@article {665273,
	title = {The pandemic exposes human nature: 10 evolutionary insights},
	journal = {PNAS},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2020/10/21/2009787117.full.pdf},
	author = {Seitz, Benjamin M. and Aktipis, Athena and Buss, David M. and Alcock, Joe and Bloom, Paul and Michele Gelfand and Sam Harris and Lieberman, Debra and Horowitz, Barbara N. and Steven Pinker and Wilson, David S. and Haselton, Martie G.}
}
@article {664878,
	title = {In Memoriam: Judith Rich Harris (1938 - 2019)},
	journal = {American Psychologist},
	volume = {75},
	number = {7},
	year = {2020},
	url = {https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2020-74102-002},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {664872,
	title = {Universality and diversity in human song},
	journal = {Science},
	volume = {366},
	number = {6468},
	year = {2019},
	url = {https://science.sciencemag.org/content/366/6468/eaax0868.abstract},
	author = {Mehr, Samuel and Singh, Manvir and Dean Knox and Kettler, Daniel M and Pickens-Jones, Daniel and Atwood, S and Christopher Lucas and Nori Jacoby and Egner, Alena A and Hopkins, Erin J and Howard, Rhea M and Hartshorne, Joshua K and Jennings, Mariela V and Simson, Jan and Bainbridge, Constance M and Steven Pinker and O{\textquoteright}Donnell, Timothy J and Krasnow, M and Glowacki}
}
@article {637441,
	title = {Common knowledge, coordination, and strategic mentalizing in human social life},
	journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America},
	year = {2019},
	url = {https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2019/06/27/1905518116.full.pdf},
	author = {Julian De Freitas and Kyle Thomas and Peter DeScioli and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {630369,
	title = {Maimonides{\textquoteright} Ladder: States of Mutual Knowledge and the Perception of Charitability},
	journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
	volume = {148},
	number = {1},
	year = {2019},
	url = {http://sinaiandsynapses.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/maimonides-ladder-study.pdf},
	author = {Julian De Freitas and Peter DeScioli and Kyle A. Thomas and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {639652,
	title = {A critical period for second language acquisition: Evidence from 2/3 million English speakers},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {177},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {263-277},
	author = {Hartshorne, J. and Tenenbaum, J., B. and Pinker, S.}
}
@article {630371,
	title = {Common knowledge, coordination, and the logic of self-conscious emotions},
	journal = {Evolution and Human Behavior},
	volume = {39},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {179{\textendash}190},
	url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513816303415},
	author = {Kyle A. Thomas and Peter DeScioli and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {630370,
	title = {Kill or Die: Moral Judgment Alters Linguistic Coding of Causality},
	journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition},
	volume = {43},
	number = {8},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {1173{\textendash}1182},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000369},
	author = {Julian De Freitas and Peter DeScioli and Jason Nemirow and Maxim Massenkoff and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {638204,
	title = {Recursive Mentalizing and Common Knowledge in the Bystander Effect},
	journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology General},
	volume = {145},
	number = {5},
	year = {2016},
	author = {Kyle Thomas and Peter DeScioli and Julian De Freitas and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {509371,
	title = {Steven Pinker on the Second Law of Thermodynamics},
	journal = {Wall Street Journal},
	year = {2016},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {448046,
	title = {Colombia{\textquoteright}s Milestone in World Peace},
	journal = {New York Times},
	year = {2016},
	month = {26 Aug, 2016},
	author = {Steven Pinker and Juan Manuel Santos}
}
@article {390281,
	title = {Psycho thrillers: five movies that teach us how the mind works},
	journal = {The Guardian},
	year = {2016},
	month = {24 April, 2016},
	author = {Catherine Shoard and Philipa Perry and Steven Pinker and Dacher Keltner and Sue Blackmore and Susan Greenfield}
}
@article {373111,
	title = {Steven Pinker interview: case against bioethocrats \&amp; CRISPR germline ban},
	journal = {www.ipscell.com},
	year = {2015},
	url = {https://www.ipscell.com/2015/08/stevenpinker/},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {371466,
	title = {Experts debate: Are we playing with fire when we edit human genes?},
	journal = {STAT},
	year = {2015},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {299626,
	title = {The untenability of faitheism},
	journal = {Current Biology },
	volume = {25},
	number = {15},
	year = {2015},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {228846,
	title = {Shakespeare: One of the first and greatest psychologists},
	journal = {The Atlantic},
	year = {2015},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {227731,
	title = {Response to the Book Review Symposium: Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature},
	journal = {Sociology},
	year = {2015},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {228126,
	title = {The commitment function of angry facial expressions},
	journal = {Psychological Science},
	volume = {25},
	number = {8},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {1511-1517},
	author = {Reed, L. and DeScioli, P. and S Pinker}
}
@article {222756,
	title = {Links that speak: The global language network and its association with global fame},
	journal = {PNAS},
	year = {2014},
	author = {Ronen, S. and Gon{\c c}alves, B. and Hu, K. and Vespignani, A. and S Pinker and Hidalgo, C.}
}
@article {209356,
	title = {Passive Resistance - The active voice isn{\textquoteright}t always the best choice},
	journal = {The Atlantic},
	year = {2014},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {203841,
	title = {Why academics stink at writing},
	journal = {The Chronicle of Higher Education},
	year = {2014},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {203471,
	title = {The Psychology of Coordination and Common Knowledge},
	journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
	volume = {107},
	number = {4},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {657-676},
	author = {Thomas, K. and DeScioli, P. and Sultan Haque, O. and S Pinker}
}
@article {203491,
	title = {The Source of Bad Writing},
	journal = {The Wall Street Journal},
	year = {2014},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {199096,
	title = {Common genetic variants associated with cognitive performance identified using theproxy-phenotype method},
	journal = {PNAS},
	year = {2014},
	author = {Reitveld, C. and Esko, T. and S Pinker and et al}
}
@article {194056,
	title = {The biological basis of language: insight from developmental grammatical impairments.},
	journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
	year = {2014},
	author = {van der Lely, Heather K.J. and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {461191,
	title = {Science vs. the Humanities Round III},
