@workingpaper {681070,
	title = {Autocrats in crisis mode: Strategic favoritism during economic shocks},
	year = {Working Paper},
	type = {Job Market Paper},
	abstract = {
	Do autocrats favor their supporters during economic shocks? I introduce a model of redistribution and regime stability that shows how in-group favors can be a strategic response to economic downturns. The model predicts that, as economic shocks worsen, autocrats may favor their supporters and confront opposition protests to save on appeasement costs. I test the model{\textquoteright}s main results in two empirical settings. First, I focus on the Venezuelan blackouts of 2019. Consistent with the model, the Maduro regime was more likely to exempt regime-supporting regions affected by the blackout from later power rationing. Moreover, blackout-induced protests were limited to opposition-leaning regions. I then focus on negative rainfall shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Droughts magnify differences in development, protests and state-coercion outcomes in favor of leaders{\textquoteright} home regions.

},
	url = {https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/josemorales-arilla/files/jmp_jma_latest.pdf},
	author = {Jose Morales-Arilla}
}
