@article {721661,
	title = {Misperceptions, Depression, and Voting for Election Deniers in the United States},
	journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
	year = {Forthcoming},
	abstract = {
	Two of the most significant concerns about the contemporary United States are the erosion of democratic institutions and the high rate of depression. We provide evidence connecting these phenomena. We use a survey (N=11,517) to show a relationship between misperceptions (about COVID-19 vaccines) and voting, in 2022, for gubernatorial candidates who denied or cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 2020 election results. We further predict and find that the presence of moderately-severe-to-severe depressive symptoms exacerbates the relationship between misperceptions and voting for election deniers or doubters. The results offer insight into the links between misperceptions, depression, and democratic backsliding (i.e., supporting candidates who challenge election results). We also contribute to a growing line of research on how mental health affects democratic functioning, potentially worldwide.

},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and James N. Druckman and Kathryn Ognyanova and Jonathan Schulman}
}
@article {708106,
	title = {Community Mobility and Depressive Symptoms During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States },
	journal = {JAMA Network Open},
	year = {2023},
	abstract = {
	Importance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Marked elevation in levels of depressive symptoms compared with historical norms have been described during the COVID-19 pandemic, and understanding the extent to which these are associated with diminished in-person social interaction could inform public health planning for future pandemics or other disasters.



	Objective\&nbsp;\&nbsp;To describe the association between living in a US county with diminished mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic and self-reported depressive symptoms, while accounting for potential local and state-level confounding factors.



	Design, Setting, and Participants\&nbsp;\&nbsp;This survey study used 18 waves of a nonprobability internet survey conducted in the United States between May 2020 and April 2022. Participants included respondents who were 18 years and older and lived in 1 of the 50 US states or Washington DC.



	Main Outcome and Measure\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Depressive symptoms measured by the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9); county-level community mobility estimates from mobile apps; COVID-19 policies at the US state level from the Oxford stringency index.



	Results\&nbsp;\&nbsp;The 192 271 survey respondents had a mean (SD) of age 43.1 (16.5) years, and 768 (0.4\%) were American Indian or Alaska Native individuals, 11 448 (6.0\%) were Asian individuals, 20 277 (10.5\%) were Black individuals, 15 036 (7.8\%) were Hispanic individuals, 1975 (1.0\%) were Pacific Islander individuals, 138 702 (72.1\%) were White individuals, and 4065 (2.1\%) were individuals of another race. Additionally, 126 381 respondents (65.7\%) identified as female and 65 890 (34.3\%) as male. Mean (SD) depression severity by PHQ-9 was 7.2 (6.8). In a mixed-effects linear regression model, the mean county-level proportion of individuals not leaving home was associated with a greater level of depression symptoms (β, 2.58; 95\% CI, 1.57-3.58) after adjustment for individual sociodemographic features. Results were similar after the inclusion in regression models of local COVID-19 activity, weather, and county-level economic features, and persisted after widespread availability of COVID-19 vaccination. They were attenuated by the inclusion of state-level pandemic restrictions. Two restrictions, mandatory mask-wearing in public (β, 0.23; 95\% CI, 0.15-0.30) and policies cancelling public events (β, 0.37; 95\% CI, 0.22-0.51), demonstrated modest independent associations with depressive symptom severity.



	Conclusions and Relevance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;In this study, depressive symptoms were greater in locales and times with diminished community mobility. Strategies to understand the potential public health consequences of pandemic responses are needed.

},
	url = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2809947},
	author = {Roy H. Perlis and Trujillo, Kristin Lunz and Safarpour, Alauna and Alexi Quintana and Simonson, Matthew D. and Jasper Perlis and Maricio Santillana and Katherine Ognyanova and Baum, Matthew A. and James N. Druckman and Lazer, David}
}
@article {697784,
	title = {The Political Consequences of Depression: How Conspiracy Beliefs, Participatory Inclinations, and Depression Affect Support for Political Violence},
	journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
	year = {2023},
	month = {9/11/2023},
	abstract = {
	Depression can affect individuals{\textquoteright} attitudes by enhancing cognitive biases and altering perceptions of control. We investigate the relationship between depressive symptoms and Americans{\textquoteright} attitudes regarding domestic extremist violence. We develop a theory that suggests the association between depression and support for political violence depends on conspiracy beliefs, participatory inclinations, and their combination. We test our theory using a two-wave national survey panel from November 2020 and January 2021. We find that among those who hold conspiracy beliefs and/or have participatory inclinations, depression is positively associated with support for election violence and the January 6thCapitol riots. The participatory inclination dynamic is particularly strong for men. Our findings reveal how the intersection of two concerning features of American society {\textendash} poor mental health and conspiratorial beliefs {\textendash} strongly relate to another {\textendash} support for political violence. The results also make clear that interventions aimed at addressing depression can potentially have substantial political consequences.

},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12827},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and James N. Druckman and Jennifer Lin and Matthew Simonson and Roy H. Perlis}
}
@article {695531,
	title = {Media Measurement Matters: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with Survey and Behavioral Data},
	journal = {The Journal of Politics},
	year = {2023},
	abstract = {
	To what extent do partisan media influence political attitudes and behavior in the United States?\&nbsp;Although recent methodological advancements have improved scholars{\textquoteright} ability to identify the\&nbsp;persuasiveness of partisan media, past studies typically rely on self-reported measures of media\&nbsp;preferences, which may deviate from real-world news consumption. Integrating individual-level web-browsing data with a large-scale survey, we contrast survey-based indicators of stated\&nbsp;preferences with behavioral measures of revealed preferences, based on the relative volume\&nbsp;and slant of news individuals consume. Overall, we find that these measurement strategies\&nbsp;generate differing conclusions regarding heterogeneity in partisan media{\textquoteright}s persuasive impact.\&nbsp;Whereas the stated preference measures raise the possibility of persuasion by counter-attitudinal\&nbsp;sources, the revealed preference measures offer a more nuanced portrait of media effects.\&nbsp;Specifically, among respondents who regularly consume ideologically slanted content, partisan\&nbsp;media exposure appears to result in limited attitude change, with any observed treatment effects\&nbsp;driven primarily by pro-attitudinal outlets.

\&nbsp;},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/724960},
	author = {Chloe Wittenberg and Baum, Matthew A. and Adam Berinsky and Justin de Benedictis-Kessner and Teppei Yamamoto}
}
@webarticle {706726,
	title = {Who Likes Donald Trump? Lots of Republicans, But Especially Hispanic Voters, Plus Very Rural and Very Conservative People},
	journal = {The Conversation},
	year = {2023},
	url = {https://theconversation.com/who-likes-donald-trump-lots-of-republicans-but-especially-hispanic-voters-plus-very-rural-and-very-conservative-people-211166},
	author = {Jonathan Schulman and Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {699616,
	title = {Media Use and Vaccine Resistance},
	journal = {PNAS Nexus},
	volume = {2},
	number = {5},
	year = {2023},
	month = {9 May 2023},
	abstract = {
	Public health requires collective action{\textemdash}the public best addresses health crises when\&nbsp;individuals engage in prosocial behaviors. Failure to do so can have dire societal and\&nbsp;economic\&nbsp;consequences. This was made clear by the disjointed, politicized response to COVID-19 in the\&nbsp;United States. Perhaps no aspect of the pandemic exemplified this challenge more than the\&nbsp;sizeable percentage of individuals who delayed or refused vaccination. While scholars,\&nbsp;practitioners, and the government devised a range of communication strategies to persuade\&nbsp;people to vaccinate, much less attention has been paid to where the unvaccinated could be\&nbsp;reached. We address this question using multiple waves of a large national survey as well as\&nbsp;various secondary data sets. We find the vaccine resistant seem to predictably obtain information\&nbsp;from conservative media outlets (e.g., Fox News) while the vaccinated congregate around more\&nbsp;liberal outlets (e.g., MSNBC). We also find consistent evidence that vaccine resistant individuals\&nbsp;often obtain COVID-19 information from various social media, most notably Facebook, rather\&nbsp;than\&nbsp;traditional media sources. Importantly, such individuals tend to exhibit low institutional\&nbsp;trust. While our results do not suggest a failure of sites such as Facebook{\textquoteright}s institutional COVID-\&nbsp;19 efforts, as the counterfactual of no efforts is unknown, they do highlight an opportunity to\&nbsp;reach those who are less likely to take vital actions in the service of public health.

},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad146},
	author = {Jon Green and James N. Druckman and Baum, Matthew A. and Katherine Ognyanova and Simonson, Matthew D. and Roy H. Perlis and Lazer, David}
}
@article {715546,
	title = {A 50-State Survey Study of Thoughts of Suicide and Social Isolation among Older Adults in the United States},
	journal = {Journal of Affective Disorders},
	volume = {334},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {43-49},
	abstract = {
	Background



	We aimed to characterize the prevalence of social disconnection and thoughts of suicide among older adults in the United States, and examine the association between them in a large naturalistic study.



	Methods



	We analyzed data from 6 waves of a fifty-state non-probability survey among US adults conducted between February and December 2021. The internet-based survey collected the PHQ-9, as well as multiple measures of social connectedness. We applied\&nbsp;multiple logistic regression\&nbsp;to analyze the association between presence of thoughts of suicide and social disconnection. Exploratory analysis, using generalized random forests, examined heterogeneity of effects across sociodemographic groups.



	Results



	Of 16,164 survey respondents age 65 and older, mean age was 70.9 (SD 5.0); the cohort was 61.4\&nbsp;\% female and 29.6\&nbsp;\% male; 2.0\&nbsp;\% Asian, 6.7\&nbsp;\% Black, 2.2\&nbsp;\% Hispanic, and 86.8\&nbsp;\% White. A total of 1144 (7.1\&nbsp;\%) reported thoughts of suicide at least several days in the prior 2\&nbsp;week period. In models adjusted for sociodemographic features, households with 3 or more additional members (adjusted OR 1.73, 95\&nbsp;\% CI 1.28{\textendash}2.33) and lack of social supports, particularly emotional supports (adjusted OR 2.60, 95\&nbsp;\% CI 2.09{\textendash}3.23), were independently associated with greater likelihood of reporting such thoughts, as was greater reported loneliness (adjusted OR 1.75, 95\&nbsp;\% CI 1.64{\textendash}1.87). The effects of emotional support varied significantly across sociodemographic groups.



	Conclusions



	Thoughts of suicide are common among older adults in the US, and associated with lack of social support, but not with living alone.

},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2023.04.038},
	author = {Nili Solomonov and Jon Green and Alexi Quintana and Jennifer Lin and Katherine Ognyanova and Santillana, Mauricio and Baum, Matthew A. and James N. Druckman and Lazer, David and Faith M. Gunning and Roy H. Perlis}
}
@article {695527,
	title = {Depressive Symptoms and Conspiracy Beliefs},
	journal = {Applied Cognitive Psychology},
	volume = {37},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {332-359},
	abstract = {Conspiratorial beliefs can endanger individuals and societies by increasing the likelihood of harmful behaviors such as the flouting of public health guidelines. While scholars have identified various correlates of conspiracy beliefs, one factor that has received scant attention is depressive symptoms. We use three large surveys to explore the connection between depression and conspiracy beliefs. We find a consistent association, with the extent of the relationship depending on individual and situational factors. Interestingly, those from relatively advantaged demographic groups (i.e., White, male, high income, educated) exhibit a stronger relationship between depression and conspiracy beliefs than those not from such groups. Furthermore, situational variables that ostensibly increase stress{\textemdash}such as having COVID-19 or parenting during COVID-19{\textemdash}exacerbate the relationship while those that seem to decrease stress, such as social support, vitiate it. The results provide insight about the development of targeted interventions and accentuate the need for theorizing about the mechanisms that lead depression to correlate with conspiracy beliefs.},
	url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/acp.4011},
	author = {Jon Green and James N. Druckman and Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David and Katherine Ognyanova and Roy H. Perlis}
}
@webarticle {695525,
	title = {Abortion is not influencing most voters as the midterms approach {\textendash} economic issues are predominating in new survey},
	journal = {The Conversation},
	year = {2022},
	url = {https://theconversation.com/abortion-is-not-influencing-most-voters-as-the-midterms-approach-economic-issues-are-predominating-in-new-survey-191836},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Safarpour, Alauna and Jonathan Schulman and Lunz-Trujillo, Kristin}
}
@article {695526,
	title = {Prevalence and Correlates of Long COVID Symptoms Among US Adults},
	journal = {JAMA Network Open},
	volume = {5},
	number = {10},
	year = {2022},
	abstract = {
	Importance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Persistence of COVID-19 symptoms beyond 2 months, or long COVID, is increasingly recognized as a common sequela of acute infection.



	Objectives\&nbsp;\&nbsp;To estimate the prevalence of and sociodemographic factors associated with long COVID and to identify whether the predominant variant at the time of infection and prior vaccination status are associated with differential risk.