	journal = {New Republic},
	year = {2013},
	month = {26 Sept, 2013},
	author = {Steven Pinker and Leon Wiestier}
}
@article {134076,
	title = {The Forum: The Decline of War},
	journal = {International Studies Review},
	volume = {15},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {396-419},
	author = {Nils Petter Gleditsch and Steven Pinker and Bradley A. Thayer and Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson}
}
@article {114516,
	title = {Obituaries - George A. Miller},
	journal = {American Psychologist},
	volume = {68},
	number = {6},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {467-468},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {110716,
	title = {Why It Is Hard to Find Genes Associated With Social Science Traits: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations},
	journal = {American Journal of Public Health},
	volume = {103},
	number = {No. S1},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {152-166},
	author = {Christopher F. Chabris and James J. Lee and Daniel J. Benjamin and Jonathan P. Beauchamp and Edward L. Glaeser and Gregoire Borst and Steven Pinker and David I. Laibson}
}
@article {105871,
	title = {"The Decline of War and Conceptions of Human Nature" in The Forum: The Decline of War},
	journal = {International Studies Review},
	volume = {15},
	number = {3},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {400-405},
	author = {Steven Pinker}
}
@article {25873,
	title = {Taming the Devil within Us},
	journal = {Nature},
	volume = {478},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {309-311},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9246,
	title = {Quantitative analysis of culture using millions of digitized books},
	journal = {Science},
	volume = {331},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {176-182},
	abstract = {We constructed a corpus of digitized texts containing about 4\% of all books ever printed. Analysis of this corpus enables us to investigate cultural trends quantitatively. We survey the vast terrain of {\textquoteleft}culturomics,{\textquoteright} focusing on linguistic and cultural phenomena that were reflected in the English language between 1800 and 2000. We show how this approach can provide insights about fields as diverse as lexicography, the evolution of grammar, collective memory, the adoption of technology, the pursuit of fame, censorship, and historical epidemiology. Culturomics extends the boundaries of rigorous quantitative inquiry to a wide array of new phenomena spanning the social sciences and the humanities.},
	author = {J-B Michel and Y K Shen and A P Aiden and A Veres and M K Gray and The Google Books Team and J P Pickett and D Hoiberg and D Clancy and P Norvig and J Orwant and S Pinker and M Nowak and E Lieberman-Aiden}
}
@article {9262,
	title = {The cognitive niche: Coevolution of intelligence, sociality, and language},
	journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
	volume = {107},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {8893-8999},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9260,
	title = {Lexical semantics and irregular inflection},
	journal = { Language and Cognitive Processes},
	volume = {25},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {1-51},
	author = {Y-T Huang and S Pinker}
}
@article {9250,
	title = {Rationales for indirect speech: The theory of the strategic speaker},
	journal = {Psychological Review},
	volume = {117},
	number = {3},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {785-807},
	abstract = {Speakers often do not state requests directly but employ innuendos such as Would you like to see my etchings? Though such indirectness seems puzzlingly inefficient, it can be explained by a theory of the strategic speaker, who seeks plausible deniability when he or she is uncertain of whether the hearer is cooperative or antagonistic. A paradigm case is bribing a policeman who may be corrupt or honest: A veiled bribe may be accepted by the former and ignored by the latter. Everyday social interactions can have a similar payoff structure (with emotional rather than legal penalties) whenever a request is implicitly forbidden by the relational model holding between speaker and hearer (e.g., bribing an honest maitre d{\textquoteright}, where the reciprocity of the bribe clashes with his authority). Even when a hearer{\textquoteright}s willingness is known, indirect speech offers higher-order plausible deniability by preempting certainty, gossip, and common knowledge of the request. In supporting experiments, participants judged the intentions and reactions of characters in scenarios that involved fraught requests varying in politeness and directness.},
	author = {J. J. Lee and S Pinker}
}
@article {9266,
	title = {Sequential Processing of Lexical, Grammatical, and Phonological Information Within Broca{\textquoteright}s Area},
	journal = {Science, 326, },
	volume = {326},
	number = {5951},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {445-449},
	abstract = {Words, grammar, and phonology are linguistically distinct, yet their neural substrates are difficult to distinguish in macroscopic brain regions. We investigated whether they can be separated in time and space at the circuit level using intracranial electrophysiology (ICE), namely by recording local field potentials from populations of neurons using electrodes implanted in language-related brain regions while people read words verbatim or grammatically inflected them (present/past or singular/plural). Neighboring probes within Broca{\textquoteright}s area revealed distinct neuronal activity for lexical (~200 milliseconds), grammatical (~320 milliseconds), and phonological (~450 milliseconds) processing, identically for nouns and verbs, in a region activated in the same patients and task in functional magnetic resonance imaging. This suggests that a linguistic processing sequence predicted on computational grounds is implemented in the brain in fine-grained spatiotemporally patterned activity.},
	author = {N T Sahin and S Pinker and S S Cash and D Schomer and E Halgren}
}
@article {9273,
	title = {Compound formation is constrained by morphology: A reply to Seidenberg, MacDonald, \& Haskell},
	journal = {The Mental Lexicon},
	volume = {3},
	number = {2},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {176-187},
	abstract = {Why do compounds containing regular plurals, such as rats-infested, sound so much worse than corresponding compounds containing irregular plurals, such as mice-infested? Berent and Pinker (2007) reported five experiments showing that this theoretically important effect hinges on the morphological structure of the plurals, not their phonological properties, as had been claimed by Haskell, MacDonald, and Seidenberg (2003). In this note we reply to a critique by these authors. We show that the connectionist model they invoke to explain the data has nothing to do with compounding but exploits fortuitous properties of adjectives, and that our experimental results disconfirm explicit predictions the authors had made. We also present new analyses which answer the authors{\textquoteright} methodological objections. We conclude that the interaction of compounding with regularity is a robust effect, unconfounded with phonology or semantics.
