%0 Conference Paper %B 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022) %D 2022 %T Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions %A Essaidi, Meryem %A Ferreira, Matheus VX %A Weinberg, S Matthew %B 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022) %I Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik %G eng %0 Conference Paper %B Forthcoming Proceedings of the 23st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %D 2022 %T Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake %A Ferreira, Matheus V. X. %A Ye Lin Sally Hahn %A Weinberg, S. Matthew %A Catherine Yu %B Forthcoming Proceedings of the 23st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %S EC ’22 %I Association for Computing Machinery %C New York, NY, USA %G eng %0 Conference Paper %B Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Advances in Financial Technologies %D 2021 %T Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market %A Ferreira, Matheus V. X. %A Daniel J. Moroz %A David C. Parkes %A Mitchell Stern %B Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Advances in Financial Technologies %S AFT '21 %I Association for Computing Machinery %C New York, NY, USA %G eng %0 Conference Paper %B Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %D 2021 %T Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness %A Ferreira, Matheus V. X. %A Weinberg, S. Matthew %B Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %S EC '21 %I Association for Computing Machinery %C New York, NY, USA %P 433–453 %@ 9781450385541 %G eng %R 10.1145/3465456.3467636 %0 Conference Paper %B Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %D 2020 %T Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments %A Ferreira, Matheus V. X. %A Weinberg, S. Matthew %K credible mechanisms %K cryptographic auctions %K Mechanism Design and Approximation %K mechanism design with imperfect commitment %K optimal auction design %B Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation %S EC ’20 %I Association for Computing Machinery %C New York, NY, USA %P 683–-712 %@ 9781450379755 %G eng %R 10.1145/3391403.3399495 %0 Conference Paper %B The World Wide Web Conference %D 2019 %T Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities %A Tithi Chattopadhyay %A Nick Feamster %A Ferreira, Matheus V. X. %A Danny Yuxing Huang %A Weinberg, S. Matthew %K Auction Design %K Mechanism Design and Approximation %K Negative Externalities %K Policy and Regulation. %K Tragedy of the Commons %B The World Wide Web Conference %S WWW ’19 %I Association for Computing Machinery %C New York, NY, USA %P 196-–206 %@ 9781450366748 %G eng %R 10.1145/3308558.3313692