@article {613349,
	title = {Leibniz{\textquoteright}s Formal Theory of Contingency},
	journal = {Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy},
	volume = {21},
	year = {2018},
	month = {2018},
	pages = {17-43},
	abstract = {This essay argues that, with his much-maligned {\textquotedblleft}infinite analysis{\textquotedblright} theory of contingency, Leibniz is, in fact, onto something deep and important -- a tangle of issues that wouldn{\textquoteright}t be sorted out properly for centuries to come, and then only by some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. The essay begins by placing Leibniz{\textquoteright}s theory in its proper historical context and draws a distinction between Leibniz{\textquoteright}s logical and meta-logical discoveries. It then argues that Leibniz{\textquoteright}s logical insights make his {\textquotedblleft}infinite analysis{\textquotedblright} theory of contingency, as it has been standardly interpreted, more rather than less perplexing. Finally, the essay argues that Leibniz{\textquoteright}s meta-logical insights point the way towards a better appreciation of (what we should regard as) his formal theory of contingency and its correlative, his formal theory of necessity.\&nbsp;},
	author = {Jeffrey K. McDonough and Zeynep Soysal},
	editor = {Katherine Dunlop and Samuel Levey}
}