},
	author = {I Berent and S Pinker}
}
@article {9269,
	title = {The logic of indirect speech},
	journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
	volume = {105},
	number = {3},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {833-838},
	abstract = {When people speak, they often insinuate their intent indirectly rather than stating it as a bald proposition. Examples include sexual come-ons, veiled threats, polite requests, and concealed bribes. We propose a three-part theory of indirect speech, based on the idea that human communication involves a mixture of cooperation and conflict. First, indirect requests allow for plausible deniability, in which a cooperative listener can accept the request, but an uncooperative one cannot react adversarially to it. This intuition is sup- ported by a game-theoretic model that predicts the costs and benefits to a speaker of direct and indirect requests. Second, language has two functions: to convey information and to negotiate the type of relationship holding between speaker and hearer (in particu- lar, dominance, communality, or reciprocity). The emotional costs of a mismatch in the assumed relationship type can create a need for plausible deniability and, thereby, select for indirectness even when there are no tangible costs. Third, people perceive language as a digital medium, which allows a sentence to generate common knowledge, to propagate a message with high fidelity, and to serve as a reference point in coordination games. This feature makes an indirect request qualitatively different from a direct one even when the speaker and listener can infer each other{\textquoteright}s intentions with high confidence.},
	author = {S Pinker and M A Nowak and J. J. Lee}
}
@article {9481,
	title = {Dating, Swearing, Sex and Language: A Conversation with Questions between Steven Pinker and Ian McEwan},
	journal = {Aret{\'e}: The Arts Tri-Quarterly, 24, Winter 2007},
	volume = {24},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {81-100},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9277,
	title = {The Dislike of Regular Plurals in Compounds: Phonological Familiarity or Morphological Constraint?},
	journal = {The Mental Lexicon},
	volume = {2},
	number = {2},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {129-181},
	abstract = {English speakers disfavor compounds containing regular plurals compared to irregular ones. Haskell, MacDonald and Seidenberg (2003) attribute this phenomenon to the rarity of compounds containing words with the phonological properties of regular plurals. Five experiments test this proposal. Experiment 1 demonstrated that novel regular plurals (e.g., loonks-eater) are disliked in compounds compared to irregular plurals with illicit (hence less frequent) phonological patterns (e.g., leevk-eater, plural of loovk). Experiments 2{\textendash}3 found that people show no dispreference for compounds containing nouns that merely sound like regular plurals (e.g., hose-installer vs. pipe-installer). Experiments 4{\textendash}5 showed a robust effect of morphological regularity when phonological familiar- ity was controlled: Compounds containing regular plural nonwords (e.g., gleeks- hunter, plural of gleek) were disfavored relative to irregular, phonologically-iden- tical, plurals (e.g., breex-container, plural of broox). The dispreference for regular plurals inside compounds thus hinges on the morphological distinction between irregular and regular forms and it is irreducible to phonological familiarity.
},
	author = {I Berent and S Pinker}
}
@article {9275,
	title = {Toward a consilient study of literature (review of J. Gottschall \& D. Sloan Wilson, "The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of Narrative")},
	journal = {Philosophy and Literature},
	volume = {31},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {161-177},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9274,
	title = {The evolutionary social psychology of off-record indirect speech acts. Intercultural Pragmatics},
	journal = {Intercultural Pragmatics},
	volume = {4},
	number = {4},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {437{\textendash}461},
	abstract = {This paper proposes a new analysis of indirect speech in the framework of game theory, social psychology, and evolutionary psychology. It builds on the theory of Grice, which tries to ground indirect speech in pure rationality (the demands of e{\textperthousand}cient communication between two cooperating agents) and on the Politeness Theory of Brown and Levinson, who proposed that people cooperate not just in exchanging data but in saving face (both the speaker{\textquoteright}s and the hearer{\textquoteright}s). I suggest that these theories need to be supple- mented because they assume that people in conversation always cooperate. A reflection on how a pair of talkers may have goals that conflict as well as coincide requires an examination of the game-theoretic logic of plausible denial, both in legal contexts, where people{\textquoteright}s words may be held against them, and in everyday life, where the sanctions are social rather than judi- cial. This in turn requires a theory of the distinct kinds of relationships that make up human social life, a consideration of a new role for common knowledge in the use of indirect speech, and ultimately the paradox of ra- tional ignorance, where we choose not to know something relevant to our interests.},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9285,
	title = {The Blank Slate},
	journal = {General Psychologist},
	volume = {41},
	number = {1},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {1-8},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9282,
	title = {Abstract Grammatical Processing of Nouns and Verbs in Broca{\textquoteright}s Area: Evidence from fMRI},
	journal = {Cortex},
	volume = {42},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {540-562},
	abstract = {The role of Broca{\textquoteright}s area in grammatical computation is unclear, because syntactic processing is often confounded with working memory, articulation, or semantic selection. Morphological processing potentially circumvents these problems. Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we had 18 subjects silently inflect words or read them verbatim. Subtracting the activity pattern for reading from that for inflection, which indexes processes involved in inflection (holding constant lexical processing and articulatory planning) highlighted left Brodmann area (BA) 44/45 (Broca{\textquoteright}s area), BA 47, anterior insula, and medial supplementary motor area. Subtracting activity during zero inflection (the hawk; they walk) from that during overt inflection (the hawks; they walked), which highlights manipulation of phonological content, implicated subsets of the regions engaged by inflection as a whole. Subtracting activity during verbatim reading from activity during zero inflection (which highlights the manipulation of inflectional features) implicated distinct regions of BA 44, 47, and a premotor region (thereby tying these regions to grammatical features), but failed to implicate the insula or BA 45 (thereby tying these to articulation). These patterns were largely similar in nouns and verbs and in regular and irregular forms, suggesting these regions implement inflectional features cutting across word classes. Greater activity was observed for irregular than regular verbs in the anterior cingulate and supplementary motor area (SMA), possibly reflecting the blocking of regular or competing irregular candidates. The results confirm a role for Broca{\textquoteright}s area in abstract grammatical processing, and are interpreted in terms of a network of regions in left prefrontal cortex (PFC) that are recruited for processing abstract morphosyntactic features and overt morphophonological content.