	Design, Setting, and Participants\&nbsp;\&nbsp;This cross-sectional study comprised 8 waves of a nonprobability internet survey conducted between February 5, 2021, and July 6, 2022, among individuals aged 18 years or older, inclusive of all 50 states and the District of Columbia.



	Main Outcomes and Measures\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Long COVID, defined as reporting continued COVID-19 symptoms beyond 2 months after the initial month of symptoms, among individuals with self-reported positive results of a polymerase chain reaction test or antigen test.



	Results\&nbsp;\&nbsp;The 16 091 survey respondents reporting test-confirmed COVID-19 illness at least 2 months prior had a mean age of 40.5 (15.2) years; 10 075 (62.6\%) were women, and 6016 (37.4\%) were men; 817 (5.1\%) were Asian, 1826 (11.3\%) were Black, 1546 (9.6\%) were Hispanic, and 11 425 (71.0\%) were White. From this cohort, 2359 individuals (14.7\%) reported continued COVID-19 symptoms more than 2 months after acute illness. Reweighted to reflect national sociodemographic distributions, these individuals represented 13.9\% of those who had tested positive for COVID-19, or 1.7\% of US adults. In logistic regression models, older age per decade above 40 years (adjusted odds ratio [OR], 1.15; 95\% CI, 1.12-1.19) and female gender (adjusted OR, 1.91; 95\% CI, 1.73-2.13) were associated with greater risk of persistence of long COVID; individuals with a graduate education vs high school or less (adjusted OR, 0.67; 95\% CI, 0.56-0.79) and urban vs rural residence (adjusted OR, 0.74; 95\% CI, 0.64-0.86) were less likely to report persistence of long COVID. Compared with ancestral COVID-19, infection during periods when the Epsilon variant (OR, 0.81; 95\% CI, 0.69-0.95) or the Omicron variant (OR, 0.77; 95\% CI, 0.64-0.92) predominated in the US was associated with diminished likelihood of long COVID. Completion of the primary vaccine series prior to acute illness was associated with diminished risk for long COVID (OR, 0.72; 95\% CI, 0.60-0.86).



	Conclusions and Relevance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;This study suggests that long COVID is prevalent and associated with female gender and older age, while risk may be diminished by completion of primary vaccination series prior to infection.

},
	url = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2797782},
	author = {Roy H. Perlis and Santillana, Mauricio and Katherine Ognyanova and Safarpour, Alauna and Trujillo, Kristin Lunz and Simonson, Matthew D. and Jon Green and Alexi Quintana and James Druckman and Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David}
}
@article {684776,
	title = {Using General Messages to Persuade on a Politicized Scientific Issue},
	journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
	year = {2022},
	month = {October 24, 2022},
	abstract = {
	Politics and science have become increasingly intertwined. Salient scientific issues such as climate change, evolution,\&nbsp;and stem cell research become politicized, pitting partisans against one another. This creates a challenge of how to\&nbsp;effectively communicate on such issues.\&nbsp;Recent work emphasizes the need for tailored messages to specific groups.\&nbsp;Here, we focus on whether generalized messages also can matter. We do so in the context of a highly polarized issue {\textendash}\&nbsp;extreme COVID-19 vaccine resistance. The results show that science-based, moral frame, and social norm messages move\&nbsp;behavioral intentions, and do so by the same amount across the population (i.e., homogenous effects). Counter to common\&nbsp;portrayals, the politicization of science does not preclude using broad messages that resonate\&nbsp;with the entire population.

},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000424},
	author = {Jon Green and James N. Druckman and Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David and Katherine Ognyanova and Matthew Simonson and Jennifer Lin and Santillana, Mauricio and Roy H. Perlis}
}
@webarticle {693269,
	title = {4 reasons why abortion laws often clash with the majority{\textquoteright}s preferences in the US, from constitutional design to low voter turnout},
	journal = {The Conversation},
	year = {2022},
	url = {https://theconversation.com/4-reasons-why-abortion-laws-often-clash-with-the-majoritys-preferences-in-the-us-from-constitutional-design-to-low-voter-turnout-188180},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Safarpour, Alauna and Trujillo, Kristin Lunz}
}
@webarticle {692911,
	title = {Kansas vote for abortion rights highlights disconnect between majority opinion on abortion laws and restrictive state laws being passed after Supreme Court decision },
	journal = {The Conversation},
	year = {2022},
	url = {https://theconversation.com/kansas-vote-for-abortion-rights-highlights-disconnect-between-majority-opinion-on-abortion-laws-and-restrictive-state-laws-being-passed-after-supreme-court-decision-187138},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Safarpour, Alauna and Trujillo, Kristin Lunz}
}
@article {633410,
	title = {Sensitive Questions, Spillover Effects, and Asking About Citizenship on the U.S. Census},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	volume = {84},
	number = {3},
	year = {2022},
	month = {July 2022},
	pages = {1869-1873},
	abstract = {
	\&nbsp;



	Many topics social scientists study are sensitive in nature. Although we know directly asking



	about these issues can lead to nonresponse, we know very little about how such questions could\&nbsp;potentially influence responses to questions later in the survey. In this study, we use the Trump\&nbsp;administration{\textquoteright}s proposal to include a citizenship question on the 2020 Census to demonstrate\&nbsp;how such spillover effects can undermine important survey-based estimates, like the number\&nbsp;of Hispanics in the United States. Using a large survey experiment (n = 9,035 respondents),\&nbsp;we find that asking about citizenship status significantly increases the percent of questions\&nbsp;skipped and makes respondents less likely to report having members of their household wh \&nbsp;are of Hispanic ethnicity. Not only does this demonstrate how sensitive questions can have\&nbsp;important downstream effects, but our results also speak to an important public policy debate\&nbsp;which will likely arise again in the future.



	\&nbsp;

},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1086/716288},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Bryce Jensen Dietrich and Rebecca Goldstein and Maya Sen}
}
@newspaperarticle {690024,
	title = {Americans love conspiracy theories, and that{\textquoteright}s dangerous for everyone},
	journal = {Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists},
	year = {2022},
	url = {https://thebulletin.org/2022/05/survey-americans-love-conspiracy-theories-and-thats-dangerous-for-everyone/},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Katherine Ognyanov}
}
@article {686301,
	title = {Association of Major Depressive Symptoms With Endorsement of COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation Among US Adults},
	journal = {JAMA Network Open},
	volume = {5},
	number = {1},
	year = {2022},
	pages = {e2145697.45697 },
	abstract = {
	Importance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Misinformation about COVID-19 vaccination may contribute substantially to vaccine hesitancy and resistance.



	Objective\&nbsp;\&nbsp;To determine if depressive symptoms are associated with greater likelihood of believing vaccine-related misinformation.



	Design, Setting, and Participants\&nbsp;\&nbsp;This survey study analyzed responses from 2 waves of a 50-state nonprobability internet survey conducted between May and July 2021, in which depressive symptoms were measured using the Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item (PHQ-9). Survey respondents were aged 18 and older. Population-reweighted multiple logistic regression was used to examine the association between moderate or greater depressive symptoms and endorsement of at least 1 item of vaccine misinformation, adjusted for sociodemographic features. The association between depressive symptoms in May and June, and new support for misinformation in the following wave was also examined.

},
	url = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2788284},
	author = {Roy H. Perlis and Katherine Ognyanova and Santillana, Mauricio and Jennifer Lin and James N. Druckman and Lazer, David and Jon Green and Matthew Simonson and Baum, Matthew A. and John Della Volpe}
}
@article {684775,
	title = {Association Between Social Media Use and Self-reported Symptoms of Depression in US Adults},
	journal = {JAMA Network Open},
	volume = {4},
	number = {11},
	year = {2021},
	abstract = {
	Importance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Some studies suggest that social media use is associated with risk for depression, particularly among children and young adults.



	Objective\&nbsp;\&nbsp;To characterize the association between self-reported use of individual social media platforms and worsening of depressive symptoms among adults.



	Design, Setting, and Participants\&nbsp;\&nbsp;This survey study included data from 13 waves of a nonprobability internet survey conducted approximately monthly between May 2020 and May 2021 among individuals aged 18 years and older in the US. Data were analyzed in July and August 2021.



	Main Outcomes and Measures\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Logistic regression was applied without reweighting, with a 5 point or greater increase in 9-item Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) score as outcome and participant sociodemographic features, baseline PHQ-9, and use of each social media platform as independent variables.



	Results\&nbsp;\&nbsp;In total, 5395 of 8045 individuals (67.1\%) with a PHQ-9 score below 5 on initial survey completed a second PHQ-9. These respondents had a mean (SD) age of 55.8 (15.2) years; 3546 respondents (65.7\%) identified as female; 329 respondents (6.1\%) were Asian, 570 (10.6\%) Black, 256 (4.7\%) Hispanic, 4118 (76.3\%) White, and 122 (2.3\%) American Indian or Alaska Native, Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian, or other. Among eligible respondents, 482 (8.9\%) reported 5 points or greater worsening of PHQ-9 score at second survey. In fully adjusted models for increase in symptoms, the largest adjusted odds ratio (aOR) associated with social media use was observed for Snapchat (aOR, 1.53; 95\% CI, 1.19-1.96), Facebook (aOR, 1.42; 95\% CI, 1.10-1.81), and TikTok (aOR, 1.39; 95\% CI, 1.03-1.87).



	Conclusions and Relevance\&nbsp;\&nbsp;Among survey respondents who did not report depressive symptoms initially, social media use was associated with greater likelihood of subsequent increase in depressive symptoms after adjustment for sociodemographic features and news sources. These data cannot elucidate the nature of this association, but suggest the need for further study to understand how social media use may factor into depression among adults.

},
	url = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2786464},
	author = {Roy H. Perlis and John Green and Matthew Simonson and Katherine Ognyanova and Santillana, Mauricio and Jennifer Lin and Alexi Quintana and Hanyu Chwe and James Druckman and Lazer, David and Baum, Matthew A. and John Della Volpe}
}
@newspaperarticle {686124,
	title = {People are more anti-vaccine if they got their COVID news from Facebook than from Fox News, data shows},
	journal = {Washington Post Monkey Cage},
	year = {2021},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/27/people-are-more-anti-vaccine-if-they-get-their-covid-19-news-facebook-rather-than-fox-news-new-data-shows/},
	author = {Lazer, David and Jon Green and Katya Ognyanova and Baum, Matthew A. and James N. Druckman and Roy H. Perlis and Santillana, Mauricio and Matthew Simonson and Ata Uslu}
}
@article {682793,
	title = {Gender-specificity of resilience in major depressive disorder },
	journal = {Depression Anxiety},
	volume = {38},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {1026{\textendash}10333},
	abstract = {
	Introduction: The major stressors associated with the COVID-19 pandemic provide an opportunity to understand the extent to which protective factors against depression may exhibit gender-specificity.



	Method: This study examined responses from multiple waves of a 50 states non- probability internet survey conducted between May 2020 and January 2021. Participants completed the PHQ-9 as a measure of depression, as well as items characterizing social supports. We used logistic regression models with population reweighting to examine association between absence of even mild depressive symptoms and sociodemographic features and social supports, with interaction terms and stratification used to investigate sex-specificity.



	Results: Among 73,917 survey respondents, 31,199 (42.2\%) reported absence of mild or greater depression{\textemdash}11,011/23,682 males (46.5\%) and 20,188/50,235 (40.2\%) females. In a regression model, features associated with greater likelihood of depression-resistance included at least weekly attendance of religious services (odds ratio [OR]: 1.10, 95\% confidence interval [CI]: 1.04{\textendash}1.16) and greater trust in others (OR: 1.04 for a 2-unit increase, 95\% CI: 1.02{\textendash}1.06), along with level of social support measured as number of social ties available who could provide care (OR: 1.05, 95\% CI: 1.02{\textendash}1.07), talk to them (OR: 1.10, 95\% CI: 1.07{\textendash}1.12), and help with employment (OR: 1.06, 95\% CI: 1.04{\textendash}1.08). The first two features showed significant interaction with gender (p \&lt; .0001), with markedly greater protective effects among women.



	Conclusion: Aspects of social support are associated with diminished risk of major depressive symptoms, with greater effects of religious service attendance and trust in others observed among women than men.

