This research note examines a key implication of informational theories of crisis bargaining—that asymmetric adversaries generate more uncertainty than symmetric ones—through an empirical analysis of 188 National Intelligence Estimates. Using sentiment analysis and keyword assisted topic modeling, I find that intelligence analysts perceive symmetric adversaries to be at least as uncertain as asymmetric ones, even as analysts perceive the former as more threatening. The psychology of uncertainty assessment offers insight into the gap between theoretical and perceived uncertainty. I connect these observations to a puzzle in global patterns of conflict duration, namely why asymmetric wars have grown longer over time, while symmetric ones have not.

Counterinsurgency campaigns led by foreign powers are often wrought with successive failures to adapt to threats posed by non-state adversaries. Why do policymakers face barriers to learning in counterinsurgency? I introduce a new theory of counterinsurgent learning that emphasizes the tightness of social norms in national security organizations. Changes in the strength of social norms, specifically those related to conformity and deference to authority, impact learning by shaping the sharpness of insurgent signals and the weight of prior beliefs about an insurgent threat. Relying upon recently declassified documents, I process trace these mechanisms, as well as alternative ones on rebel technology and force structure, through a case study of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. I also test key hypotheses with cross-national data on wars of counterinsurgency. This research has implications for the literature on organizational learning, threat assessment, and counterinsurgency.

How do state officials evaluate the risk of international terrorism and insurgency? Existing explanations predict that state officials rely on observable behaviors of strength to guide threat assessments, but these indicators often serve as poor proxies of prospective capabilities and produce noisy signals instead. We develop an alternative argument that -- under large amounts of uncertainty -- officials evaluate the risk of future violence through the construction and application of a threat schema. We identify two factors governing the construction of these schema: retrievability of comparable cases and information processing techniques. We examine our theory through a case study of the 1979 Herat Rebellion in Afghanistan, where Soviet and American officials reached opposing conclusions about the conict's prospective trajectory despite possessing similar information. Our findings advance understanding about foreign policy decision-making and threat assessment for terrorism and insurgency.

From a historical perspective, presidents have frequently directed the use of military force without explicit permission from Congress. Yet, presidents still court legislative approval on select occasions. Why do presidents sometimes seek congressional authorization and other times do not? I explain authorization-seeking behavior according to variations in presidential bargaining strength. I argue that both weak and strong presidents prefer authorization-seeking; by obtaining congressional backing, weak presidents conceal a lack of national resolve from international audiences, while strong ones use approval to enhance their coercive authority. Presidents with mid-level bargaining strength, however, prefer unilateral action; on the one hand, unilateral action may demonstrate resolve in the face of potential legislative resistance, while on the other, it avoids contentious debate that risks “muddying” the diplomatic waters. I illustrate these arguments by revisiting four prominent historical cases: the Korean War, the Gulf of Tonkin crisis, the invasion of Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf War.

Why do states no longer declare war? In a provocative analysis, Tanisha M. Fazal argues that states stopped declaring war to evade the costs of complying with the growing body of international humanitarian laws. We argue instead that post-1945 normative and legal developments that sought to prohibit war changed the meaning of war declarations in a way that made them at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. Although war-making did not end, a once routine feature of warfare came to be seen as a signal of extreme aims that could complicate escalation management and coalition building. Moreover, the United Nations (UN) system provided more desirable ways for states to justify military operations, particularly through self-defense claims. We support this argument through a reassessment of the empirical pattern of war declarations, an analysis of self-defense claims made under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and case studies of undeclared wars in the post-1945 period.