces. 

luna_2015_judicialindependence.pdf
In Preparation
Luna J. Political Finance in a Developing State (Dissertation Book Project). In Preparation.Abstract

How do politicians finance campaigns and other political activities in Ghana?  I identify four sets of actors--politicians, bureaucrats, construction contractors and political--party chairs--who collude to extract financial resources from the state. These resources are taken from the public--procurement process and legitimized by the bureaucrat's monopoly over expertise.  Politicians and bureaucrats oversee procurement committees across the country, and award contracts to favored contractors who return kickbacks. Politicians use these funds to pay political--party executives, who mobilize party operatives to canvas for votes. If a politician does not pay the party chair sufficiently, that chair can ruin the politician's political future. Ultimately, this system diminishes the quality of development, and I examine various implications through ethnographic, statistical and experimental methods.

2013
Gyimah-Boadi E, Armah-Attoh D, Awal M, Luna J. Oil & Mining Countries: Transparency Low, Immunity High.; 2013. ab_r5_policypaperno6.pdf