},
	author = {Roy Perlis and Katherine Ognyanova and Alexi Quintana and Jon Green and Santillana, Mauricio and Jennifer Lin and James Druckman and Lazer, David and Matthew Simonson and Matthew Baum and Hanyu Chwe}
}
@article {677624,
	title = {Factors Associated With Self-reported Symptoms of Depression Among Adults With and Without a Previous COVID-19 Diagnosis},
	journal = {JAMA Network},
	volume = {4},
	number = {6},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {1-4},
	url = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2780928?guestAccessKey=bd55674d-087f-4192-8937-7b3fd702c5ea\&utm_source=jps\&utm_medium=email\&utm_campaign=author_alert-jamanetwork\&utm_content=author-author_engagement\&utm_term=1m},
	author = {Roy Perlis and Mauricio Santellana and Katherine Ognyanova and Jon Green and James Druckman and Lazer, David and Matthew Baum}
}
@article {672212,
	title = {Association of Acute Symptoms of COVID-19 and Symptoms of Depression in Adults},
	journal = {JAMA Network Open},
	volume = {4},
	number = {3},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {e213223-e213223},
	abstract = {After acute infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a subset of individuals experience persistent symptoms involving mood, sleep, anxiety, and fatigue,\&nbsp;which may contribute to markedly elevated rates of major depressive disorder observed in recent epidemiologic studies.\&nbsp;In this study, we investigated whether acute coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) symptoms are associated with the probability of subsequent depressive symptoms.},
	url = {https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2777421?utm_source=silverchair\&utm_medium=email\&utm_campaign=article_alert-jamanetworkopen\&utm_content=wklyforyou\&utm_term=031221},
	author = {Roy H. Perlis and Katherine Ognyanova and Santillana, Mauricio and Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David and James Druckman and John Della Volpe}
}
@article {676650,
	title = {The role of race, religion, and partisanship in misperceptions about COVID-19},
	journal = {Group Processes \& Intergroup Relations},
	volume = {24},
	number = {4},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {638 - 657},
	abstract = {Concerns about misperceptions among the public are rampant. Yet, little work explores the correlates of misperceptions in varying contexts {\textendash} that is, how do factors such as group affiliations, media exposure, and lived experiences correlate with the number of misperceptions people hold? We address these questions by investigating misperceptions about COVID-19, focusing on the role of racial/ethnic, religious, and partisan groups. Using a large survey, we find the number of correct beliefs held by individuals far dwarfs the number of misperceptions. When it comes to misperceptions, we find that minorities, those with high levels of religiosity, and those with strong partisan identities {\textendash} across parties {\textendash} hold a substantially greater number of misperceptions than those with contrasting group affiliations. Moreover, we show other variables (e.g., social media usage, number of COVID-19 cases in one{\textquoteright}s county) do not have such strong relationships with misperceptions, and the group-level results do not reflect acquiescence to believing any information regardless of its truth value. Our results accentuate the importance of studying group-level misperceptions on other scientific and political issues and developing targeted interventions for these groups.},
	author = {James N. Druckman and Katherine Ognyanova and Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David and Roy H. Perlis and John Della Volpe and Santillana, Mauricio and Hanyu Chwe and Alexi Quintana and Matthew Simonson}
}
@webarticle {666983,
	title = {Glaring Omission from Biden{\textquoteright}s COVID-19 Task Force: Mental Health Expertise},
	journal = {STAT},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/23/mental-health-expertise-missing-from-biden-covid-19-task-force/},
	author = {Roy Perlis and Baum, Matthew A. and Katherine Ognyanova}
}
@webarticle {665240,
	title = {These nine swing states will see the biggest {\textquoteleft}blue shift{\textquoteright} as ballots are counted after the election},
	journal = {The Washington Post Monkey Cage},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/20/these-9-swing-states-will-see-biggest-blue-shift-ballots-are-counted-after-election/$\#$comments-wrapper},
	author = {Lazer, David and Jonathan Green and Baum, Matthew A. and Alexi Quintana Math{\'e} and Katherine Ognyanova and Adina Gitomer and James N. Druckman and Matthew Simonson and Hanyu Chwe and Roy H. Perlis and Jennifer Lin and Santillana, Mauricio}
}
@webarticle {660478,
	title = {How a Public Health Crisis Becomes a Public Trust Crisis},
	journal = {Real Clear Politics},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/07/20/how_a_public_health_crisis_becomes_a_public_trust_crisis_143750.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David and Alexi Quintana and Roy Perlis and Katherine Ognyanova and James N. Druckman and John Della Volpe and Santillana, Mauricio}
}
@newspaperarticle {655295,
	title = {Trump Still Has Approval Ratings Far Higher than George Bush. Here{\textquoteright}s Why.},
	journal = {Los Angeles Times},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-06-28/donald-trump-approval-ratings-election?utm_source=feedburner\&utm_medium=feed\&utm_campaign=Feed\%3A+topoftheticket+\%28Top+of+the+Ticket\%29},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@report {653713,
	title = {Understanding Misinformation on Mobile Instant Messengers (MIMs) in Developing Countries},
	year = {2020},
	institution = {Harvard Kennedy School, Shorenstein Center of Media, Politics and Public Policy},
	address = {Cambridge},
	url = {https://shorensteincenter.org/misinformation-on-mims/},
	author = {Irene Pasquetto and Baum, Matthew A. and Eaman Jahani and Alla Baranovsky}
}
@article {618749,
	title = {(Sex) Crime and Punishment: How Legally Irrelevant Details Influence Crime Reporting and Sanctioning Decisions},
	journal = {Political Behavior},
	year = {2020},
	month = {6 May, 2020},
	abstract = {Recent prominent rape cases have raised concerns that the US exhibits a {\textquotedblleft}culture of rape,{\textquotedblright} wherein victims are often disbelieved and blamed. We present an empirical conceptualization of rape culture, outlining four key features: blaming victims, empathizing with perpetrators, assuming the victims{\textquoteright} consent, and questioning victims{\textquoteright} credibility. In a series of experimental studies, we evaluate the relative impact of different types of rape culture biases on the reporting of rape, and how it is punished. We test how participants{\textquoteright} exposure to legally irrelevant details related to rape culture affects their decision-making. We find that exposure to certain details{\textemdash}relating to the victim{\textquoteright}s consent and credibility{\textemdash}significantly\&nbsp;decreasesparticipants{\textquoteright} propensities to recommend a rape case be reported to police or to advocate for a severe punishment for the perpetrator. The same biases do not emerge in robbery cases, suggesting that rape is regarded differently from other violent crimes.},
	url = {https://rdcu.be/b3ZQe},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Dara Kay Cohen and Schwarz, Susanne}
}
@webarticle {655296,
	title = {These Three Governors are Reopening Their States Faster than Their Voters Want: That{\textquoteright}s What Our Polling Found in Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee},
	journal = {The Washington Post Monkey Cage},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/29/these-three-governors-are-reopening-their-states-faster-than-their-voters-want/},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Katherine Ognyanova and Lazer, David}
}
@newspaperarticle {655294,
	title = {Trump{\textquoteright}s Coronavirus Approval Rating: Why its Going Up},
	journal = {Los Angeles Times},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-03-30/donald-trump-approval-ratings-coronavirus-pandemic},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@report {719341,
	title = {COVID States Project Public Report Series ($\#$1-101)},
	year = {2020},
	abstract = {Links to all public reports from the COVID States Project (101 reports in total, as of May 2023), for which I am a co-author, are available at www.covidstates.org},
	url = {https://www.covidstates.org},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David and Katya Ognyanova and Jamie Druckman and Roy Perlis and Santillana, Mauricio and et al.}
}
@article {614223,
	title = {Persuading the Enemy: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment Design},
	journal = {American Political Science Review},
	volume = {113},
	number = {4},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {902-916},
	abstract = {Does media choice cause polarization, or merely reflect it? We investigate a critical aspect of this puzzle: how partisan media contribute to attitude polarization among different groups of media consumers. We implement a new experimental design, called the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment (PICA) design, that incorporates both free choice and forced exposure. We estimate jointly the degree of polarization caused by selective exposure and the persuasive effect of partisan media. Our design also enables us to conduct sensitivity analyses accounting for discrepancies between stated preferences and actual choice, a potential source of bias ignored in previous studies using similar designs. We find that partisan media can polarize both its regular consumers and inadvertent audiences who would otherwise not consume it, but ideologically-opposing media potentially also can ameliorate existing polarization between consumers. Taken together, these results deepen our understanding of when and how media polarize individuals.\&nbsp;},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000418},
	author = {Justin de Benedictis-Kessner and Baum, Matthew A. and Berinsky, Adam, J. and Teppei Yamamoto}
}
@article {632344,
	title = {vMOBilize: Gamifying Civic Learning and Political Engagement in a Classroom Context},
	journal = {Journal of Political Science Education},
	year = {2019},
	month = {2019},
	abstract = {This study presents the results of a quasi-experiment (N= 307) conducted over the course of 10 weeks in Spring of 2016 to assess the effectiveness of a game platform designed to facilitate political engagement, attention, efficacy, knowledge, and participation among college students. Results indicate positive effects of gameplay on several key dimensions of political engagement, including voter registration, virtual political participation (following a candidate on Twitter, liking a candidate on Facebook, and watching debates), and consumption of public affairs information (including National Public Radio, non-NPR political talk radio, and online news aggregator sites). Additionally, gameplay provided significantly greater benefits to students with the lowest rates of political knowledge at baseline. Overall, participants reported high rates of game satisfaction, with 79\% of participants reporting being very to somewhat pleased if they were asked to play the game again. These results are discussed in terms of the implications for civics education, pedagogy, and political engagement among young people.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15512169.2019.1609486},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Dannagal G. Young and Prettyman, Duncan}
}
@inbook {618750,
	title = {Polarization and Media Usage: Disentangling Causality},
	booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion},
	year = {2019},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	organization = {Oxford University Press},
	address = {New York},
	abstract = {This chapter examines the literature concerning media choice and partisan polarization.\&nbsp; The past few decades have seen enormous growth in the number of television and internet news sources, giving consumers dramatically increased choices.\&nbsp; Previous research has suggested two distinct links between media choice and partisan polarization: partisan media as a\&nbsp;reflectionof polarization, as partisans self-select into media that conforms with their preexisting views, or as a\&nbsp;causeof polarization, when outlets present one-sided stories that persuade people to adopt more extreme views.\&nbsp; This chapter discusses how the literature in these two research traditions\&nbsp;has diverged, as well as more recent research attempting to bridge this divide.\&nbsp; Using novel methods, these studies have drawn together both self-selection and causal research designs to provide a more complete picture of media choice effects, and expanded the literature to more recent mediums, including the internet and social media.},
	url = {https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190860806.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190860806-e-22},
	author = {Justin de Benedictis-Kessner and Baum, Matthew A. and Adam J. Berinsky}
}
@article {629487,
	title = {Design, Identification, and Sensitivity Analysis for Patient Preference Trials},
	journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association},
	volume = {114},
	number = {528},
	year = {2019},
	month = {2019},
	pages = {1532-1546},
	abstract = {Social and medical scientists are often concerned that the external validity of experimental results may be compromised because of heterogeneous treatment effects. If a treatment has different effects on those who would choose to take it and those who would not, the average treatment effect estimated in a standard randomized controlled trial (RCT) may give a misleading picture of its impact outside of the study sample. Patient preference trials (PPTs), where participants{\textquoteright} preferences over treatment options are incorporated in the study design, provide a possible solution. In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of PPTs based on the potential outcomes framework of causal inference. We propose a general design for PPTs with multi-valued treatments, where participants state their pre- ferred treatments and are then randomized into either a standard RCT or a self-selection condition. We derive nonparametric sharp bounds on the average causal effects among each choice-based sub- population of participants under the proposed design. We also propose a sensitivity analysis for the violation of the key ignorability assumption sufficient for identifying the target causal quantity. The proposed design and methodology are illustrated with an original study of partisan news media and its behavioral impact.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2019.1585248},
	author = {Dean Knox and Teppei Yamamoto and Baum, Matthew A. and Adam Berinsky}
}
@newspaperarticle {634849,
	title = {New Research Shows Just How Badly a Citizenship Question Would Hurt the 2020 Census},
	journal = {Washington Post Monkey Cage},
	year = {2019},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/22/new-research-shows-just-how-badly-citizenship-question-would-hurt-census/?utm_term=.9c1387ed2d61},
	author = {Matthew Barreto and Chris Warshaw and Baum, Matthew A. and Bryce J. Dietrich and Rebecca Goldstein and Maya Sen}
}
@article {609100,
	title = {Media Ownership and News Coverage of International Conflict},
	journal = {Political Communication},
	volume = {36},
	number = {1},
	year = {2019},
	note = {Replication data are available here.},
	month = {October 26, 2018},
	pages = {36-63},
	abstract = {How do differences in ownership of media enterprises shape news coverage of international conflict? We examine this relationship using a new dataset of 591,532 articles on US-led multinational military operations in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, published by 2,505 newspapers in 116 countries. We find that ownership chains exert a homogenizing effect on the content of newspapers{\textquoteright} coverage of foreign policy, resulting in coverage across co-owned papers that is more similar in scope (what they cover), focus (how much {\textquotedblleft}hard{\textquotedblright} relative to {\textquotedblleft}soft{\textquotedblright} news they offer), and diversity (the breadth of topics they include in their coverage of a given issue) relative to coverage across papers that are not co-owned. However, we also find that competitive market pressures can mitigate these homogenizing effects, and incentivize co-owned outlets to differentiate their coverage. Restrictions on press freedom have the opposite impact, increasing the similarity of coverage within ownership chains.},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1483606},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@article {627664,
	title = {Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in the Age of Trump},
	journal = {Journal of Politics},
	volume = {81},
	number = {2},
	year = {2019},
	month = {Apr 2019},