},
	author = {N Sahin and S Pinker and E Halgren}
}
@article {9292,
	title = {So How Does the Mind Work?},
	journal = {Mind and Language},
	volume = {20},
	number = {1},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {1-24},
	abstract = {In my book How the Mind Works, I defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally selected system of organs of computation. Jerry Fodor claims that {\textquoteleft}the mind doesn{\textquoteright}t work that way{\textquoteright} (in a book with that title) because (1) Turing Machines cannot duplicate humans{\textquoteright} ability to perform abduction (inference to the best explanation); (2) though a massively modular system could succeed at abduction, such a system is implausible on other grounds; and (3) evolution adds nothing to our under- standing of the mind. In this review I show that these arguments are flawed. First, my claim that the mind is a computational system is different from the claim Fodor attacks (that the mind has the architecture of a Turing Machine); therefore the practical limitations of Turing Machines are irrelevant. Second, Fodor identifies abduction with the cumulative accomplishments of the scientific community over millennia. This is very different from the accomplishments of human common sense, so the supposed gap between human cognition and computational models may be illusory. Third, my claim about biological specialization, as seen in organ systems, is distinct from Fodor{\textquoteright}s own notion of encapsulated modules, so the limitations of the latter are irrelevant. Fourth, Fodor{\textquoteright}s arguments dismissing of the relevance of evolution to psychology are unsound.},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9291,
	title = {The faculty of language: what{\textquoteright}s special about it?},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {95},
	number = {2},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {201-236},
	abstract = {We examine the question of which aspects of language are uniquely human and uniquely linguistic in light of recent suggestions by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch that the only such aspect is syntactic recursion, the rest of language being either specific to humans but not to language (e.g. words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g. speech perception). We find the hypothesis problematic. It ignores the many aspects of grammar that are not recursive, such as phonology, morphology, case, agreement, and many properties of words. It is inconsistent with the anatomy and neural control of the human vocal tract. And it is weakened by experiments suggesting that speech perception cannot be reduced to primate audition, that word learning cannot be reduced to fact learning, and that at least one gene involved in speech and language was evolutionarily selected in the human lineage but is not specific to recursion. The recursion-only claim, we suggest, is motivated by Chomsky{\textquoteright}s recent approach to syntax, the Minimalist Program, which de-emphasizes the same aspects of language. The approach, however, is sufficiently problematic that it cannot be used to support claims about evolution. We contest related arguments that language is not an adaptation, namely that it is {\textquotedblleft}perfect,{\textquotedblright} non-redundant, unusable in any partial form, and badly designed for communication. The hypothesis that language is a complex adaptation for communication which evolved piecemeal avoids all these problems.
},
	author = {S Pinker and R Jackendoff}
}
@article {9290,
	title = {The nature of the language faculty and its implications for evolution of language (Reply to Fitch, Hauser, \& Chomsky)},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {97},
	number = {2},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {211-225},
	abstract = {In a continuation of the conversation with Fitch, Chomsky, and Hauser on the evolution of language, we examine their defense of the claim that the uniquely human, language-specific part of the language faculty (the {\textquotedblleft}narrow language faculty{\textquotedblright}) consists only of recursion, and that this part cannot be considered an adaptation to communication. We argue that their characterization of the narrow language faculty is problematic for many reasons, including its dichotomization of cognitive capacities into those that are utterly unique and those that are identical to nonlinguistic or nonhuman capacities, omitting capacities that may have been substantially modified during human evolution. We also question their dichotomy of the current utility versus original function of a trait, which omits traits that are adaptations for current use, and their dichotomy of humans and animals, which conflates similarity due to common function and similarity due to inheritance from a recent common ancestor. We show that recursion, though absent from other animals{\textquoteright} communications systems, is found in visual cognition, hence cannot be the sole evolutionary development that granted language to humans. Finally, we note that despite Fitch et al.{\textquoteright}s denial, their view of language evolution is tied to Chomsky{\textquoteright}s conception of language itself, which identifies combinatorial productivity with a core of {\textquotedblleft}narrow syntax.{\textquotedblright} An alternative conception, in which combinatoriality is spread across words and constructions, has both empirical advantages and greater evolutionary plausibility.
},
	author = {R Jackendoff and S Pinker}
}
@article {9288,
	title = {Computation of Semantic Number from Morphological Information},
	journal = {Journal of Memory and Language, 53, },
	volume = {53},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {342-358},
	abstract = {The distinction between singular and plural enters into linguistic phenomena such as morphology, lexical semantics, and agreement and also must interface with perceptual and conceptual systems that assess numerosity in the world. Three experiments examine the computation of semantic number for singulars and plurals from the morphological properties of visually presented words. In a Stroop-like task, Hebrew speakers were asked to determine the number of words presented on a computer screen (one or two) while ignoring their contents. People took longer to respond if the number of words was incongruent with their morphological number (e.g., they were slower to determine that one word was on the screen if it was plural, and in some conditions, that two words were on the screen if they were singular, compared to neutral letter strings), suggesting that the extraction of number from words is automatic and yields a representation comparable to the one computed by the perceptual system. In many conditions, the effect of number congruency occurred only with plural nouns, not singulars, consistent with the suggestion from linguistics that words lacking a plural affix are not actually singular in their semantics but unmarked for number.
