@workingpaper {640358,
	title = {Brokering Votes with Information Spread Via Social Networks},
	year = {Submitted},
	abstract = {
	Revise \&amp; Resubmit at the\&nbsp;Review of Economic Studies



	\&nbsp;



	Politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes throughout much of the developing world. We investigate how social networks facilitate these vote-buying exchanges. Our model suggests that brokers should be particularly well-placed within the network to learn about non-copartisans{\textquoteright} reciprocity in order to target transfers effectively. As a result, parties should recruit brokers who are central among non-copartisans. We combine village network data from brokers and citizens with broker reports of vote buying. We show that networks diffuse politically-relevant information about citizens to brokers who leverage it to target transfers. In particular, among those citizens who are not registered to their party, brokers target reciprocal citizens about whom they can learn more through their network. Moreover, recruited brokers are significantly more central than other citizens among non-copartisans, but not among copartisans. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying, broker recruitment, and ultimately for political outcomes.\&nbsp;

},
	url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w26241},
	author = {Duarte, Ra{\'u}l and Frederico Finan and Horacio Larreguy and Schechter, Laura}
}