	pages = {747-756},
	abstract = {Democratic publics have always struggled to constrain their elected leaders{\textquoteright} foreign policy actions. By its nature, foreign policy creates information asymmetries that disadvantage citizens in favor of leaders. But has this disadvantage deepened with the advent of the Internet and the resulting fundamental changes in the media and politics? We argue that it has. The current information and political environments erode constraint by inclining constituents to reflexively and durably back {\textquotedblleft}their{\textquotedblright} leaders and disapprove of opposition. These changes make it harder for citizens to informationally {\textquotedblleft}catch up{\textquotedblright} with and constrain leaders because views that contradict citizens{\textquoteright} beliefs are less likely to break through when media are fragmented and siloed. These changes have important implications for theories concerning the democratic peace, audience costs, rally effects, and diversionary war. They may also contribute to instability in foreign policy by contributing to sudden and destabilizing changes in public opinion that undercut commitments abroad.},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/702233},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B. K. Potter}
}
@inbook {643077,
	title = {The {\textquotedblleft}Daily Them": Hybridity, Political Polarization and Presidential Leadership in a Digital Media Age},
	booktitle = {New Directions in Public Opinion Research},
	year = {2019},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	organization = {Routledge},
	edition = {Third Edition},
	url = {https://www.crcpress.com/New-Directions-in-Public-Opinion/Berinsky/p/book/9781138483569},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Dannagal G. Young}
}
@proceedings {634149,
	title = {Polarized, Together: Comparing Partisan Support for Trump{\textquoteright}s Tweets Using Survey and Platform-based Measures},
	journal = {Thirteenth international AAAI conference on web and social media (ICWSM)},
	volume = {13},
	number = {1},
	year = {2019},
	note = {This is a peer-reviewed, terminal publication (ICWSM Conference Proceedings).},
	pages = {290-301},
	publisher = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence},
	address = {Munich, Germany},
	abstract = {Using both survey- and platform-based measures of support, we study how polarization manifests for 4,313 of President\&nbsp;Donald Trump{\textquoteright}s tweets since he was inaugurated in 2017.\&nbsp;We find high levels of polarization in response to Trump{\textquoteright}s\&nbsp;tweets. However, after controlling for mean differences, we\&nbsp;surprisingly find a high degree of agreement across partisan\&nbsp;lines across both survey and platform-based measures. This\&nbsp;suggests that Republicans and Democrats, while disagreeing\&nbsp;on an absolute level, tend to agree on the relative quality of\&nbsp;Trump{\textquoteright}s tweets. We assess potential reasons for this, for example,\&nbsp;by studying how support changes in response to tweets\&nbsp;containing positive versus negative language.We also\&nbsp;explore\&nbsp;how Democrats and\&nbsp;Republicans respond to tweets containing\&nbsp;insults of individuals with particular socio-demographics,\&nbsp;finding that Republican support decreases when Republicans,\&nbsp;relative to Democrats, are insulted, and Democrats respond\&nbsp;negatively to\&nbsp;insults of women and members of the media.},
	url = {https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/3230},
	author = {Kenneth Joseph and Briony Swire-Thompson and Hannah Masuga and Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David}
}
@article {622330,
	title = {The way Kavanaugh{\textquoteright}s supporters are talking about sexual assault allegations can be dangerous, our new study finds.},
	journal = {The Monkey Cage (Washingtonpost.com)},
	year = {2018},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/27/the-way-kavanaughs-supporters-are-talking-about-sexual-assault-allegations-can-be-dangerous-our-new-study-finds/?utm_term=.1321b12e0d22},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Dara Kay Cohen and Schwarz, Susanne and Yuri Zhukov}
}
@article {607011,
	title = {The science of fake news},
	journal = {Science},
	volume = {359},
	number = {6380},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {1094-1096},
	abstract = {The rise of fake news highlights the erosion of long-standing institutional bulwarks against misinformation in the internet age. Concern over the problem is global. However, much remains unknown regarding the vulnerabilities of individuals, institutions, and society to manipulations by malicious actors. A new system of safeguards is needed. Below, we discuss extant social and computer science research regarding belief in fake news and the mechanisms by which it spreads. Fake news has a long history, but we focus on unanswered scientific questions raised by the proliferation of its most recent, politically oriented incarnation. Beyond selected references in the text, suggested further reading can be found in the supplementary materials.},
	url = {http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1094.full?ijkey=0SQjo5zWzATLY\&keytype=ref\&siteid=sci},
	author = {David M. J. Lazer and Baum, Matthew A. and Yochai Benkler and Adam J. Berinsky and Kelly M. Greenhill and Filippo Menczer and Miriam J. Metzger and Brendan Nyhan and Gordon Pennycook and David Rothschild and Michael Schudson and Steven A. Sloman and Cass R. Sunstein and Emily A. Thorson and Duncan J. Watts and Jonathan L. Zittrain}
}
@article {609099,
	title = {Does Rape Culture Predict Rape? Evidence from U.S. Newspapers, 2000-2013},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
	volume = {13},
	number = {3},
	year = {2018},
	month = {2018},
	pages = {263-289},
	abstract = {We offer the first quantitative analysis of rape culture in the United States. Observers\&nbsp;have long worried that biased news coverage of rape - which blames victims, empathizes with\&nbsp;perpetrators, implies consent, and questions victims{\textquoteright} credibility - may deter victims from\&nbsp; coming\&nbsp;forward, and ultimately increase the incidence of rape. We present a theory of how rape culture\&nbsp;might shape the preferences and choices of perpetrators, victims and law enforcement, and test\&nbsp;this theory with data on news stories about rape published in U.S. newspapers between 2000 and 2013. We find that rape culture in the media predicts both the\&nbsp; frequency of rape and its pursuit\&nbsp;through the local criminal justice system. In jurisdictions where rape culture was more prevalent,\&nbsp;there were more documented rape cases, but authorities were less vigilant in pursuing them.\&nbsp;},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00016124},
	author = {Matthew Baum and Dara Kay Cohen and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@workingpaper {608574,
	title = {Reporting Bias and Information Warfare},
	year = {2018},
	abstract = {International Studies Association Annual Convention},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/zb_isa_v5.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@webarticle {609112,
	title = {Google and Facebook aren{\textquoteright}t fighting fake news with the right weapons},
	journal = {Los Angeles Times},
	year = {2017},
	url = {http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-baum-lazer-how-to-fight-fake-news-20170508-story.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Lazer, David}
}
@conference {609101,
	title = {Combating Fake News: An Agenda for Research and Action},
	year = {2017},
	publisher = {Shorenstein Center},
	organization = {Shorenstein Center},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	abstract = {Drawn from presentations byYochai Benkler (Harvard), Adam Berinsky (MIT), Helen Boaden (BBC), Katherine Brown (Council on Foreign Relations), Kelly Greenhill (Tufts and Harvard), David Lazer (Northeastern), Filippo Menczer (Indiana), Miriam Metzger (UC Santa Barbara), Brendan Nyhan (Dartmouth), Eli Pariser (UpWorthy), Gordon Pennycook (Yale), Lori Robertson (FactCheck.org), David Rothschild (Microsoft Research), Michael Schudson (Columbia), Adam Sharp (formerly Twitter), Steven Sloman (Brown), Cass Sunstein (Harvard), Emily Thorson (Boston College), and Duncan Watts (Microsoft Research).Executive SummaryRecent shifts in the media ecosystem raise new concerns about the vulnerability of democratic societies to fake news and the public{\textquoteright}s limited ability to contain it. Fake news as a form of misinformation benefits from the fast pace that information travels in today{\textquoteright}s media ecosystem, in particular across social media platforms. An abundance of information sources online leads individuals to rely heavily on heuristics and social cues in order to determine the credibility of information and to shape their beliefs, which are in turn extremely difficult to correct or change. The relatively small, but constantly changing, number of sources that produce misinformation on social media offers both a challenge for real-time detection algorithms and a promise for more targeted socio-technical interventions.},
	url = {https://shorensteincenter.org/combating-fake-news-agenda-for-research/},
	author = {Matthew Baum and Lazer, David and Nir Grinberg and Lisa Friedland and Kenneth Joseph and Will Hobbs and Carolina Mattsson}
}
@report {605724,
	title = {Report on Network Sunday Morning Talk Show Content and Ratings, Comparing 1983, 1999, and 2015},
	year = {2017},
	note = {Citation:\&nbsp;Baum, Matthew A. "Report on Network Sunday Morning Talk Show Content and Ratings, Comparing 1983, 1999, and 2015." HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP17-041, September 2017.},
	abstract = {We studied the content and Nielsen ratings for interviews on the three network Sunday morning talk shows{\textemdash}Meet the Press (henceforth MTP), Face the Nation (FTN), and This Week (TW). We compared three time periods{\textemdash}1983 (MTP, FTN), 1999 (all three shows), and 2015 (all three shows). In order to insure apples-to-apples comparisons, for over time comparisons, we either restricted our analyses to MTP and FTN or analyzed the data with and without TW. For {\textquotedblleft}overall{\textquotedblright} snapshots we included all three shows (MTP, FTN, TW). Our goals were fourfold: (1) identify any discernable trends in the topics and types of guests featured on the Sunday talk shows, (2) identify any trends in audience ratings, (3) assess whether and to what extent trends in topics and guests correlate with audience ratings, and (4) assess whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances, the Sunday talk shows influence the subsequent news agenda.},
	url = {https://shorensteincenter.org/network-sunday-morning-talk-shows/},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@webarticle {609111,
	title = {Why it{\textquoteright}s entirely predictable that Hillary Clinton{\textquoteright}s emails are back in the news},
	journal = {Washington Post: The Monkey Cage},
	year = {2016},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/01/why-its-entirely-predictable-that-hillary-clintons-emails-are-back-in-the-news/?utm_term=.a3eeb35c91a1},
	author = {Matthew Baum and Phil Gussin}
}
@webarticle {609110,
	title = {How Media Newsworthiness Norms Have Sustained the Trump Candidacy},
	journal = {Huffington Post},
	year = {2016},
	url = {https://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-a-baum/how-media-newsworthiness_b_12442128.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@webarticle {609109,
	title = {President Obama{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}Trump Card{\textquotedblright} in the Upcoming Supreme Court Nomination Battle},
	journal = {Huffington Post},
	year = {2016},
	url = {https://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-a-baum/president-obamas-trump-ca_b_9385330.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@webarticle {609108,
	title = {No one talks about democratization any more. Is there a better policy?},
	journal = {Washington Post: The Monkey Cage},
	year = {2015},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/05/no-one-talks-about-democratization-any-more-is-there-a-better-policy/?utm_term=.c3c9f1af612f},
	author = {Matthew Baum and Philip B. K. Potter}
}
@webarticle {609107,
	title = {Where You Stand Depends On Where You Sit{\textellipsis}While Reading the Paper: Reporting Bias in Democracies and Autocracies},
	journal = {The Political Communication Report},
	year = {2015},
	url = {http://politicalcommunication.org/websites/polcomm_old/newsletter_25_1_baum-zhukov.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@webarticle {609106,
	title = {News coverage of civil conflict is biased in both democracies and autocracies},
	journal = {Washington Post: The Monkey Cage},
	year = {2015},
	url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/26/news-coverage-of-civil-conflict-is-biased-in-both-democracies-and-autocracies/?utm_term=.29f458e35eb7},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@inbook {608562,
	title = {The Longest War Story: Elite Rhetoric, News Coverage, and The War in Afghanistan},
	booktitle = {Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Routledge },
	organization = {Routledge },
	address = {London},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/GroelingBaum_LongestWarStoryd_proofs.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@article {607033,
	title = {Filtering revolution: Reporting bias in international newspaper coverage of the Libyan civil war},
	journal = {Journal of Peace Research },
	year = {2015},
	abstract = {Reporting bias {\textendash} the media{\textquoteright}s tendency to systematically underreport or overreport certain types of events {\textendash} is a persistent problem for participants and observers of armed conflict. We argue that the nature of reporting bias depends on how news organizations navigate the political context in which they are based. Where government pressure on the media is limited {\textendash} in democratic regimes {\textendash} the scope of reporting should reflect conventional media preferences toward novel, large-scale, dramatic developments that challenge the conventional wisdom and highlight the unsustainability of the status quo. Where political constraints on reporting are more onerous {\textendash} in non-democratic regimes {\textendash} the more conservative preferences of the state will drive the scope of coverage, emphasizing the legitimacy and inevitability of the prevailing order. We test these propositions using new data on protest and political violence during the 2011 Libyan uprising and daily newspaper coverage of the Arab Spring from 113 countries. We uncover evidence of a status-quo media bias in non-democratic states, and a revisionist bias in democratic states. Media coverage in non-democracies underreported protests and nonviolent collective action by regime opponents, largely ignored government atrocities, and overreported those caused by rebels. We find the opposite patterns in democratic states.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumZhukov_JPR.pdf},
	author = {Matthew A Baum and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@book {607014,
	title = {War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {280},
	publisher = {Princeton University Press},
	organization = {Princeton University Press},
	edition = {Paperback},
	abstract = {Why do some democracies reflect their citizens{\textquoteright} foreign policy preferences better than others? What roles do the media, political parties, and the electoral system play in a democracy{\textquoteright}s decision to join or avoid a war? War and Democratic Constraint shows that the key to how a government determines foreign policy rests on the transmission and availability of information. Citizens successfully hold their democratic governments accountable and a distinctive foreign policy emerges when two vital institutions{\textemdash}a diverse and independent political opposition and a robust media{\textemdash}are present to make timely information accessible.Matthew Baum and Philip Potter demonstrate that there must first be a politically potent opposition that can blow the whistle when a leader missteps. This counteracts leaders{\textquoteright} incentives to obscure and misrepresent. Second, healthy media institutions must be in place and widely accessible in order to relay information from whistle-blowers to the public. Baum and Potter explore this communication mechanism during three different phases of international conflicts: when states initiate wars, when they respond to challenges from other states, or when they join preexisting groups of actors engaged in conflicts.Examining recent wars, including those in Afghanistan and Iraq, War and Democratic Constraint links domestic politics and mass media to international relations in a brand-new way.},
	url = {https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10515.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B. K. Potter}