},
	author = {I Berent and S Pinker and J Tzelgov and U Bibi and L Goldfarb}
}
@article {9296,
	title = {Clarifying the logical problem of language acquisition},
	journal = {Journal of Child Language},
	volume = {31},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {949-953},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9295,
	title = {Why nature \& nurture won{\textquoteright}t go away},
	journal = {D{\ae}dalus},
	year = {2004},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9294,
	title = {Q \&amp; A Steven Pinker},
	journal = {Current Biology},
	year = {2004},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9299,
	title = {The nature of regularity and irregularity: Evidence from Hebrew nominal inflection},
	journal = {Journal of Psycholinguistic Research},
	volume = {31},
	number = {5},
	year = {2002},
	pages = {459-502},
	abstract = {Most evidence for the role of regular inflection as a default operation comes from languages that confound the morphological properties of regular and irregular forms with their phonological characteristics. For instance, regular plurals tend to faithfully preserve the base{\textquoteright}s phonology (e.g., rat-rats), whereas irregular nouns tend to alter it (e.g., mouse- mice). The distinction between regular and irregular inflection may thus be an epiphenomenon of phonological faithfulness. In Hebrew noun inflection, however, morphological regularity and phonological faithfulness can be distinguished: Nouns whose stems change in the plural may take either a regular or an irregular suffix, and nouns whose stems are preserved in the plural may take either a regular or an irregular suffix. We use this dissociation to examine two hallmarks of default inflection: its lack of dependence on analogies from similar regular nouns, and its application to nonroots such as names. We show that these hallmarks of regularity may be found whether or not the plural form preserves the stem faithfully: People apply the regular suffix to novel nouns that don{\textquoteright}t resemble existing nouns, and to names that sound like irregular nouns, regardless of whether the stem is ordinarily preserved in the plural of that family of nouns. Moreover, when they pluralize names (e.g., the Barak-Barakim), they do not apply the stem changes that are found in their homophonous nouns (e.g., barak-brakim {\textquotedblleft}lightning{\textquotedblright}), replicating an effect found in English and German. These findings show that the distinction between regular and irregular phenomena cannot be reduced to differences in the kinds of phonological changes associated with those phenomena in English. Instead, regularity and irregularity must be distinguished in terms of the kinds of mental computations that effect them: symbolic operations versus memorized idiosyncrasies. A corollary is that complex words are not generally dichotomizable as {\textquotedblleft}regular{\textquotedblright} or {\textquotedblleft}irregular{\textquotedblright}; different aspects of a word may be regular or irregular depending on whether they violate the rule for that aspect and hence must be stored in memory.
},
	author = {I Berent and S Pinker and J Shimron}
}
@article {9298,
	title = {The past and future of the past tense},
	journal = {Trends in Cognitive Science},
	volume = {6},
	number = {11},
	year = {2002},
	pages = {456-463},
	abstract = {What is the interaction between storage and computation in language processing? What is the psychological status of grammatical rules? What are the relative strengths of connectionist and symbolic models of cognition? How are the components of language implemented in the brain? The English past tense has served as an arena for debates on these issues. We defend the theory that irregular past-tense forms are stored in the lexicon, a division of declarative memory, whereas regular forms can be computed by a concatenation rule, which requires the procedural system. Irregulars have the psychological, linguistic and neuropsychological signatures of lexical memory, whereas regulars often have the signatures of grammatical processing. Furthermore, because regular inflection is rule-driven, speakers can apply it whenever memory fails.},
	author = {S Pinker and M Ullman}
}
@article {9554,
	title = {The Irregular Verbs},
	journal = {Landfall},
	year = {2000},
	note = {March 2000},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {403651,
	title = {Steven Pinker receives the 2016 William James Fellow Award from the Association for Psychological Science},
	year = {1999}
}
@article {9303,
	title = {Default nominal inflection in Hebrew: Evidence for mental variables},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {72},
	year = {1999},
	pages = {1-44},
	abstract = {According to the {\textquoteleft}word/rule{\textquoteright} account, regular inflection is computed by a default, symbolic process, whereas irregular inflection is achieved by associative memory. Conversely, pattern- associator accounts attribute both regular and irregular inflection to an associative process. The acquisition of the default is ascribed to the asymmetry in the distribution of regular and irregular tokens. Irregular tokens tend to form tight, well-defined phonological clusters (e.g. sing-sang, ring-rang), whereas regular forms are diffusely distributed throughout the phono- logical space. This distributional asymmetry is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of a regular default. Hebrew nominal inflection challenges this account. We demonstrate that Hebrew speakers use the regular masculine inflection as a default despite the overlap in the distribution of regular and irregular Hebrew masculine nouns. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrates that regular inflection is productively applied to novel nouns regardless of their similarity to existing regular nouns. In contrast, the inflection of irregular sounding nouns is strongly sensitive to their similarity to stored irregular tokens. Experiment 2 estab- lishes the generality of the regular default for novel words that are phonologically idiosyn- cratic. Experiment 3 demonstrates that Hebrew speakers assign the default regular inflection to borrowings and names that are identical to existing irregular nouns. The existence of default inflection in Hebrew is incompatible with the distributional asymmetry hypothesis. Our find- ings also lend no support for a type-frequency account. The convergence of the circumstances triggering default inflection in Hebrew, German and English suggests that the capacity for default inflection may be general.
},
	author = {I Berent and S Pinker and J Shimron}
}
@article {9312,
	title = {Words and rules},
	journal = {Lingua},
	volume = {106},
	year = {1998},
	pages = {219-242},
	abstract = {The vast expressive power of language is made possible by two principles: the arbitrary sound- meaning pairing underlying words, and the discrete combinatorial system underlying grammar. These principles implicate distinct cognitive mechanisms: associative memory and symbol- manipulating rules. The distinction may be seen in the difference between regular inflection (e.g., walk-walked), which is productive and open-ended and hence implicates a rule, and irregular inflection (e.g., come-came, which is idiosyncratic and closed and hence implicates individually memorized words. Nonetheless, two very different theories have attempted to collapse the distinction; generative phonology invokes minor rules to generate irregular as well as regular forms, and connectionism invokes a pattern associator memory to store and retrieve regular as well as irregular forms. I present evidence from three disciplines that supports the traditional word/rule distinction, though with an enriched conception of lexical memory with some of the properties of a pattern-associator. Rules, nonetheless, are distinct from pattern- association, because a rule concatenates a suffix to a symbol for verbs, so it does not require access to memorized verbs or their sound patterns, but applies as the "default," whenever memory access fails. I present a dozen such circumstances, including novel, unusual-sounding, and rootless and headless derived words, in which people inflect the words regularly (explaining quirks like flied out, low-lifes, and Walkmans). A comparison of English to other languages shows that contrary to the connectionist account, default suffixation is not due to numerous regular words reinforcing a pattern in associative memory, but to a memory-independent, symbol-concatenating mental operation.
