@conference {ferreira2020credible,
	title = {Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
	series = {EC {\textquoteright}20},
	year = {2020},
	pages = {683{\textendash}-712},
	publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
	organization = {Association for Computing Machinery},
	address = {New York, NY, USA},
	keywords = {credible mechanisms, cryptographic auctions, Mechanism Design and Approximation, mechanism design with imperfect commitment, optimal auction design},
	isbn = {9781450379755},
	doi = {10.1145/3391403.3399495},
	author = {Ferreira, Matheus V. X. and Weinberg, S. Matthew}
}