}
@webarticle {609105,
	title = {In democracies an effective media and opposition are both needed to sanction leaders{\textquoteright} foreign policy missteps },
	journal = {The London School of Economics and Political Science },
	year = {2014},
	url = {http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/02/12/in-democracies-an-effective-media-and-opposition-are-both-needed-to-sanction-leaders-foreign-policy-missteps/},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B. K. Potter}
}
@webarticle {609104,
	title = {Reflections on the Budget Standoff: How a Political Conflict Becomes an Institutional Crisis},
	journal = {Huffington Post},
	year = {2013},
	url = {https://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-a-baum/reflections-on-the-budget_b_4110766.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@webarticle {609103,
	title = {Obama{\textquoteright}s good fortune on Syria},
	journal = {Aljazeera America },
	year = {2013},
	url = {http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/16/obama-opinion-pollingsyria.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@webarticle {609102,
	title = {Syria vs. Cyrus},
	journal = {Huffington Post},
	year = {2013},
	url = {https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amber-boydstun/syria-vs-cyrus_b_3890493.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Amber Boydstun}
}
@workingpaper {608628,
	title = {Partisan News Before Fox: Newspaper Partisanship and Partisan Polarization, 1881-1972  },
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {How do partisan media affect polarization and partisanship? The rise of Fox News, MSNBC, and hyper-partisan outlets online gives this question fresh salience, but in this paper, we argue that the question is actually not new: prior to the broadcast era, newspapers dominated American mass communication. Many of these were identified as supporting one party over the other in their news coverage. While scholars have studied the composition and impact of the partisan press during their 19th-century height, the political impact of the gradual decline of these partisan papers remains relatively under-examined. The unnoted vitality and endurance of partisan newspapers (which constituted a majority of American newspapers until the 1960s) represents a huge hole in our understanding of how parties communicate. As a consequence of this omission, scholars have ignored a potentially vital contributing factor to changing patterns of partisan voting. In this paper, we examine both the degree and influence of partisanship in historical newspapers. We begin by content analyzing news coverage in the Los Angeles Times from 1885-1986 and the Atlanta Constitution from 1869-1945. To avoid problems of selection bias and the absence of a neutral baseline of coverage in the coded news, we focus on a subset of partisan news for which we have access to neutral coverage of a full population of potential stories: the obituaries of U.S. Senators. By coding whether and how the papers covered the deaths of these partisans over time, we are able to systematically test for bias. We then collect information on newspaper editorial stances from Editor and Publisher{\textquoteright}s Annual Yearbook to examine the impact of newspaper partisanship on voting patterns in presidential elections from 1932-92. Specifically, we test whether the proportion of partisan news outlets in a given media market explains changes in the rate of polarized voting.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/GroelingBaumPartisanNewsWorkingPaper.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@article {607034,
	title = {Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access, and Democratic Constraint},
	journal = {The Journal of Politics },
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {For leaders to generate credibility through audience costs, there must be mechanisms in place that enable citizens to learn about foreign policy failures. However, scholars have paid relatively little attention to variations among democracies in the extent to which the public is able to obtain this sort of information. We argue here that electoral institutions play this role by influencing the number of major political parties in a country and, with it, the extent and depth of opposition to the executive. Opposition leads to whistle-blowing, which makes it more likely that that the public will actually hear about a leader{\textquoteright}s foreign policy blunders. The effectiveness of this whistle-blowing, however, is conditional on the public{\textquoteright}s access to the primary conduit for communication between leaders and citizens: the mass media. We test these expectations statistically, demonstrating that leaders in systems with these attributes fare better with respect to their threats and the reciprocation of conflicts that they initiate. These findings suggest that democracies are not automatically able to generate credibility through audience costs and that the domestic institutions and political processes that link the public and leaders must be taken seriously.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/PotterBaum_AudienceCosts_JOP.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B. K. Potter}
}
@article {607035,
	title = {Women and Pre-Tenure Scholarly Productivity in International Studies: An Investigation into the Leaky Career Pipeline},
	journal = {International Studies Perspective },
	year = {2013},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/IntStudPers2013.pdf},
	author = {Kathleen Hancock and Marijke Breuning and Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@workingpaper {608632,
	title = {Foreign Policy Worldviews and US Standing in the World},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {What do Americans think about the US role in world affairs and why do they think as they do? Existing scholarship identifies some general attitudes Americans hold toward world affairs, rejecting isolationism and favoring multilateralism, but few studies explore more specific attitudes such as assessments of US standing in the world (defined as foreign views of America{\textquoteright}s capability, credibility and esteem abroad). American National Election Study data from 1958-2008 provide one such data point, which shows a strong correlation between party identification and attitudes toward US standing defined as weakness. When Democrats occupy the White House, Republicans generally see US standing falling. The reverse holds true when Republicans hold the White House. Past studies conclude that this correlation is primarily a matter of partisanship and domestic political ideology (conservative vs. liberal). In this article we investigate a deeper and more novel explanation rooted in the independent influence of individuals{\textquoteright} foreign policy worldviews. Respondents assess US standing based on nationalist, realist, conservative and liberal internationalist views of the world. Across multiple statistical investigations, we find that while party ID remains a powerful heuristic for defining attitudes toward standing, foreign policy worldviews also exert a distinct influence on such attitudes, especially for more politically sophisticated respondents.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Baum-NauAPSA2012Final.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Henry R. Nau}
}
@inbook {608563,
	title = {Partisan Media and Attitude Polarization: The Case of Healthcare Reform},
	booktitle = {Regulatory Breakdown The Crisis of Confidence in U.S. Regulation},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press },
	organization = {University of Pennsylvania Press },
	url = {http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15037.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@workingpaper {608630,
	title = {War Through Red- and Blue-Colored Glasses: Partisan News Self-Selection and Public Opinion on the NATO Intervention in Libya },
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {This paper uses an online media exposure experiment to examine the role of selective exposure on attitude formation and reinforcement regarding the U.N. intervention in Libya shortly after its initiation. In particular, we examine both the baseline level of selective exposure behavior and levels following treatment to a condition where participants thought they might be called upon to defend their positions in a debate format. We find evidence that both the personal characteristics and attitudes of participants, as well as the setting in which they are being asked to conduct their information search, influence the quality and extensiveness of their information search, as well as their likelihood to expose themselves to information that disputes their prior opinions and incorporate such arguments into their reasoning process.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumGroelingLibyaAPSA2012.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@workingpaper {608629,
	title = {What Determines the News About Foreign Policy? Newspaper Ownership, Crisis Dynamics and the 2011 Libyan Uprising},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Why does media coverage of foreign policy vary across and within countries? We examine the sources of this variation using a new dataset of 102,568 articles on the 2011 Libyan uprising and subsequent NATO intervention published by 1,925 newspapers in 50 countries. We find that newspaper ownership structures and networks play an important role in shaping the nature and extent of foreign policy coverage. Higher circulation, independent newspapers offer more extensive coverage and place a greater emphasis on hard news topics and themes, while papers within larger ownership networks display the opposite patterns, net of circulation. In the context of the Arab Spring, we also find that -- compared to more selective forms of violence -- incidents of indiscriminate force by the Libyan regime tended to push newspapers toward a greater focus on policy-oriented stories and more open critique of a government{\textquoteright}s performance in managing the crisis. By shaping the scope, tone and content of media coverage, these factors are likely to play important roles in determining whether and under what circumstances citizens support their countries{\textquoteright} foreign policies.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumZhukov_ISA2012.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Yuri M. Zhukov}
}
@article {607036,
	title = {The Iraq Coalition of the Willing and (Politically) Able: Party Systems, the Press, and Public Influence on Foreign Policy},
	journal = {American Journal of Political Science },
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Media outlets in multiparty electoral systems tend to report on a wider range of policy issues than media in two-party systems. They thus make more competing policy frames available to citizens. This suggests that a {\textquotedblleft}free press{\textquotedblright} is insufficient to hold governments accountable. Rather, we should observe more challenges to the governments{\textquoteright} preferred frames and more politically aware citizens in multiparty democracies. Such citizens should thus be better equipped to hold their leaders accountable, relative to their counterparts in two-party democracies. I propose a mechanism through which democratic publics can sometimes constrain their leaders in foreign policy. I test hypotheses derived from my theory with cross-national data on the content of news coverage of Iraq, on public support for the war, and on decisions to contribute troops to the Iraq {\textquotedblleft}Coalition of the Willing.{\textquotedblright} I find that citizens in countries with larger numbers of parties confronted more critical and diverse coverage of Iraq, while those with more widespread access to mass media were more likely to oppose the war and their nations likely to contribute fewer troops to the Coalition.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/COTW_AJPS.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {608564,
	title = {Media, Public Opinion, and Presidential Leadership },
	booktitle = {New Directions in Public Opinion},
	year = {2011},
	publisher = {Routledge},
	organization = {Routledge},
	address = {New York},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Baum-ch15.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {608566,
	title = {Preaching to the Choir or Converting the Flock: Presidential Communication Strategies in the Age of Three Medias},
	booktitle = {iPolitics: Citizens, Elections, and Governing in the New Media Age},
	year = {2011},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	address = {Cambridge },
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Baum_3Medias_LMU.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {607037,
	title = {Red State, Blue State, Flu State: Media Self-Selection and Partisan Gaps in Swine Flu Vaccinations},
	journal = {Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law},
	year = {2011},
	abstract = {Prevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of {\textquotedblleft}reality{\textquotedblright} very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration{\textquoteright}s preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from over 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/RedStateBlueStateFluState_JHPPL.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {608567,
	title = {Soft News and The Four Oprah Effects},
	booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media},
	year = {2011},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press },
	organization = {Oxford University Press },
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumJamison_UncorrectedProofs.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Angela Jamison}
}
@workingpaper {608631,
	title = {Emotions, the Horserace Metaphor and the 2008 Presidential Campaign},
	year = {2010},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Baum-Crigler-Just-MillsPaper.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Ann Crigler and Marion Just and Jesse Mills}
}
@article {607038,
	title = {Democratic Peace, Domestic Audience Costs, and Political Communication},
	journal = {Political Communication },
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {This article addresses a gap in the literature connecting the empirical observation of a democratic peace to a theoretical mechanism based on domestic audience costs. We argue that the link between these literatures lies in the way leaders reach he ultimate source of audience costs {\textendash} the public. The audience cost argument implicitly requires a free press because, without it, the public has no way of reliably assessing the success or failure of a leader{\textquoteright}s foreign policy. Hence leaders can credibly commit through audience costs only when the media is an effective and independent actor. The implication is that while leaders might gain at home by controlling the media, they do so at the cost of their capacity to persuade foreign leaders that their {\textquotedblleft}hands are tied.{\textquotedblright}},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/PotterBaum_PolComm2010.pdf},
	author = {Philip K. Potter and Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {607039,
	title = {Reality Asserts Itself: Public Opinion on Iraq and the Elasticity of Reality},
	journal = {International Organization },
	year = {2010},
	abstract = {Prevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of {\textquotedblleft}reality{\textquotedblright} very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration{\textquoteright}s preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from over 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumGroeling_IO.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@workingpaper {608633,
	title = {Bandwagon an Underdog Effects in the 2008 Presidential Primary Campaign: A Survey Experiment },
	year = {2009},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Baum-JustAPSA2009.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Marion Just}
}
@article {608514,
	title = {Journalists{\textquoteright} Incentives and Media Coverage of Elite Foreign Policy Evaluations},
	journal = {Conflict Management and Peace Science},
