Recent Papers

Shepsle KA, Eguia J. Endogenous agendas and seniority advantage, in Annual Conference. New Orleans: American Political Science Association ; 2012. eguiashepslerevised81312j.pdf
Ansolabehere SD, Hersh E, Shepsle KA. Movers, Stayers, and Registration: Why Age is Correlated with Registration in the U.S. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 2012;7 :1-31. mobility_model_v6.3.pdf
Hall A, Shepsle KA. The Changing Value of Seniority in the US House: Conditional Party Government Revised. forthcoming. 2012. hall_shepsle.pdf
Shepsle K, Weingast B. Why So Much Stability?: Majority Voting, Legislative Institutions, and Gordon Tullock. Public Choice. 2012;152 (1-2) :83-95. Shepsle-Weingast_on_Tullock._Final_Version_3.22.10.pdf
Dewan T, Shepsle K. Political Economy Models of Elections. Annual Review of Political Science. 2011;14 :311-331.
Shepsle KA. William H. Riker. International Encyclopedia of Political Science. 2011. Riker_11.10.08.pdf
Shepsle KA. The Rules of the Game: What Rules? Which Game?, in prepared for the Conference on the Legacy and Work of Douglass C. North, St. Louis. November 2010. ; 2010. north_paper_2010.pdf
Muthoo A, Shepsle K. Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures. 2010. MS_Seniority_28thJuly10_1.pdf
Shepsle K. Elinor Ostrom: Uncommon. Public Choice. 2010. Ostrom_essay_2010.pdf
Shepsle KA, Muthoo A. Information, Institutions, and Constitutional Arrangements. Public Choice. 2010;144 :1-36. Muthoo-Shepsle_Public_Choice.pdf
Shepsle K, Console-Battilana S. Nominations for Sale. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2009. 413-449_JTP-339832.pdf
Shepsle KA. Dysfunctional Congress?. Boston University Law Review. 2009. SHEPSLE-1-1.pdf
Shepsle KA. Why?. In: King G, et al The Future of Political Science. ; 2009. Why_--_Verba_volume_--_King_et_al_editors_06.27.08.pdf
Shepsle KA, Dewan T, Dowding K. Rational Choice Politics (Sage 2009), 4 vols.; 2009. RAT_CH_POL_Tof_C_and_Intro_2008_.pdf
Shepsle K, Houweling RV, Abrams S, Hanson P. The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics. American Journal of Political Science. 2009.Abstract
We consider the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle and bicameralism for distributive politics, introducing the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e. that members of a state's House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations that originate in their chamber with delegation members in the other chamber. Using data that isolates appropriations of each chamber, we test a model of the strategic incentives contested credit claiming creates. Our empirical analysis indicates that the Senate electoral cycle induces a back-loading of benefi…ts to the end of senatorial terms, but that the House blunts this tendency with countercyclical appropriations. Our analysis informs our understanding of appropriations earmarking, and points a way forward in studying the larger consequences of bicameral legislatures.
Kellerman M, Shepsle KA. Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority Randomization in the U.S. House of Representatives. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 2009;4 (2) :87-101. Kellerman__Shepsle_QJPS_0402.pdf
Shepsle KA, Muthoo A. The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism. In: Helpman E Institutions and Economic Performance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press ; 2008. MuthooShepsleBICAMERALISM16thNov07-2.pdf
Shepsle KA, Rabushka A. Epilogue 2008. In: Longmans Classics in Political Science edition of Politics in Plural Societies, 2nd edition. New York: Longmans ; 2008. Rabushka-Shepsle_Epilogue_2008.pdf
Shepsle KA, Dewan T. Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part 1. British Journal of Political Science. 2008. bjpols_part_i_final_14_mar.pdf