},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9308,
	title = {Obituary: Roger Brown},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {66},
	year = {1998},
	pages = {199-213},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {9320,
	title = {A neural dissociation within language: Evidence that the mental dictionary is part of declarative memory, and that grammatical rules are processed by the procedural system},
	journal = {Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience},
	volume = {9},
	number = {2},
	year = {1997},
	pages = {289-299},
	abstract = {	Language comprises a lexicon for storing words and a grammar for generating rule-governed forms. Evidence is presented that the lexicon is part of a temporal-parietalhnedial-temporal {\textquotedblleft}declarative memory{\textquotedblright} system and that granlmatical rules are processed by a frontamasal-ganglia {\textquotedblleft}procedural{\textquotedblright} system. Patients produced past tenses of regular and novel verbs (looked and plagged), which require an -ed-suffixation rule, and irregular verbs (dug), which are retrieved from memory. Word-finding difficulties in posterior aphasia, and the general declarative memory impairment in Alzheimer{\textquoteright}s disease, led to more errors with irregular than regular and novel verbs. Grammatical difficulties in anterior aphasia, and the general impairment of procedures in Parkinson{\textquoteright}s disease, led to the opposite pattern. In contrast to the Parkinson{\textquoteright}s patients, who showed suppressed motor activity and rule use, Huntington{\textquoteright}s disease patients showed excess motor activity and rule use, underscoring a role for the basal ganglia in grammatical processing.
},
	author = {M Ullman and S Corkin and M Coppola and G Hickok and J H Growdon and W J Koroshetz and S Pinker}
}
@article {9321,
	title = {The Nature of Human Concepts/Evidence from an Unusual Source},
	journal = {Communication \& Cognition},
	volume = {29},
	number = {3/4},
	year = {1996},
	pages = {307-362},
	abstract = {What kind of categories to human concepts represent? },
	author = {S Pinker and A Prince}
}
@article {644067,
	title = {Weird past tense forms},
	journal = {Journal of child language},
	volume = {22},
	number = {2},
	year = {1995},
	pages = {531-556},
	author = {Xu, Fei and Steven Pinker}
}
@article {9324,
	title = {The Representation of Location  in Visual Images},
	journal = { Cognitive Psyhcology},
	volume = {26},
	year = {1994},
	pages = {1-32},
	abstract = {By definition, visual image representations are organized around spatial properties. However, we know very little about how these representations use information about location, one of the most important spatial properties. Three experiments explored how location information is incorporated into image representations. All of these experiments used a mental rotation task in which the location of the stimulus varied from trial to trial. If images are location-specific, these changes should affect the way images are used. The effects from image representations were separated from those of general spatial attention mechanisms by comparing performance with and without advance knowledge of the stimulus shape. With shape information, subjects could use an image as a template, and they recognized the stimulus more quickly when it was at the same location as the image. Experiment 1 demonstrated that subjects were able to use visual image representations effectively without knowing where the stimulus would appear, but left open the possibility that image location must be adjusted before use. In Experiment 2, distance between the stimulus location and the image location was varied systematically, and response time increased with distance. Therefore image representations appear to be location-specific, though the represented location can be adjusted easily. In Experiment 3, a saccade was introduced between the image cue and the test stimulus, in order to test whether subjects responded more quickly when the test stimulus appeared at the same retinotopic location or same spatiotopic location as the cue. The results suggest that location is coded retinotopically in image representations. This finding has implications not only for visual imagery but also for visual processing in general, because it suggests that there is no spatiotopic transform in the early stages of visual processing.
},
	author = {K Cave and S Pinker and L Giorgi and C Thomas and L Heller and J Wolfe and H Lin}
}
@article {9327,
	title = {Generalizations of regular and irregular morphology},
	journal = {Language and Cognitive Processes},
	volume = {8},
	number = {1},
	year = {1993},
	pages = {1-56},
	abstract = {When it comes to explaining English verbs{\textquoteright} patterns of regular and irregular generalization, single-network theories have difficulty with the former, rule-only theories with the latter process. Linguistic and psycholinguistic evidence, based on observation during experiments and simulations in morphological pattern generation, independently call for a hybrid of the two theories.
},
	author = {S Prasada and S Pinker}
}
@article {9331,
	title = {Overregularization in language acquisition},
	journal = {Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development},
	volume = {57},
	year = {1992},
	pages = { i+iii+v+vi+1-178},
	abstract = {Children extend regular grammatical patterns to irregular words, resulting in overregularizations like comed, often after a period of correct performance ("U-shaped development"). The errors seem paradigmatic of rule use, hence bear on central issues in the psychology of rules: how creative rule application interacts with memorized exceptions in development, how overgeneral rules are unlearned in the absence of parental feedback, and whether cognitive processes involve explicit rules or parallel distributed processing (connectionist) networks. We remedy the lack of quantitative data on overregularization by analyzing 11,521 irregular past tense utterances in the spontaneous speech of 83 children. Our findings are as follows. (1) Overregularization errors are relatively rare (median 2.5\% of irregular past tense forms), suggesting that there is no qualitative defect in children{\textquoteright}s grammars that must be unlearned. (2) Overregularization occurs at a roughly constant low rate from the 2s into the school-age years, affecting most irregular verbs. (3) Although overregularization errors never predominate, one aspect of their purported U-shaped development was confirmed quantitatively: an extended period of correct performance precedes the first error. (4) Overregularization does not correlate with increases in the number or proportion of regular verbs in parental speech, children{\textquoteright}s speech, or children{\textquoteright}s vocabularies. Thus, the traditional account in which memory operates before rules cannot be replaced by a connectionist alternative in which a single network displays rotelike or rulelike behavior in response to changes in input statistics. (5) Overregularizations first appear when children begin to mark regular verbs for tense reliably (i.e., when they stop saying Yesterday I walk). (6) The more often a parent uses an irregular form, the less often the child overregularizes it. (7) Verbs are protected from overregularization by similar-sounding irregulars, but they are not attracted to overregularization by similar-sounding regulars, suggesting that irregular patterns are stored in an associative memory with connectionist properties, but that regulars are not. We propose a simple explanation. Children, like adults, mark tense using memory (for irregulars) and an affixation rule that can generate a regular past tense form for any verb. Retrieval of an irregular blocks the rule, but children{\textquoteright}s memory traces are not strong enough to guarantee perfect retrieval. When retrieval fails, the rule is applied, and overregularization results.