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {Scholars have long recognized that public support for presidential uses of military force depends critically on elite support. Similarly, scholars have argued that the media {\textquotedblleft}index{\textquotedblright} their coverage of foreign policy to reflect the responses of partisan (particularly congressional) elites. We argue that journalists{\textquoteright} choices also play an important role by systematically (and predictably) skewing the elite rhetoric presented to the public. In particular, we argue that criticism of the president by his own party is disproportionately likely to be broadcast -- particularly in unified government -- and that such criticism should be exceptionally persuasive to citizens. To separate the media{\textquoteright}s independent effect from that of the actual tenor of elite discourse, as presented in the news, we investigate all interviews with members of Congress on network television Sunday morning political interview shows between 1980 and 2003. We then determined which comments were selected for inclusion on the evening news and compare the characteristics of such comments to those that were not selected, both during periods immediately following major U.S. uses of military force and during {\textquotedblleft}normal{\textquotedblright} periods. We find that the evening news presents a biased sample of elite rhetoric, heavily over-representing criticism of the president by his own party, while under-representing supportive rhetoric. Our findings indicate that future studies of public opinion and U.S. foreign policy must take into account the intervening role of journalists, who function as strategic, self-interested gatekeepers of public information regarding foreign policy events.\&nbsp;\&nbsp;You can download a pdf version of the paper,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/GroelingBaum_CMPS.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@article {608515,
	title = {New Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse},
	journal = {Political Communication },
	year = {2009},
	abstract = {Scholars of political communication have long examined newsworthiness by focusing on the {\textquotedblleft}gatekeepers,{\textquotedblright} or organizations involved in newsgathering (Lewin 1947, White 1950, Sigal 1973, Gans 1979). However, in recent years these gatekeeper organizations have increasingly been joined or even supplanted by {\textquotedblleft}new media{\textquotedblright} competitors, including cable news, talk radio, and even amateur bloggers. The standards by which this new class of gatekeepers evaluates news are at best partially explained by prior studies focused on {\textquotedblleft}professional{\textquotedblright} journalists. In this study, we seek to correct this oversight. We do so by content analyzing five online news sources {\textendash} including wire service, cable news, and blog sites {\textendash} in order to compare their gatekeeping decisions in the four months prior, and approximately three weeks immediately following, the 2006 midterm election. To determine each day{\textquoteright}s major political news, we collected all stories from Reuters{\textquoteright} and AP{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}Top Political News{\textquotedblright} sections. We then investigated whether a given story was also chosen to appear on each wire{\textquoteright}s Top News page (indicating greater perceived newsworthiness than those that were not chosen) and compare the wires{\textquoteright} editorial choices to those of more partisan blogs (from the left: DailyKos.com, and from the right: FreeRepublic.com) and cable outlets (FoxNews.com). We find evidence of greater partisan filtering on the latter three web sources, and relatively greater reliance on traditional newsworthiness criteria on the news wires.\&nbsp;You can download this article, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumGroeling_PolComm.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@book {607013,
	title = {War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {368},
	publisher = {Princeton University Press},
	organization = {Princeton University Press},
	edition = {Paperback},
	abstract = {How does the American public formulate its opinions about U.S. foreign policy and military engagement abroad? War Stories argues that the media systematically distort the information the public vitally needs to determine whether to support such initiatives, for reasons having more to do with journalists{\textquoteright} professional interests than the merits of the policies, and that this has significant consequences for national security. Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling develop a "strategic bias" theory that explains the foreign-policy communication process as a three-way interaction among the press, political elites, and the public, each of which has distinct interests, biases, and incentives.Do media representations affect public support for the president and faithfully reflect events in times of diplomatic crisis and war? How do new media--especially Internet news and more partisan outlets--shape public opinion, and how will they alter future conflicts? In answering such questions, Baum and Groeling take an in-depth look at media coverage, elite rhetoric, and public opinion during the Iraq war and other U.S. conflicts abroad. They trace how traditional and new media select stories, how elites frame and sometimes even distort events, and how these dynamics shape public opinion over the course of a conflict.Most of us learn virtually everything we know about foreign policy from media reporting of elite opinions. In War Stories, Baum and Groeling reveal precisely what this means for the future of American foreign policy.},
	url = {https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9084.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim J. Groeling}
}
@article {608516,
	title = {Crossing the Water{\textquoteright}s Edge: Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon},
	journal = {Journal of Politics },
	year = {2008},
	abstract = {The most widely accepted explanation for the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon is a relative absence of elite criticism in the news during the initial stages of foreign crises.\&nbsp; In this study we argue that the nature and extent of elite debate may matter less than\&nbsp;media coverage\&nbsp;of any such debate, and that these often systematically diverge.\&nbsp; We also argue that not all messages in this debate matter equally for public opinion. Rather, the persuasiveness of elite messages depends on their credibility, which, in turn, arises out of an interaction between the sender, receiver, and message. Hence, only by understanding the interactions between elites, the public, and the press can we account for variations in public responses to presidential foreign policy initiatives. We test our theory by examining public opinion data and network news coverage of all major U.S. uses of military force from 1979 to 2003. We content analyze all congressional evaluations of the president and the executive branch of government from the three network evening newscasts within 60-day time periods centered on the start date of each use of force. Our results offer strong support for the theory.\&nbsp;\&nbsp;You can download this paper, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/WatersEdge_JOP.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@article {608530,
	title = {In the Eye of the Beholder: How Information Shortcuts Shape Individual Perceptions of Bias in the Media},
	journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
	year = {2008},
	abstract = {Research has shown that human beings are biased information processors. This study investigates an important potential example of biased information processing: when ex ante assessments of a media outlet{\textquoteright}s ideological orientation {\textquotedblleft}cause{\textquotedblright} individual{\textquoteright}s to perceive bias.\&nbsp; We conduct an experiment in which subjects evaluated the content of a news report about the 2004 presidential election identified as originating from CNN, FOX or a fictional TV station.\&nbsp; Our results suggest that in an increasingly fragmented media marketplace, individuals not only distinguish between media outlets but, more importantly, outlet {\textquotedblleft}brand names,{\textquotedblright} and the reputations they carry, function as heuristics, heavily influencing perceptions of bias in content.\&nbsp;Individuals sometimes {\textquotedblleft}create{\textquotedblright} bias, even where none exists. This suggests that assessments of media content operate on a more nuanced level than has been captured in previous research.\&nbsp;You can download this paper, in pdf format, along with a replication dataset\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-7010},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Phil Gussin}
}
@article {608531,
	title = {The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis},
	journal = {Annual Review of Political Science},
	year = {2008},
	abstract = {Democracy requires that citizens{\textquoteright} opinions play\&nbsp;some\&nbsp;role in shaping policy outcomes, including in foreign policy. Yet, while the literature on public opinion and foreign policy has made great progress over the past several decades, scholars have reached no consensus concerning\&nbsp;what\&nbsp;the public thinks, or thinks about, with respect to foreign policy,\&nbsp;how\&nbsp;it comes to hold those opinions, or\&nbsp;whether\&nbsp;those opinion\&nbsp;do\&nbsp;or\&nbsp;should\&nbsp;influence foreign policy. In this chapter, we first review the extensive gains in scholarly knowledge in the area of public opinion and foreign policy over the past several decades (with a particular emphasis on relatively recent work). We then suggest a framework, based on the concept of market equilibrium, aimed at synthesizing the various disparate research programs that together constitute the literature on public opinion and foreign policy. To do so, we incorporate a third strategic actor, the mass media, which we believe play a critical role alongside citizens and elites in shaping public attitudes about, and influence upon, foreign policy. Our goal is to clarify the multifaceted relationships between these actors and foreign policy outcomes.\&nbsp;You can download the current version of this chapter, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumPotter_AnnualReview2008.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B. K. Potter}
}
@article {608513,
	title = {Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War},
	journal = {Political Behavior },
	year = {2008},
	abstract = {Research has shown that messages of intra-party harmony tend to be ignored by the news media, while internal disputes, especially within the governing party, generally receive prominent coverage. We examine how messages of party conflict and cooperation affect public opinion regarding national security, as well as whether and how the reputations of media outlets matter. We develop a typology of partisan messages in the news, determining their likely effects based on the characteristics of the speaker, listener, news outlet, and message content. We hypothesize that criticism of the president by his fellow partisan elites should be exceptionally damaging (especially on a {\textquotedblleft}conservative{\textquotedblright} media outlet), while opposition party praise of the president should be the most helpful (especially on a {\textquotedblleft}liberal{\textquotedblright} outlet). We test our hypotheses through an experiment and a national survey on attitudes regarding the Iraq War. The results show that credible communication (i.e., {\textquotedblleft}costly{\textquotedblright} rhetoric harmful to a party) is more influential than {\textquotedblleft}cheap talk{\textquotedblright} in moving public opinion. Ironically, news media outlets perceived as ideologically {\textquotedblleft}hostile{\textquotedblright} can actually enhance the credibility of certain messages relative to {\textquotedblleft}friendly{\textquotedblright} news sources.\&nbsp;\&nbsp;\&nbsp;You can download this paper, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/ShotByTheMessenger_POBH.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@article {608532,
	title = {Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies},
	journal = {Japanese Journal of Political Science},
	year = {2007},
	abstract = {Since the 1980s, the mass media have changed the way they cover major political stories, like foreign policy crises, and, as a consequence, in what the public learns and believes about these events. More media outlets cover major political events than in the past, including the entertainment-oriented soft news media. When they do cover a political story, soft news shows do so differently than the traditional news media, focusing more on {\textquotedblleft}human drama,{\textquotedblright} and especially the character and motivations of decision-makers, as well as individual stories of heroism or tragedy, and less on the political or strategic context, or substance, of policy debates. Consequently, many Americans who previously ignored politics now attend to some information about major political events, like wars, via the soft news media. Less politically engaged Americans who learn about major events from the soft news media are more suspicious of the motives of political leaders and less supportive of their policies than their non-soft-news-consuming, or more-politically-engaged counterparts.Soft news, in turn, is gaining popularity around the world. Consequently, these changes have important implications for democratic politics both in the United States and abroad. Most importantly, a large number of relatively apolitical, and hence particularly persuadable, potential voters are now tuning in to politics via soft news outlets. This gives politicians an incentive to develop strategies for reaching out to soft news consumers. Such individuals care less about the nuances of policy and more about the personality of leaders and any sensational human drama that a policy, like a war, entails. Soft news consumers care less about geopolitics than about body bags. Politicians who want their votes are therefore likely to emphasize body bags rather than geopolitics. In short, the {\textquotedblleft}new{\textquotedblright} media environment is changing both the style and substance of politics in democracies.\&nbsp;\&nbsp;You can download this article, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/JJPS_Soft_News_and_Foreign_Policy_000.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {619172,
	title = {Hard and Soft News},
	booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Media and Politics},
	year = {2006},
	publisher = {Congressional Quarterly Press},
	organization = {Congressional Quarterly Press},
	address = {Washington D.C.},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {608568,
	title = {How Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television: From 1969 to 2006},
	booktitle = {The Principles and Practice of American Politics},
	year = {2006},
	publisher = {Congressional Quarterly Press },
	organization = {Congressional Quarterly Press },
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/BaumKernell2006_uncorrected_page_proofs.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Samuel Kernell}
}
@article {608533,
	title = {The Oprah Effect: How Soft News Helps Inattentive Citizens Vote Consistently },
	journal = {The Journal of Politics},
	year = {2006},
	abstract = {Do the news media provide voters with sufficient information to function as competent democratic citizens? Many have answered {\textquotedblleft}no,{\textquotedblright} citing as evidence the proliferation of entertainment-oriented {\textquotedblleft}soft news.{\textquotedblright} Yet, public affairsoriented {\textquotedblleft}hard{\textquotedblright} news is often unappealing to politically inattentive individuals. We argue that news {\textquotedblleft}quality{\textquotedblright} depends upon how well it enables citizens to determine which candidate best fits their own preferences. In this regard, for politically inattentive citizens, we argue that soft news is more efficient than traditional hard news. Drawing on the logic of low-information rationality, we derive a series of hypotheses, which we test using the 2000 National Election Study.We find that politically inattentive individuals who consumed daytime talk shows (a popular form of soft news) were more likely than their nonconsuming, inattentive counterparts to vote for the candidate who best represented their self-described preferences. This suggests soft news can facilitate voting {\textquotedblleft}competence{\textquotedblright} among at least some citizens.\&nbsp;Slate.com\&nbsp;editor-at-large Jack Shafer wrote an article about this study, You can find it\&nbsp;here. "UCLA Today" also did a feature story on the study, which you can find\&nbsp;here.You can download this paper, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.A\&nbsp;supplemental\&nbsp;appendix\&nbsp;for this paper, including expert survey questionnaire, NES variable definitions and coding, additional discussion of several concepts addressed in the paper, as well as a variety of robustness, reliability and validity tests, is available, in pdf format,\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/OprahEffect},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Angela S. Jamison}
}
@workingpaper {608634,
	title = {Issue Bias: How Issue Coverage and Media Bias Affect Voter Perceptions of Elections },
	year = {2005},
