@article {688318,
	title = {Putin{\textquoteright}s take it or break it strategy in Ukraine and his perilous nuclear options},
	journal = {Taking Bearings. Harvard Blogs},
	number = {March 26},
	year = {2022},
	abstract = {Ten things to know about the war in Ukraine, including Putin{\textquoteright}s potential use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine:\&nbsp;1. Time is now an ally of Ukraine. With Western logistical support, time is now on Ukraine{\textquoteright}s side. Until recently time was viewed as something that worked against Ukraine. Given Russia{\textquoteright}s superior numbers, the defeat and occupation of Ukraine was widely viewed (myself included)\&nbsp; as just a matter of time. The stout Ukrainian resistance combined with Russian Army and Air Force arrogance and incompetence have now, however, turned time into a Ukrainian asset. Absent substantial help from China, or Putin{\textquoteright}s use of tactical nuclear weapons (for political purposes his most viable WMD option) the war has devolved into one of attrition that gives a constantly resupplied Ukraine a fighting chance.\&nbsp;2. Putin{\textquoteright}s WMD reasoning. A war of attrition increases the potential that Putin will resort to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. How likely is it that Putin might pursue a nuclear option? If Putin is irrational then rational analysis will not yield medium or high confidence assessments of his potential decisions, but one way to approach this problem is to assess negative outcomes a rational Putin might weigh in deciding whether to use a nuclear device.\&nbsp;3. Perilous options. Should Putin attempt the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, he not only faces the prospect that (1) subordinates may not follow orders, but also (2) that a nuclear weapon fizzles. If either of those things happen, it is the end of the Putin regime.\&nbsp;4. A military plundered by corruption. How much confidence does Putin have in his command and control? {\textellipsis}.\&nbsp;5. How potent is the Russian nuclear threat? There is also great uncertainty regarding the state of Russian nuclear weapons. Given the state of Russian military infrastructure and performance, it is questionable whether the Russian have adequately maintained and replenished enriched uranium or plutonium stocks. Nuclear weapons also depend on other components that degrade with time{\textellipsis} (download to read more)},
	url = {https://blogs.harvard.edu/kleelerner/putins_take_it_or_break_it_strategy_in_ukraine_and_his_perilous_nuclear_options/},
	author = {K.Lee Lerner}
}
