%0 Generic %D Working Paper %T Do Ordeals Work for Selection Markets? Evidence from Health Insurance Auto-Enrollment %A Mark Shepard %A Myles Wagner %X Are application hassles, or “ordeals,” an effective way to limit public program enrollment? We provide new evidence by studying (removal of) an auto-enrollment policy for health insurance, adding an extra step to enroll. This minor ordeal has a major impact, reducing enrollment by 33% and differentially excluding young, healthy, and economically disadvantaged people. Using a simple model, we show that adverse selection – a classic feature of insurance markets – undermines ordeals' standard rationale of excluding low-value individuals, since they are also low-cost and may not be inefficient. Our analysis illustrates why ordeals targeting is unlikely to work well in selection markets. %G eng %U https://www.nber.org/papers/w30781