	abstract = {It is virtually a truism in American politics that a focus on some issue areas during election campaigns, like national security or traditional values, redounds to the benefit of Republicans, while emphasis on other areas, like education or social security, benefits Democrats. Political scientists refer to this phenomenon as {\textquotedblleft}issue ownership{\textquotedblright} (Petrocik 1996, Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). To the extent that one or the other party benefits disproportionately from media emphasis on particular issues during election campaigns, it is possible that, whether intended or not, media coverage may disproportionately benefit one or the other party. If so, this would appear to be an important potential form of bias. Baum and Gussin (2004) find that typical individuals use media outlet labels as a heuristic, to assess the validity of information presented by different outlets. Liberals tended to {\textquotedblleft}find{\textquotedblright} a conservative bias in outlets they believed, ex ante, have a conservative slant, even if the content was actually from an outlet that they believed to have a liberal slant. The opposite was true for conservatives. We extend that research by investigating how issue ownership and the Hostile Media Outlet Phenomenon mediate, separately and in interaction, voter perceptions of media campaign coverage. We look at the effects of story selection on individuals{\textquoteright} perceptions concerning which party benefits more from media issue coverage. To do so, we conducted an experimental content analysis in which we asked subjects to code transcripts and articles, from eight major network and cable news broadcasts and newspapers, about the 2000 presidential campaign. We modified the transcripts and articles to create three distinct sets of treatment stimuli. One set correctly identified the source of the material. The second incorrectly identified the source and, in the third, all identifying elements were removed. We investigate whether individuals with differing political preferences are more or less likely to view certain issues as favorable to one or the other party, as well as the extent to which their propensity to do so is mediated by media outlets{\textquoteright} {\textquotedblleft}brand names,{\textquotedblright} independent of the true sources of news coverage. We find that, except when they have strong prior beliefs about the ideological orientation of a media outlet, our subjects rely far more on issue ownership as a heuristic than on the hostile media heuristic. However, when they do have strong prior beliefs regarding outlet ideology, the opposite pattern prevails, with subjects relying on the hostile media heuristic to evaluate news content.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/IssueBias_APSA05.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Phil Gussin}
}
@article {608534,
	title = {Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit},
	journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
	volume = {49},
	number = {2},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {213-234},
	abstract = {In an effort to show themselves as {\textquotedblleft}regular guys,{\textquotedblright} the 2000 presidential election found presidential aspirants commiserating with Oprah Winfrey, Rosie O{\textquoteright}Donnell, Queen Latifah and Regis Philbin, trading one-liners with Jay Leno and David Letterman, discussing rap music with MTV{\textquoteright}s youthful viewers and even courting the kid (or perhaps parent) vote on Nickelodeon. This study is a preliminary assessment of the impact of entertainment-oriented talk show coverage of presidential politics, using the 2000 election as a case study. \&nbsp; I consider why entertainment-oriented TV talk shows might choose to cover presidential politics, why candidates choose to appear on talk shows, and who is likely to be the primary audience for such coverage. This discussion yields a series of hypotheses concerning the effects of talk show coverage of presidential politics on public views of the candidates and the campaign. \&nbsp; I test my hypotheses through a content analysis of campaign coverage by entertainment-oriented talk shows, traditional political talk shows, and national news campaign coverage, as well as through a series of statistical analyses employing the 2000 NES. I find that talk show coverage of presidential politics does indeed influence voter attitudes. In particular, net of partisan preferences and a variety of other demographic and political factors, voters who rely primarily on entertainment-oriented TV talk shows as a source of campaign information are more likely to find the opposition candidate {\textquotedblleft}likeable,{\textquotedblright} as well as to cross party lines and vote for him, relative to their more politically aware counterparts who pay closer attention to traditional news outlets.This article is available for download from JSTOR\&nbsp;here.\&nbsp;You can download a zip archive containing the 2000 NES variable definitions and re-coding, as well as the content analysis data and coding form, from this article\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3647673?seq=1$\#$page_scan_tab_contents},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@newspaperarticle {619171,
	title = {Unconventional Channels for Today{\textquoteright}s Conventional Politics },
	journal = {San Diego Union Tribune},
	year = {2004},
	url = {http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/uniontrib/20040725/news_lz1e25baum.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@magazinearticle {619170,
	title = {Can Entertainment Drive Foreign Policy? Soft News and Public Reactions to the Abu Ghraib Prisoner Abuse Scandal },
	journal = {MESSAGE - internationale Fachzeitschrift f{\"u}r Journalismus},
	year = {2004},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {608537,
	title = {Circling the Wagons: Soft News and Isolationism in American Public Opinion},
	journal = { International Studies Quarterly},
	year = {2004},
	abstract = {This study investigates the differences in coverage of foreign policy by the soft and hard news media, and the implications of such differences for public attitudes regarding the appropriate U.S. role in the world. I find that, relative to traditional news outlets, the soft news media place greater emphasis on dramatic, human-interest themes and episodic frames and less emphasis on knowledgeable information sources or thematic frames, while also having a greater propensity to emphasize the potential for bad outcomes. I then develop a conceptual framework in order to determine the implications of these differences. I argue that the style of coverage of soft news outlets tends to induce suspicion and distrust of a proactive or internationalist approach to U.S. foreign policy, particularly among the least politically attentive segments of the public. I test this and several related hypotheses through multiple statistical investigations into the effects of soft news coverage on attitudes toward isolationism in general, and U.S. policy regarding the Bosnian Civil War in particular. I find that among the least politically attentive members of the public, but not their more-attentive counterparts, soft news exposurebut not exposure to traditional news sourcesis indeed associated with greater isolationism in general, and opposition to a proactive U.S. policy toward Bosnia in particular.You can download a pdf copy of this article\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/CircletheWagons_ISQ.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {608535,
	title = {Going Private: Presidential Rhetoric and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises},
	journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
	year = {2004},
	abstract = {In this study, I explain why, despite the potential credibility enhancement associated with generating domestic audience costs, leaders frequently opt to {\textquotedblleft}go private,{\textquotedblright} by conducting foreign policy out of the public spotlight. \&nbsp; I argue that leaders (in this instance U.S. presidents) are likely to prefer to forego the potential benefits of audience costs (such as enhanced credibility in the eyes of an adversary) in crises involving relatively modest strategic stakes, unless they are confident of success in a fight. There are two reasons for this. First, public scrutiny disproportionately raises the potential political price of a bad outcome, thereby decreasing a leader{\textquoteright}s willingness to incur a large political risk for a relatively small strategic or political gain. Second, the reactions of the domestic {\textquotedblleft}audience,{\textquotedblright} once a leader seeks to engage them, is not entirely predictable. Hence, leaders{\textquoteright} efforts to generate audience costs can sometimes backfire, leading to reduced, rather than enhanced, credibility. I test my hypotheses with data on U.S. behavior in all international crises between 1946 and 1994. \&nbsp; My results show that when U.S. national security interests in a crisis are modest, American presidents are indeed less likely to speak publicly about potential adversaries, unless they are quite confident of success if a fight ensues.You can download a zipped excel spreadsheet containing the data for this article\&nbsp;here.If you or your institution subscribe to Ingenta, you can download a pdf copy of this article\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/GoingPrivate_JCR.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {608536,
	title = {How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope},
	journal = {Presidential Studies Quarterly},
	year = {2004},
	abstract = {Most previous research on the influence of domestic politics on international conflict behavior treats public opinion as endogenous to political institutions, leaders{\textquoteright} preferences, or both. In contrast, I argue that public opinion is more accurately characterized as partially exogenous. I further argue that, partly as a consequence, public scrutiny can inhibit U.S. presidents from using force as a foreign policy tool, particularly when the strategic stakes in a dispute are relatively modest. The literature on domestic audience costs, in turn, holds that public scrutiny may enhance a democratic leader{\textquoteright}s credibility in the eyes of a potential adversary, thereby increasing his likelihood of victory in a dispute. Yet, it also raises the potential political price of a bad outcome. Democratic leaders are therefore cross-pressured by the simultaneous advantages and disadvantages of public scrutiny. As a preliminary test of the theory, I conduct a plausibility probe of the influences of public opinion on the decision making of Presidents Bush and Clinton with respect to the 1992-1994 U.S. intervention in Somalia. I find that only by considering the constraining effect of public scrutiny can we fully understand these two presidents{\textquoteright} policies regarding Somalia.You can download a pdf copy of this article\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Somalia_PSQ.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {608569,
	title = {What Gets Covered? How Media Coverage of Elite Debate Drives the Rally-{\textquoteright}Round-the-Flag Phenomenon, 1979-1998. },
	booktitle = {In the Public Domain: Presidents and the Challenges of Public Leadership},
	year = {2004},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/WhatGetsCovered.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling}
}
@article {608539,
	title = {The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital},
	journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {Democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy. We argue that there are important indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education. Where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital, we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators. In addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth, we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies. We conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30-year panel of 128 countries. We find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth. Rather, we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in non-poor countries.You can download this article from JSTOR\&nbsp;here.A replication dataset for this article is available for download as a zipped Excel file\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186142?seq=1$\#$page_scan_tab_contents},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and David A. Lake}
}
@article {608538,
	title = {Soft News and Political Knowledge: Evidence of Absence or Absence of Evidence?},
	journal = {Political Communication },
	year = {2003},
	abstract = {In {\textquotedblleft}Any Good News in Soft News?{\textquotedblright} Markus Prior investigates whether or not, beyond enhancing their attentiveness to select political issues, consumers also learn about politics from soft news. He presents evidence suggesting that the audience for soft news is much smaller than that for hard news, and that a self-expressed preference for soft news outlets is associated with at most sporadic gains in factual political knowledge. He concludes that the public appears to learn about politics from the soft news media at most only sporadically. In this commentary, I argue, contrary to Prior, that the audience for soft news outlets is, in fact, quite large, perhaps rivaling that for hard news. I further argue that long-term retention of factual political knowledge {\textendash} the focus of Prior{\textquoteright}s web-based survey -- is a highly restrictive definition of learning. By broadening our definition, taking into account recent insights from cognitive and social psychology concerning human information processing, it becomes possible to understand how consuming soft news might indeed be associated with learning about politics, but not necessarily with an enhanced long-term store of factual political knowledge. I present evidence that consuming soft news influences the attitudes of politically inattentive individuals and that, in at least some fairly predictable contexts, consuming soft news is also associated with enhanced factual political knowledge. I conclude that while Prior{\textquoteright}s finding of an absence of evidence of consistent factual political knowledge effects represents a valuable contribution to our understanding of the political significance of the soft news media, it does not constitute compelling evidence of absence of any meaningful learning about politics associated with consuming soft news. Hence, as Prior acknowledges in his conclusion, it is premature to conclude that there is no good news in soft news.You can download a pdf\&nbsp;of this article\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/SoftNewsAndPoliticalKnowledge.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@book {607012,
	title = {Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age},
	year = {2003},
	pages = {344},
	publisher = {Princeton University Press},
	organization = {Princeton University Press},
	edition = {Paperback},
	abstract = {The American public has consistently declared itself less concerned with foreign affairs in the post-Cold War era, even after 9/11, than at any time since World War II. How can it be, then, that public attentiveness to U.S. foreign policy crises has increased? This book represents the first systematic attempt to explain this apparent paradox. Matthew Baum argues that the answer lies in changes to television{\textquoteright}s presentation of political information. In so doing he develops a compelling "byproduct" theory of information consumption. The information revolution has fundamentally changed the way the mass media, especially television, covers foreign policy. Traditional news has been repackaged into numerous entertainment-oriented news programs and talk shows. By transforming political issues involving scandal or violence (especially attacks against America) into entertainment, the "soft news" media have actually captured more viewers who will now follow news about foreign crises, due to its entertainment value, even if they remain uninterested in foreign policy.Baum rigorously tests his theory through content analyses of traditional and soft news media coverage of various post-WWII U.S. foreign crises and statistical analyses of public opinion surveys. The results hold key implications for the future of American politics and foreign policy. For instance, watching soft news reinforces isolationism among many inattentive Americans. Scholars, political analysts, and even politicians have tended to ignore the soft news media and politically disengaged citizens. But, as this well-written book cogently demonstrates, soft news viewers represent a largely untapped reservoir of unusually persuadable voters.},
	url = {https://press.princeton.edu/titles/7655.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@magazinearticle {619169,
	title = {Making Politics Fun. What Happens When Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit?},
