# Research

**Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler’s Fallacy in Optimal-Stopping Problems**, December 2018.

[download pdf] [online appendix] [arXiv]

### Abstract

**Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning **(with Krishna Dasaratha).

Revision requested at *Theoretical Economics*, August 2018.

[download pdf] [slides] [arXiv] [pre-registration]

### Abstract [click to expand]

**Player-Compatible Equilibrium** (with Drew Fudenberg), December 2018.

[download pdf] [arXiv]

### Abstract [click to expand]

*Player-Compatible Equilibrium*(PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' “trembles” onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite. We show that rational learning and some near-optimal heuristics imply our compatibility restrictions in a steady-state setting.

**Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games **(with Drew Fudenberg).*Econometrica*, July 2018.

[download pdf] [online appendix] [publisher's DOI] [arXiv]

### Abstract [click to expand]

**Learning and Equilibrium Refinements in Signaling Games **(with Drew Fudenberg), September 2017.

[download pdf] [arXiv]

### Abstract [click to expand]

**Bayesian Posteriors for Arbitrarily Rare Events** (with Drew Fudenberg and Lorens Imhof).*Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, May 2017.

[download pdf] [publisher's DOI] [arXiv]

### Abstract [click to expand]

**Differentially Private and Incentive Compatible Recommendation System for the Adoption of Network Goods** (with Xiaosheng Mu).*Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’14)*, June 2014.

[download pdf] [slides] [publisher's DOI]