},
	author = {G Marcus and S Pinker and M Ullman and M Hollander and T Rosen and F Xu and H Clahsen}
}
@article {9341,
	title = {Why no mere mortal has ever flown out to center field},
	journal = {Cognitive Science},
	volume = {15},
	number = {2},
	year = {1991},
	note = {The English past tense system has recently been used to argue that formal grammatical categories (such as root, rule, and lexical item) may not be necessary to explain the acquisition and knowledge of language. Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) devised a connectionist model relying solely on phonological information; it is often suggested that any deficiencies of such a model can be remedied by supplying it with semantic information. These proposals are incorrect: Grammatical categories and abstract morphological structure are indispensable and cannot be replaced with semantics while preserving the patterns of psychological generalization in the system. Linguists have noted that irregular past tense mappings (e.g., fly/flew; stick/stuck) apply only when a verb{\textquoteright}s root is marked in the lexicon as having an irregular past. Because nouns are never so marked, verbs with noun roots{\textemdash}denominal verbs{\textemdash}are regular even if they are phonologically identical to irregular verbs, hence: flied out/*flew out to center field; high-sticked/*high-stuck the goalie. Experiment 1 shows that adult subjects are highly sensitive to this principle when rating regular and irregular past tense forms of novel versions of irregular sounding verbs: New verbs formed from nouns were judged as better with a regular past tense (e.g., line-drived was the preferred past of {\textquotedblleft}to hit a line drive{\textquotedblright}): new verbs formed from verbs were judged as better with an irregular past tense (e.g., line-drove was the preferred past of {\textquotedblleft}to drive along a line{\textquotedblright}). Experiment 2 replicated the results with noncollege-educated adults, showing that the effect is not due to prescriptive language training. Experiment 3 tested an alternative to the formal grammatical account proposed by Lakoff (1987): When a verb has two meanings, one with an irregular past and one with a regular past, the irregular will belong to the meaning that is more central. Using regression techniques and ratings data, we disconfirm this prediction: In the data from Experiment 1, judgments of regular and irregular forms of a new verb are shown to be affected by whether the verb is derived from a noun or a verb, but not by whether its new sense is near the center or the periphery of the sense of the word it was derived from. Experiments 4 and 5 explain the few apparent counter-examples by gathering independent evidence for a short-circuiting process: When a denominal verb appears to have an irregular past tense form, it is because speakers sometimes interpret such verbs as having been derived directly from a related irregular verb root, bypassing the relevant noun. The experiments serve as a straightforward demonstration that representations of formal grammatical categories and structures are powerful determinants of linguistic behavior, and are not reducible to semantics, phonology, or prescriptive training.
},
	pages = {173-218},
	author = {J Kim and S Pinker and A Prince and S Prasada}
}
@article {9335,
	title = {Affectedness and Direct Objects: The role of Lexical Semantics in the Acquistion of Verb Argument Structure},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {41},
	number = {1-3},
	year = {1991},
	pages = {153-195},
	abstract = {How do speakers predict the syntax of a verb from its meaning? Traditional theories posit that syntactically relevant information about semantic arguments consists of a list of thematic roles like "agent", "theme", and "goal", which are linked onto a hierarchy of grammatical positions like subject, object and oblique object. For verbs involving motion, the entity caused to move is defined as the "theme" or "patient" and linked to the object. However, this fails for many common verbs, as in fill water into the glass and cover a sheet onto the bed. In more recent theories verbs{\textquoteright} meanings are multidimensional structures in which the motions, changes, and other events can be represented in separate but connected substructures; linking rules are sensitive to the position of an argument in a particular configuration. The verb{\textquoteright}s object would be linked not to the moving entity but to the argument specified as "affected" or caused to change as the main event in the verb{\textquoteright}s meaning. The change can either be one of location, resulting from motion in a particular manner, or of state, resulting from accommodating or reacting to a substance. For example, pour specifies how a substance moves (downward in a stream), so its substance argument is the object (pour the water/glass); fill specifies how a container changes (from not full to full), so its stationary container argument is the object (fill the glass/water). The newer theory was tested in three experiments. Children aged 3;4-9;4 and adults were taught made-up verbs, presented in a neutral syntactic context (this is mooping), referring to a transfer of items to a surface or container. Subjects were tested on their willingness to encode the moving items or the surface as the verb{\textquoteright}s object. For verbs where the items moved in a particular manner (e.g., zig-zagging), people were more likely to express the moving items as the object; for verbs where the surface changed state (e.g., shape, color, or fullness), people were more likely to express the surface as the object. This confirms that speakers are not confined to labeling moving entities as "themes" or "patients" and linking them to the grammatical object; when a stationary entity undergoes a state change as the result of a motion, it can be represented as the main affected argument and thereby linked to the grammatical object instead.