	journal = {Presidency Research Group Report},
	year = {2002},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@inbook {608570,
	title = {The Communications Revolution and the Political Use of Force},
	booktitle = {Technology, Development, and Democracy: International Conflict and Cooperation in the Information Age},
	year = {2002},
	url = {https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/079145214X/qid=1053637750/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-3716816-2795347?v=glance\&s=books},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {608540,
	title = {Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public},
	journal = {American Political Science Review},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {This study argues that, due to selective political coverage by the entertainment-oriented, soft news media, many otherwise politically inattentive individuals are exposed to information about high-profile political issues, most prominently foreign policy crises, as an incidental byproduct of seeking entertainment. I conduct a series of statistical investigations examining the relationship between individual media consumption and attentiveness to a series of recent high-profile foreign policy crisis issues. For purposes of comparison, I also investigate several non-foreign crisis issues, some of which possess characteristics appealing to soft news programs, and others of which lack such characteristics. I find that information about foreign crises, and other issues possessing similar characteristics, presented in a soft news context, has indeed attracted the attention of politically uninvolved Americans. The net effect is a reduced disparity in attentiveness to select high profile political issues across different segments of the public.Replication datasets for this article are available for download as zipped Excel files\&nbsp;here.\&nbsp;},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117812?seq=1$\#$page_scan_tab_contents},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {608542,
	title = {The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon},
	journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
	year = {2002},
	abstract = {Scholars have repeatedly confirmed the phenomenon of relatively short-lived spikes in presidential approval ratings immediately following the occurrence of sudden, high profile foreign policy crisis events.\&nbsp; Despite the massive attention heaped upon the rally phenomenon, relatively little attention has been paid to its constituent elements. Yet, recent research has found that different groups of Americans respond differently to presidents{\textquoteright} activities according to their interests and attentiveness.\&nbsp; In this study, I disaggregate public opinion along two dimensions: political party and political sophistication. I argue that, in responding to presidential activities, particularly such high profile activities as the use of force abroad, different groups of Americans weigh various individual, contextual and situational factors differently.\&nbsp; I investigate all major U.S. uses of force between 1953 and 1998 and find that the propensity of different groups to "rally" does indeed vary according to individual circumstances.\&nbsp; Moreover, these differences are refracted through variations in the external environment.\&nbsp; To explain these differences, I employ two models of public opinion change.\&nbsp; The first emphasizes the importance of threshold effects in explaining opinion change.\&nbsp; That is, individuals who are closest to the point of ambivalence between approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances. The second emphasizes both the propensities of different types of individuals to be exposed to a given piece of information, and their susceptibility to having their opinion influenced by any additional information.\&nbsp; My results offer a more nuanced picture of the nature and extent of the rally phenomenon than has been available in previous studies.\&nbsp; My findings hold important implications for other, related, scholarly debates, such whether, and under what circumstances, the use of force can successfully divert public attention from a president{\textquoteright}s domestic political difficulties.You can download a pdf copy of this article\&nbsp;here.(Note: This is an electronic version of an article published in\&nbsp;International Studies Quarterly.\&nbsp;Complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of\&nbsp;International Studies Quarterly\&nbsp;\&nbsp;is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal{\textquoteright}s website at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/ISQ or http://www.blackwell-synergy.com.)},
	url = {https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/46/2/263/1792611},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@article {608544,
	title = {Economic Class and Popular Support for Franklin Roosevelt in War and Peace},
	journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
	year = {2001},
	abstract = {Presidential popularity research has treated public opinion as a monolithic entity. Yet research in economics suggests that different sectors of society may respond differently to external events. History has judged FDR as one of America{\textquoteright}s greatest leaders in large part because he maintained his popularity throughout the Depression and World War II. During this era, the primary explanatory variables in presidential popularity scholarship ? the economy and war ? assumed their most extreme values of the twentieth century. Yet FDR{\textquoteright}s public support has received little systematic attention. Compiling partially disaggregated time-series data from 1937 to 1943, we investigate FDR{\textquoteright}s popular support among different economic classes during both national crises. We find that Roosevelt{\textquoteright}s peacetime support divided along class lines; while during the war class divisions blurred. Roosevelt{\textquoteright}s popular support was indeed conditioned by external events, refracted through the interests of different societal groups. We conclude that public support for modern presidents should be similarly studied as the sum of opinions among heterogeneous constituencies.This article is available for download on JSTOR\&nbsp;here.The time-series data for this article is available for download as an Excel file\&nbsp;here\&nbsp;.},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078802?seq=1$\#$page_scan_tab_contents},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Samuel Kernell}
}
@article {608543,
	title = {The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services},
	journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
	year = {2001},
	abstract = {Attention has recently focused on the distinctive foreign policies of democracies. We examine the domestic policy consequences of democracy. Building upon a model of the state as a monopoly provider of public services, we hypothesize that democratic states will seek fewer monopoly rents and produce a higher level of public services than autocracies. We also hypothesize that changes in regime type will produce fairly rapid and disproportionate effects on the level of public service provision. We test these hypotheses both cross-sectionally and over time for a variety of public service indicators. The statistical results strongly support our expectations. Democracies indeed provide significantly higher levels of public services, substantial changes in regime type appear to produce disproportionately large effects on public service provision, and the lag between changes in the level of democracy and in the level of public goods appears quite short, suggesting that periods of "democratic transition" may be more rapid than commonly supposed.If you or your organization subscribe to Sage Publications, you can download a pdf copy of this article\&nbsp;here.The time-series data for this article is available for download as a zipped Excel file\&nbsp;here\&nbsp;.},
	url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414001034006001},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and David A. Lake}
}
@workingpaper {608636,
	title = {Trade and Conflict in the Cold War Era: An Empirical Analysis Using Directed Dyads (Working Paper) },
	year = {2000},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/Beck_and_Baum_2000.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Nathaniel Beck}
}
@newspaperarticle {619168,
	title = {The Program is in the Previews},
	journal = {Los Angeles Times},
	year = {2000},
	url = {http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jan/27/local/me-58272},
	author = {Sam Kernell and Sam Kernell}
}
@mastersthesis {608637,
	title = {Tabloid Wars: The Mass Media, Public Opinion, and the Decision to Use Force Abroad},
	year = {2000},
	type = {Dissertation },
	abstract = {Live televised images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, wounded American prisoners of war paraded in front of video cameras in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo, while their families were interviewed simultaneously on live television at home and scud missile attacks in Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War have brought foreign policy directly into America{\textquoteright}s living rooms.\&nbsp; By transforming complex, distant events into entertaining and compelling human dramas, these images have captured the American public{\textquoteright}s attention to a far greater extent than printed reports, photographs and tape-delayed videos ever could. \&nbsp; The immediate, vivid and sometimes bloody images that can now be transmitted in real time to the American people as a war unfolds make it far more difficult for the public to ignore the very real costs of war. \&nbsp; Scholars and journalists have documented the urgency placed by the Bush Administration during the Gulf War on achieving a quick, decisive victory, lest images of bloody American soldiers, broadcast live into America{\textquoteright}s living rooms, erode domestic support for the war. \&nbsp; Simply stated, massive, real-time media coverage of U.S. military actions has become ubiquitous in the 1990s and will likely be factored into all future presidential decisions concerning the use of force.My project addresses the evolving relationship between the mass media, public opinion and presidential decisionmaking regarding the use of force abroad. \&nbsp; I focus upon a key domestic political variable -- public opinion -- and the media{\textquoteright}s role as an intervening variable between public opinion and policy decisionmaking in foreign crises.Much of the contemporary literature holds that the media does significantly influence public opinion, and public opinion does, at least sometimes, influence policy outcomes. \&nbsp; Yet no theory adequately explains how changes in the media might alter public perceptions of foreign policy, nor how public opinion influences policy decisionmaking. \&nbsp; Have modern media technologies and practices affected Americans{\textquoteright} fascination with and tolerance for war? \&nbsp; And will their reactions reduce the willingness of America{\textquoteright}s leaders to employ military force as a policy tool in the future? \&nbsp; These are the primary questions this dissertation ultimately seeks to answer.The dissertation is divided into two sections. \&nbsp; In the first section, I challenge the conventional wisdom of an unchanging public. \&nbsp; I argue that past empirical findings that the political awareness of the mass public has been unaffected by the media revolution have failed to capture meaningful changes which have, in fact, occurred and which, by adjusting one{\textquoteright}s analytical focus, can be measured. \&nbsp; I attempt to demonstrate that the relationship between the media and the mass public has evolved in the post-World War II era, resulting in an evolution in mass opinion concerning certain high profile political issues {\textemdash} most notably foreign military crises. \&nbsp; Simply stated, I argue that, even as the American public declares itself, in countless opinion polls, to be less concerned with foreign affairs in the Post-Cold War era, the public is nonetheless becoming more attentive to foreign policy crises.\&nbsp; To test my theory, I employ content analyses of media coverage of various military conflicts and statistical analyses of public opinion surveys, using nine distinct data sets, including both cross-sectional and time-series data, to demonstrate trends in public opinion and to relate increases in public attentiveness to foreign crises to the growth and diversification of the mass media.In the second section, I turn to the implications of this trend for the future management of foreign crises by U.S. Presidents.\&nbsp; I argue that presidents are becoming increasingly constrained by a crisis-galvanized public. \&nbsp; I employ a formal model to develop hypotheses concerning how, and under what circumstances, public attentiveness will influence presidential decisionmaking during foreign crises. \&nbsp; I then, in subsequent chapters, conduct various tests of the model{\textquoteright}s predictions, including statistical analyses of all U.S. foreign crises since World War II and a case study of the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia.},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/dissertation.html},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@workingpaper {608635,
	title = {Political Scandal, Gender, and Tabloid News: An Experimental Examination of the Evolutionary Origins of Consumer Preferences for Scandalous News},
	year = {2000},
	abstract = {Building on recent work in evolutionary psychology, we predict substantial gender-relateddifferences in demand for scandalous political news. We argue that individuals{\textquoteright} self-images can\&nbsp;alter their motivation to seek information about potential sexual competitors and mates, even\&nbsp;when those figures are {\textquotedblleft}virtual{\textquotedblright}{\textemdash}appearing in mass media. Individuals perceiving themselves as\&nbsp;attractive will seek negative news about attractive same-gender individuals, whereas individuals\&nbsp;perceiving themselves as unattractive will seek negative information about the opposite gender.We test our hypotheses in three ways. First, we investigate partially disaggregated nationalopinion data regarding news attention. Second, we conduct an experiment in which we asked participants to choose the two most interesting stories from a menu of headlines. We varied the\&nbsp;gender and party affiliation of the individual featured in the story. Each participant saw aheadline promoting a DUI arrest of an attractive male or female {\textquotedblleft}rising star{\textquotedblright} from one of the two\&nbsp;parties. Finally, we repeat the experiment with a national sample, this time also varying the\&nbsp;valence of the tabloid story. We find strong correlations between respondents{\textquoteright} self-image and\&nbsp;their likelihood of seeking and distributing positive or negative information about {\textquotedblleft}virtual{\textquotedblright}\&nbsp;competitors and mates.\&nbsp;},
	url = {https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/mbaum/documents/GroelingBaumHaselton.pdf},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling and Martie Haselton}
}
@article {608545,
	title = {Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?},
	journal = {American Political Science Review},
	year = {1999},
	abstract = {For the past 30 years, presidents have enlisted prime-time television to promote their policies to the American people. For most of this era, they have been able to commandeer the national airwaves and speak to "captive" viewers. Recently, however, presidents appear to be losing their audiences. Two leading explanations are the rise of political disaffection and the growth of cable. We investigate both by developing and testing a model of the individual{\textquoteright}s viewing decision using both cross-sectional (1996 NES survey) and time-series (128 Nielsen audience ratings for presidential appearances between 1969 and 1998) data. We find that cable television but not political disaffection has ended the golden age of presidential television. Moreover, we uncover evidence that both presidents and the broadcast networks have begun adapting strategically to this new reality in scheduling presidential appearances.The time-series data for this article is available for download as an Excel file\&nbsp;here.},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585763?seq=1$\#$page_scan_tab_contents},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Samuel Kernell}
}
@newspaperarticle {619167,
	title = {Biological Nightmare Awaits: Clock is Ticking for U.S. to Tackle New Threat },
	journal = {Defense News},
	year = {1993},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
@newspaperarticle {619166,
	title = {Evolving Along with Our Technology},
	journal = {Chicago Tribune},
	year = {1993},
	author = {Baum, Matthew A.}
}