},
	author = {J Gropen and S Pinker and M Hollander and R Goldberg}
}
@article {9337,
	title = {Rules of Language},
	journal = {Science},
	volume = {253},
	year = {1991},
	pages = {530-535},
	abstract = {Language and cognition have been explained as the products of a homogeneous associative memory structure or alternatively, of a set of genetically determined computational modules in which rules manipulate symbolic representations. Intensive study of one phenomenon of English grammar and how it is processed and acquired suggest that both theories are partly right. Regular verbs (walk-walked) are computed by a suffixation rule in a neural system for grammatical processing; irregular verbs (run-ran) are retrieved from an associative memory.},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
@article {451236,
	title = {Natural Language and Natural Selection },
	journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
	volume = {13},
	number = {4},
	year = {1990},
	pages = {707-784},
	author = {Steven Pinker and Bloom, Paul}
}
@article {9344,
	title = {When does human object recognition use a viewer-centered reference frame?},
	journal = {Psychological Science},
	volume = {1},
	number = {4},
	year = {1990},
	pages = {253-256.},
	abstract = {How do people recognize an object in different orientations? One theory is that the visual system describes the object relative to a reference frame centered on the object, resulting in a representation that is invariant across orientations. Chronometric data show that this is true only when an object can be identified uniquely by the arrangement of its parts along a single dimension. When an object can only be distinguished by an arrangement of its parts along more than one dimension, people mentally rotate it to a familiar orientation. This finding suggests that the human visual reference frame is tied to egocentric coordinates. 
},
	author = {M Tarr and S Pinker}
}
@article {353746,
	title = {Mental rotation and orientation-dependence in shape recognition.},
	journal = {Cognitive Psychology},
	number = {21},
	year = {1989},
	pages = {233-282},
	author = {M.J. Tarr and S Pinker}
}
@article {9352,
	title = {Reinterpreting Visual Patterns in Mental Imagery},
	journal = {Cognitive Science},
	volume = {13},
	number = {1},
	year = {1989},
	pages = {51-78},
	abstract = {In a recent paper, Chambers and Reisberg (1985) showed that people cannot reverse classical ambiguous figures in imagery (such as the Necker cube, duck/rabbit, or Schroeder staircase). In three experiments, we refute one kind of explanation for this difficulty: that visual images do not contain information about the geometry of a shape necessary for reinterpreting it or that people cannot apply shape classification procedures to the information in imagery. We show, that given suitable conditions, people can assign novel interpretations to ambiguous images which have been constructed out of parts or mentally transformed. For example, when asked to imagine the letter {\textquotedblleft}D{\textquotedblright} on its side, affixed to the top of the letter {\textquotedblleft}J{\textquotedblright}, subjects spontaneously report {\textquotedblleft}seeing{\textquotedblright} an umbrella. We also show that these reinterpretations are not the result of guessing strategies, and that they speak directly to the issue of whether or not mental images of ambiguous figures can be reconstrued. Finally, we show that arguments from the philosophy literature on the relation between images and descriptions are not relevant to the issue of whether images can be reinterpreted, and we suggest possible explanations for why classical ambiguous figures do not spontaneously reverse in imagery.
},
	author = {R Finke and S Pinker and M Farah}
}
@article {9347,
	title = {The Learnability and Acquistion of Dative Alternation in English},
	journal = {Language},
	volume = {65},
	number = {2},
	year = {1989},
	pages = {203-195},
	author = {J Gropen and S Pinker and M Hollander and R Goldberg and R Wilson}
}
@article {9355,
	title = {Productivity and Constraints in the Acquisition of the Passive },
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {26},
	number = {3},
	year = {1987},
	pages = {195-267},
	abstract = {The acquisition of the passive in English poses a learnability problem. Most transitive verbs have passive forms (e.g., kick/was kicked by), tempting the child to form a productive rule of passivization deriving passive participles from active forms. However, some verbs cannot be passivized (e.g. cost/was cost by). Given that children do not receive negative evidence telling them which strings are ungrammatical, what prevents them from overgeneralizing a productive passive rule to the exceptional verbs (or if they do incorrectly passivize such verbs, how do they recover)? One possible solution is that children are conservative: they only generate passives for those verbs that they have heard in passive sentences in the input. We show that this proposal is incorrect: in children{\textquoteright}s spontaneous speech, they utter passive participles that they could not have heard in parental input, and in four experiments in which 3{\textendash}8-year-olds were taught novel verbs in active sentences, they freely uttered passivized versions of them when describing new events. An alternative solution is that children at some point come to possess a semantic constraint distinguishing passivizable from nonpassivizable verbs. In two of the experiments, we show that children do not have an absolute constraint forbidding them to passivize nonactional verbs of perception or spatial relationships, although they passivize them somewhat more reluctantly than they do actional verbs. In two other experiments, we show that children{\textquoteright}s tendency to passivize depends on the mapping between thematic roles and grammatical functions specified by the verb: they selectively resist passivizing made-up verbs whose subjects are patients and whose objects are agents; and they are more likely to passivize spatial relation verbs with location subjects than with theme subjects. These trends are consistent with Jackendoff{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}Thematic Hierarchy Condition{\textquotedblright} on the adult passive. However, we argue that the constraint on passive that adults obey, and that children approach, is somewhat different: passivizable verbs must have object arguments that are patients, either literally for action verbs, or in an extended abstract sense that individual languages can define for particular classes of nonactional verbs.},
	author = {S Pinker and S Lebeaux and L A Frost}
}
@article {631602,
	title = { Word Magic Revisited: Monolingual and Bilingual Children{\textquoteright}s Understanding of the Word-Object Relationship},
	journal = {Child Development},
	volume = {54},
	number = {3},
	year = {1983},
	pages = {773-780},
	author = {Tamar Rosenblum and Steven A. Pinker}
}
@article {9359,
	title = {Formal Models of Language Learning},
	journal = {Cognition},
	volume = {7},
	year = {1979},
	pages = {217-283},
	abstract = {Research is reviewed that addresses itself to human language learning by developing precise, mechanistic models that are capable in principle of acquiring languages on the basis of exposure to linguistic data. Such research includes theorems on language learnability from mathematical linguistics, computer models of language acquisition from cognitive simulation and artificial intelligence, and models of transformational grammar acquisition from theoretical linguistics. It is argued that such research bears strongly on major issues in developmental psycholinguistics, in particular, nativism and empiricism, the role of semantics and pragmatics in language learning, cognitive development, and the importance of the simplified speech addressed to children.},
	author = {S Pinker}
}
